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A four-frame analysis of NCLB was conducted.  The first frame involved constitutional 
federalism as defined by the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment and its 
intersection with the Spending Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Eleventh 
Amendment.  The historical context of each constitutional component was examined and 
presented in the belief that text without context fails to provide full understanding.  135 court 
cases, primarily Supreme Court cases, were examined using legal analysis procedures.  Peter 
Senge’s systems thinking formed the second frame, while the third frame centered on Ronald 
Heifetz’s concept of the adaptive work required to close the gap between the vision (no child left 
behind) and the reality (achievement gaps).  The fourth frame, federalism as a public policy 
approach, emerged from writings by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, Justice Felix 
Frankfurter, and Akhil Reed Amar as well as opinions by Justices Brandeis and O’Connor.  
Federalism as a public policy views the federal and state governments as equal partners wherein 
states serve as laboratories engaged in experimentation to find solutions to complex problems.  
Comparative analysis and rational argument were used for the last three analytical frames.  
Historical research and analytical study broke new ground regarding: the thread of America’s 
answer to Aristotle’s question regarding a government based on the rule of law or of individuals; 
Madison’s activities as reflecting both possible answers to Aristotle’s question; the intertwining 
of treaty rights, the status of tribal governments, and citizenship rights for tribal citizens; and the 
substitution of argumentative tricks for sound analysis in recent Tenth and Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence. The following findings were reached:  1) NCLB possibly violates one or more of 
the conditional spending tests articulated in Dole v. South Dakota; 2) NCLB does not take a 
systems approach to the system of children’s well-being in America; 3) NCLB treats a symptom 
(achievement gaps) and ignores the primary cause of those achievement gaps (poverty); 4) by 
treating a symptom as a cause, NCLB ignores the adaptive work needed to close the gap between 
NCLB’s vision and the reality of achievement gaps primarily caused by inequitable distribution 
of incomes and poverty in America; 5) poverty exerts a primary force upon education that is 
negative, that acts as a fundamental factor impacting the system of children’s well-being, and 
that inhibits a child’s ability to fully benefit from education; 6) NCLB does not utilize a public 
policy approach based upon federalism; and 7) until the system of children’s well-being is 
addressed, achievement gaps will persist.  It is recommended that the amicus curiae brief 
submitted by the National Council of State Legislatures in Dole be used as a model for a 
constitutional challenge to NCLB.  Since NCLB is an exercise in congressional conditional 
spending, it needs to be challenged on those grounds.  Finally, constitutional challenges to 
NCLB will not matter in the absence of a systemic approach designed to confront the negative 
influences of poverty on the system of children’s well-being in America.      
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Statement of Purpose 
 I propose to examine the constitutional issues relating to federalism raised by the latest 
federal reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), popularly 
known by title as the No Child Left Behind Act or by acronym as NCLB.  In examining the 
provisional impact of federal legislation upon a state’s educational system according to the 
principles of federalism, I will consider the Guarantee Clause, the Tenth Amendment, the 
Eleventh Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as 
viewed through the lens of the eighteenth century constitutional debates, the historical record of 
each of the Amendment’s development and adoption, textual analysis of the constitutional 
components, and subsequent case law. 
 The importance of a constitutionally viable system of federalism for achieving the goal of 
NCLB cannot be overstated.  This a priori proposition forms the context for both federalism’s 
importance and the justification for analyzing NCLB according to the constitutional provisions 
governing federalism.  Federalism provides a policy approach that forges a federal-state 
partnership to solve America’s problems.  The goal, seeing that no child in America gets left 
behind, is a noble one.  It also appears to be a complex goal as well.  A child’s ability to benefit 
from instructional programs depends greatly upon her or his well-being.  The well-being of 
children in America results from the impact of multiple systems, only one of which is education. 
Efforts to see that no children get left behind must therefore be cognizant of a systems view that 
frames the issue in terms of children’s well-being.  The path towards achieving that goal, 
moreover, does not appear to be clear either.  Therefore we have a complex problem that we’re 
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not sure how to solve.  By definition, according to Ron Heifetz, this is a task requiring adaptive 
work (Heifetz, 1994, pp. 74-75).  Heifetz defined adaptive work as the “learning required … to 
diminish the gap between the values people stand for and the reality they face” (Heifetz, 1994, p. 
22).  According to Heifetz, attention must be focused “on the specific issues created by the gap 
(between aspirations and reality)” (Heifetz, 1994, p. 99). 
From a constitutional standpoint federalism represents a uniquely American political 
concept which: 1) regards sovereignty as residing in the people (as opposed to a government or 
individual ruler); and 2) is designed to counter tyranny through a system of split government that 
would encourage citizen involvement at the local level and provide for a viable national 
government.  From a public policy standpoint federalism could link systems thinking and 
adaptive work together in a powerful combination.  Only by yoking federalism, systems 
thinking, and adaptive work can the goal of NCLB be achieved, that of ensuring that no children 
be left behind in American society. 
 To illustrate the constitutional importance of federalism, information will be presented 
that explains federalism as a political concept that was developed by the constitutional Framers, 
a concept that was directly embedded in the Constitution, and a political concept that was 
subsequently illuminated by Supreme Court rulings.  Each of the constitutional components of 
federalism will be presented and discussed.  These constitutional elements include the Guarantee 
Clause, the Tenth Amendment (including Twentieth Century developments regarding its 
intersection with the Spending Clause), the Eleventh Amendment, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Additionally, a preliminary sketch will be presented discussing the intersection of 
federalism and NCLB. 
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 To illustrate the procedural importance of federalism for public policy, information about 
the contents of NCLB will be presented which will be followed by three analyses of NCLB.  The 
first analysis, based upon qualitative work, will present informed views of NCLB from the 
leaders of two Midwestern state departments of education (Doug Christensen, Nebraska 
Commissioner of Education, and Ted Stilwill, Director of the Iowa Department of Education) 
charged with implementing the federal law in their state’s public schools.  Their views will serve 
to highlight subsequent analyses based on the three frameworks of this dissertation’s title.  The 
next two analyses will offer the first two of three framework analyses of NCLB – Senge’s model 
for systems thinking and Heifetz’ concept of adaptive work.  Federalism will serve as the 
common thread linking those analyses with the analysis based upon the framework of 
constitutional federalism, which, in turn, will highlight the critically important role that 
federalism plays.   
 The constitutional and public policy threads of federalism interweave to form a uniquely 
American tapestry of government serving as a blueprint for addressing America's problems and 
for securing the general welfare of American society.  To help highlight the interdependence of 
these two threads, the constitutional importance of federalism will be located between the public 
policy analysis of NCLB by two state educational leaders and the public policy analyses formed 
by the frameworks of systems thinking and adaptive work.  Having established the importance 
and uniqueness of federalism as being deeply embedded in the Constitution for public policy 
purposes, the constitutional analysis of NCLB in terms of federalism will then occupy center 
stage for the remainder of this study.  
Statement of the Problem 
 Federalism. 
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 Federalism occupies center stage in the American constitutional scheme for 
representative government.  Federalism focuses on the distribution of powers between the federal 
government and the multiple state governments.  Possessing a keen historical perspective, the 
constitutional framers were well aware of numerous instances in ancient and modern Europe 
whereby a love of and desire for greater power had perverted previous democracies and republics 
into oligarchies and tyrannies.  As John Dickinson reminded his fellow delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention, “Experience must be our guide.  Reason may mislead us” (Farrand, 
II, p. 278; afterwards all citations of Farrand’s Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 will 
be cited as Farrand, volume number in roman numerals, and p. followed by the page number).  
The founders sought to counter what they perceived as a historical trend by separating national 
power into three branches of government with each branch possessing a unique set of checks and 
balances on the other two branches.  The framers further divided power between the national 
government and the various state governments.  Finally, they established additional protections 
for federalism in the Constitution by enumerating the powers of the national government and by 
including two clauses, the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Guarantee Clause.   
Following the adoption of the constitution, amendments pertaining to federalism were 
added to the Constitution.  These subsequent additions to the Constitution included the Tenth, 
Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments.  Just as each of the three branches of government had its 
own unique powers to check the other two branches from accumulating too much power, so 
federalism was designed by the constitutional framers to prevent tyrannical concentrations of 
power at either the federal or state levels of American government.  In twenty-first century 
America the balance of power between state and federal governments is regulated by the 
Constitution and by the constitutional case law developed by the judicial branch’s interpretations 
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of federalism since the adoption of the Constitution.  The issue of federalism lies at the heart of 
the recent federal education bill, particularly as it relates to Iowa’s experience in providing a free 
and public education for its young people. 
 Iowa’s educational system. 
 Iowa, like each of its 49 sister states, created its system of public education under specific 
authorization of its state constitution (McCoy, pp. 1-11).  Iowa grounded the operation of its state 
educational system in the concept of “local control.”  Under both this concept and constitutional 
authorization, legislators created the Iowa Department of Education “to act in a policymaking 
and advisory capacity and to exercise general supervision over the state system of education” 
(Chapter 256.1, Code of Iowa).  Rules and regulations subsequent to constitutional and 
legislative authorization created a system of education whereby local boards of education in each 
school district were formed with board members being democratically elected by the citizens of 
each district.  These boards were directed to provide governance for their local schools.  By these 
actions the state created a broad educational framework and general expectations for public 
education in the state and made each local school district responsible for filling in the details of 
how students would be educated in their district.   
 Iowa thus chose to enact its vision of education based upon the belief that the best 
educational decisions for each learner are those decisions made in closest proximity to the 
learner.1  Iowa stood alone in resisting the nationwide call for state standards for student 
achievement.  When this study began in 2003, Iowa was the only state that did not have state 
student achievement standards (see Appendix A).  Instead the responsibility for developing 
standards for student achievement had been shouldered by each of the 367 school districts in 
Iowa (Chapter, 280.12, Code of Iowa).  Neither did Iowa at that time, nor does it currently, 
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require its students to pass a statewide test in order to graduate (see Appendices B & C).  As with 
student learning standards, graduation requirements were locally determined by each of the 367 
democratically elected boards (Chapter 280.14, Code of Iowa).  However, effective with the 
graduation classes of 2010, all states were mandated to have completed a core curriculum in 
order to graduation.  The core curriculum was defined by the state as four years of English and 
three years each of social studies, math, and science.  The nature and make-up of those courses, 
however, is still a matter of local determination. 
 Perhaps because the state is grounded in agriculture, citizens instinctively know that a 
system predicated on testing, sanctions, and fear do not create either gardens or fields of 
opportunity where learning flourishes.  One vocational agriculture instructor characterized such 
efforts as futile and observed, “You don’t fatten cattle for market by weighing them” (Albertson, 
p. 1).  More recently the literal meaning of this metaphor was stated directly by David Larson, 
Executive Director of the Connecticut Association of Public School Superintendents.  
Commenting upon the testing requirements of the ESEA Reauthorization Bill, Mr. Larson 
observed, “You don’t make a kid smarter by testing him more” (Lightman, p. A1). 
Neither do they believe in a one-size-fits-all educational approach achieved through 
legislative or executive fiat.  For the most part, Iowa has chosen to enact policy and to leave the 
working out of the details to achieve that policy to each of the 372 school boards and their 
district’s parents and educators.   
 Recent action by the State of Iowa reflects a continuing belief in local control, that the 
state’s role is to be that of policy maker with local school districts being given the task of 
deciding how that policy is to be implemented in individual districts (Chapter 280.14, Code of 
Iowa).  The state adopted Iowa Teaching Standards as a guidepost for teaching excellence 
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(Chapter 284.3, Code of Iowa).  Each standard, while directed to specific instructional 
expectations, is general enough to allow districts to develop specific descriptors of district 
expectations for instructional excellence.  At the same time, Iowa also adopted state Professional 
Development Standards, again building upon local control with the state as policy maker and 
individual districts as decision-makers as to the what and how of policy implementation (Chapter 
83.6 (2)(b), Iowa Administrative Code).  Each district is given responsibility for determining 
both the content of professional development and its alignment (how the selected professional 
development will be aligned with district student achievement standards and the Iowa Teaching 
Standards).  Ironically, Iowa’s educational policy (no state standards for student achievement, 
but state standards for teaching and for professional development) remains the only policy (state 
or national) that rests on a solid research base for promoting student learning.2   
 The concept of local control, particularly as it relates to educational issues as enacted in 
Iowa, rests upon some bedrock beliefs and assumptions.3  First is a belief in representative 
democracy – people can choose good legislators who will enact policies that promote the public 
good.  Second is a belief in grassroots democracy – people need to be involved in determining 
how specific policies will be enacted in their neighborhoods and communities.  Third is an 
educational belief – that the best educational decisions are those made in closest proximity to the 
learner.  Such an educational belief: 1) implements local control; 2) acknowledges the 
importance of educators to student learning; and 3) deductively implements a research-based 
practice regarding formative evaluation and student learning (Black & Wiliam, pp. 139-148)4. 
 Problematic components of nclb. 
 The prescriptive approach of the No Child Left Behind Act runs counter to Iowa’s 
educational practice of local control.  Rather than reflecting policy and leaving the 
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implementation details to the local level, NCLB is highly prescriptive in detailing what each 
state will do.  Such prescriptive requirements include: 
• requiring every (not just Title I students) public school student in grades three 
through eight and at least one high school grade level to take tests every year in 
reading, math, and science. 
• requiring every state to hold each of their public schools accountable for student 
proficiency on the exams required of all students in grades three through eight and in 
at least one high school grade level. 
• requiring every state to administer the National Assessment of Educational Progress 
to a sample of students. 
• requiring the states to oversee a federal system of escalating sanctions to schools not 
deemed to be performing well by federal standards. 
• requiring states to abandon their own system of attendance requirements in favor of 
the federal law which will create choice for students in schools not deemed to be 
performing well by the federal government. 
The prescriptive approach of NCLB also appears to go beyond current understandings of the 
federal government’s role regarding both educational policy and educational practice.  It also 
represents a change in students targeted for help by federal aid.  Whereas in the past, ESEA 
legislation focused on just the students targeted for educational assistance with federal funds, this 
ESEA action focuses on all students.  Whether or not the law passes constitutional muster 
regarding federalism remains the central question that this author proposes to examine. 
Research Questions 
 Primary question. 
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 Do portions of the No Child Left Behind Act that represent federal action violate any of 
the constitutional provisions governing federalism?  If no, how so?  If yes, in what respects?  
Federalism’s English root is “federal” which derives from the Latin foeder-, foedus meaning 
compact or league. According to Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law (1996), federal refers to 
“a form of government in which power is distributed between a central authority and a number of 
constituent territorial units (as states)” (p. 189).  The same dictionary defines federalism as the 
“distribution of power in a federation … especially the allocation of significant lawmaking 
powers to those constituent units” (p. 189).  Regarding the United States, federalism then 
concerns itself with the distribution of powers between the federal and state governments.  The 
application of federalism to NCLB lies at the heart of this inquiry. 
 Secondary questions. 
 The primary importance of federalism, both constitutionally and procedurally, in 
addressing major societal issues undergirds both the primary question and the purpose of this 
study.   The Framers embedded federalism in the Constitution, linking it with the doctrines of 
“separation of powers” and “judicial review” as safeguards against the development of tyranny 
in American government.  Developed by the Framers, confirmed by each state ratifying 
convention, and reaffirmed by subsequent Supreme Court decisions, the constitutional 
importance of federalism has been well established as a deep, fundamental, uniquely American 
tradition.  As viewed by this study, federalism as a procedural public policy approach links 
systems thinking and adaptive work to form a powerful triumvirate, which, this writer believes, 
forms the only means with which to realize the underlying goal of the No Child Left Behind Act.  
The public policy aspect of federalism's importance gives rise to three related questions: 
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• Does NCLB take a systems approach to ensuring that no child gets left behind in 
America when viewed through the lens of Senge's systems perspective? 
• Given the goal of NCLB and the incongruence between the goal of ensuring that no 
children are left behind and the current reality in America whereby achievement gaps 
exist between classes of students grouped by race and by socioeconomic status, does 
NCLB utilize adaptive work as articulated by Heifetz in order to close the gap 
between America’s current reality and the goal of NCLB? 
• Does NCLB represent a public policy approach based upon federalism in which the 
states are viewed as co-partners and as laboratories of experimentation engaged in 
finding solutions to a complex problem? 
The answers to the secondary questions will provide fundamental support to the inquiry 
established by the primary question. 
Research Design 
 Theoretical background. 
 The research framework used to examine the primary question posed for this study flows 
from the tradition of legal analysis.  The major works about both the quantitative and the 
qualitative research traditions don’t directly address the research structure of legal analysis.5  To 
become better informed about the structure of legal analytic work, I contacted law school 
personnel, analyzed the structure of several law review articles, and reviewed the organizational 
structure of previous doctoral dissertations that had focused on an analysis of legal questions.  
First, I contacted Susan Katcher, Senior Lecturer in Law and Associated Director of the Legal 
Studies Center, University of Wisconsin Law School in Madison, WI, and inquired about the 
format followed by legal scholars writing dissertations for the LL.M and S.J.D. graduate law 
   
   
11
degrees.  Noting that the structure varied “depending upon the nature of the specific research 
project,” she recommended that I “look at recently published law review articles in established 
law review journals to notice the scope of research models that have been used” (S. Katcher, 
personal communication, December 2, 2002).  She also offered the following advice: 
Since the [structure for legal analysis] can be variable, you would probably 
want to develop one that fits your particular project best, noting perhaps in 
an introduction to the proposal that more typical research models don't seem 
appropriate to your task and thus you are going to be taking such-and-such 
approach towards your research.  (S. Katcher, personal communication, 
December 2, 2002) 
 
Taking her advice, I next turned my attention to an examination of law review articles (see 
Appendix D) followed by an analysis of the organizational structure of dissertations focusing 
upon an analysis of legal and constitutional issues (see Appendix E).  Generally, both the law 
review articles and the dissertations with a legal focus followed a similar pattern.  First, an 
introductory section presented the context or historical development of a legal problem; 
specifically identified the problem and described the author’s focus in providing a legal analysis 
of the problem; and illustrated the organizational pattern of the analysis by briefly noting the 
following sections and listing the focus of each section.  Thus, the introduction established the 
organizational framework for the resulting legal analysis.  In their description of qualitative 
research Gall, Gall, & Borg (2003) recognized this pattern when they noted that “certain aspects 
of the research design are likely to be emergent” (p. 45).  Table 1 below compares the 
organizational patterns of the quantitative/qualitative research traditions with the general pattern 
of legal analysis. 
As a final step I reviewed several leading authorities’ books that focused on legal 
research.  Looking at Table 1 above, one noticeable surface difference between the traditional 
research traditions, i.e., quantitative and qualitative, and legal analysis appears to be the absence 
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of any literature review in legal analysis.  Actually, as will be shown, such an assumption is 
unwarranted.  Besides being embedded in the process of conducting a legal analysis, literature 
reviews also take a different form.  Each legal concept requires its own “lit” review that consists 
of reviewing law review articles about the legal concept being examined as well as searching for 
specific court rulings, which featured the legal concept under consideration. 
Table 1: 







 Legal analysis actually consists of two basic methods, the case law method and 
constitutional research.  Typically, the majority of legal analysis research involves using the case 
law method.  In using this method, the researcher is examining a particular set of facts and trying 
to build a legal argument around them.  Because the American legal system is based on the 
doctrine of stare decisis (literally, “Let the decision stand,” or, previous court decisions shall 
guide the present ruling so that legal answers to similar questions of law are consistent), the 
researcher is searching for cases that are factually similar to the set of facts being examined 
(Hall, 1992, p. 663; Roberts & Schlueter, pp. 2-3).  The researcher is also examining various 
laws and administrative rules that may bear on a particular set of facts.   
 The preceding approach differs in important respects from constitutional research as 
noted below: 
1.  Introduction. 
2.  Review of the Literature. 
3.  Research Method. 
4.  Research Findings. 
5.  Discussion. 
1.  Introduction. 
2.  First Legal Concept/Issue. 
3.  Second Legal Concept/Issue. 
4.  Third Legal Concept/Issue. 
5.  Conclusions. 
Quantitative & Qualitative Legal Analysis 
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Most research into what the law is on a particular topic does not involve 
constitutional research.  This is because statutes and regulations define the 
law in most instances.  However, you may find yourself doing constitutional 
research if you suspect a statute or regulation is unconstitutional.  (Elias & 
Levinkind, p. 6/3) 
 
And what if the issue also involves a conflict between federal and state authority, in which the 
constitutional provisions surrounding federalism are thought to be violated by either of 
federalism’s partners?  Two noted authorities in legal research offered the following: 
Although the federal and state governments are independent governments, 
they sometimes regulate some of the same areas…  Who controls varies.  
Often a determination of which of the conflicting authorities governs is 
decided by reviewing the Constitution.  … The federal courts sometimes are 
asked to decide who controls.  The courts may look to the Constitution for 
guidance or may consider what has pervasively regulated an area.  For 
example, if a case involves a section of the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. 
Supreme Court is the final authority.  (Yelin & Samborn, p. 21) 
 
If constitutional issues are thought to be involved, legal research experts recommend the 
following methods.6  First, the constitutional issue(s) involved need to be identified.  Then, for 
each constitutional issue noted, a review needs to be conducted which involves examining 
background resources, i.e., books about constitutional law and/or about the specific 
constitutional provision being investigated, and law review articles.  As one expert noted, these 
sources “provide a wealth of information about the historical background of the Constitution and 
its provisions” (Roberts & Schlueter, p. 30).   They also point the way to specific court rulings 
that interpret the meaning and applications of the constitutional provisions, both those which are 
permitted and those which are prohibited.  The constitutional researcher may also locate court 
rulings interpreting constitutional provisions by examining the United States Code Annotated 
(published by West Group) and the United States Code Service (published by LEXIS 
Publishing).  This process is referred to as finding the “interpretive case law” (Roberts & 
Schlueter, p. 33).  The penultimate step in researching a federal constitutional problem is to 
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update the interpretative case law by reviewing the appropriate SHEPARD’S U.S. Citations.  
The final step is to analyze the collected material and construct a legal argument based on your 
analysis. 
The frameworks used to examine the secondary questions focusing upon the procedural 
importance of federalism as a public policy approach are based upon rational analysis and will 
offer two critical perspectives for viewing the No Child Left Behind Act.  The procedural aspects 
of federalism as a public policy form the connecting thread running through the two critical 
perspectives, each of which is formed by argument and logical analysis. 
The two critical perspectives, each centering upon one of the secondary questions, derive 
from two theoretical concepts, Peter Senge’s model of systems thinking and Ron Heifetz’ 
concept of adaptive work.  The framework for each concept will be used as a lens with which to 
critically view the No Child Left Behind Act.  These complementary views will serve to 
highlight the importance of federalism in achieving the ultimate goal of NCLB, that of ensuring 
that no children in America get left behind. 
Finally, a qualitative study centering on the thoughts and views of two Midwestern 
leaders of state educational systems – Doug Christensen, Commissioner of Education in 
Nebraska, and Ted Stilwill, Director of the Iowa Department of Education –  will inform the 
questions deriving from the three analytical frameworks of constitutional federalism, systems 
thinking, and adaptive work.7    Their thoughts about NCLB were collected in the spring of 2003 
(a time period subsequent to the enactment of NCLB) as part of a qualitative research study 
conducted by the author under the supervision of Dr. Sally Beisser at Drake University.8  Having 
responsibility for the leadership of public education in their respective states, both prior and 
subsequent to the enactment of NCLB, both Dr. Christensen and Mr. Stilwill were uniquely 
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positioned to provide both information and critical perspectives regarding the nature of NCLB’s 
impact on their respective state’s system of public education.  Neither was new to the position of 
state educational leader at the time NCLB was enacted, so their views were quite informed about 
public education. 
 Implementation of the constitutional research method. 
 Since the first step involved identifying constitutional issues, I began with the concept of 
federalism as initially defined by the Tenth Amendment.  The next task involved investigating 
background materials.  The following materials were examined, some partially, some wholly.  
They are listed alphabetically by author.  For brevity, I’ve included only the author, date of 
publication, and title.  Complete information about each may be found in the reference list. 
• Alexander, K. & Alexander, M.D. (2001).  American public school law.  5th Edition. 
• Amar, A.R. (1998).  The Bill of Rights: Creation and reconstruction. 
• Bowen, C.D. (1966).  Miracle at Philadelphia: The story of the Constitutional 
Convention May to September 1787. 
• Chase, H.W. & Ducat, C.R. (Ed.) (1978).  Edward S. Corwin’s the Constitution and 
what it means today.  14th Edition.  
• Farrand, M. (1913).  The framing of the Constitution of the United States. 
• Hall, K.L. (Ed.) (1999).  The Oxford guide to United States Supreme Court decisions. 
• Hall, K.L. (Ed.) (1992).  The Oxford companion to the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 
• McCloskey, R.G. (2000).  The American Supreme Court.  Third Edition (Revised by 
S. Levinson). 
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• Rakove, J.N. (1996).  Original meanings: Politics and ideas in the making of the 
Constitution. 
• Rossiter, C. (1987, 1966).  1787 the grand convention. 
• Rossiter, C. (Ed.) (1999, 1961).  The federalist papers. 
• Schwartz, B. (1993).  A history of the Supreme Court. 
• Story, J. (1986).  A familiar exposition of the Constitution of the United States. 
Using both the law libraries at The University of Iowa and Drake University, I conducted 
searches of law journals, using “federalism” and “United States” as keywords.  Several were 
located and examined; however, I will mention only one because: a) it deeply influenced and 
expanded my thinking; and b) the others will be cited in the respective chapters of this 
dissertation as specific constitutional issues are examined.  I refer to Professor Merritt’s article 
which highlighted the Guarantee Clause as a bulwark of federalism, “The Guarantee Clause and 
State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century,” published in the January 1988 issue of the 
Columbia Law Review.  At the time the article was published, Dr. Merritt served as Assistant 
Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.  In 2002 she served as Professor of Law, 
Ohio State University College of Law where she teaches constitutional law as one of her 
specialties.  Professor Merritt also serves as Director, John Glenn Institute for Public Policy and 
Service, Ohio State University.  As a result of my background reading, consisting primarily of 
the books listed above in addition to Dr. Merritt’s article, I expanded my original list of 
constitutional issues to include the following: 
• the Tenth Amendment; 
• the Guarantee Clause; and 
• the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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I contacted Dr. M. David Alexander, author of an authoritative school law text and Chair 
of the Department of Educational Leadership and Policy Studies at Virginia Polytechnic Institute 
and State University, and shared both my project and thoughts with him, asking for a critical 
response.  He confirmed the constitutional issues listed above and suggested another for 
investigation, the Eleventh Amendment (M.D. Alexander, personal e-mail communication, 
March 26, 2002).  Dr. Alexander also generously sent along a paper he helped present at the 
annual conference of the Educational Law Conference in November 2000 that discussed 
federalism and the Eleventh Amendment rulings of the Rehnquist Court.  And so, the list of 
constitutional issues raised by the federal No Child Left Behind Act was expanded to include the 
Eleventh Amendment.  The final list derives from three main sources – my background reading, 
Professor Deborah Merritt’s article, and Dr. M. David Alexander’s helpful response to my query. 
There remains the implementation of the next steps of the constitutional research method 
– location of court cases and identifying the body of interpretive case law surrounding each 
constitutional issue.  This will be completed in each of the succeeding chapters following chapter 
4 by focusing upon each constitutional issue relating to federalism.  Finally, the collective issues 
will be analyzed and a judgment made as to whether or not NCLB violates any of the principles 
of federalism addressed by this inquiry. 
Organization and Scope of the Study 
 Both the constitutional and procedural importance of federalism as a policy approach for 
realizing the goal of the No Child Left Behind Act will be established prior to the actual 
examination of the constitutional issues surrounding federalism raised by the congressional 
passage of NCLB.  Chapters two through four will focus upon the importance of federalism.  The 
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constitutional components undergirding federalism will then occupy center stage for the 
remainder of this study.   
Chapters 2-4: Analytical frameworks for federalism as a public policy approach, for 
systems thinking, and for adaptive work. 
 
 First, the contents of NCLB’s requirements for state action will be presented in Chapter 
Two immediately followed by the views of two state educational directors of public education 
regarding the implementation of NCLB in their respective states.  These views derive from a 
qualitative study conducted by the author in the late spring and early summer of 2003 that 
examined the intersection of federalism and the No Child Left Behind Act.  Chapter Three will 
explain federalism, discuss its purpose from the Framers' perspective and from subsequent 
Supreme Court opinions, briefly describe the constitutional components of federalism, and 
discuss NCLB as a policy approach in terms of federalism. 
 Chapter four will analyze NCLB from the perspective of two analytical frameworks, each 
of which will identify shortcomings that can only be addressed through a viable and 
constitutionally sound federalism.  The first framework is a systems model developed by Peter 
Senge (Senge, 1994).  Appropriate to education, Senge’s model of systems thinking centers on 
developing a learning organization built upon developing mastery in five disciplines.  The 
disciplines include mental models, personal mastery, shared vision, team learning, and systems 
thinking.  NCLB will be analyzed from the perspective of each discipline. 
 The second analytical framework is Ronald Heifetz’ concept of adaptive work (Heifetz, 
1994).  Heifetz coined the term to describe changes in beliefs, attitudes, and beliefs that need to 
occur around significant problems for which there appear to be no current solutions.  NCLB will 
be analyzed in terms of its approach to adaptive work.  Both frameworks, Senge’s systems 
thinking and Heifetz’ adaptive work, directly answer an important secondary question – by 
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focusing on only one system (public education) impacting the well-being of children in our 
society, does NCLB perpetuate a nonsystemic approach to a vitally important area and thus 
avoid engaging people in the work needed in order to effect needed improvement? 
Chapters 5-8: Analytical framework for constitutional federalism. 
 Chapters five through eight will focus on examining the constitutional issues raised by 
the No Child Left Behind Act.  This analysis will focus upon the emergence of interpretive case 
law as courts began to referee the arguments regarding the exact meaning of federalism and how 
power was to be distributed between the state and federal governments.  Following somewhat 
chronologically according to the judicial development of federalism as a concept, this discussion 
will focus upon emerging interpretive case law regarding the Guarantee Clause, the Tenth 
Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the most recent development, the Eleventh 
Amendment.  To enhance understanding, the historical development of each constitutional 
component listed previously will be provided.  It is the author’s belief that text without context 
provides a poor basis for the full comprehension and understanding required for analysis and 
application in that interesting intersection of legal facts and principles, on the one hand, and, on 
the other hand, the subject matter of life. 
 All cases will be either summarized or briefed.  Those cases to be summarized fall into 
two major categories: 1) those cases prior to the mid-twentieth century which presented the 
opposing arguments in detail; and, 2) those cases subsequent to the mid-twentieth century which 
no longer feature the opposing arguments.  All cases falling within the second category will be 
summarized in order to avoid the inherent bias within the reported opinions regarding the 
reporting of the two opposing sets of legal arguments presented by the appellee or the appellant 
attorneys (some arguments are summarized and addressed within the Court’s opinion, some are 
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not; other arguments can be inferred from the Court’s opinion).  Cases falling within the first 
category to be summarized will be selected according to the following criteria: a) the central 
legal question does not directly involve a constitutional issue under consideration; b) the 
constitutional issues of federalism play a secondary role in the court’s decision; c) the case is not 
one that is cited by subsequent cases as bearing on federalism; d) the case upholds a previous 
decision bearing on federalism without venturing into new territory vis-à-vis legal reasoning.  
The format for summarized cases will include two main headings: 1) case summary; 2) 
significance for the federalism issue under consideration, e.g., “Significance for the Guarantee 
Clause,” etc. (See Figure 1).   
Figure 1: 




The criteria for cases that will be briefed include: a) the central legal question of the case directly 
involves the constitutional issue under consideration for the particular chapter; b) the case is 
cited as controlling by subsequent court opinions; c) the case possesses a dissent capable of 
being the basis for a majority ruling at a later date.  Court cases selected to be briefed will follow 
the format in Figure 2.9 
 The “Case Description” will include the case name, legal citation, and the year of the 
opinion.  The “Facts & Procedural History” portion will present the events giving rise to the 
lawsuit and its journey through the court system from the time the plaintiff first filed suit until 
the decision was appealed.  The “Legal Question” will provide information about what the court 
Case Description 
Case Summary 
Significance for the Federalism Principle Under Discussion 
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is being asked to decide.  It will be stated as a question (or questions) that can be answered yes or 
no.  The portion, “Legal Reasoning of Opposing Sides,” will summarize the legal arguments 
used by both sides regarding the legal question(s).  This section will articulate the difference in 
position of the two parties.  The “Holding & Disposition” will answer the legal question(s) under 
dispute and will provide information about who won, who lost, and what happened next with the 
case.  The “Court’s Rationale” part of the brief will explain the logical steps in the court’s 
reasoning process and provide the rational argument upon which the judicial decision rests.  It 
will summarize the court’s reasoning and explain the guiding principles the court selected from 
prior statutory and/or case law to apply to the facts of the case in order to reach its ruling.  The 
last portion of the brief, “Concurring/Dissenting Opinions” will either summarize the opinion in 
fashion similar to the “Court’s Rationale” section or will summarize the critical differences 
between the reasoning of the differing opinion and that of the majority.  
Figure 2: 







 Also, a word about U.S. Supreme Court case citations under three sets of circumstances.  
Cases that have their own headings will be cited in their correct legal format, i.e., the volume 
number of the case report series, the abbreviated name of the case report series, and the page 
number in the volume where the report begins.  An example would be Brown v. Board of 
 
Case Description 
Facts & Procedural History 
Legal Question(s) 
Legal Reasoning of Opposing Parties 
Holding & Disposition 
Court’s Rationale 
Concurring/Dissenting Opinions 
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Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  “347 U.S.” references the volume number of the U.S. Reports, 
the report series for all U.S. Supreme Court cases.  “483” indicates the page number on which 
the case report begins while “(1954)” reports the year in which the case was decided.  The 
second circumstance involves discussion of a particular case under its own heading.  In these 
situations, only the page number of the court report containing the section being quoted will be 
cited.  The third situation occurs when reference to a case is made at a different location in the 
paper, i.e., not in its particular section of this study.  By way of example, one of the most quoted 
parts of the Brown decision references education as one of the most important responsibilities of 
state and local governments.  That quote is made on page 493 of the Court’s report and would be 
referenced as follows: 347 U.S. 483, 493.  References to federal district court decisions and 
federal circuit court cases will follow the same format, the only difference being the abbreviated 
name of the report series.  Federal courts of appeals decisions are contained in the Federal 
Reporter series and will be abbreviated F., F.2d, or F.3d.  Federal district court decisions since 
1932 are contained in the Federal Supplement series and are abbreviated F.Supp. or F.Supp. 2d. 
 There are, of course, a few cases that could fall under more than one of the major 
federalism headings, i.e., the Guarantee Clause and the Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  When a case has been briefed or summarized in a previous section, but has some 
relevance to the particular subsection of federalism case law being investigated, the format will 
contain two main headings: 1) Location of Case Previously Briefed/Summarized; and 2) 
Significance for the Tenth (or Eleventh or Fourteenth) Amendment.  Within each of the 
categories of constitutional issues the cases will be presented in chronological order.  The 
decisions regarding whether to brief or to summarize are neither expert nor infallible, but they 
are reasonable and defensible.  Finally, an overall analysis of the constitutional and public policy 
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components of federalism will be presented as they relate specifically to the No Child Left 
Behind Act. 
 Use of apa, sixth edition, guidelines 
 The manuscript implements APA (American Psychological Association) 
recommendations throughout the study with one minor exception regarding the fourth level of 
the five-level model for formatting headings.  The formatting requirement for fourth-level 
headings requires that headings be “[i]ndented, [in] boldface, italicized, lowercase [type, i.e., 
with] the first letter of the first word [being] uppercase and the remaining words … lowercase” 
(American Psychological Association, p. 62 & p. 62, n. b).  Those requirements are followed 
exactly EXCEPT when court cases with their full legal citation constitute the fourth level of 
heading.  In those instances, all in chapters five through eight, the legal formatting requirement 
will supersede the APA requirements regarding CAPITALIZATION only.  According to APA 
guidelines, the heading for the case discussion of Brown v. Board of Education would be:  
Brown v. board of education, 347 u.s. 483 (1954).  Instead, in chapters five through eight, the 
legal formatting requirement requirements will be followed along with the APA requirements 
regarding boldface and italicized print (along with indentation), the heading would be:  Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  The APA requirement requiring only lowercase print 
will be disregarded in these instances only.  This minor adjustment will act to maintain clarity 
and consistency of legal citations throughout the manuscript. 
Mental Model 
 What is a mental model? 
Whether you call it a paradigm, philosophy, or mental model, is unimportant because 
each of the previous names serves a similar purpose – guiding our perceptions by drawing 
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attention to what we think is important and ignoring both what we take for granted and what we 
think is unimportant.  Thus they guide what we consciously view and upon what we fix both our 
attention and efforts. 
Thomas Kuhn’s work on the history of the development of scientific theories drew on 
Gestalt psychology in his analysis of how conceptual worldviews replaced one another in the 
field of science.  The Gestalt view of perception hinged on the division between figure and 
ground.  Figure constituted what was important and of interest to the viewer.  Ground consisted 
of what was taken for granted, what we often refer to as “hidden assumptions” and “unexamined 
values.”  According to Kuhn, scientific theories replaced previous theories according to changes 
in what was viewed as figure and what became ground – what was one theory’s figure became 
another theory’s ground and vice versa. 
[E]very problem that normal science sees as a puzzle can be seen, from 
another viewpoint, as a counterinstance and thus as a source of crisis.  
Copernicus saw as counterinstances what most of Ptolemy’s other 
successors had seen as puzzles in the match between observation and theory.  
(Kuhn, p. 79) 
 
Utilizing terms, which became popularized in the 1990’s, Kuhn talked of paradigm and paradigm 
shifts as determining what could be taken for granted and upon what should attention be focused. 
In the absence of a paradigm or some candidate for paradigm, all of the facts 
that could possible pertain to the development of a given science are likely 
to seem equally relevant…  [T]he paradigm forces scientists to investigate 
some part of nature in a detail and depth that would otherwise be 
unimaginable.  (Kuhn, pp. 15, 24) 
 
What Kuhn found mysterious was the process by which thinkers shifted the governing figure-
ground configurations: 
What the nature of that final stage is – how an individual invents a new way 
of giving order to data now all assembled – must here remain inscrutable 
and may be permanently so.  Almost always the men who achieve these 
fundamental inventions of a new paradigm have been either very young or 
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very new to the field whose paradigm they change.  …[O]bviously these are 
the men who, being little committed by prior practice to the traditional rules 
of normal science, are particularly likely to see that those rules no longer 
define a playable game and to conceive another set that can replace them.  
(Kuhn, pp. 89-90) 
 
 Much of Peter Senge’s discussion of mental models in The Fifth Discipline corresponds 
to Kuhn’s concept of paradigms and their importance in directing thought and attention.  
According to Senge, mental models “are deeply ingrained assumptions … that influence how we 
understand the world and how we take action” (Senge, 1994, p. 8).  Mental models guide our 
thinking about “what or cannot be done,” thus determining acceptance or rejection of new 
insights into what is possible (Senge, 1994, p. 8). 
Because mental models determine figure-ground relationships, part of Senge’s solution to 
the limitations of mental models was to “focus on openness needed to unearth shortcomings in 
our present ways of seeing the world” (Senge, 1994, p. 12).  Since mental models govern how 
people continually create reality and how they change it, the reader should have some 
understanding of this writer’s beliefs, experiences, and values.  Hopefully, such openness will 
help the reader guard against being uncritically influenced by the writer’s beliefs, values, and 
assumptions in addition to providing the reader with insight into the writer’s reasoning and into 
the writer’s choices of what constitutes figure and ground.  I provide such information in the 
spirit with which Senge described how mental models are both deeply embedded and extensively 
intertwined into individual psyches.  According to Senge, “We do not ‘have’ mental models.  We 
‘are’ our mental models.  They are the medium through which the world and we interact.  They 
are inextricably woven into our personal life history and sense of who we are” (Senge, 1994, p. 
xv).  Caveat lector. 
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 My perspective. 
I am neither an attorney nor a law school student.  I am looking at the constitutional 
issues governing federalism from the point of view of a public educator and an educated citizen.  
Having spent my entire professional career in education as either a teacher or an administrator at 
the elementary, middle school, and high school levels, my perspective is not that of a person 
trained in the practice of law.  In this respect, my situation is somewhat similar to that of the 
many citizens who participated in one of the greatest debates held in our country’s history, the 
debates in each of the original thirteen states determining whether or not the Constitution 
emanating from the Constitutional Convention of 1787 would be ratified and thus become the 
“Supreme Law of the Land.”   
The constitutional framers envisioned a citizenry capable of understanding and discussing 
the Constitution and its application to American political life.  They did not anticipate that it 
would be necessary to have a law degree in order to discuss and analyze constitutional issues.  
As a matter of fact, a considerable number of the constitutional framers had no training in the 
practice of law, but they were both educated and thoughtful.  As one commentator observed, 
“Not the least surprising characteristic of the Federal Convention was that, contrary to the 
tradition of political assemblies, it let itself be swayed by men of thought and historical 
perspective” (Bowen, p. 179).  Another constitutional scholar remarked on the expectation that 
citizens had been and were expected to continue to be involved in applying constitutional 
principles to their current political life: 
Finally, government in a republic is properly the concern of all those who 
have an enduring attachment to the community.  …Within the American 
consensus there were, to be sure, sharp differences of emphasis, especially 
over the application of these constitutional abstractions to concrete problems 
of governing free men.  (Rossiter, p. 64) 
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 Alexander Hamilton attended to this issue as well when he addressed the “people of America” in 
the first of what became known as The Federalist Papers: 
[Y]ou are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United 
States of America.  The subject speaks its own importance…  It has been 
frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this 
country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, 
whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good 
government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined 
to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.  (Federalist 
No. 1, p. 1) 
 
 One might wonder that with the adoption of the Constitution by a previous generation of 
citizens, it would be expected that subsequent constitutional questions would be handled 
primarily by legal specialists.  In a later paper, Hamilton again stated the intention that American 
citizens would need to become involved in constitutional issues: 
If the federal government should overpass the just bounds of its authority 
and make tyrannical use of its powers, the people, whose creature it is, must 
appeal to the standard they have formed, and take such measures to redress 
the injury done to the Constitution as the exigency may suggest and 
prudence justify. (Federalist No. 33, p. 171) 
 
It is in that spirit that I venture forth.  The emphasis will be on detecting possible infringements 
of the constitutional principles of federalism and its public policy aspects, not on declaring parts 
of the No Child Left Behind Act unconstitutional.  The tools that will be brought to bear on this 
task include critical thought, logical analysis, historical perspective, rational argument, 
constitutional analysis, an educational background grounded in history, political science & 
philosophy, and a career spent as a teacher and administrator in both tribal and public education 
at the elementary, middle school, and high school levels.  Each reader will need to determine 
both the strengths and shortcomings of such an approach.  
Summary 
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 This chapter began with a statement of purpose, which is to examine constitutional issues 
surrounding federalism and the No Child Left Behind Act.  In stating the nature of the problem, I 
discussed federalism, Iowa’s educational system, and problematic components of NCLB.  The 
research design will follow the legal analysis structure derived from triangulating expert opinion, 
examination of law review articles, and review of previous doctoral dissertations focusing on 
legal issues.  This triangulation was further validated by an examination of expert opinion in the 
field of legal research, specifically three major works on the subject.  The primary research 
question guiding this study is, “Do portions of the No Child Left Behind Act violate any of the 
constitutional provisions governing federalism?”  The secondary research questions analyze 
NCLB from the perspectives of systems thinking, adaptive work, and federalism as a public 
policy approach.  Next, I discussed the specifics of this study’s organizational structure which 
flow from the research question and the legal issues involved, i.e., federalism as understood by 
the Constitution, the Constitutional debates, the Spending Clause, the Guarantee Clause, the 
Tenth Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the case law 
resulting from various courts’ interpretations of what exactly federalism means in a variety of 
contexts.  Finally, I presented the concept of mental model as a guide to individual perceptions, 
both in terms of what attention is focused upon and what is taken for granted.  Information about 
my own perspective was presented to inform readers of this study.
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Chapter 2 
What Is NCLB? 
Introduction 
 NCLB, the acronym for the congressional No Child Left Behind Act, was enacted on 
December 18, 2001 and officially went into effect on January 8, 2002.  Described as President 
Bush’s education program, NCLB was “written largely by the White House” (Rothstein, 2001, p. 
D9).  Officially entitled the “Federal Re-authorization of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act,” NCLB significantly changed the federal role in education.  Previous enactments 
of ESEA, also known as Title I, had provided supplemental assistance to states and public 
schools that was targeted towards reading and math instruction for students deemed in need of 
assistance.  The federal role in setting and controlling educational policy had been minimal.  
With the passage of NCLB the federal government “dictate(d) to states” what the educational 
policy of individual states should be (School Administrators of Iowa, p. 1).  The change from 
supplemental to controlling thus represented a seismic shift in the federal role in education.  It 
also should be noted that NCLB targeted only public education.  No private schools were 
affected by the legislation. 
The Contents of NCLB’s Requirements for the States 
 What exactly did the 1,200-page bill require? Described as a bill “that would dramatically 
extend the federal role in public education,” NCLB contained numerous federal mandates for the 
states (Schemo, p. A32). 
• All states are required to administer state tests in reading and math every year to every 
public school student in grades 3 through 8 as well as one high school grade level.  
Science was to be phased in at a later date. 
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• Each state is required to establish a minimum level of proficiency for each of the 14 
state exams. 
• Each state is required to report to the federal government the proficiency levels 
obtained by all students on each of the 14 exams. 
• Each state is also required to report disaggregated proficiency levels for each of the 14 
exams.  Required disaggregated data includes proficiency levels by subgroups of the 
student population at each grade level according to race/ethnicity, socioeconomic 
status, English Language status, gender, and disability status.  For example, a school 
containing three racial/ethnic groups would have the following score report 
requirements for third-grade reading: 
• Aggregate proficiency (all students). 
• Hispanic proficiency. 
• American Indian proficiency. 
• White proficiency. 
• Eligible for Free/Reduced-Price Lunch proficiency. 
• Non-eligible for Free/Reduced-Price Lunch proficiency. 
• ELL proficiency (English Language Learner). 
• Non-ELL proficiency. 
• Female proficiency. 
• Male proficiency. 
• IEP proficiency (special education students). 
• Non-IEP proficiency. 
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 Of course, this would have to be repeated not only for third-grade math, but also for 
the remaining 12 exams (reading and math exams at grades 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, & HS) as well 
as for science once that was phased in. 
• Each state is required to identify and report “poorly performing” schools, that is, those 
schools performing below the minimum level as initially set by the state and approved 
by the federal government.  
• Each state is required to enforce an escalating set of sanctions against the public 
schools in its jurisdiction that have been designated as “poorly performing.”  These 
sanctions include: 
• In Year 1, any student in the “poorly performing” school would be 
eligible to transfer to a better-performing public school.  Transportation 
costs would be carved out of the district’s existing Title I funds. 
• In Year 2, low-achieving students would be eligible for tutoring, 
summer school, and other supplemental services which could be 
provided by religious institutions, private companies, or nonprofit 
organizations.  Those services would be paid for by the district out of 
its federal Title I funds.  In addition, the district would continue to pay 
transportation expenses for those students wishing to attend better-
performing schools in the district. 
• Schools failing to make adequate progress after two years become 
subject to having teachers and administrators replaced, its curriculum 
revamped, or being converted to a charter school. 
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• Each state is required to administer the National Assessment of Educational Progress 
each year to a representative sample of students (as determined by the federal 
government) in order to assess the adequacy of state-established standards.  The NAEP 
testing requirement for each state is in addition to the state-administered tests in 
reading and math to all students in grades 3 through 8 as well as one high school grade 
level. 
• Each state is required to submit to the federal Department of Education its plan for: 
• ensuring that all public schools in its jurisdiction will be in compliance 
with all of the mandates listed above. 
• ensuring that all subgroups achieve proficiency at the end of 13 years 
through annual improvement known as “Adequate Yearly Progress.”  
This becomes known as an AYP goal.  Generally, schools with 
subgroups not making the AYP goal for two consecutive years will be 
labeled a “poorly performing” school. 
 States are required to revise plans deemed unacceptable by the U.S. Department of 
Education until such time as they become acceptable to the federal government.  For 
example, Iowa’s initial plan was not approved and was sent back to be revised.  
• Each state is required to develop a plan for ensuring that “highly qualified” teachers 
are placed in every classroom within four years. 
• Each state is required to ensure that each public school district within its jurisdiction 
only enacts instructional programs with a “scientific research base.”   
• Each state is required to ensure that all third-graders are reading at grade level. 
NCLB as Viewed by Two State Educational Leaders 
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 Under the federal law, departments of education in the various states had to scramble to 
develop plans for implementing the requirements of NCLB, which then had to be approved by 
the U.S. Department of Education.  To investigate views about the issues raised by NCLB from 
the top educational leadership in two Midwestern states, each with national reputations for 
educational excellence as measured by student achievement, two state directors of education 
were interviewed – Doug Christensen, Commissioner of Education in Nebraska, and Ted 
Stilwill, Director of the Iowa Department of Education. Both interviews utilized a conversational 
approach centered on nine basic questions (see Appendix F).  The interview with Doug 
Christensen took place in his office in Lincoln, NE, on April 28, 2003 while the interview with 
Ted Stilwill occurred in his office in Des Moines, IA on May 14, 2003.  Each interview lasted 
approximately one hour.    The questions were structured to be open-ended to elicit the thoughts 
of each state leader about NCLB in both a wide-ranging, yet specific, way.  To facilitate fresh 
responses to the questions that was based upon their current thinking, the questions were not 
shared with either director prior to the interview.  The interviews were taped and then transcribed 
before being analyzed thematically.  Their comments illuminate three questions: 1) Why NCLB; 
and 2) What are the problems with NCLB; and 3) What are the benefits of NCLB?  Responses to 
the three questions are grouped in the following sections.10 
 Why nclb? 
 Christensen attributed a number of reasons for congressional passage of NCLB.  First, he 
believed that if 9-11 hadn't happened, NCLB would either have not passed or it would have been 
passed in a different form than it currently possesses.  Since a foreign attack took place on 
American soil for the first time in the twentieth century, NCLB took on a different look, a look 
that brought a measure of stability, a sense that the country was moving again, that America was 
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"getting back to normal" (Christensen, p. 4).  Also, being a "Republican" Congress, Republicans 
wanted to deliver a major piece of legislation for a Republican President.  Christensen found this 
somewhat ironic, because some measure of NCLB had been proposed previously by President 
Clinton, a Democrat.  As Christensen described it, when President Clinton had earlier proposed a 
national test, "every Republican went berserk" (Christensen, p. 4).   
 NCLB also occurred because of a deadly combination of ignorance and positive sound 
bites.  Congressmen voted not knowing the details of what they were voting on because it "was 
written behind a closed door" (Christensen, p. 5).  According to Christensen, the Nebraska 
Senators and Representatives reported to him that they were unable to find out the content of 
what they were voting on.  And then when it was released, it was a massive tome in excess of 
"twelve hundred pages" that no one had the time to read (Christensen, p. 5).  Ignorance, a 
national crisis, a sense of wanting to see the country moving ahead towards normalcy – all of 
these combined to forge a non-critical stance towards NCLB – that and the fact that everyone got 
caught up in the "buzz words" of NCLB or as Christensen observed, "Well, how could 
something be wrong that's named 'No Child Left Behind.'  It has flexibility, more money… more 
equity for all kids, I mean, what's wrong with that" (Christensen, p. 6)?  Most critical, in all the 
mix, was 9-11.  Without it, Christensen believed that calm, deliberate debate would have 
occurred in which "all of the warts of No Child Left Behind would have been exposed" 
(Christensen, p. 4).   
 Finally, Christensen perceived a sinister force at work, a desire to discredit American 
public education.  He noted early in the conversation that "you can't have a conversation about 
alternatives to public education until you can prove that public education isn't working" 
(Christensen, p. 8).  A hint of the ethical issues involved is provided by the final words spoken 
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by Christensen' in the interview, words he used to characterize the No Child Left Behind 
legislation: 
…this is not about improving public education.  This is about embarrassing 
public education, so that we can have a conversation about choice and 
vouchers and charter schools.  Because if it was about improving public 
education, we wouldn't do it this way.  Nobody would.  I mean even the 
staunchest Republicans would not do it this way.  (Christensen, p. 22) 
 
 Stilwill viewed the context in which NCLB occurred in simpler overall terms, but in 
greater complexity regarding the specific support for NCLB.  Basically, in terms of the context,  
Stilwill believed NCLB occurred because there exists a national interest "in having our 
educational system do better than it's doing today" (Stilwill, 2003, May 14, p. 5; unless otherwise 
noted, all subsequent references to Stilwill in this section will refer to this date and will reference 
only his name and the page number).  High school diplomas are no longer a guarantee of a 
decent job.  Nowadays, according to Stilwill, good jobs require some type of degree in 
postsecondary education, either a two-year or a four-year degree.  As he described it: 
Well, that's a very new expectation for K-12 districts, that a very high 
percentage, I mean a very high – 90% of their kids – would be prepared to 
the level where they could succeed in postsecondary education…   … now 
the expectations have escalated well beyond whatever was agreed upon for 
what the current system was supposed to deliver.  (Stilwill, p. 5) 
 
Stilwill concurred with Christensen's finding that Senators and Representatives did not 
understand what they were voting for when they approved the No Child Left Behind legislation.  
Stilwill reported that at least one Representative reported to him that he didn't fully understand 
the way it would play out when he voted for NCLB.  And, Stilwill noted, others publicly stated 
that they "didn't realize it was going to have this kind of an impact on Iowa," that they believed 
"because of Iowa's lead position perhaps much of this law might not apply" (Stilwill, p. 2).  
Stilwill didn't fault the legislators because it was "complex legislation," the kind in which you 
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"have to make a lot of assumptions that other people have done that kind of homework" (Stilwill, 
p. 2).  Taking a pragmatic, accepting view of the fact that Iowa's Senators and Representatives 
voted for legislation without understanding it, Stilwill observed with a shrug, "And I know that 
that happens" (Stilwill, p. 2).   
Noting the complexity of the support for NCLB, Stilwill described it as a "coalition" that 
is not always "cohesive on a day-to-day basis," but it just so happened that they came "to agree at 
this point in time that this is in their constituents' best interests" (Stilwill, p. 7).  One of the 
coalition partners represented "poor kids and minority kids in large urban areas who had been 
ignored," who hadn't been getting help they felt they needed (Stilwill, p. 7).  They supported 
NCLB because now their district and state were going to be forced to be accountable for the poor 
and minority kids.  Stilwill described these people as being a combination of "strong advocates 
of public education" and "particularly strong advocates for those kids" (Stilwill, p. 7). 
The strange bedfellows of the coalition were described by Stilwill as being "not terribly 
strong advocates of public schools" (Stilwill, p. 7).  These people, Stilwill noted, viewed public 
education as "monopolistic and as part of the problem, not part of the solution" (Stilwill, p. 7).  
Stilwill described this partner of the NCLB coalition as being composed of "advocates of choice" 
(Stilwill, p. 7).  "And," according to Stilwill, "that's a perfectly legitimate policy debate.  You 
know, 'Is education a utility that ought to be offered in the most efficient way as possible to as 
many people as possible" (Stilwill, p. 7)? 
 And so, where Christensen saw ethical problems, Stilwill observed a policy debate. 
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 Problems with nclb. 
 Both Christensen and Stilwill identified similar, but not identical, problems although 
Christensen discussed the problems in greater detail.  Both identified problems centered within 
these broad categories:   
• systemic problems. 
• local control issues. 
• negative reinforcement gets motivation wrong. 
• unrealistic expectations. 
• no recognition of critical differences. 
Each, however, gave a slightly different spin to the problems within each of these areas.  So 
while the topics each mentioned were similar, the particulars were different.    
 For example, Christensen's take on systemic change centered on his interpretation of 
NCLB as "coming from outside the system" (Christensen, p. 1).  According to him, 
No one regards the federal government as part of the education system.  It is 
a support place; it's historically been a support place where you provide an 
incentive for states to move into an area, like vocational education, like 
gifted, like whatever, but it's never intended to be a regulatory device or be 
the defining policy related to education.  (Christensen, p. 1) 
 
For Christensen, the violation of systemic change linked with another critical area of concern, the 
way in which NCLB violated the state's system of local control.  Christensen stated that local 
control, the face-to-face interactions in local decision-making, constituted the major reason why 
education worked as well as it did in the rural midwestern and northeastern states.  Local control 
involves people in important decision-making and promotes a sense of ownership.  Christensen 
compared the local hierarchies (teachers, principals, superintendents, boards, community 
members) with the state educational hierarchy (state department of education, state 
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commissioner, state board, legislators, governor, and the public) and observed that in Nebraska, 
at least, it was still local, it was still largely face-to-face.  As Christensen described the state 
hierarchy, he "could go over there to any of those 49 senators.  I could walk into their offices – I 
mean, it's face to face" (Christensen, p. 2).  Moving on to the federal hierarchy, he characterized 
it in faceless, impersonal terms.  "That hierarchy is so remote from what is actually going on in 
education.  It isn't face to face; it's by memo, it's by telephone call, it's by FAX, it's by paging – 
twelve hundred pages of No Child Left Behind – I mean, give me a break" (Christensen, p. 2).   
 Stilwill, on the other hand, didn't overtly link systemic problems with violations of local 
control.  In fact, Stilwill didn't use the term "systemic."  But he did talk about the nature of 
change, both in terms of what has worked and what hasn't worked in Iowa.  And his examples 
resonated with pictures of local control; however, the term itself wasn't used.  Stilwill couched 
his discussion of systemic improvement or change using the psychological concepts employed in 
operant conditioning, what the psychologists refer to as punishment (shame, fear, accountability) 
and positive reinforcement (pride, positive self-image, personal investment & commitment).  
Only Stilwill didn't use the language of psychologists.  As can be seen, Stilwill discussed these 
three concepts – systemic change, local control, and punishment versus positive reinforcement – 
without mentioning them by name.   
 Talking about problems with NCLB, Stilwill pointed out that the notion of "simply 
tightening up on accountability" as a way to improve education constituted a "flaw in our 
thinking at the moment nationally" (Stilwill, p. 5).  Noting that we had more than sufficient 
evidence to indicate that shame and fear were short-term strategies that didn't work well in the 
long run to effect change, Stilwill observed: 
And in Iowa we have excellent evidence that in fact pride is more effective 
in change, and school districts in Iowa do well because they are invested in 
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their kids, and they care about what happens to them, and they feel good 
about what happens to them.  (Stilwill, p. 6) 
 
Related to the flaw in national thinking regarding accountability as the means to ratchet-up what 
was perceived to be an under-performing system of public education, Stilwill observed that he 
didn't think that in some "15,000 school districts across the United States you can make the 
argument that, you know, there's just mismanagement and ineptness" (Stilwill, p. 6).  Another 
flaw in national thinking identified by Stilwill regarded the thinking of people who favored 
private education and didn't support public education.  Stilwill observed that no proven 
educational research was "being used in private education that's not being used in public 
education" (Stilwill, p. 6).  He continued, "There's not a proven track record that's any different 
that simple privatization is somehow going to create dramatically different results" (Stilwill, p. 
6).  So, according to Stilwill, NCLB was based on an incorrect premise, the premise that 
privatization would provide the cure-all for what was perceived as the failure of public 
education. 
 Christensen also identified the punishment aspect of NCLB as violating a basic belief 
about systemic change.  Criticizing NCLB as being bad policy no matter at which level, federal 
or state or local, it was enacted, Christensen stated that Nebraska would never do such a thing to 
themselves as adopt a policy like NCLB because, "Number One, we don't believe that you get 
improvement by shaming people" (Christensen, p. 2).  Another systemic failure of NCLB 
identified by Christensen centered on the intertwining of systems change, motivation, and local 
control – concepts illustrated, but not specifically identified as such, in a revealing portrait of 
how the law was designed to be implemented at the state level.  Noting that policy outcomes 
were attributed to NCLB, but were never actually specified in the law, Christensen observed: 
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That, to me, just speaks volumes about the incapacity of this law to generate 
leadership, because it's "Follow the letter of the law."  We fill out 
workbooks, for gosh sakes.  I mean, we had to fill out an AYP workbook.  
Makes you feel like a child.  Makes you feel like, "Well, why don't they just 
fill it out and then we'll sign it," instead of going through this charade of us 
filling it out and letting them sign it.  I don't think they grasp the notion that 
you can't generate leadership and discretion and decision-making at a local 
policy level from afar.  (Christensen, p. 3) 
 
 Both Christensen and Stilwill identified another problem with NCLB – its uniform 
requirements across a vast array of differences that don’t take those differences into account.  
Christensen captured the essence of the problem when he noted that NCLB was "a one size fits 
all" kind of program, the problem being that "none of us are the same size" (Christensen, p. 3).  
Stilwill pointed out the specifics of how the "one size fits all" mentality of NCLB would play out 
with English language learners to the detriment of the purpose of education. 
… if a student is identified as an English language learner, almost by 
definition they're not making average yearly progress; that's why they're in 
that program; that's why they're getting the help.  And to penalize the district 
because they've identified students who need help and are helping them, and 
even if they help them succeed and now there's a new group coming in, 
they're going to be penalized for the new group coming in.  That's just not 
very logical, and I'd like to think there could be some adjustments around 
that.  (Stilwill, p. 3) 
 
 Stilwill also noted the problems caused by NCLB's failure to recognize the differences posed by 
another group of students, a group also not fitting into NCLB's one-size-fits-all mold, students 
with disabilities. 
But to assume that somehow kids who are very severely handicapped or 
even moderately handicapped are going to achieve at exactly the same level 
as other students may not be appropriate either.  That's a more controversial 
conversation than the English language learners, but I think to some extent 
again, there's a group of students identified because they need help, because 
they're not making progress…  (Stilwill, p. 3) 
 
 Still within the context of the failure to recognize differences, both Stilwill and 
Christensen pointed out that NCLB failed to account for the wide performance differences in 
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educational systems across the country.  Stilwill observed that NCLB needed to be more realistic 
in targeting not all schools, but a smaller group of schools that really do need to be more 
productive in terms of educating students. 
For my part, though, one recommendation that seems fairly obvious is that 
you have to attach a different mathematical formula to a smaller group of 
schools or school districts who really ought to be the focal point.  I don't 
think anybody thinks it's really productive to identify the majority of schools 
or the majority of school districts in the state and then line up those 
progressive sanctions to that large a body of schools or school districts.  It's 
not practical,  it's not effective, and I don't think that was the intent of the 
law.  (Stilwill, pp. 2-3) 
 
Christensen spoke bluntly about the clear differences in state educational systems, differences 
that were not recognized by NCLB. 
…if we were California, I'd be shaking in my boots because I'd think they 
have every reason to stomp on us and say, "What the hell?  Your scores are 
down there at the bottom!"  I don't care whether it's your ACT scores or 
your NAEP scores or your TEM score or whatever, California is number 50.  
They have no grounds upon which to argue with the feds about, "Why are 
you doing this to us?"  But the Nebraska’s and the Iowa’s and the 
Wisconsin’s can say, "Wait a minute.  There isn't a measure out there that 
we're not in the top ten.  Now tell us what the hell the issue is!"  
(Christensen, p. 16) 
 
 The failure of NCLB to recognize differences, not only among different groups of 
learners, but also among the different educational systems in place across the country, may be 
partially responsible for another problem identified by both Christensen and Stilwill, the problem 
of unrealistic expectations as spelled out in the law.  Christensen addressed the issue directly: 
We believe that everybody is different, and until we have the resources and 
all that to make sure everybody starts at the same starting line and is equal – 
money, time, kids, teachers, and so forth – the idea that they will all at some 
point be equal down the road is just crazy.   …the idea that somehow 
something's going to happen at the end, that everybody's going to meet at 
100 percent proficiency, is just ludicrous.  (Christensen, pp. 2-3) 
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Stilwill pointed to the "Adequate Yearly Progress" portion of NCLB as being both unrealistic 
and critical.  He foresaw the need for AYP to be adjusted down the road. 
… one of the most critical pieces is the "Adequate Yearly Progress" piece, 
and I know I watched the states do the simulations where they came up with 
projections that a large number of schools would be identified.  It took them 
several weeks, and they had a testing staff and accountability  staff of 20 or 
30 people.  Well, Congress doesn't always have that kind of staff at their 
disposal, and they didn't take the time to, you know, ask states how this 
would play out, or states didn't have credibility, or whatever the case might 
be.  So I think there will be some adjustments down the road because of that.  
(Stilwill, p. 2) 
 
Christensen also voiced criticism of the Adequate Yearly Progress, or AYP, concept as being 
both unrealistic and as setting up schools to fail.  Although moving his state to comply with 
NCLB, Christensen also drew a line in the sand with the feds regarding AYP and the manner in 
which Nebraska would proceed regarding its implementation. 
I don't like the AYP from the standpoint it sets schools up at some point, 
virtually every school is going to hit the wall, like running a marathon.  It's 
just going to hit that wall.  I mean, I don't like that.  I don't know what to do 
about that, but that's not the area I'm going to fall on a sword over.  You 
know, we figured out how to put our system into an AYP kind of formula.  I 
mean, I think it's still not good policy, but there is not the area where I think 
you can build your case for "This is going to be harmful."  …And we set it 
up so that – and we told them that when they came here for the peer review 
– we would not identify any more schools than we had the capacity to help.  
And I said, "That's probably about 25 a year."  And I think for the first 
probably five years, 90% of our schools will be fine.  (Christensen, p. 15) 
 
 While both might view the failure to recognize differences as possibly leading to 
unrealistic expectations, Christensen would attribute, in large measure, another causal factor, the 
desire to discredit public education in order to legitimize a discussion about alternatives to public 
education.  But he does believe, somewhat skeptically, that if the intent of federal legislators was 
to improve education, it won't work. 
Well, if the intent really is improvement, if the intent really is changing 
public education to something better, if the intent is making sure that all kids 
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have access to a school system that's going to provide them the maximum 
benefit of that education, this is not the way to do it.  In my opinion, it 
violates every principle that I know of, every principle that the research says 
is out there…  (Christensen, p. 20) 
 
 Stilwill and Christensen each voiced an additional problem that was not mentioned by the 
other.  Stilwill spoke about the requirement of NCLB that schools only "implement research-
based teaching strategies and programs" (Stilwill, p. 4).  While favoring the notion, Stilwill 
paraphrased the Director of the newly-created federal Institute of Education Sciences who had 
commented about what research-based strategies and programs were available to be 
implemented by schools under NCLB. 
Well, Russ Whitehurst, the lead person for research for the U.S. Department 
of Education, is very honest about the fact that there's pretty good research 
in reading, not much in math, not much in science, about effective 
strategies.  (Stilwill, p. 4) 
 
So, even if schools wanted to comply with the research-based strategies and programs in the 
NCLB-targeted areas of science and mathematics, there wouldn't be much available for them in 
those two areas. 
 Christensen identified what could be called a violation of good educational principles by 
NCLB, that is, if the research is correct in indicating that the biggest factor affecting whether or 
not students learn is the teacher and his/her expertise (see Ferguson, 1991; Hedges, Laine, & 
Greenwald, 1994; Greenwald, Hedges, & Laine, 1996; and Darling-Hammond, 1998).  In 
Christensen's opinion, the people who actually make a difference in determining whether or not 
students learn are placed by NCLB "clear down at the bottom" (Christensen, p. 2).  He 
continued: 
… classroom teachers now are the last people that have anything to say 
about what happens under No Child Left Behind.  In fact, they're not trusted 
to have anything to say about it.  Superintendents and principals are trusted 
equally as little, and it's no respect for the local system of education at all – 
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very little respect for the state system of education and respect only for a 
particularly slanted view of education at the federal level.  (Christensen, p. 
2) 
 
 As has been shown, both Christensen and Stilwill identified a number of problems 
associated with the No Child Left Behind Act.  In the many examples they provided, several of 
the problems overlapped and intertwined with each other; that is, in discussing one problem, they 
often discussed other issues as well.  Broadly speaking, the major problems identified by both 
Stilwill and Christensen dealt with the NCLB legislation: 
• exhibiting no understanding of systems change. 
• not respecting local control . 
• missing the boat on motivation through its emphasis on negative 
reinforcement. 
• posing unrealistic expectations. 
• not recognizing important critical differences, both in terms of students and of 
state educational systems as well as school districts within states. 
In addition the state commissioner and the state director each identified a problem not mentioned 
by the other.  And while the problems have been listed separately to facilitate portraying the 
thoughts of the two state leaders, they intertwine with each other as shown in the following 
summary viewpoint of what is wrong with NCLB. 
It violates everything I know about how you get change to occur, how you 
get it to be systemic, meaning that, you know, it's got to come from the 
inside.  It does nothing to foster leadership.  It creates an environment that I 
think is just absolutely contrary to all that in that it's a compliance 
environment.  It's compliance with rules, it's test-bound, which is – you 
know, I believe that assessment is a very valuable piece of learning how to 
teach and teach well and improving teaching, but this isn't about assessment 
– it's about testing.  And testing becomes a compliance document.  It's the 
ultimate compliance document.  And, you know, if you want people to rise 
to high levels, you have to make a decision whether or not you're going to 
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be accountable or to be held accountable.  And being held accountable 
makes you a junior partner; it makes you a lesser person in the hierarchy; it 
makes you a person who can't be given free choice, free will, as opposed to 
being accountable.  (Christensen, p. 21) 
 
 Benefits of nclb. 
 Giving life to the folk saying that "in every dark cloud, there is a silver lining," each state 
leader mentioned what he viewed as a benefit.  Granted, each identified far more problems than 
benefits, but still, there were some benefits contained in NCLB that they identified. 
 Stilwill identified three positive aspects of NCLB.  First, he viewed it as a first attempt to 
focus on critical issues that would eventually get better. 
It's (pause) – you know, we haven't been looking at national domestic policy 
in education for very long.  Yeah, I think it's going to be there; it needs to be 
a national issue.  It's not going to go away; I don't think it should go away.  I 
think this is the first really comprehensive foray into trying to figure out 
how to do it.  And there's undoubtedly some pieces of it that need to change, 
and I think probably will change.  (Stilwill, p. 1) 
 
Second, Stilwill supported the legislation's demands that schools implement research-based 
teaching strategies and educational programs.  He commented, "There are high demands in the 
legislation for research-based interventions, you know.  And I think strong, good advice – except 
it's not just advice – that you only implement research-based teaching strategies and programs" 
(Stilwill, p. 4).  Third, and lastly, Stilwill, clearly differentiating between Iowa school districts 
and school districts in other parts of the country, saw benefit in focusing on districts in other 
parts of the country who weren't doing what they should be doing for kids. 
I've just not had the experience of working with a district – at least if you 
give it enough time – where people don't end up doing what's best for kids.  
Now, I understand that's not the case in every school district in the United 
States.  I understand that there are school districts where the leadership isn't 
paying attention to kids that they need to do.  But I think it will change… 
(Stilwill, p. 6) 
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 Christensen also identified three benefits, but his descriptions are somewhat more 
complex because in discussing two of them, he tied the benefit to a problem he saw with NCLB.  
First, an unqualified benefit Christensen identified in NCLB – it disturbed the complacency that 
plagued efforts to improve in states who already had good educational systems, states like 
Nebraska and Iowa.  As Christensen observed, "Good is the enemy of being better.  'Cause 
what's the motivation for it" (Christensen, p. 19)?  And Christensen also saw NCLB's efforts to 
focus attention on children disadvantaged by poverty and/or color as an extremely positive 
component of NCLB.  He described the problem in greater detail: 
And I know you get in Iowa, and we do here – you try to have a 
conversation about what it's going to take to improve education and most of 
the conversations, at least over the last 20 years have been, "Well, what's 
wrong with what we're doing now?  Seventy-five percent of the kids are 
getting it."  Well, the point is, "Yeah, that's true, but twenty-five percent 
aren't getting it.  And what about them?  Because you wouldn't tolerate it if 
it was your own kid, or your grandkid – you wouldn't tolerate that."  Now, 
those are somebody's kids.  Well, happens to be in Nebraska, those kids are 
poor kids, those kids are Hispanic kids, those kids are black kids, and a lot 
of people don't care about those kids.  That's not right.  (Emphasis in 
original)  (Christensen, pp. 18-19) 
 
 And now the discussion of benefits from Christensen's perspective becomes more 
complex – more complex because in each of the two following examples, he ties a benefit 
directly to a problem.  For example, Christensen viewed as positives that NCLB embedded the 
ideas of equity, of judging schools on the basis of how all of its students do, and of having highly 
qualified teachers in its language.  And yet… it is a bad law.  When asked whether he viewed 
NCLB as a good law, Christensen responded: 
No.  No, it isn't.  I mean, if you could take it on its face value for what it is 
trying to accomplish, the notion of equity is certainly a worthy goal, and the 
idea that we've got to judge performance of school districts on the basis of 
how all kids do, I mean, you can't argue with that.  Should we have highly 
qualified teachers, should we have highly qualified paraprofessionals, 
should we have a growth model as an accountability measure – I mean, 
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that's all worthy, but it misses the point about this is coming from the 
farthest outside the system that it could possible come.  I mean, it's coming 
from the wrong place.  I don't care how hard you try, there will be nothing 
systemic about No Child Left Behind because it's coming from outside the 
system.  No one regards the federal government as part of the education 
system.  It is a support place …  (Christensen, p. 1) 
 
 Christensen did see an unadulterated benefit to No Child left behind – it legitimized 
projects that the Nebraska Department of Education had been wanting to do for some time.  And 
yet, if given a choice, Christensen would just as soon pass on the opportunity to do those projects 
if it meant he didn't have to embrace the host of problems he saw in implementing the policies 
required by NCLB. 
Now, on the other hand, you know, we have found some things that we're 
doing that we wanted to do for a long time that we're going to use the 
leverage of No Child Left Behind to get accomplished.  We've never had a 
state data-based, student information data base, and we need one.  Otherwise 
we're going to overwhelm our small school districts – even if we didn't have 
No Child Left Behind – with our own reporting system.  It's just a huge 
burden. 
 
The second thing is we're using it to force our federal programs people to 
get all together – we're going to have one application for all federal 
programs, one reporting mechanism – fiscal reporting mechanism, one final 
report.  It's all going to be together, or those programs are going away.  And 
we're doing that as well. 
 
So, you know, those things have been positive for us.  But, if I actually 
could pick between doing those and doing No Child Left Behind, didn't 
have to do it because of the other monies involved with No Child Left 
Behind, I'd kiss No Child Left Behind good-bye in a minute.  Because I 
don't think it's worth what we're doing.  (Christensen, pp. 8-9) 
 
So, in Christensen's view, NCLB is a not-so-well-mixed bag containing a little good, a lot of bad.  
Stilwill, on the other hand, views NCLB as basically a first attempt that is flawed, but which will 
get better. 
Summary 
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 The purpose of the chapter was to present factual and contextual information about the 
federal No Child Left Behind Act.  I began  by discussing the divergence of NCLB from the 
pattern of previous ESEA acts of Congress.  The pattern shifted from supplemental targeted 
assistance to students-in-need with control of education vested in each of the several states to a 
scheme whereby the federal government dictated both educational policy and educational 
practices to the collective states that impacted all students, not just those deemed to be in need of 
supplemental assistance in reading and math.  I next highlighted the federal requirements of 
NCLB on the states’ public educational systems.  Finally I concluded the chapter by presenting 
the views of two leaders of state educational systems towards the federal No Child Left Behind 
Act.  Both Doug Christensen from Nebraska and Ted Stilwill from Iowa discussed NCLB in 
terms of three basic questions.  First, why did NCLB happen?  Second, what problems do you 
see with NCLB?  Third, what benefits do you see with NCLB?
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Chapter 3 
The Constitutional Importance of Federalism 
Introduction 
 After the U.S. Senate gave final congressional approval to NCLB in December 2001, a 
reporter for the New York Times described the act as " a breathtaking intrusion of the federal 
government on states' control of education" (Rothstein, 2001, p. D9).  Surprisingly, few other 
writers or newspapers framed the issue around the central question of federalism as did the New 
York Times.  Perhaps this can best be explained in terms of two different ideological positions, 
each side thinking it gained some benefit from NCLB.   
Liberal Democrats have long wanted more federal involvement in 
education, hoping this would bring extra funds to urban schools. 
Conservative Republicans argued against a federal role, warning that it 
would lead to national curriculums that reflect liberal values.  
 
When President Bush signed the education bill last week, liberals got their 
wish for federal involvement, though with less money than they wanted. 
Conservatives did not fret about increased federal control because they saw 
a chance to impose their own values on the nation's schools.  (Rothstein, 
2002, p. B10) 
 
 Only two professional educational organizations voiced concerns related to federalism 
about the federal government’s greatly expanded role in education.  Just prior to final 
congressional approval of NCLB, Bruce Hunter, Associate Executive Director of the American 
Association of School Administrators observed: 
Somebody’s going to have to explain to [school districts] that the people 
who give them 7% of the money have acquired a major voice in school 
evaluation and teacher qualifications.  I don’t think that’s going to be an 
easy sell.  (Anderson, p. A30) 
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After passage of the act and given some time to fully consider the implications of NCLB 
regarding public education, School Administrators of Iowa specifically raised the issue of 
federalism: 
The absence of express authority in the United States Constitution for 
Congress to make laws relating to education, coupled with the Supreme 
Court’s pronouncement in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) that 
“education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments,” mean that education is primarily, if not exclusively, a state 
responsibility.  Principles of federalism and comity dictate that Congress’ 
role in setting or controlling educational policy should be minimal.  (School 
Administrators of Iowa, p. 1) 
 
 And so, the intersection of federalism and NCLB remained neatly ignored by the vast 
majority of writers, editors, state politicians, federal politicians, educators, state directors of 
education, and citizens.  The lone exceptions were two professional educational organizations, 
School Administrators of Iowa and the American Association of School Administrators, and a 
New York Times reporter. 
What Is Federalism? 
Federalism plays a central role in the American constitutional system of representative 
democracy.  Constitutionally, federalism focuses on the distribution of powers between the 
federal government and the states.  The Founding Fathers exhibited a realistic understanding 
about the dark side of human nature and the lure of power when they established our 
constitutional form of democratic government.  As one renowned scholar noted, the Federalists’ 
goal was to create a government that did not depend upon the virtue of its citizens. 
Believing with Washington that virtue had ‘in a great degree taken its 
departure from our land’ and was not to be easily restored, the Federalists 
hoped to create an entirely new and original sort of republican government – 
a republic which did not require a virtuous people for its sustenance.  If they 
could not, as they thought, really reform the character of American society, 
then they would somehow have to influence the operation of the society and 
moderate the effects of its viciousness.  (Wood, 1968, 1998, p. 475) 
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Not having any illusions about a need to depend upon virtue for government sustenance, the 
Federalists also exhibited an awareness of the struggle between private interests and the public 
good.  While societal life would go well when the two interests worked harmoniously, problems 
would arise when private interests worked against the public good.  As one political analyst 
noted, the Constitution illustrated what could emerge when private and public interests 
coincided: 
Few men in the history of mankind have espoused a view of the “common 
good” or “public interest” that militated against their private status; even 
Plato with all his reverence for disembodied reason managed to put 
philosophers on top of the pile.  Thus it is not surprising that a number of 
diversified private interests joined to push the nationalist public interest; 
what would have been surprising was the absence of such a pragmatic 
united front.  And the fact remains that, however motivated, these men did 
demonstrate a willingness to compromise their parochial interests in behalf 
of an ideal which took shape before their eyes and under their ministrations.  
(Roche, p. 801) 
 
However, perpetual harmony between private and public interests was recognized as only a 
sometimes occurrence.  Fully cognizant of the tendency throughout history for power to enlarge 
itself and for private interests to rise above the public good, the constitutional Framers: 
• provided for separation of powers at the federal level with checks and balances; and 
• embedded the principle of federalism through the Necessary and Proper Clause, the 
Guarantee Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and the Tenth Amendment. 
Subsequent constitutional amendments related to federalism were added after the constitutional 
period, most notably the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments.   
 American federalism grew out of a compromise in the Constitutional Convention 
between those who wanted a strong central government and those who wanted independent 
sovereignty for the states.  By dividing power between the state and federal levels, the Framers 
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sought to check abuses of governmental power at either level.  The Framers communicated this 
unique development of American federalism to the public in The Federalist Papers prior to the 
state ratifying conventions.  James Madison briefly summarized the task facing the Framers 
before linking the doctrines of “separation of powers” with “federalism” as the Convention’s 
approach to avoiding the danger of tyrannical concentrations of power.  First, the task: 
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.  …If men were angels, no 
government would be necessary.  If angels were to govern men, neither 
external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.  In 
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the 
great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control 
the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.  (Federalist No. 
51, p. 290) 
 
Next, the solution: 
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better 
motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private 
as well as public.  …[T]he constant aim is to divide and arrange the  several 
offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other – that the 
private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. 
 
…In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the 
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the 
portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments.  
Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people.  The different 
governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be 
controlled itself.  (Federalist No. 51, pp. 290-291) 
 
Alexander Hamilton provided further clarification about the intent of federalism and its critical 
role in the proposed constitutional government: 
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will 
at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, 
and these will have the same disposition towards the general government.  
The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it 
preponderate.  If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the 
other as the instrument of redress… 
 
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system that the  State 
governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security 
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against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority.  (Federalist 
No. 28, p. 149) 
 
As noted by Madison, “[T]he proposed government cannot be deemed a national one; since its 
jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a 
residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects” (Emphasis Madison) (Federalist No. 
39, p. 213).  A current constitutional scholar summarized federalism in the following manner: 
[N]either the state nor the nation can be supreme, because both must be 
subordinated to the ultimate supremacy of the ultimate law – the 
Constitution itself.  Both … exist to promote, and must ultimately yield to, 
citizens’ rights that the Constitution creates or declares.  Both sets of limited 
sovereigns must be kept within the limitations imposed on their sovereignty 
by the ultimate Sovereign – We the People of the United States who 
ordained and established those limitations.  (Amar, 1994, p. 1232) 
 
 To help understand the seriousness with which the Framers viewed their newly created version 
of federalism, one needs only note that even the process of constitutional ratification was viewed 
as a federal decision, not a national one.   According to Madison, “The act, therefore, 
establishing the Constitution will not be a national but a federal act” (Emphasis Madison) 
(Federalist No. 39, p. 211).  Madison explained: 
That it will be a federal and not a national act … is obvious from this single 
consideration: that it is to result neither from the decision of a majority of 
the people of the Union, nor from that of a majority of the States.  It must 
result from the unanimous assent of the several States that are parties to it…  
Were the people regarded in this transaction as forming one nation, the will 
of the majority of the whole people of the United States would bind the 
minority, …and the will of the majority must be determined either by a 
comparison of the individual votes, or by considering the will of the 
majority of the States as evidence of the will of a majority of the people of 
the United States.  Neither of these rules has been adopted.  Each State, in 
ratifying the Constitution is considered as a sovereign body independent of 
all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act.  In this relation, 
then, the new Constitution will, if established, be a federal and not a 
national constitution.  (Emphasis Madison) (Federalist No. 39, pp. 211-212) 
 
   
   
54
Not only was federalism embedded in the Constitution, not only was the ratification of the 
Constitution a federal process – the Constitution’s foundation was federal in nature.  The federal 
foundation of the Constitution was again noted by Madison in an interesting explanation of the 
interweaving of federal and national principles in the newly proposed American government. 
In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the 
ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly 
national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the 
extent of them, again, it is federal, not national; and finally in the 
authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal 
nor wholly national.  (Federalist No. 39, p. 214) 
 
The interweaving of three political doctrines (federalism, the separation of powers, and judicial 
review) with the Constitution framing the resulting tapestry provided the key to resolving 
jurisdictional disputes between the national government and the state governments. 
It is true that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two 
jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide is to be established 
under the general government.  But this does not change the principle of the 
case.  The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the 
Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to 
secure this impartiality.  (Federalist No. 39, pp. 213-214) 
 
 More than two hundred years have passed since the Constitution was carefully debated 
and formulated, extensively discussed and examined, and subsequently ratified by the state 
conventions.  How has the Framers’ view of federalism held up over the years?  Judging from 
their citations in subsequent Supreme Court rulings, in writings by Supreme Court justices, and 
in essays by constitutional scholars, the answer must be, “Quite well!”  Witness Justice 
Frankfurter discussing the views of his respected colleague, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, on 
the issue of federalism: 
When seen through the eyes of a Mr. Justice Holmes, there emerges from 
the Constitution the conception of a nation adequate to its national and 
international duties, consisting of federated states possessed of ample power 
for the diverse uses of a civilized people.  He has been mindful of the Union 
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for which he fought; he has been equally watchful to assure scope for the 
states upon which the Union rests.  (Frankfurter, p. 80) 
 
Witness also one of Justice Frankfurter’s own statements on the subject: 
The states need the amplest scope for energy and individuality in dealing 
with the myriad problems created by our complex industrial civilization…  
Opportunity must be allowed for vindicating reasonable belief by 
experience.  The very notion of our federalism calls for the free play of local 
diversity in dealing with local problems.  (Frankfurter, pp. 48, 49) 
 
 In a similar vein, a noted constitutional scholar wrote, “A centralized regime of one-size-fits-all 
national uniformity denies federalism’s rich diversity and its corresponding possibilities for 
citizen choice and self-selection” (Amar, 1994, p. 1237).   And, writing for the Court majority in 
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, Justice Powell noted, “The Framers believed that the states 
played a vital role in our system and that strong state governments were essential to serve as a 
counterpoise to the power of the Federal Government” (473 U.S. 234, 240).  In a dissent written 
the same year as Atascadero, Powell reiterated the same theme.  “It is at … state and local levels 
– not in Washington as the Court so mistakenly thinks – that ‘democratic self-government’ is 
best exemplified” (Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 577).  In 
a later majority opinion, Justice O’Connor extensively quoted the writings of Madison and 
Hamilton regarding federalism and summarized many of the advantages of federalism.  In her 
summary of federalism’s advantages, Justice O’Connor observed: 
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people 
numerous advantages.  It assures a decentralized government that will be 
more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases 
opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for 
more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes 
government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a 
mobile citizenry… 
 
Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses of 
government power…  Just as the separation and independence of the co-
ordinate Branches of the Federal Government serves to prevent the 
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accumulation of excessive power in any one Branch, a healthy balance of 
power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk 
of tyranny and abuse from either front.  Alexander Hamilton explained to 
the people of New York, perhaps optimistically, that the new federalist 
system would suppress completely “the attempts of the government to 
establish a tyranny”…  (Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-459) 
 
Finally, using a metaphor derived from 20th century physics, Justice Kennedy both summarized 
and noted the uniqueness of American federalism.  Originally appearing in a concurring opinion, 
Justice Kennedy’s characterization of federalism was subsequently cited in several majority 
Court opinions as well as in a dissenting opinion representing the short end of a 5-4 Supreme 
Court decision. As Justice Kennedy astutely stated in a concurring opinion in U.S. Term Limits v. 
Thornton: 
Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery.  The Framers split the atom of 
sovereignty.  It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two 
political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion 
by the other.  The resulting Constitution … establish[ed] two orders of 
government, each with its own direct relationship, … its own set of mutual 
rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.  
(514 U.S. 779, 841-842) 
 
Kennedy’s metaphor for federalism was subsequently cited in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U .S. 489, 504, 
n. 17 (1999); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 142-143, 
text and n. 3 (2000) (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, dissenting). 
The Intersection of Federalism and NCLB 
Through federalism the Framers intended for the state and federal governments to serve as 
checks and counterbalances to tyrannical concentrations of power at either level.  This issue, the 
balance of power between state and federal governments as mediated by the constitutional case 
law of federalism, lies at the heart of concerns raised by passage of the No Child Left Behind Act 
and its effects upon "local control" in Iowa and other states.  NCLB abolishes local control in 
terms of district goals for student achievement.  Portions of this act raise constitutional issues as 
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they relate to the Guarantee Clause, the Tenth Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.  The problems primarily center on the federal 
requirements for state action and the requirements that impact all students, not just those deemed 
to be in need of supplemental assistance.  The issue is not whether these requirements constitute 
sound educational policy.  The issue centers on the question, "Who possesses legitimate 
authority to determine educational policy under our system of constitutional government?" 
The Constitutional Components of Federalism 
 While contained in one location (the Constitution and its amendments), the provisions 
governing the distribution of power between the various state governments and the federal 
government are sprinkled throughout the document and are to be found either in constitutional 
clauses receiving their name from subsequent Supreme Court case law or are located within 
several of the constitutional amendments.  The components of federalism are identified and 
briefly discussed in this section. 
 The guarantee clause. 
 Found in Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution, the Guarantee Clause declares that 
"[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of 
Government."   
What exactly does this mean?  The most obvious meaning is that the U.S. promises to 
guarantee each of the 50 states the autonomy necessary to maintain a republican form of 
government.  It also means that the federal government should not infringe on the ability of state 
governments to reflect and enact the core values of republican government.  The Supreme Court 
and commentators on federalism use the term “local control” to refer to governments at the state, 
county, and municipal levels.   
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The Guarantee Clause suggests a limit on the power of the federal government to infringe 
on the powers of state governments.  Interestingly, each of the constitutions of the fifty states 
specifically mentions public education as a function of state government.  The Guarantee Clause 
recognizes that citizens of a state cannot enact their own laws if their government is beholden to 
Washington.  It recognizes that for governments to be republican, they must have something 
purposeful to enact which is meaningful to citizens at the state level.  Simply put, a federal 
intrusion into a state’s control of its system of public education impairs the republican 
government guaranteed each of the states. 
 The tenth amendment. 
 Very simply, the Tenth Amendment declares that "Powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States." 
Education is not mentioned in the U.S. Constitution.  Historically, as a matter of public 
policy, control of public education has been left to the various state governments.  That, of 
course, was the lay of the land before NCLB.  The Tenth Amendment reinforces the necessity of 
enforcing the federalism principle located in the Guarantee Clause.  The structure of government 
created by the Constitution, obviously a federal system, clearly illustrates the importance of 
interpreting both the Guarantee Clause and the Tenth Amendments as joint restraints on federal 
power. 
Use of the Spending Clause by the federal government to increase the scope of 
congressional authority is a 20th century development in Tenth Amendment/Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence whereby Congress began attaching requirements of state action in order to access 
federal funds.  It derives its authority from Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, which states that 
Congress "shall have the power to…provide for the…general welfare of the United States.”  
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Currently, in order to successfully attach conditions of state action to receipt of federal funds, 
Congress must abide by conditions spelled out by the U.S. Supreme Court in South Dakota v. 
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).  Dole was a case in which South Dakota unsuccessfully challenged 
the constitutionality of federal requirements to adopt a minimum drinking age of 21 in order to 
access federal highway funds.  Elizabeth Dole, as Secretary of the Department of Transportation, 
was named the defendant.  The conditions laid out by the Court in Dole are: 
1. the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of "the general welfare." 
2. any condition(s) attached to the receipt of federal funds must be clearly stated in order 
to allow the States to exercise their choice knowingly. 
3. the conditions must be related to the federal interest in particular national projects or 
programs. 
4. the condition must not require states to act in an unconstitutional manner. 
5. the financial inducement must not be so coercive as to pass the point at which 
pressure turns into compulsion. 
The problems arise under items 4 and 5.  With regards to item 4 above, NCLB requires the states 
to act as an enforcement agent for federal law.  Supreme Court rulings have consistently held this 
to be a violation.  Thus the law requires states to act in an unconstitutional manner.  Regarding 
item 5 above, the dire financial condition of schools in Iowa over the past three years could 
conceivably qualify as the point at which the loss of any funding becomes coercive.  Increases in 
funding have not kept pace with the increases in operating costs for Iowa schools.  Across-the-
board cuts in state aid for two of the past three years exacerbated the financial problems of Iowa 
schools.  Some basic facts illustrate the problem:11 
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 • Iowa’s schools received an average of 1.17% allowable growth in the three fiscal 
years (FY 2002, FY 2003, FY 2004) following passage of NCLB. 
 •  Negotiated settlements with teachers for the same time period averaged 3-4 % 
annually. 
 • Health insurance costs increased from 15-48% annually over the same time period. 
 • For the 2003-2004 school year, 231 of 370 public school districts in Iowa were on the 
budget guarantee, a mechanism that permits districts to avoid revenue reductions at 
the penalty of zero revenue growth.  For the 2004-2005 school year, the number of 
public school districts on the budget guarantee has increased to 242. 
Other states’ budgets have also experienced declining revenues resulting in reduced levels of 
funding for their public schools.  Thus the loss of funding from the federal government could 
well represent coercion in states other than Iowa as well. 
 The eleventh amendment. 
 This amendment states that "the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed 
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States…"  In lay terms, this amendment serves to restrict lawsuits against individual states. 
 The constitutional issue here does not arise until the federal government withholds funds 
from a school or a state because of NCLB.  The argument here would center on the fact that the 
NCLB enforcement mechanism would in effect constitute a lawsuit against one of the states or 
against one of its agencies, i.e., a local education agency. 
 The fourteenth amendment. 
 Two clauses of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment could pertain to the NCLB Act.   
What is known as the Due Process Clause reads, “…nor shall any State deprive any person of 
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life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; …”  The Equal Protection Clause portion of 
the Fourteenth Amendment immediately follows the Due Process Clause and declares, “…nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment could contradict the constitutionality of NCLB in two ways.  First, if funds are 
withheld from a school or are re-directed away from the instructional component because of the 
low performance of a particular subgroup, then other groups are negatively impacted with a loss 
of instructional funds without receiving either due process or the equal protection of the law.  
Their performances are ok, but still funds are withdrawn from their school or are re-directed to 
non-instructional components. 
The other argument comes into play when considering the various subgroups constructed 
by NCLB and how they are assessed.  First, the original sub-group’s aggregate assessment 
performance is not compared against its own performance at other educational stages, either 
prior or subsequent to the assessment results being examined.  Each year a new sub-group is 
created and their performance is measured against that of either a previous or future sub-group.  
For example, the performance of one racial group of fourth-graders is compared not against their 
own prior or subsequent performance to determine growth.  Instead the performance of one 
racial group of fourth-graders is compared against the performance of an entirely new group of 
fourth-graders of the same racial heritage.  It would be argued that such a system fails the 
"rational basis" test.  In creating groups based on race or gender, there must be a legitimate 
reason or a rational basis for doing so.  In this case, there is no clear rational basis for forming 
such groups.  In fact, it could be argued that it is not even a rational practice.  If, on the other 
hand, the same group was followed over time and assessed against their prior performances as a 
group in order to determine whether the standard of adequate progress had been made, such 
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might pass the rational basis test.  It is doubtful that the current law does indeed have a rational 
basis. 
Clearing the rational basis hurdle, however, is only the first barrier to be overcome in 
order to pass constitutional muster.   Usually the courts defer to the legislature if a rational basis 
can be shown.  If a law involves a “suspect” class such as gender or race, however, the Supreme 
Court has ruled that the government’s action must pass a much higher test – the government 
must prove a “compelling interest” exists in order to treat people differently.  This is a more 
difficult test.  Since education has not been viewed by the U.S. Supreme Court as a fundamental 
right, it is not readily apparent, nor has it been articulated, that a compelling interest exists to 
justify NCLB’s treatment of “suspect” classes. 
A knowledgeable and astute reader might object that this is irrelevant, that the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits state governments, not the federal government, from violating due process 
rights and from denying any citizens the equal protection of its laws.  Since the No Child Left 
Behind Act is federal, not state, law, these Fourteenth Amendment arguments are specious.  
However, this objection would not be valid.  The Supreme Court has ruled that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment acts to restrain federal action in the same way that the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restricts the states.  See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 
U.S. 497 (1954).   
NCLB As a Policy Approach and Federalism 
 The prescriptive approach of NCLB runs counter to Iowa's educational practice of local 
control as well as the educational practices of other states.  Rather than reflecting policy and 
leaving the implementation details to the local level, NCLB is highly prescriptive in detailing 
what each state will do.  In a front-page headline, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch identified local 
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control as an issue raised by the passage of NCLB and observed that “educators are leery of the 
federal government telling local districts what to do” (Pierce & Bower, p. A1).  The story quoted 
an official with the Missouri School Board Association: "It seems in a broad sense to represent a 
significant shift in authority over public education from the state and local level to the federal 
level" (Pierce & Bower, p. A1).  The prescriptive approach of NCLB is thus viewed as going 
beyond current understandings of the federal government's role regarding both educational 
policy and educational practice.  According to Nebraska Commissioner of Education Doug 
Christensen, as quoted in The Baltimore Sun, 
The Constitution of this country says education is a state matter, that it's our 
job, and I cannot in good conscience stand up in front of anyone in this state 
and say we need to do something because the federal government says we 
do.  (Greene, ¶ 12) 
 
As the article also noted, state officials opposed the thrust of NCLB to ignore the “principle that 
the federal government should not meddle in state-run public education” (Greene, ¶  9).  For this 
reason, Nebraska Republican senator, Chuck Hagel, voted against NCLB (Greene, ¶ 8).   
NCLB also represents a change in students targeted for help by federal aid.  Whereas in 
the past, ESEA legislation focused on just the students targeted for educational assistance with 
federal funds, this ESEA action focuses on all students.  Whether or not the law passes 
constitutional muster regarding federalism remains a vitally important question that this 
dissertation will address. 
Summary 
This chapter began by noting the sparcity of concerns about the fit between federalism 
and the No Child Left Behind Act.  The concept of federalism was then explained and discussed 
in terms of possible intersections between it and NCLB.  Next the specific constitutional 
components of federalism were identified and explained.  The components of federalism 
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identified as being contained within either the text of the original Constitution or its subsequent 
amendments included the Guarantee Clause, the Tenth Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment, 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Spending Clause.  Because so few concerns were publicly 
expressed about NCLB meeting the constitutional requirements of federalism, the next chapter 
will explore the importance of federalism to the No Child Left Behind Act.  After discussing the 
contextual importance of federalism, the major question about NCLB’s constitutionality will be 
fully addressed in the remaining sections and will constitute the bulk of this work. 
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Chapter 4 
The Procedural Importance of Federalism 
As a Public Policy Approach 
Introduction 
 The approach used by the No Child Left Behind Act towards achievement gaps ignores 
the shortcomings of other systems impacting the well-being of children in American society.  
From birth until age eighteen, children spend slightly more than 8% of their total life in the 
classroom (see Appendix G). Yet NCLB places responsibility for the success or failure of 
children to learn solely on the educational system and ignores the systems impacting the 
remaining 92% of children’s lives during the formative and emerging periods of their lives. 
The failure to systemically address the multiple systems bearing on the well-being of 
American children has several consequences.  First, success in achieving the goal of NCLB will 
be limited as other systems impacting child welfare will not be addressed in any major fashion.  
As Senge observed, “[V]ision without systems thinking ends up painting lovely pictures of the 
future with no deep understanding of the forces that must be mastered to move from here to 
there” (Senge, p. 12).  He continued, “Without systems thinking, the seed of vision falls on harsh 
soil” (Senge, p. 12).  Without the vision provided by systems thinking, the policies of NCLB 
may well create future problems.  According to Senge: 
[T]he causes of many pressing issues, from urban decay to global ecological 
threat, lay in the very well-intentioned policies designed to alleviate them.  
These problems were “actually systems” that lured policymakers into 
interventions that focused on obvious symptoms not underlying causes, 
which produced short-term benefit but long-term malaise, and fostered the 
need for still more symptomatic interventions.  (Senge, pp. 14-15)  
 
 Second, and more important, by not recognizing the important role of other systems, we 
will not be making the fundamental changes that need to occur in order for America to be 
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recognized as a society that places primary value upon the nation’s children.  NCLB does not see 
the whole (children’s well-being) because of its fixation on a part (what happens in the 
classroom).  As one analyst noted, “We are conditioned to see life as a series of events, and for 
every event, we think there is one obvious cause.” 
Focusing on events lead to “event” explanations…  Such explanations may 
be true as far as they go, but they distract us from seeing the longer-term 
patterns of change that lie behind the events and from understanding the 
causes of those patterns.  (Senge, p. 21) 
 
NCLB focuses on the event of “non-learning” which it defines as a score on a single exam that 
falls below an arbitrary criterion.   According to Senge, this is typical of efforts to apply linear 
thinking to complex non-linear situations by not viewing it holistically. 
Most of us have had a lifetime of training in breaking complex problems 
apart, in focusing on the part we know best, and in “fixing” problem 
symptoms, usually with little understanding of deeper causes.  It is hard for 
us to see the limits of ways of thinking that are so ingrained.  (Senge, p. xix) 
 
We need, therefore, to destroy “the illusion that the world is created of separate, unrelated 
forces” (Senge, p. 3). 
 Third, we will be delaying the start of the adaptive work that needs to occur in order for 
us to realize the promise of America.  As Senge noted, “Learning that changes mental models is 
immensely challenging.  It is disorienting.  It can be frightening as we confront cherished beliefs 
and assumptions” (Senge, p. xv).  Yet, adaptive work requires us to adjust what is challenging if 
we are to change the current system of children’s well-being in America to better meet the needs 
of children and their families. 
[O]ur organizations work the way they work, ultimately, because of how we 
think and how we interact.  Only by changing how we think can we change 
deeply embedded policies and practices.  Only by changing how we interact 
can shared visions, shared understandings, and new capacities for 
coordinated action be established.  (Senge, p. xiv) 
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 This chapter will establish the contextual importance of using federalism as a tool by 
which systems thinking and adaptive work can be forged together to accomplish the goal of the 
No Child Left Behind Act.  It will be shown that the current version of NCLB represents a short-
sighted and ill-conceived attempt to apply a technical fix to a larger systemic problem, the well-
being of children in America.  It will further be shown that NCLB does not recognize the nature 
of the adaptive work that needs to occur in order to realize the vision of ensuring that no children 
get left behind.  Finally, it will be argued that such a recognition needs to be harnessed to 
systems thinking through federalism. 
A Systems Viewpoint of NCLB 
 Introduction. 
Since the agenda of proficiency for all encompasses the entire system of public education 
in this country, it is fair to ask, “How does NCLB fare when viewed through the lens of a 
systems perspective?”  An initial attempt to answer this question will be posed from the 
organizational framework provided by Peter Senge in The Fifth Discipline.  Senge proposed five 
disciplines as forming the core of an approach to systems analysis. These disciplines include 
mental models, personal mastery, shared vision, team learning, and systems thinking. According 
to Senge, systems thinking is “a discipline of seeing wholes.  It is a framework for seeing 
interrelationships rather than things, for seeing patterns of change rather than static ‘snapshots’” 
(Senge, p. 68).  Senge believed that we need to destroy “the illusion that the world is created of 
separate, unrelated forces” (Senge, p. 3).  He further outlined his thinking: 
I call systems thinking the fifth discipline because it is the conceptual 
cornerstone that underlies all of the five learning disciplines…  All are 
concerned with a shift of mind from seeing parts to seeing wholes, from 
seeing people as helpless reactors to seeing them as active participants in 
shaping their reality, from reacting to the present to creating the future.  
(Senge, p. 69) 
   
   
68
 
For Senge, the “essence” of systems thinking lay in a “shift of mind:  seeing interrelationships 
rather than linear cause-effect chains, and seeing processes of change rather than snapshots” 
(Senge, p. 73).    He continued, “Eventually, systems thinking forms a rich language for 
describing a vast array of interrelationships and patterns of change” (Senge, p. 73). 
Senge’s model thus provides a framework for examining NCLB from a systems 
perspective according to each of the five disciplines.  Strengths and problems will be diagnosed 
in terms of their congruence (or lack thereof) between a particular discipline and the No Child 
Left Behind Act.  Any problems emerging from this analysis will be defined, described, and 
discussed within the context of particular disciplines.  Finally, some systems-based solutions will 
be offered to remediate any systemic deficiencies of NCLB. 
 Mental model. 
 What is the “mental model” of NCLB?  What beliefs and values drive its provisions?  
The philosophical underpinnings are not directly identified in the act.  However, many of its 
provisions are grounded in philosophical realism as discussed by Ozmon & Craver (1999), most 
notably the following beliefs and assumptions: 1) viewing education as an enterprise that 
provides students with “basic and essential knowledge,” most notably in reading, writing, math, 
science, and history (Ozmon & Craver, pp. 69, 71-73, 79); 2) believing that knowledge exists 
and can be measured (Ozmon & Craver, p. 81); 3) requiring students to measure up to objective 
standards (Ozmon & Craver, pp. 72, 81); 4) using tests to evaluate “teacher effectiveness and 
student performance” (Ozmon & Craver, p. 82); and 5) making higher standards for teachers 
(Ozmon & Craver, pp. 72, 82). 
 One provision of NCLB, however, appears to be grounded in philosophical idealism – all 
children will be proficient in reading, math, and science.  This doesn’t exist anywhere in current 
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reality in any society in the world, so it doesn’t derive from realism.  Its only existence in today’s 
world is in the realm of ideas, as a possibility underlying reality that can’t be seen, but can only 
be inferred in similar fashion to Plato’s analogy of the cave (Cornford, pp. 227-235).  Just as the 
perfect person or the perfect government exists only in our imagination, but not in reality, neither 
does the perfect educational system exist that is capable of ensuring that everyone is an expert 
reader, mathematician, and scientist, no matter what differences in mental ability each brings to 
the endeavor, no matter what negative social forces are impacting each young person’s life.  Or, 
as the president of the California Teachers Association observed, “You could require every 
teacher to run the 100 in 9-flat, but that doesn't mean it's going to happen" (Coile, p. A1).  
Evidently one or more of the authors of NCLB stumbled into the sunlight and captured a glimpse 
of the reality lurking beyond our material world, but a number of educators, including two state 
directors of education, have some problems believing that ALL children can achieve proficiency 
under either the current system or the one proposed by NCLB (see Christensen, p. 9 and Stilwill, 
2003, May 14, p. 2).  Howard Butters, superintendent of Manhattan School District 114 in 
Illinois, illustrated the problem with the idea of all children achieving proficiency in a Chicago 
Tribune article.  Mr. Butters observed: 
For students to receive special education services, they have to at least be 
performing two years below grade level.  And then to expect that those 
children are going to be able to perform on the state’s assessment at grade 
level, I just find that ludicrous.  (Banchero & Little, p. 9) 
 
 Motivationally, NCLB assumes a draconian approach – the system will only improve, 
first, through top-down action imposed from outside the system, and second, by imposing 
sanctions and penalties for failure to achieve the legislation’s purpose.  The “top-down action 
coming from outside the system” aspect of NCLB has drawn criticism from public education 
officials.  Chicago Public Schools chief Arne Duncan criticized NCLB in this manner: 
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It infuriates me when bureaucrats in Washington make laws and set rules 
that makes no sense and, in the end, harm kids.  The way this law is being 
implemented creates disincentives and discourages those who are trying to 
do the right thing.  It is wrong morally and intellectually, and it harms public 
education.  (Banchero & Little, p. 9) 
 
Reporters for the Chicago Tribune summarized the sanctions and penalties facing schools that 
fail to meet the legislation’s purpose: 
The law lays out a series of escalating sanctions for schools that fail to 
measure up, beginning with a requirement that they allow students to 
transfer to better schools and ending with possible closure. 
 
A district that fails to meet standards two years in a row must create an 
improvement plan laying out how the district will fix the problems that led 
to the student failure…  Most troubling to some sub-par districts, however, 
is the provision that bars them from overseeing tutoring programs in failing 
schools.  (Banchero & Little, p. 9) 
 
How does this mental model square with research?  Ironically, in some respects, not too 
well.  It is ironic because while NCLB requires schools to implement practices which have a 
clear, scientific research base, some provisions of the law don’t measure up to that requirement.  
This is most evident in the research regarding intrinsic/extrinsic motivation and its effects upon 
learning as well as the research regarding the purpose of learning as being either growth or 
measuring up to a fixed external standard.  One could make an entire list of research bases whose 
effects on learning are either violated or ignored by NCLB.  These include, but are not limited to, 
multiple intelligences, positive reinforcement versus punishment, multiple causation, and the 
effects of low socioeconomic status on learning. 
First, what is the incongruence between NCLB’s mental model and the research about 
motivation and learning?  Extrinsic motivational procedures and external standards, both 
featured prominently in NCLB, negatively effect learning, at least according to research 
conducted by Ames & Archer (1988), Amrein & Berliner (2002), Deci, Spiegel, Ryan, Koestner, 
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& Kauffman (1982), Elliott & Dweck (1988), Flink, Boggiano, & Barrett (1990), Grolnick & 
Ryan (1987), Maehr & Stallings (1972), Mueller & Dweck (1998), and Utman (1997).   This 
research built on the initial work of Deci & Ryan at the University of Rochester who had 
postulated a need for autonomy or self-determination as a descriptor of intrinsic motivation.  
They contrasted intrinsic motivation [individuals focus on learning and mastering task skills] 
with extrinsic motivation [individuals are pressured by external forces and feel compelled to 
focus on demonstrating ability and worth].  According to Deci and Ryan, intrinsically motivated 
persons are willing to try and stretch their abilities beyond their present capabilities.  
Furthermore, they derive pleasure from attempting to meet such a challenge.  Deci and Ryan 
believed that intrinsic motivation fostered creativity, spontaneity, and flexibility in problem 
solving.  They contrasted intrinsic with extrinsic motivation in which individuals are motivated 
by factors external to a particular task, e.g., rewards, goals set by others, evaluations of 
individual performance, etc.  Being compelled to achieve by external forces, according to Deci 
and Ryan, promoted increased feelings of pressure in individuals and fostered low levels of 
creative, spontaneous, and flexible behavior.  Extrinsic motivation would also act to undermine 
any intrinsic motivation that people possessed prior to the onset of extrinsic motivation as a 
prime factor in behavior.  Subsequent research confirmed that: 
• when external rewards or other strategies designed to control behavior 
are used, 
• behavior is no longer viewed as self-determined. 
• a person’s interest in pursuing that activity in her or his free time 
declines. 
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• even when the reason for doing an activity is internally motivated, self-
determination decreases and motivation is impaired by the use of 
controlling forces. 
• creativity and overall achievement are impaired by controlling forces, i.e., “students 
experience(ing) controlling behaviors used by others to achieve a given standard” 
(Flink, Boggiano, & Barrett, p. 916).   
To summarize, incongruence appears to exist between NCLB’s mental model and the research 
regarding extrinsic/intrinsic motivation, particularly as such motivation impacts learning. 
The realist’s idea of knowledge as existing independently of the learner, another 
assumption of NCLB grounded in philosophical realism as discussed previously, is challenged 
directly by the qualitative research of developmentalists Vygotsky, Piaget, Clay, and Goodman 
(see reference list for their works) who see knowledge as being constructed and developed by 
learners through their interactions with the world around them.  The idea of construction of 
literacy by student learners is a prominent feature of their work which can also be seen from 
some of the titles – “How Children Construct Literacy,” “Becoming Literate: The Construction 
of Inner Control,” and “The Construction of Reality in the Child” (Goodman, 1986; Clay, 1991; 
Piaget, 1954).  By contrast, NCLB views learning as a quantifiable set of facts that can be taught, 
learned, mastered, and assessed by a single exam.  A single score obtained at a specific date in 
time defines learning and determines success or failure, both for each student and her/his own 
school. 
To sum up the mental model of NCLB, it possesses internal inconsistencies between realism and 
idealism.  It also conflicts with research regarding motivation and purpose for learning.  NCLB’s 
mental model of knowledge also clashes with developmental theories as well as a significant 
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body of qualitative research conducted by Vygotsky, Piaget, Clay, and Goodman focusing upon 
how children actually learn.  Finally, the mental model of NCLB focuses on compliance, not on 
collaboration or upon mutual partnerships.   
 Personal mastery. 
How does NCLB fare from the perspective of personal mastery?  According to Senge’s 
definition, it is only a partial mesh.  NCLB interprets mastery literally, focusing almost 
exclusively upon students’ competence and skills, especially skills and competencies associated 
with reading, math, and science.  Mastery is defined as performance on a single exam.  NCLB 
also applies the same literal focus regarding teacher competencies and skills.  Yet, Senge 
cautioned that  
[p]ersonal mastery goes beyond competence and skills, though it is 
grounded in competence and skills.  It goes beyond spiritual unfolding or 
opening, although it requires spiritual growth.  It means approaching one’s 
life as a creative work, living life from a creative as opposed to reactive 
viewpoint.  (Senge, p. 141) 
 
Senge discussed the views of a successful businessperson, Kazuo Inamori, regarding personal 
mastery.  According to Senge, Inamori observed that the active force of any enterprise or 
endeavor was “people.  And people have their own will, their own mind, and their own way of 
thinking” (Senge, p. 139).  As presented by Senge, Inamori’s concept of personal mastery from a 
leadership point of view involves “tapping the potential of people” (Senge, p. 140).  Such 
personal mastery “will require new understanding of the ‘subconscious mind,’ ‘willpower,’ and 
‘action of the heart …  sincere desire to serve the world’” (Senge, p. 140).   I haven’t read, either 
in the legislation or in any of the reports about NCLB, anything related to Inamori’s conception.  
So, it would appear that from a personal mastery standpoint, NCLB at best only meets about half 
of the criteria and at worst, a much smaller amount.   
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 Shared vision. 
 What about shared vision?  With its unilateral imposition of penalties, sanctions, and 
targets, NCLB in effect has announced that their voice is, and shall be, the only one that matters.  
To avoid the penalties and negative sanctions of NCLB, state systems of public education need 
to adopt NCLB’s mental model, inconsistencies and conflicts with research notwithstanding.  To 
assume that such an approach represents a shared vision stretches credulity.  If by shared, one 
means a vision that is developed mutually, then there is no shared vision.  If by shared vision, 
one refers to the governmental concept of federalism regarding how power is distributed and 
shared between the federal and state levels, NCLB also falls short (see Christensen, pp. 1-2, 15-
17 and Stilwill, 2003, May 14, pp. 1, 9-10).  According to Senge, “Shared visions emerge from 
personal visions.  This is how they derive their energy and how they foster commitment” (Senge, 
p. 211).  Furthermore, in Senge’s view, “Organizations intent on building shared visions 
continually encourage members to develop their personal visions” (Senge, p. 211).   This does 
not appear to be the intent of NCLB.  Finally, building shared visions requires organizations and 
governments “to give up traditional notions that visions are always announced from ‘on high’” 
(Senge, p. 213).  Few, if any, think that NCLB represents the federal government’s intent to give 
up such a traditional notion.  All of the evidence suggests that NCLB is not about sharing, but 
about complying.  Both Commissioner Doug Christensen in Nebraska and recently retired 
Director Ted Stilwill in Iowa share that viewpoint.  Referring to the No Child Left Behind Act, 
Dr. Christensen noted: 
It does nothing to foster leadership.  It creates an environment that I think is 
just absolutely contrary to (fostering leadership) in that it’s a compliance 
environment.  It’s compliance with the rules, it’s test-bound, which is – you 
know, I believe that assessment is a very valuable piece of learning how to 
teach and teach well and (for) improving teaching, but this isn’t about 
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assessment; this is about testing.  And testing becomes a compliance 
document.  (Christensen, p. 21) 
 
Noting that Iowa’s educational system provided evidence that pride and local control were 
effective in promoting change, Director Stilwill observed that policy makers “have to move 
beyond what’s almost an exclusive emphasis on accountability as a mechanism to increase 
productivity.”  He continued: 
If there’s a flaw in our thinking at the moment nationally, it’s that simply 
tightening up on accountability – and it’s sometimes described as creating a 
situation where, you know, shame and fear drive the agenda – I think we 
know, we have ample evidence from work at both the public and private 
sector, that those are short-term strategies.  (Stilwill, 2003, May 14, pp. 5-6) 
 
Since sharing and compliance are such different concepts in terms of mutuality between partners, 
I don’t believe NCLB currently involves developing a shared vision within the context presented 
by Senge. 
 Team learning. 
 Because NCLB’s basic orientation focuses upon compliance and because it raises 
concerns about violations of federalism, the No Child Left Behind Act also comes up short with 
regards to team learning.  There can be little idea of a team concept when pronouncements are 
announced from “on high” with no input from either state educational leaders or from educators 
at any level.  With respect to NCLB, shared visions and team learning are intertwined with each 
other.  The issues underlying shared vision and team learning raise ethical concerns about both 
how and why the law was written.  A report in the New York Times described the NCLB bill as 
having been “written largely by the White House” (Rothstein, 2001, p. D9).  One of the chief 
architects of NCLB, Margaret Spellings, first served as the political director of Bush’s 1994 
campaign for governor of Texas before being subsequently elevated, first, to chief educational 
advisor for Texas Governor Bush, then to Chief Domestic Policy Advisor to President Bush, and 
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finally, nominated by President Bush to replace Rod Paige as Secretary of Education.12  
According to both Christensen and Stilwill, NCLB was written behind closed doors without 
input from the states or from educators.13  NCLB was such a closely guarded secret that 
legislators voted on it without knowing the particulars.  According to the Nebraska 
Commissioner of Education: 
So they voted for it, assuming that certainly, how could it be doing any 
harm, the idea of No Child Left Behind, the idea of more money, the idea of 
flexibility.  And so they adopted all the buzzwords, and I don’t think 
probably you could find on one hand the number of people who actually 
read the twelve hundred pages of the bill.  And it was written behind a 
closed door.  Nobody found out.  Until it hit the floor, our Senators and 
Congressmen could not find out what was the content of the legislation.  
Because it was done behind closed doors, and they wouldn’t tell anybody.  
(Christensen, pp. 4-5) 
 
Ted Stilwill, Iowa Director of Education during the time NCLB was passed and initially 
implemented, also noted that the Iowa congressional delegation didn’t understand what they 
were voting on or how the law would “play out” when they approved NCLB. 
[T]hey didn’t realize it was going to have this kind of an impact on Iowa, 
they thought, because of Iowa’s lead position perhaps much of this law 
might not apply.  And I know that that happens…  They have to make a lot 
of assumptions that other people have done that kind of homework.  
(Stilwill, 2003, May 14, pp. 1-2) 
 
And when the text was made available after the voting had taken place, its sheer massiveness 
(more than 1,200 pages) prevented either an immediate or clear understanding.  Then there was 
the intent on the part of some legislators to use NCLB as a means to discredit public education in 
order to pave the way for vouchers for private schools.  Christensen noted that “you can’t have a 
conversation about alternatives to public education until you can prove that public education 
isn’t working” (Janson, 2003, p. 5).  In characterizing the intent of NCLB, Christensen stated: 
[T]his is not about improving public education.  This is about embarrassing 
public education, so that we can have a conversation about choice and 
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vouchers and charter schools.  Because if it was about improving public 
education, we wouldn’t do it this way.  Nobody would.  I mean even the 
staunchest Republicans would not do it this way.  (Janson, 2003, pp. 5-6) 
 
Christensen’s premonition about NCLB appeared to be coming to fruition earlier than 
anticipated.  As Christensen viewed NCLB, “[I]t sets schools up [because] at some point, 
virtually every school is going to hit the wall, like running a marathon” (Christensen, p. 15).  
According to the Chicago Tribune, “In Illinois, nearly 60 percent of districts either have run 
afoul of the law or have a school that has done so” (Banchero & Little, p. 9).  As of November 
12, 2004, approximately 51% of the state’s districts faced sanctions unless test scores improved.   
A Tribune analysis of the state data shows that the biggest stumbling block 
for districts was the performance of special education students.  Of the 400 
districts that had enough special education students to total a subgroup, 
nearly three-quarters of them failed to meet the state testing standards in 
special education reading.  (Banchero & Little, p. 9) 
 
The catch was that the schools being labeled included schools that enjoy a positive reputation for 
educational excellence, schools like New Trier, Lake Forest, Hinsdale, and Franklin Park, all 
western suburbs of Chicago.   According to the Chicago Tribune, 
By most measure, Franklin Park School District 84 in west suburban Cook 
County is a success. 
 
Roughly 70 percent of its students passed state achievement exams last year.  
All four of its schools met – and in most cases overwhelmingly surpassed – 
the testing standards of the federal No Child Left Behind Act.  Its class sizes 
are smaller than average. 
  
But the 1,300-pupil system suddenly finds itself in a peculiar and unenviable 
position, labeled as a troubled district by the federal government… 
  
The story is much the same across the nation, where some of the best-
regarded school districts are being tripped up by nuances of the complicated 
and controversial federal education reform.  Their inclusion on the list of 
troubled districts is inflaming the debate already raging over the law, which 
some educators and lawmakers argue is deeply flawed and focuses too much 
on testing.  (Banchero & Little, pp. 1,9) 
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As mentioned earlier, it is not certain that Christensen thought his premonition would 
play out as quickly as seemed to be the case in November of 2004, barely into the third 
year of implementation. 
Stilwill also observed that some of the legislators’ votes in favor of NCLB occurred 
because the individuals were “not terribly strong advocates of public schools.”  These legislators, 
according to Stilwill, “viewed public education as monopolistic and as part of the problem, not 
part of the solution” (Janson, 2003, p. 7).  The public interest was ignored in favor of private 
interests on the part of some legislators.  Such actions did not constitute “good work” as defined 
by Gardner, Csikszentmihalyi, & Damon (2001) in Good Work: When Excellence and Ethics 
Meet.  According to the authors, good work results from “melding expertise with moral 
distinction” (Gardner, Csikszentmihalyi, & Damon, p. viii).  With legislators voting for 
legislation in hopes of discrediting public education so that private schools could receive public 
funds through vouchers and charter-school programs, “good work” clearly did not happen with 
the passage of NCLB.  The hope of diverting money away from public education to benefit 
private schools and their clientele could be characterized as a reverse “Robin Hood” attempt to 
redistribute wealth, only this time benefiting those who are already economically comfortable.  
This writer does not believe that undercutting public education for private gain is ethical or that 
such attempts constitute “good work.” 
  Punishment damages the concept embodied by team learning and shared responsibility.  
As both Christensen and Stilwill noted, shaming and sanctions have a poor track record in their 
states regarding systematic change).  The renowned psychologist, B.F. Skinner, also noted the 
ineffectiveness of punishment.  According to Skinner, punishment was less effective than 
positive reinforcement in changing behavior because it:  caused the individual to “avoid being 
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punished” rather than changing the behavior; caused “slower and less learned responses”; trained 
an individual about “what not to do,” but didn’t train them regarding “what to do”; and it caused 
a person to “associate the punishment with the punisher” and not the behavior to be abolished or 
to be modified (Benson, pp. 80-81).  Perhaps the problem is more than NCLB being grounded in 
a negative portion of operant conditioning.  Perhaps the problem is that NCLB is grounded in 
operant conditioning in the first place.  Instead of focusing on punishment or reward, perhaps the 
focus should be on what is needed to improve educational opportunities for all children.  The 
idea that such an approach might be tried appears to be developing currently in Ireland where the 
government is providing additional funds to purchase books in poverty-stricken schools, is 
developing a plan to tackle disadvantage which would include providing incentives for high-
performing teachers to teach in high-poverty areas, and is opposed to shaming schools by 
making a public listing of schools that have lower performing students because of higher poverty 
levels (Flynn, p. 7). 
 Systems thinking. 
 How does NCLB fare when examined from a systems thinking perspective?  With 
regards to federalism as part of the system of American government, not too well. NCLB raises 
constitutional concerns about violations of federalism as defined by the Constitution and 
developed through case law.  Specifically, these concerns focus upon the Guarantee Clause, the 
intersection of Tenth Amendment & the Spending Clause, the Eleventh Amendment, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.   
From a systems perspective which views education as interacting with and dependent 
upon other systems such as families, childcare, and preschool, NCLB doesn’t fare too well once 
again. The approach used by the No Child Left Behind Act towards achievement gaps ignores 
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the shortcomings of other systems impacting the well-being of children in American society.  
From birth through age eighteen, children spend approximately 8% of their total life in an 
instructional setting (see Appendix G).  Yet NCLB places responsibility for the success or failure 
of children to learn solely on the educational system and ignores the systems impacting the 
remaining 92% of children’s lives during the formative and emerging periods of their lives.  The 
failure to systemically address the multiple systems bearing on the well-being of American 
children reveals a significant flaw in NCLB’s use of a system’s viewpoint. 
 Summary of systems thinking & nclb. 
 To summarize, NCLB has serious flaws when analyzed according to the disciplines 
comprising Senge’s view of systems thinking – mental models, personal mastery, shared vision, 
team learning, and systemic thinking.  All of Senge’s disciplines reveal problems with NCLB 
from a systems perspective. 
 What to do?  Incorporating federalism as an operating principle of NCLB will do much to 
meet the problems with shared vision and team learning.  It may even be used to promote 
personal mastery should a state educational system attempt such an approach.  That, at least, was 
part of Iowa’s intent in rejecting student standards in favor of standards for teaching and 
professional development.  Personal mastery undergirds the State of Iowa initiatives in reading 
and math.   
Federalism might also provide a different mental model from that currently embodied in 
NCLB.  In a much quoted Supreme Court dissent, Justice Brandeis articulated the idea of states 
serving as laboratories, particularly in those situations when a solution to an identified problem 
didn't appear to be obvious.   
There must be power in the states and the nation to remold, through 
experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing 
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social and economic needs.  …To stay experimentation in things social and 
economic is a grave responsibility.  Denial of the right to experiment may be 
fraught with serious consequences to the nation.  It is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.  (New State Ice v. 
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311) 
 
By setting a direction (leaving no children behind), by adopting a growth model to benchmark 
progress towards the goal, and by using federalism to encourage states to experiment with a 
variety of approaches to improving the learning of all students, America could systemically 
move forward towards promoting the educational well-being of all children. 
It is questionable that the current No Child Left Behind Act represents a constitutionally 
viable system of federalism.  Two remedies have been suggested to address possible 
constitutional flaws – (1) a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of NCLB in order to 
invalidate the provisions violating federalism, or (2) convincing federal legislators to modify the 
law in a manner that addresses federalism concerns.   
How to incorporate a systems viewpoint still remains a question.  Embracing federalism 
still ignores the systems of families, of childcare, and of preschool education, not to mention 
other systems impacting the well-being of children.  Subsidizing a parent (father or mother) to 
remain at home to be the primary caregiver for young children from birth to age two or three 
because this represents a critical stage in emotional and cognitive development, subsidizing a 
system of licensed child care providers for working families, and providing a free and public 
preschool education for all four-year olds; each of the foregoing begins to address the needs of 
those systems and give recognition to their importance to the educational system.  These and 
other approaches recognize the need to take a systems viewpoint towards the larger issue of 
valuing all children in our society.  None of these approaches has immediate, short-term results.  
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However, their importance to education over the long-haul is well documented in a variety of 
research studies.  A veteran newspaper editor summarized America’s stance with this 
observation:  “We’re the richest nation in the world, yet we view education as an expense, not an 
investment” (Troy, p. 1).  Our systems viewpoint must also embrace the social and emotional 
well-being of children if we truly wish to leave no child behind educationally.  Finally, as will be 
shown, embracing federalism without embracing a systems view focused upon addressing young 
people’s well-being also means we will continue to ignore the negative impact of poverty upon 
both learning and children’s well-being. 
Adaptive Work and NCLB 
 Introduction. 
 The approach used by the No Child Left Behind Act towards achievement gaps ignores 
the shortcomings of other systems impacting the well-being of children in American society.  
From birth through age eighteen, children slightly more than 8% of their total life in a public 
school classroom (see Appendix G).  Yet NCLB places responsibility for the success or failure of 
children to learn solely on the educational system and ignores the systems impacting the 
remaining 92% of children’s lives during the formative and emerging periods of their lives. 
The failure to systemically address the multiple systems bearing on the well-being of 
American children has several consequences.  First, the success in achieving the goal of NCLB 
will be limited as other systems impacting child welfare will not be addressed in any major 
fashion.  Second, and more important, by not recognizing the important role of other systems, we 
will not be making the fundamental changes that need to occur in order for America to be 
recognized as a society that places primary value upon the nation’s children.  Third, we will be 
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delaying the start of the adaptive work that needs to occur in order for us to realize the promise 
of America. 
The agenda, all children learning, is the right one.  The vision of America, equitable 
opportunities for all, is one we still strive to realize.  Slavery wasn’t abolished until 89 years after 
our country’s founding, a founding based upon the recognition that all people are created equal, 
that they are endowed by rights deemed incapable of alienation, that these rights included liberty. 
Women didn’t receive the vote until 147 years after it was proclaimed that “all men are created 
equal.”  The original inhabitants of our land weren’t recognized as citizens until 1924, some 
three hundred years after the first European settlements were established on our shores.  
Segregation in public education wasn’t abolished until 178 years after America declared its 
independence and freedom as a nation, and some 86 years following the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, specifically adopted to protect the freedom granted to the newly freed 
slaves, whereby all people were promised the equal protection of the law.  America’s declaration 
of war on poverty occurred only 38 years ago.  While we have come far in our journey, while we 
have overcome some obstacles to equality of opportunity, we still have far to go.  The gap 
between the vision of America and current realities remains huge.  The work of equal 
opportunities for all as it pertains to public education, if it is to be effective, must be addressed as 
part of a larger, more comprehensive, systemic effort that recognizes the nature of the adaptive 
challenge facing us. 
 Adaptive work. 
Just what is adaptive work?  According to Ronald Heifetz, adaptive work “consists of the 
learning required to address conflicts in the values people hold, or to diminish the gap between 
the values people stand for and the reality they face” (Heifetz, 1994, p. 22).  Viewed over time, 
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our national value system centers on achieving the promise of America.  In each of the 
transformations mentioned earlier, people had to change the way they thought about slavery, 
about women voting, and about segregation.  The nation had to change its image of tribal 
members from that of aboriginal savages to American citizens.  These changes did not come 
easily nor did they happen overnight.  In some instances, the change in attitudes and values 
remains yet a “work in progress.”  As can be seen from the examples given, adaptive work is 
difficult, long-term, and on-going.  It involves problems for which there are no ready or easy 
answers.  Solutions cannot be easily provided within existing frameworks and methods.  Instead 
something new and different must be tried.  In proposing new solutions, it is difficult to foresee 
all of the unintended consequences.  For example, the nation is still struggling with how to best 
provide assistance to those in economic need without creating a culture of dependency. 
Heifetz differentiated between “adaptive” problems, which have no readily apparent 
solutions, and “technical” problems.  According to Heifetz, “Problems are technical in the sense 
that we know already how to respond to them” (Heifetz, 1994, p. 71).  Heifetz cautioned that 
solutions to technical problems were not necessarily easy or unimportant.  “What makes a 
problem technical is not that it is trivial; but simply that its solution already lies within the 
organization’s repertoire” (Heifetz & Linsky, p. 18).  Often technical problems require great 
ingenuity and professional expertise in order to be solved.  Drawing upon his own professional 
medical experience, Heifetz discussed a hospital’s emergency room to illustrate his meaning.  An 
emergency room staff’s solutions to medical problems save lives and are part of a large 
organizational effort.  However, the professional expertise required to solve a problem is not the 
critical criterion that denotes a technical problem.  As Heifetz discussed technical problems, he 
observed that for technical problems, 
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the necessary knowledge about them has been digested and put in the form 
of a legitimized set of known organizational procedures guiding what to do 
and role authorizations guiding who should do it.  For those situations, we 
turn to authority with reasonable expectations.  In our various social 
systems, our authority structures and the norms they maintain govern 
thousands of problem-solving procedures.  (Heifetz, 1994, pp. 71-72) 
 
To summarize, technical problems are those for which solutions are known, even though the 
problem-solving application requires great expertise.  Adaptive problems are those for which 
solutions are not readily apparent or known.  Engaging in work to solve adaptive problems 
requires that leaders be “expert in the management of processes by which the people” come to 
agreement about how to resolve the problem (Heifetz, 1994, p. 85).  Heifetz further noted that 
with adaptive problems, authority must look beyond authoritative solutions.  
Authoritative action may usefully provoke debate, rethinking, and other 
processes of social learning, but then it becomes a tool in a strategy to 
mobilize adaptive work toward a solution, rather than a direct means to 
institute one.  (Heifetz, 1994, p. 87 
 
In working to solve adaptive problems, authority’s primary responsibility is to “induce learning 
by asking hard questions and by recasting people’s expectations to develop their response 
ability” (Heifetz, 1994, p. 84). 
 The underlying goal of NCLB goes beyond education and addresses a fundamental 
question, “How do we as a society fulfill the promise of America for all our nation’s children and 
ensure that no child gets left behind?”  To illustrate the issue, Ron Heifetz drew an unusual 
lesson about children’s well-being from a story held in common by three major religions – 
Judaism, Islam, and Christianity.  The story centers on Abraham’s near-sacrifice of his son, 
Isaac.  Admitting that he dreads confronting the story, Heifetz proposed that perhaps the main 
message of the story is one that our society has yet to recognize and take to heart, the message 
that God no longer wishes us to sacrifice our children (Heifetz, 2004, p. 1).  Instead we need to 
fully confront the issue of children’s well-being in a systemic manner. 
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 Before we instinctively recoil from a message contained in a story centering on child-
sacrifice, perhaps we should consider how we, the world’s longest living democracy, could 
possibly be viewed as tolerating any such practice.  Perhaps part of the evidence lies in the 
absence of adequate day-care for the children of America’s working families, in the absence of 
adequate health care for all of America’s children, and in the inadequate funding provided 
schools working with higher percentages of lower socioeconomic students.  Additional evidence 
points to the fact that we as a nation provide subsidies to a variety of business sectors, but not to 
the parents of children aged birth to three-years-of-age in order to provide the nurturing 
environment so vitally important to health and brain development.  Other industrial nations 
provide subsidies for one parent to stay home with young children until they reach an age of 
three or four, but not America.  Based on figures from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and 
the U.S Census, in 1970 the percent of “Mothers in the Work Force” with children up to age five 
was 28% of women in two-parent families and 50% of women in single-parent families 
(Rubiner, p. 1B).  By 1998 those figures had increased to 78% of women in two-parent families 
and 70% of women in single-parent households (Rubiner, p. 2B).  If one moves beyond the age 
of five to consider figures for working mothers of school-age children, the figures are similar.  In 
1998 the national average in terms of the percentage of school-age children with both parents (in 
a two-parent family) or the only parent (in a single-parent household) working was 66% (Carney, 
p. 1A).  Iowa led the nation with 83.2% of parents of school-age children in the work force 
(Carney, p. 1A).  Following closely behind were North Dakota [83.0%], South Dakota [79.4%], 
Vermont [79.0%], and Nebraska [78.7%] (Carney, p. 8A).  These figures put the idea of quality 
child care, particularly the time periods before-school and after-school, in a different perspective. 
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So perhaps the message contained in the story of Abraham and Isaac does contain some 
relevance for America.   
 The simple fact that we still struggle with the notion of how to provide assistance without 
inadvertently creating a cycle of increasing dependency does not mean that we should abandon 
the effort to seek solutions.  As struggling with the question of how to provide assistance without 
creating dependency has not meant the abandonment of business subsidies and tax breaks for the 
wealthy, neither should it mean the abandonment of our efforts to win the war on poverty.  Nor 
should we refrain from tackling the difficult challenge of creating a  system that will indeed 
leave no child behind.  This will require adaptive work, and it is the task of adaptive leadership 
to expose the internal contradictions between our aspirations and our current position in falling 
short of our goal.  According to Heifetz, the short-term task of leadership lies in keeping us 
focused on our goal and in “making progress on an adaptive challenge.”  The long-term task of 
leadership must focus on “developing adaptive capacity” (Heifetz, 1994, p. 129).  The 
development of adaptive capacity means framing the issue so that adaptive work, systems 
thinking, and federalism form powerful links with which to move forward toward the realization 
of America’s promise for its children and young people. 
 Gaps between the promise of america and current reality. 
So, what are some of the current gaps between current reality and America’s vision for its 
society?  Most disconcerting are the variables associated with poverty and educational 
attainment, especially in terms of comparisons between the United States and other industrialized 
nations, comparisons that show other nations as being further along than is America.   
Of the world's 29 richest nations, the United States' child poverty rate is the second-worst 
of the major industrialized countries according to a report by the U.N. Children's Fund 
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(Associated Press, 2000, p. 7A).  22.4% of American children live in poverty, a rate that is lower 
than only one other country, Mexico, which has 26 % of its children living in poverty, according 
to the report issued by the U.N. Children’s Fund.  Compare the U.S. rate with the top three 
countries – Sweden with 2.6%, Norway with 3.9%, and Finland with 4.3% (Associated Press, 
2000, p. 7A).  According to the news article describing the report, 
The report countered the assumption that more single-parent families mean 
more child poverty.  The study found that Sweden has the highest share of 
children living with one parent but the lowest child-poverty rate.  
(Associated Press, 2000, p. 7A) 
 
The figures in 2000 for U.S. child-poverty rates are not much different from those found 
in 1991.  At that time, "21.5% of American children younger than age 18 lived in families below 
the poverty level" (Taylor, p. 10).  In terms of international comparisons compiled by the 
Children's Defense Fund in 1996, the U.S. ranked "dead last" among the 18 leading 
industrialized nations of the world with poverty rates three times greater than those of France and 
Germany (Taylor, p. 10).  As depressing as these numbers sound, what should alarm educators 
and national leaders is the finding that "there is evidence to suggest that differences on poverty-
related social indicators are associated with differences in school outcomes both internationally 
and nationally" (Taylor, p. 10).   Further evidence linking school achievement and 
socioeconomic factors arises from comparisons of the worlds inhabited by Japanese, German, 
and American children in  Table 2 below (Jaeger, p. 122).   According to Jaeger, “Children in the 
three nations experience vast differences in economic support and family structure and stability 
that are essential to school success” (Jaeger, p. 122).  Evidence cited by Jaeger included the 
following: 
• the U.S. child-poverty rate was more than two times greater than that of West 
German children. 
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• as an indication of family instability the divorce rate for American women 
was approximately three times that of West German women and four times 
that of Japanese women. 
• poverty rates for children living in single-parent homes as well as the percent 
of children living in single-parent homes are highest in the U.S.   
Table 2 






 What do these figures have to do with school learning?  In analyzing the differences in 
achievement scores from the First International Mathematics Study, researchers discovered that 
"virtually all of the variation in mean test scores can be predicted by the child poverty rate" 
(Jaeger, p. 122).  Furthermore, approximately three-fifths of the variation in scores could be 
"predicted by the poverty rate among children in single-parent households" (Jaeger, p. 122).  
Regarding divorce as a factor of family stability, in his analysis of student scores on the Second 
International Mathematics Study, Jaeger concluded that "childhood involvement in divorce alone 
shows similar predictive power with regard to students' mean arithmetic scores" (Jaeger, p. 122).  
His conclusion?  "Societal factors are associated with differences in national performance on 
standardized mathematics tests" (Jaeger, p. 122).   
Poverty was also linked to poor literacy performance in Ireland.  One of the major 
findings of a report from the Education Research Centre was that “up to 30 per cent of primary 
 
Country % of children in single-parent home % of single-parent poverty 
Japan 6% NA 
W. Germany 14% 35% 
United States 25% 50% 
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schoolchildren in poorer areas suffer severe literacy difficulties” (Flynn, p. 7).  According to the 
Minister for Education and Science, this is much higher than would normally be expected.  The 
Minister, Ms. Hanafin, observed, “We know from previous research that about 10 per cent of 
children in our schools would have serious reading difficulties.  Yet this report shows that the 
number of children in designated disadvantaged schools with serious reading difficulties is 
between 25 and 30 percent” (Flynn, p. 7).  Regarding the impact of societal factors on reading, 
general secretary of the Irish National Teachers Organisation [sic], John Carr “said many factors 
which affected literacy standards and educational attainment lay outside the school’s influence.”  
Carr continued: 
For example, one in four children in Ireland lives in families where the 
household income is half of the national average income.  This translates 
into children coming to school hungry, poorly dressed, no books, no money 
for extras.  Is it any wonder there are reading difficulties when this is the 
daily reality for so many children?  Food and clothing, not books, are the 
priorities here.  (Flynn, p. 7) 
 
 Addressing the question, “[Has] research … failed to explore what actually generates 
differences in achievement among school districts and states in America,” a researcher at the 
University of Missouri responded in the negative (Emphasis in original) (Biddle, p. 10).  He 
explained: 
On the contrary, a good deal of research has now appeared concerning the 
real causes of achievement deficits, and evidence from these efforts suggests 
strategies for improving American education that are quite different from 
those being advocated in Washington.  For the purposes of this article, I 
focus on two such causes, both associated with social problems that are 
particularly severe in our country: poor school funding and poverty among 
children.  (Biddle, p. 10) 
 
Focusing on child poverty, Dr. Biddle observed that the child poverty rate in the United States 
“far exceeds that of other industrialized nations” (Biddle, p. 11).  Citing the Luxembourg Income 
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Study that compared income distributions in Western industrialized nations over the course of a 
decade, Biddle pointed to its findings: 
Their figures show that the rate of child poverty in our country is more than 
50% higher than for all other nations studied and five to eight times greater 
than the rates for some nations with which we are often compared with 
regard to educational achievement.  (Emphasis added) (Biddle, p. 11) 
 
He translated child poverty into terms readily understandable to most readers: 
[C]hildren in America [impacted by poverty] are likely to live in 
substandard housing, have an inadequate diet, wear only cast-off or torn 
clothes, lack health insurance, suffer from chronic dental or health problems, 
and be members of a family headed either by a single mother or by two 
over-burdened parents who subsist on welfare or work long hours at 
miserably paid jobs.  (Biddle, p. 11) 
 
Noting that “poor children … are uniquely handicapped for education because of their poverty,” 
Professor Biddle illustrated the manner in which poverty negatively impacted education (Biddle, 
p. 11): 
The homes of poor children provide little access to the books, writing 
materials, computers, and other supports for education that are normally 
present in middle-class or affluent homes in America.  Impoverished 
students are also distracted by chronic pain and disease; have poorer 
nourishment; tend to live in communities that are afflicted by physical 
decay, serous crime, gangs, and drugs; and must face problems in their 
personal lives because their parents or older siblings have left home, died, 
been incarcerated, or lead seriously disturbed lives.  (Biddle, p. 11) 
 
Having noted and illustrated the negative impact exerted by child poverty upon education, Dr. 
Biddle pointed to a “general unwillingness to debate or even think about poverty and its impact 
within the current political climate in America” (Biddle, p. 11).  He declared: 
This is absurd when it comes to poverty and education.  Child poverty is not 
only a huge social problem in our country but also an obvious generator of 
educational difficulties, and it deserves at least as much attention as any 
other component of (dis)advantage.  (Biddle, p. 11) 
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 Comparative statistical information about children's well-being has not drawn much 
attention in the United States.   Perhaps part of the reason for the silence and inattention is an 
unconscious recognition of the complexity of the problem.  Perhaps the silence lies in the 
absence of anyone being clearly responsible for the problem.  And perhaps part of the inattention 
lies in the absence of any clearly defined solution to the problem of America being at the bottom 
of the heap when children's well-being is compared across industrialized countries.  But perhaps 
another indicator of why such figures cause no public outrage is the finding cited by another 
researcher:  "Of all industrialized nations, the United States and South Africa accept the least 
public responsibility for young children" (Lubeck, p. 471).  The mind-set driving such an attitude 
was summarized in this fashion: 
Despite the fact that government plays an increasingly prominent role in 
people's lives, the ideology of private responsibility remains firmly etched in 
the American consciousness.  Child bearing and rearing are perceived to be 
a parental/family responsibility, and it is primarily parents who finance child 
care and early education for their children.  The inability to provide well for 
children, to afford child care or decent housing or needed health care, has 
thus signaled individual rather than structural failure [emphasis mine].  
Although recent efforts to increase public responsibility for young children 
in the United States have shown some success, the ideology of 
individualism and private responsibility continues to hamper the 
development of a coherent family policy.  (Lubeck, p. 472) 
 
To illustrate the differences in responsibility assumed by families as compared to the federal 
government according to monies expended, examine the following figures.  Parents expended $12 
billion in 1989 compared to federal expenditures of $6.8 million in 1988 (Lubeck, p. 488, n. 25).    
 How does this compare with other major industrialized countries?  In France, except for 
those opting out, 100% of all children receive free preschool education between the ages of three 
and six while about "30% of infants and toddlers receive subsidized childcare" (Taylor, p. 11).  
During the same period, approximately 30% of American children received a preschool education 
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– there was no breakdown between private preschools and publicly-funded Head Start preschools 
in terms of percentages (Taylor, p. 11).  So, comparatively speaking, American society does not 
fare well when examining publicly funded preschool and subsidized childcare.  One researcher 
spelled out exactly what was not being provided by the United States that was provided by many 
of the world’s industrialized nations. 
Above all, the U.S. does not provide various tax-supported services, 
common in other industrialized nations, that serve the needs of poor 
children: a national health care system, tax-supported preschools, paid 
leaves for child and prenatal care, universal child allowances, child-support 
programs for single parents, safety nets for families with special needs, and 
secure unemployment or low-wage supplemental income programs.  
(Biddle, p. 11) 
 
 How do we fare in terms of moving families out of poverty?  According to a Children's 
Defense Fund study conducted in 1994 that compared performances of eight industrialized 
countries, the U.S. ranked last.  For the period 1984–1987, Table 3 below shows performances of 
three countries in terms of lifting low-income children's families out of poverty (Taylor, p. 11): 
Table 3 





 Not only do we compare poorly with other industrialized nations, the picture inside the 
United States got worse for poor children and for single-mother households during the last 
decade of the twentieth century according to a study completed in 1999 by the Center on Budget 
and Policy Priorities.  The study reported that “only 40 of 100 poor children received assistance 
in 1998, the lowest since the 1970s” (Mathis, 1999, p. 8A).  In addition, the “average income for 
 
 Country  % of Low-Income Families w/children Lifted Out of Poverty 
 France 78.2% 
 Germany 66.7% 
 U.S. 8.5% 
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the most destitute single-mother households fell from $8,624 in 1995 to $8,047 in 1997” 
(Mathis, 1999, p. 8A).  When you take inflation into account, the decline in income worsens.  
Figures for the change in family incomes from 1977-1988 for the lowest income deciles also 
show declines.  For the lowest income group the decline, expressed in terms of 1987 dollars, was 
-14.8% (Phillips, 1990, p. 17).  Figures for the second, third, fourth, and fifth income deciles also 
showed lower family incomes: -8.0%, -6.2%, -6.6%, and –6.3% respectively (Phillips, 1990, p. 
17).  Figures for the wealthiest families, those in the tenth income decile, showed a +16.5% 
increase during the same time period (Phillips, 1990, p. 17). 
 For the sake of making a fuller comparison, what happened at the other end of the 
socioeconomic scale during the 1990s and beyond?  Was the worsening economic situation at the 
lower end duplicated by a similar economic decline at the upper economic levels of American 
society?  Quite the opposite, according to financial figures from a variety of sources.  From 1996 
through 1999 the number of millionaire households increased by 67% (Bounds, p. B1).  Or, 
during the decade between 1989 and 1999, the number of millionaire households witnessed a 
200% increase (Bounds, p. B1).   
 Nor did the 21st Century witness a decline in the number of American millionaires.  
According to figures from Merrill Lynch and Capgemini, the number of millionaires increased 
by 14% from 2003 to 2004 (Gilliganaire, p. 30).  More recently figures from Forbes indicated 
that the number of billionaires worldwide increased by 17.8% from 2004 to 2005 (Kroll & 
Goldman, p. 125).  While one might initially question the significance of worldwide figures for 
America, closer examination reveals an overwhelming dominance of Americans on the Forbes’ 
list of billionaires.  First, Americans Bill Gates and Warren Buffett head the list.  Of all the 
countries in the world, Americans represent 50% of the top ten richest people in the world.  If 
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you expand the list to the top 20 wealthiest people, Americans represent 55%.  If one further 
expands the list to include the top 50 of the world’s richest persons, Americans still constitute 
50% of the world’s total billionaires (Kroll & Goldman, pp. 125, 166).  As Forbes noted, “The 
rich had a good year” (Kroll & Goldman, p. 125). 
 An economist characterized the differing situations between the richest and poorest 
segments of American society in the following manner. 
By the close of the 1990s the United States had become more unequal than 
at any other time since the dawn of the New Deal – indeed, it was the most 
unequal society in the advanced democratic world.  The top 20 percent of 
households earned 56 percent of the nation’s income and commanded an 
astonishing 83 percent of the nation’s wealth.  Even more striking, the top 
one percent earned about 17 percent of national income and owned 38 
percent of national wealth… 
 
In contrast, the bottom 40 percent of Americans earned just 10 percent of 
the nation’s income and owned less than one percent of the nation’s wealth.  
(Boshara, pp. 91-92) 
 
Another researcher pointed to the cause of increased child poverty and the increasing inequitable 
distribution of wealth in the nation: 
For one thing, recent shifts in the industrial culture, political climate, and tax 
laws of our nation have generated a massive upward redistribution of 
income and wealth – away from poor and middle-class Americans and into 
the hands of the super rich.  (Biddle, p. 11) 
 
 More recent data about income inequalities in America suggest the situation has 
worsened for lower income groups and the families therein.  In 2007, figures for the top 1% of 
the wealthiest income group indicated a disturbing comparison with similar figures for 1928, the 
year before the Great Depression commenced.  According to Robert Reich, former U.S. 
Secretary of Labor and currently a professor of public policy at the University of California, 
Berkeley, “surging inequality” in America was responsible for both the Great Depression 
(viewed as beginning with the stock market crash in 1929) and the Great Recession of 2008: 
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[I]n 1928 the richest 1 percent of Americans received 23.9 percent of the 
nation’s total income.  After that, the share going to the richest 1 percent 
steadily declined.  New Deal reforms, followed by World War II, the GI Bill 
and the Great Society expanded the circle of prosperity.  By the late 1970s 
the top 1 percent raked in only 8 to 9 percent of America’s total annual 
income.  But after that, inequality began to widen again, and income 
reconcentrated at the top.  By 2007 the richest 1 percent were back to where 
they were in 1928 – with 23.5 percent of the total.  (Reich, p. 13) 
 
Jeff Madrick, senior fellow at the Roosevelt Institute and the Schwartz Center for Economic 
Policy Analysis, confirmed Reich’s figures for the top 1% and related that to a decreased share to 
total income for the bottom.  Madrick articulated his economic analysis:  
[T]he top 1 percent of families made 23.5% of all income in 2007, including 
capital gains, compared with less than 10 percent in the early 1970s.  It 
hadn’t risen nearly to that level since 1928….  In sum, the top fifth of 
families increased their share of total income from 41.1 percent in 1973 to 
47.3 percent in 2007.  The bottom 80 percent lost share.  (Madrick, p. 21) 
 
Dean Baker, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, stated that “rising 
inequality is at the center of the current economic crisis [of 2008+]” (Baker, p. 17).  He attributed 
the cause to government policy.  According to Baker: 
The first Great Depression was not just the result of mistaken policy during 
the initial banking crisis; it was caused by ten years of inadequate policy 
response…  And since that increase in inequality [the Great Recession of 
2008+] was not a natural process but the result of conscious policy, it can be 
reversed….  [U]nions have long been a major force in reducing inequality.  
Whatever can be done to protect the right to organize and allow workers the 
option of joining unions will help to reduce inequality.  It is not difficult to 
develop policies to reduce the inequality that has given us a crisis-prone 
economy.  The problem is getting the political will.  (Baker, p. 16; p. 17) 
 
Currently, then, we’re seeing an increase in poverty as a result of public policy without a public 
policy designed to systemically address the increasing poverty, a course that puts increasing 
numbers of American families and children at risk and insures that increasing numbers of 
children will get left behind in spite of the public school systems efforts to educate them. 
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 So, what does all of this mean for American schools when their society fails to address 
the larger systemic issues of children's well-being, when it views student failure as a school 
failure, and when it views school failure as an individual family failure?  National efforts to 
change the view of school failure as a structural failure of the nation remain absent.  We continue 
on a course that continues to camouflage the systemic issues of children's well-being in America.  
In the words of one analyst, "The most prosperous nation on earth is failing many children" 
(Jaeger, p. 126).   Dr. Angela Taylor observed that if society intends to expect that students and 
schools in America will measure up to world class standards regarding academic performance, 
then Americans "have every right to expect our political and business leaders to hold themselves 
accountable for implementing policies and business practices that help to ensure 'world class' 
conditions (which) support student learning and achievement" (Taylor, p. 12).  In comparing 
U.S. performance against other industrialized countries that provide structural support for 
families in poverty, Taylor concluded, “Perhaps it's not that the French, Germans, and Japanese 
expect more from  their nations' children but rather that they expect more for them” (Taylor, p. 
12). 
 An editorial in the Des Moines Register two years later made a similar point in discussing 
the situation of latchkey children who leave for school after their parents have left for work and 
who arrive home before their parents complete their day’s work.   
The problem is that society feels little responsibility for making sure good 
child care is available or for assisting lower-income families who can’t fit 
the cost of good child care into their budgets.  It is not just those receiving 
welfare or just off welfare who struggle with this.  Why is Iowa so stingy? 
 
Tough, is the unspoken but loud and clear message.  People shouldn’t have 
children if they can’t manage.  Instead of treating children as treasures, we 
treat them as liabilities.  (Des Moines Register Editorial-page Staff, p. 4AA) 
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Another illustration of the issue of responsibility and expectations emerged from a recent study 
reported in Archives of Pediatrics & Adolescent Medicine that was reported in newspapers.  
According to an article from The Houston Chronicle reprinted in a Midwestern newspaper, the 
study found that as immigrant Hispanic teens became more acclimated to American culture, 
“they become dramatically more sexually active” (The Houston Chronicle, p. 3A).  More 
disturbing was how this finding fit a pre-existing pattern emerging from other research, a pattern 
termed the “Healthy-Immigrant Paradox” (The Houston Chronicle, p. 3A).  According to the 
article, the research findings suggest  
that Hispanics coming to the United States are healthier than second- and 
third-generation U.S. residents from the same countries.  Various research 
has found that less-Americanized Hispanic children have healthier diets, 
better immunization rates, fewer suicide attempts, and decreased use of 
tobacco, alcohol and drugs than more Americanized adolescents.  (The 
Houston Chronicle, p. 3A) 
 
The foregoing are all components of the system of “children’s well-being” which are not 
being addressed by NCLB.  Comparative international data showing our nation’s poor 
performance in addressing children’s well-being includes statistical information about the 
following: 
• child poverty rates; 
• single-parent poverty rates; 
• provision for universal free preschool; and 
• ability to lift low-income families out of poverty. 
Additional information was presented indicating that national child-poverty rates were 
most responsible for the variations in national mean test scores.  Finally, information was 
presented about the increased inequities in the distribution of wealth in this country by 
the end of the twentieth century, a fact that greatly impacts children’s well-being in 
   
   
99
America.  These factors greatly impact children’s ability to benefit from education and to 
make education a life priority, but they are ignored by NCLB. 
Federalism as the Cornerstone for Adaptive Work Applied to Systems Thinking 
 Introduction. 
Closing the gap between the promise of America and current reality requires adaptive 
work.  Attitudes must be changed regarding how best to promote the well-being of America’s 
children and young people in order to truly ensure that “No Child Will Be Left Behind.”  This 
researcher believes the adaptive work must take place within a systems framework if we are 
serous about impacting the well-being of children and young people since more than the 
educational system impacts their lives.  And since the answers and approaches to addressing the 
problem of children’s well-being are not obvious, we need experimentation.  America faced the 
threat to its economic well-being in much the same fashion during the Great Depression with the 
New Deal programs in which both the states and federal agencies served as experimental 
laboratories for finding workable solutions.  Changing the way we view our world links systems 
thinking and adaptive work, according to Senge.  “Eventually, systems thinking forms a rich 
language for describing a vast array of interrelationships and patterns of change.  Ultimately it 
simplifies life by helping us see the deeper patterns lying behind the events and details” 
(Emphasis Senge) (Senge, p. 73). 
 Benefits of federalism. 
 Contemporary thinkers and Supreme Court justices have identified at least four benefits 
of America’s federal system of government.  First is the ability of state governments to check the 
oppression of the federal government through lobbying Congress and litigation.14  Thus far no 
states have initiated legal action, but legal action is being considered regarding the issue of 
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unfunded federal mandates and NCLB.  This writer is unaware of any pending legal challenges 
based upon constitutional issues.  However, several state legislatures have approved legislation 
calling either for exemptions from NCLB or for changes to be made in NCLB. 
 Second is the ability of state and local governments to involve citizens in the political 
process by training citizens in democracy through participation and by promoting accountability, 
thus enhancing voter confidence in the democratic process.  Local governments have a greater 
ability to allow individuals to actively participate in governmental decision-making.15  Iowa’s 
educational system of “local control” regarding education provides a prime example. 
The third benefit of federalism lies in its ability to provide diversity by allowing citizens 
in each region of the country (or state) to create the political and social climate they desire.16  For 
example, Iowa annually devotes over 60% of its state budget to building and sustaining a pre-
eminent educational system (see Appendix H)17 that results in Iowa having the highest adult 
literacy rate in the nation18 as well as having the top city (Iowa City) in the country in terms of 
college-educated adults as a percentage of the city’s total population (see Appendix I)19. 
In a much quoted dissent, Justice Brandeis articulated a fourth benefit of America’s 
federal system of government when he observed that each state is allowed to “serve as a 
laboratory” that may “try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country” (New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311).  Justices in subsequent Supreme 
Court rulings have frequently cited Justice Brandeis’ defense of state autonomy as a bulwark of 
federalism.20  Examples of programs that originated in state legislatures prior to proving their 
worth and being expanded into nationwide programs include unemployment compensation, 
minimum wage laws, no-fault insurance, public financing of political campaigns, hospital cost 
containment, and prohibitions against discrimination in housing and employment (Merritt, p. 9).  
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Thus the distribution of power among fifty-one different governments in a federal scheme 
supports the notion of strong state governments as a major source of innovation and 
experimentation.  Iowa’s system of “local control” for education provides a prime example, not 
only of the power to be innovative, but also for that innovation to have enough strength to resist 
the lemming-like rush to leap into the abyss of educational decisions being made at a level far 
removed from the learner.  Such an approach caused one national educational commentator to 
refer to Iowa as “the last bastion of sanity” (Bracey, p. 1). 
Summary 
 This chapter viewed the No Child Left Behind Act through the lens of two policy 
frameworks, that of systems thinking and that of adaptive work.  Peter Senge’s model for 
systems analysis was presented.  Each of the five disciplines forming the core of Senge’s system 
– mental model, personal mastery, shared vision, team learning, and systems thinking – was 
explained before examining NCLB against the standards posed by each discipline.  Following 
this examination, a summary of the analysis was presented within the context of federalism.  
Next, Ronald Heifetz’ concept of adaptive work was explained.  Data regarding the well-being of 
families and children in America were also presented and examined comparatively, both in terms 
of similar data from other nations around the world and with the model of adaptive work.  Issues 
of poverty and of poverty’s impact on student learning were addressed as well.  Comparative 
data was shared indicating that the U.S. is one of the world’s least effective industrialized nations 
in confronting poverty as a public policy priority.  Finally, adaptive work, systems thinking, and 
federalism were considered as integral partners of a larger concept, that of achieving the goal of 
the NCLB legislation.  Discussion included a consideration of the benefits of federalism. 
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 Thus far this paper has examined NCLB through the perspective of two directors of state 
public education systems, through the frameworks of adaptive work and systems thinking, and 
through the lens of federalism as a policy approach which could incorporate systems thinking 
and adaptive work.  The larger task remains, that of examining whether NCLB is itself 
constitutionally sound with regards to federalism.  The remaining chapters will address the 
constitutional issues undergirding federalism, beginning with the Guarantee Clause. 
 
   
   
103
Chapter 5 
The Guarantee Clause 
Introduction 
 Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution of the United States constitutes, in its entirety, 
what has been termed the Guarantee Clause.  It reads: 
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican 
Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and 
on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature 
cannot be convened) against domestic violence.  (U.S. Constitution, Article 
IV, § 4) 
 
The vagueness of the wording raises many questions.  Which branch of the federal government is 
responsible for implementing this guarantee?  What are the components of a republican 
government?  How is the guarantee to be carried out?  To whom should the states make 
application when threatened with domestic violence?  The lack of specificity calls to mind the 
vagueness of the ancient Greek oracles, capable of multiple interpretations.  One is also 
reminded of Winston Churchill’s characterization of Russia as “a riddle wrapped in a mystery 
inside an enigma” (Bartlett, p. 920b [Radio broadcast, October 1, 1939]). 
Historical Background 
 Several sources, ranging from the Constitutional Convention to the subsequent 
ratification debates in the various states, combine to suggest that the Guarantee Clause was 
intended to limit federal intrusions into state autonomy.  First, the Virginia Plan for a federal 
Constitution as presented by Edmund Randolph on May 29, 1787, included language similar to 
the actual Guarantee Clause that emerged from the Philadelphia proceedings:  “11.  Resd. That a 
Republican Government and the territory of each State, except in the instance of a voluntary 
junction of Government & territory, ought to be guaranteed by the United States to each State” 
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(Farrand, I, p. 22).  Prior to introducing the Virginia Plan, Randolph had noted the deficiencies of 
the Confederation and had concluded that the remedy needed to proceed according to “the 
republican principle” (Farrand, I, p. 19).  This was expanded by Paterson’s notes of Randolph’s 
same presentation whereby he listed the Guarantee under the heading, “Checks upon the Legv. 
And Ex. Powers” and noted “A Guary. By the United States to each State of its Territory, etc.” 
(Farrand, I, p. 28).  In a subsequent discussion regarding a “national Legislature,” Randolph 
provided further clarification two days later when he “disclaimed any intention to give indefinite 
powers to the national Legislature, declaring that he was entirely opposed to such an inroad on 
the State jurisdictions” (Farrand, I, p. 53).   
 A second source points to the Framers viewing the Guarantee Clause as protecting states 
from undesired federal intrusions into state sovereignty.  Writing in The Federalist Papers 
Alexander Hamilton observed: 
The inordinate pride of State importance has suggested to some minds an 
objection to the principle of a guaranty in the federal government as 
involving an officious interference in the domestic concerns of the members.  
A scruple of this kind would deprive us of one of the principal advantages to 
be expected from union, and can only flow from a misapprehension of the 
nature of the provision itself….  The guaranty could only operate against 
changes to be effected by violence.  (Federalist No. 21, p. 108) 
 
 The ratification debates in the various state conventions furnish yet another source 
indicating that the Guarantee Clause expressed an intent to preserve state sovereignty within a 
framework of federalism at the time the Constitution was being adopted by the people of the 
United States.  Typical are the remarks by Jasper Yeates to the Pennsylvania convention: 
Lest anything, indeed, should be wanting to assure us of the intention of the 
framers of this constitution to preserve the individual sovereignty and 
independence of the States inviolate, we find it expressly declared by the 4th 
article, that “the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union, a 
republican form of government.  (Merritt, p. 31) 
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Political pamphleteers outside of the convention halls in the various states reiterated the same 
points.  For example, a federalist with the pen name of Uncus, arguing in the Maryland Journal, 
that the Guarantee Clause was a restraint on national power, observed that  
[s]o decided have the convention been in not infringing upon the internal 
police of the states, that they ordain in art. 4, sect. 4, that Congress shall not 
only allow, but “shall guarantee to every state in the Union, a republican 
form of government.  (Kaminski et al, p. 58) 
 
Even the opponents of the new Constitution viewed the Guarantee Clause as an effort to protect 
state autonomy.  Anti-federalists argued, however, that the Guarantee Clause lacked the strength 
to achieve its objective.  An anti-federalist using the pseudonym Centinel III wrote an essay that 
appeared in many states which argued that the new Constitution destroyed the various state 
governments in spite of the Guarantee Clause. 
The convention, after vesting all the great and efficient powers of 
sovereignty in general government, insidiously declare by section 4th of 
article 4th, “that the United States shall guarantee to every state in this 
union, a republican form of government;” but of what avail will be the form 
without the reality of freedom.  (Kaminski et al, p. 76) 
 
Thus both the federalists and the anti-federalists recognized the Guarantee Clause as an effort to 
determine the boundaries of federalism between the state and federal governments. 
 The origin of the Guarantee Clause can be traced to Montesquieu’s extensive 
examination of historical republican governments and their failures.  In his Spirit of the Laws, 
Montesquieu observed the following, which in turn was quoted extensively by Alexander 
Hamilton (Federalist No. 9, p. 42): 
If a republic is small, it is destroyed by a foreign force; if it is large, 
it is destroyed by an internal vice. 
Thus it is very likely that ultimately men would have been obliged to 
live forever under the government of one alone if they had not devised a 
kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of republican 
government and the external force of monarchy.  I speak of the federal 
republic. 
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This form of government is an agreement by which many political 
bodies consent to become citizens of the larger state that they want to form.  
It is a society of societies that make a new one, which can be enlarged by 
new associates that unite with it.  (Montesquieu, 1748/2002, Book IX, § 1, 
p. 126) 
 
Montesquieu’s next chapter was entitled, “That the federal constitution should be composed of 
states of the same nature, above all of republican states” (Montesquieu, 1748/2002,  Book IX, § 
2, p. 127).  Montesquieu explained the results of his historical analysis:  “The spirit of monarchy 
is war and enlargement of dominion: peace and moderation are the spirit of a republic.  These 
two kinds of government cannot naturally subsist in a confederate republic” (Montesquieu, 
1748/2002, Book IX, § 2, pp. 127-128).  In other words, for a federal republic to work, its 
constituent societies must also be republican.  James Madison noted as much by stating his 
understanding of Montesquieu’s political writing:  “Governments of dissimilar principles and 
forms have been found less adapted to a federal coalition of any sort than those of a kindred 
nature” (Federalist No. 43, p. 243).  This provided an initial reason for the Guarantee Clause 
being inserted into the Constitution by the Framers. 
In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of 
republican members, the superintending government ought clearly to 
possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchical 
innovations.  The more intimate the nature of such a union may be, the 
greater interest have the members in the political institutions of each other; 
and the greater right to insist that the forms of government under which the 
compact was entered into should be substantially maintained.  (Federalist 
No. 43, p. 242) 
 
Madison continued to clarify the Guarantee Clause from this perspective: 
As long, therefore, as the existing republican forms are continued by the 
States, they are guaranteed by the federal Constitution.  Whenever the States 
may choose to substitute other republican forms, they have a right to do so 
and to claim the federal guaranty for the latter.  The only restriction imposed 
on them is that they shall not exchange republican for anti-republican 
Constitutions…  (Federalist No. 43, p. 243) 
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 Both Hamilton (Federalist No. 9, p. 43) and Madison (Federalist No. 43, pp. 245-246) 
quoted the following advantage of a federal republic as explained by Montesquieu:  “Should a 
popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states, the others are able to quell it.  
Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound” (Montesquieu, 
1748/2002, Book IX, § 1, p. 127).  Accordingly, this became a part of the Guarantee Clause, as 
Madison explained it (Federalist No. 43, p. 244).  Madison raised the issue whether or not this 
addition to the Guarantee Clause agreed with the theory of republican government. 
At first view, it might seem not to square with the republican theory to 
suppose either that a majority have not the right, or that a minority will have 
the force, to subvert a government….  But theoretic reasoning … must be 
qualified by the lessons of practice.  Why may not illicit combinations, for 
purposes of violence be formed….  The existence of a right to interpose will 
generally prevent the necessity of exerting it.  (Federalist No. 43, p. 244) 
 
 Interestingly, this understanding of the Guarantee Clause provided the basis for President 
Abraham Lincoln asking Congress to authorize the war powers of the federal government against 
the rebellion by the southern states.  On July 4, 1861 President Lincoln spoke to a joint session of 
Congress.  Lincoln began framing the issue as one of rebellion and not secession by observing: 
The States have their status in the Union, and they have no other legal 
status.  If they break from this, they can only do so against law and by 
revolution.  The Union, and not themselves separately, procured their 
independence and their liberty.  By conquest or purchase the Union gave 
each of them whatever of independence and liberty it has.  (Richardson, p. 
3228) 
 
After reviewing the actions taken against Fort Sumter, Lincoln declared, “In this act, discarding 
all else, they have forced upon the country the distinct issue, ‘Immediate dissolution or blood’” 
(Richardson, p. 3224).  Lincoln proceeded to discuss the questions raised by events in the South. 
And this issue embraces more than the fate of these United States.  It 
presents to the whole family of man the question whether a constitutional 
republic, or democracy – a government of the people by the same people – 
can or can not maintain its territorial integrity against its own domestic foes.  
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It presents the question whether discontented individuals … can … break up 
their government, and thus practically put an end to free government upon 
the earth.  (Richardson, p. 3224) 
 
Then Lincoln posed the ancient question which has troubled political thinkers since first 
recorded in the conversations began by the ancient Greeks, the question regarding the proper mix 
of freedom and control for democratic government.  He asked, “It forces us to ask, Is there in all 
republics this inherent and fatal weakness?  Must a government of necessity be too strong for the 
liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence” (Richardson, p. 3224)?   
 President Lincoln began framing America’s reply to the ancient question by noting the 
experimental nature of American government. 
Our popular Government has often been called an experiment.  Two points 
in it our people have already settled – the successful establishing and the 
successful administering of it.  One still remains – its successful 
maintenance against a formidable internal attempt to overthrow it.  
(Richardson, p. 3231) 
 
Addressing the question of how America’s experiment with republican government should be 
maintained, Lincoln pointed to the Constitution as a guide. 
Lest there be some uneasiness in the minds of candid men as to what is to be 
the course of the Government toward the Southern States after the rebellion 
shall have been suppressed, the Executive deems it proper to say it will be 
his purpose then, as ever, to be guided by the Constitution…  (Richardson, 
pp. 3231-3232) 
 
Having noted the importance of the Constitution for resolving fundamental issues, President 
Lincoln proceeded directly to the Constitution’s Guarantee Clause. 
The Constitution provides, and all the States have accepted the provision, 
that “the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
republican form of government.”  But if a State may lawfully go out of the 
Union, having done so it may also discard the republican form of 
government; so that to prevent its going out is an indispensable means to the 
end of maintaining the guaranty mentioned; and when an end is lawful and 
obligatory the indispensable means to it are also lawful and obligatory.  
(Richardson, p. 3232) 
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As Lincoln noted, he had no choice but to come before Congress and ask that the war powers of 
the federal government be activated in order to “assure all faithful citizens who have been 
disturbed in their rights of a certain and speedy restoration to them under the Constitution and the 
laws” (Richardson, p. 3232): 
It was with the deepest regret that the Executive found the duty of 
employing the war power in defense of the Government forced upon him.  
He could but perform this duty or surrender the existence of the 
Government.  No compromise by public servants could in this case be a 
cure…  (Richardson, p. 3232) 
 
And in language reminiscent of the ancient Hebrews21, Lincoln concluded his address to the joint 
session of Congress with this exhortation:  “And having thus chosen our course, without guile 
and with pure purpose, let us renew our trust in God and go forward without fear and with manly 
hearts” (Richardson, p. 3232).   
 Having covered much of the Guarantee Clause’s political ground, the next step is to 
explore how the Guarantee Clause was understood judicially.  Other political uses will be 
discussed within the context of legal decisions featuring, either directly or indirectly, the 
Guarantee Clause.  Although attempts were made to use the Guarantee Clause as a basis for 
eliminating slavery, beginning with the Congressional debates in 1819-1820 that culminated in 
the Missouri Compromise, they were unsuccessful because of a number of factors that would 
require a more lengthy explanation than available for this dissertation.  As an English historian 
noted, “The question of the persistence of slavery in the United States can be answered only by 
examining the attitudes of the ascendant race and its ascendant sex” (Brogan, p. 289).  Suffice it 
to say that the majority of adult white males during the first half of the nineteenth century held 
racist views towards non-whites in general and towards black people in particular.22  Another 
contributing factor included Southern domination of Congress and the Supreme Court.  Five of 
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the seven Supreme Court justices in the Dred Scott decision were from Southern states and were 
proslavery (Brogan, p. 315; Hall, 1992, p. 859).  The Wilmot Proviso prohibiting slavery in any 
territories emerging in the aftermath of the Mexican War could not be passed.  Other legislation 
favoring the Northern states could not be passed by Congress until the Southern congressman 
withdrew following their states’ secession from the Union, e.g., a protective tariff on English 
imports, a Homestead Act, and an act providing for the Transcontinental Railroad, all of which 
the Southern states viewed as threatening to the continued existence and expansion of slavery.  
Anti-slavery forces were insufficient in both number and strength to stop passage of the Fugitive 
Slave Law.  Historians have identified the “Three-fifths Clause” of the Constitution (Art. 1, § 2, 
¶ 3) as the mechanism responsible for such Southern dominance.23 
Restricting further discussion of political uses of the Guarantee Clause only to those 
occurring within the context of legal decisions, the remainder of the chapter will be devoted to an 
examination of various court cases that featured Guarantee Clause questions and the court’s 
interpretations of the Guarantee Clause.  The court cases are divided into categories reflecting 
major interpretations of the Guarantee Clause and its applicability to the facts and issues of the 
case: 
• The Guarantee Clause requires federal intervention to restore republican government 
to the state; 
• The Guarantee Clause requires federal intervention to secure protection against 
abusive state governments; 
• The Guarantee Clause requires that legislation be overturned because of its 
unrepublican nature;  
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• The Guarantee Clause prohibits federal intervention so that the state continues to have 
a republican government; and 
• Republican government and racial discrimination. 
Within each category the cases are arranged chronologically.  The case law emerging from the 
various opinions will be summarized at the conclusion of this chapter. 
Case Law of the Guarantee Clause 
The guarantee clause requires federal intervention to restore republican 
government to the state. 
 
 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849). 
 Facts & procedural history. 
 The legal dispute arose within the context of the Industrial Revolution and the Dorr 
Rebellion in Rhode Island over dissatisfaction with the state government which, unlike its sister 
colonies, had never adopted a new constitution following the Declaration of Independence or the 
adoption of either the Articles of Confederation or the Constitution.  Instead it continued to 
operate under a constitution derived from the colonial charter of 1663 from the King of England.  
This constitution operated to disenfranchise large portions of the urban population engaged in 
textile manufacturing while giving disproportionate power to the rural landholders of the state in 
terms of representation.  As a result of this paradox – Rhode Island being one of the “foremost 
among American states in the Industrial Revolution” while at the same time being one of the 
most “backward” among American states in that its constitutional order still derived from a royal 
charter – a state of high tension existed between the verbiage of a constitutional republic and the 
political realities for many of the citizens (Hall, 1992, p. 515). 
Rebuffed in numerous attempts to reform the state government, reformers took the 
Declaration of Independence to mean what it said, that the people could “alter or abolish” 
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oppressive government and could “institute (a) new government.”  Reformers called for and held 
a state convention in 1841 where they drafted a new constitution that addressed the issues of 
urban disenfranchisement and malapportionment of representation.  The new constitution was 
submitted for popular ratification with elections subsequent to its approval.  At the same time, 
the existing charter government submitted a draft constitution of its own; however, it failed to 
garner the votes necessary for ratification.  The new majority of voters under the reform 
constitution elected Thomas Dorr to be the new governor of Rhode Island.  He and the newly 
elected legislators and other officials assembled in May 1842, and began to organize the new 
government. However, the existing governor and legislators refused to cede power and obtained 
a promise from President John Tyler that the federal government would provide military aid if 
violence occurred.  Faced with the refusal of the charter government to step down, Dorr prepared 
to assert the authority of the new government by force with the armed backing of his supporters. 
Armed with the promise of federal support from the President, the extant government on 
June 25, 1842, declared martial law, called out the state militia to enforce the martial law, and 
began a series of arrests.  Under the authority of martial law a militiaman, Luther Borden, broke 
into the home of Martin Luther, a staunch Dorr supporter, and arrested him on June 29, 1842.  
Luther filed an action of trespass against Borden in the Circuit Court of the United States for the 
District of Rhode Island in October 1842 in which he contended “that the charter government 
was displaced, and ceased to have any lawful power” following the ratification of the new 
constitution and subsequent election (p. 38).  The charter government denied that the new 
constitution under which Dorr claimed election had been ratified.  Upon Luther’s offer to “prove 
it by the production of the original ballots, and the original registers of the persons voting,” the 
Circuit Court  
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rejected this evidence, and instructed the jury that the charter government 
and laws under which the defendants acted were, at the time the trespass is 
alleged to have been committed, in full force and effect…, and constituted a 
justification of the acts of the defendants as set forth in their pleas.  (p. 38)  
 
In November 1843, the Circuit Court ruled in favor of the defendants.  Plaintiff Martin Luther 
subsequently filed a writ of error to the Supreme Court.   
 Legal question. 
 Was Borden acting under lawful orders when he broke into Luther’s home?  Which of the 
two opposing governments of Rhode Island was the legitimate one – the charter government or 
the government established by the voluntary convention?  What is the substantive content by 
which a republican government is defined?  Who should make the determination of whether or 
not a government is republican as required by Article IV, § 4 of the U.S. Constitution? 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 Daniel Webster, arguing for the defendant, filed four pleas in justification of Borden’s 
actions.  These pleas averred that: first, there existed an insurrection to overthrow the state 
government by force; second, martial law was declared by the state legislature to defend the 
state; third, the plaintiff was “aiding and abetting said insurrection” (p. 2); fourth, the defendant 
Borden, as a member of the state militia, was ordered to arrest the plaintiff Luther under existing 
martial law.  In support of these pleas, the defense presented a series of events to the Court 
showing that the existing charter government had been recognized as the legal government of 
Rhode Island by the King until July 4, 1776, after which it had been recognized as such by 
continental congresses and American governments under both the Articles of Confederation and 
the Constitution.  Webster also reminded the Court that the Constitution guaranteed to each of 
the states “a republican form of government” that included a guarantee “to protect them against 
domestic violence” (p. 32). 
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 Plaintiff’s attorneys began their argument by establishing that since the Declaration of 
Independence, the idea that government is instituted “by the people” for “the benefit, protection, 
and security of the people” was embodied in the Constitution and the frame of government 
established by it; furthermore, such was the “supreme fundamental law of the State of Rhode 
Island” when the events under dispute took place (p. 19).   Since American liberty is based upon 
the idea that “people are capable of self-government” and that American citizens “have an 
inalienable right… to establish and alter or change the constitution” of their government, 
plaintiff’s actions were subject only to the “limitation provided by the United States Constitution, 
that the State government shall be republican” (p. 20).  When the people of Rhode Island adopted 
a new constitution and proceeded elect and organize a new government, the “charter government 
was, ipso facto, dissolved” (p. 21).  Accordingly, all subsequent actions by the charter 
government were void.  The main issue before the Court, according to plaintiff Luther’s 
attorneys, was whether or not the people of Rhode Island had the “right to adopt a State 
constitution for themselves, that constitution establishing a government, republican in form, 
within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States” (p. 21).  If the answer is negative, 
“then the theory of American free governments for the States is unavailable in practice,” which is 
contrary to the constitutional guarantee of republican government for the states (p. 21). 
 Holding & disposition. 
 Framing the Guarantee Clause arguments as a political question, the Court declared: 
But the courts uniformly held that the inquiry proposed to be made belonged 
to the political power and not to the judicial; that it rested with the political 
power to decide whether the charter government had been displaced or not; 
and when that decision was made, the judicial department would be bound 
to take notice of it as the paramount law of the State…  (p. 39) 
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The answer to the political question had already been decided by the charter government of 
Rhode Island.  As a result, the Court held that it would abide by the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court’s decision “that the charter government was the lawful and established government of the 
State during the period in contest, and that those who were in arms against it were insurgents, 
and liable to punishment” (p. 39).  According to Chief Justice Taney: 
The question relates, altogether, to the constitution and laws of that State 
[Rhode Island]; and the well settled rule in this court is, that the courts of the 
United States adopt and follow the decisions of the State courts in questions 
which concern merely the constitution and laws of the State.  (p. 40) 
 
Due to the state of martial law having been declared by the charter government of Rhode Island, 
Borden was “acting under military orders” and was “justified in breaking and entering the 
plaintiff’s house” (p. 45).   
 Court’s rationale. 
 Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion.  The question raised by the plaintiff, which 
government is legal, is a political question, not a judicial one.  None of the state courts have 
recognized this question as a judicial one.   Since the Declaration of Independence, “the political 
department has always determined whether the proposed constitution or amendment was ratified 
or not by the people of the State, and the judicial power has followed its decision” (p. 39).   
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, affirming the conviction of Thomas 
Dorr for treason, had ruled that the political power, according to the laws and institutions of the 
state, had recognized the charter government as being “the lawful and established government of 
the State during the period in contest, and that those who were in arms against it were insurgents, 
and liable to punishment” (p. 39).24  The legal question, then, had already been answered by the 
Rhode Island courts.  “[T]he well settled rule in this court is, that the courts of the United States 
adopt and follow the decisions of the State courts in questions which concern merely the 
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constitution and laws of the State” (p. 40).  As a result, the Court “must therefore regard the 
charter government as the lawful and established government during the time of this contest” (p. 
40).  Since the charter government was the lawfully established government, it had the power to 
protect itself against insurrection and to lawfully arrest insurgents.   
 Finally, in dicta that was separate from the actual holding in the case, the Court discussed 
the Guarantee Clause.  According to Chief Justice Taney, the question of legitimacy under the 
Guarantee Clause  
rests with Congress to decide what government is the established one in a 
State.  For as the United States guarantee to each State a republican 
government, Congress must necessarily decide what government is 
established in the State before it can determine whether it is republican or 
not.  (p. 42) 
 
Since the Constitution “has treated the subject as political in its nature” and has placed the power 
of recognizing a state government in the hands of Congress, “its decision is binding on every 
other department of the government, and could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal” (p. 42).  
For the Court to exercise this power would be “to overstep the boundaries which limit its own 
jurisdiction” (p. 47).   Noting that appeal had been made by the charter government to President 
Tyler and not to Congress for assistance in quelling a domestic rebellion, Chief Justice Taney 
pointed out that Congress had, by its act of February 28, 1795,  given 
the power of deciding whether the exigency [the need to apply to the federal 
government for protection against domestic violence as provided by the 
Guarantee Clause] had arisen upon which the government of the United 
States is bound to interfere … to the President.  (p. 43)  
 
In case there was doubt, the Court cited the language of the act: 
[I]n case of an insurrection in any State against the government thereof, it 
shall be lawful for the President of the United States, on application of the 
legislature of such State or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be 
convened), to call forth such number of the militia of any other State or 
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States, as may be applied for, as he may judge sufficient to suppress such 
insurrection.  (p. 43) 
 
 In sum, the matter of Luther v. Borden was “an action of trespass … for breaking and 
entering” (p. 34).  Determinations regarding questions of which government is to be recognized 
are political questions to be answered by political institutions.  Those determinations had been 
made by the charter government of Rhode Island, the state government recognized by the United 
States Government.  It was the duty of the courts to take cognizance of those decisions.  
Therefore the dismissal of Luther’s suit by the lower court was affirmed by the Supreme Court.  
Much, however, would later be made of the dicta in Luther v. Borden regarding the Guarantee 
Clause by subsequent Courts.  Chief Justice Taney’s “reluctance to assert judicial power in 
Luther affected the constitutional development of the Guarantee Clause for the next century” 
(Hall, 1992, p. 355).  
 Concurring/dissenting opinions. 
 Justice Woodbury wrote a dissenting opinion in which he concurred with the Court’s 
ruling that the question was political and not judicial, but he dissented over the question of 
martial law.  At the time martial law was declared by the legislature, the government of Rhode 
Island was operating under the original English charter which prohibited it from violating the 
laws of England.  Such laws would be those in existence from the time the charter was granted in 
1663 and continuing forward to 1776.  These laws would include Magna Charta, the Petition of 
Right, and the English Bill of Rights, all of which provided limits on martial law.  These limits 
included prohibitions of being levied on entire populations, of being used only during war 
“waged against a public enemy, and then by the ‘military officer’ appointed to command the 
troops so engaged” (p. 68).  The legislative act declaring martial law violated these provisions 
and was therefore unconstitutional.  The arrest of plaintiff Luther was therefore illegal. 
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 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1869). 
 Case summary. 
 The dispute involved bonds that belonged to Texas prior to the Civil War that the 
secession government transferred to White and Charles to raise funds for the rebellion. White 
and Charles subsequently transferred parts of the original transaction to other defendants.  After 
the Civil War the Reconstruction government of Texas filed suit to recover the bonds for the 
state and to enjoin the defendants from receiving any payment from the U.S. for any of the 
bonds.  Defendants White and Charles argued that the action had no authority, that Texas, having 
seceded and not fully restored to the Union, was not “one of the United States of America” and 
was not “competent to file an original bill” in federal courts (p. 717).   
 Chief Justice Salmon Chase wrote for the 5-3 majority.  States do not have a lawful right 
to withdraw from the Union which “was solemnly declared to ‘be perpetual’” as derived from 
the purpose of the Constitution, “to form a more perfect Union” (p. 725).  The Court declared, 
“The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of 
indestructible States” (p. 725).  All actions of the illegal secessionist government in Texas were 
null and void.  Distinguishing between relations or actions and obligations, the Court declared 
that even after the illegal actions, “The obligations of the State, as a member of the Union, and of 
every citizen of the State, as a citizen of the United States, remained perfect and unimpaired.  It 
certainly follows that the State did not cease to be a State” (p. 726).   
 Regarding the question of the right to sue, such requires a state government that is 
“competent to represent the state” (p. 726).  The Reconstruction Acts of Congress and 
subsequent action by the President in appointing commanders for the military districts as 
stipulated by Congress established a competent government and began the duty of the United 
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States to re-establish “the broken relations of the State with the Union” (p. 727).  Even though 
not fully restored to the Union, the provisional government was recognized as the legal 
government by both Congress and the President; therefore, “the suit was instituted and is 
prosecuted by competent authority” (p. 732).  A decree was issued requiring that all bonds be 
restored to Texas.  White and Charles, as well as other defendants, were enjoined from asserting 
any claims to the bonds. 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 The Guarantee Clause, according to the Court in Texas v. White, provided the legal 
underpinning for the congressional Reconstruction Acts.  In the aftermath of the Civil War, the 
Court noted that “there was no government in the State” (p. 729).  Emancipation of the slaves 
created a “great social change” that “increased the difficulty of the situation” (p. 728).  The 
authority to restore the State to its proper constitutional relations “was derived from the 
obligation of the United States to guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of 
government” (pp. 727-728).  Drawing upon Luther v. Borden, the Court noted that “the power to 
carry into effect the clause of guarantee is primarily a legislative power, and resides in Congress” 
(p. 730).  The Chief Justice quoted from the previous ruling: 
Under the fourth article of the Constitution, it rests with Congress to decide 
what government is the established one in a State.  For, as the United States 
guarantee to each State a republican government, Congress must necessarily 
decide what government is established in the State, before it can determine 
whether it is republican or not.  (p. 730) 
 
Chase concluded,  “And, we think that the principle sanctioned by it may be applied, with even 
more propriety, to the case of a State deprived of all rightful government, by revolutionary 
violence…” (p. 730). 
 White v. Hart, 80 U.S. 646 (1871). 
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 Case summary. 
 The dispute centered on the validity of a promissory note, the subject of which was a 
slave.  The plaintiff sold the defendant a slave in February 1859 and received a promissory note 
that became due in March 1860 with 10% interest from the date of the note.  Having not received 
payment the plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court of Chattooga County.  The defendant argued 
that the Georgia Constitution, as amended in 1868, prohibited the court from considering the 
matter because of the following amended clause:  “Provided, that no court or officer shall have, 
nor shall the General Assembly give, jurisdiction to try, or give judgment on, or enforce any debt 
the consideration of which was a slave or the hire thereof” (p. 648).  The plaintiff argued that the 
U.S. Constitution prohibited states from passing “any law impairing the obligation of contracts” 
(p. 649).  The court agreed with the former argument and gave judgment for the defendant.  The 
plaintiff then appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court, which ruled that since Georgia was “a 
conquered territory” when its constitution was amended under the “dictation and coercion of 
Congress,” and since Congress was not restricted from impairing contracts, the resulting state 
constitution was in reality a congressional action (p. 649).  The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed 
the lower court’s judgment.  White then applied for a writ of error to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
which was granted. 
 Justice Swayne wrote for the majority.  The action of Georgia in amending its 
constitution was both voluntary and valid, and it was accepted and approved by Congress as 
such.  Both during and after the rebellion, the “constitutional duties and obligation” of the 
rebellious states “remained unaffected by the rebellion” (p. 646).  The Court observed, “It is well 
settled by the adjudications of this court, that a State can no more impair the obligation the 
obligation of a contract by adopting a constitution than by passing a law” (p. 652).  Since slavery 
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was legal at the time of the contract, the contract was legal.  The Court noted the inseparability of 
contract validity and the remedy to enforce its provisions, both of which are “parts of the 
obligation which is guaranteed by the Constitution against invasion.  Accordingly, whenever a 
State, in modifying any remedies to enforce a contract, does so in a way to impair substantial 
rights, the attempted modification is within the prohibition of the Constitution, and to that extent 
void” (p. 647).  Georgia’s constitutional amendment “had no effect on a contract made previous 
to it, though the consideration of the contract was a slave” (p. 647).  The Court reversed in favor 
of the plaintiff and remanded the case to the Georgia Supreme Court “with directions to proceed 
in conformity to this opinion” (p. 654). 
 The Chief Justice dissented, noting that slavery and slave contracts “were annulled by the 
thirteenth amendment of the Constitution which abolished slavery” (p. 663).  He also noted that 
the Fourteenth Amendment forbade “compensation for slaves emancipated by the thirteenth…” 
(p. 664).  Because the supreme law of the land acts on slavery and on slave contracts, state 
actions in accordance with the Constitution “cannot be held void as in violation of the original 
Constitution, which forbids the States to pass any law violating the obligation of contracts” (p. 
664). 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 The action of Congress, in accepting and approving Georgia’s amended constitution that 
resulted in full restoration to the Union, constituted a political act, according to White v. Hart.  
Citing Luther v. Borden, the Court observed:  “The action of Congress upon the subject cannot 
be inquired into.  The case is clearly one in which the judicial is bound to follow the action of the 
political department of the government, and is concluded by it” (p. 649). 
 City of Rome v. United States, 472 F.Supp. 221 (1979). 
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 Case summary. 
 The dispute centered on the requirements of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 pursuant to 
the Fifteenth Amendment.  The City of Rome, Georgia brought the action in the U.S. District 
Court, District of Columbia as specified by the Voting Rights Act provisions governing 
disagreements between voting jurisdictions and the U.S. Attorney General.  The U.S. Attorney 
General did not approve the city’s plan of majority vote and run-off provisions because it had the 
effect of discriminating against black voters.  Upon the refusal of the Attorney General to 
reconsider his position, the city government initiated the legal challenge.  The city argued that 
the Fifteenth Amendment required only a showing that the purpose was to discriminate, and that 
requirements centering on effect went beyond congressional authority, according to the Fifteenth 
Amendment. 
 Circuit Judge McGowan wrote the opinion for the three-judge panel.  According to the 
ruling, “Congress was within its broad enforcement power … when it outlawed voting changes 
discriminatory in effect only” (p. 237).  The opinion quoted Chief Justice Warren’s citation in 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 327, of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ex parte 
Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345-46: 
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects 
the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the 
prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of 
perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against 
State denial or invasion if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of 
congressional power.  (pp. 237-238) 
 
According to a finding of the Court, plurality voting in Rome, as opposed to majority voting with 
run-off requirements, would have resulted in a black candidate being elected to the city’s school 
board.  Finding that the effect of Rome’s voting requirements was discriminatory, the Court 
ruled against the plaintiffs and for the defendant.   
   
   
123
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 Although not central to the legal question under consideration, the Court ruled against the 
plaintiff’s assertion that its rights under the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause were 
violated by the Voting Rights Act as passed by Congress.  The Court dismissed the Tenth 
Amendment argument by citing the Supreme Court’s ruling in Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324: 
As against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational 
means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in 
voting.  …The gist of the matter is that the Fifteenth Amendment supersedes 
contrary exertions of state power.  (pp. 240-241). 
 
 Regarding the Guarantee Clause argument, the District Court cited Luther v. Borden as 
determining that such an issue was “generally not justiciable in federal courts” (p. 241).  But, the 
Court continued, the Guarantee Clause actually serves to provide the justification for “an 
affirmative exercise of Congress’ power” in the Voting Rights Act, not a prohibition to such 
action (p. 241).  According to the Court, the purpose of the Voting Rights Act was “to guarantee 
to the covered jurisdiction one essential feature of a truly republican form of government – i.e., 
the equal right of any citizen, irrespective of race or color, to exercise the franchise” (p. 241). 
The guarantee clause requires federal intervention to secure protection against 
abusive state government. 
 
 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
 Case summary. 
 The facts of the case originated in Baltimore where suit was brought by a wharf owner 
who claimed the city owed him for economic losses resulting from the city’s actions to divert 
streams which resulted in silting of the harbor whereby “the water was rendered so shallow that 
it ceased to be useful for vessels of any important burthen” (p. 180).  This resulted in lost income 
and a useless wharf that previously had enjoyed “the deepest water in the harbour” (p. 243).  
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Barron claimed that his property (his ability to operate his wharf business) was taken without just 
compensation as required by the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  Attorneys for the 
mayor and city council of Baltimore argued that the city’s actions were “justified under the 
authority they deduced from the charter of the city, granted by the legislature of Maryland…” (p. 
244). 
 Baltimore County Court found for plaintiff Barron and rendered a verdict of $4,500 
against the city.  The court of appeals reversed the decision of the county court and didn’t 
remand the case for further trial.  Barron, the defendant in the court of appeals, was granted a 
writ of error to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 Chief Justice John Marshall delivered the unanimous decision of the Court.  First, he 
observed that “[t]he constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States 
for themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of the individual states” 
(p. 247).  Given this understanding, Marshall next stated that the “fifth amendment must be 
understood as restraining the power of the general government, not as applicable to the states.  In 
their several constitutions they have imposed such restrictions on their respective governments as 
their own wisdom suggested” (p. 247).  The Chief Justice then made the following observation.  
“Had the framers of these amendments intended them to be limitations on the powers of the state 
governments, they would have imitated the framers of the original constitution, and have 
expressed that intention” (p. 249).  He then delivered the ruling of the Court: 
We are of the opinion that the provision in the fifth amendment to the 
constitution, declaring that private property shall not be taken for public use 
without just compensation, is intended solely as a limitation of the exercise 
of power by the government of the United States, and is not applicable to the 
legislation of the states.  We are therefore of the opinion that there is no 
repugnancy between the several acts of the general assembly of Maryland 
… and the constitution of the United States.  This court, therefore, has no 
jurisdiction of the cause; and it is dismissed.  (p. 249) 
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 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 The significance for the Guarantee Clause is that Barron v. Baltimore withdraws the 
individual rights guaranteed under the Bill of Rights from effective judicial interpretation of 
what constitutes a republican government as applied to state governments.  Such would remain 
the case until the adoption of the post-Civil War amendments. 
 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875). 
 Facts & procedural history. 
 Women’s suffrage constitutes the heart of this legal issue.  Although plaintiff’s argument 
centered on the Fourteenth Amendment, prior to making its ruling the Court discussed its 
understanding of the meaning of republican government as presented by the Guarantee Clause.  
Given the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is not surprising that early attempts by the 
judiciary to rule on the Fourteenth Amendment involved discussion of the Guarantee Clause as it 
provided the basis for both the Civil War amendments and the Reconstruction Acts. 
The abolitionists insisted that the guarantee clause empowered Congress to 
“dictate the form of [a state’s] fundamental code or constitution, with a view 
of rendering it consistent with … [a republican] form of government.”  (12 
Cong. Deb. 4269 (1836) [covering 1824-1837] (Hard).  They were 
convinced that such a government secured the rights of “life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness,” and was founded on the assumption that “all men are 
created equal,” and that “government derives its just powers from the 
consent of the governed.”  See 12 Cong. Deb. 4271-72 (1836) [1824-1837] 
(Hard).  (Cited in Bonfield, 1962, pp. 531-532) 
 
With the abolitionists in control of Congress immediately following the conclusion of the Civil 
War, this argument was resurrected.  As a professor of constitutional law noted: 
The guarantee clause had been mentioned preciously as a possible source of 
congressional power in this area.   …As a result, when the Committee on 
Reconstruction reported out the fourteenth amendment, it resurrected their 
prior reliance on article IV, section 4.  It was from that provision, it 
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concluded, that Congress derived the power to reconstruct the southern 
states and assure equal rights…  (Bonfield, 1962, January, p. 539) 
 
Mrs. Virginia Minor, “a native born, free, white citizen of the United States and of the 
State of Missouri, over the age of twenty-one years” attempted to register to vote in Missouri on 
October 15, 1872 for the general election scheduled to be held in November 1872 (p. 163).  
Happersett, the voter registrar, refused to register Mrs. Minor because “she was not a ‘male 
citizen of the United States,’ but a woman” (pp. 163-164). 
Mrs. Minor filed suit against Happersett in “one of the inferior State courts of Missouri” 
for “willfully refusing to place her name upon the list of registered voters, by which refusal she 
was deprived of her right to vote” (p. 164).  As the Court records note, “The registrar 
demurred…” (p. 164).  The unabridged Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines 
demurrer as “a pleading by a party to a legal action that assumes the truth of the matter alleged 
by the opposite party and sets up that it is insufficient in law to sustain his claim (the opposite 
party’s claim)” (Gove, p. 601).  The lower court sustained Happersett’s demurrer and ruled in his 
favor.  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the demurrer.  Mrs. Minor applied for 
and received a writ of error from the United States Supreme Court. 
 Legal question. 
 Is the right to vote one of the necessary privileges of citizenship?  Does the Fourteenth 
Amendment grant suffrage to women of legal age who meet residency requirements? 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 The Court records noted that “No opposing counsel” appeared for Happersett at the 
Court’s hearing on the issue (p. 164). 
 Minor’s legal arguments began with the assumption that women were citizens and that as 
citizens, they were “entitled to any and all the ‘privileges and immunities’ that belong to such 
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position” (p. 164).  The legal argument next asserted that “the elective franchise is a ‘privilege’ 
of citizenship” and “of the right of the citizen to participate in his or her government” (p. 164).  
Minor’s attorneys further noted that “the Constitution of the United States” as amended by the 
Fourteenth Amendment “expressly declares that ‘no State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” (p. 164).  Minor’s 
legal argument concluded by noting that “the provisions of the Missouri constitution and registry 
law … are in conflict with and must yield to the paramount authority of the Constitution of the 
United States” (p. 164). 
 Holding & disposition. 
 Citizenship does not necessarily include the right of suffrage.  “Neither the Constitution 
nor the fourteenth amendment made all citizens voters” (p. 163).  “[T]he constitutions and laws 
of the several States which commit that important trust [the right to vote] to men alone are not 
necessarily void” (p. 178).  Thus the Court “affirmed the judgment” of the Missouri Supreme 
Court (p. 178).  
 Court’s rationale. 
 Chief Justice Waite delivered the Court’s opinion.  The Court defined citizenship as 
“conveying the idea of membership of a nation, and nothing more” (p. 166).  According to the 
Court, “For nearly ninety years the people have acted upon the idea that the Constitution, when it 
conferred citizenship, did not necessarily confer the right of suffrage” (p. 177).  In the Court’s 
reasoning, citizenship and suffrage were separate entities.  In this light, the Fourteenth 
Amendment had no effect upon citizenship: 
The fourteenth amendment did not affect the citizenship of women any more 
than it did of men.  In this particular, therefore, the rights of Mrs. Minor do 
not depend upon the amendment.  She has always been a citizen from her 
birth, and entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizenship.  The 
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amendment prohibited the State, of which she is a citizen, from abridging 
any of her privileges and immunities as a citizen of the United States; but it 
did not confer citizenship on her.  That she had before its adoption.  (p. 170) 
 
According to the Court, “The Constitution does not define the privileges and immunities of 
citizens” (p. 170).  The Court next noted that the “United States has no voters in the States of its 
own creation.  The elective officers of the United States are all elected directly or indirectly by 
State voters” (p. 170).  The Court continued: 
When the Federal Constitution was adopted, all the States, with the 
exception of Rhode Island and Connecticut, had constitutions of their own.  
These two continued to act under their charters from the Crown.  Upon an 
examination of these constitutions we find that in no State were all citizens 
permitted to vote.  Each State determined for itself who should have that 
power.  (p. 172) 
 
Regarding the issue of women’s suffrage, the Court observed, “Women were excluded from 
suffrage in nearly all the States by the express provisions of their constitutions and laws” (p. 
176).  The Court further noted, “No new State has ever been admitted to the Union which has 
conferred the right of suffrage upon women, and this has never been considered a valid objection 
to her admission” (p. 177).  The Court next referenced the condition of the southern states 
following the Civil War and the impact of the Reconstruction Acts upon their governments 
regarding suffrage. 
Since then the governments of the insurgent States have been reorganized 
under a requirement that before their representatives could be admitted to 
seats in Congress they must have adopted new constitutions, republican in 
form.  In no one of these constitutions was suffrage conferred upon women, 
and yet the States have all been restored to their original position as States in 
the Union.  (p. 177) 
 
Regarding the requirements of the Guarantee Clause, the Court observed, “All these several 
provisions of the Constitution must be construed in connection with the other parts of the 
instrument, and in the light of the surrounding circumstances” (p. 175).  The Court continued: 
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The guaranty is of a republican form of government.  No particular 
government is designated as republican, neither is the exact form to be 
guaranteed, in any manner especially designated.  Here, as in other parts of 
the instrument, we are compelled to resort elsewhere to ascertain what was 
intended. 
 
The guaranty necessarily implies a duty on the part of the States themselves 
to provide such a government.  All the States had governments when the 
Constitution was adopted.  These governments the Constitution did not 
change.  They were accepted precisely as they were…  Thus we have 
unmistakable evidence of what was republican in form, within the meaning 
of that term as employed in the Constitution.  (pp. 175-176) 
 
The Court next linked its previous analysis of the states’ constitutional positions regarding 
women’s suffrage with the provisions of the Guarantee Clause. 
As has been seen, all the citizens of the States were not invested with the 
right of suffrage.  In all, save perhaps New Jersey, this right was only 
bestowed upon men and not upon all of them.  Under these circumstances it 
is certainly now too late to contend that a government is not republican, 
within the meaning of this guaranty in the Constitution, because women are 
not made voters.  (p. 176) 
 
Before announcing the holding of the case, the Court concluded its reasoning by briefly noting 
the Court’s legal limitations and obligations: 
If the law is wrong, it ought to be changed; but the power for that is not with 
us.  …No argument as to woman’s need of suffrage can be considered.  We 
can only act upon her rights as they exist.  It is not for us to look at the 
hardship of withholding.  Our duty is at an end if we find it is within the 
power of a State to withhold.  (p. 178) 
 
 Concurring/dissenting opinions. 
 There were no dissenting opinions as the decision of the Court was unanimous. 
 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
 Case summary. 
 The case originated in the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Louisiana and was 
brought on behalf of two U.S. citizens “of African descent and persons of color,” Levi Nelson 
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and Alexander Tillman.  Cruikshank and other white citizens had banded together to harass and 
frighten black citizens from exercising their rights, particularly their right to vote.  Cruikshank et 
al were charged with violating the congressional Enforcement Act designed to give effect to 
constitutional guarantees.  In what was to become a pattern of judicial noninterference with 
discriminatory actions against black citizens, the Supreme Court denied federal jurisdiction, 
which would not be again asserted until well into the twentieth century of jurisprudence.  Rights 
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights prohibit violations by the federal government, not state 
governments.  “For their protection in its enjoyment, therefore, the people must look to the 
States” (p. 552).  Taking a limited view of federal powers, the Court declared: 
The government of the United States s one of delegated powers alone.  Its 
authority is defined and limited by the Constitution.  All powers not granted 
to it by that instrument are reserved to the States or to the people.  No rights 
can be acquired under the constitution or laws of the Untied States, except 
such as the government of the United States has the authority to grant or 
secure.  All that cannot be so granted or secured are left under the protection 
of the States.  (p. 551) 
 
With regards to the rights of due process and equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, such prohibitions exist against state governments, not individual 
citizens. 
The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; but this adds nothing to 
the rights of one citizen as against another.  It simple furnishes an additional 
guaranty against any encroachment by the States upon the fundamental 
rights which belong to every citizen as a member of society.  (p. 554) 
 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 Sadly enough, in the Court’s reasoning in United States v. Cruikshank, the Guarantee 
Clause was trumped by the States’ Rights argument as grounded in the Tenth Amendment.  
According to the opinion written by Chief Justice Waite, the duty for maintaining citizens rights 
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under a republican government resided in the states’ powers.  The federal government was 
limited only to ensuring that the states did not infringe upon federal rights.  It was powerless to 
act against individual citizens. 
The fourteenth amendment … does not … add any thing to the rights which 
one citizen has under the Constitution against another.  The equality of the 
rights of citizens is a principle of republicanism.  Every republican 
government is in duty bound to protect all its citizens in the enjoyment of 
this principle, if within its power.  That duty was originally assumed by the 
States; and it still remains there.  The only obligation resting upon the 
United States is to see that the States do not deny the right.  This the 
amendment guarantees, but no more.  The power of the national government 
is limited to the enforcement of this guaranty.  (pp. 554-555) 
 
According to the Court, the federal government could not take action to ensure that individual 
citizens respected the rights of others as guaranteed under a republican form of government.  
Such was a state responsibility. 
 In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449 (1891). 
 Case summary. 
 This case reached the Supreme Court on appeal from the U.S. Circuit Court for the 
Western District of Texas.  Dick Duncan had been tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for 
first-degree murder by the State of Texas.  He filed for a writ of habeas corpus with the court 
from which the appeal was granted, arguing that he had been denied due process and the equal 
protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment because of alleged 
irregularities in the passage of Texas’ penal code.  The federal Circuit Court, after conducting a 
hearing on the application, “dismissed the petition and denied the writ,” whereupon the petitioner 
appealed.  Chief Justice Fuller wrote the Court’s opinion.  After citing three Texas court 
decisions affirming the validity of the state’s penal code, the Court observed: 
It is unnecessary to enter upon an examination of the rulings in the different 
States upon the question whether a statute duly authenticated, approved and 
   
   
132
enrolled can be impeached by resort to the journals of the legislature or 
other evidence, for the purpose of establishing that it was not passed in the 
manner prescribed by the state constitution.  The decisions are numerous, 
and the results reached fail of uniformity.  The courts of the United States 
necessarily adopt the adjudication of the state courts on the subject.  (pp. 
455-456) 
 
The Court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court, observing that it was for the state to 
determine “whether certain statutes have or have not binding force” and declaring that “no 
Federal question” had been raised which would give “the courts of the United States jurisdiction 
(p. 462).  
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 The Court, in reaching its decision, commented on the Guarantee Clause as providing the 
constitutional authority for the federal courts to decline jurisdiction when no federal question is 
raised.  Before citing Luther v. Borden, the Court observed: 
By the Constitution, a republican form of government is guaranteed to every 
State in the Union, and the distinguishing feature of that form is the right of 
the people to choose their own officers for governmental administration, and 
pass their own laws in virtue of the legislative power reposed in 
representative bodies, whose legitimate acts may be said to be those of the 
people themselves; but, while the people are thus the source of political 
power, their governments, National and State, have been limited by written 
constitutions, and they have themselves thereby set bounds to their own 
power, as against the sudden impulses of mere majorities.  (p. 461) 
 
 Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135 (1892). 
 Case summary. 
 The issue originated in Nebraska and involved citizenship with a resulting effect upon 
eligibility to hold state office.  Boyd, born in Ireland of parents who immigrated to Ohio when he 
was ten, was elected governor of Nebraska.  Thayer, the previous governor who hadn’t run for 
re-election, sought to invalidate the election results by claiming that Boyd was not a citizen 
because first, his immigrant father didn’t get citizenship papers until after Boyd turned twenty-
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one and second,  because Boyd did not apply for citizenship after reaching legal age.  Because 
the state attorney general would not prosecute the case, Thayer obtained permission from the 
Nebraska Supreme Court “to file an information against James E. Boyd to establish the relator’s 
right to the office of governor of that State, and to oust the respondent therefrom” (p. 137).   
Boyd responded that his father “in open court declared it to be his bona fide intention to 
become a citizen of the United States” on March 5, 1849, and thereafter exercised full rights of 
citizenship, including being elected to public office (p. 139).  Believing that he was a citizen by 
virtue of his father’s declaration, Boyd asserted that he voted in Ohio before moving to Iowa and 
then on to the Nebraska Territory as a young man where he had resided continuously since 
August, 1856.  During his Nebraska residency Boyd had been elected county clerk, had served as 
a U.S. soldier on Nebraska’s frontier, had been elected to the territorial legislature, had also been 
elected to serve in two state constitutional conventions, and had served two terms as Omaha’s 
mayor before being elected governor.  Boyd had continuously exercised his right to vote during 
his tenure in Nebraska.  After learning that his citizenship was being questioned, Boyd had gone 
before the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska “for the purpose of removing all 
doubts that might arise” concerning his citizenship (p. 149).  The U.S. District Court “found, 
determined and adjudged that he was in fact and law a full citizen of the United States” (p. 149). 
The Nebraska Supreme Court, with two of three justices concurring while one dissented, 
ruled that Boyd was not a U.S. citizen as required by the state constitution because his father 
hadn’t received naturalization papers until after Boyd had turned twenty-one.   Accordingly the 
court issued a “judgment of ouster” against Boyd as well as an order reinstating Thayer to the 
governor’s office (p. 150).  Boyd appealed on a writ of error to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
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 The Court began by citing Justice Waite’s observation in United States v. Cruikshank, in 
which he noted, “Citizens are the members of the political community to which they belong” (p. 
158).  The Court asserted its jurisdiction because a defense had been “interposed under the 
Constitution or laws of the United States” that “involved the denial of a right or privilege under 
the Constitution and laws of the United States” and had been overruled by “the highest court of 
the State” (p. 161).   
According to the Court, the critical question involved congressional authority over the 
Nebraska Territory before Nebraska became a state because Boyd had moved to and resided in 
the Nebraska Territory.  “What the State had power to do after its admission is not the question.  
Before Congress let go its hold upon the Territory, it was for Congress to say who were members 
of the political community” (p. 175).  The Court noted that the “organic law under which the 
Territory of Nebraska was organized” stipulated that “every free white male inhabitant above the 
age of twenty-one years who shall be an actual resident of said Territory, and shall possess the 
qualifications hereinafter prescribed, shall be entitled to vote… and shall be eligible to any office 
within the said Territory” (pp. 170-171).  Also, the act of Congress “to enable the people of 
Nebraska to form a constitution and state government, and for the admission of such State into 
the Union on an equal footing with the original states” stipulated that “the inhabitants of … the 
Territory of Nebraska … are hereby authorized to vote for and choose representatives to form a 
convention…” (pp. 172-173).  Finally, the Court cited another ruling by Chief Justice Waite, this 
time from Minor v. Happersett in which he observed, “Whoever, then, was one of the people of 
either of these States when the Constitution of the United States was adopted, became ipso facto 
a citizen – a member of the nation created by its adoption” (p. 176).  Because new states were 
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admitted to the Union “on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever,” 
including “equality of constitutional right and power” (p. 170), Boyd  
was within the intent and meaning, effect and operation of the acts of 
Congress in relation to citizens of the Territory, and was made a citizen of 
the United States and of the State of Nebraska under the organic and 
enabling acts and the act of admission.  (p. 179) 
 
The Court ruled that Boyd was a citizen, reversed the decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court, 
and remanded “the cause” to be “proceeded in according to law and in conformity with this 
opinion” (p. 182). 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 Although the Guarantee Clause was not specifically mentioned in this case except in the 
dissenting opinion, the contents of the case involve the criteria for this section, namely, that 
federal intervention was required in order to uphold the form of republican government.  Boyd 
had been elected governor by the citizens of Nebraska and had been recognized as a citizen by a 
federal court.  The U.S. Supreme Court intervened when the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled to 
oust a duly elected official because the state didn’t recognize Boyd’s citizenship. 
 Justice Field dissented from the Court majority because he viewed the Tenth Amendment 
as putting a limit upon the use of the Guarantee Clause to justify federal interventions in state 
matters. 
In his opinion the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the Nebraska Supreme Court’s 
decision, and thus its ruling constituted unjustified interference in the affairs of a “qualified” 
sovereignty that possessed “only the powers of an independent political organization which are 
not ceded to the general government or prohibited to them by the Constitution” (p. 182).  He 
continued by observing that “the States within the limits of their powers not granted, or, in the 
language of the Tenth Amendment, ‘reserved,’ are as independent of the general government as 
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that government within its sphere is independent of the States” (p. 182).  Justice Field further 
noted that the U.S. government’s  
power of interference with the administration of the affairs of the State and 
the officers through whom they are conducted extends only so far as may be 
necessary to secure to it a republican form of government, and protect it 
against invasion, and also against domestic violence on the application of its 
legislature, or of its executive when that body cannot be convened.  Const. 
Art. IV, sec. 4.  Except as required for these purposes, it can no more 
interfere with the qualifications, election and installation of the state 
officers, than a foreign governments.  And all attempts at interference with 
them in those respects … are in my judgment so many invasions upon the 
reserved rights of the States and assaults upon their constitutional autonomy.  
(p. 183) 
 
 Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900). 
 Facts & procedural history. 
 This is a highly interesting case regarding federalism because of, first, the intertwining of 
the Guarantee Clause and of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and second, 
the dissent offered by Justice John Marshall Harlan that prefigured modern legal reasoning.  
Because of the Court’s previous interpretation of the Guarantee Clause in Luther v. Borden, the 
Court’s majority declined to take jurisdiction.  However, for Justice Harlan, it was the Guarantee 
Clause that made the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that provided the 
basis for his dissent. 
 The facts of the case originated in the gubernatorial election of 1899 in Kentucky.  The 
day before the election the governor (who was not running for re-election) called out the troops 
in Louisville and stationed them at polling places to maintain order, but later alleged for the 
purpose of intimidating Democratic voters.  It was later alleged that the Louisville and Nashville 
Railroad Company and other corporations intimidated their employees under threat of dismissal 
from work into voting for the Republican candidates. 
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 Following the election the State Board of Election Commissioners canvassed the election 
returns as required by Kentucky statute and determined that the Republican ticket of William S. 
Taylor and John Marshall received a higher number of votes than did the Democratic ticket of 
William Goebel and J.C.W. Beckham.  The State Board of Election Commissioners accordingly 
awarded certificates of election to Taylor and Marshall on December 9, 1899, whereupon they 
were sworn into office on December 12, 1899. 
 Within thirty days of the announced results, the losers (Goebel & Beckham) of the 
popular election filed notice as required by Kentucky law that they would contest the results of 
the election.  Kentucky statutes required that each chamber of the General Assembly meet in 
legal session to appoint Boards of Contests to try the election contests.  After being duly sworn, 
the Boards met to separately try the contests, make a decision, and report that decision to the 
respective chamber that appointed the Board.  Each board reached the same conclusion which 
was the opposite of the election results as determined previously by the State Board of Election 
Commissioners, namely that the Democratic candidates, Goebel and Beckham, won the election. 
 Before the results could be reported to the respective legislative bodies, the Democratic 
candidate for governor, William Goebel, was shot on January 30, 1900.  On January 31 the 
Republican governor-elect, William Taylor, declared that “a state of insurrection existed at 
Frankfort” and adjourned the General Assembly until February 6, at which time it was to meet 
not at the State House, but instead at London, Kentucky (p. 562).   
 The Democratic members of the General Assembly defied the Republican governor’s 
order and met on February 2 in the Capitol Hotel in Frankfort since the State House was 
occupied by troops who prohibited legislators from entering.  Each house separately approved 
and adopted the reports of the contest boards, allegedly without notifying the Republican 
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legislators.  Meeting in joint session, both houses formally adopted the reports and declared that 
the Republican candidates, Goebel and Beckham, were the “duly elected Governor and 
Lieutenant Governor” (p. 562).  Both Goebel and Beckham took the oath of office on that same 
day, February 2. 
 The next day, February 3, Goebel died of the wound received on January 30.  As the 
declared Lieutenant Governor, Beckham assumed the office of Governor upon Goebel’s death.  
Taylor and Marshall, the State Board-certified and duly sworn candidates, refused to relinquish 
their offices and the records maintained by each office.  Whereupon Beckham, the legislatively-
declared and duly sworn candidate, filed suit in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County in the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky seeking a judgment of ouster against the defendants, Taylor and 
Marshall. 
 The Circuit Court ruled that the determination of who won the contested election was 
conducted according to the laws of the state, that both Goebel and Beckham were duly sworn, 
and that upon Goebel’s death, the law required Beckham as Lieutenant Governor to assume the 
duties of Governor.  Based upon its findings the Circuit Court issued a judgment of ouster 
against the defendants, Taylor and Marshall.  Taylor and Marshall appealed the decision to the 
Court of Appeals of Kentucky. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court 
by a 6-1 majority.  Specifics of their ruling are discussed in the “rationale” section following 
presentation of the legal questions and arguments since it appears that the Kentucky Court of 
Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court covered much of the same ground.  Subsequently the 
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case under a writ of error.  
 Legal questions. 
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 First, were the actions of the Boards of Contests and of the General Assembly that 
determined Goebel and Beckham as winners of the election conducted in a legal manner?  
Second, did the actions of the Boards of Contests and of the General Assembly deprive Taylor 
and Marshall of a property right without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment?  
Third, in overturning the will of the voters as determined by the State Board of Election 
Commissioners, did the Boards of Contests and the General Assembly deprive the people of 
Kentucky the “benefit of a republican form of government” without due process of law and thus 
violate “provisions of the fourth section of the fourth article of the … Constitution” as well as the 
Fourteenth Amendment (p. 557)? 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 The legal reasoning derives from that used by each party in both proceedings before the 
Kentucky high court and the U.S. Supreme Court.  Plaintiff Beckham argued that the laws of 
Kentucky were followed in determining the winner of the election for governor and lieutenant 
governor.  Plaintiff also argued that the meetings of the General Assembly were legal because 
the governor possessed no power to disband the legislature or to prohibit it from meeting.  The 
“powers of Taylor as Governor and of Marshall as Lieutenant Governor immediately ceased on 
the determination of the contest by the General Assembly” (p. 551).  However, instead of 
relinquishing their offices as required by state law, Taylor and Marshall “usurped the said 
offices” and “refused to surrender the records, archives, journals and papers pertaining to the 
office of Governor, and the possession of the executive offices in the Capitol in the city of 
Frankfort” (p. 551).  Plaintiff Beckham sought a judgment of ouster against the defendants. 
 Defendants Taylor and Marshall argued that the actions of the Boards of Contests and the 
General Assembly were “the result of a conspiracy … to wrongly and unlawfully deprive 
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contestees of their offices” (p. 552).  In support of this position, they claimed that the actions of 
the Boards of Contest and the General Assembly did not follow state laws in that members of the 
Boards were not “fairly drawn by lot, as required by law,” but were instead selected according to 
their political allegiance, that the “Senate lacked a quorum at the time of the pretended adoption 
of the Contest Boards’ reports,” and that the meeting of the General Assembly was illegal 
because Taylor, in his capacity as governor, “refused to permit the members of the General 
Assembly to meet as the General Assembly at Frankfort, because he had preciously adjourned 
the General Assembly to meet on February 6 at London, in Laurel County” (p. 552).  Defendants 
further contended that the meetings of the General Assembly were void because 
the said meetings were held secretly, without any notice to any of the 
Republican members of the General Assembly and without any notice to 
either of these defendants that such meetings were to be held, and without 
any opportunity either to the said Republican members or any of them to be 
present, or any opportunity for either of these defendants to be present at 
such meetings…  (p. 558) 
 
Also, the defendants argued, “the entries on the Journals of the General Assembly were false and 
fraudulent, and made in pursuance of said conspiracy…” (p. 552).  Finally, Taylor and Marshall 
noted, having received certificates of election from the State Board of Election Commissioners, 
defendants received a property interest in their respective offices and “became charged with an 
express public trust for the benefit of the people of the State of Kentucky” (p. 557).  If deprived 
of these offices by the illegal actions of the General Assembly,  
Defendants will be thereby deprived by the State of Kentucky of their 
property without due process of law and both they and the people of 
Kentucky, and the qualified voters thereof will be deprived of their liberty 
without due process of law, and will be denied the benefit of a republican 
form of government, all of which is contrary to the provisions of the fourth 
section of the fourth article of the said Constitution and to the Fourteenth 
Amendment …  (p. 557) 
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Taylor and Marshall requested the Court to dismiss the case, to adjudge Beckham a usurper, and 
to issue a ruling that the defendants (being also the appellants) were the legal governor and 
lieutenant governor of Kentucky. 
 Holding & disposition. 
 The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error, thus affirming the judgment of the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals. 
 Court’s rationale. 
 Kentucky’s high court, the Court of Appeals, ruled that Taylor’s action to dismiss the 
legislature did not meet the state’s constitutional requirements, voided the attempt by Taylor as 
governor-elect to do so, and declared the meeting of the legislature at the Capitol Hotel in 
Frankfort to be a lawful meeting.  On the question of the validity of the Journals of the General 
Assembly, the court ruled  
that evidence aliunde could not be received to impeach the validity of the 
record prescribed by the constitution as evidence of the proceedings of the 
General Assembly, and that the court was without jurisdiction to go behind 
the record thereby made.  (p. 565) 
 
Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court of Appeals determined that public office was 
not property, but “a matter of state policy” (p. 567).  If not property, the “determination of the 
result of an election is purely a political question,” and such proceedings are “not in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment” (p. 567). 
 Chief Justice Fuller wrote the Supreme Court’s opinion upholding the decision reached 
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.  In affirming the Kentucky court’s judgment that a property 
right was not involved, he noted that “the right to hold the office of Governor or Lieutenant 
Governor of Kentucky was not property in itself” because it was “created by the state 
Constitution, was conferred and held solely in accordance with the terms of that instrument and 
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laws passed pursuant thereto” (p. 575).  Justice Fuller further substantiated such a position by 
discussing two previous rulings and citing others to the same effect.  He concluded, “The 
decisions are numerous to the effect that public offices are mere agencies or trusts, and not 
property as such” (p. 577).  In one additional stroke the Supreme Court both upheld the Court of 
Appeals decision not to inquire into the procedures of the General Assembly and ruled that such 
action did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 
It is clear that the judgment of the Court of Appeals in declining to go 
behind the decision of the tribunal vested by the state constitution and laws, 
with the ultimate determination of the right to these offices, denied no right 
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.  (p. 578). 
 
And then the Supreme Court dealt with the argument intertwining the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the Guarantee Clause. 
But it is said that the Fourteenth Amendment must be read with Section 4 of 
article IV of the Constitution…  It is argued that when the State of Kentucky 
entered the Union, the people “surrendered their right of forcible revolution 
in state affairs,” and received in lieu thereof a distinct pledge to the people 
of the State of the guarantee of a republican form of government, and of 
protection against invasion, and against domestic violence; that the 
distinguishing feature of that form of government is the right of the people 
to choose their own officers for governmental administration; that this was 
denied by the action of the General Assembly in this instance; and, in effect, 
that this court has jurisdiction to enforce that guarantee, albeit the judiciary 
of Kentucky was unable to do so because of the division of the powers of 
government.  And yet the writ before us was granted under § 709 of the 
Revised Statutes to revise the judgment of the state court on the ground that 
a constitutional right was decided against by that court.  (p. 578) 
 
At this point, the Chief Justice cited Luther v. Borden.  “It was long ago settled that the 
enforcement of this guarantee belonged to the political department” (p. 578).  After extensively 
reviewing that ruling and subsequent uses of the Luther ruling, the Chief Justice delivered the 
Court’s rational for dismissing the writ of error. 
We must decline to take jurisdiction on the ground of deprivation of rights 
embraced by the Fourteenth Amendment, without due process of law, or of 
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the violation of the guarantee of a republican form of government by reason 
of similar deprivation.  (p. 580) 
 
 Concurring/dissenting opinions. 
 Two justices, Brewer and Brown, wrote a dissenting opinion stating their agreement with 
the result, but differing in the rationale they used.  Justice Harlan dissented with both the result 
and the legal reasoning of the majority decision.   
To this observer, it seemed as if the court majority and Justice Harlan had listened to 
separate legal arguments.  Justice Harlan disagreed completely with the court majority.  He 
disagreed with the Court’s interpretation of the facts and with the Court’s ruling, both of which, 
according to Harlan, violated existing case, statutory, and constitutional law. 
Harlan began his dissent by observing that the certificates of election awarded Taylor and 
Marshall by the appropriate state officials following the election established a prima facie right 
to office.  Justice Harlan next stated that Taylor and Marshall could not be deprived of that right 
except through, first, a challenge and hearing of the dispute according to law, and second, 
evidence being presented that proved someone else was entitled to office.  After reviewing 
Kentucky’s statutory and case law regarding contested elections, Harlan commented that the 
members of the Board of Contest were required to settle the dispute according to the evidence 
presented.  The Board was also required to present these evidentiary facts to the legislature for a 
final determination.  According to Harlan, “If no proof was laid before (the legislature), then the 
prima facie right of the incumbent based upon the certificate awarded to him, must prevail” (p. 
590). 
Justice Harlan next observed that the Board of Contest presented a report to the 
legislature giving their opinion that Goebel and Beckham had been elected, not Taylor and 
Marshall.  Harlan noted that the Board’s report contained neither a summary of the evidence nor 
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any particular evidentiary citations upon which the Board based its statement that Goebel and 
Beckham were the legitimate winners of the gubernatorial contest.  Harlan next cited Kentucky 
statutes that required members of the Board of Contest to “give true judgment according to the 
evidence” (Emphasis J. Harlan) (p. 590).  Without examining any evidence or requiring that any 
evidence be presented, Harlan noted, the legislature approved the Board’s report and declared, in 
separate resolutions, that Goebel and Beckham were the legal elected governor and lieutenant 
governor respectively.  As Harlan remarked, “The evidence renders it clear that the declaration 
that (Goebel) had received the highest number of legal votes cast was in total disregard of the 
facts” (p. 607).  According to Justice Harlan, the foregoing constituted the critical facts of the 
case upon which the lawsuit was based. 
Justice Harlan next reviewed four previous Court rulings in support of his contention that 
the Court’s current majority had “departed from the rulings of this court in former cases” when it 
dismissed “the writ of error for want of jurisdiction” (p. 592).  Harlan concluded his review by 
stating: 
It thus appears that in four cases, heretofore decided, this court has 
proceeded upon the ground that to deprive one without due process of law of 
an office created under the laws of a State, presented a case under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of which we 
could take cognizance and inquire whether there had been due process of 
law.  (p. 597) 
 
Harlan next contrasted his interpretation of constitutional and case law with that of the Court’s 
majority opinion, using language that gave rise to a sense of irony. 
When the Fourteenth Amendment forbade any State from depriving any 
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, I had supposed 
that the intention of the People of the United States was to prevent the 
deprivation of any legal right in violation of the fundamental guarantees 
inhering in due process of law.  The prohibitions of that amendment, as we 
have often said, apply to all the instrumentalities of the State, to its 
legislative, executive and judicial authorities…  (Emphasis added) (p. 599) 
   




It is said that the courts cannot, in any case, go behind the final action of the 
legislature to ascertain whether that which was done was consistent with 
rights claimed under the Federal Constitution.  If this be true then it is in the 
power of the state legislature to override the supreme law of the land.  (p. 
600) 
 
Justice Harlan then cited a previous Supreme Court ruling that stood contrary to the 
interpretation rendered by the Court’s majority. 
The idea that any legislature, state or Federal, can conclusively determine 
for the people and for the courts that what it enacts in the form of law, or 
what it authorizes its agents to do, is consistent with the fundamental law, is 
in opposition to the theory of our institutions.  The duty rests upon all 
courts, Federal and state … to see that no right secured by the supreme law 
of the land is impaired or destroyed by legislation.  …[T]he liberty which is 
enjoyed under (our institutions) depends, in no small degree, upon the power 
given the judiciary to declare null and void all legislation that is clearly 
repugnant to the supreme law of the land.  Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466.  (p. 
601) 
 
Continuing, in a somewhat ironic vein of portraying himself as a somewhat naïve student with 
differing (and therefore mistaken) views that starkly contrast with the majority of his more 
learned brethren, Harlan observed: 
I had supposed that the principles announced in the cases above cited were 
firmly established…  It seems however – if I do not misapprehend the scope 
of the decision now rendered – that under our system of government the 
right of a person to exercise a state office to which he has been lawfully 
chosen by popular vote … may be taken from him by the arbitrary action of 
a state legislature, in utter disregard of the principle that Anglo-Saxon 
freemen have for centuries deemed to be essential in the requirement of due 
process of law – a principle reaffirmed in the Kentucky Bill of Rights, 
which declares that “absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and 
property of freemen exists nowhere in a Republic, not even in the largest 
majority.”  (Emphasis added) (p. 601) 
 
Justice Harlan concluded his review of the contrasts between his interpretation of case and 
constitutional law and that of the Court’s majority by declaring, “I cannot assent to the 
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interpretation now given to the Fourteenth Amendment” (p. 601.  After further buttressing his 
opinion, Harlan added to his previous conclusion: 
I go farther.  The liberty of which the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a State 
from depriving any one without due process of law is something more than 
freedom from the enslavement of the body or from physical restraint.  In my 
judgment the words “life, liberty or property” in the Fourteenth Amendment 
should be interpreted as embracing every right that may be brought within 
judicial cognizance, and therefore no right of that kind can be taken in 
violation of “due process of law.”  (pp. 602-603) 
 
 It is in discussing liberty that Justice Harlan notes the connection between the Guarantee 
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The liberty of which I am speaking is that which exists, and which can exist, 
only under a republican form of government.  “The United States,” the 
supreme law of the land declares, “shall guarantee to every State in the 
Union a republican form of government.”  (p. 604) 
 
Justice Harlan continued further: 
The constitution of Kentucky expressly forbids the exercise of absolute and 
arbitrary power over the lives, liberty or property of freemen.  And that 
principle is at the very foundation of the Government of the Union.  …The 
doctrine of legislative absolutism is foreign to free government as it exists in 
this country.  The cornerstone of our republican institutions is the principle 
that the powers of government shall, in all vital particulars, be distributed 
among three separate coordinate departments, legislative, executive and 
judicial.  And liberty regulated by law cannot be permanently secured 
against the assaults of power or the tyranny of a majority, if the judiciary 
must be silent when rights existing independently of human sanction, or 
acquired under the law, are at the mercy of legislative action taken in 
violation of due process of law.  (pp. 608-609) 
 
In concluding his dissent, Justice Harlan opined that the writ of error should have been sustained 
and that a judgment should have been issued declaring that Taylor’s and Marshall’s due process 
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated by the actions of the 
Kentucky legislature. 
 South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905). 
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 Case summary. 
 The central issue was whether or not the United States had the authority to tax the State 
of South Carolina’s liquor business.  The case arrived at the Court on appeal from the Court of 
Claims which had conducted a hearing, made findings of fact, and ruled in favor of the federal 
government.  South Carolina argued, “The Constitution contains no grant of power to Congress 
… to tax a State or its means and instrumentalities of government” (p. 440).  The state continued, 
“[T]he exercise by Congress of a power not expressly or impliedly granted by the Constitution to 
it is impliedly forbidden” (p. 440). 
 The U.S. Solicitor General agreed that “all necessary agencies for legitimate purposes of 
state government” were “beyond the taxing power of Congress” (p. 443).  However, he 
continued, the state business of dispensing liquor throughout its boundaries fell outside of that 
rule.  “If a State embarks in the liquor business, it does so with the same consequences and 
subject to the same liabilities under the law as a private individual or an ordinary corporation” (p. 
447).   
 Justice Brewer wrote the opinion for the majority.  He noted that this was a conflict 
between two spheres of government, national and state, each with legitimate spheres of 
influence. 
There are certain matters over which the National Government has absolute 
control and no action of the State can interfere therewith, and there are 
others in which the State is supreme, and in respect to them the National 
Government is powerless.  To preserve the even balance between these two 
governments and hold each in its separate sphere is the peculiar duty of all 
courts, preeminently of this… (p. 448) 
 
Justice Brewer then stated two undebatable propositions of constitutional jurisprudence: 
One is that the National Government is one of enumerated powers, and the 
other that a power enumerated and delegated by the Constitution to 
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Congress is comprehensive and complete, without other limitations than 
those found in the Constitution itself.  (p. 448) 
 
He then discussed the interpretation of the Constitution.  After observing that its meaning didn’t 
alter, Justice Brewer stated: 
Being a grant of powers to a government its language is general, and as 
changes come in social and political life it embraces in its grasp all new 
conditions which are within the scope of the powers conferred.  In other 
words, while the powers granted do not change, they apply from generation 
to generation to all things to which they are in their nature applicable.  (pp. 
448-449) 
 
Justice Brewer also observed that constitutional interpretations also needed to take cognizance of 
the common law and quoted an observation by Justice Matthews in Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 
at 478, “The interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by 
the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be 
read in the light of its history” (p. 450).  Finally, the Court opinion noted that “that which is 
implied is as much a part of the Constitution as that which is expressed.   
Among those matters which are implied, though not expressed, is that the 
Nation may not, in the exercise of its powers, prevent a State from 
discharging the ordinary functions of government, just as it follows from the 
second clause of Article VI of the Constitution, that no State can interfere 
with the free and unembarrassed exercise by the National Government of all 
the powers conferred upon it.  (pp. 451-452) 
 
The Court ruled that the state’s power to be involved in the liquor business was a legitimate 
exercise of its sovereignty with which the federal government could not interfere.  However, 
“whenever a State engages in a business which is of a private nature that business is not 
withdrawn from the taxing power of the Nation” (p. 463).  The Supreme Court thus affirmed the 
decision of the Court of Claims. 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
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 The opinion in South Carolina v. United States quoted a previous Court ruling in Texas v. 
White, 7 Wall. at 725 which noted the federal government’s responsibility under the Guarantee 
Clause without specifically mentioning the Clause: 
Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and independent 
autonomy to the States, through their union under the Constitution, but it 
may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the States, and the 
maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of 
the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the 
National Government.  (p. 453) 
 
Shortly thereafter, the Court directly addressed the importance of the Guarantee Clause. 
Each State is subject only to the limitations prescribed by the Constitution 
and within its own territory is otherwise supreme.  Its internal affairs are 
matters of its own discretion.  The Constitution provides that “the United 
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of 
government.”  Art. IV, sec. 4.  That expresses the full limit of National 
control over the internal affairs of a State.  (p. 454) 
 
This provided the basis for the Court’s ruling that the right of South Carolina to control liquor 
sales within its borders was sustained. 
 Elder v. Colorado ex rel. Badgley, 204 U.S. 85 (1907). 
 Case summary. 
 The dispute centered on a dispute created by two claimants to the office of county 
treasurer arising from Colorado changing county and city jurisdictions involving Denver “from 
the old county of Arapahoe and the old city of Denver” to the “city and county of Denver” (pp. 
85-86).  The problem was created by the charter of the new city and county of Denver which 
changed the dates of election and the terms of officers from that specified by Colorado’s 
constitution.  Charles Badgley, the relator, was elected to the office in the general elections of 
November 1904, which was held according to Colorado statutes.  Charles Elder, the defendant, 
was elected to the office in May 1904, under authority of the new charter for the city and county 
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of Denver.  The District Court ruled that defendant Elder was the legal office holder.  The 
Colorado Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s ruling, finding instead that the charter 
provisions under which Elder was elected were “repugnant to the constitution of Colorado,” and 
found in favor of relator Badgley (p. 86).  The U.S. Supreme Court issued a writ of error to 
review the state supreme court’s ruling. 
 Citing Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court 
dismissing the writ of error and upholding the Colorado Supreme Court’s ruling because the 
federal court had no jurisdiction. 
[I]t is foreclosed that a mere contest over a state office, dependent for its 
solution exclusively upon the application of the constitution of a State or 
upon a mere construction of a provision of a state law, involves no possible 
Federal question.  (p. 89) 
 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 The Colorado Supreme Court, in discussing the legal situation, considered the Guarantee 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution and its own previous rulings regarding the need for state 
governments to maintain a republican character as required by the Guarantee Clause.  If the 
charter provisions changing constitutional requirements were allowed to stand, the state high 
court reasoned, such a decision would “cut loose the city and county of Denver from any and all 
constitutional limitations and restrictions, and make the voice of the people, whether deliberately 
or hysterically expressed, the law in that locality” (86 Pac.Rep. at 236).  The Colorado Supreme 
Court continued by quoting from a previous ruling of their Court: “Even by constitutional 
amendment the people cannot set apart any portion of the state in such manner that that portion 
of the state shall be freed from the Constitution” (86 Pac.Rep. at 237).  Such an event would 
create “an imperium in imperio” (86 Pac.Rep. at 237).  They found this situation analogous to a 
previous situation in which they had said: 
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[T]his could not be done, for the reason that such act would be subversive of 
a republican form of government, repugnant to the Constitution of the 
United States, and violative of the compact existing between the state and 
federal government.  (86 Pac.Rep. at 237) 
 
Because the charter conflicted with the Colorado Constitution, the provisions changing the terms 
of office and election dates were “invalid and inoperative” (86 Pac.Rep. at 239), and that 
officials elected under the charter’s provisions were “guilty of usurping, intruding into and 
unlawfully holding and exercising office” and were to be “ousted and excluded from … office” 
(86 Pac.Rep. at 239) 
 The U.S. Supreme Court, taking note of the state high court’s consideration of the 
Guarantee Clause, stated: 
Whilst, when a state court has considered a Federal question, that fact may 
serve to elucidate whether a Federal issue properly arises for consideration 
by this court, that doctrine has no application to a case where the 
controversy presented is inherently not Federal, and incapable of presenting 
a Federal question for decision.  (p. 89) 
 
 Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911). 
 Case summary. 
 The dispute arose over an act of the Oklahoma legislature moving the state capital from 
Guthrie to Oklahoma City.  Coyle, a resident of Guthrie, filed suit against Smith, the Secretary of 
State of Oklahoma, to prohibit the move.  The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled against the 
plaintiff who was then granted a writ of error by the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld the ruling of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, observing that the validity of the 
Oklahoma statute relocating its state capital was a matter “of state law, not subject to the 
reviewing power of this court under a writ of error to a state court” (p. 563). 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
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 To reach its final position, the Court had to confront a somewhat unusual claim by the 
plaintiffs, namely that the Guarantee Clause gave Congress the power to “impose terms and 
conditions upon the admission of” proposed new states which would “operate to deprive the 
State of powers which it would otherwise possess” (p. 566).  Plaintiffs further asserted that 
congressional actions under the Guarantee Clause, being political, were “uncontrollable by the 
courts” (p. 566).  Plaintiffs contended that the Oklahoma act removing the capital from Guthrie 
to Oklahoma City conflicted with the congressional Enabling Act by which Oklahoma was 
admitted as a state.   
 Justice Lurton, writing for the Court, opined: 
The argument that Congress derives from the duty of “guaranteeing to each 
State in this Union a republican form of government,” power to impose 
restrictions upon a new State which deprives it of equality with other 
members of the Union, has no merit.  (p. 567) 
 
He further observed that the United States “was and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity 
and authority, each competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution itself” (p. 567).  The Guarantee Clause “obviously does not confer 
power to admit a new State which shall be any less a State than those which compose the Union” 
(p. 568).  Furthermore, the Court, in reviewing its previous opinions, could find nothing that 
sanctioned “the claim that Congress may by the imposition of conditions in an enabling act 
deprive a new State of any of those attributes essential to its equality in dignity and power with 
other states” (p. 568).  “The Constitution not only looks to an indestructible union of 
indestructible States, Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700,725, but to a union of equal States as well” (p. 
559, 579).  According to the Court, “The power to locate its own seat of government, to change 
the same, and to appropriate its public money therefore, are essentially state powers beyond the 
control of Congress” (p. 559). 
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The guarantee clause requires that legislation be overturned 
because of its unrepublican nature. 
 
 Rice v. Foster, 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 479 (1847). 
 Facts & procedural history. 
 This case contains aspects that are unique in several respects.  First, it is a case where the 
principles of republican government secured by the Guarantee Clause constituted the sole 
constitutional issue.  Second, arguments used to challenge the constitutionality of a Delaware 
statute prefigured later arguments used to challenge the constitutionality of state laws creating 
the initiative, the referendum, and conservation districts.  These arguments focused upon what 
were perceived to be unconstitutional delegations of legislative power in violation of the 
principles of republican government which the Framers embedded in the Constitution.  Finally, it 
represents one of the few cases whereby legislation was declared unconstitutional on the basis of 
a violation of the principles of republican government required of every state by the Constitution.  
While the discussion centered on the U.S. Constitution, the actual decision referenced the 
Delaware constitution.   
 In February 1847, the Delaware legislature approved a measure entitled “An act 
authorizing the people to decide by ballot, whether the license to retail intoxicating liquors shall 
be permitted among them” (p. 479).  The measure allowed each county to determine the question 
by majority vote whether or not taverns and other stores selling alcoholic beverages would be 
allowed to operate within the county’s boundaries.  Rice leased a “tavern house in Wilmington” 
to Foster that was located in the county of New Castle.  A majority of voters in New Castle voted 
against permitting the liquor licenses in their county.  Foster paid the rent on his lease to Rice up 
to the date the county vote went into effect “and refused to pay any more” (p. 481).  Rice then 
brought suit to recover the funds not paid him by Foster.  The action began in the Superior Court 
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for New Castle County who ordered that the questions be reserved “for hearing before … the 
Court of Appeals” (p. 480).  The case was heard during the court’s June term of 1847 “and was 
argued mainly on the constitutional question, (though objection was also taken to the validity and 
sufficiency of the election returns,)…” (p. 481).  Chief Justice James Booth delivered the court’s 
opinion that was unanimous on the Constitutional question, but split on the issue of the vote 
return’s validity.  The latter question, however, was rendered moot by the court’s decision. 
 Legal question. 
 Does the Delaware law, which establishes a series of county referenda regarding whether 
or not liquor licenses shall be granted in each county, transfer or delegate legislative power in 
violation of the constitutional requirement that state governments be republican? 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 One would normally expect that the party adversely affected by the majority vote in New 
Castle County (Foster as the operator of a tavern) would be the one to challenge the 
constitutionality of the law establishing such a referendum that deprived him of his livelihood.  
Such, however, was not the case.  Foster’s attorneys argued that the Delaware statute was 
constitutional while Rice, the leaseholder, challenged both the constitutionality of the law as well 
as the vote totals for New Castle County.   
 Attorneys for Rice, the plaintiff, argued that “the act of 1847 was unconstitutional, 
because it was contrary to the limitations of legislative power necessarily involved in a 
representative republican form of government” (p. 481).  According to plaintiff’s legal counsel, 
“The act of 1847 delegates legislative power to a majority of the people of a county” (p. 481).  
They explained: 
The people cannot make a law; neither the whole people nor a part of them.  
All laws must be made by their representatives in general assembly met for 
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deliberation, consultation and judgment; acting under oath, and under the 
restrictions of the constitution.  (p. 481) 
 
Plaintiff’s attorneys continued their argument by discussing the responsibilities of representatives 
once they were chosen by the people to enact legislation. 
The representatives of the people in the legislature, though, in general, 
bound to respect the will of their constituents, are also bound to exercise 
their own judgment, and to oppose that will, when it invades individual 
rights, or violates the principles of the social compact.  This is a right of 
minorities, which it was the object of the constitution to secure.  (p. 481) 
 
They further noted: “The general assembly is the depository of legislative power; which is a trust 
to be executed with judgment and discretion, and cannot be delegated to any other body, or 
persons” (p. 481).  Concluding their arguments, counsel for Rice summarized:  “Original and 
ultimate sovereignty is in the people; yet it is never exercised by them collectively, but only 
through agents of their selection.  The purpose of elections is to choose such agents” (p. 482). 
 Foster’s defense attorneys contended that the “act of 1847 was constitutional” because it 
did “not delegate legislative power” (p. 482).  The Delaware legislature passed a law, expressed 
its opinion that the act was beneficial, and “declared the legislative will that such a law should 
exist, if a certain number, to wit, a majority of the people of either county, should vote in a 
certain way” (p. 482).  The legislature has “the right to pass conditional laws, which are to 
commence their operation or to be void upon the happening of some future event, or some 
contingency…” (p. 493).  Defense counsel pointed to the fact that state constitutions had been 
submitted to “a vote of the people” as a “strong argument in favor of the law” (p. 482).   
 Plaintiff’s attorneys responded to the last argument by noting “that the framing of 
constitutions … where no constitution existed before, was a different thing from passing laws 
under constitutions which vest legislative power in a particular branch” (p. 483). 
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 Defense attorneys concluded by noting current laws that were “all on the same principle” 
as the act under attack:  an “act for the establishment of free schools,” a “supplement to the 
Wilmington city charter,” and “the act authorizing school district No. 18, Kent county, to lay 
taxes by vote” (p. 483). 
 Holding & disposition. 
 The Delaware Act of February 1847 was nullified because it violated the Guarantee 
Clause.  The court unanimously rendered judgment “for the plaintiff,” (p. 499). 
 Court’s rationale. 
 The opinion in Rice v. Foster stands among the more unique of the decisions read that 
have the Guarantee Clause as their subject matter.  Serving as a possible primer on the purpose 
of government, the opinion by the Delaware Chief Justice distinguished between direct and 
representative democracy, discussed the constitutional Framers’ views on the same subject, 
provided historical examples illustrating the differences between the two types of democracy, 
and elaborated on the need for a constitution to protect rights and to restrain public passions.   
 Chief Justice James Booth confronted defense counsels’ argument that the Delaware Act 
was comparable to the legislation “establishing and supporting free schools” because such law 
delegated the power “to raise taxes for the support of their schools” (p. 495).  The Chief Justice 
disagreed, noting that the school law constituted each school district in the state as “a corporation 
with limited powers” (p. 495).  He continued by observing, “No power is granted to them, or to 
any other persons, to repeal or change any part of the law; nor does its existence or operation 
depend on the … will or acts of the corporators” (p. 495).  Booth concluded: 
No ingenuity can discover the shadow of similitude between the act of the 
19th of February, 1847, and any part of the school law.  To say that the 
authority given to the school voters – to members of a corporation – to 
determine whether a tax shall be laid or not, is a grant of legislative power; 
   
   
157
is an abuse of language.  Legislative power is the power of making laws.  (p. 
495) 
 
 Addressing the “important question” regarding the constitutionality of the “act of the 
nineteenth of February,” the Chief Justice stated, “The proposition that an act of the legislature is 
not unconstitutional, unless it contravenes some express provision of the constitution is, in the 
opinion of this court, untenable” (p. 485).  Noting the various purposes for which government 
was established, Booth continued: 
The nature and spirit of our republican form of government … have 
established limits to the exercise of legislative power, beyond which it 
cannot constitutionally pass.  An act of the legislature directly repugnant to 
the nature and spirit of our form of government, or destructive of any of the 
great ends of the constitution, is contrary to its true intent and meaning…  It 
is irrational to maintain, that such an act is a law, when it defeats the very 
object and intention of granting legislative power.  (p. 485) 
 
The Chief Justice next brought “the lessons of history” to bear on the question. 
The framers of the Constitution … were men of wisdom, experience, 
disinterested patriotism, and versed in the science of government.  They had 
been taught by the lessons of history, that equal and indeed greater dangers 
resulted from a pure democracy, than from an absolute monarchy.  Each 
leads to despotism.  (p. 485) 
 
Booth continued by noting the dangers of direct democracy and the need for representative 
democracy. 
Whenever the power of making laws, which is the supreme power in a State, 
has been exercised directly by the people under any system of polity, and 
not by representation, civil liberty has been overthrown.  Popular rights and 
universal suffrage, the favorite them of every demagogue, afford, without 
constitutional control or a restraining power, no security to the rights of 
individuals, or to the permanent peace  and safety of society.  (pp. 485-486) 
 
Without the restraints of a constitution, when a government is founded completely on “popular 
will,” the people become subject to “impulse and passion” and are “betrayed into acts of folly, 
rashness and enormity” whereby “the great aim and objects of civil government are prostrated 
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amidst tumult, violence and anarchy” (p. 486).  The Chief Justice pointed out that in the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787, “The members most tenacious of republicanism, were as 
loud as any in declaiming against the vices of democracy” (p. 486).  After quoting several of the 
Framers, Booth discussed the final reasons why representative government was preferred over 
that of a direct democracy. 
To guard against these dangers and the evil tendencies of a democracy, our 
republican government was instituted by the consent of the people.  The 
characteristic which distinguishes it from the miscalled republics of ancient 
and modern times, is, that none of the powers of sovereignty are exercised 
by the people; but all of them by separate, co-ordinate branches of 
government in whom those powers are vested by the constitution.  These co-
ordinate branches are intended to operate as balances, checks and restraints, 
not only upon each other, but open the people themselves; to guard them 
against their own rashness, precipitancy, and misguided zeal; and to protect 
the minority against the injustice of the majority.  (p. 487) 
 
Observing that “[t]he making of laws is the highest act of sovereignty that can be performed in a 
free nation,” Booth reached this point of law: 
The sovereign power therefore, of this State, resides with the legislative, 
executive, and judicial departments.  Having thus transferred the sovereign 
power, the people cannot resume or exercise any portion of it.  To do so, 
would be an infraction of the constitution, and a dissolution of the 
government.  (pp. 489, 488) 
 
 The court then turned to an examination of what transpired at the hands of the Delaware 
legislature.   
Our legislature … declined the responsibility which it was their duty to 
assume; and thus devolved the performance of their trust on the people of 
each county; in order that a majority … might decide a question, which none 
had the authority to decide, but the legislature.  (pp. 490-491) 
 
Although laws licensing or forbidding the “sale of spirituous and vinous liquors are valid laws,” 
according to the Court, “No such law has been, or was intended to be passed by the legislature.  
They purposely avoided it” (p. 491).  Accordingly, the Court declared, “The design and true 
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character of the act of the 19th of February last are, to confer the functions of the legislature of 
the State upon the people of a county” (p. 491).   
 Announcing the opinion of the Court, the Chief Justice declared: 
The only check which the constitution interposes to an act of the legislature 
tending to such consequences, is an independent and upright judiciary.  As 
the act … is repugnant to the principles, spirit, and true intent and meaning 
of the constitution of this State, and tends to subvert our representative 
republican form of government, it is the unanimous opinion of this Court, 
that the said act is null and void…”  (p. 499) 
 
 Concurring/dissenting opinions. 
 Justice Harrington and Chancellor Johns offered separate concurring opinions.  Although 
the court was split regarding the adequacy of the vote, no separate dissenting opinions on that 
question were offered, probably because the question was rendered moot by the court’s 
unanimity regarding the Constitutional issue. 
 Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475 (1866). 
 Case summary. 
 Legal action in this case began directly with the Supreme Court by the State of 
Mississippi and involved a novel approach without legal precedent.  Mississippi sought an 
injunction against President Johnson to prevent him from executing the provisions of the 
Reconstruction Acts passed by Congress in March 1867.  The petition for injunction alleged that 
the Reconstruction Acts were unconstitutional, but didn’t seek a ruling directly on their 
constitutionality.  Instead, the State of Mississippi argued that if not enjoined from executing the 
congressional action, the President would be “in violation of the Constitution, and in violation of 
the sacred rights of the States” (p. 477).  The Reconstruction Acts, according to Mississippi, 
“annihilate the State,” make “the civil power subordinate to the military power,” and establish a 
“military despotism” by which people could be deprived of “goods, lands, liberty, and life” 
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without “observance of any of those requirements and guarantees by which the Constitution and 
laws so plainly protect and guard the rights of the citizen” (pp. 476-477). 
 Attorney General Stanberry argued that there was no precedent for such an approach and 
that “there is no allegation that the President is about to do anything of his own motion, which, as 
President, he is not authorized to do” (p. 482).  The Attorney General further argued that “the 
President of the United States is above the process of any court or the jurisdiction of any court to 
bring him to account as President” (p. 484).  He later continued, “As President, he is beyond the 
control of any other department, except through the impeaching power…  Only in that other 
chamber can you arraign him for anything done or omitted to be done while he is President” (p. 
491).   
 The Chief Justice spoke for the court majority and noted that the Court would limit its 
inquiry to consideration of a single point:  “Can the President be restrained by injunction from 
carrying into effect an act of Congress alleged to be unconstitutional” (p. 498)?  The Court 
further noted that “the application now made to us is without a precedent; and this is of much 
weight against it” (p. 500).  Regarding challenges to the constitutionality of an act, the Court 
observed that “no one seems to have though of an application for an injunction against the 
execution of the act by the President” (p. 500).  The Supreme Court, according to the Chief 
Justice, “has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official 
duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by us” (p. 501).  Therefore, a request for “an 
injunction against the execution of an act of Congress by the incumbent of the presidential office 
cannot be received…” (p. 501).  The Court denied then denied Mississippi’s request for such an 
injunction. 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
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 Without specifically mentioning the Guarantee Clause, the State of Mississippi in effect 
argued that the Reconstruction Acts destroyed republican government in their state.  Unspoken in 
the Court records, however, was the counterargument that the Guarantee Clause formed the 
justification for congressional passage of the Reconstruction Acts.  The congressional Committee 
on Reconstruction concluded “that Congress derived the power to reconstruct the southern states 
and assure equal rights for all Negroes” (Bonfield, 1962, January, p. 539).  The “overwhelming 
majority” of Congress believed that the Reconstruction Acts “insured the restoration of 
republican constitutions in the southern states (Bonfield, 1962, p. 542).  Charles Sumner 
expressed the feeling of the “bulk of Congress” who believed Congress was “acting pursuant to 
the clause’s mandate:” 
… by the national Constitution, the nation is bound to assure a republican 
government to all the States, thus giving to Congress the plenary power to 
fix the definition of such a government; but by the Declaration of 
Independence, the fundamental elements of this very definition are supplied 
in terms from which there can be no appeal.  By this Declaration it is 
solemnly announced, first, that all men are equal in rights; and, secondly, 
that just government stands only on the consent of the governed…  
Whenever Congress is called to maintain a republican government, it must 
be according to these universal, irreversible principles.  (Cong. Globe, 41st 
Cong., 2d Sess. 1358 [1870] [Sumner]; see also Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 
1st Sess. 614 [1867] [Sumner].  Cited in Bonfield, 1962, January, p. 543). 
 
To reiterate, while not mentioned directly in the arguments or ruling, the Guarantee Clause lay at 
the center of any discussion for or against the Reconstruction Acts. 
 In a separate, somewhat ironic note, President Johnson had vetoed the Civil Rights Bill of 
1866 on the grounds that the bill was unconstitutional because Congress “had no power to 
prevent the states from discriminating against Negroes” (Bonfield, 1962, January, p. 539).  His 
veto, however, was overridden, and the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 became law.  In like fashion, 
President Johnson subsequently vetoed the separate congressional acts of March 1867 that 
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collectively were known as the Reconstruction Acts.  Both acts were “passed over the 
President’s veto” (Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. 50). 
 Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. 50 (1868). 
 Case summary. 
 Similar to Mississippi v. Johnson, a southern state avoided a direct challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Reconstruction Acts through an indirect challenge.  Instead of seeking 
injunctive relief against the actions of the President, however, this action by Georgia asked the 
Court to enjoin Secretary of War Stanton, General Ulysses Grant, and Major-General Pope 
(military commander of the Third Military District comprised of Georgia, Florida, and Alabama) 
from “carrying into execution the several provisions of … the ‘Reconstruction Acts’” (p. 50).  
Georgia’s petition argued that “the intent and design of the acts of Congress .. was to overthrow 
and to annul this existing State government, and to erect another and different government in its 
place, unauthorized by the Constitution and in defiance of its guarantees…” (p. 52).  The heart of 
its objection was stated: 
The change proposed by the two acts of Congress in question is fundamental 
and vital.  The acts seize upon a large portion – whites – of the constituent 
body and exclude them from acting as members of the State.  It violently 
thrusts into the constituent body, as members thereof, a multitude of 
individuals – negroes – not entitled by the fundamental law of Georgia to 
exercise political powers.  The State is to be Africanized.  This will work a 
virtual extinction of the body politic, to take its place and enjoy its rights 
and property.  Such new State would be formed, not by the free will or 
consent of Georgia or her people…, but by external force.  (p. 66) 
 
Attorneys for Georgia concluded their argument by declaring, “Instead of keeping the guaranty 
against a forcible overthrow of its government by foreign invaders or domestic insurgents, this is 
destroying that very government by force” (p. 66).   
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 Attorney General Stanberry presented a motion to dismiss the request for injunction 
because of a “want of jurisdiction” because it was a political question, not a judicial one (p. 53).  
The Court agreed and dismissed the case “for want of jurisdiction” (p. 78). 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 The ruling upheld the previous decision of Luther v. Borden, but in doing so discussed 
the distinction between political and judicial matters as resulting from the Constitution’s 
incorporation of the doctrine of the separation of powers. 
This distinction results from the organization of the government into the 
three great departments, executive, legislative, and judicial, and from the 
assignment and limitation of the powers of each by the Constitution.   
 
The judicial power is vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior 
courts as Congress may ordain and establish: the political power of the 
government in the other two departments. 
 
The distinction between judicial and political power is so generally 
acknowledged in the jurisprudence both of England and of this country, that 
we need do no more than refer to some of the authorities on the subject.  
They are all in one direction.  (p. 71) 
 
 Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 18 (1912). 
 Facts & procedural history. 
 In 1902 Oregon amended its constitution to include the initiative and the referendum.  
The initiative provided for a specified number of voters to be able to put desired legislation 
directly before the people for a popular vote that, if approved, would become state law.  The 
referendum provided that voters could, either by petition of a specified number of voters or by 
legislative action, approve or disapprove laws passed by the state legislature. 
In 1906 the initiative was used to pass a law taxing telephone and telegraph companies at 
a rate of 2% of a company’s gross revenue from business conducted within Oregon.  One Oregon 
corporation, Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Company (hereafter referred to as Pacific 
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States), refused to pay the tax whereupon the state filed suit in lower state court “to enforce 
payment of [the] assessment and the statutory penalties for delinquency” (p. 136). 
Pacific States launched a three-pronged defense.  First, they alleged defects in the tax’s 
nature and operation.  Second, they challenged the constitutionality of the tax under the Oregon 
Constitution.  Third, Pacific States challenged the constitutionality of the initiative and 
referendum as violating the Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  Oregon’s response was a 
demurrer.  The lower court sustained the demurrer.  As Pacific States offered no further pleading, 
the lower court ruled against the defendant.  On appeal the Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed 
the lower court’s judgment.  The U.S. Supreme Court issued a writ of error to hear the case.  
Thus the original plaintiff, Oregon, became the defendant and appellee before the Supreme Court 
while the original defendant, Pacific States, became the plaintiff and appellant in the final legal 
hearing of this case before the nation’s high court. 
 Legal questions. 
 Whose duty is it to determine if a State’s government has stopped being republican?  
Whose duty is it to enforce the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution?  Did the adoption of the 
initiative and referendum provisions destroy republican government within the State of Oregon? 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 Pacific States argued that the initiative tax measure violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment because all other persons and entities in the state are subject only 
to “tax laws passed by the Legislative Assembly” whereas Pacific States is subject to 
legislatively enacted taxes as well as the initiative tax measure passed by the state’s citizens (p. 
119).  Pacific States next argued that the initiative tax measure violated “the right to a republican 
form of government which is guaranteed by § 4 of Art. IV of the Federal Constitution” (pp. 120-
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121) because:  first, the taxation power “belongs exclusively to the legislative branch” (p. 119); 
second, “representation and taxation must go together” (p. 120); and third, under our 
constitutional form of government, “[t]here can be but one source of legislation, but one law-
making power in a State; that power must be a legislature…” (p. 120). 
Building on these arguments in a fashion similar to the statements expressed by the Chief 
Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court in Rice v. Foster, Pacific States also differentiated 
between direct democracy and representative government, the former being “hateful to the 
founders of our government” and “subversive of the structure which they erected” (p. 123).  
According to Pacific States’ argument, “The framers of the Constitution recognized the 
distinction between the republican and democratic form of government, and carefully avoided 
the latter” (p. 124).  They further argued that the “vital element in a republican form of 
government … is representation.  Legislation by the people directly is the very opposite, the 
negative of this principle” (p. 125).    Pacific States also observed: 
The direct exercise of the powers of government by the people at large 
would remove from a republic the feature which distinguishes it from a 
democracy.  That government cannot be said to be representative in which 
the people at large are the legislators.  (p. 124) 
 
Therefore, they concluded, “Initiative legislation is invalid because government by the people 
directly is inconsistent with our form of government” (pp. 124-125).   
 The State of Oregon responded to the appellant’s claim that the initiative violated the 
Guarantee Clause of the Constitution with a two-pronged argument that dealt with the two 
avenues open to the Court, the first possibility being one in which the Court might determine that 
the major question was political in nature, the second possibility being one whereby the Court 
would determine the question was judicial.  First, Oregon noted that according to previous Court 
rulings (Luther v. Borden, Texas v. White, Taylor v. Beckham, and In re Duncan), the issue has 
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been treated as a “political question” (p. 129). “The power to determine whether a State has a 
republican form of government is vested in Congress.  Hence it is a political rather than a judicial 
question” (p. 129). 
 Regarding the possibility that the Court would view the issue as a judicial one, appellee, 
citing Luther v. Borden, noted that “[i]f the question is a judicial one, courts of the United States 
will follow the decision of the state courts, where the state court has passed upon the question” 
(p. 129).  Next, should the Court decide to retain jurisdiction and not defer to the state court, 
Oregon argued: 
A state constitution should not be held to contravene the Federal 
Constitution unless the general scope and plan of government provided in 
the former is opposed to the general scope and plan of government required 
by the latter, to be maintained by the State.  The initiative and referendum 
amendment is essentially republican in form as guaranteed in the Federal 
Constitution…  (p. 130) 
 
According to Oregon, “The members of the Federal convention considered a ‘republican form of 
government’ to be a government which derived all its powers from the great body of the people” 
(p. 131).  The appellee, the State of Oregon, continued, “Both the Federal and state courts have 
uniformly held that the initiative method of enacting laws was not repugnant to the provisions of 
§ 4, Art. IV, of the Federal Constitution, either directly or by necessary inference” (p. 131).  
Furthermore, Oregon noted, the federal executive and legislative branches have in effect 
determined that reserving the initiative and referendum powers to the people does not violate 
either the Constitution or the Guarantee Clause because Congress passed legislation that was 
signed by the President admitting Oklahoma and Arizona to the Union, both states having “the 
initiative and referendum principles reserved to the people” in their state constitutions (p. 130).  
Oregon further noted that the following states had amended their state constitutions to include 
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the initiative and referendum without federal objection:  “South Dakota, Utah, Colorado, 
Arkansas, Maine…” (p. 132).   
 Pertaining to the Fourteenth Amendment claim made by Pacific States, the State of 
Oregon responded: 
The act does not violate any of the provision of § 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Assuming that the act under consideration was lawfully 
enacted the taxes levied thereby must be considered a valid exercise of the 
taxing power of the State…  (p. 132) 
 
 Holding & disposition. 
 The legal questions are political in nature and thus lie outside the Court’s jurisdiction.  
The enforcement of the Guarantee Clause belongs to the political department.  The issue of 
whether the initiative and referendum makes a state adopting those provisions no longer 
republican as required by the Guarantee Clause “is a purely political question over which this 
court has no jurisdiction” (p. 119).  The Court dismissed the writ of error. 
 Court’s rationale. 
 The Court relied heavily upon Luther v. Borden which it extensively reviewed for six 
pages (about 1/3 of the total pages devoted to the opinion) and upon Taylor v. Beckham to a 
lesser extent which occupied approximately one page of the Court’s opinion.  Chief Justice 
White delivered the opinion.  He noted that Pacific Telephone had already withdrawn its 
arguments before the Court regarding the validity of the tax regarding its defective nature.  The 
Chief Justice then dispensed with Pacific Telephone’s arguments concerning the state’s 
constitution by noting that “they are concluded by the judgment of the state court” (p. 136).  
Turning next to the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the Court stated that it was “merely 
superficial” because the reasons supporting the equal protection clause and violation of 
fundamental rights arguments were “solely based on § 4 of Art. IV” (p. 140).  The real 
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arguments advanced by the appellant centered on the Guarantee Clause, according to the Court.  
“In other words, the propositions each and all proceed alone upon the theory that the adoption of 
the initiative and referendum destroyed all government republican in form in Oregon” (p. 141). 
 The Court noted that if the Court were to find in favor of Pacific Telephone, the 
consequence would be to invalidate not only the tax initiative, but also “every statute passed in 
Oregon since the adoption of the initiative and referendum” (p. 141).  The Court next moved to 
consideration of the implications to the nation at large that would occur should the Court 
sanction a doctrine providing for “the inconceivable expansion of the judicial power and the 
ruinous destruction of legislative authority in matters purely political” (p. 141).  Following such 
consideration, Chief Justice White asked: 
Do the provisions of § 4, Art. IV, bring about these strange, far-reaching and 
injurious results?  That is to say, do the provisions of that Article obliterate 
the division between judicial authority and legislative power upon which the 
Constitution rests?  In other words, do they authorize the judiciary to 
substitute its judgment as to a matter purely political for the judgment of 
Congress on a subject committed to it and thus overthrow the Constitution 
upon the ground that thereby the guarantee to the States of a government 
republican in form may be secured, a conception which after all rests upon 
the assumption that the States are to be guaranteed a government republican 
in form by destroying the very existence of a government republican in form 
in the Nation.  (p. 142) 
 
The Court declared that such contentions were repugnant “to the letter and spirit” of the 
Constitution (p. 142-143).  Characterizing the appellant as having misconceptions on the one 
hand and the appellee as having misapprehensions on the other hand, the Court declared that a 
“mere citation of the cases” would be insufficient, that what was needed was for the Court to 
“state more at length than we otherwise would the issues and the doctrine expounded in the 
leading and absolutely controlling case – Luther v. Borden” (p. 143).  Numerous quotations were 
provided from Luther v. Borden as well as citations from Taylor v. Beckham which quoted 
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Luther v. Borden.  Believing that the issue had been well settled, the Court noted that it was 
inappropriate “to suggest that the settled distinction … between judicial authority over justiciable 
controversies and legislative power as to purely political questions tends to destroy the duty of 
the judiciary in proper cases to enforce the Constitution” (pp. 149-150).  Besides being 
inappropriate, such a suggestion arises  
from failing to distinguish between things which are widely different, that is 
the legislative duty to determine the political questions … and the judicial 
power .. to enforce and uphold the applicable provisions of the Constitution 
as to each and every exercise of governmental power.  (p. 150) 
 
 Reaching what was determined to be a foregone and inescapable conclusion, the Chief 
Justice delivered the ruling whereby the issues, being “political and governmental,” were “not 
therefore within the reach of judicial power” (p. 151).  Since the case was not within the Court’s 
jurisdiction, “the writ of error must therefore be, and it is, dismissed for want of jurisdiction” (p. 
151). 
 Concurring/dissenting opinions. 
 There were no separate opinions offered as the ruling was a unanimous 9-0 decision. 
 Kiernan v. Portland, 223 U.S. 151 (1912). 
 Case summary. 
 Both the preceding case and this one were decided the same day by the Court.  Although 
the facts differed somewhat, both cases challenged the constitutionality of the initiative and 
referendum in Oregon.  Similar arguments were used.  Since the decision in this case followed 
Pacific States v. Oregon, the Court referred to the Pacific States decision as part of the rationale 
for dismissing the writ of error.  The other reason for dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction 
centered on the fact that the Supreme Court of Oregon had already ruled on the constitutionality 
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of the initiative and referendum from the state constitutional viewpoint; therefore, their decision 
was regarded as controlling. 
 The facts differed regarding the application of the initiative and referendum to 
municipalities in Oregon.  After the state constitution had been amended to include the initiative 
and referendum, “two other amendments to the constitution were adopted by that method” (p. 
159).   The first amendment applied the initiative and referendum to municipal legislation while 
the second amendment provided opportunities to municipal voters to “enact and amend their 
municipal charter, subject to the constitution and criminal laws of the State of Oregon” (p. 160, 
note).  Voters in the City of Portland approved amending their municipal charter to provide for 
the construction of a bridge across the Willamette River in Portland and to issue bonds to pay for 
the project.  Kiernan filed for an injunction to stop the sale of bonds and thus prevent the city 
from “carrying out … the amendment of the city charter which had been adopted…” (p. 162). 
 According to the Court’s synopsis of events, “The case was submitted to the trial court on 
bill and answer, and resulted in the dismissal of the bill.  The case was taken to the Supreme 
Court of the State, where that judgment was affirmed” (p. 162).   The Court noted that the 
Oregon Supreme Court’s opinion ruled that the application of the initiative and referendum to 
municipalities did not violate the state’s constitution.  The Court also pointed out that the Oregon 
Supreme Court had discussed the “various contentions concerning these subjects, based upon the 
Constitution of the United States” and that the state high court had disposed of them also “in the 
course of the opinion” (p. 162). 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
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 Both decisions, Kiernan and Pacific States, reaffirmed the precedent established in 
Luther v. Borden as most immediately reaffirmed by Taylor v. Beckham.   This precedent was 
that 
the determination of whether the government of a State is republican in form 
within the meaning of § 4 of Art. IV of the Constitution is a political 
question within the jurisdiction of Congress and over which the courts have 
no jurisdiction.  (p. 151) 
 
 Denver v. New York Trust Company, 229 U.S. 123 (1913). 
 Case summary. 
 This case also challenged the constitutionality of the initiative and referendum via the 
Guarantee Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, but it was more complicated than Pacific 
States and Kiernan.  Complicating factors arose from the intertwining of contract law in the 
dispute as well as the involvement of three separate parties in the legal proceedings – the City 
and County of Denver, the Denver Union Water Company, and the water company’s mortgage 
holder, the New York Trust Company.  A final complicating factor emerged from the amended 
state constitution of 1902 which granted home rule to municipalities under whose authority 
Denver voters framed and adopted their own charter providing for the initiative and referendum 
in 1904.   
 Denver’s original contract with the water company began in 1870 for a twenty-year 
period.  That was modified in 1874 to run for a seventeen-year period.  In 1890, a year before the 
contract with the water company expired, Denver passed an ordinance extending the contract 
until April 10, 1910, and further provided options for renewal or non-renewal of the contract as 
well as purchase by the city or not of the water company with a mechanism established for 
appraising the property.  In 1904 Denver voters amended their charter as authorized by the 
amended Constitution of Colorado.  Subsequently Denver re-affirmed the terms of the 1890 
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agreement with the notation that the options specified would now be subject to “an approving 
vote of the taxpaying electors” (p. 129).   In 1907, some two and one-half years before the 
expiration in 1910 of the contract between the water company and the city, the city passed an 
ordinance that was accepted by the water company to conduct an appraisement of the water 
company’s value as well as to submit the questions of which options to pursue to the voters.  The 
appraisal was $14 million, which the city thought too high.  The agreement of 1890 expired on 
April 10, 1910.  On May 17, 1910 the Denver voters amended their charter by which they 
created a public utilities commission “with large powers in respect of the construction, 
acquisition, maintenance and operation of a water plant” (p. 130).  The amended charter required 
that questions regarding purchase of water plants or granting/renewal of contracts for water 
distribution be subjected to municipal voters for their approval.  The amendment also authorized 
bonds of $7 million for the purchase of the existing water plant, subject to voters approving the 
purchase. 
 The water company refused the $7 million offer, arguing that the city was obligated to 
either renew the contract or to purchase the plant at its appraised value.  The city argued that the 
options “were not alternative in the sense that one or the other must be exercised, but were 
independent in the sense that there was no obligation to exercise either” (p. 131).  They also 
noted that the contract resulting from the 1890 ordinance was limited to 20 years and had 
expired.  The trust company, operating in its capacity as the trustee of a mortgage with the water 
company that was given in 1894, filed suit against the city.  The trust company sought a court 
order that would “declare that the city had elected and become obligated to purchase the 
property, to direct a specific performance of that obligation” at the “purchase price to the trust 
company under the mortgage, and restrain and enjoin the city” from building a new water plant 
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(p. 132).  The water company then filed a cross-bill against the city and the trust company asking 
the court to establish the company’s “right to a renewed contract … for another term of 20 years” 
(p. 132). 
 The Circuit Court issued “interlocutory orders” (an action not final or definitive, but 
made during the progress of an action [Gove, p. 179]) on both legal actions, one “temporarily 
enjoining the city” from proceeding to construct a water plant and from issuing bonds for such 
construction, and the other preventing any interference with the water company’s continuing to 
enjoy its rights under the contract of 1890 (pp. 132-133).  Upon appeal the Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the interlocutory orders.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to review the decisions. 
 Without examining the arguments and reasoning regarding the contract law aspects of the 
case, I will simply report that the Court ruled for the City and County of Denver.  Justice Van 
Devanter, speaking for the Court, after extensively reviewing the conflicting contractual 
arguments, declared, “In so far, then, as the bill and cross-bill are founded upon the contractual 
relations…, they must fail” (p. 140).  The Court then dismissed the allegation that rights 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were infringed by noting 
that with the expiration of the contract, neither the water company nor its trustee had valid 
property rights.  Justice Van Devanter next addressed the claim that rights guaranteed by the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated by Denver because only 
the water supply was regulated by the charter amendment which left all other public utilities 
“under general charter provisions” (p. 142).  The Court observed, “There is no merit to this 
objection.  The equal protection clause is directed only against arbitrary discrimination, that is, 
such as is without any reasonable basis” (p. 143).  According to the Court, the Equal Protection 
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Clause “does not prevent a city from applying the scheme of municipal ownership and 
maintenance to one public utility without applying it to all” (p. 143).  The Court concluded, 
“There is nothing unequal in this in the sense of that clause” (p. 143).   
 The Court noted the objection named in the cross-bill, namely that the state constitution 
upon which the charter amendment was based was 
repugnant to Article IV, § 4 of the Constitution of the United Stats 
guaranteeing to the State a republican form of government, in that it takes 
from the state legislature and vests directly in the people of the city 
legislative power over all subjects of purely municipal concern…  (p. 141) 
 
Justice Van Devanter observed that such a claim had recently “disposed of … by our recent 
decision in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon” (p. 141).  He also noted that 
since the Supreme Court of Colorado had also ruled on the constitutionality of the amended 
constitution previously, that claim was “foreclosed” (p. 141). 
 The Court reversed the interlocutory decrees and remanded the case “with direction to 
dismiss both bills on the merits” (p. 145). 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 This is the second case, which dismissed claims arising under the Guarantee Clause by 
referencing the Pacific States decision that was, in turn, based upon both the Luther v. Borden 
and the Taylor v. Beckham rulings. 
 Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250 (1913). 
 Case summary. 
 This case originated in an attempt by the legislature and governor of Indiana to submit an 
entirely new state constitution to voters for approval.  Suit was brought in the Circuit Court of 
Marion County, Indiana, by Dye who sought to enjoin Governor Marshall and other state 
officials from taking the necessary steps to submit the new constitution to voters.  Dye argued 
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that the legislative act of 1911 proposing to submit a new constitution to Indiana voters was 
unconstitutional under Indiana’s constitution because of a “want of authority in the legislature to 
submit an entire constitution to the electors of the State for adoption or rejection” (p. 256).  In the 
unlikely event that the new constitution was to be construed as “a series of amendments,” such 
action was still unconstitutional because the state’s constitutional requirement that such 
amendments “receive the approval of two general assemblies” had not been met (p. 256). 
 The Indiana Attorney General argued that Indiana courts “have no power or jurisdiction 
over the Governor of the State to enjoin official action in any case” and that the “court had no 
power to interfere with the exercise of legislative discretion” (pp. 251-252).  Court interference 
with the executive and legislative branches of the state government would deny “Federal rights” 
secured by “Article IV, § 4, of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that the 
United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government” (p. 
256).   
 The Circuit Court granted an injunction, ruling that the legislative action violated the 
state’s constitution.  On appeal the Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed the Circuit Court’s ruling.  
The U.S. Supreme Court issued a writ of error to review the case.  Before the case could be 
heard, Dye died and his executor was approved by the Court to continue the case on Dye’s 
behalf. 
 Justice Day delivered the Court’s decision upholding the Indiana Supreme Court’s ruling 
and dismissing the writ of error.  Regarding Indiana’s Guarantee Clause claim, the Court cited its 
ruling in Pacific States and observed that the  
full treatment of the subject in that case renders further consideration of that 
question unnecessary, and the contention in this behalf presents no 
justiciable controversy concerning which the decision is reviewable in this 
court upon writ of error to the state court.  (pp. 256-257) 
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The Court observed that the appeal was brought by state officials and further noted that they 
were prohibited from reviewing “the judgment of the highest court of a State” because of the 
requirement that parties seeking review must “have a personal as distinguished from an official 
interest in the relief sought” (p. 257).  According to the Court, the appellants would be affected 
by the outcome “in their official capacity only” (p. 259).  Therefore, “the judgment of the state 
Supreme Court is not reviewable here, as it is not alleged to violate rights of a personal nature, 
secured by the Federal Constitution or laws” (p. 259). 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 Marshall v. Dye is the third case in a two-year period to cite the ruling in Pacific States as 
a controlling factor in the Court’s deliberation.  As such it continues the precedent first 
articulated in the dicta of Luther v. Borden that the “enforcement of the provision in Article IV, § 
4 of the Constitution … depends upon political and governmental action through the powers 
conferred on the Congress and not those conferred on the courts” (p. 250).  Marshall v. Dye also 
offers a corollary to the effect that claims alleging the denial of republican government by state 
court rulings on state constitutional issues because of “the interference of the judicial department 
with the legislative and executive departments” do not “present a justiciable controversy” that 
can be reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court (p. 250). 
 O’Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244 (1915). 
 Case summary. 
 The Nebraska legislature delegated authority to state district courts to organize drainage 
districts throughout the state as public utilities for the welfare of the public.  O’Neill filed suit to 
enjoin a water district thus formed from condemning his land for a right of way to construct a 
ditch that would drain, reclaim, and protect the “lands in the district from overflow” (p. 247).  
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Leamer was one of the supervisors chosen to oversee the drainage district created by the state 
district court.   
O’Neill alleged that the delegation of authority by the legislature to the courts violated 
the Guarantee Clause as it made a government that was not republican.  He also claimed that the 
purpose of the ditch was “essentially for a private purpose and hence contrary to the Fourteenth 
Amendment as amounting to a deprivation of property without due process of law” (p. 249).  The 
plaintiff also argued that the taking of private land for the ditch through condemnation 
proceedings and appointed appraisers denied him “the equal protection of the laws in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment” (p. 246). 
The trial court made findings establishing that all aspects of state law had been followed 
by the District Court in creating the water district as a public corporation and by the supervisors 
in administering the required steps to plan for and construct a drainage ditch for the public 
welfare.  Based upon its findings, the trial court issued a temporary injunction until the lands had 
been paid for, at which time the injunction “should be dissolved and the action dismissed” (p. 
247).  Upon appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court issued a writ of error to review the actions taken by the Nebraska courts. 
 Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court, declared, 
The propriety of the delegation of authority to the District Court in the 
matter of the formation of the drainage district is a state question.  The 
attempt to invoke § 4 of Article IV of the Federal Constitution is obviously 
futile (Pacific Telephone Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118)…  (pp. 247-248) 
 
Turning next to the arguments put forth by the plaintiff, who was also the appellant before the 
Supreme Court, Justice Hughes observed: 
We find no ground for a contrary view as to the nature of the authorized 
enterprise.  We have repeatedly said that the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, embodying fundamental conceptions of justice, cannot be 
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deemed to prevent a State from adopting a public policy for the irrigation of 
arid lands or for the reclamation of wet or over-flowed lands.   …there is 
nothing in the Federal Constitution which denies to them the right to 
formulate this policy or to exercise the power of eminent domain in carrying 
it into effect.  (p. 253). 
 
Finding that the ruling of the Nebraska courts had “abundant support in the decisions of this 
court,” the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Nebraska Supreme Court (p. 254). 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 With differing subject matter, O’Neill v. Leamer marks the fourth decision in four years 
whereby the Court cited Pacific States as prohibiting court involvement in questions based upon 
the Guarantee Clause. 
 Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916). 
 Case summary. 
 This case represented yet another challenge to the constitutionality of the referendum 
provision, this time in Ohio.  In 1912 the constitution of Ohio was amended to provide for the 
referendum.  Pursuant to the apportionment act passed by Congress in 1911, the Ohio legislature 
in 1915 approved “an act redistricting the State for the purpose of congressional elections” that 
changed some of the existing districts (p. 566).  The required number of eligible voters petitioned 
to have the measure submitted to a popular vote under the requirements of the referendum 
provision of the state constitution.  The election was held, and the reapportionment law was 
 defeated. 
 Suit was then filed with the Ohio Supreme Court seeking a mandamus that would direct 
state election officers “to disregard” the results of the referendum and “to proceed” under the 
assumption that the referendum was “void” and that the original bill passed by the Ohio 
legislature “was subsisting and valid” (pp. 566-567).  The argument was that “the referendum 
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vote was not and could not be a part of the legislative authority of the State” because if conflicted 
with § 4, Art. I and § 4, Art. IV of the U.S. Constitution (p. 567).  § 4, Art. I provided that “The 
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be 
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof” (p. 567).  Furthermore, 
to include the referendum in the scope of the legislative power is to 
introduce a virus which destroys that power, which in effect annihilates 
representative government and causes a State where such condition exists to 
be not republican in form in violation of the guarantee of the Constitution.  
Const., § 4, Art. IV.  (p. 569) 
 
The eligible voters of the state by way of a referendum cannot constitutionally be a part of the 
“legislative power” of the state (p. 566).  
 The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that the referendum vote was valid under the state 
constitution which, by way of the amendment of 1912, had declared that the legislative power of 
the State of Ohio was  
vested not only in the Senate and House of Representatives of the State, 
constituting the General Assembly, but in the people in whom a right was 
reserved by way of referendum to approve and disapprove by popular vote 
any law enacted by the General Assembly.  (p. 566) 
 
 Chief Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court whereby it declined to review the 
decision of the Ohio Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of the referendum in terms of 
the state constitution.  Regarding the federal constitutional arguments, the Court observed that 
the plaintiff’s arguments  
disregard the settled rule that the question of whether that guarantee of the 
Constitution has been disregarded presents no justiciable controversy but 
involves the exercise by Congress of the authority vested in it by the 
Constitution.  Pacific Telephone Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118.  (p. 569) 
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Noting that it made no difference in terms of outcome whether the Court dismissed the case for 
“want of merit in the Federal questions relied upon” or whether the Court affirmed the lower 
court’s decision, the Court affirmed the Ohio Supreme Court’s verdict (p. 570). 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant marks the fifth decision in five years in which the Court 
cited Pacific States as prohibiting court involvement in questions based upon the Guarantee 
Clause.  This case also represents the fourth unsuccessful attempt to get the initiative and/or the 
referendum declared unconstitutional by way of the Guarantee Clause. 
 Mountain Timber Company v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917). 
 Case summary. 
 A lumber company challenged the constitutionality of the Washington Workmen’s 
Compensation Act passed in 1911.  Under the act, employers made contributions to an industry-
wide fund to be administered by the state in compensating workers or surviving family members 
for worker injury or death suffered on the job.  The law mandated participation by both 
employers and employees.  The quid pro quo for employer contributions used to fund worker 
compensation was “exemption from liability” for accidental injury (p. 234).  The declaration of 
policy in the first section of the act noted that “the common-law system governing the remedy of 
workmen against employers for injuries received in hazardous work is inconsistent with modern 
industrial conditions” wherein injuries occurred with inadequate remedy for workers (p. 228).  
Citing the belief that the “welfare of the State depends upon its industries, and even more upon 
the welfare of its wage-workers,” the state declared it would exercise its “police and sovereign 
power” to withdraw “all phases” of the problem from “private controversy” (p. 228). 
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  Washington initiated the action to recover premiums required by the act that were not 
paid by Mountain Timber Company as an employer in a hazardous industry.  A lower state court 
ruled for the state.  On appeal to the Supreme Court of Washington, the logging company “by 
demurrer raised objections to the act based upon the Constitution of the United States” (p. 227).  
The state high court overruled the demurrer and affirmed the lower court’s judgment in favor of 
the state.  The U.S. Supreme Court issued a writ of error to review the decision. 
 Originally the defendant, the appeal process made Mountain Timber Company the 
appellant.  Its defense combined tort and constitutional arguments of law.  The reader wishing to 
understand more of the tort aspect of the case, from the point of view of both the attorneys’ 
arguments and the Court’s rationale, are urged to read the case for its warnings of the specters of 
socialism, communism, old-age pensions, and insurance for both sickness and unemployment, all 
of which were portended, according to the logging company’s attorneys, by the Washington law 
through “philanthropic interference with the liberty of a self-reliant race” (p. 223).   
 Constitutional arguments by Mountain Timber Company referenced the Seventh 
Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Guarantee Clause.  The Seventh Amendment 
regarding the right to a  trial by jury was alleged to be violated because of the Washington law’s 
withdrawing the “right of recovery in ordinary cases, and therefore leaves nothing to be tried by 
jury” (p. 235).  However, the Court found that “nothing in the act excludes a trial by jury,” as 
willful injury or death by either employer or employee were excluded from the act’s prohibitions 
of legal action (p. 235). 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause was violated by the Act’s requirement 
of payment “to a fund for the benefit of employees, without regard to any wrongful act of the 
employer” (p. 235).  Such action deprived the employer “of his property, and of his liberty to 
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acquire property, without compensation and without due process of law” (p. 235).  The Equal 
Protection Clause of the same amendment was violated because certain industries were singled 
out as being hazardous and thus subject to the Act while others, notably agriculture, were not 
affected by the law. 
In approaching the Fourteenth Amendment arguments, the Court rephrased the legal 
question. 
[T]he crucial inquiry under the Fourteenth Amendment is whether it clearly 
appears to be not a fair and reasonable exertion of governmental power, but 
so extravagant or arbitrary as to constitute an abuse of power.  All 
reasonable presumptions are in favor of its validity, and the burden of proof 
and argument is upon those who seek to overthrow it.  (pp. 237-238) 
 
The critical questions centered on whether the law’s purpose was the public interest or that of a 
private interest and whether or not the charges were “reasonable” or “oppressive” (p. 238).  
Regarding the first question, the Court quoted from Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31: 
Neither the [fourteenth] amendment – broad and comprehensive as it is – 
nor any other amendment, was designed to interfere with the power of the 
State, sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe regulations to 
promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, 
and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its 
resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity.  (p. 238) 
 
Regarding the second question, the Court quoted from the same decision: 
Regulations for these purposes may press with more or less weight upon one 
than upon another, but they are designed, not to impose unequal or 
unnecessary restrictions upon any one, but to promote … the general good.  
(p. 239) 
 
The Court then determined that the Washington Workmen’s Compensation Act did not infringe 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s provisions. 
 Regarding the Guarantee Clause argument, Justice Pitney stated: 
As has been decided repeatedly, the question whether this guaranty has been 
violated is not a judicial but a political question, committed to Congress and 
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not to the courts.  Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 39,42; Pacific States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118; Kiernan v. Portland, 
Oregon, 223 U.S. 151; Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250, 256; Davis v. Ohio, 
241 U.S. 565.  (pp. 234-235) 
 
The Court, in a 5-4 decision, affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington.  No 
dissenting opinions were presented. 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington marks the sixth decision in as many years whereby 
the Court cited Pacific States as prohibiting court involvement in questions based upon the 
Guarantee Clause.  For the legal scholar, this decision sandwiches Pacific States between Luther 
v. Borden and the cases subsequent to Pacific States. 
 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
 Case summary. 
 This case and the Stanton decision are the only cases thus far which have intimated that 
the Court would not review congressional action pursuant to § 4, Art. IV, of the Constitution.  
Although the Commonwealth of Massachusetts relied primarily upon the Tenth Amendment and 
only secondarily upon the Guarantee Clause in its arguments, the Court’s opinion addressed the 
justiciability of political arguments in terms previously used to address questions arising under 
the Guarantee Clause.  For the aforementioned reasons, Mellon is located in this chapter. 
 The issue involved the congressional “Maternity Act” passed in 1921 for the purpose of 
“cooperating” with the states “to reduce maternal and infant mortality and to protect the health of 
mothers and infants” (p. 447).  States were given the option of participating or not.  Those who 
agreed to participate received funds upon approval of a state plan submitted to a federal bureau 
created by the act.  Participating states then made reports regarding their “operations and 
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expenditures” to the federal bureau who could withhold funds from the state that the bureau 
deemed to have been improperly expended (p. 447). 
 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts elected not to participate in the program 
established by the Maternity Act and subsequently initiated a suit in the U.S. Supreme Court 
challenging the constitutionality of the law.  The Massachusetts’ Attorney General countered the 
justification that the congressional program was authorized under Art. I, § 8 of the Constitution 
by citing opposing views of the Founding Fathers about the meaning of the “general welfare 
clause” (p. 463).  Hamilton had held that funds could be raised and appropriated for “any public 
purpose connected with the general welfare of the United States” (p. 463).  Madison and 
Jefferson, on the other hand, believed that the general welfare clause was “merely descriptive of 
and limited by the specific grants of power to Congress contained in § 8, and that the power to 
tax and appropriate [was] therefore confined to the enumerated powers” (p. 463).  Congressional 
attempts to move beyond the enumerated powers violated the Tenth Amendment by which 
powers not delegated to the Union were reserved to the states.   
Next, the Attorney General for Massachusetts argued that the act established a “system of 
government by cooperation between the United States and the States accepting the act” that 
excluded Massachusetts (p. 471).  Citing Texas v. White and South Carolina v. United States, the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney General indirectly advanced the Guarantee Clause by asking that 
Massachusetts “be restored to its position as one of the States in a Federal Union” (p. 471).  He 
further argued that the current case did not involve a “political question” nor did it ask the Court 
to  
decide what is the established government in a State, and to enforce the 
constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government under Const., 
Art. IV, § 4.  Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1; Taylor & Marshall v. Beckham, 
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178 U.S. 548; Pacific Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118; Davis v. Ohio, 241 
U.S. 565; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219.  (p. 472) 
 
 The Attorney General began his conclusion by noting “that so-called ‘Federal Aid’ legislation 
by Congress … has been found to be an effective way to induce States to yield a portion of their 
sovereign rights” (p. 474).  He concluded: 
[U]nless checked by this Court on the ground of unconstitutionality, no limit 
can be foreseen to the amounts which may thus be expended for matters of 
local concern, resulting in the establishment of large federal bureaus with 
many officers for the performance of duties entirely outside the purview of 
the Constitution.  (pp. 474-475) 
 
 Justice Sutherland delivered the Court’s decision “that the cases must be disposed of for 
want of jurisdiction without considering the merits of the constitutional questions” (p. 480).  He 
stated that Massachusetts presented “no justiciable controversy” in that their powers were not 
invaded “since the statute imposes no obligation but simply extends an option which the State is 
free to accept or reject” (p. 480).  As a prelude to a lengthy discussion of justiciability, the Court 
synthesized the state’s arguments. 
In the last analysis, the complaint of the plaintiff State is brought to the 
naked contention that Congress has usurped the reserved powers of the 
several States by the mere enactment of the statute, though nothing has been 
done and nothing is to be done without their consent; and it is plain that that 
question, as it is thus presented, is political and not judicial in character, and 
therefore is not a matter which admits of the exercise of the judicial power.  
(p. 483) 
 
After discussing and quoting at length from previous decisions, Justice Sutherland articulated 
what he viewed as the demarcation line between justiciable and nonjusticiable issues. 
It follows that in so far as the case depends upon the assertion of a right on 
the part of the State to sue in its own behalf we are without jurisdiction.  In 
that aspect of the case we are called upon to adjudicate, not rights of person 
or property, not rights of dominion over physical domain, not quasi-
sovereign rights actually invaded or threatened, but abstract questions of 
political power, of sovereignty, of government.  No rights of the State 
falling within the scope of the judicial power have been brought within the 
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actual or threatened operation of the statute and this Court is as much 
without authority to pass abstract opinions upon the constitutionality of acts 
of Congress as it was held to be, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, supra, of 
state statutes.  (p. 485) 
 
Expounding further upon the topic near the end of the opinion, the Court noted, “We have no 
power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional” 
(p. 488).  Continuing later, Justice Sutherland stated: 
The party who invokes the power must be able to show not only that the 
statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of 
sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely 
that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.  (p. 
488) 
 
To declare the act of Congress unconstitutional, the Court concluded, “would be not to decide a 
judicial controversy, but to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another 
and co-equal department, an authority which plainly we do not possess” (p. 489).  The Court 
then officially dismissed the case. 
 Significance for the guarantee clause 
 As noted previously, this is one of only two decisions thus far whereby the Court 
declined to question congressional action on the basis of the Guarantee Clause.  Mellon also 
provides interest in its discussion of the dividing line between nonjusticiable and justiciable legal 
issues.  Finally, Mellon is the first case thus far examined that centers on the issue of conditional 
federal aid’s impact upon federalism. 
Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park District et al, 281 U.S. 74 (1930). 
 
 Case summary. 
 While the issues are fairly straightforward, the litigation process for this case is more 
complex as new issues emerged from the activities of the courts involved.  Yet in the end, the 
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issues were summarily dealt with in simple fashion by Chief Justice Hughes, primarily by 
relying upon precedent. 
 Ohio law empowered county probate judges to establish park districts if they find, 
through a process of petitions, notice, and hearing, that such “will be conducive to the general 
welfare” (p. 74).  Upon a positive finding, the judge is then required to appoint a board of park 
commissioners who are empowered to “acquire lands within the district for the conservation of 
its natural resources,” to “lay assessments,” to “levy limited taxes upon all taxable property 
within the district,” and to “adopt regulations for the preservation of good order within and 
adjacent to such parks” (pp. 74-75). 
Bryant, an Ohio taxpayer, filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas seeking an injunction 
to stop the proceedings of the Akron Metropolitan Park District on the basis of a challenge to the 
“validity of the Park District Act of the State” (p. 76).  Bryant argued that the statute violated the 
Ohio constitution, both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Guarantee Clause.  The Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Guarantee Clause arguments were intertwined in that both were violated, according to the 
plaintiff, by the “unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the probate court and to the 
nonelective park commissioners” by the Park District Act (p. 77).  It was further argued that the 
lack of an appeal process for the probate judge’s decision to establish a park district violated the 
due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court of Common Pleas sustained the validity of the Park District Act.  Upon appeal, 
the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas.  On a writ of error to 
the Supreme Court of Ohio, the state’s high court was divided.  Two justices held the statute to 
be valid while five justices thought it not valid.  However, the Ohio constitution provided that 
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“no law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the Supreme Court without a concurrence of 
at least all but one of the judges” (p. 77).  In accordance with the state constitution, the Supreme 
Court of Ohio subsequently affirmed the lower courts’ judgments in favor of the defendant, the 
Akron Metropolitan Park District.  Bryant’s attorneys then entered motions in the Ohio Supreme 
Court to have the judgments vacated and to have a judgment of reversal entered because the 
afore mentioned constitutional provision  
was in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution 
in that it denied to citizens of Ohio due process of law and the equal 
protection of the laws, and also that the provision was repugnant to Section 
4 of Article IV of the Federal Constitution assuring to every State a 
Republican form of government.  (p. 77) 
 
The state supreme court overruled the plaintiff’s motions.  The case was then brought on appeal 
to the U.S. Supreme Court, but the appeal contained the additional argument challenging the 
validity of the Ohio constitutional provision by which judgment went against the plaintiff, 
Bryant.   
Chief Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the Court.  Regarding the arguments that 
the Park District Act violated the Ohio constitution, the Court noted that “it is not for this Court 
to intervene to protect the citizens of the State from the consequences of its policy, if the State 
has not disregarded the requirements of the Federal Constitution” (p. 81).  Addressing the issue 
of the unconstitutionality of the Ohio constitution, the Court pointed out that the constitutional 
requirement being attacked was “one operating uniformly throughout the entire State” (p. 81).  
The challenge to the validity of the state constitution “from a Federal standpoint” was found “to 
be without merit” (p. 79).   
Regarding the Guarantee Clause argument presented by the plaintiff, the Court remarked: 
As to the guaranty to every State of a republican form of government (Sec. 
4, Art. IV), it is well settled that the questions arising under it are political, 
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not judicial, in character and thus are for the consideration of the Congress 
and not the courts.  Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph C. v. Oregon, 223 
U.S.  118; O’Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244, 248; State of Ohio ex rel. Davis 
v. Hildebrant, Secretary of State of Ohio, 241 U.S.  565; Mountain Timber 
Co. v. State of Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 234.  (pp. 79-80) 
 
Addressing the plaintiff’s argument that the Park District Act violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court opined: 
We do not consider it necessary to consider at length this objection, or the 
other points sought to be made against the statute under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as, in view of the repeated decisions of this Court, we do not 
find any substantial Federal question presented.  (p. 79) 
 
Despite the Court’s previous statement, the opinion subsequently addressed both the Due Process 
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.  According to the Court, “the right of appeal is not 
essential to due process, provided that due process has already been accorded in the tribunal of 
first instance” (p. 80).  As the Court further noted,  
The opportunity afforded to litigants in Ohio to contest all constitutional and 
other questions fully in the Common Pleas Court and again in the Court of 
Appeals plainly satisfied the requirement of the Federal Constitution in this 
respect and the State was free to establish the limitation in question in 
relation to appeals to its Supreme Court in accordance with its views of state 
policy.  (p. 80) 
 
Regarding the Equal Protection Clause, the Court pointed to previous rulings and summarized: 
It has been held by this Court that the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is not violated by diversity in the jurisdiction of the 
several courts of a State as to subject matter or finality of decision if all 
persons within the territorial limits of the respective jurisdictions of the state 
courts have an equal right in like cases under like circumstances to resort to 
them for redress.  (p. 81) 
 
The Court further clarified by observing that a state could theoretically establish one system of 
courts for rural areas and another court system for cities without violating requirements of the 
“Federal Constitution” (p. 81). 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
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 Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park District continues a line of cases citing 
Pacific States as being controlling upon claims based upon the Guarantee Clause whereby the 
Court refuses to take jurisdiction.  However, this case possesses a different significance for this 
inquiry because it is the first case examined thus far whereby the Court does not automatically 
defer to the judgment of the state’s supreme court, but investigates the legal situation and issues 
a ruling based upon its own inquiry. 
 Cochran et al v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930). 
 Case summary. 
 The Louisiana legislature enacted legislation in 1928 that provided tax monies for the 
purpose of “supplying school books to the school children of the State” (p. 374).  The legislation 
further directed the State Board of Education to provide “school books for school children free of 
cost to such children” (p. 374). 
 Cochran and other Louisiana citizens filed suit requesting an injunction to stop the 
Louisiana State Board of Education from distributing free textbooks, purchased with public tax 
dollars, to children attending private schools.  Plaintiffs argued that such use amounted to state 
aid for private schools that in turn constituted the “taking of private property for private 
purposes” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Plaintiffs also argued that such a plan 
destroyed an essential part of republican government in violation of the Guarantee Clause. 
If the principle upon which there is allowed a diversion of the public school 
funds for the benefit of private individuals, is sanctioned, then the division 
of the public school funds may be permitted, so that ultimately those whose 
children attend private schools, under the simulation of bearing the burden 
of taxation for the public schools, are paying for the maintenance only of 
their own private schools.  This finally means, in effect, depriving the State 
of its power to tax (for the support of the public schools) those who support 
only their private schools – and practically the destruction of one of the free 
institutions under our republican form of government.  (pp. 372-373) 
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 The trial court refused to issue the requested injunction which decision was affirmed by 
the Supreme Court of Louisiana on appeal as the state’s high court “held that these acts were not 
repugnant to either the state or the Federal Constitution” (p. 374).  Having granted an appeal and 
having heard opposing arguments, Chief Justice Hughes announced the Court’s decision.  
Regarding the Guarantee Clause, the Chief Justice noted his own previous opinion on the issue. 
No substantial Federal question is presented under section 4 of Article IV of 
the Federal Constitution guaranteeing to every State a republican form of 
government, as questions arising under this provision are political, not 
judicial, in character.  State of Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan 
Park District, ante, p. 74, and cases there cited.  (p. 374) 
 
Turning next to the claims arising under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court quoted from the 
Louisiana Supreme Court’s ruling that the Louisiana law was not objectionable under the 
Fourteenth Amendment:  “The schools, however, are not the beneficiaries of these 
appropriations.  They obtain nothing from them, nor are they relieved of a single obligation, 
because of them.  The school children and the state alone are the beneficiaries” (p. 375).  
Immediately prior to announcing that the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court was 
affirmed, the Chief Justice concluded: 
Viewing the statute as having the effect thus attributed to it, we can not 
doubt that the taxing power of the State is exerted for a public purpose.  The 
legislation does not segregate private schools, or their pupils, as its 
beneficiaries or attempt to interfere with any matters of exclusively private 
concern.  Its interest is education, broadly; its method, comprehensive.  
Individual interests are aided only as the common interest is safeguarded.  
(p. 375) 
 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 Cochran v. Board of Education continued a line of decisions begun with Luther v. 
Borden whereby questions arising under the Guarantee Clause are deemed nonjusticiable by the 
Court. 
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 Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. et al. v. Agnew et al., 300 U.S. 608 (1937). 
 Case summary. 
 Although the case is referenced as Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, the original suit 
was filed by Luther W. High who was joined by Highland.  The legal dispute centered on the 
provisions of a Virginia statute referred to as the “Milk and Cream Act” that was enacted in 1934 
(p. 609).  The Virginia law, after reciting “demoralizing trade practices in the dairy industry” that 
threatened to “interrupt the supply of pure and wholesome milk for the inhabitants of the 
Commonwealth” and thereby create an “economic emergency,” created a “Milk Commission 
with power to create … natural market areas, and to fix the minimum and maximum prices to be 
charged for milk and cream therein” (pp. 609, 610).  Distributors were required to obtain a 
license, without which it was illegal to sell dairy products within the market area.  Interstate 
commerce was exempted from the act’s provisions.   
Highland Farms Dairy purchased milk from farmers in Maryland and Virginia before 
processing it and selling its “entire output of bottled milk” to Luther High for his retail stores in 
Virginia (p. 610).  Highland was judged by the Milk Commission to be engaged in interstate 
commerce and thus exempt from the act even though it was selling milk products below the 
minimum prices established for the market area.  High was also selling his products to 
consumers below the price established.  High refused to get a license and kept selling at his 
below-market prices whereupon the “Commission gave notice to High that it would proceed 
against him for an injunction if he refused compliance with its orders” (p. 611).  High then filed 
suit seeking to “enjoin enforcement of the Act” which was joined by Highland Farms Dairy (p. 
611).  Among other claims, plaintiffs argued that the act violated both the Virginia constitution 
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and the Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution by unconstitutionally delegating legislative 
powers to the Milk Commission, a nonlegislative body. 
 According to Justice Cardozo, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
“gave judgment for the defendants, with a comprehensive opinion to which little can be added” 
(p. 611).  Appeal of the District Court’s decision was granted by the Supreme Court.  Justice 
Cardozo delivered the Court’s decision in which nine justices concurred in the judgment, but 
four justices dissented from the portion of the opinion attributing “to the State a power to fix 
minimum and maximum prices to be charged in the sale of milk” (p. 617).  However, no separate 
opinions were presented. 
 Regarding the Constitutional issue, Justice Cardozo remarked: 
The Constitution of the United States in the circumstances here exhibited 
has no voice upon the subject.  The statute challenged as invalid is one 
adopted by a state.  This removes objections that might be worthy of 
consideration if we were dealing with an act of Congress.  How power shall 
be distributed by a state among its governmental organs is commonly, if not 
always, a question for the state itself.  (p. 612) 
 
Having in effect declined federal intervention so that republican government in Virginia could be 
preserved, Cardozo next moved to explicit mention of the Guarantee Clause. 
The statute is not a denial of a republican form of government.  Constitution, 
Art. IV, § 4.  Even if it were, the enforcement of that guarantee, according to 
the settled doctrine, is for Congress, not the courts.  Pacific States Telephone 
Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118; Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565; Ohio ex 
rel. Bryant v. Akron Park District, 281 U.S. 74, 79, 80.  (p. 612) 
 
 Regarding the argument that the Milk and Cream Act violated the Virginia constitution, 
Justice Cardozo pointed to the Virginia Supreme Court’s ruling in another case that found the 
Act not violative of the state’s constitution and ruled that  “[a] judgment by the highest court of a 
state as to the meaning and effect of its own constitution is decisive and controlling everywhere” 
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(p. 613).  The Court, noting that all arguments against the act had already been “summarized and 
answered,” affirmed the judgment of the District Court (p. 617). 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew marks the first attempt by the Court to offer an opinion 
regarding the impact of the Guarantee Clause upon the legal issue; however, it then officially 
ruled to decline jurisdiction and thereby abide by the precedent first established in Luther v. 
Borden and continued since in an unbroken line of multiple cases extending through the decision 
in this case. 
 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 Case summary. 
 This case presents several features of interest.  First, Chief Justice Earl Warren “called 
Baker v. Carr ‘the most vital decision’ during his service on the Court, and the apportionment 
revolution it inaugurated as the most important achievement of his Court” (Hall, 1999, p. 17).  
Such an assessment is quite remarkable, given that the vast majority of the public is more 
familiar with Brown v. Board of Education and probably regards that decision as the Warren 
Court’s most significant accomplishment.  No movies, dramatic presentations, or television 
specials have emerged that focus exclusively on Baker v. Carr.  Neither is Baker v. Carr 
associated with any great socio-political movement.  Nor was the lead attorney who argued the 
case subsequently appointed to the Supreme Court.   
 Second, six of the eight justices who heard the case wrote opinions. Justice Whittaker 
didn’t participate because of health concerns and would shortly announce his resignation from 
the Court because of “physical exhaustion” (Hall, 1992, p. 930).  Interestingly, Chief Justice 
Warren and Justice Black were the only participating justices not authoring an opinion. Justice 
   
   
195
Brennan wrote the opinion for the 6-2 majority while Justices Douglas, Clark, and Stewart wrote 
separate concurring opinions.  Justices Frankfurter and Harlan wrote separate dissenting opinions 
in which each concurred with the other. 
 Third, while the case was not argued on the basis of the Guarantee Clause, five of the six 
written opinions specifically mentioned the Constitutional guarantee of republican government.  
Justices Brennan, Douglas, Clark, Frankfurter, and Harlan each addressed the Guarantee Clause 
in their remarks.  Although the case was argued under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Frankfurter characterized the case as “in effect, a Guarantee 
Clause claim masquerading under a different label” (p. 297). 
 Fourth, Baker v. Carr represented, according to Justice Clark, one of the “most carefully 
considered” decisions of the Supreme Court, one in which the Court gave “detailed study” to the 
problematic issues involved (pp. 258, 261).  The case was before the Court for two years, was 
first argued on April 19-20, 1961 for three hours, was reargued on October 9, 1961, for another 
three hours, and was decided on March 26, 1962, after “over six hours’ argument (three times the 
ordinary case)” as well as having been “considered over and over again by us in Conference and 
individually” (p. 258). 
 Fifth, the newly elected Kennedy administration filed an amicus curiae brief urging 
reversal of the district court decision through its Solicitor General, Archibald Cox.25  During the 
reargument of the case, Cox “reargued the cause for the United States” by “special leave of 
Court, 365 U.S. 864” (p. 187). 
 The legal dispute centered on apportionment.  Baker as well as other plaintiffs living in 
Knoxville, Memphis, and Nashville filed action in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District 
of Tennessee against Joseph Cordell Carr, secretary of state for Tennessee, and George 
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McCanless, the Tennessee attorney general.  In their suit the plaintiffs argued that they “and 
others similarly situated, are denied the equal protection of the laws accorded them by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by virtue of the debasement of 
their votes” (pp. 187-188).  Under Tennessee’s Constitution, the legislature was required to 
apportion the members of the state legislature among Tennessee’s ninety-five counties following 
each decennial census.  However, the last time the legislature fulfilled the constitutional 
obligation was 1901.  Even that measure was flawed, according to the plaintiffs, because it failed 
to provide municipal voters with their fair share of seats.  Plaintiffs noted that the state courts had 
refused to become involved in subsequent years, thus leaving the federal courts as the only forum 
that might provide any relief.  They asked the court to declare the Tennessee Apportionment Act 
of 1901 unconstitutional and to issue an injunction prohibiting state officials from conducting 
future elections under its auspices.  Justice Brennan provided greater insight into the plaintiffs’ 
constitutional argument when he summarized their position in the Court’s majority opinion: 
Their constitutional claim is, in substance, that the 1901 statute constitutes 
arbitrary and capricious state action, offensive to the Fourteenth 
Amendment in its irrational disregard of the standard of apportionment 
prescribed by the State’s Constitution or of any standard, effecting a gross 
disproportion of representation to voting population.  The injury which 
appellants assert is that this classification disfavors the voters in the counties 
in which they reside, placing them in a position of constitutionally 
unjustifiable inequality vis-à-vis voters in irrationally favored counties.  A 
citizen’s right to a vote free of arbitrary impairment by state action has been 
judicially recognized as a right secured by the Constitution…  (pp. 207-208) 
 
 The district judge convened a three-judge district court to hear the case after reviewing 
several Supreme Court decisions and determining that justification existed for convening such a 
court (175 F. Supp. 649).  This three-judge district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that 
they didn’t have jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution or the federal statutes 
implementing Article III that outlined the scope of judicial power.  In addition, the three-judge 
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federal court noted that even if they had jurisdiction, the questions presented by the plaintiffs 
were political and therefore nonjusticiable. 
 The Court granted direct appeal of the district court’s decision.  In its ruling the Court 
held “that the District Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the federal constitutional 
claim asserted in the complaint” and “that a justiciable cause of action is stated upon which 
appellants would be entitled to appropriate relief” (pp. 204, 198).  The State of Tennessee argued 
that apportionment could involve a constitutional right only if it rested on the Guarantee Clause 
and that such complaints had previously been held by the Court to “present political questions 
which are nonjusticiable” (p. 209). Responding to Tennessee’s argument, the Court stated: 
We hold that the claim pleaded here neither rests upon nor implicates the 
Guaranty Clause and that its justiciability is therefore not foreclosed by our 
decisions of cases involving that clause….  Appellants’ claim that they are 
being denied equal protection is justiciable, and if “discrimination is 
sufficiently shown, the right to relief under the equal protection clause is not 
diminished by the fact that the discrimination relates to political rights.”  
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11.  (pp. 209-210) 
 
Concluding that “[t]he right asserted is within the reach of judicial protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment,” the Court reversed the District Court’s judgment and remanded the 
cause “for further proceedings consistent with [the Court’s] opinion” (p. 237). 
 Describing the impact of the case in terms of subsequent actions, a constitutional scholar 
noted its significance. 
It did not take long for other states to go through the door opened by Baker 
v. Carr.  In one year, thirty-six states had become involved in 
reapportionment lawsuits.  During the next several years the Court rounded 
out the reapportionment revolution.  The judges quickly retreated from the 
“rationality test” – that apportionment plans were to be evaluated in terms of 
whether or not they had any rational basis – to what many think to be a 
simplistic but nonetheless more manageable standard of mathematical strict 
equality – one person, one vote.  Within a short time the Court had 
concluded that no factors … but strictly equal population districts would 
pass constitutional muster.  (Hall, 1999, p. 20) 
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 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 Baker v. Carr presented multiple items of interest for the Guarantee Clause of which both 
scholars and litigants need to be cognizant.  Unique to this case in both breadth and depth, the 
justices focused on the following topics pertinent to the Guarantee Clause: 
• Types of dismissal of cases by the Court; 
• Federal district court jurisdictional boundaries. 
• Criteria for political questions;  
• Justiciability of Guarantee Clause claims; and the 
• Status of Congress regarding the Guarantee Clause. 
Of course, the majority opinion dwelt at length with Luther v. Borden.  Luther also drew 
comments from other justices in their opinions.  The majority opinion as well as an analysis by a 
constitutional scholar suggests a limiting of Luther’s influence in modern constitutional 
jurisprudence.  Finally, two topics of interest remain. The first arises from the majority opinion’s 
questionable rationale that what is nonjusticiable under the Guarantee Clause suddenly becomes 
justiciable under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The second concerns the justices’ contrasting 
views of the role of the courts in American jurisprudence. The topics will be discussed in the 
order just presented.  The reader should bear in mind that the issues of political questions, 
justiciability, and congressional status vis-à-vis the Guarantee Clause intertwine with each other; 
nevertheless, an attempt will be made to distinguish the main features of each as presented in the 
various opinions contained within Baker v. Carr. 
 In reviewing the District Court’s order of dismissal, Justice Brennan noted “two possible 
reasons for dismissal” – “lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter” and “failure to state a 
justiciable cause of action” (p. 196).  The problem for the Court arose from the District Court’s 
   
   
199
use of both “without attempting to distinguish between these [two] grounds” (p. 196).  In 
discussing these two possibilities, Justice Brennan also articulated a third reason for court 
dismissal of a case – lack of standing by plaintiff to litigate a cause.  The Court pointed out that 
the three-judge panel did not doubt that constitutional rights had been violated as the following 
portion of the court’s ruling demonstrates.   
With the plaintiffs’ argument that the legislature of Tennessee is guilty of a 
clear violation of the state constitution and of the rights of the plaintiffs the 
Court entirely agrees.  It also agrees that the evil is a serious one which 
should be corrected without further delay.  But even so the remedy in this 
situation clearly does not lie with the courts.  It has long been recognized 
and is accepted doctrine that there are indeed some rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution for the violation of which the courts cannot give redress.  179 
F. Supp., at 828.  (p. 197) 
 
The Supreme Court ruled that the lower court erred in resting its ruling on any of the three 
possible reasons for dismissing a case (the two announced in the District Court ruling, the third 
presented by the State of Tennessee in its arguments before the Supreme Court).  The Court 
announced its holding: 
In light of the District Court’s treatment of the case, we hold today only (a) 
that the court possessed jurisdiction of the subject matter; (b) that a 
justiciable cause of action is stated upon which appellants would be entitled 
to appropriate relief; and (c) because appellees raise the issue before this 
Court, that the appellants have standing to challenge the Tennessee 
apportionment statutes.  (pp. 197-198) 
 
 In explaining its holding that the lower court possessed jurisdiction, the Supreme Court 
reviewed the jurisdictional boundaries of federal district courts as delineated by Article III, § 2 of 
the Constitution and by “the power of Congress to assign to the jurisdiction of the District 
Courts” according to Article III, § 2.  The Court explicitly quoted from 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) in 
its ruling: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
authorized by law to be commenced by any person … [t]o redress the 
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deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the 
Constitution of the United States….  (p. 200) 
 
In a footnote, the Court noted further jurisdictional implications by quoting from 42 U.S.C. § 
1983: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to 
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.  (p. 200, n. 18) 
 
 In explaining why it rejected Tennessee’s argument that apportionment claims were 
based on the Guarantee Clause, the Court noted that it was “necessary first to consider the 
contours of the ‘political question’ doctrine” (p. 210).  According to the majority opinion, “The 
nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers” (p. 
210).  Justice Brennan continued: 
Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the 
Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that 
branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate 
exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court 
as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.  (p. 211) 
 
The Court proceeded to examine various governmental issues “to infer from them the analytical 
threads that make up the political question doctrine” (p. 211).  After examining questions related 
to foreign relations, dates regarding the start and conclusion of hostilities, validity of enactments, 
and the status of Indian tribes, the Court summarized the elements of political questions which 
arose, in the Court’s view, over issues related to the separation of powers.  The Court identified 
six elements or “analytical threads” of political questions: 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is 
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
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manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of 
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political 
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.  (p. 
217) 
 
Cautioning that courts needed to conduct a “discriminating inquiry into the precise facts and 
posture of the particular case,” and noting that it was impossible to resolve the determination of 
whether or not a political question was involved by “any semantic cataloguing,” the Court 
summarized its position vis-à-vis political questions: 
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there 
should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground of a political 
question’s presence.  The doctrine of which we treat is one of “political 
questions,” not one of “political cases.”  The courts cannot reject as “no law 
suit” a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated 
“political” exceeds constitutional authority.  (p. 217) 
 
According to the Court, previous Guarantee Clause cases had involved “those elements which 
define a ‘political question’ and for that reason and no other, they (were) nonjusticiable” (p. 
218).  Later in the opinion, the Court reiterated that “it is the involvement in Guaranty Clause 
claims of the elements thought to define ‘political questions,’ and no other feature, which … 
render[ed] them nonjusticiable” (p. 229). 
 Justice Frankfurter’s dissenting opinion defined political questions as constituting “a 
class of controversies which do not lend themselves to judicial standards and judicial remedies” 
(p. 280).  To call them political questions was, in Frankfurter’s judgment, to state a conclusion 
rather than to conduct an analysis.  Justice Frankfurter offered his own category of reasons for 
noninvolvement of the federal judiciary, not all of which pertained to the Guarantee Clause.  
Two, however, seem pertinent.  The first reiterated one of the majority opinion’s reasons for 
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judicial noninvolvement in Guarantee Clause cases, “the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial 
determination” (p. 283, quoting Chief Justice Hughes’ opinion in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 
433, 454-455).  According to Justice Frankfurter: 
A controlling factor in such cases is that, decision respecting these kinds of 
complex matters of policy being traditionally committed not to courts but to 
the political agencies of government for determination by criteria of political 
expediency, there exists no standard ascertainable by settled judicial 
experience or process by reference to which a political decision affecting the 
question at issue between the parties can be judged.  (p. 282) 
 
Justice Frankfurter’s second reason for nonjusticiability applies to other cases as well, but hasn’t 
been explicitly explained in previous cases examined thus far.  It deals with what Frankfurter 
described as the Court’s refusal “to exercise its jurisdiction to pass on ‘abstract questions of 
political power, of sovereignty, of government’” (p. 286, quoting from Massachusetts v. Mellon, 
262 U.S. 447, 485).  Justice Frankfurter provided further elucidation. 
The “political question” doctrine, in this aspect, reflects the policies 
underlying the requirement of “standing”:  that the litigant who would 
challenge official action must claim infringement of an interest particular 
and personal to himself, as distinguished from a cause of dissatisfaction with 
the general frame and functioning of government – a complaint that the 
political institutions are awry.  (pp. 286-287) 
 
 Since the issue of political questions and the Guarantee Clause originated with Luther v. 
Borden, Justice Brennan conducted a thorough review of that case in examining the issue of 
justiciability.  After devoting five pages to an examination of Luther v. Borden, the Court 
appeared to narrow the significance of the Taney Court’s ruling upon Guarantee Clause claims: 
But the only significance that Luther could have for our immediate purposes 
is in its holding that the Guaranty Clause is not a repository of judicially 
manageable standards which a court could utilize independently in order to 
identify a State’s lawful government.  (p. 223) 
 
However, in a separate note, Justice Brennan suggested that the absence of standards might not 
be a hindrance.  He opined that “the judiciary might be able to decide the limits of the meaning 
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of ‘republican form,’ and thus the factor of criteria might fall away…” (p. 223, n. 48).  
According to a professor of constitutional law, Justice Brennan reinforced such an interpretation 
by citing “indices that earlier Courts have deemed requisites of republican government” 
(Bonfield, 1962, p. 248).   
 Arthur E. Bonfield, professor of law at the University of Iowa, noted an important 
distinction regarding the holding in Luther v. Borden that sheds light on the case law springing 
from Luther.  He pointed out that the holding in Luther was actually quite narrow, but that 
additional discussion in the opinion not directly related to the finding (i.e., dicta) became the 
focal point for subsequent case law.   
Therefore, despite dicta to the contrary, Luther does not hold that the 
guarantee is solely enforceable by Congress.  Rather, its holding is only that 
the particular determination there involved resided with the President.  But 
in line with the dicta in Luther and the holdings of later cased relying 
thereon, Justice Brennan seems convinced that the guarantee’s enforcement 
is exclusively committed to Congress.  (Bonfield, 1962, p. 249) 
 
Professor Bonfield also observed that the holding in Luther does not lend support to an 
interpretation that any enforcement of the Guarantee Clause is committed to Congress since the 
“unique determination required in Luther was exclusively delegated to the President” (Bonfield, 
1962, p. 248).  He continued: 
The latter clauses of article IV, section 4, and a statute enacted in 1795 
conferred on the President the exclusive power to decide which of two 
competing state governments was legitimate and lawful.  He was to curb 
insurrection by calling forth the militia on application of the proper 
governmental authority of a state.  As a result, the obligation had been 
impliedly placed on him to “determine what body of men constitute the 
legislature, and who is the governor, before he can act.”  While the President 
never actually summoned the militia, he did recognize the old governor as 
the executive power of Rhode Island.  (Bonfield, 1962, pp. 248-249) 
 
 Examination of the Guarantee Clause reveals the lack of any textual support that would 
suggest exclusive enforcement of that clause by Congress.  Yet Justice Brennan made an 
   
   
204
incredible and solitary leap from exclusive enforcement of the Guarantee Clause by Congress to 
an assertion that “challenges to congressional action on the ground of inconsistency with [the 
Guarantee Clause] … present no justiciable question” (p. 224).  Such a leap was solitary because 
two other sitting justices denied such an interpretation.  In a separate concurring opinion, Justice 
Douglas disavowed both interpretations: 
The statements in Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 42, that this guaranty is 
enforceable only by Congress or the Chief Executive is not maintainable.  
Of course the Chief Executive, not the Court, determines how a State will be 
protected against invasion.  Of course each House of Congress, not the 
Court, is “the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own 
Members.”  Article I, Section 5, Clause 1.  But the abdication of all judicial 
functions respecting voting rights (7 How., at 41), however justified by the 
peculiarities of the charter form of government in Rhode Island at the time 
of Dorr’s Rebellion, states no general principle.  It indeed is contrary to the 
cased discussed in the body of this opinion – the modern decisions of the 
Court that give the full panoply of judicial protection to voting rights.  
Today we would not say with Chief Justice Taney that it is no part of the 
judicial function to protect the right to vote of those “to whom it is denied 
by the written and established constitution and laws of the State.”  Ibid.  (p. 
242, n. 2) 
 
Justice Douglas continued by quoting from Justice Woodbury’s dissenting opinion in Luther v. 
Borden: 
It would be alarming enough to sanction here an unlimited power, exercised 
either by legislatures, or the executive, or courts, when all our governments 
are themselves governments of limitations and checks, and of fixed and 
known laws, and the people a race above all others jealous of encroachments 
by those in power.  (p. 243, n. 2) 
 
Dismissing any notion of congressional infallibility or immunity from judicial review of that 
body’s actions under the Guarantee Clause, Justice Douglas cited a federal court judge’s ruling 
from Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220, 236: 
The whole thrust of today’s legal climate is to end unconstitutional 
discrimination.  It is ludicrous to preclude judicial relief when a mainspring 
of representative government is impaired.  Legislators have no immunity 
from the Constitution.  The legislatures of our land should be made as 
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responsive to the Constitution of the United States as are the citizens who 
elect the legislators.  (p. 249) 
 
Justice Frankfurter also disagreed with any interpretation whereby the enforcement of the 
Guarantee Clause was committed to Congress:  “Art. IV, § 4, is not committed by express 
constitutional terms to Congress.  It is the nature of the controversies arising under it, nothing 
else, which has made it judicially unenforceable” (p. 297).   
 Having studied the intersection of the Guarantee Clause and Congress and having written 
articles discussing this issue, Professor Bonfield noted that the American system of federalism 
opposed any abstinence from judicial review of congressional action, particularly under the 
Guarantee Clause. 
For judicial abstinence would give Congress unlimited power to impose on 
the states whatever government it deemed republican.  Not only would such 
authority spell the complete end of our federal system, but it would create an 
unchecked power capable of destroying rather than guaranteeing republican 
government.  (Bonfield, 1962, January, pp. 564-565) 
 
While a court might refrain from enforcing the Guarantee Clause, such a course of action did not 
preclude judicial review of attempts by the other branches to enforce the Clause. 
For this reason [preventing the possibility of congressional tyranny], though 
the Court might refuse to enforce the guarantee on its own initiative, it 
would review the legitimacy of any congressional attempt to do so.  In such 
a case, it would be only performing its usual function of keeping the 
legislature within those powers actually conferred …  (Bonfield, 1962, 
January, p. 565). 
 
Bonfield concluded, “As a result, any congressional enforcement of the guarantee clause will be 
subject to judicial scrutiny” (Bonfield, 1962, January, p. 565).   
 Siding with Justices Douglas and Frankfurter in disagreeing with Justice Brennan’s views 
of congressional status regarding the Guarantee Clause, Professor Bonfield criticized not only 
the results of Justice Brennan’s reasoning, but also the assumptions made and the cases used to 
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support what Bonfield viewed as an illogical interpretation.  Regarding the assertion of 
congressional immunity regarding the Guarantee Clause, Bonfield pointed out: 
The cases he cites to support this last proposition are wholly inapposite, for 
they were grounded in the unique circumstances of the Reconstruction of the 
South in the aftermath of the Civil War.  Only in a footnote is it admitted 
that the “implication of the Guaranty Clause in a case concerning 
congressional action does not always preclude judicial action.”  (Bonfield, 
1962, p. 249) 
 
He continued by illustrating the consequences of such an interpretation by Justice Brennan: 
Certainly his textual references could not have meant to convey the 
impression that all congressional action allegedly pursuant to the guarantee 
was unreviewable.  Such a doctrine would be disastrous, since it would 
leave in Congress an unfettered and unchecked power capable of destroying 
all republican government.  (Bonfield, 1962, p. 249) 
 
As Bonfield explained in a footnote, “To free any action from judicial scrutiny, all Congress 
need do is assert that it was acting pursuant to the guarantee” (Bonfield, 1962, p. 249, n. 32).   
 Bonfield also criticized Justice Brennan’s opinion that the enforcement of the Guarantee 
Clause is an exclusively congressional responsibility. 
And his initial assumption that the clause is enforceable in the first instance 
solely by Congress is as questionable as his further assumption that the 
Court is impotent to review Congressional action thereunder.  This 
conclusion becomes obvious when it is realized that no “textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department” exists here.  (Bonfield, 1962, pp. 249-250) 
 
 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter disagreed with the majority opinion’s 
restricted view of Luther v. Borden.  Justice Frankfurter’s dissent also disagreed with the 
separate concurring opinions written by Justices Douglas and Clark regarding justiciability of 
claims regarding constitutional violations of constitutional guarantees.  Justice Frankfurter’s 
comments provide a contrasting view of Luther v. Borden, one that had held judicial sway for 
over a century. 
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The influence of these converging considerations – the caution not to 
undertake decision where standards meet for judicial judgment are lacking, 
the reluctance to interfere with matters of state government in the absence of 
an unquestionable and effectively enforceable mandate, the unwillingness to 
make courts arbiters of the broad issues of political organization historically 
committed to other institutions and for whose adjustment the judicial 
process is ill-adapted – has been decisive of the settled line of cases, 
reaching back more than a century, which holds that Art. IV, § 4, of the 
Constitution, guaranteeing to the States “a Republican Form of 
Government,” is not enforceable through the courts.  (p. 289) 
 
 Somewhat troublesome is the majority opinion’s view that the claims of this case are 
justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that the same 
claims are not justiciable under the Guarantee Clause.   
We conclude then that the nonjusticiability of claims resting on the 
Guaranty Clause which arises from their embodiment of questions that were 
thought “political,” can have no bearing upon the justiciability of the equal 
protection claim presented in this case.  (p. 228) 
 
It can only be surmised that such a conclusion is arrived at through semantic posturing, or by 
following the dicta in the Luther opinion, or both.  Justice Brennan observed for the majority: 
This case does, in one sense, involve the allocation of political power within 
a State, and the appellants might conceivably have added a claim under the 
Guaranty Clause.  Of course, as we have seen, any reliance on that clause 
would be futile.  But because any reliance on the Guaranty Clause could not 
have succeeded it does not follow that appellants may not be heard on the 
equal protection claim which in fact they tender.  (pp. 226-227) 
 
And then, immediately following, is a statement whereby the majority justices acknowledge that 
the current case does not present a political question. 
True, it must be clear that the Fourteenth Amendment claim is not so 
enmeshed with those political question elements which render Guaranty 
Clause claims nonjusticiable as actually to present a political question itself.  
But we have found that not to be the case here.  (p. 227) 
 
The immediate question springing to mind after such a statement – “If there is no political 
question, why not involve the Guarantee Clause?”  Perhaps the Guarantee Clause had an 
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unsavory reputation in judicial circles in that, despite protestations to the contrary, any claim 
presented under the Guarantee Clause was deemed to involve “political” questions and thus be 
nonjusticiable.  Perhaps the Guarantee Clause represented a judicial Gordian Knot to the 
majority justices that was too complicated to unravel.  A much easier task would be to disavow 
any connection with the Guarantee Clause and proceed to examine the case according to its 
merits under another constitutional provision.  According to Justice Brennan: 
We hold that the claim pleaded here neither rests upon nor implicates the 
Guaranty Clause and that its justiciability is therefore not foreclosed by our 
decisions of cases involving that clause….  Appellants’ claim that they are 
being denied equal protection is justiciable, and if “discrimination is 
sufficiently shown, the right to relief under the equal protection clause is not 
diminished by the fact that the discrimination relates to political rights.”  
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11.  (pp. 209-210) 
 
 Justice Frankfurter also had problems with the majority opinion’s “nonjusticiable under 
the Guarantee Clause, but justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause” argument.  According 
to Justice Frankfurter, “’[E]qual protection’ is no more secure a foundation for judicial judgment 
of the permissibility of varying forms of representative government that is ‘Republican Form’” 
(pp. 300-301).  Justice Frankfurter next noted the nexus between the Equal Protection Clause and 
a republican form of government: 
For a court could not determine the equal-protection issue without in fact 
first determining the Republican-Form issue, simply because what is 
reasonable for equal-protection purposes will depend upon what frame of 
government, basically, is allowed.  To divorce “equal protection” from 
“Republican Form” is to talk about half a question” (p. 301) 
 
 A professor of constitutional law well versed in the Guarantee Clause characterized as 
“incongruous” the majority opinion’s formulation of “justiciable when presented under the equal 
protection clause, but nonjusticiable when raised under the guarantee” (Bonfield, 1962, p. 252).  
He continued: 
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[N]or are there greater difficulties under this provision [the Guarantee 
Clause] in defining the criteria necessary for judicial enforcement than there 
are under the fourteenth amendment.  As a result, an issue raised under the 
guarantee should be deemed “political” solely if it is burdened with some of 
the other elements Justice Brennan notes.  An issue cognizable under the 
fourteenth amendment, as that in Baker v. Carr, must therefore, as a logical 
proposition, be so under the guarantee.  (Bonfield, 1962, p. 252) 
 
 Of final interest, this case revealed a fundamental fault-line between contrasting views of 
the role of courts in America’s experiment with republican government. Should the courts strive 
for equality or should they exhibit self-restraint and not become involved in controversial issues?  
Justices Harlan and Frankfurter argued for the latter while Justices Clark and Douglas favored 
the first proposition.  Justice Harlan stated the case for restraint from controversy: 
[I]t is appropriate to say that one need not agree, as a citizen, with what 
Tennessee has done or failed to do, in order to deprecate, as a judge, what 
the majority is doing today.  Those observers of the Court who see it 
primarily as the last refuge for the correction of all inequality or injustice, 
not matter what its nature or source, will no doubt applaud this decision and 
its break with the past.  Those who consider that continuing national respect 
for the Court’s authority depends in large measure upon its wise exercise of 
self-restraint and discipline in constitutional adjudication, will view the 
decision with deep concern.  (pp. 339-340) 
 
Justice Frankfurter’s agreement with Justice Harlan’s view of the Court’s role can be seen in the 
following: 
Disregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the Court’s “judicial 
Power” not only presages the futility of judicial intervention in the 
essentially political conflict of forces by which the relation between 
population and representation has time out of mind been and now is 
determined.  It may well impair the Court’s position as the ultimate organ of 
“the supreme Law of the Land” in that vast range of legal problems, often 
strongly entangled in popular feeling, on which this Court must pronounce.  
(p. 267) 
 
Both justices were concerned with the public’s view of the Court.  Justice Frankfurter concluded: 
The Court’s authority – possessed of neither the purse nor the sword – 
ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.  Such 
feeling must be nourished by the Court’s complete detachment, in fact and 
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in appearance, from political entanglements and by abstention from 
injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political settlements.  (p. 
267) 
 
 Justices Clark and Douglass would agree with the first sentence of the previous citation, 
but would strongly disagree with a policy of abstention from controversy on what they regard as 
fundamental issues.  Justice Clark drew sustenance for his view of the Court’s role in America’s 
scheme of government from a participant in the Constitutional Convention who later served as 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 
As John Rutledge (later Chief Justice) said 175 years ago in the course of 
the Constitutional Convention, a chief function of the Court is to secure the 
national rights.  Its decision today supports the proposition for which our 
forebears fought and many died, namely, that to be fully conformable to the 
principle of right, the form of government must be representative.  That is 
the keystone upon which our government was founded and lacking which no 
republic can survive.  (pp. 261-262) 
 
While “self-restraint and discipline in constitutional adjudication” is an admirable practice, it 
must not blind the Court to the point of sanctioning the infringement of “national rights” (p. 
262).  Justice Clark concluded: 
National respect for the courts is more enhanced through the forthright 
enforcement of those rights rather than by rendering them nugatory through 
the interposition of subterfuges.  In my view the ultimate decision today is 
in the greatest tradition of this Court.  (p. 262)  
 
Justice Douglas strongly believed in protecting the individual rights necessary for a republican 
form of government to flourish, even to the extent of implying that Luther v. Borden and its 
subsequent case law constituted a judicial mistake. 
I feel strongly that many of the cases cited by the Court and involving so-
called “political” questions were wrongly decided.  In joining the opinion, I 
do not approve those decisions but only construe the Court’s opinion in this 
case as stating an accurate historical account of what the prior cases have 
held.  (p. 241, n. 1) 
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It is instructive of his position that one of the opinions he selected to cite in his concurring 
opinion came from an apportionment case previously reversed by a federal appeals court and not 
reviewed by the Supreme Court, a decision that would have been upheld if it had been reached 
subsequent, instead of prior, to Baker v. Carr.  Justice Douglass approvingly quoted from Judge 
McLaughlin’s original decision:  “The whole thrust of today’s legal climate is to end 
unconstitutional discrimination.  It is ludicrous to preclude judicial relief when a mainspring of 
representative government is impaired” (p. 249). 
 The debate surrounding this fault-line continues today in another guise, that of judicial 
activism.  However, the opposing positions were clearly defined in the multiple opinions 
contained within Baker v. Carr.  A belief in the position articulated by Justices Clark and 
Douglass also motivated the stirring dissents of Justice Harlan’s grandfather, Justice John 
Marshall Harlan, particularly his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson reviewed in a later section of this 
chapter. 
The guarantee clause prohibits federal intervention so that the state continues to 
have a republican government. 
 
 Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506 (1897). 
 Case summary. 
 The dispute arose over the City of Hammond’s desire to annex the plaintiff’s land and 
involved actions, some of which were simultaneous, in both state and federal courts.  Indiana 
state law authorized “the annexation of contiguous territory to the limits of a city with or without 
the consent of the owner” (p. 507).  The city council of Hammond approved the annexation, the 
county commissioners of Lake County denied the application, the city appealed to the Circuit 
Court of Lake County where it was transferred to the Circuit Court of Porter County which 
conducted a jury trial that determined in favor of the city’s annexation.  Following this action, 
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the city levied taxes on the plaintiff’s property whereupon she filed for an injunction to restrain 
the collection of taxes with the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Indiana.  The Circuit Court 
denied the motion for injunction and dismissed the suit, and the plaintiff appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit which reversed the lower court’s decision.  This time the city of 
Hammond successfully applied to the U.S. Supreme Court for a certiorari directed to the Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  In the meantime, the plaintiff and others had appealed the 
decision of the Circuit Court of Porter County to the Supreme Court of Indiana, which upheld the 
decision of the lower state court. 
 Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the majority and asked, “Having litigated a 
question in one competent tribunal and been defeated, can she litigate the same question in 
another tribunal, acting independently, and having no appellate jurisdiction” (p. 517)?  
Answering his own question, the Justice noted that the concept of res judicata (a common law 
principle whereby final judgment by an appropriate court concludes the rights of all parties in 
subsequent litigation involving the same issues already resolved [Hall, 1992, p. 730]) applied to 
the situation “in all its force” (p. 517).  He also observed that the subject matter was one 
“peculiarly within the domain of state control” (p. 518).   
It is for the State to determine its political subdivisions, the number and size 
of its municipal corporations and their territorial extent.  These are matters 
of a local nature, in \which the nation, as a whole, is not interested, and in 
which, by the very nature of things, the determination of the state authorities 
should be accepted as authoritative and controlling.  (p. 518) 
 
He noted, “The construction by the courts of a State of its constitution and statutes is , as a 
general rule, binding on the Federal courts” (p. 518)  The decision of the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit was reversed, and the case was remanded to the U.S. Circuit Court for the 
District of Indiana with instructions to dismiss the case. 
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 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 Justice Brewer cited the Guarantee Clause as providing for two courses of action.  First, 
the Clause did not prohibit state citizens from giving jurisdiction of territorial boundaries to the 
state courts and removing such jurisdiction from the legislature as the “preservation of legislative 
control in such matters is not one of the essential elements of a republican government…” (p. 
519).  But the clause did impose a limit on the federal judiciary: 
And whenever the Supreme Court of a State holds that under the true 
construction of its constitution and statutes the courts of that State have 
jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal courts can neither deny the 
correctness of this construction nor repudiate its binding force as presenting 
anything in conflict with the Federal Constitution.  (p. 519) 
 
 United States v. Downey, 195 F.Supp. 581 (1961). 
 Case summary. 
 William Downey, a secretary in the governor’s office of the State of Illinois, was indicted 
by a federal grand jury “for evasion of income taxes” for each of the years from 1953 through 
1956.  In his trial before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, the Attorney 
General of Illinois and the State’s Attorney of Sangamon County, Illinois intervened and “filed a 
motion for disclosure” of the federal grand jury proceedings by which Downey had been 
indicted.  In their motion they claimed authority under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) 
that states:  “Disclosure of matters occurring before the Grand Jury other than its deliberations, 
and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the government for use in the 
performance of their duties” (p. 583).  Both state officials claimed they were government 
attorneys and thus covered by the provisions of the act.  This cited case, therefore, is the ruling of 
the federal district court on the “motion for disclosure of grand jury proceedings to parties who 
intervened in a criminal proceeding” (p. 581). 
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 District Judge Poos pointed out that the grand jury proceedings dealt with violations of 
“criminal laws of the United States, and not with criminal offenses against the laws of a State” 
(p. 583).  After reviewing the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Judge Poos noted that the 
rules pertained to “proceedings in the courts of the United States, and none other” (p. 584).  
Continuing, he then ruled that the phrase in Rule 6(e), “to the attorneys for the government for 
use in the performance of their duties,” clearly referred to “and could only mean attorneys for the 
United States Government, and not the attorneys of any county or state government” (p. 584).  
Clarifying his reasoning, Judge Poos explained: 
If this were not true, and if Congress or the United States Supreme Court 
could make rules for criminal procedure in the State courts, then one would 
have to disregard the provisions of Article IV, Sec. 4 of the Constitution of 
the United States, which provides:  “The United States shall guarantee to 
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government …”  (p. 585) 
 
Poos then held, “A republican form of government includes the right to have a system of state 
courts” (p. 585).  Explaining further the basis of his holding, Judge Poos noted: 
The rule is aptly stated in 11 Am.Jur., Sec. 174, page 870, as follows:  
“Among the matters which are implied in the Federal Constitution, although 
not expressed therein, is that the National Government may no, in the 
exercise of its powers, prevent a state from discharging its ordinary 
functions of government.  This corresponds to the prohibition that no state 
can interfere with the free and unembarrassed exercise by the Federal 
Government of all powers conferred upon it.  In other words, the two 
governments, national and state, are each to exercise its powers so as not to 
interfere with the free and full exercise of the powers of the other.”  (p. 585) 
 
Because the Illinois officials presented “no factual basis” to support their motion and because of 
the “strength of the authorities above cited,” Judge Poos denied the motion to release federal 
grand jury transcripts to state officials (p. 588). 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
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 In this instance the Guarantee Clause justified the noninterference of the federal 
government with the state court system.  This ruling was reached through the district court 
judge’s rephrasing of the issue by illustrating the effect that would have been generated had he 
granted the motion made in federal court by state officials. 
Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585 (1965); 384 U.S. 929 (1966) (Black, J., joined by 
Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 
 Case summary. 
 On the face of it, the case did not concern itself with the constitutional issues surrounding 
federalism in either the arguments presented in court or in the rulings issued by the court.  The 
Guarantee Clause as a constitutional issue, however, was raised by Justice Black in his dissent 
regarding the Court’s refusal to review the case as decided by the District Court for the Middle 
District of Florida and modified by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 The case originated in St. Augustine, Florida on issues surrounding the public 
accommodations requirements of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Lucille Plummer and seven other 
individuals filed for injunctive relief against numerous restaurant and motel owners and 
managers from interfering with their efforts to avail themselves of public accommodations 
guaranteed by the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The district court judge determined that violations 
of the Civil Rights Act had occurred and issued the injunction.  Subsequent to the injunction, 
Charles Lance, Jr., in his capacity as an unpaid volunteer deputy sheriff for St. Johns County 
violated the injunction in collaboration with the manager of a motel and restaurant complex.  The 
district court, upon determination that Lance had violated the injunction, fined Lance $200 for 
civil contempt, ordered him to obey all terms of the injunction, directed him to resign his 
position of volunteer deputy sheriff, and ordered Lance to surrender his badge and police 
equipment to his superiors in the sheriff’s office of St. Johns County, Florida. 
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 Lance appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit who 
affirmed the district court rulings except for the order for Lance to resign his position.  The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals modified this provision, stating that it was appropriate to order Lance to 
surrender his badge “and cease his functions as a peace officer so long as he continues” to violate 
the injunction (p. 592).  However, the court had to provide opportunity for Lance to repent of his 
actions and, upon proof to the court of compliance with the injunction, to resume his volunteer 
status with the sheriff’s office.  Lance appealed the Circuit Court’s ruling to the U.S. Supreme 
Court which refused, without comment from the majority, to hear the case.  Justice Black, joined 
by Justice Harlan, dissented in a written opinion.  
 Justice Black concerned himself primarily with the district court judge’s attempts to lay 
down the law, prosecute violators, pass judgment on alleged violators, and impose punishment as 
the judge “sees fit” – all of this proceeding not from a jury trial with constitutional guarantees, 
but from a summary contempt proceeding (p. 931).   
To give federal judges such authority not only seems completely out of 
place in our federal form of government but also comes perilously close to 
violating the constitutional obligation of the Federal Government to 
guarantee to every State a republican form of government.  …I cannot help 
but believe that the legislators who passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 will 
be greatly surprised if not shocked to learn that by passage of that law they 
empowered federal judges to remove state officers without even giving 
these impeached officers a trial by jury.  Federal courts have heretofore been 
reluctant to exercise equity powers to interfere with a State’s governmental 
operations.  (p. 931) 
 
Justice Black concluded his dissent with a discussion of the possible ramifications and by 
drawing a parallel with a recent Court decision regarding a characteristic of a republican 
government. 
I regret that the Court refuses to review this case in order to make it clear to 
all the people just how far this new contempt power of federal judges goes.  
…If federal judges can remove deputy sheriffs why not sheriffs, members of 
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the state legislatures, state judges, and why not even state governors?  …In 
order to protect the rights of citizens to vote in state elections this Court 
recently announced the constitutional principle of “one person, one vote.”  It 
seems a little early to graft onto that principle a new one giving United 
States judges the power to remove state officials chosen by the people in 
strict accordance with the “one person, one vote” principle.  (p. 932) 
 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 Justices Black and Harlan defined republican government as one in which state laws 
govern the removal of officials from state offices.  The removal of state officials from office by 
the federal government would work to destroy a fundamental aspect of republican government 
for the states in violation of the Guarantee Clause.  They believed that the Court missed an 
opportunity to breathe life into the Guarantee Clause. 
 Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (1966); 386 U.S. 1021 (1966). 
 Case summary. 
 This case presents an example of litigation whereby constitutional issues were not argued 
in the first instance, but the facts gave rise to another legal action wherein the constitutional issue 
was presented in either argument or in the opinion.  Therefore, in order to understand the context 
for the second action at law, it is necessary to understand the facts of the first case. 
 The facts of the case arose from an “almost bizarre and complex factual background” that 
went back to the early 1950’s (p. 583).  As a teenager, William J. Bauers, Jr., escaped from a 
New Jersey reformatory in October 1950 and engaged in a crime spree in both Hunterdon and 
Essex Counties, New Jersey, before being apprehended by law enforcement officials.  Bauers 
was charged with “assault with intent to rob and auto larceny” to which he pleaded non vult in 
Essex County Curt.  Bauer was then sentenced to serve four to six years on each count. 
 During this same time period (January 1951) the grand jury for the county in which the 
reformatory was located (Hunterdon County) indicted Bauers for “escape from the reformatory 
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and auto larceny” (p. 583).  However, the case was not actually tried in Hunterdon County Court 
until May 1953 at which time he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to serve two to three years 
concurrently with the sentence given by the Essex County Court.   
 Bauers completed serving the Hunterdon County sentence before being released on 
parole on the Essex County sentences.  In February 1963 Bauers filed an action in Hunterdon 
County Court to have the 1951 indictments against him dismissed and to have the sentences 
imposed by the court vacated on the grounds that, being a juvenile when the offenses were 
committed, the Hunterdon County Court indictments were illegal.  The Hunterdon County Court 
denied Bauers’ application for dismissing the indictments and vacating the resulting sentence.  
However, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey reversed the lower court’s 
ruling and held that “since Bauers was not eighteen years old when the offenses were committed, 
jurisdiction over him was lodged exclusively in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court” (p. 
583).  The court’s ruling declared the indictments illegal and ordered that the resulting guilty 
plea and imposed sentences “should be expunged from the record” (p. 584). 
 Following the appellate court’s ruling, Bauers initiated civil action in U.S. District Court 
for the District of New Jersey against Hunterdon County Prosecutor, Herbert T. Heisel, Jr., for 
deprivation of his civil right of liberty under Sections 1979 and 1083 of the Third Civil Rights 
Act of 1871.  The federal district court dismissed the complaint.  Bauers appealed to the U.S. 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals who agreed to hear the case. 
 The holding in the second legal action was that judicial (in this instance, state 
prosecutors) officers of the state are immune from liability under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, in 
part, because of the Guarantee Clause.  Following the Court of Appeals ruling, Bauers appealed 
to the U.S. Supreme Court who denied a writ of certiorari on an 8-1 vote.  Justice Douglas 
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dissented from the majority, but didn’t offer a written opinion.  Because of the writ’s denial by 
the Court, the opinion by the federal circuit court stood as controlling on the issues raised within 
the court’s jurisdiction and as influential in other federal jurisdictions. 
 According to the opinion of the 7-2 majority of the Third Circuit of Appeals: 
The framers of the Constitution clearly evinced their belief that a separate 
and independent judiciary is an indispensable element of a republican form 
of government.  See The Federalist, pp. 236, 303-305, 408 et seq., 494 et 
seq.  We believe that abrogation of judicial immunity by Congress would 
destroy the independence of the judiciary in the various States, and 
consequently deprive them of a republican form of government.  (pp. 588-
589) 
 
If the Third Civil Rights Act of 1871 were “construed to abrogate judicial immunity,” the court 
continued, “the Act would violate the Guarantee Clause” (p. 589).  Because of the framers’ 
intent, because of the Guarantee Clause, because “the concept of judicial immunity [was] deeply 
rooted in Anglo-American law,” and because of previous court decisions embodying the 
principle of judicial immunity, the Third Circuit Court ruled that judicial officers and their 
“derivative” cousins, state prosecutors, were entitled to judicial immunity (pp. 587, 590).   
 The Circuit Court’s approach to the issue of justiciability of the Guarantee Clause is 
interesting for its approach and withdrawal from the issue.  Citing the Luther v. Borden decision 
as the beginning of “a long line of cases,” the court noted that “[a]lleged violations of this clause 
have been held to present ‘political questions’ which are non-justiciable” (p. 589).  And then, a 
surprise: 
Despite the wealth of cases holding Art. 4, Sect. 4 violations to be non-
justiciable, we think that none would govern the instant case.  … The 
absence of any overbearing political factor and the presence of substantial 
precedent to serve as criteria might well require a whole new analysis of the 
Guarantee Clause and non-justiciability.  (p. 589) 
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And then, having raised the issue of re-analyzing the justiciability of Guarantee Clause claims, 
the Circuit Court backed away from such work:  “Fortunately, our task is only to state the 
problem, not to resolve it” (p. 589).  The court didn’t have to resolve it because they were only 
spelling out “at least one of perhaps several constitutional questions which would necessarily 
arise if the Act were construed so as to abrogate judicial immunity” (p. 588). 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 Bauers v. Heisel represents the first time a federal court considered the issue of 
justiciability of the Guarantee Clause from the perspective of issues that are not political, such an 
assessment arising after an examination of the facts in the case.  The court raised the possibility 
that Luther v. Borden might not be controlling in all situations that involve Guarantee Clause 
claims. 
 Cintron-Garcia v. Romero-Barcelo, 671 F.2d 1 (1982). 
 Case summary. 
 The case arose in Puerto Rico where an elected candidate to the Commonwealth’s House 
of Representatives was discovered to be too young to hold office as determined by Puerto Rico’s 
constitution.  Constitutional procedures for filling legislative vacancies specified that the 
President of the House should appoint a successor recommended by the political party belonging 
to the elected representative causing the vacancy.  
 Eight registered voters filed suit in U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico 
requesting an injunction to prohibit filling the legislative vacancy by appointment and seeking a 
court order to compel an election open to all voters.  The plaintiffs argued that the 
Commonwealth’s constitutional provisions governing the replacement procedure violated the 
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First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution by not providing “for a by-
election open to all voters regardless of party.   
 The federal district judge issued a preliminary injunction that prevented Commonwealth 
officials from filling the vacancy through the procedures established by the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico because of a belief that the replacement procedures “probably 
violated the federal constitution” (p. 1).  The First Circuit Court of Appeals granted defendants 
an appeal. 
 The federal appeals court held that the Guarantee Clause and the Tenth Amendment 
jointly work to permit states and Puerto Rico “to decide whether, and when, to fill interim 
vacancies” in their legislatures (p. 5).  According to the three-judge panel of the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals: 
That the federal Constitution embodies this wisdom is suggested by the 
broad language used in relation to the form of a state’s government (“the 
United States shall guarantee to every State … a Republican Form of 
Government,” Article IV, Section 4); by the Tenth Amendment’s 
reservation to the states of powers not prohibited by the Constitution, and by 
the absence in the Constitution of any language requiring the contrary….  
Thus, considerations of … federalism (state autonomy in determining, 
within fairly broad limits, the nature of its own political system) all make it 
likely that these decisions allowing interim appointments to fill state 
legislative vacancies remain good law.  (p. 5) 
 
The court explained its reasoning in linking Puerto Rico’s republican governmental status with 
that of the states in the Union: 
In sum, this vacancy-filling system appears to be no less fair or democratic 
than that found in most states; it is nonetheless tailored to the special 
concerns and political circumstances of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.  
Certainly, the federal Constitution and the Compact entered into by the 
Congress with Puerto Rico provide no less autonomy to Puerto Rico than to 
the states in this regard.  (p. 7) 
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The federal appeals court vacated the injunction and remanded the case to the original district 
court “for proceedings consistent with this opinion” (p. 9). 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 The significance of this decision rests upon three pillars.  First, the decision continues the 
precedent of not permitting federal intervention in order to foster republican governments at the 
state level as required by the Guarantee Clause.  Second, this is the first case examined since 
Luther v. Borden in which the court relied upon its own application of the Guarantee Clause to 
the facts and issues of the case without invoking previous Court rulings.  Not a single case 
investigated thus far was cited by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in its decision.  Third, this 
ruling marks the first time that a court opinion linked the Guarantee Clause and the Tenth 
Amendment and cited them as working together to prevent federal intervention into matters of 
state government.  Both had been linked previously by attorneys’ arguments, but not by any 
court ruling. 
Brown v. Environmental Protection Agency, 521 F.2d 827 (1975); EPA v. Brown, 431 
U.S. 99 (1977). 
 
 Facts & procedural history. 
 Congressional passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 gave rise to a series of 
events that culminated in a hearing before the U.S. Supreme Court.  The legal actions 
surrounding the issues of the case present a somewhat complicated array to organize and 
simplify.  Arguments involved the Guarantee Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the Commerce 
Clause that the court discussed along with another issue not raised, the Eleventh Amendment.  
Two other legal actions preceded the case in question.  Federal arguments shifted from the initial 
hearing to the Supreme Court review.  The Supreme Court announced in its decision that it 
would “not review judgments of the Courts of Appeals invalidating … regulations promulgated 
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by” the EPA Administrator, thus requiring a focus on the Appeals Court ruling as well as the 
Supreme Court opinion (431 U.S. 99).  Finally, the case actually heard by the Supreme Court 
involved four other parallel appeals being consolidated, along with Brown v. Environmental 
Protection Agency, into one with a new title, EPA v. Brown.   
 The original case involved a disagreement between the State of California and the federal 
government’s Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.  The disagreement 
centered on the administration of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970.  Under this act, states 
were required to develop and submit plans to the EPA Administrator, William Ruckelshaus, for 
approval.  The state plans needed to provide “for the implementation, maintenance, and 
enforcement of national ambient air quality standards” (p. 829).  EPA-State of California 
interactions following passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments included partial approval of 
plans, partial disapproval of plans, no submission of a required plan, and notice of violation from 
the EPA to California. 
Then followed an action that precipitated Governor Brown’s request to the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, on behalf of the State of California, for a court review of EPA regulations 
promulgated by William Ruckelshaus as EPA Administrator.  The catalyst for the requested 
court review centered on the EPA’s promulgation of a transportation plan for California that 
contemplated reducing the amount of gasoline sold in highly-populated areas, state inspection of 
vehicles to ascertain the presence of emission-control devices, surcharges on parking spaces, and 
requiring California to shift funds from “one portion of its budget to another in order to finance 
the undertakings required by the Agency” (p. 831). 
 Lawsuits were also filed between the passage of the Clean Air Amendments Act and the 
court review request submitted by the State of California.  First, in City of Riverside v. 
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Ruckelshaus, 4 E.R.C. 1728 (C.D.Cal. 1972) the District Court for the Central District of 
California ordered the EPA Administrator “to promulgate regulations to control photo-chemical 
oxidants” (p. 829).  Then, another court action followed Ruckelshaus’ action in extending the 
“time within which the national primary standard for photo-chemical oxidants in California 
could be attained” (p. 829).  In National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 154 U.S.App.D.C. 384, 475 F.2d 968 (1973) the court ruled that such an 
extension was “impermissible under the terms of the Clean Air Act” (p. 829).  States had been 
required to submit implementation plans that would enable them “to meet the primary standard 
by May 31, 1975” (p. 829).  The court ordered Ruckelshaus to “inform the states which had not 
submitted” the implementation plan that they had until April 15, 1973 to submit such a plan to 
the EPA (P. 829). 
 Following the state-requested court review, the federal government appealed for a writ of 
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.  California was not an isolated example of the battle 
between the federal government and the states over implementation and enforcement of the 
requirements of the Clean Air Act.  In reviewing the appeal of the Ninth Circuit Court’s ruling, 
the Supreme Court consolidated appeals of rulings by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, the District of Columbia Circuit, and another ruling by the Ninth Circuit in a separate 
case.  The Supreme Court noted the similarity between the various circuit court rulings: 
All of the courts rested on statutory interpretation, but noted also that serious 
constitutional questions might be raised if the statute were read as the 
United States argued it should be.  Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (CA9 
1975); Arizona v. EPA, 521 F.2D 825 (CA9 1975); District of Columbia v. 
Train, 172 U.S.  App.D.C. 311, 521 F.2D 971 (1975); Maryland v. EPA, 
530 F.2D 215 (CA4 1975).  (431 U.S. 99, 102) 
 
 Legal question. 
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 Does the Administrator of the Environmental protection Agency have the “power to 
impose sanctions on the state or its officials for their failure to comply with the Administrator’s 
regulations directing the state to regulate the pollution-creating activities of those other than 
itself and its subdivisions” (p. 827)? 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 The Commerce Clause constituted the major underpinning of the federal government’s 
argument.  Of course, California took a position different from the federal government with 
respect to the Commerce Clause and federalism.  In its presentation to the three-judge panel, 
attorneys for California countered the federal government’s pleadings and argued that the 
Guarantee Clause and the Tenth Amendment work conjunctively to limit undue applications of 
the Commerce Clause. 
[T[he Commerce Power does not extend to requiring a state to undertake 
such governmental tasks as might be assigned to it by Congress, or its 
proper delegate, with respect to activities which admittedly are within reach 
of the Commerce Power.  The Constitution’s Tenth Amendment and Article 
IV, Section 4, which obligates the United States to guarantee to every state a 
Republican Form of government, precludes such an extension of the 
Commerce Power….  Moreover, insofar as the Necessary and Proper Clause 
is concerned the petitioners contend that the means, compulsory state 
administration and enforcement, is inappropriate and inconsistent with the 
letter and spirit of the Constitution.  (p. 838) 
 
 The Justice Department attorney argued that the powers of the Clean Air Act to elicit 
obedience and enforcement on the part of the states derived from Chief Justice John Marshall’s 
definition of Congress’ power to regulate commerce as spelled out in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 
(9 Wheat.) 1 (1824.  More specifically, “The emission of air pollutants without regard to their 
source … has been found by Congress to exert the requisite effect on interstate commerce” 
which in turn rested on a “rational basis” (p. 837).  The federal government next established a 
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nexus between the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause as spelled out in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 by quoting the following from that decision:   
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and 
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, 
which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional.  (p. 837) 
 
The federal government next drew a specific connecting line from Chief Justice Marshall’s 
exposition of the Necessary and Proper Clause to the Clean Air Act. 
The end (abatement of air pollution) is legitimate; it (the power to regulate 
air emissions) is within the scope of the Constitution; and the means (state 
administration and enforcement) are appropriate, plainly adapted to the end, 
which is not prohibited, and consistent with the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution.  (p. 837) 
 
The federal government summarized its legal position in this manner: 
Having the power to regulate air pollution, … Congress, under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, has the power to direct that state officials 
either incorporate in the law of their state or administer and enforce on 
behalf of the Federal Government those regulations designed to control air 
pollution which are properly promulgated by the Administrator.  (p. 837) 
 
 However, circumstances changed by the time the consolidated appeals were heard by the 
Supreme Court, and the federal government chose to withdraw its legal position that was just 
previously summarized.  In effect, the EPA backed down.  In oral argument before the Court, 
federal attorneys stated the changed position of the EPA which the Court included in its ruling:  
“The Administrator … concedes the necessity of removing from the regulations all requirements 
that the States submit legally adopted regulations; the [Administrator’s] regulations contain no 
requirement that the State adopt laws” (431 U.S. 99, 103).  The federal government’s concession 
to the position of the states left the Court with no legal issue upon which to rule. 
 Holding & disposition 
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 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the EPA Administrator had no authority to 
impose sanctions on the state.  The court ruled, “All efforts by the Administrator to impose 
sanctions on the State of California are stayed to the extent indicated in this opinion” (p. 842). 
 The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the “judgments of the respective Courts of Appeals” 
and remanded the cases “for consideration of mootness” (431 U.S. 99, 104).  
 Court’s rationale 
 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in referring to the state’s legal argument, remarked, 
“We do not view these contentions as frivolous” (p. 838).  As the three-judge panel further 
noted, 
To treat the governance of commerce by the states as within the plenary 
reach of the Commerce Power would in our opinion represent such an 
abrupt departure from previous constitutional practice as to make us 
reluctant to adopt an interpretation of the Clean Air Act which would force 
us to confront the issue.  Such treatment, for example, would authorize 
Congress to direct the states to regulate any economic activity that affects 
interstate commerce in any manner Congress sees fit….  A commerce 
Power so expanded would reduce the states to puppets of a ventriloquist 
Congress.  (p. 839) 
 
The Circuit Court further noted that it did not look with favor upon the federal government’s 
legal argument, pointing out that a healthy federalism needed to be the major point of concern. 
We hasten to point out that our reluctance to accept the Administrator’s 
interpretation of the Act is not an effort at this late date to ignore Chief 
Justice Marshall’s triumph over Mr. Jefferson with regard to the power of 
the Federal government vis-à-vis the states.  Our concern, as we believe was 
Justice Marshall’s, is to preserve and protect a strong government of the 
United States and viable governments of the states.  As we see it, our 
interpretation of the Act is more compatible with these objectives than that 
of the Administrator.  (p. 840) 
 
 Regarding the Guarantee Clause, Circuit Judge Sneed, delivering the opinion of the three-
judge panel, stated that the facts of the case suggested that the State of California was not 
“irresponsible when they strongly suggest[ed] that the Republican Form of Government of the 
   
   
228
states would be seriously impaired” if the federal government’s interpretation prevailed (p. 840).  
Continuing, Circuit Judge Sneed observed: 
A structure in which all power on the part of states to spend was vested in 
Congress while the power and obligation to tax remained with the states 
would encourage few even casually acquainted with the writings of 
Montesquieu and the Federalist papers to assert that the states enjoyed a 
Republican Form of Government.  (p. 840) 
 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also drew support from a previous Supreme Court ruling as 
it noted below: 
Finally, we are encouraged by the Supreme Court’s footnote 7 in Fry v. 
United States.  In describing the Tenth Amendment, it was said in the 
footnote:  “The [Tenth] Amendment expressly declares the constitutional 
policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the 
States’ integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.”  
421 U.S. at 547 n.7, 95 S.Ct. at 1795.  (p. 842) 
 
The appeals court also drew sustenance from another Supreme Court ruling in Maryland v. 
Wirtz:  “The Court has ample power to prevent what the appellants purport to fear, ‘the utter 
destruction of the State as a sovereign political entity.’  392 U.S. at 196, 88 S.Ct. at 2024” (p. 
842). 
 Faced with Constitutional issues and statutory interpretation, the Ninth Circuit Court 
noted its duty. 
It is our task, where possible, to avoid a statutory interpretation which would 
require us to decide whether the extensive control of state expenditures, 
which the Administrator’s view would permit, does either threaten “the utter 
destruction of the State as a sovereign political entity,” or “impair the States’ 
integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.”  (p. 842) 
 
The appeals court did find a way to avoid directly confronting the constitutional issues.  
Choosing to focus on interpreting the law itself, the Circuit Court noted: 
While we do not feel it necessary to embrace fully California’s position, we 
do believe that the meaning of the Clean Air Act, insofar as the 
imposition(s) of sanctions is concerned, is sufficiently ambiguous to permit 
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us to interpret it in a fashion that avoids the constitutional issues.  
Accordingly we hold that the Clean Air Act does not authorize the 
imposition of sanctions on a state or its officials for failure to comply with 
the Administrator’s regulations …  (p. 831) 
 
The appeals court ruling differentiated between state actions that violate the Clean Air Act and 
state actions to enforce a federal law.  “Tersely put, the Act, as we see it, permits sanctions 
against a state that pollutes the air, but not against a state that chooses not to govern polluters as 
the Administrator directs” (p. 832).  According to the written opinion, the circuit judges could 
not locate in the Clean Air Act any “Congressional intent to make the states departments of the 
Environmental Protection Agency no less obligated to obey its Administrator’s command than 
are its subordinate officials” (p. 835). 
 Prior to concluding its opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed possible 
problems with the Eleventh Amendment caused by federal directions to states to enforce federal 
programs.  The Circuit Court specifically quoted a long section of law professor Henry Hart’s 
article, “The Relations Between State and Federal Law,” published in the Columbia Law Review 
in 1954 (54 Colum.L.R. 515-516): 
Judicial mandates to non-judicial state officers to enforce either primary or 
remedial duties requiring the performance of affirmative acts are relatively 
infrequent.  Lower feeder courts may prohibit state officers, in their 
individual capacity, from taking action under color of office in violation of 
law.  But an action to compel the performance of an affirmative act would 
encounter, ordinarily, the bar of the Eleventh Amendment.  Whether a writ 
of mandamus to compel performance of a ministerial duty would be 
regarded as an action against the state is not altogether clear.  But it is 
significant that a practice of issuing such writs to state officers has never 
become established.  (pp. 841-842) 
 
 As stated previously, the federal government changed its position between the Ninth 
Circuit Court’s ruling and the hearing of the appeal by the U.S. Supreme Court.  The Court took 
note of this change by observing, “But the federal parties have not merely renounced an intent to 
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pursue certain specified regulations; they now appear to admit that those remaining in 
controversy are invalid unless modified in certain respects” (431 U.S. at 103).  Before vacating 
the various appeals courts’ judgments by an 8-1 majority, the Court noted: 
We decline the federal parties’ invitation to pass upon the EPA regulations, 
when the only ones before us are admitted to be in need of certain essential 
modifications.  Such action on our part would amount tot eh rendering of an 
advisory opinion.  For this Court to review regulations normally required to 
be first reviewed in the Court of Appeals, before such review is had, is 
extraordinary.  (431 U.S. at 103-104) 
 
 Concurring/dissenting opinions 
 Justice Stevens dissented, noting that the EPA had not actually rescinded the disputed 
regulations.  According to the Justice,  
Unless and until the Environmental Protection Agency rescinds the 
regulations in dispute, it is perfectly clear that the litigation is not moot.  
Moreover, an apparent admission that those regulations are invalid unless 
modified is not a proper reason for vacating the Court of Appeals judgments 
which invalidated the regulations.  (431 U.S. at 104) 
 
Instead, Stevens continued, if the justices were convinced that the EPA Administrator would 
modify the regulations, “[T]he writs of certiorari should be dismissed as improvidently granted” 
(431 U.S. at 104).  Justice Stevens concluded his dissent with a declaration:  “By vacating the 
judgments below, the Court hands the federal parties a partial victory as a reward for an apparent 
concession that their position is not supported by statute.  I respectfully dissent” (431 U.S. at 
104). 
 Heimbach v. Chu, 774 F.2d 11 (1984). 
 Case summary. 
 The case arose in New York over a financing bill for the Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority that was passed by the New York Senate in 1981. The finance measure levied an 
additional tax on the ridership of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority.  The state senate 
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had a procedure for a “fast roll call” voting procedure under which five designated senators 
could pass a measure unless five senators requested a roll call of the whole senate.  Absence 
during either voting procedure was interpreted under the rules of the senate as indicating a vote 
in favor of the measure under consideration.  Senator Nolan, who opposed the bill, was absent 
when the vote took place in order to have surgery.  The bill received the minimum number of 
votes required for passage (31), which included a favorable vote by Senator Nolan in his 
absence. 
 Louis Heimbach filed a class-action suit in New York Supreme Court, Orange County, 
on behalf of himself and other voters in Orange and Suffolk counties (Senator Nolan’s senate 
district) against Roderick Chu, the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Taxation 
and Finance, and Warren Anderson, Temporary President of the New York State Senate.  The 
suit alleged that the tax act “violated the equal protection rights of taxpayers in Orange and 
Suffolk counties” (p. 13).  The suit claimed that the act “had not been duly enacted because 
Senator Nolan opposed the bill and his vote should not have been counted in favor of it” (p. 13).   
The state court for Orange County declared the statute invalid “because it had not received the 
‘assent of a majority of the members elected to each branch of the legislature’ as required by … 
the New York State Constitution” (p. 13).  The court did not rule on the equal protection 
argument as that issue was rendered moot by the decision to nullify the law. 
 On appeal the Appellate Division, Second Department of the New York state court 
system, reversed the decision.  Because Heimbach “conceded in that court that the fast roll call 
procedure did not violate the State constitution,” the court only considered the question of 
whether the Senate Minority Leader “had wrongfully neglected to have Senator Nolan marked 
‘excused’ which would have negated an affirmative vote assumption (p. 13).  Refusing to 
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“intervene in the internal affairs of the Legislature,” the Appellate court reversed the lower 
court’s decision that had nullified the tax law.  Upon further appeal the Court of Appeals took the 
same approach as the Appellate court, thus upholding the reversal of the original action 
nullifying the legislation. 
 Defeated in the state courts, Heimbach filed suit in U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York seeking a federal ruling that the roll-call procedure and the Senate custom 
in New York of presuming “affirmative votes by all ‘present’ Senators” violated the “Guarantee 
Clause of the United States Constitution” (p. 13).  Heimbach also “asked the district court to 
invalidate” the tax on Metropolitan Transportation Authority ridership because the “manner in 
which it was passed violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution” (p. 
13).  The federal district court dismissed the “equal protection and due process claims as 
improper attempts to challenge a State tax in the federal courts” (p. 13).  The district court also 
dismissed Heimbach’s Guarantee Clause argument because of nonjusticiability and because 
“appellant’s injury was too abstract to create the standing necessary for bringing suit” (p. 13).   
 Heimbach was granted an appeal by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  
Noting a newly issued Supreme Court ruling (Migra v. Warren City School District Board of 
Education) in which the Court held “that a State court judgment in a … civil rights action had the 
same preclusive effect in federal court that it would have had in the State courts,” the Circuit 
Court affirmed the federal district court’s ruling regarding the constitutional issues “on the basis 
of res judicata” which bars filing action in another court jurisdiction when further action is 
barred in another jurisdiction under the same set of facts (p. 13).  In other words, because 
Heimbach was unsuccessful in state court he was precluded from bringing a similar action in 
federal court.  According to the Circuit Judge, “The doctrine of res judicata precludes piece-meal 
   
   
233
attacks such as are being attempted here” (p. 16).  Also, since Heimbach didn’t raise the 
Constitutional issue of the role call vote as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment or of the 
Guarantee Clause in the New York Court of Appeals, it couldn’t be considered later.  Also, 
Heimbach was not barred from raising a Constitutional issue in a state court.  According to the 
opinion delivered by the Circuit Judge, “New York judges … are bound by oath or affirmation to 
support the Constitution of the United States, … and State courts are under the same duty as 
federal courts to respect rights arising thereunder” (p. 14).   
 While the Circuit Court upheld the district court’s decision, it did so for a different 
reason.  The Circuit Court also criticized the New York Court of Appeals refusal to “intrude into 
the wholly internal affairs of the Legislature” even though that aspect of the decision had not 
been appealed (p. 14).  Circuit Judge Van Graafeiland noted that “[l]egislative proceedings 
which violate the United States Constitution are not ‘wholly internal’ legislative affairs” (p. 15).  
The Circuit Judge further noted that reliance upon the presiding officer’s certification of a bill’s 
passage as conclusive was “misplaced” (p. 14).  Such a certification “is conclusive evidence only 
as to the matters certified by the presiding officer.  He certifies that the bill ‘so passed’.  He does 
not certify that the method of passage met the requirements of the United States Constitution” 
(pp. 14-15). 
 The U.S. Supreme Court, in Order No. 84-944 denied certiorari to Heimbach’s appeal.  
470 U.S. 1084 (1985). 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 Although not specifically noted by the Circuit Court as working to uphold the Guarantee 
Clause by forbidding federal interference in state affairs, its upholding of the District Court’s 
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dismissal of appellant’s constitutional claims because it interfered in state tax matters amounted 
to such.  According to the Circuit Court,  
The Tax Injunction Act, with ‘its roots in equity practice, in principles of 
federalism, and in recognition of the imperative need of a State to administer 
its own fiscal operations, limit[s] drastically federal district court 
jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as the collection of 
taxes.  (p. 15) 
 
 Also, in the Circuit Court’s admonition that “[l]egislative proceedings which violate the 
United States Constitution are not ‘wholly internal’ legislative affairs” brings a portion of Justice 
Harlan’s dissent in Taylor & Marshall v. Beckham to judicial life in a majority federal court 
decision (p. 14).  It also raises the issue of potential justiciability of the Guarantee Clause in the 
future.  However, the U.S. District Court had continued the established precedent of ruling that 
Guarantee Clause claims are not justiciable. 
 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 Case summary. 
 In 1985 Congress passed the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act that 
imposed the obligation upon each state to arrange for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste 
that was generated within its borders.  In addition, Congress provided three sets of incentives to 
provide motivation for the states to comply with the obligations set forth in the act.  The State of 
New York and two of its counties filed suit against the United States in federal district court  
seeking a declaratory judgment that, inter alia, the three incentives 
provisions are inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment – which declares that 
“powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States” – and with the 
Guarantee Clause of Article IV, § 4 – which directs the United States to 
“guarantee to every State … a Republican Form of Government.”  (p. 144) 
 
The original suit also contained arguments that the congressional action violated the Eleventh 
Amendment and the Due Process Clause requirements of the Fifth Amendment.   
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The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed the suit.  Upon 
appeal the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal.  
Subsequently the Supreme Court granted certiorari.  Since the main arguments and the major 
portion of the Court’s opinion focused upon the Tenth Amendment, this case will be more fully 
treated in Chapter 6 (see pp. 439-470).  The following discussion of the Court’s opinion will 
focus solely upon the Guarantee Clause.  Justice O’Connor delivered the Court’s opinion. 
 Having already invalidated one set of incentives because it violated the Tenth 
Amendment, the Court limited its discussion to the “applicability of the Guarantee Clause to the 
Act’s other two challenged provisions” (p. 184).  Noting that the Court was approaching “the 
issue with some trepidation, because the Guarantee Clause has been an infrequent basis for 
litigation throughout our history,” Justice O’Connor summarized that history by observing that 
the Court, in the majority of cases, had “found the claims presented to be nonjusticiable under 
the ‘political question’ doctrine” (p. 184).  In citing those cases, the Court drew a line from the 
Pacific States decision to the decision of City of Rome that was decided in 1980.  The Court next 
noted that the nonjusticiability of the Guarantee Clause claims was rooted in Luther v. Borden.  
Justice O’Connor noted that the holding in Luther was limited to the issue of deciding “what 
government is the established one in a State” (p. 184).  Yet somehow, she continued, “Over the 
following century, this limited holding metamorphosed in the sweeping assertion that ‘[v]iolation 
of the great guaranty of a republican form of government in States cannot be challenged in the 
courts.’  Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (pluarality opinion)” (p. 184).  Justice 
O’Connor then carved out a separate set of Guarantee Clause cases that addressed the arguments 
put forth instead of dismissing them on the ground of nonjusticiability. 
This view [automatic nonjusticiability] has not always been accepted.  In a 
group of cases decided before the holding of Luther was elevated into a 
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general rule of nonjusticiability, the Court addressed the merits of claims 
founded on the Guarantee Clause without any suggestion that the claims 
were not justiciable.  See Attorney General of Michigan ex rel. Kies v. 
Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 239 (1905); Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 519 
(1897); In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461-462 (1891); Minor v. Happersett, 
21 Wall. 162, 175-176 (1875).  (pp. 184-185) 
 
It would seem that Justice O’Connor and a majority of the Court viewed Pacific States as 
decisive in making the issue of nonjusticiability of Guarantee Clause a general rule of stare 
decisis.   
 Justice O’Connor continued by pointing out that the Court itself had “suggested that 
perhaps not all claims under the Guarantee Clause present nonjusticiable political questions.  See 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964) (“[S]ome questions raised under the Guarantee 
Clause are nonjusticiable”)” (p. 185).  The Court then noted that contemporary legal scholars had 
“likewise suggested that courts should address the merits of such claims, at least in some 
circumstances” (p. 185).   
 Noting next that the “difficult question” of Guarantee Claim justiciability didn’t need to 
be resolved in the current decision of the Court, Justice O’Connor proceeded under the 
hypothetical assumption that it was justiciable and examined its applicability to the facts of the 
case.   
[N]either the monetary incentives provided by the Act nor the possibility 
that a State’s waste producers may find themselves excluded from the 
disposal sites of another State can reasonably be said to deny any State a 
republican form of government.  (p. 185) 
 
The opinion next explained the reasons for such an interpretation. 
As we have seen [in the portion focusing upon the Tenth Amendment 
arguments], these two incentives represent permissible conditional exercises 
of Congress’ authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses 
respectively, in forms that have now grown commonplace.  Under each, 
Congress offers the States a legitimate choice rather than issuing an 
unavoidable command.  The States thereby retain the ability to set their 
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legislative agendas; state government officials remain accountable to the 
local electorate.  The twin threats imposed by the first two challenged 
provisions of the Act … do not pose any realistic risk of altering the form or 
the method of functioning of New York’s government.  (pp. 185-186) 
 
The Court concluded its discussion of the Guarantee Clause arguments by observing, “Thus even 
indulging the assumption that the Guarantee Clause provides a basis upon which a State or its 
subdivisions may sue to enjoin the enforcement of a federal statute, petitioners have not made 
out such a claim in these cases” (p. 186). 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 First, this is the second High Court opinion explicitly challenging the generalized 
application of nonjusticiability to all claims arising under the Guarantee Clause and continues the 
discussion initiated by Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr (1962).  Second, the Court noted 
additions to Justice Brennan’s discussion of justiciability of the Guarantee Clause that had 
occurred between Baker v. Carr and New York v. United States.  One such continuation included 
a remark by Chief Justice Earl Warren in Reynolds v. Sims (1964) which “suggested,” in Justice 
O’Connor’s words, “that perhaps not all claims under the Guarantee Clause present 
nonjusticiable political questions” (p. 185).  Justice O’Connor quoted Chief Justice Warren’s 
actual statement from Reynolds v. Sims:  “[S]ome [sic] questions raised under the Guarantee 
Clause are nonjusticiable” (377 U.S. 533, 582; cited p. 185).  For the second continuation of 
Justice Brennan’s original discussion about the justiciability of the Guarantee Clause, Justice 
O’Connor noted and cited the work of legal and historical scholars as well.  According to Justice 
O’Connor: 
Contemporary commentators have likewise suggested that courts should 
address the merits of such claims [presented under the Guarantee Clause], at 
least in some circumstances.  See, e.g., L. Tribe, American Constitutional 
Law 398 (2d ed. 1988); J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of 
Judicial Review 118, n., and 122-123 (1980); W. Wiecek, The Guarantee 
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Clause of the U.S. Constitution 287-289, 300 (1972); Merritt, 88 Colum. L. 
Rev., at 70-78; Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A 
Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 Minn. L. Rev. 513, 560-565 (1962).  
(505 U.S. 144, 185) 
 
Third, this decision would seem to suggest that if claims are to be successful against alleged 
unconstitutional use by Congress of its perceived authority as granted by the Spending Clause, 
such claims will need to address the conditional tests posed by the Court in its Dole decision. 
A republican government and racial discrimination. 
 
 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 Case summary. 
 One needs to read the dissenting opinions as well as independent case summaries in order 
to get a full-blown portrayal of the basic facts of the case because the majority opinion 
completely ignored the state case law of Missouri and the events transpiring in Missouri state 
courts prior to the federal action.  Also, a clerical error in the federal handling of the case 
misspelled Sanford.  However, the misspelling became part of the official federal court record. 
 Dred Scott was born in Virginia as a slave.  After moving to St. Louis with his master, he 
was sold in 1833 to an army surgeon, Dr. John Emerson.  Emerson’s army career took them both 
to Rock Island, Illinois (a free state) from 1834 to 1836 after which they went to Fort Snelling in 
the Upper Louisiana Territory (soon afterward the Wisconsin Territory), a territory in which 
slavery was prohibited by the Missouri Compromise.  While in Fort Snelling from 1836 to 1838, 
Scott married Harriet Robinson whose ownership was transferred to Dr. Emerson.  In 1838 
Emerson was transferred to western Louisiana where he met and married Irene Sanford whose 
family lived in St. Louis.  When Dr. Emerson was posted to Florida in 1842 to help with the 
Seminole War, his wife and the family slaves remained in St. Louis.  Shortly after rejoining his 
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family in St. Louis in 1843, Emerson died.  Dred and Harriet Scott continued to work for his 
widow. 
In 1846 Dred and Harriet Scott filed action to obtain their freedom in the Missouri Circuit 
Court of St. Louis County.  Numerous precedents in Missouri case law supported such a suit, the 
general rule of law being that a slave living with his or her master in a free state or territory 
gained their freedom.  “[I]t has been recognized from the beginning of the Government as a 
correct position in law, that a master who takes his slave to reside in a State or Territory where 
slavery is prohibited, thereby emancipates his slave” (p. 554).  Another source described the 
Missouri case law: 
[I]f a slave returned to Missouri, as Dred Scott had done, after having 
sojourned in a free state or territory, that slave was entitled to freedom by 
virtue of residence in the free state or territory.  The established legal 
principle in Missouri was “once free, always free.”  (Hall, 1999, p. 277) 
 
According to Justice McLean’s dissent, Missouri was not the only slave state with such case law.  
“It has been so held in Mississippi, in Virginia, in Louisiana, formerly in Kentucky, Maryland, 
and in other States” (p. 558).   
 The case came to trial in 1847 where “a problem of hearsay evidence resulted in the 
judge ordering a mistrial” (Hall, 1999, p. 277).  The case was not retried until three years later in 
1850 when the court ordered that Dred Scott be freed.  An earlier agreement to try only one suit 
meant that the judgment also applied to his wife, Harriet Scott.  However, events occurring in the 
intervening three years prior to the second trial combined to the Scotts’ disadvantage.  Mrs. 
Emerson remarried and moved with her new husband to New England, leaving her affairs in St. 
Louis in the hands of her brother, John Sanford.  During the same time period, Scott’s wages 
were held in escrow until his status as free man or slave was determined by the courts.  One 
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commentator noted that “the possible loss of his accumulated wages led Sanford, acting for his 
sister, to appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court seeking a reversal” (Hall, 1999, p. 277). 
 The appeal before the Missouri Supreme Court in 1852 came at a time of heightened 
debate over the slavery issue in the United States and “transformed the litigation from a routine 
freedom suit to a cause célèbre” (Hall, 1999, p. 277).  The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed 
the decision of the lower court.  In doing so it ignored its own established rule of law.  In his 
dissent, Justice McLean declared, “Rights sanctioned for twenty-eight years ought not and 
cannot be repudiated, with any semblance of justice, by one or two decisions, influenced, as 
declared, by a determination to counteract the excitement against slavery in the free states” (p. 
556). 
 Fearing the case would be dismissed on direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court on the 
basis of the decision of the state supreme court without any consideration of the merits of the 
case, Scott’s attorneys began a new suit in federal court challenging the Missouri court’s reversal 
of the “once free, always free” legal principle (Hall, 1999, p. 277).  This was done by filing an 
“action of trespass” against Sanford for assaulting and imprisoning Dred Scott, his wife Harriet, 
and their two daughters “on the ground that they were his slaves, which was without right on his 
part, and against law” (p. 529). 
 Chief Justice Roger Taney delivered the Court’s opinion for the 7-2 majority following 
the second argument of the case.  He began by framing the question before the Court: 
Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as 
slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought 
into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become 
entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied by that 
instrument to the citizen?  One of which rights is the privilege of suing in a 
court of the United States in the cases specified in the Constitution.  (p. 403) 
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Shortly thereafter in the opinion, Taney again inquired “whether the class of persons described in 
the plea” could be considered part of the “people of the United States” in terms of participating 
in representative government.  The Chief Justice answered: 
We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended 
to be included, under the word “citizens” in the Constitution, and can 
therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument 
provides for and secures to citizens of the United States.  (p. 404) 
 
Taney continued to articulate the majority view: 
On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a subordinate and 
inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, 
whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had 
no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the 
Government might choose to grant them.  (pp. 404-405) 
 
According to the Chief Justice, this view of African-Americans did not originate with the 
country’s republican framers. 
They [people of African heritage] had for more than a century before been 
regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with 
the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that 
they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the 
negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.  He 
was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and 
traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it.  This opinion was at that time 
fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race.  (p. 407) 
 
After noting provisions of the Articles of Confederation and the federal Constitution pertaining 
to slavery and after an extensive review of state and federal legislation displaying racial 
prejudice, Story delivered the first decision of the opinion. 
Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri within the meaning of the 
Constitution of the United States, and not entitled as such to sue in its 
courts; and, consequently, that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the 
case, and that the judgment on the plea in abatement is erroneous.  (p. 427) 
 
  Although neither the plaintiff nor the defendant had questioned the constitutionality of 
the Missouri Compromise, the Court next turned its attention to it, claiming that this law formed 
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the basis for Scott’s claim that he should be declared a free man.  This law also, according to 
Chief Justice Taney, perhaps provided the foundation for the Circuit Court’s erroneous decision 
granting Dred Scott legal standing to file a suit in federal court. 
The act of Congress, upon which the plaintiff relies, declares that slavery 
and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, shall be forever 
prohibited in all that part of the territory ceded by France, under the name of 
Louisiana, which lies north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north 
latitude, and not included with in the limits of Missouri.  (p. 432) 
 
The Court phrased the new question that it raised: 
[T]he inquiry is, whether Congress was authorized to pass this law under 
any of the powers granted to it by the Constitution; for if the authority is not 
given by that instrument, it is the duty of this court to declare it void and 
inoperative, and incapable of conferring freedom upon any one who is held 
as a slave under the laws of any one of the States.  (p. 432) 
 
Carving out a new interpretation and casting aside all precedents, the Court majority ruled that 
the term, territory, as used in the Constitution referred only “to a territory then in existence, and 
then known or claimed as the territory of the United States” (p. 436).  Since the Louisiana 
Territory did not belong to the United States at the time the Constitution was adopted, it was not 
a territory within the meaning of the Constitution. 
Consequently, the power which Congress may have lawfully exercised in 
this Territory, while it remained under a Territorial Government, and which 
may have been sanctioned by judicial decision, can furnish no justification 
and no argument to support a similar exercise of power over territory 
afterwards acquired by the Federal Government.  We put aside, therefore, 
any argument, drawn from precedents, showing the extent of the power 
which the General Government exercised over slavery in this Territory, as 
altogether inapplicable to the case before us.  (p. 442) 
 
According to Taney, the federal government is bound “to maintain in the Territory the authority 
and rights of the Government, and also the personal rights and rights of property of individual 
citizens, as secured by the Constitution” (p. 447).  The Court next applied the rights of due 
process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to slaveholders. 
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Thus the rights of property are united with the rights of person, and placed 
on the same ground by the fifth amendment to the Constitution, which 
provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property, 
without due process of law.  And an act of Congress which deprives a 
citizen of the United States of his liberty or property, merely because he 
came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of the 
United States, and who had committed no offence against the laws, could 
hardly be dignified with the name of due process law.  (p. 450) 
 
The Court opinion summarized this interpretation, “The powers over person and property of 
which we speak are not only not granted to Congress, but are in express terms denied, and they 
are forbidden to exercise them” (p. 450).  Turning next to the supposition that there was a 
“difference between property in a slave and other property” that obligated the Court to a different 
set of rules, Taney declared: 
[T]he right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the 
Constitution.  The right to traffic in it, like an ordinary article of 
merchandise and property, was guaranteed to the citizens of the United 
States, in every State that might desire it, for twenty years.  And the 
Government in express terms is pledged to protect it in all future time, if the 
slave escapes from his owner….  And no word can be found in the 
Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over slave property, or 
which entitles property of that kind to less protection than property of any 
other description.  The only power conferred is the power coupled with the 
duty of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights.  (pp. 451-452) 
 
And then the Court majority invalidated the Missouri Compromise which, in turn, eliminated the 
underpinning of Scott’s claim to freedom: 
Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the court that the act of 
Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of 
this kind in the territory of the United States north of the line therein 
mentioned, is not warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore void; and 
that neither Dred Scott himself, nor any of his family, were made free by 
being carried into this territory; even if they had been carried there by the 
owner, with the intention of becoming a permanent resident.  (p. 452) 
 
 The decision in Scott v. Sandford “played a major role in precipitating the Civil War 
(Hall, 1999, p. 277).   
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American legal and constitutional scholars consider the Dred Scott decision 
to be the worst ever rendered by the Supreme Court.  Historians have 
abundantly documented its role in crystallizing attitudes that led to war.  
Taney’s opinion stands as a model of censurable judicial craft and failed 
judicial statesmanship.  It took the Civil War and the Civil War 
Amendments to overturn the Dred Scott decision.  (Hall, 1999, p. 278) 
 
Dred Scott, however, gained no benefit from Lincoln’s Civil War Emancipation Proclamation or 
from the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.  He died in 1858. 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 Freedom from slavery is today considered a basic human right.  Humans are not property 
– period.  Such was not the majority view when this case was decided.  While at least one 
dissenting justice opined that slavery had no basis in either moral or political reasoning, but only 
under express laws enacted by particular societies, no justices argued that it violated any 
principles of republican government.  Today, while no one rationally argues that race provides 
grounds for categorization as a sub-species, seven majority justices in this case held that it did, 
that race (being of African descent) precluded individuals from U.S. citizenship.  Only two 
justices didn’t subscribe to that belief in this case.  However, this counter-belief was not 
advanced under any principles of republican government.  What is significant for the modern 
reader is the absence of any discussion about the requirements of republican government in terms 
of basic rights. 
 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 Case summary. 
 This case began in Louisiana as an effort to test the constitutionality of “Jim Crow” laws 
segregating the races as southern whites gained control of state legislatures.  In 1890 the 
Louisiana legislature enacted the “Separate Railway Car” legislation that required railroads “to 
provide equal, but separate, accommodations for the white and colored races” and that further 
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provided criminal penalties for violations of the statute (p. 537).  “A New Orleans group of 
Creoles and blacks organized themselves as the Citizens’ Committee to Test the Constitutionality 
of the Separate Car Law” (Hall, 1999, p. 239).  The railroads provided some support to the group 
because of the added costs of providing extra cars to implement the law.   
 Plessy agreed to challenge the law with the committee’s support.  An earlier Louisiana 
Supreme Court decision had ruled the law could not apply to interstate commerce, so Plessy was 
careful to purchase a ticket for in-state travel only.  Upon boarding the train, he selected a seat in 
the “coach where passengers of the white race were accommodated” (p. 538).  Plessy was 
arrested, removed from the train, and placed in the parish jail of New Orleans to await trial after 
refusing to move from the white car to “the coach used for the race to which he belonged” (p. 
541).  Although Plessy was “seven eighths Caucasian and one-eighth African blood” and 
although “the mixture of colored blood was not discernible in him,” Plessy was classified as 
“colored” according to Louisiana law (p. 541; Hall, 1999, p. 239). 
 John Ferguson was the judge of the criminal District Court for the parish of Orleans who 
was subsequently named defendant in a suit seeking to enjoin the judge from adjudicating an 
unconstitutional law.  At the criminal trial, Judge Ferguson overruled Plessy’s pleading 
challenging the constitutionality of the act as being “in conflict with the Constitution of the 
United States,” particularly the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments (p. 539).  Ferguson 
further declared that unless “enjoined by a writ of prohibition for further proceeding” in the case, 
he was prepared to “fine and sentence petitioner to imprisonment” (p. 539).  Plessy was granted 
both a writ of prohibition and a writ of certiorari by the Louisiana Supreme Court who 
subsequently ruled the statute constitutional and denied further relief to Plessy.  Plessy was 
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granted a writ of error to the U.S. Supreme Court with the agreement of the Chief Justice of the 
Louisiana Supreme Court. 
 The Court narrowly construed the Thirteenth Amendment to apply literally to only those 
attempts to reintroduce slavery or involuntary servitude.  Speaking of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, Justice Brown recounted a previous ruling:  “This amendment was said in the 
Slaughter-house cases, 16 Wall. 36, to have been intended primarily to abolish slavery” (p. 542).  
He continued by noting a subsequent ruling by the Court. 
So, too, in the Civil Rights cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24, it was said that the act of a 
mere individual, the owner of an inn, a public conveyance or place of 
amusement, refusing accommodations to colored people, cannot be justly 
regarded as imposing any badge of slavery or servitude upon the applicant, 
but only as involving an ordinary civil injury, properly cognizable by the 
laws of the State…  (pp. 542-543) 
 
The Court held that the Thirteenth Amendment did not prohibit distinctions based on skin color. 
A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and 
colored races – a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races, 
and which must always exist so long as white men are distinguished from 
the other race by color – has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the 
two races, or reestablish a state of involuntary servitude.  (p. 543) 
 
   The Court next turned to the Fourteenth Amendment argument, which it had touched 
upon in its discussion of the Thirteenth Amendment and the “Slaughter-house cases” (p. 542). 
It was intimated, however, in that case that this amendment was regarded by 
the statesmen of that day as insufficient to protect the colored race from 
certain laws which had been enacted in the Southern States, imposing upon 
the colored race onerous disabilities and burdens, and curtailing their rights 
in the pursuit of life, liberty and property to such an extent that their 
freedom was of little value; and that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
devised to meet this exigency.  (p. 542) 
 
Having held out the hope that Plessy’s argument of the Louisiana statute’s unconstitutionality as 
an infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court proceeded to demolish that hope in 
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piecemeal fashion.  It first began by distinguishing between rights of U.S. citizens and those 
pertaining to state citizenship.  Speaking of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Brown observed: 
[B]ut it was said generally that its main purpose was to establish the 
citizenship of the negro; to give definitions of citizenship of the United 
States and of the States, and to protect from the hostile legislation of the 
States the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as 
distinguished from those of citizens of the States.  (p. 543) 
 
Continuing, the Court next distinguished between political and social equality. 
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute 
equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could 
not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to 
enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of 
the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.  (p. 544) 
 
Continuing to speak for the 7-1 majority, Justice Brown invoked stare decisis:  “The distinction 
between laws interfering with the political equality of the negro and those requiring the 
separation of the two races in schools, theatres and railway carriages has been frequently drawn 
by this court” (p. 545).  The Court reduced the argument of the statute’s conflict with the 
Fourteenth Amendment to a “question whether the statute of Louisiana is a reasonable 
regulation” with the Court’s interpretative answer providing “a large discretion on the part of the 
legislature” (p. 550). 
In determining the question of reasonableness it [the Louisiana legislature] 
is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs and 
traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, 
and the preservation of the public peace and good order.  Gauged by this 
standard, we cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires the 
separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable, or more 
obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment that the acts of Congress requiring 
separate schools for colored children in the District of Columbia, the 
constitutionality of which does not seem to have been questioned, or the 
corresponding acts of state legislatures.  (pp. 550-551) 
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The Court next turned its attention to the attitudes and faulty reasoning employed by those who 
sought to challenge the impending “Separate But Equal” decision that would authorize the 
continuance and expansion of Jim Crow legislation. 
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in 
the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the 
colored race with a badge of inferiority.  If this be so, it is not by reason of 
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put 
that construction upon it….  The argument also assumes that social 
prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be 
secured to the negro except by an enforced commingling.  We cannot accept 
this proposition. 
 
Immediately prior to affirming the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court, the Court declared:  
“If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put 
them upon the same plane” (p. 552).  The doctrine articulated and the policies approved by the 
Court in Plessy v. Ferguson would stand unchallenged in law for the next half-century. 
 Justice John Marshall Harlan offered a stinging dissent that provided support to later 
challenges to and rejections of the “separate but equal doctrine” (Hall, 1999, p. 240).  In his 
dissent Justice Harlan offered a different interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
The Thirteenth Amendment does not permit the withholding or the 
deprivation of any right necessarily inhering in freedom.  It not only struck 
down the institution of slavery as previously existing in the United States, 
but it prevents the imposition of any burdens or disabilities that constitute 
badges of slavery or servitude.  It decreed universal civil freedom in this 
country.  (p. 555) 
 
Noting that the Thirteenth Amendment had “been found inadequate to the protection of the rights 
of those who had been slavery,” Harlan observed that the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to 
secure unprotected rights (p. 555).  Together, these two amendments forged, in Harlan’s view, 
what should have been an insurmountable barrier to legalized racial distinctions. 
These two amendments, if enforced according to their true intent and 
meaning, will protect all the civil rights that pertain to freedom and 
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citizenship….  These notable additions to the fundamental law were 
welcomed by the friends of liberty throughout the world.  They removed the 
race line from our governmental systems.  (p. 555) 
 
Justice Harlan pointed to the intent of racial discrimination behind the efforts to segregate the 
races. 
Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose … 
to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white 
persons….  The thing to accomplish was, under the guise of giving equal 
accommodation for whites and blacks, to compel the latter to keep to 
themselves while traveling in railroad passenger coaches.  (p. 557) 
 
Describing the racial attitudes of whites, Harlan noted, “The white race deems itself to be the 
dominant race in this country” (p 559).  “But,” he continued, “in view of the Constitution, in the 
eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.  There is no 
caste here” (p. 559).  In ringing tones that held a beacon light for yet far-distant legal decisions, 
Justice Harlan declared: 
Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes 
among citizens.  In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the 
law.  The humblest is the peer of the peer of the most powerful.  The law 
regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color 
when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are 
involved.  (p. 559) 
 
According to Harlan, “[T]he statute of Louisiana is inconsistent with the personal liberty of 
citizens, white and black, in that State, and hostile to both the spirit and letter of the Constitution 
of the United States” (p. 563).  If upheld, a system “of sinister legislation” on the part of the 
states with the purpose of interfering “with the full enjoyment of the blessings of freedom” and 
of regulating “civil rights, common to all citizens, upon the basis of race” would be legalized (p. 
563).  In Harlan’s view, such a ruling by the Court would contravene the Guarantee Clause. 
Such a system is inconsistent with the guarantee given by the Constitution to 
each State of a republican form of government, and may be stricken down 
by Congressional action, or by the courts in the discharge of their solemn 
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duty to maintain the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or 
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.  (p. 564) 
 
Before closing his dissent, Justice Harlan compared the majority’s decision with the Dred Scott 
decision, declaring, “In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be 
quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case” (p. 559).  
Indeed, both the Scott and Plessy decisions gave life to the taunt thrown centuries before by 
Thrasymachus to Socrates in Plato’s Republic, that justice is nothing but the advantage of the 
stronger (Cornford, pp. 18, 25).  His taunt was later paraphrased as “might makes right.”  A 
noted historian later commented, “Like acts of intolerance, discourtesy, and inhumanity, acts of 
segregation acquire a new significance when they are endowed with the compulsory conformity 
of ‘folkways’ or the majesty of the law” (Woodward, p. viii).  The Plessy decision clothed 
majority “folkways” regarding racial prejudice in the majestic robes of legality posing as “the 
supreme Law of the Land” (Woodward, p. viii; U.S. Constitution, Article VI). 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 Justice Harlan’s dissent stands as the first Court attempt to characterize racial 
discrimination as unrepublican in character and thus represents an attempt to contravene the 
Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution.  Harlan’s dissent also differs from the 
accepted reasoning that held the Court could not address claims arising under the Guarantee 
Clause.  In Harlan’s view, racial discrimination violates the foundations of republican 
government and thus presents a justiciable claim for the Court to resolve. 
 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 Case summary. 
 Brown cannot be properly understood and fully appreciated apart from its context.  And 
its contextual legal foundation was constructed by Charles Hamilton Houston, the architect of the 
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NAACP strategy that culminated in Brown.  Appointed to the newly created position of Special 
Counsel by the NAACP in 1935, Houston accepted  
on the condition that the program of litigation be conducted as a protracted 
legal struggle based on the planned, deliberate prosecution of test cases to 
secure favorable legal precedents, and thereby lay a foundation for 
subsequent frontal attacks against racial discrimination and discrimination.  
(McNeil, p. 134) 
 
Houston favored a “step-by-step process” because he believed it “would have greater long-range 
effects” by virtue of its recognition of a “lack of tradition for equality within the American 
system” (McNeil, p. 135).  Showing a recognition of what would later be termed a systems 
approach and of the requirements of adaptive work over time in terms of changing attitudes and 
beliefs, Houston observed, “The social and public factors must be developed at least along with 
and, if possible, before the actual litigation commences” (McNeil, p. 135). 
 To this strategy Houston welded his concept of “the lawyer’s basic duty of social 
engineering,” a moral position that provided both direction and inspiration to those doing the 
work (McNeil, p. 84).  According to Houston, a social engineer’s responsibility was to be “the 
mouthpiece of the weak and a sentinel guarding against wrong” (McNeil, p. 85).  In Houston’s 
view, “[D]iscrimination, injustice, and the denial of full citizenship rights and opportunities on 
the basis of race and a background of slavery could be challenged within the context of the 
Constitution if it were creatively, innovatively interpreted and used” (McNeil, pp. 84-85).  Such 
social engineering work required “a highly skilled, perceptive, sensitive lawyer who understood 
the Constitution of the United States and knew how to explore its uses in the solving of 
‘problems of … local communities” and in ‘bettering conditions of the underprivileged citizens’” 
(McNeil, p. 84).  As the “architect and dominant force of [the] legal program” for the NAACP, 
Houston also devised the tactical approach to be used by the NAACP (McNeil, p. 133): 
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The “positionary tactics” devised by Houston – within the context of a basic 
strategy of judicial precedent-building for the erosion of the “separate but 
equal” principle and establishment of the unconstitutionality of segregation 
– constituted the program of the NAACP for the legal struggle against 
educational discrimination…  He selected: 
three glaring and typical discriminations as focal points for 
legal action:  (1) differentials in teachers’ pay between white 
and Negro teachers having the same qualifications, holding 
the same certificate, and doing the same work; (2) 
inequalities in transportation…; (3) inequalities in graduate 
and professional education… (CHH, “Tentative Statement 
Concerning Policy of N.A.A.C.P.”, p. 1.). 
(McNeil, p. 136) 
 
 In delivering the Court’s opinion in Brown, Chief Justice Warren traced the various 
decisions since 1935 whereby the system of Jim Crow had been successfully challenged with 
regards to higher education.  Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1937), a case 
argued by Houston, ended Missouri’s practice of sending African-American students out of state 
for law school by paying their tuition while the opinion in Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 
(1948), another case argued by Houston, directed Oklahoma to provide Ada Sipuel a legal 
education in Oklahoma instead of sending her out of state (See Appendix O, pp. 1155-1157 of 
this paper for further discussion of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada).  McLaurin v. Oklahoma 
State Regents for Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), ordered an end to “separate but equal” 
practices in higher education because such practices denied McLaurin “his personal and present 
rights to the equal protection of the laws” as required under the Fourteenth Amendment (339 
U.S. 637, 642).  In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629  (1950), the Court “made clear that the 
separate but equal standard established by Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) was unattainable – at least 
in state-supported higher education” (Hall, 1999, p. 298).26  The Sweatt holding declared “that a 
segregated law school for Negroes could not provide them equal educational opportunities” and 
ordered that Sweatt be admitted to the previously all-white University of Texas Law School (p. 
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493).  Described as a “landmark decision in the history of United States race relations” by a legal 
scholar, Sweat had been argued by a future justice of the Supreme Court, Thurgood Marshall 
(Hall, 1992, 851). 
 Brown actually consisted of two separate rulings, the first on the merits and the second on 
the relief.  They are sometimes referred to as Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Brown II, 349 
U.S. 294 (1955).  The two decisions resulted from Chief Justice Warren’s proposal to the Court 
justices to separate the two decisions in order to reduce the monumental questions involved to 
manageable scope (Hall, 1999, pp. 34-35).  Brown I also consisted of an original argument on 
December 9, 1952 followed by a re-argument on December 8, 1953.  Brown II resulted after 
hearing re-argument regarding the questions of who should be responsible for ensuring that the 
relief is provided and at what pace it should occur.  Brown I held that separate but equal had no 
place in public education while Brown II ordered that school desegregation should proceed with 
“all deliberate speed” (349 U.S. 294, ). 
 The first Brown decision represented a ruling on not just one case, but on three others as 
well.  According to the Chief Justice, the four cases presented “a common legal question” that 
justified their being considered “together in this consolidated opinion” (p. 486).  The common 
legal question arose from the similar efforts of school children in Kansas, South Carolina, 
Virginia, and Delaware to “seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools 
of their community on a nonsegregated basis” (p. 487). 
 In the case bearing the name of the consolidated opinion, elementary children in Topeka 
filed action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas “to enjoin enforcement of a 
Kansas statute which permits, but does not require, cities of more than 15,000 population to 
maintain separate school facilities for Negro and white students” (p. 486, n. 1).  The District 
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Court, consisting of a three-judge panel, ruled that “segregation in public education has a 
detrimental effect upon Negro children,” but it “denied relief on the ground that the Negro and 
white schools were substantially equal with respect to buildings, transportation, curricula, and 
educational qualifications of teachers” (p. 486, n. 1).  The U.S. Supreme Court granted the 
request for appeal. 
 Plaintiffs in the South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliott, were elementary and high school 
students in Clarendon County.  They filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
of South Carolina seeking an injunction to stop enforcement of sections in the state’s constitution 
and statutes that required “the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools” (p. 486, n. 
1).  “The three-judge District Court” denied the relief requested by the plaintiffs, but “found that 
the Negro schools were inferior to the white schools and ordered the defendants to begin 
immediately to equalize the facilities” (p. 486, n. 1).  The District Court “ordered the defendants 
to begin immediately to equalize the facilities,” but denied admission to the white schools for the 
plaintiffs during the process of the equalization program (p. 486, n. 1).  The U.S. Supreme Court 
vacated the decision and remanded for hearing on the progress of the equalization program.  
Following that hearing which found progress in the states equalization program, the Supreme 
Court granted plaintiff’s request for appeal. 
 Plaintiffs in the Virginia case were high school students in Prince Edward County.  Filing 
suit in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, they sought an injunction to stop 
enforcement of the state constitutional and statutory code provisions requiring “the segregation 
of Negroes and whites in public schools” (p. 487, n. 1).  In Davis v. County School Board, a 
three-judge panel denied the injunction, but “found the Negro school inferior in physical plant, 
curricula, and transportation” (p. 487, n. 1).  Similar to the South Carolina case, the District 
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Court ordered the defendants to provide the plaintiffs an equal program while denying them 
admission to white schools while the equalization program was being undertaken.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs’ request for appeal. 
 The ruling in the Delaware case, Gebhart v. Belton, contained an interesting statement 
that “segregation itself results in an inferior education for Negro children” (p. 488, n. 1).  The 
case was filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery on behalf of elementary and high school 
students living in New Castle County.  Like the suits in South Carolina and Virginia, plaintiffs 
sought an injunction stop the constitutional and statutory requirements that required segregation 
in the state’s public schools.  Unlike the federal courts in Virginia and South Carolina, however, 
the “Chancellor gave judgment for the plaintiffs and ordered their immediate admission to 
schools previously attended only by white children” because of the enumerated conditions of 
inferiority in the Negro schools (p. 487, n. 1).  Upon appeal the Supreme Court of Delaware 
affirmed the Chancellor’s ruling, but suggested that “the defendants might be able to obtain a 
modification of the decree after equalization of the Negro and white schools had been 
accomplished” (p. 488, n. 1).  The defendants appealed only the “immediate admission of the 
Negro plaintiffs to the white schools” to the U.S. Supreme Court who agreed to review the case. 
 In its unanimous 9-0 ruling the Supreme Court noted that in “each of the cases other than 
the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-
called ‘separate but equal’ doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537” (p. 488).  The Court also noted plaintiffs’ contention, “that segregated public schools are 
not ‘equal’ and cannot be made ‘equal,’ and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection 
of the laws” (p. 488).  Turning to the subject of education, the Court declared, “Today, education 
is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments” (p. 493).  Continuing, the 
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Court reasoned, “In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to 
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.  Such an opportunity, where the 
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms” 
(p. 493).  Coming to the heart of the matter, the Court noted: 
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in 
public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities 
and other “tangible” factors may be equal, deprive the children of the 
minority group of equal educational opportunities?  We believe that it does.  
(p. 493) 
 
The Court explained its reasoning in terms of the psychological damage caused by 
segregation. 
To separate them from others of similar age and qualification solely because 
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the 
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to 
be undone.  The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities 
was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which 
nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs…  (p. 494) 
 
Commenting that the “extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson” was 
unknown, the Court stated that the findings of psychological damage were “amply supported by 
modern authority” and declared, “Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is 
rejected” (pp. 494-495).  Continuing, the Court announced its conclusion: 
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of “separate 
but equal” has no place.  Separate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal.  Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated 
for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation 
complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  (p. 495) 
 
Before closing, Chief Justice Warren repeated, “We have now announced that such segregation 
is a denial of the equal protection of the laws” (p. 495).   
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 On a somewhat poignant note, although his strategy proved successful in toppling 
Plessy’s separate but equal doctrine as a legal bulwark of segregation, Charles Hamilton Houston 
didn’t live to see it.  He died April 22, 1950 of a heart attack (McNeil, p. 250).  However, his 
pupil and mentee, Thurgood Marshall led the arguments for the plaintiffs before the Court.  
Years later, after being named to the Supreme Court, Justice Marshall recounted Houston’s 
contributions to Brown: 
When Brown against the Board of Education was being argued in the 
Supreme Court … [t]here were some two dozen lawyers on the side of the 
Negroes fighting for their schools….  [O]f those … lawyers … only two 
hadn’t been touched by Charlie Houston….  [T]hat man was the engineer of 
all of it.  (McNeil, p. 3) 
 
 Significance for the guarantee clause. 
 Rights to equal protection of the laws and to due process as protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment embody particularized requirements of a republican government.  The Guarantee 
Clause was cited by Congressional leaders as the primary justification for the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  While the Brown decision didn’t mention the Guarantee Clause, it’s holding 
centered on the concept of inviolable rights as part of the nation’s definition of republican 
government, its duties, and its purposes. 
Summary of Salient Points 
 This chapter began by introducing the Guarantee Clause and reviewing its historical 
background.  Understandings of the Guarantee Clause as determining boundaries of federalism 
between state and federal governmental responsibilities were presented through an examination 
of comments and statements made at the Constitutional Convention, uttered during the debates in 
ratifying conventions in the various states, set forth in the Federalist, and presented by the Anti-
Federalists.  Montesquieu’s influence on the necessity for such a clause protecting and ensuring 
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republican governments was discussed as were subsequent uses of the Guarantee Clause by the 
executive and legislative branches of American government.   
 More substantially, an examination of specific court cases formed the basis for an 
investigation of the case law emerging from legal disputes involving concepts embodied in the 
Guarantee Clause.  Cases culminating in U.S. Supreme Court decisions constituted the majority.  
The 39 cases, selected through an extensive literature review, represent all of the cases that this 
writer was able to identify in which the Guarantee Clause was either presented as a legal 
argument by one of the litigants or was discussed in the opinion.  The analysis of each case 
utilized one of the two formats presented in Chapter 1.  Cases were grouped thematically into 
five general categories: 
• Guarantee Clause requires federal intervention to restore republican government to a 
state.   
• Guarantee Clause requires federal intervention to secure protection against abusive 
state government.  
• Guarantee Clause requires that legislation be overturned because of its unrepublican 
nature.  
• Guarantee Clause prohibits federal intervention so that the state continues to have a 
republican government. 
• Republican government and race.  
 The first case in which the Supreme Court interpreted the Guarantee Clause arose out of 
the Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island.  In Luther v. Borden (1849), the Supreme Court ruled that 
the issues presented (centering on the question of which government was the legitimate one) 
were political questions most properly handled by the “political power and not … the judicial,” 
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that the State of Rhode Island had “already decided” the political questions, that the President 
(under the authority of an act of Congress) had likewise recognized the charter government as 
being the lawful government of Rhode Island, and that the “courts of the United States adopt and 
follow the decisions of the State courts in questions which concern merely the constitution and 
laws of the State” (48 U.S. 1, 39, 40).  Out of this grew the doctrine that Guarantee Clause 
questions constituted political questions and were therefore nonjusticiable. 
 Several thematic threads run through the Guarantee Clause jurisprudence.  The first 
thread centers on the idea that the Courts should invalidate legislation deemed to be violative of 
the principles of republican government.  Cases illustrating this thematic thread include Rice v. 
Foster (1847), Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph v. Oregon (1912), Kiernan v. Portland 
(1912), Denver v. New York Trust Co. (1913), and Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrandt (1916).  The 
second thematic thread focuses on the idea that a republican government is a government that 
won’t tolerate discrimination based on either gender or race.  Cases involved in this thematic 
strand include Minor v. Happersett (1875), United States v. Cruikshank (1876), and Plessy v. 
Ferguson (1896).  The third thematic thread centers on narrowing the holding of Luther v. 
Borden so that it doesn’t act to automatically exclude all cases brought under the Guarantee 
Clause.  Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in Baker v. Carr (1962), the first of the 
reapportionment cases, and Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in New York v. United States 
(1992), a case wherein Guarantee Clause and Tenth Amendment arguments intertwined, occupy 
center stage in portraying the third thematic thread of Guarantee Clause jurisprudence.  Chief 
Justice Warren’s solitary remark in Reynolds v. Sims (1964), the last of the reapportionment 
cases, plays a supporting role as well. 
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 Regarding the first thematic thread centering on the idea that the preservation of a 
republican form of government requires that legislation be invalidated by the courts, only one 
court in our nation’s history did just that.  In 1847, two years before Luther v. Borden was 
decided, the Supreme Court of Delaware overturned state legislation whereby the residents of 
each county would determine whether or not liquor would be sold in their county.  The decision 
was based upon the state constitution and the ideas of republican government contained in that 
document.  In Rice v. Foster (1847), attorneys for Rice had argued that the state legislature 
delegated “legislative power to a majority of the people in a county,” an act that was contrary to 
a representative republican form of government (4 Del. 479, 481).  According to Rice’s 
attorneys: 
The people cannot make a law; neither the whole people nor a part of them.  
All laws must be made by their representatives in general assembly met for 
deliberation, consultation and judgment; acting under oath, and under the 
restrictions of the constitution.  (4 Del. 479, 481) 
 
In announcing the holding that invalidated the Delaware legislature’s act, the Chief Justice of the 
Delaware Supreme Court noted that the “legislature [had] declined the responsibility which it 
was their duty to assume” (4 Del. 479, 490).  The holding was based on the following finding 
whereby the Supreme Court of Delaware declared: 
The sovereign power therefore, of this State, resides with the legislative, 
executive, and judicial departments.  Having thus transferred the sovereign 
power, the people cannot resume of exercise any portion of it.  To do so, 
would be an infraction of the constitution and a dissolution of the 
government.  (4 Del. 479, 488) 
 
Announcing the Delaware Supreme Court’s holding, Chief Justice James Booth pronounced: 
The only check which the constitution [of the State of Delaware] interposes 
to an act of the legislature tending to such consequences, is an independent 
and upright judiciary.  As the act … is repugnant to the principles, spirit, and 
true intent and meaning of the constitution of this State, and tends to subvert 
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our representative republican form of government, it is the unanimous 
opinion of this Court, that the said act is null and void…  (4 Del. 479, 499) 
 
 As was noted earlier in this document, Chief Justice James Booth’s opinion would serve 
well as a primer on American government for any student wishing to learn the basic principles 
underlying a constitutional republic based on representative government, the separation of 
powers, and judicial review.  In particular, Chief Justice Booth distinguished between direct and 
representative democracy, discussed the constitutional Framers’ views on the distinctive forms, 
provided historical examples illustrating the differences between the forms of representative and 
direct democracy, and elaborated on the need for a constitution to protect rights and to restrain 
public passions.   
 Rice v. Foster is notable for another reason – its arguments prefigured the arguments that 
would later be used in the early twentieth century to challenge the constitutional amendments 
which incorporated provisions for the initiative and referendum, two components of direct 
democracy.   The initiative, referendum, and recall constituted important planks of the 
Progressive movement’s platform to “be enacted where ‘government has in actual fact become 
non-representative’” because it had been captured by special interests who were indifferent to the 
interests of the people (Kolko, p. 197).   Articulating his understanding of the Progressive’s 
message at their party’s convention in Chicago, Theodore Roosevelt declared, “The first 
essential in the Progressive programme [sic] is the right of the people to rule” (Kolko, p. 196).  
Joining forces with the Progressive Party’s opposition to “the great benefactors of privilege and 
reaction,” Roosevelt declared: 
Our fight is a fundamental fight against both of the old corrupt party 
machines, for both are under the dominion of the plunder league of the 
professional politicians who are controlled and sustained by the great 
beneficiaries of privilege and reaction.  (Kolko, p. 196) 
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The weapons whereby people would regain control of their government were “direct Presidential 
primaries and direct election of Senators, as well as [the use of] initiative, referendum, and 
recall” (Kolko, pp. 196-197).   
 The Progressive Movement thus provides the important context for understanding the 
adoption of the initiative and referendum by various states and the subsequent legal challenges 
mounted to invalidate the new-found state constitutional status of these Progressive measures.  
The arguments used to legally combat the initiative and referendum sounded remarkably similar 
to the representative v. direct democracy arguments articulated in Rice v. Foster.  However, 
Luther v. Borden had occurred in the intervening interval between Rice v. Foster and the early 
twentieth century court cases challenging the constitutional adoption of the initiative and 
referendum in Oregon and Colorado and the referendum in Ohio.  Pacific States Telephone & 
Telegraph v. Oregon (1912), Kiernan v. Portland (1912), Denver v. New York Trust Co. (1913), 
and Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrandt (1916) – all argued that the legislative power had been 
delegated to the people in violation of representative democracy as part of the republican form of 
government that was guaranteed by the Constitution – all reached the Supreme Court of the 
United States – all were dismissed under the rationale that the legal questions were “political in 
nature and thus lie outside the Court’s jurisdiction” (223 U.S. 118, 119).  In dismissing the case 
in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph v. Oregon, the Court cited the Court’s ruling in Luther 
v. Borden.  In dismissing the other cases as constituting political questions whose determination 
belonged to the political departments of government, the Court cited Luther v. Borden and 
Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph v. Oregon.   
 Another thematic thread of the Guarantee Clause’s jurisprudence uncovered in this 
chapter centered on the idea of republican government as being anti-discriminatory regarding 
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gender or race.  Minor v. Happersett (1875), United States v. Cruikshank (1876), and Plessy v. 
Ferguson (1896) all pinned such hopes on the Guarantee Clause.  All were disappointed as the 
Supreme Court rejected the Guarantee Clause arguments as constituting nonjusticiable political 
questions by citing Luther v. Borden.  All had their Fourteenth Amendment arguments rejected 
as well.  In United States v. Cruikshank, the Court presented an argument analogous to what 
would be later characterized by Joseph Heller as a Catch 22, a type of dilemma from which there 
is no escape (Heller, p. 52).27  As a part of the pattern of judicial noninterference with 
discriminatory action against black citizens, the Supreme Court denied federal jurisdiction by 
pointing out that the Bill of Rights prohibits violations by the federal government, not state 
governments and further directed, “For their protection in its enjoyment, therefore, the people 
must look to the States” (92 U.S. 542, 552).  However, when looking to the states, the Court 
ruled that the rights of due process and the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment applied against state governments, not against individual citizens.  The 
only bright spot in this dismal picture was Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, the first high Court attempt to characterize racial discrimination as unrepublican in 
character.  For Justice Harlan, racial discrimination represented a contravention of the Guarantee 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  Since racial discrimination violated the foundations of 
republican government, it presented a justiciable claim for the Court’s resolution.  As articulated 
by Justice Harlan: 
Such a system [of racial discrimination] is inconsistent with the guarantee 
given by the Constitution to each State of a republican form of government, 
and may be stricken down by Congressional action, or by the courts in the 
discharge of their solemn duty to maintain the supreme law of the land, 
anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary 
notwithstanding.  (163 U.S. 537, 564) 
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 Finally, a thematic thread of Guarantee Clause jurisprudence exists that centers on the 
idea of narrowing the role played by Luther v. Borden in eliminating all Guarantee Clause 
arguments as nonjusticiable political questions.  This thread first emerged in Baker v. Carr 
(1962) and was added to by New York v. United States (1992).  Justice Brennan’s majority 
opinion in Baker v. Carr (the case that “inaugurated” the re-apportionment revolution and gave 
rise to the “one person, one vote” rule) observed that Guarantee Clause claims were not 
automatically nonjusticiable (Hall, 1992, pp. 57, 59).  What had rendered previous Guarantee 
Clause claims nonjusticiable was the presence of “the elements thought to define ‘political 
questions,’ and no other feature, which … render[ed] them nonjusticiable” (369 U.S. 186, 229).  
Therefore, before rejecting them out of hand, Guarantee Clause claims should be examined to 
determine whether any of the elements of political questions were present. If any of the 
“analytical threads” of political questions were present, then the case should be dismissed; 
however, if absent, then the case should be heard by the Court (369 U.S. 186, 211).  First, the 
Court pointed out, “[T]he mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a political right does not 
mean it presents a political question” (369 U.S. 186, 209).  Second, most political question cases 
included issues related to the separation of powers doctrine.  According to Justice Brennan: 
[I]n the Guaranty Clause cases and in the other “political question” cases, it 
is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the 
Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary’s relationship to the 
States, which gives rise to the “political question.”  (369 U.S. 186, 210) 
 
Two sentences later, Justice Brennan reiterated, “The nonjusticiability of a political question is 
primarily a function of the function of the separation of powers” (369 U.S. 186, 210).  Next, 
Justice Brennan articulated the various types of argument whereby a political question would be 
involved: 
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Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is 
found: 
• a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or 
• a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it; or 
• the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination 
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or 
• the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of 
government; or 
• the unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision 
already made; or 
• the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements 
by various departments on one question.  (Formatting added) (369 
U.S. 186, 217) 
 
As a legal historian observed of Baker v. Carr’s impact on Guarantee Clause jurisprudence: 
Although the justices did not overturn Taney’s decision that Guarantee 
Clause cases presented nonjusticiable political questions, the Court 
nevertheless narrowed the number of cases they would exclude from their 
jurisdiction under the political question doctrine.  (Hall, 1992, p. 355) 
 
 In New York v. United States (1992), the State of New York relied on both the Tenth 
Amendment and the Guarantee Clause to buttress its legal argument against the congressional 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act.  In delivering the Court’s 6-3 decision, 
Justice O’Connor noted the case centered on the Nation’s “oldest question of constitutional law,” 
a question which “consist[ed] of discerning the proper division of authority between the Federal 
Government and the States” (505 U.S. 144, 149).  The Court’s holding has relevance for 
federalism. 
We conclude that while Congress has substantial power under the 
Constitution to encourage the States to provide for the disposal of the 
radioactive waste generated within their borders, the Constitution does not 
confer upon Congress the ability simply to compel the States to do so.  We 
therefore find that only two of the Act’s three provisions at issue are 
consistent with the Constitution’s allocation of power to the Federal 
Government.  (Emphasis added) (505 U.S. 144, 149) 
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Having pointed out that the nonjusticiability of the Guarantee Clause claims in the Court’s 
history was rooted in Luther v. Borden, Justice O’Connor noted that the holding in Luther was 
limited to the issue of deciding “what government is the established one in a State” (505 U.S. 
144,  184).  Yet somehow, O’Connor continued, “Over the following century, this limited 
holding metamorphosed in the sweeping assertion that ‘[v]iolation of the great guaranty of a 
republican form of government in States cannot be challenged in the courts.’  Colegrove v. 
Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (pluarality opinion)” (505 U.S. 144, 184).  Justice O’Connor 
next pointed out that the Court itself had “suggested that perhaps not all claims under the 
Guarantee Clause present nonjusticiable political questions.  See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 
582 (1964) (“[S]ome questions raised under the Guarantee Clause are nonjusticiable”)” (505 
U.S. 144, 185).  The remark cited from Reynolds v. Sims was made by Chief Justice Warren, the 
author of the majority opinion in the case that represented the conclusion of the reapportionment 
cases begun by Baker v. Carr.  Justice O’Conner then noted that contemporary legal scholars had 
“likewise suggested that courts should address the merits of such claims, at least in some 
circumstances” (505 U.S. 144, 185).   
 .Justice O’Connor next made the hypothetical assumption that a Guarantee Clause 
argument was justiciable and examined its applicability to the facts of the case.   
[N]either the monetary incentives provided by the Act nor the possibility 
that a State’s waste producers may find themselves excluded from the 
disposal sites of another State can reasonably be said to deny any State a 
republican form of government.  (505 U.S. 144, 185) 
 
The opinion next explained the reasons for such an interpretation. 
As we have seen [in the portion focusing upon the Tenth Amendment 
arguments], these two incentives represent permissible conditional exercises 
of Congress’ authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses 
respectively, in forms that have now grown commonplace.  Under each, 
Congress offers the States a legitimate choice rather than issuing an 
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unavoidable command.  The States thereby retain the ability to set their 
legislative agendas; state government officials remain accountable to the 
local electorate.  The twin threats imposed by the first two challenged 
provisions of the Act … do not pose any realistic risk of altering the form or 
the method of functioning of New York’s government.  (505 U.S. 144, 185-
186) 
 
The Court concluded its discussion of the Guarantee Clause arguments in New York v. United 
States by observing, “Thus even indulging the assumption that the Guarantee Clause provides a 
basis upon which a State or its subdivisions may sue to enjoin the enforcement of a federal 
statute, petitioners have not made out such a claim in these cases” (505 U.S. 144, 186). 
 It was noted by this writer that one significance of New York v. United States resided in a 
conjecture that in order for claims to be successful against congressional legislation based on the 
Spending Clause, successful arguments would need to address the conditional tests posed by the 
Court in its South Dakota v. Dole decision.  This conjecture was indirectly suggested by Justice 
O’Connor’s statement regarding the incentives contained in the congressional act being 
challenged.  As stated by Justice O’Connor: 
As we have seen, these two incentives represent permissible conditional 
exercises of Congress’ authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses 
respectively in forms that have now grown commonplace.  Under each, 
Congress offers the States a legitimate choice rather than issuing an 
unavoidable command.  (505 U.S. 144, 185) 
 
 Of the three thematic strands of Guarantee Clause jurisprudence, the one most closely 
pertaining to the purpose of this investigation resides in the Court’s statements in Baker v. Carr, 
Reynolds v. Sims, and New York v. United States which narrowed the scope of the original 
holding in Luther v. Borden.  Now, it can be argued, the original holding in Luther v. Borden 
pertains to only one classification of Guarantee Clause arguments, that being the class formed by 
political questions.  The other classification, by inference, includes all Guarantee Clause 
arguments that don’t contain political questions.  
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 Finally, the historic trendline portraying the Guarantee Clause’s actual use needs to be 
taken into account. The mainstream use of the Guarantee Clause has been to justify federal 
action.  The Guarantee Clause has never been used by federal courts to either limit or to 
invalidate any federal laws in spite of state arguments that such was necessary to preserve a 
republican form of government.  Nor has the Guarantee Clause been used to prohibit or impede 
congressional action in recognizing that a state either enjoys or lacks a republican form of 
government.  Instead, just the opposite results have occurred.  The Guarantee Act provided the 
basis for the congressional act, noted in Luther v. Borden, wherein Congress designated the 
President as the vehicle for fulfilling the Guarantee Clause’s provisions regarding domestic 
violence.  According to the Court: 
By this act, the power of deciding whether the exigency had arisen upon 
which the government of the United States is bound to interfere, is given to 
the President.  He is to act upon the application of the legislature or of the 
executive, and consequently he must determine what body of men constitute 
the legislature, and who is the governor, before he can act….  [T]he 
President must, of necessity, decide which is the government, and which 
party is unlawfully arrayed against it, before he can perform the duty 
imposed upon him by the act of Congress.  (48 U.S. 1, 43) 
 
The Guarantee Clause thereby justified President Tyler’s recognition of the charter government 
as the legitimate government of Rhode Island during the Dorr Rebellion.  The Guarantee Clause 
supplied the primary justification for President Lincoln’s request to Congress that federal troops 
be used to restore the southern states to a republican form of government.  The Clause’s federal 
guarantee of republican government furnished the basis for the Congressional program of 
reconstructing the South so that once more its people enjoyed a republican form of government.  
The Guarantee Clause provided the main foundation upon which the Fourteenth Amendment was 
constructed.  And, finally, the Guarantee Clause, combined with his constitutional responsibility 
as President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” supplied justification for 
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President Eisenhower’s order sending “in 500 soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division to preserve 
true order in Little Rock for the rest of the school year” after the Arkansas National Guard, 
followed by a mob, had denied “a handful of black children admission to Little Rock High 
School” during September, 1957 (U.S. Constitution, Article II, § 3; Brogan, p. 648). 
 When asked if he saw any way in which the Guarantee Clause might be used as part of a 
challenge to NCLB, Professor Bonfield, a law professor at the University of Iowa, reflected for a 
moment and then responded,  “Not really.  It’s much more conceivable that the Guarantee Clause 
would be used by the Federal Government Congress to assert even more control over education 
in this country than what they currently have” (Bonfield, 2009).  The argument that could be 
used by Congress would be that an educated citizenry is essential for the maintenance and 
perpetuation of a republican form of government in the various states.  Given the importance of 
education in today’s world, given the role that education plays in preparing young people for 
careers and work, given the Court-recognized importance of education in preparing students for 
the exercise of their responsibilities as citizens, and given the disparate performances of the 
various state systems of public education, such an assertion would be plausible.  Such a move, 
moreover, could be difficult to challenge.  According to the case law, which runs from Luther v. 
Borden to the modern-day, Congress is the main determiner of what constitutes a republican 
form of government.  Also, congressional determinations regarding a republican form of 
government do not present a justiciable cause of action for the courts, according to an impressive 
array of the case law centering on the Guarantee Clause. 
 Of course, such a policy course would violate the use of federalism as a public policy 
approach.  Such a policy approach would also require much adaptive work to overcome long 
traditions of state control of public education which generally incorporate features of local 
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control through publicly elected boards of education in each of the school districts.  A cynic 
might suggest that the adaptive work of undercutting the current system of public education has 
been underway for some time on the part of critics. The federalizing of public education would 
violate the “teamwork” component of Senge’s systems thinking as well.  Given the public’s 
support of local control of education, however, it’s difficult to envision an outright federal 
takeover of education in this country.  And actually, Professor Bonfield didn’t view either 
possible use of the Guarantee Clause as likely.  In his opinion, either use of the Guarantee Clause 
was unlikely (on the one hand, to challenge federal legislation regarding public education; on the 
other, to assert greater federal control of public education). 
 The Guarantee Clause cases comprise slightly less than half (46%) of the total federalism 
cases being examined by this writer.   The remaining cases (54%) divide unequally between the 
Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments. The next chapter will examine the federalism 
case law that emerged from the Tenth Amendment. 
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Chapter 6 
The Tenth Amendment 
Introduction 
 The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is the only amendment in 
the Bill of Rights that doesn’t act to protect the rights and liberties of individuals.  Instead it acts 
to protect the powers of state governments and reads, “The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people” (Farrand, IV, p. 95).  During the state conventions that ratified the 
Constitution, the anti-Federalists demanded that amendments be added to the proposed document 
in order to prevent subsequent tyrannical actions by the national government being constitituted.  
As one journalist noted, “[T]he Tenth Amendment was the only part of the Bill of Rights that 
was recommended by all the state conventions that submitted proposed amendments” (Monk, p. 
194).  It was added because of widespread “support for an explicit guarantee that the states 
should retain control over their internal affairs” (Hall, 1992, pp. 861-862). 
 Article II of the Articles of Confederation served as the Tenth Amendment’s antecedent:  
“Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and 
right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress 
assembled” (Farrand, 1913, p. 212).  Much would be made of the phrase, “expressly delegated,” 
in subsequent years as will be shown in discussing both the historical background and the case 
law of the Tenth Amendment.  That phrase had kept the Congress under the Confederation “from 
carrying into effect the few powers with which it had been entrusted,” which was one of the 
reasons the phrase was not included in the newly added amendment (Hall, 1992, p. 862). 
Historical Background 
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An american political fault line: From the articles of confederation to the 
constitution of the united states. 
 
 Introduction. 
 Clashes involving the Tenth Amendment reveal a primordial fault line in American 
politics with local and state rights located on one side and national government supremacy 
situated on the other. Unlike Athena springing full-grown from the forehead of Zeus, the United 
States did not begin its existence as a nation with the creation of the Constitution, but rather 
developed through a series of related events over time.  Similarly the origins of this deeply-
rooted argument about government powers lie intricately embedded in the historical evolution of 
this country from a collection of individual British colonies to united States declaring their 
independence to a confederacy in which the states reigned supreme to a constitutional republic 
based upon representative democracy, upon separation of powers (horizontal division of power 
between the judicial, legislative, and executive branches of the federal government), and upon 
federalism (vertical division of power between the state and federal governments).  Movement 
from a group of separate colonies to a nation under the present Constitution of the United States 
also illustrated the fact that adaptive work often requires time, e.g., changed values whereby the 
major focal point of allegiance switches from ones colony to the nation. 
 Finally, political clashes along America’s fault line presaged the legal clashes contained 
in the case law of the Tenth Amendment.  This chapter will trace these political clashes, 
beginning with the Articles of Confederation and moving forward to the first legal clash, 
McCullough v. Maryland, the case that begins the “case law” section of this chapter.  These 
political clashes provide the historical context required to more fully understand the ensuing 
legal battles over government sovereignty in the United States.  Arguments used in the political 
clashes prior to McCullough were subsequently employed by both sides in the courtroom battles, 
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and thus emphasize the continuity of the primordial struggle for sovereignty between local and 
central governments in American life.   
 The articles of confederation. 
 Written subsequent to the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, 
according to one historian, were based on original, revolutionary principles. 
Original principles signified Revolutionary principles…  And it meant 
whatever men chose it to mean: to men like Governor Clinton of New 
York…, original principles signified as little government as possible, a 
federation wherein each state would remain sovereign, with Congress at 
their disposal.  Had not the Articles of Confederation been written with this 
idea uppermost?  (Bowen, p. 8) 
 
Historically, the Articles of Confederation denote the high water mark of state sovereignty.  As 
one constitutional scholar noted, the Articles of Confederation flowed naturally from the 
sentiments of those who declared their independence from the tyrannies of English rule. 
When the Articles had been anticipated in 1774, mulled over in 1776, 
proposed in 1777, and finally ratified in 1781, a confederate, congressional 
form of government was clearly what most Americans wanted to handle 
their common affairs.  It had to be confederate because they were in no 
mood to give a faraway, central regime in the United States what they were 
busy denying to a faraway, central regime in Britain…  It had to be 
congressional because they were in no mood to give an independent 
executive in the United States what they were busy denying to an 
independent executive in Britain.  (Rossiter, p. 47) 
 
 Sometimes referred to as the “first constitution of the United States,” the Articles of 
Confederation granted only a limited authority to the national government and further “made the 
exercise of the limited authority it granted almost exclusively dependent on the good will of each 
of the thirteen states” (Rossiter, p. 50).  The government of the United States “could resolve and 
recommend but could not command and coerce” (Rossiter, p. 52)  The good will of each state 
that was necessary for national action depended upon its citizenry, many of whom fit the 
following characterization:  “[T]he pioneering yeoman developed a self-respecting dependence 
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on those around him and a headstrong independence of those remote from him” (Rossiter, p. 27).  
Such attitudes favored putting individual state needs above those of the federation as a whole, 
thus making national action difficult to achieve.   
 General George Washington’s aide-de-camp, Alexander Hamilton, first experienced the 
weaknesses of the national government and its dependence upon the good will of the states in 
rather direct fashion at Valley Forge.  Consequently Hamilton turned his attention to the Articles 
of Confederation.  With subsequent events having verified his initial analysis, Hamilton pointed 
out its flaws to James Duane, the President of Congress, in a letter written September 3, 1780.  
According to Hamilton: 
The fundamental defect is a want of power in Congress….  [I]t has 
originated from three causes – an excess of the spirit of liberty which has 
made the particular states show a jealousy of all power not in their own 
hands, and this jealousy has led them to exercise a right of judging in the 
last resort of the measures recommended by Congress, and of acting 
according to their own opinions of their propriety or necessity, a diffidence 
in Congress of their own powers, by which they have been timid and 
indecisive in their resolutions…  (Syrett, 2, p. 401; hereafter referred to as 
PAH) 
 
And, expressing an interpretation precursive to an opinion he delivered some eleven years later 
to President Washington as a member of his first cabinet (as well as Chief Justice Marshall’s 
paraphrase of Hamilton’s interpretation in the first Supreme Court case involving the Tenth 
Amendment, McCullough v. Maryland) regarding the powers of the federal government relative 
to the establishment by Congress of the First Bank of the United States, Hamilton declared, 
“Undefined powers are discretionary powers, limited only by the object for which they were 
given – in the present case, the independence and freedom of America” (PAH, 2, p. 401).  
Hamilton thought that a convention should be called to remedy what he regarded as a “defective” 
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political structure that “requires to be altered” (PAH, 2: 402).  He further characterized the 
existing confederation: 
[I]t is neither fit for war, nor peace.  The idea of an uncontrollable 
sovereignty in each state, over its internal police, will defeat the other 
powers given to Congress, and make our union feeble and precarious.  There 
are instances without number, where acts necessary for the general good, 
and which rise out of the powers given to Congress must interfere with the 
internal police of the states….  The confederation gives the states 
individually too much influence…  (PAH, 2, p. 402) 
 
 The constitution of the united states. 
 Events during the 1780s convinced others of the deficiencies of the Articles of 
Confederation as well.  According to one constitutional historian: 
By 1787 men like Washington and Madison had come to see the 
commercial, financial, social, and diplomatic disorders of the new Republic 
as primarily political in character….  [T]he trouble with the United States 
was that it was governed hardly at all….  [T]hey also saw these disorders as 
primarily national in scope.  (Rossiter, p. 46) 
 
Originally, “[s]eventy-four delegates were named to the Convention at Philadelphia; in the end 
fifty-five turned up” (Bowen, p. 11).  By the time the fifty-five delegates convened for the 
Constitutional Convention in 1787,  
[F]orty-two of the Framers had already served at one time or another in the 
Congress of the United States, and thus had been given a chance … to find 
out for themselves what it meant to pursue national ends through 
confederate means.  (Rossiter, p. 145) 
 
In addition, “[a]ll but two or three Framers had also served as public officials of colony or state” 
(Rossiter, p. 146).   
 According to Professor Rossiter, the Framers intended to develop a charter for 
government that would be “a faithful reflection of the ideas of the Revolution, which all of them 
agreed had been stated most forcefully in the Declaration of Independence” (Rossiter, p. 59).  
They also intended that whatever was developed would be “a creative synthesis of the best 
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previous efforts to convert [the ideas contained in the Declaration of Independence] into 
institutions, which most of them agreed had taken place in Massachusetts, Virginia, and New 
York” (Rossiter, p. 59),  In spite of these intentions, the Convention almost foundered upon the 
idea of representation in Congress, the large states favoring population and the small states 
demanding equality of representation.  The Framers wrestled with this issue for fourteen working 
days in extreme summer heat, from June 27th to July 16th (Farrand, I, pp. 437-606; Farrand, II, 
pp. 1-20).  The small states regarded equal representation as a guarantee of their continued 
viability.  According to the small-state delegates, “[A]nything short of ‘equality of voice’ in one 
branch would mean an end to the state governments and, in time, to the states themselves” 
(Rossiter, pp. 192-193).   
 What emerged at the end was a compromise in which one legislative house was based on 
population while the remaining body was based on equal representation.  Rossiter referred to the 
compromise as “the invention of American federalism” and found it ironic that it resulted from 
what he described as “an ill-tempered struggle for power” (Rossiter, p. 193).  State sovereignty 
was reined in as the lead horse for American government.  In its place stood federalism, 
consisting of the Great Compromise, enumerated powers of the national government, and powers 
prohibited from being exercised by the states.  Professor Rossiter described the situation of the 
states under the new Constitution: 
The Great Compromise was a confirmation of the states as states, as 
communities that never had been and never would be sovereign nations, and 
yet always had been and still meant to be discrete, self-conscious, 
indestructible units of political and social organization.  (Rossiter, p. 193) 
 
 Such is the ancient fault line of sovereignty in American history from colonial beginnings 
through the Constitutional Convention, the jagged line recording the movement of the 
subterranean plates of state sovereignty and federal supremacy as they moved against each other 
   
   
277
to gain a position of preëminence.  Moreover, tremors along this fault would continue to be felt 
throughout the nation’s history up to and including present-day disagreements.   




 The Great Rift Valley marks where eastern Africa and the Middle East almost split off 
from the African continent just as the Greenleaf fault (running from the tip of Lake Superior in 
Minnesota to a point near Greenleaf, Kansas) marks where the North American continent almost 
split apart eons ago.  In similar fashion we can trace the jagged lines of demarcation between the 
state rights position and that of federal supremacy as played out against republican ideas and 
pragmatism through varied constitutional arguments in America’s political and legal life.  The 
fault line reveals itself in arguments regarding the nature of the Constitution, how it should be 
interpreted, who should interpret its meaning – all these arguments divide along the fault line 
separating state rights and national supremacy. 
 The fault line is also revealed by events and their accompanying documents that contain 
both political and legal opinions.  Major events include arguments over the constitutionality of a 
Bank of the United States that occurred in President Washington’s first administrative cabinet, 
the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, and the Nullification and Secession Crises that 
culminated in the Civil War.  Key documents that reveal the state rights position include the 
Articles of Confederation, Madison’s opposition as a member of the House of Representatives to 
the First Bank of the United States, Jefferson’s authorship of the Kentucky Resolutions, 
Madison’s authorship of the Virginia Resolutions, and the use of both resolutions by southerners 
in the nullification and secession controversies.  Key documents that reveal a strong central 
government position include the Federalist, Hamilton’s analysis of the weaknesses of the 
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Confederation in his letter of 1780 to James Duane, Hamilton’s opinion as Secretary of the 
Treasury to President Washington regarding the constitutionality of the proposed Bank of the 
United States, and several Supreme Court rulings which answered questions regarding the nature 
of the Constitution as well as who should interpret its meaning.   
 How one would answer the following questions would depend upon one’s stance 
regarding sovereignty, either state rights or federal supremacy: 
• Is the Constitution a compact of the state governments, thus deriving its powers from 
the various states, or is it a compact flowing from the people and thereby deriving its 
powers from them? 
• Is the Constitution a general blueprint for American government or instead a detailed 
plan? 
• Who should interpret the Constitution? 
• Should the Constitution be interpreted broadly, which would include implied powers, 
or should it be interpreted strictly according to its literal meaning? 
As might be surmised by an astute and knowledgeable reader, an individual favoring state 
sovereignty would provide answers different from an individual favoring federal supremacy.  
Generally, a state rightist argued that the Constitution was a compact of the various state 
governments, that it was a detailed plan that should be interpreted strictly according to its literal 
meaning, and that state governments could determine the constitutionality of congressional 
actions.  Conversely, a federal spokesperson argued the opposite.  The Supreme Court would be 
the final arbiter of these questions and has provided definitive answers to the first and third 
questions.  What continue to be argued today are questions about how to interpret the 
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Constitution, which has some implications for the question of whether the Constitution is a 
general blueprint or a detailed plan. 
 To more fully illustrate the sovereignty fault line in America’s political and legal life, the 
remainder of the historical section of this chapter will focus on two events that presaged the legal 
clash initiated by McCullough v. Maryland. First, the multiple events culminating in a 
constitutional argument within President Washington’s Cabinet will be fully examined.  Second, 
the events, as well as the subsequent consequences, surrounding the Kentucky and Virginia 
Resolutions will be presented and analyzed. Each event will receive further introduction.  As will 
be shown, both events illustrate legal arguments regarding sovereignty that were subsequently 
used before the Supreme Court.   
Constitutional arguments in president washington’s cabinet re: Hamilton’s economic 
proposals. 
 
 Hamilton’s economic proposals for america: Introduction. 
 In order to understand the constitutional debate within Washington’s Cabinet, one needs 
to understand the intricate intertwining of economic and political factors underlying the 
constitutional issues.  To further understand the constitutional debate, one also needs to 
understand Hamilton’s economic proposals as well as the other political factors operating at the 
time.  In order to understand Hamilton’s two-phased economic proposals, one needs to 
understand the specific problems of the American economy at the time that Hamilton’s proposals 
were designed to alleviate.  In order to understand the nexus between America’s economic 
problems and Hamilton’s economic solutions, one needs to understand Hamilton’s analysis of 
the nation’s economy.  Furthermore, to understand the opposition to Hamilton’s economic 
proposals, one needs to understand the influence of specific political and economic perceptions 
behind the constitutional arguments presented against Hamilton’s proposals.  Finally, the entire 
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event, in all of its contextual understanding, needs to be viewed as part of the much larger 
picture, that of the adaptive work required in changed values and focal points of primary 
allegiances in the movement from colonies to states to a nation.  All of the preceding viewpoints 
were represented in the debates inasmuch as the key players, having witnessed the adaptive work 
described, held a continuum of viewpoints reflecting that period of development. 
 The first constitutional argument involved three Virginians who were opposed by an 
immigrant from the West Indies residing in New York.  First, the Virginians:  James Madison, a 
member of the House of Representatives; Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State; and Edmund 
Randolph, Attorney General.  The immigrant opposing this distinguished trio of native sons was 
Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury, who had fought in the Revolution and had 
attended the Constitutional Convention as one of New York’s delegates.  Between the two of 
them, Hamilton and Madison authored 90% of the eighty-five numbered articles comprising The 
Federalist.28  They parted company, however, over Hamilton’s proposals for ensuring the 
stability and prosperity of the new country’s economy. 
 Hamilton’s economic proposals for america: The context of the economy. 
 To understand Hamilton’s proposals, one needs first to understand the condition of the 
American political economy in the aftermath of the American Revolution and the Articles of 
Confederation.   
In theory, the financing of the war was to have been simple – the states 
supplying the funds and the Continental Congress disbursing them; but in 
practice both the states and Congress had spent large sums directly and on 
their own initiative.  (McDonald, 1979, p. 144) 
 
During the war, Congress issued unsecured paper money, bonds in the form of loan office 
certificates, and promissory notes for supplying and paying the army.  The paper money alone 
had a “gross face value of more than $200 million,” but had depreciated to almost nothing “and 
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had been officially devalued at a ratio of 40 to 1” (McDonald, 1979, p. 147).  The value of the 
loan certificates had been adjusted to approximately $11 million while the “army-related debts, 
originally a nightmare of confusion,” had been “’liquidated’ by the issuance of new certificates” 
(McDonald, 1979, p. 147).  By 1789, “about $16 million in army certificates and related 
securities remained outstanding” (McDonald, 1979, p. 148).  According to noted economic 
historian, Forrest McDonald, “Existing arrangements for servicing these debts ranged from 
nearly adequate to nonexistent” (McDonald, 1979, p. 147).  Not only were many debts still 
outstanding, the interest payments on the existing debts were not being paid.  “Outstanding 
arrears of interest on the various forms of national debt was $13 million, making a grand total ... 
of about $40 million” (McDonald, 1979, p. 148).     
 As if the various paper debts of Congress were not problematic enough, the war debts of 
the various states further compounded the country’s economic problems.  By the end of 1789 the 
combined debts of the states were estimated by Hamilton to be somewhere “between $21 and 
$25 million” (PAH, 6: 119).  The responses of the states to their own debts further complicated 
an already tangled web of state war debts.  Some states had no existing debts while others had 
“enormous debts by the end of the war” (McDonald, 1979, p. 148).   
Some, Massachusetts and South Carolina for instance, attempted to manage 
their debts honorably but proved unable to collect the high taxes they levied 
to service them and thus remained deeply in debt in 1789.  On the other 
extreme, Rhode Island, Virginia, and North Carolina employed more or less 
fraudulent means to retire a large part of their obligations.  In between were 
those few states that proved both able and willing to service their debts on a 
fair and equitable basis.  (McDonald, 1979, p. 148) 
 
 Finally, there remained the matter of foreign loans.  Over the course of the Revolutionary 
War, the United States received slightly more than $10 million in foreign loans (McDonald, 
1979, p. 145).  Rounded off, the loans were: 
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• $4.4 million from the French royal treasury; 
• $1.8 from Dutch bankers that was guaranteed by the French government; 
• $3.6 million directly from Dutch bankers that was not guaranteed by a friendly 
government; and 
• $175,000 from the royal treasury of Spain. 
Compounding the problem of foreign loans, “the United States was $1.6 million in arrears for 
interest payments on these various loans and nearly $1.4 million in arrears on scheduled 
repayments of principal.  Additional repayments of principal were falling due at a rate of 
$463,000 a year” (McDonald, 1979, p. 145).  As one historian noted of the young country’s 
economic situation, “The Americans were oppressed by all manner of debts, and the means of 
paying them seemed to be lacking” (Brogan, p. 194).  He concluded that “[p]ublic credit was 
exhausted” (Brogan, p. 195).  Another historian summarized the Revolution and its aftermath 
more cogently: 
In the early days of the Revolution, when patriotic enthusiasm was sufficient 
to sustain the cause, Congress had had credit in abundance.  But the supply 
of public credit based upon goodwill was soon exhausted; ordinary 
Americans and their duly elected representatives, it turned out, loved liberty 
so dearly that they were willing to pay for it with anybody’s dollars but their 
own.  Consequently, the public had earned a credibility rating of nearly zero.  
(McDonald, 1979, p. 143) 
 
 Hamilton’s economic proposals for america: Hamilton’s analysis & proposals. 
 The major task facing Hamilton as the first Secretary of the Treasury under the 
Constitution was a daunting challenge – bringing order to the young republic’s finances.  
Hamilton’s analysis of the nation’s condition and needs merited this historical description: 
He was in any case determined to provide for these men [a dynamic 
merchant class] a national economic context in which their energies could 
function.  That context should include capital in mobilizable form, readily 
accessible credit both foreign and domestic, a stable currency for the 
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transaction of business, and government encouragement for the kinds of 
enterprise that would be of greatest benefit to the entire community.  (Elkins 
& McKitrick, p. 116) 
 
The historians continued their summary of Hamilton’s analysis: 
Parallel with Hamilton’s projection for America as a society was one for the 
United States as a government.  The government required a sound system of 
taxation, undoubted stability of credit both national and international, an 
orderly funding of the several complicated layers of public indebtedness that 
had grown out of the Revolution, and a banking institution to provide a 
dependable circulating medium and to manage the government’s day-to-day 
fiscal affairs.  The carrying through of both these projections would result in 
a nation strengthened in every possible way.  (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 116) 
 
Hamilton laid out his proposals for the nation’s political economy over the course of a year in a 
series of reports to two sessions of Congress.  The dates, titles, and subject matter (second and 
third reports only) follow: 
January 9, 1790 “Report on the Public Credit” (PAH, 6, p. 65-168) 
December 13, 1790 “First Report on the Further Provision Necessary for 
Establishing Public Credit” [Taxation] (PAH, 7, pp. 
210-236) 
December 14, 1790 “Second Report on the Further Provision Necessary for 
Establishing Public Credit” [Bank of the United States] (PAH, 7, 
pp. 236-342) 
January 28, 1791 “Report on the Establishment of a Mint” (PAH, 7, pp. 462-607) 
 While discussing Hamilton’s analysis and proposals for America’s political economy, 
one historian observed, “His understanding of the economic forces at work in the world was 
profound, and he relied on them to build up the United States” (Brogan, p. 264).  Part of that 
understanding was based on a research technique that “Hamilton more or less invented” in order 
to get accurate information about a variety of economic activities (McDonald, 1979, p. 139).  
   
   
284
Beginning in October of 1789, Hamilton “conducted a large-scale socioeconomic research 
project using questionnaires” with the first questionnaires being sent to customs collectors at the 
various ports and financial centers (McDonald, 1979, p. 139).  As a result, his “storehouse of 
information placed his understanding [of the nation’s economy] qualitatively beyond [anyone 
else’s] reach” (McDonald, 1979, p. 140).  A major part of Hamilton’s understanding of the ways 
in which economic forces worked was gained from reading a wide variety of economic writings, 
both theoretical and practical, and from studying the economic institutions of other countries, 
e.g., the Bank of England.  Major theoretical influences included the Scottish thinkers, David 
Hume and Adam Smith, and Jacques Necker, the French Minister of Finance.  Writing well 
before the term “systems thinking” became widespread in graduate schools, Necker had written, 
“Administrative genius [is] the capacity to perceive, simultaneously, the whole of a system and 
the relations of all its parts to one another and to the whole, and to discern instantly the effects of 
a change in any of the parts” (McDonald, 1979, p. 135).29  As to how Hamilton applied Necker’s 
concept, two other historians, writing about the genesis of Hamilton’s proposals for the 
American political economy, unwittingly supplied the answer.  First, they set the stage: 
As to how it [Hamilton’s economic designs] evolved, the process may 
perhaps be pictured as going on at two levels.  One was the level of theory 
and imagination, that of the conception in its total sweep.  The other was 
that of practical detail and of specific choices (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 115) 
 
Next, they provided an explanation: 
There is a characteristic device of Hamilton’s mind which is discernible at 
almost every stage of his reasoning, and seems also to furnish the key to 
certain of his critical choices in the translation of theoretical predilections 
into practical policy.  The device is that of the projection: an ordering of 
facts and circumstances into patterns which present conditions have not as 
yet made actual but which future ones will.  (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 115) 
 
Finally, they provided an example: 
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On the very highest plane, Hamilton’s imagination was dominated by a 
projection of what America could and ought to become [the interaction of 
multiple systems].  It was a vision ... of economic growth and economic 
development.  The potential for growth – an expanding population, limitless 
natural resources, vast tracts awaiting tillage, a vigorous people – was 
certainly there.  The problem was one of execution, of how the potential was 
to be made real.  Up to this time there had been two massive difficulties 
[each representing a system].  One was political in nature, the question of a 
government with the power to act.  This had been for the most part solved 
[with the adoption of the Constitution].  The other difficulty was economic.  
It was this challenge – that of how the economic energies of the people 
might best be mobilized – that Hamilton now intended to meet, to the extent 
that the initiative of the United States Treasury could shape the result.  
(Elkins & McKitrick, p. 115) 
 
 Hamilton’s economic proposals for america: Phase one. 
 So what exactly did Hamilton propose to restore the nation’s credit and its financial 
credibility?  Despite rumors that the young country should repudiate its debts, Hamilton 
proposed to not only honor the national debts, but also to fund them.  Funding the debt meant a 
number of things.30  First, the debts would be refinanced.  Second, the debts would have first 
priority on government revenues that in effect provided a guarantee of payment, particularly of 
interest payments, which made refinancing both more credible and attractive to financiers and 
foreign bankers.  Third, funding the debt left the decision about when (sooner, later, or never) to 
retire the principal to the government’s discretion.  Fourth, not immediately paying the principal 
avoided draining a limited supply of money; in effect, monetization of the public debt increased 
the availability of money for all economic classes.  Fifth, and critically important, funding the 
national debt enhanced the nation’s credit rating with foreign banks, particularly the Dutch, who 
at that time were the major financiers in Europe.    
 Next, Hamilton proposed that the national government assume responsibility for the debts 
incurred by the states in prosecuting the Revolutionary War.  In effect, this would bind all state 
creditors to the new republic’s government.  It also placed all of the states on a similar economic 
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footing regarding war indebtedness.  Hamilton had some political and legal justification for 
assumption. 
From the very beginning there had been the understanding, which was 
written into the Articles of Confederation, that the costs of the Revolution 
were to be borne by the United States in its character as a national 
government and not by the several states acting individually.  (Elkins & 
McKitrick, p. 119) 
 
In subsequent reports Hamilton proposed tariffs and excise taxes to provide funds for the 
national treasury, a mint to coin money, and a Bank of the United States to facilitate government 
financing and the collection of revenues.  Of Hamilton’s proposals, two aroused political 
opposition – the assumption of state war debts and the bank.  The latter, because of politics, 
devolved into constitutional arguments.  But first, the opposition to the assumption of state debts 
by the national government will be discussed because the settlement of that issue became 
intertwined with the constitutional issues being raised as part of the political opposition to the 
bank.  Virginians played critical roles in both issues. 
 The assumption of state debts was not quite as simple as it might seem on the face of it.  
While debts indeed were incurred, there was also the matter of reimbursement by the national 
government for state expenditures related to the war effort that didn’t necessarily involve state 
borrowing for the funds.  Both issues intertwined.  The situation was both tangled and complex; 
insisting “upon strict and uniform accounting procedures” as an approach to settling the issue of 
reimbursement to states for their war-effort expenditures was “hopelessly impracticable,” 
according to two historians of the period (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 119).  They explained: 
In case after case the line between expenditures authorized by the 
Continental Congress and those not so authorized could not be maintained.  
Some states had spent money on expeditions that were not authorized but 
turned out to be very useful; others had assumed expenses that properly 
belonged to the Continental government; many of the southern states – 
Virginia in particular – had either failed to keep proper records or else had 
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lost them as a result of British invasions.  Finally, the size of the 
expenditures as well as the mode of financing them had varied considerably 
from state to state.  Massachusetts, Virginia, and South Carolina all claimed 
very large expenditures.  Massachusetts had kept careful records but wanted 
credit for a major undertaking ... which had not been authorized....  
Virginian could show little evidence for what that state had expended in its 
struggle to repel the British invasions of 1779-80.  (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 
119) 
 
“To make matters still more complex,” the historians continued, 
Virginia had by 1789 paid off a large part of its state debts while South 
Carolina and Massachusetts were still burdened by huge debts which they 
had no wish to scale down but which, with their limited tax resources, they 
could not continue to support.  (Elkins & McKitrick, pp. 119-120) 
 
Hamilton’s plan to assume debts also accepted all state expenditures in support of the war effort, 
whether authorized by Congress or not, which offered something to everyone.  States would be 
credited for expenditures, debited for their share of the national defense, and those states that 
emerged as creditors at the end of the process would “receive a final compensation from the 
federal government” (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 120).   
 Hamilton’s economic proposals for america: Political opposition to phase one. 
 Opposition to Hamilton’s proposals existed, however, despite their promise for 
establishing a sound public credit for the nation.  As one historian described the situation, “In 
Congress there were two sets of ready-made enemies of Hamilton’s proposals.  One can be 
loosely described as the frontier faction, consisting of representatives from Georgia, the back 
country of South Carolina and Pennsylvania, and northern New Hampshire” (McDonald, 1979, 
p. 173).  Most were anti-federalists and suspicious of strong national governments.  An economic 
bond also united them as “nearly all were engaged in trying to make a fortune through the 
purchase of state-owned lands with depreciated public securities” (McDonald, 1979, p. 174).  
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Hamilton’s plan to assume state debts would raise the market price of the public securities, thus 
spoiling “these speculators’ lucrative game” (McDonald, 1979, p. 174).   
 The remaining set of Hamilton’s “ready-made enemies” consisted of “special-interest 
politicians based in the tobacco-growing regions of Maryland, Virginia, and tidewater North 
Carolina” who were led by James Madison (McDonald, 1979, pp. 173 & 174).  Although most of 
the tobacco-growing legislators agreed that the nation needed strong public credit and that 
Hamilton’s proposals would help secure that result, “they were prepared to drive a hard bargain, 
to demand particular advantages for their region as the price for allowing the funding system to 
become law” (McDonald, 1979, p. 175). 
Putting their special interests ahead of national interest was habitual with 
planters in the tobacco belt, and just now they had compelling reasons for 
doing so: early frosts had wiped out half the tobacco crop, and the bizarre 
money market prevented tobacco prices from rising enough to make up 
more than a fraction of the losses.  In those circumstances, they were in no 
mood to pay taxes for the support of a public debt of which they held but 
little.  They were even less eager to have the settlement of state accounts 
divorced from politics, for that would cost them millions.  (McDonald, 
1979, p. 175) 
 
The hard bargain, as it turned out, consisted of permanently locating the nation’s capital on the 
Potomac in return for supporting Hamilton’s initial proposal to establish the nation’s public 
credit.  Not so coincidentally, Madison and a fellow Virginian, Henry Lee, had spent £4,000 
pounds acquiring lands on the Potomac where they hoped the capital city would be located 
(McDonald, 1979, p. 175).  On June 20, 1790 Thomas Jefferson hosted a dinner meeting for 
Hamilton, Madison, and himself after having brokered a compromise with Senator Robert Morris 
on temporarily moving the capital from New York to Philadelphia where it would remain for a 
period of time before being permanently moved to the Potomac in return for Senate passage of 
assumption (McDonald, 1979, p. 184).  At the dinner meeting a quid pro quo was arranged 
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whereby Madison would find the votes necessary in the House for Hamilton’s assumption 
proposal, Hamilton would find the necessary extra votes in the Senate to remove the capital from 
New York to its temporary home in Philadelphia, and Hamilton would “help the Virginians 
obtain a better financial deal for their state” regarding their expenditures during the Revolution 
(McDonald, 1979, pp. 184 & 185).   
 Had Hamilton’s proposal for resurrecting the nation’s public credit not been enacted, the 
consequences could have been dire.  The government’s only source of revenue was the 1789 
tariff that constituted the nation’s only tax.  It would not have generated enough revenue to 
service the foreign debt, the domestic debt, nor meet the yearly expenses of government.  
Servicing only the foreign debt cost in excess of “$1 million a year” which would have taken 
most of the funds generated by the tariff (McDonald, 1979, pp. 145 &146).  Hamilton had 
already sought “a postponement of the debts due France” (McDonald, 1979, p. 146).  An 
economic historian summarized Hamilton’s thinking about the possible disaster and how to avert 
it. 
If the United States could be temporarily freed from that obligation, it could 
quickly bring itself up to date with its Dutch banking creditors and thus be 
in a position to negotiate a new loan in Holland large enough to repay all its 
foreign debts.  That done, the annual interest would be only $500,000 to 
$600,000, an entirely manageable sum.  (McDonald, 1979, p. 146) 
 
A solid credit rating was necessary, however, before the Dutch bankers could be approached.  
When analyzing the domestic debts, both of the nation and of the states, an additional 
complicating factor emerged.  After the Constitution had been approved, which stipulated that 
Congress now had taxing power, Dutch bankers began buying up huge quantities of depreciated 
securities.  All parts of Hamilton’s proposal for public credit  interlocked, i.e., funding the debt, 
assumption, etc., so that without any one part, the whole was bound to fail.  Certainly, “without 
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the Dutch all hope of establishing public credit would have been forlorn” (McDonald, 1979, p. 
177).  Congress, however, eventually enacted all the critical pieces of Hamilton’s proposal for 
establishing public credit.  One piece of the quid pro quo dinner party arrangement (locating the 
capital permanently on the Potomac) that facilitated this achievement would be responsible, 
however, for escalating a political disagreement about the United States Bank into a 
constitutional argument. 
 Hamilton’s economic proposals for america: Phase two. 
  On August 12, 1791, Congress adjourned.  Prior to leaving the House had passed a 
resolution instructing Hamilton to make further reports on the nation’s public credit, “by which it 
was understood that he would draw up plans fur further taxes and for a national bank” 
(McDonald, 1979, p. 188).  The House expected Hamilton to have the reports ready when they 
reconvened in December in their new temporary capital, Philadelphia.   To increase government 
revenues, Hamilton drew up plans for a graduated system of excise taxes to be levied on 
alcoholic beverages.  He also began drafting a report for the national mint that would be located 
in Philadelphia.  The bank served as the final piece of Hamilton’s plan for America’s economic 
system.  And it was a system that Hamilton had in mind, all parts working cooperatively to 
promote the country’s economic health.  One analyst commented, “Hamilton saw things 
differently, and from more perspectives, than other men did” (McDonald, 1979, p. 189).  To 
illustrate his point, he provided two contrasting views of the public debt.  First, the commonly 
held view: 
[T]he public debt had been an enormous number of pieces of paper, 
representing pledges of various American governments to pay various 
amounts to the bearers, if and when government should so decide, and to 
pay a stipulated rate of interest in the meantime.  Until 1790 each of the 
governments that coped with those pieces of paper regarded them negatively 
and directed its efforts toward retiring them in one way or another.  As a 
   
   
291
consequence, the paper was a national burden, politically divisive and 
economically destructive.  (McDonald, 1979, p. 189) 
 
And now, Hamilton’s view of the public debt: 
Viewing the problem differently, Hamilton brought about funding, 
assumption, and the sinking fund, which transformed the paper into a form 
of capital.  Moreover, a huge amount of new capital was created into the 
bargain: the market value of the paper a few months before Hamilton took 
office had been less than $15 million; by the end of 1790 it was about $45 
million.  Thus $30 million in liquid capital had been manufactured, as it 
were, out of thin air.  Indeed, the new capital was made of stuff even more 
ephemeral: all that happened was that the public, instilled with illusions and 
expectations, changed its opinion about the value of those pieces of paper.  
(McDonald, 1979, p. 189) 
 
 Hamilton’s plans for funding the debt had created “a pool of liquid capital for economic 
development;” however, to help the capital operate for its intended purpose, an additional step 
was required (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 226).  There needed to be 
An arrangement whereby it should be to the advantage of individual 
security-holders to place both securities and specie at the disposal of a 
public institution – thereby achieving a new level of concentration – that 
could make these resources accessible to the entire mercantile community.  
This, Hamilton believed, could be achieved by the creation of a large 
national bank.  (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 226) 
 
The bank that Hamilton proposed would render a number of important services to both the 
government and the business world.  The Bank of the United States  
would serve as the government’s chief fiscal agent, assisting in the 
collection of taxes, the disbursement and transfer of funds, and the provision 
of immediate short-term credit whenever needed.  A ready source of funds, 
moreover, would be present in time of national emergency.  The bank’s 
notes would provide a universally acceptable and convenient currency for an 
economy traditionally short of specie.  Of special importance, however, was 
that by means of its capital base of specie and federal securities … the bank 
could provide to the mercantile community a large, dependable, and 
convenient source of credit for expanding business projects.  (Elkins & 
McKitrick, p. 226) 
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  In writing the proposal for the bank he envisioned, Hamilton made extensive use of the 
Bank of England, even to the point of copying the English bank’s charter verbatim in places 
(McDonald, 1979, p. 194; Elkins & McKitrick, p. 227).  However, the two banks differed in 
important respects which one historian attributed to “Hamilton’s study of Necker’s experiences 
in France” (McDonald, 1979, p. 194).  “The Bank of England was designed solely as an 
instrument of public finance.  Its capital consisted exclusively of public debt” (McDonald, 1979, 
p. 194).  The English banks commercial relations were “secondary to its functions as an 
instrument of government” (McDonald, 1979, pp. 194-195).  In contrast, “only three-fifths of the 
[U.S.] bank’s total capital should consist of government securities, rather than all of it as was the 
case with the Bank of England” (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 227).  In Hamilton’s design, the bank’s 
“main function would be to provide a large, stable, but flexible national money supply for the 
financing of ordinary business and general economic development” (McDonald, 1979, p. 195). 
Moreover, Hamilton insisted that it be operated for the private profit of its 
stockholders, thus making it in the interest of the stockholders to run it 
properly.  If it were operated as an instrument of public policy, the 
temptation toward abuse through fiscally unsound practices would, soon or 
late, prove irresistible to people in government.  (McDonald, 1979, p. 195) 
 
Hamilton further intertwined the bank with assumption, the funded debt, and sound public credit 
through his proposal for purchasing shares in the Bank of the United States.  Government 
securities, whether national or state, would be accepted at face value with payment for the bank 
shares made at a ratio of “three-fourths in securities to one-fourth in specie” (Elkins & 
McKitrick, p. 226). 
 Hamilton’s economic proposals for america: Political opposition to phase two. 
 Like Hamilton’s previous proposal for the assumption of state war debts, the Bank 
became entangled with the issue of the permanent location of the nation’s capital on the Potomac 
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that was scheduled to occur in 1800.  The Bank was to be located in Philadelphia, described by 
one historian as being, at that time, “the first city of America” (Bowen, p. 21).  The largest city in 
the nation in 1790 with a population exceeding 45,000, Philadelphia was more than a quarter 
larger than its nearest rival, New York City (Rossiter, p. 25).  After London, Philadelphia was 
Great Britain’s second largest city, described as “the most prosperous and populous city of the 
colonies (Knaver, p. 54).  Moreover, it had patriotic prestige, having served as the seat of both 
the First Continental Congress in 1774 and the Constitutional Convention in 1987.  Finally, the 
Declaration of Independence, the country’s original charter, had been signed in Philadelphia’s 
Independence Hall in 1776.  These factors combined to inspire fear on the part of the Virginians 
and other southerners that the compromise regarding assumption and the permanent location of 
the nation’s capital on the Potomac might be threatened.  The combination of the city’s prestige 
and the influence of such a powerful institution as the Bank could operate as a force for keeping 
the national capital in Philadelphia.  Such fears were given legitimacy by two developments.  
First, when Madison and Jefferson arrived in Philadelphia, “they were shocked to hear the 
Pennsylvania members of Congress declare openly ‘that they never intended to aid in a removal’ 
of the capital to the Potomac” (McDonald, 1979, p. 200).  Second, “the Pennsylvania House of 
Representatives voted to appropriate money to build permanent buildings for the federal 
government in Philadelphia,” a measure that was later not approved by the state’s other 
legislative chamber (McDonald, 1979, p. 200). 
 James Madison, having a sizable financial investment to safeguard, a political reputation 
to protect, and Virginia’s interests to defend, served as the leader of the forces opposing the Bank 
(Elkins & McKitrick, p. 229; McDonald, 1979, pp. 199-200).  When the Senate sent the bank bill 
to the House, it was read on two separate occasions during which Madison made no objections to 
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the proposed bank.  Working behind the scenes, Madison first sought to limit the Bank’s charter 
to ten years so it would expire approximately at the same time the capital was to be relocated to 
the Potomac (McDonald, 1979, p. 200).   Seeking to work out a compromise, “Madison 
approached the Pennsylvania delegation and offered unconditional southern support for the bank 
if only Pennsylvania would join with the South in insisting upon a ten instead of a twenty year 
charter” (Bowling, p. 235).  During the political maneuvering between Madison and the 
Pennsylvania legislators, Madison threatened to attack the bank on constitutional grounds should 
the Pennsylvanians not agree to the proposed compromise (Bowling, p. 235; Elkins & 
McKitrick, p. 229; McDonald, p. 200).  One historian described Pennsylvania’s reaction to 
Madison’s offer and threat: “The Pennsylvanians, however were obdurate; and besides, they 
distrusted the Virginians, fearing that in their eagerness to prepare the permanent site they would 
deny Philadelphia even its agreed-upon ten years” (McDonald, 1979, p. 200).  Perhaps the 
Pennsylvanians were also aware that the supporters of the Bank “outnumbered its opponents by 
about two to one in the House and three to one in the Senate” (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 228). 
Hamilton’s economic proposals for america: Madison’s constitutional objections to 
phase two. 
 
 And so the constitutional question was raised, not because of any grave constitutional 
concerns, but for political reasons (see Appendix J).  Madison made good on his threat and 
attacked the bank bill on constitutional grounds in the House on Wednesday, February 2, 1791 
(Benton, I, p. 274).  After discussing both the advantages and disadvantages of banks, he 
observed that the Constitutional Convention had considered including the “power to grant 
charters of incorporation” as one of the enumerated powers, but that proposal had been 
“rejected” (Benton, I, p. 275).  Having raised the constitutional issue, Madison then phrased the 
question to be examined: “Is the power of establishing an incorporated bank among the powers 
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vested by the constitution in the Legislature of the United States” (Benton, I, p. 275)?  After 
reviewing the Constitution, Madison continued, he had been able to discover only three clauses 
“under which such a power could be pretended” (Benton, I, p. 275).  They were: “[t]he power to 
lay and collect taxes,” “[t]he power to borrow money,” and “[t]he power to pass all laws 
necessary and proper to carry into execution those powers” (Benton, I, p. 275).   
 Subsequent to discussing the first two powers and argumentatively demonstrating how he 
didn’t think they applied to the proposed bank bill, Madison came to the Necessary and Proper 
Clause of the Constitution.  It was here that Madison articulated the “Strict Construction Theory” 
of how the Constitution should be interpreted.  First, Madison observed, the Constitution was a 
“grant of particular powers only” by “which the Federal Government is limited” (Benton, I, p. 
275).   Any interpretation “that destroys the very characteristic of the Government cannot be 
just” (Benton, I, p. 275).  Furthermore, Madison noted, the general purposes of government 
“were limited and explained by the particular enumeration subjoined” (Benton, I, p. 275).  
Madison continued, “To understand these terms [necessary and proper] in any sense that would 
justify the power in question, would give to congress an unlimited power; would render nugatory 
the enumeration of particular powers; would supersede all the powers reserved to the State 
Governments” (Benton, I, p. 275).   No interpretation of the meaning of necessary and proper 
“can be admitted, that would give an unlimited discretion to Congress.  Its meaning must, 
according to the natural and obvious of the terms and the context, be limited to means necessary 
to the end” (Benton, I, p. 276).  Madison continued his exposition: 
The essential characteristic of the Government, as composed of limited and 
enumerated powers, would be destroyed, if, instead of direct and incidental 
means, any means could be used, which, in the language of the preamble to 
the bill,  “might be conceived to be conducive to the successful conducting 
of the finances, or might be conceived to tend to give facility to the 
obtaining of loans.”  (Benton, I, p. 276) 
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Since the bill in question neither levied taxes nor borrowed money, both of which were 
enumerated powers of the national government, there was nothing to which “necessary and 
proper” could be connected.  Finally, Madison warned of the dangers of treading down the 
slippery path of implied powers:  “The doctrine of implication is always a tender one.  The 
danger of it has been felt in other Governments.  The delicacy was felt in the adoption of our 
own; the danger may also be felt if we do not keep close to our chartered authorities” (Benton, I, 
p. 276).   
 One week later, on February 8, 1791, Madison summarized his position: “The power of 
granting charters is a great and important power, and ought not to be exercised unless we find 
ourselves expressly authorized to grant them” (Benton, I, p. 306).  Regarding the “constructions 
of the constitution” by the bill’s advocates that rested on the necessary and proper clause, 
Madison declared that they went “to the subversion of every power whatever in the several 
States” (Benton, I, p. 307).   
Hamilton’s economic proposals for america: Madison’s constitutional objections 
analyzed according to his previous record. 
 
 In rising to attack the bank bill as the self-proclaimed champion of strict construction, 
Madison contradicted his own previously consistent record of advocating for a broad 
interpretation focused on the doctrine of implied powers (e.g., the President’s power to remove 
cabinet officials, expanding the census, articulating the doctrine of implied powers regarding the 
Articles in 1781, advocating implied powers in constructing the meaning of the Constitution in 
Federalist No. 44, and by carefully preserving the doctrine of implied powers in framing the 
Tenth Amendment).  Even more awkwardly (in regards to the timing of his turnaround), he had 
only recently supported the doctrine of implied powers regarding the power of the president to 
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remove cabinet officials.  This occurred during congressional debates centered on creating the 
executive departments of the new government in 1789.  The only method of removal provided by 
the Constitution was impeachment.  Madison “countered with the commonsense argument that 
the power to appoint inherently carried with it the power of removal” (McDonald, 1979, p. 130).  
Eventually congressional legislation creating the executive departments granted exclusive 
removal power to the President, largely on the strength of Madison’s arguments that the power to 
remove was implied in the expressly-stated constitutional power to appoint cabinet officials.31 
 As will be further shown, Madison had a long and consistent history of supporting the 
doctrine of implied powers before he uttered his remarkable statements in Congress challenging 
the constitutionality of the proposed First Bank of the United States.  Even more recently than 
the issue of the President’s removal power over cabinet officials, Madison had been a leading 
proponent of expanding the census beyond the constitutional requirements.  Article I, § 2 of the 
Constitution required that an enumeration be made every ten years of the “whole Number of free 
Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, 
three fifths of all other Persons.”  On January 25, 1790, Madison proposed that the census bill be 
“extended so as to embrace some other objects besides the bare enumeration of the inhabitants” 
in order to enable legislators “to adapt the public measures to the particular circumstances of the 
community” (Hobson & Rutland, 13, p. 8; hereafter cited as PJM).  The next day Madison 
presented a “particular schedule” to be attached to the census bill that “included categories for 
landowners, merchants, manufacturers, ‘artificers,’ sailors, and a variety of tradesmen” (PJM, 13, 
p. 9, n. 1).  On February 2, 1790, Madison responded to objections that his proposal for the 
census was “impracticable” by declaring there would be “more difficulty … taking the census in 
the way required by the constitution, and which we are obliged to perform” than there would be 
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with the added “distinctions contemplated in the bill” because the additional information would 
allow legislators “to accommodate our laws to the real situation of our constituents” (PJM, 13, p. 
15).   
 Madison had first articulated a loose construction of the Articles of Confederation that 
focused upon the doctrine of implied powers on March 12, 1781, in discussing a proposal to 
amend the Articles.  Madison began by citing what he regarded to be a pertinent section of the 
Articles: 
Whereas it is stipulated and declared in the 13th. [sic] Article of the 
Confederation “that every State shall abide by the determinations of the 
United States in Congress assembled on all questions which by this 
Confederation are submitted to them.  And that the Articles of this 
Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State.”  (Hutchinson & 
Rachal, III, p. 17; hereafter cited as PJM) 
 
Madison then continued by using the phrase “implied power” for the first time in his career, 
according to Hutchinson & Rachal (PJM, III, p. 19, n. 2): 
[B]y which Arti[c]le [sic] a general and implied power is vested in the 
United States in Congress assembled to enforce and carry into effect all the 
Articles of the said Confederation against any of the States which shall 
refuse or neglect to abide by such determinations, or shall otherwise violate 
any of the said Articles, but no determinate and particular provision is made 
for that purpose.  (PJM, III, pp. 17-18) 
 
Madison reiterated his thinking regarding implied powers in a letter to Thomas Jefferson on 
April 16, 1781: 
If they [a state or states] should refuse [to comply with a measure passed by 
Congress], Congress will be in a worse situation than at present: for as the 
confederation now stands, and according to the nature even of alliances 
much less intimate, there is an implied right of coer[c]io[n] [sic] against the 
delinquent party, and the exercise of it by Congress whenever a palpable 
necessity occurs will probably be acquiesced in.  (PJM, III, p. 72) 
 
 Even more fundamentally, in a constitutional sense, Madison enshrined the doctrine of 
implied powers in The Federalist.  Madison devoted Numbers 41-44 of The Federalist to a 
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discussion of “The Powers Conferred by the Constitution” (Federalist No. 41, p. 223).  He 
discerned six classes “of provisions in favor of the federal authority” which he discussed in detail 
in Nos. 41-44 (Federalist No. 44, p. 248).  The Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution 
belonged to the sixth class, according to Madison’s delineation of federal power derived from the 
Constitution.  As Madison expressed it, “Without the substance of this power, the whole 
Constitution would be a dead letter” (Federalist No. 44, p. 252).  Regarding the possibility of a 
strict construction, Madison observed: 
They [the members of the Constitutional Convention] might have copied the 
second article of the existing Confederation, which would have prohibited 
the exercise of any power not expressly delegated; they might have 
attempted a positive enumeration of the powers comprehended under the 
general terms ‘necessary and proper’; … (Federalist No. 44, p. 252). 
 
Madison then proceeded to lay out the consequences of such actions, had the Framers been so 
unwise to adopt them.  Regarding the possibility of including the phrase “expressly delegated,” 
Madison spelled out the possible repercussions in detail: 
[I]t is evident that the new Congress would be continually exposed, as their 
predecessors have been, to the alternative of construing the term “expressly” 
with so much rigor as to disarm the government of all real authority 
whatever, or with so much latitude as to destroy altogether the force of the 
restriction.  (Federalist No. 44, p. 252) 
 
At this point, Madison introduced his understanding of implied powers derived from his own 
(and others’) prior experience as a congressman: 
It would be easy to show, if it were necessary, that no important power 
delegated by the Articles of Confederation has been or can be executed by 
Congress, without recurring more or less to the doctrine of construction or 
implication.  (Federalist No. 44, p. 252) 
 
And now, Madison applied implied powers to the government proposed by the Constitution: 
As the powers delegated under the new system are more extensive, the 
government which is to administer it would find itself still more distressed 
with the alternative of betraying the public interests by doing nothing, or of 
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violating the Constitution by exercising powers indispensably necessary and 
proper, but, at the same time, not expressly granted.  (Federalist No. 44, p. 
252) 
 
As for the notion that powers needed to be explicitly enumerated in order to be exercised by the 
federal government, Madison showed the ridiculousness of such an idea by observing: 
Had the convention attempted a positive enumeration of the powers 
necessary and proper for carrying their other powers into effect, the attempt 
would have involved a complete digest of laws on every subject to which 
the Constitution relates; accommodated too not only to the existing state of 
things, but to all the possible changes which futurity may produce…  
(Federalist No. 44, pp. 252-253) 
 
Madison then concluded with the nucleus of what would become the classical interpretation of 
implied powers when subsequently articulated by Alexander Hamilton and Chief Justice John 
Marshall: 
No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever 
the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to 
do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included.  
(Federalist No. 44, p. 253) 
 
 Even more fundamentally, in a constitutional sense, Madison had carefully preserved the 
doctrine of implied powers through his crafting of the Tenth Amendment.  He purposely did not 
include the term “expressly” in the Tenth Amendment.32  Otherwise, the amendment would have 
read, “The powers not expressly delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people” (Emphasis 
added). 
Hamilton’s economic proposals for america: Congressional reactions to madison’s 
constitutional objections. 
 
 If Madison had thought his stature as a member of the Constitutional Convention and as a 
leading expositor of the document would help sway fellow legislators to his point of view 
regarding the bank bill, he was in for a rude jolt.  Massachusetts Representative Fisher Ames first 
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arose in response to Madison.  Given the fact that the bill had undergone two readings in the 
House without any objection from Madison, Ames posed the question, “Why, then, did he suffer 
the bill to pass the committee in silence” (Benton, I, p. 279)?  Ames remarked that it was “rather 
late in the day to adopt [Madison’s doctrine of strict construction] as a principle of conduct” 
since “we have scarcely made a law in which we have not exercised our discretion with regard to 
the true intent of the constitution” (Benton, I, p. 279).  Ames then proceeded to provide an 
example of Congress having made “laws conformably to the powers plainly implied, though not 
expressed in the frame of Government” (Benton, I, p. 279): 
We may regulate trade; therefore we have taxed ships, erected light-houses, 
made laws to govern seamen, &c., because we say that they are the incidents 
to that power.  The most familiar and undisputed acts of legislation will 
show that we have adopted it as a safe rule of action, to legislate beyond the 
letter of the constitution.  (Benton, I, p. 279) 
 
Of course, Madison had himself favored such legislation.  Regarding the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, Ames observed that “[h]e did not pretend that it gives any new powers;” instead the 
clause “establishes the doctrine of implied powers” (Benton, I, p. 282).  According to Ames, 
“That construction may be maintained to be a safe one which promotes the good of society, and 
the ends for which the Government was adopted, without impairing the rights of any man or the 
powers of any State” (Benton, I, p. 280). 
 Next, Theodore Sedgwick, also of Massachusetts, rose in response to Madison.  After 
remarking that he had not thought that either the constitutionality or the usefulness of a national 
bank “was doubted by any intelligent man in America,” Sedgwick raised the matter of Madison’s 
consistency regarding the doctrine of implied powers (Benton, I, p. 282): 
I do not wish to deprive that member of the honor of consistency; but I well 
remember the time when the energy of his [Madison’s] reasoning impressed 
on the minds of the majority of this House a conviction that the power of 
removal from office, holden at pleasure, was, by construction and 
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implication, vested by the constitution in the President; for there could be no 
pretence that it is expressly granted to him.  (Benton, I, p. 282) 
 
After connecting the bank’s purpose as a means to accomplish constitutionally “enumerated 
powers,” Sedgwick stated the separate purposes of constitutions and codes of law: 
[T]he constitution had expressly declared the ends of legislation; but in 
almost every instance had left the means to the honest and sober discretion 
of the Legislature.  From the nature of things this must ever be the case; for 
otherwise the constitution must contain not only all the necessary laws under 
the existing circumstances of the community, but also a code so extensive as 
to adapt itself to all future possible contingencies.  (Benton, I, p. 283) 
 
 One wonders how Madison felt when hearing the very arguments he had advanced in 
Federalist No. 44 being used against him (see Federalist No. 44, pp. 252-253).  Of course, at this 
particular juncture the authors of the various articles contained in The Federalist remained 
unknown (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 231).    The irony must have been heightened even more for 
Madison when Representative Elias Boudinot of New Jersey rose to speak and began reading 
extensive excerpts from Madison’s Federalist No. 44 to refute Madison’s changed position, most 
of which were “too long to be inserted” into the official record (Benton, I, p. 290).  At the time, 
however, speculation erroneously centered on Alexander Hamilton as the author of Federalist 
No. 44.33  The excerpts that were “too long to be inserted” into the record included three entire 
pages of Federalist No. 44 that included the most powerful argument offered by Madison for 
implied powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause, namely: 
No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever 
the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to 
do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included.  
(Federalist No. 44, p. 253; Benton, I, p. 290) 
 
 Not only did Madison hear his own arguments being persuasively used against him, he 
also had his “authority to pontificate about the intentions of the framers of the Constitution” 
questioned by two of his colleagues (McDonald, 1979, p. 201).  Elbridge Gerry of 
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Massachusetts, himself a member of the Constitutional Convention, after observing that Madison 
had “endeavored to support his interpretation of the constitution by the sense of the Federal 
Convention,” asked how such an action was “to be obtained” (Benton, I, p. 304)?  Gerry further 
asked, “[A]re we to depend on the memory of the gentleman for a history of their debates, and 
from thence to collect their sense” (Benton, I, p. 304)?  He concluded: 
This would be improper, because the memories of different gentlemen 
would probably vary, as they had already done, with respect to those facts; 
and if not, the opinions of the individual members who debated are not to be 
considered as the opinions of the Convention.  (Benton, I, p. 304) 
 
Gerry, as a member of the same convention that Madison attended, flatly contradicted Madison’s 
prior assertion that the Framers had rejected a measure for establishing a national bank. 
[N]o motion was made in that Convention, and therefore none could be 
rejected for establishing a National Bank; and the measure which the 
gentleman has referred to was a proposition merely to enable Congress to 
erect commercial corporations, which was, and always ought to be, 
negatived.  (Benton, I, p. 304) 
 
Gerry also questioned Madison’s consistency regarding the doctrine of implied powers, citing 
Madison’s persuasive advocacy for giving “the President the power of removing [cabinet] 
officers” as well as Madison’s advocacy for an interpretive rule whereby the President and 
Congress determined “when and where they should hold their next session, although the 
constitution provides that this power should rest solely in the two Houses” (Benton, I, p. 303).  
Representative John Vining of Delaware next rose to question Madison’s claim to know the 
sense of the Constitutional Convention regarding the proposed bank.  Suggesting that Madison’s 
opinion was unique among the congressional members who had attended the Constitutional 
Convention, Vining remarked that Madison’s opinion regarding the constitutionality of the bank 
bill was “different from that of his contemporaries” (Benton, I, p. 305).  Continuing, Vining 
noted that “a similar objection had not been started by those gentlemen of the Senate, who had 
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been members of the Convention” (Benton, I, p. 305).  Vining was referring to the eleven 
members of the Senate who had been delegates to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, 
none of whom entertained any constitutional doubts about the bank bill. 
 The Senate had approved the bank bill by a three-to-one margin before sending it to the 
House (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 228).  On Tuesday, February 8, 1791, following a motion by 
Madison to “move for the previous question,” the House also approved the bank bill, 39 to 20 
(Benton, I, p. 308).  According to one historian, “Nineteen of the twenty dissenting votes were 
from the South, twelve of them from the two states on the Potomac” (McDonald, 1979, p. 201).  
Not all southern legislators opposed the bank, but the vast majority of opposition to the bank 
came from southern members of Congress. 
 Southern states, engaged primarily in agricultural production, were generally suspicious 
of banks, a suspicion that was described as a “kind of country-party fundamentalism with regard 
to banks” (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 229).  According to Michael Stone, a representative from 
Maryland, “This Bank will swallow up the State banks; it will raise in this country a moneyed 
interest at the devotion of Government; it may bribe both States and individuals” (Benton, I, p. 
295).  Stone noted that the bill would all “a few stockholders [to] institute banks in particular 
States, to their aggrandizement and the oppression of others” (Benton, I, p. 295).  Representative 
James Jackson of Georgia alluded to the division in the House regarding the proposed bank that 
was represented by a “geographical line” and asked, “[W]here is the gentleman to the southward 
that is for it [the bank]” (Benton, I, p. 286)?  As one historian noted, “The divisions on the bank 
bill in the House and Senate were more sectional than on any other votes in the First Congress” 
(Bowling, p. 233).  Besides the suspicion of banks, another reason existed to explain regional 
opposition to the bank.  Professor McDonald cited an analysis of the opposition furnished by a 
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contemporary, Representative Benjamin Bourne of Rhode Island, who wrote in a letter: “But I 
am persuaded we would not have heard anything of either [the unconstitutionality and the 
inexpedience of the bank] did not the Gentleman from the Southward view the measure, as 
adverse to the removal of Congress, ten years hence” (McDonald, 1979, pp. 201-202).   
Hamilton’s economic proposals for america: Constitutional objections to phase two by 
randolph and jefferson. 
 
 While the House was still debating the measure, President Washington asked two fellow 
Virginians who were members of his cabinet for formal opinions regarding the bill’s 
constitutionality because Madison had raised constitutional objections to the bank bill.  Edmund 
Randolph, Attorney General, “endorsed Madison’s argument that the bill was unconstitutional” 
since, in his opinion, “there was no way of construing the incorporation of a bank from the 
Constitution’s enumerated powers” (McDonald, 1979, p. 202; Elkins & McKitrick, p. 232).  
Randolph’s opinion was described as “rather rambling” (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 232).  The other 
Virginian asked by Washington to provide a formal opinion was his Secretary of State, Thomas 
Jefferson.  Jefferson, too, found the bank bill to be unconstitutional in an opinion described as a 
“shorter and less persuasive version of Madison’s arguments” (McDonald, 1979, p. 202). 
 Jefferson began by citing the Tenth Amendment, which he incorrectly identified. 
I consider the foundation of the Constitution as laid on this ground that ‘all 
powers not delegated to the U.S. by the Constitution, not [sic] prohibited by 
it to the states, are reserved to the States or to the people’ (XIIth. 
Amendmt.).  To take a single step beyond the boundaries thus specially 
drawn around the powers of Congress, is to take possession of a boundless 
feild [sic] of power, no longer susceptible of any definition.  (Boyd & 
Lester, 19, p. 270; hereafter cited as PTJ) 
 
Continuing, Jefferson opined, “The incorporation of a bank, and other powers assumed by this 
bill have not, in my opinion, been delegated to the U.S. by the Constitution” (PTJ, 19, p. 276).  
Elaborating his remarks, Jefferson noted that “[t]hey are not among the powers specially 
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enumerated” nor were they “within either of the general phrases” (PTJ, 19, pp. 276, 277).  The 
first general phrase to which Jefferson referred dealt with the taxing power of the United States.  
The other general phrase was the Necessary and Proper Clause.  In interpreting the term 
“necessary,” Jefferson provided what would become the classic definition, taken up by 
subsequent strict constructionists, in which he interpreted the term to mean “absolutely 
indispensable” for achieving an enumerated power. 
The second general phrase is ‘to make all laws necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution the enumerated powers.’ [sic]  But they can all be 
carried into execution without a bank.  A bank therefore is not necessary, 
and consequently not authorized by this phrase.  (Emphasis Jefferson)  (PTJ, 
19, p. 278) 
 
 Jefferson concluded his opinion by noting that the presidential veto was intended to be a “shield 
provided by the constitution to protect against the invasions of the legislature” (PTJ, 19, p. 279).  
According to Jefferson, the power to charter a bank was “a right remaining exclusively with the 
states and [was] consequently one of those intended by the constitution to be placed under his 
[the President’s] protection” (PTJ, 19, p. 280). 
 Described as “seriously upset by the raising of the constitutional issue” and “genuinely 
perplexed” by the opinions of trusted advisors questioning the bill’s legality, President 
Washington, in a letter written February 16, 1791, formally asked Hamilton for his opinion 
regarding the constitutionality of the bank bill so that he could be “fully possessed of the 
Arguments for and against the measure” before he determined whether to veto or to sign the 
proposed “Act to incorporate the Subscribers to the Bank of the United States” (Emphasis in 
original) (McDonald, 1979, p. 202; Elkins & McKitrick, p. 232; PAH, 8, p. 50).  Washington 
also provided Hamilton with copies of Randolph’s and Jefferson’s opinions in order that 
Hamilton “may know the points on which the Secretary of State and the Attorney-General 
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dispute the constitutionality of the Act” and thus be provided “an opportunity of examining & 
answering the objections contained in the enclosed papers” (PAH, 8, p. 50).  At the same time, 
Washington requested Madison to prepare a veto message that could be used in the event it 
proved necessary (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 232; McDonald, 1979, p. 202). 
Hamilton’s economic proposals for america:  Constitutional opinion by hamilton 
regarding phase two. 
 
 Hamilton submitted his opinion to President Washington on February 23, 1791 (PAH, 8, 
pp. 62-63).  Described as possessing “profound legal gifts,” his opinion was characterized as 
“another of Hamilton’s great disputations, quite in the line of The Farmer Refuted and The 
Federalist” (McDonald, 1979, p. 205; Elkins & McKitrick, p. 232).  Another historian 
characterized Hamilton’s legal reasoning as “a brilliant treatise” and as a “masterful brief” 
(Leibiger, p. 135).  Even one of Madison’s principal biographers described Hamilton’s opinion 
as a “brilliant and persuasive treatise” (Ketcham, p. 321).  Two historians of the period rendered 
this account of Hamilton’s constitutional analysis: 
Hamilton’s opinion was more thorough and comprehensive than the 
arguments by the bank’s supporters in Congress, and was better thought 
through on constitutional as well as technical grounds than any of the 
adverse opinions.  He had the advantage of having the others laid out before 
him; he also knew more about the subject than anyone else.  (Elkins & 
McKitrick, p. 232) 
 
By his opinion Hamilton expounded the doctrine of implied powers through a broad construction 
of the Constitution’s meaning that was subsequently used “by Marshall, Webster, Lincoln, the 
two Roosevelts, and other advocates of federal power” (Ketcham, p. 321).   
 In introducing his opinion, Hamilton noted that his primary motivating factor in 
rendering a constitutional opinion lay not with his authorship of the bank bill (although such 
“personal considerations alone … would be sufficient”), but instead arose from his “firm 
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persuasion, that principles of construction like those espoused by the Secretary of State and the 
Attorney General would be fatal to the just & indispensable authority of the United States” 
(PAH, 8, p. 97).  Hamilton’s opening point focused on sovereignty as he stated a self-evident 
proposition: 
[E]very power vested in a Government is in its nature sovereign, and 
includes by force of the term, a right to employ all the means requisite, and 
fairly applicable to the attainment of the ends of such power; and which are 
not precluded by restrictions & exceptions specified in the constitution; nor 
not immoral, or not contrary to the essential ends of political society. 
(Emphasis in original, here and in following Hamilton quotations) (PAH, 8, 
p. 98) 
 
In order to disprove this self-evident proposition, a person would be required “to shew that a rule 
which in the general system of things is essential to the preservation of the social order is 
inapplicable to the United States” (PAH, 8, p. 98).  The fact that sovereignty in the United States 
was divided between the state and federal governments did not alter the nature of sovereignty.  It 
meant only “that each has sovereign power as to certain things, and not as to other things” 
(Emphasis in original, this and following quotations) (PAH, 8, p. 98).  For a person to deny that 
the national government had sovereign powers just because its powers were limited would 
require that such an individual also deny that state governments had sovereign powers since their 
powers were limited as well.  The absurdity of such reasoning was pointed out by Hamilton: 
“And thus the United States would furnish the singular spectacle of a political society without 
sovereignty, or of a people governed without government” (PAH, 8, p. 98). 
 Discussing whether or not the United States had the power to “erect a corporation,” 
Hamilton pointed out that it was “unquestionably incident to sovereign power to erect 
corporations, and consequently to that of the United States, in relation to the objects intrusted to 
the management of the government” (PAH, 8, p. 99).  Noting that the opponents of the bank bill 
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cited the Tenth Amendment as foundational to their argument against the power of the 
government to erect corporations because it is not a power that is “enumerated in the 
constitution,” Hamilton observed that the “main proposition” of the Tenth Amendment was “not 
to be questioned” since it was “nothing more than a consequence of this republican maxim, that 
all government is a delegation of power” (PAH, 8, pp. 99-100).  However, Hamilton continued, 
“It is not denied, that there are implied, as well as express powers, and that the former are as 
effectually delegated as the latter” (PAH, 8, p. 100).  After discussing the power of the national 
government to provide for governments in newly acquired territories as an example of an implied 
power, Hamilton reiterated his former point, that “implied powers are to be considered as 
delegated equally with express ones” (PAH, 8, p. 100).  Furthermore, implied powers were the 
means “of carrying into execution … any of the specified powers” (PAH, 8, p. 100).  Therefore, 
the only legitimate question regarding implied powers was “whether the mean to be employed, 
or in this instance the corporation to be erected, has a natural relation to any of the acknowledged 
objects or lawful ends of the government” (PAH, 8, p. 100).  For example, Congress could not 
establish a corporation to superintend the police of Philadelphia because they had no 
constitutional authorization “to regulate the police of that city” (PAH, 8, p. 100).  However, 
Hamilton continued, Congress could establish a corporation for the purpose of collecting taxes or 
for regulating foreign and/or interstate commerce (PAH, 8, p. 100).  In Hamilton’s view, the 
opponents of the bank bill mistakenly argued as if the establishment of a corporation were an end 
instead of merely a means to a legitimate constitutional end.  Such reasoning led them to 
“erroneous conclusions” regarding the constitutionality of the bank bill (PAH, 8, p. 101).   
 Hamilton next directed attention to Jefferson’s narrow interpretation of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.  Jefferson had argued that the clause was to be interpreted as meaning absolutely 
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necessary for the accomplishment of the desired end, or as Hamilton paraphrased Jefferson’s 
reasoning, the clause restricted congressional power “to those [means], without which the grant 
of the power would be nugatory” (PAH, 8, p. 101).  According to Hamilton, such a view was 
nonsense: “It is essential to the being of the National government, that so erroneous a conception 
of the meaning of the word necessary, should be exploded” (PAH, 8, p. 102).  Hamilton 
continued by offering both a grammatically correct and a common-sense meaning of 
“necessary”: 
It is certain, that neither the grammatical, nor popular sense of the term 
requires that construction.  According to both, necessary often means no 
more than needful, requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive to.  It is a 
common mode of expression to say, that it is necessary for a government or 
a person to do this or that thing, when nothing more is intended or 
understood, than that the interests of the government or person require, or 
will be promoted, by the doing of this or that thing.  (PAH, 8, p. 102) 
 
Jefferson’s narrow interpretation also violated the intentions of the Framers.  According to 
Hamilton: 
The whole turn of the clause containing it, indicates, that it was the intent of 
the convention, by that clause to give a liberal latitude to the exercise of the 
specified powers.  The expressions have peculiar comprehensiveness.  They 
are – “to make all laws, necessary & proper for carrying into execution the 
foregoing powers & all other powers vested by the constitution in the 
government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.”  
(PAH, 8, pp. 102-103) 
 
Thus Jefferson’s narrow interpretation of “necessary” not only “depart[ed] from its obvious & 
popular sense,” but also gave “it a restrictive operation” that was “never before entertained” 
(PAH, 8, p. 103).  Jefferson’s argument interpreted necessary “as if the word absolutely or 
indispensably had been prefixed to it (PAH, 8, p. 103).  Finally, Jefferson’s interpretation 
substituted a false test of constitutionality. 
The degree in which a measure is necessary, can never be a test of the legal 
right to adopt it.  That must ever be a matter of opinion; and can only be a 
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test of expediency.  The relation between the measure and the end, between 
the nature of the mean employed towards the execution of a power and the 
object of that power, must be the criterion of constitutionality not the more 
or less of necessity or utility.  (PAH, 8, p. 104) 
  
 To show the paralyzing effect upon government that would be caused by Jefferson’s 
position, Hamilton examined several practical examples of legislation enacted under the new 
Constitution.  He began by declaring, “The practice of the government is against the rule of 
construction advocated by the Secretary of State” (PAH, 8, p. 104).  Congress had recently 
passed an “act concerning light houses, beacons, buoys & public piers.”  According to Hamilton: 
This doubtless must be referred to the power of regulating trade, and is 
fairly relative to it.  But it cannot be affirmed, that the exercise of that 
power, in this instance, was strictly necessary; or that the power itself would 
be nugatory without that of regulating establishments of this nature.  (PAH, 
8, p. 104) 
 
Similarly Hamilton applied Jefferson’s reasoning to state governments that had incorporated 
both banks and towns within their borders.  Hamilton pointed out “that there is no express power 
in any State constitution to erect corporations” (PAH, 8, p. 103).  Hamilton’s final illustration 
focused on the act “which declares the power of the President to remove officers at pleasure” 
(PAH, 8, p. 106).  Reiterating his point once more, Hamilton declared, It is not only agreed, on 
all hands, that the exercise of constructive powers is indispensable, but every act which has been 
passed is more or less an exemplification of it” (PAH, 8, p. 106).  And, Hamilton cautioned, the 
Necessary and Proper Clause did not act to provide the government with “any new or 
independent power” (PAH, 8, p. 106).  The Necessary and Proper Clause does, however, provide  
an explicit sanction to the doctrine of implied powers, and is equivalent to 
an admission of the proposition, that the government, as to its specified 
powers and objects, has plenary & sovereign authority, in some cases 
paramount to that of the States, in others coordinate with it.  For such is the 
plain import of the declaration, that it may pass all laws necessary & proper 
to carry into execution those powers.  (PAH, 8, p. 106).   
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According to Hamilton, difficulties regarding the Necessary and Proper Clause arose from 
federalism and were “inherent in the nature of the foederal [sic] constitution” (PAH, 8, p. 107). 
The consequence … is, that there will be cases clearly within the power of 
the National Government; others clearly without its power; and a third class, 
which will leave room for controversy & difference of opinion, & 
concerning which a reasonable latitude of judgment must be allowed.  
(PAH, 8, p. 107) 
 
Furthermore, the doctrine of implied powers articulated by Hamilton did possess “a criterion of 
what is constitutional, and of what is not so.  This criterion is the end to which the measure 
relates as a mean” (PAH, 8, p. 107).  Hamilton then offered what became the classical 
benchmark of constitutionality in the hands of Chief Justice John Marshall and his successors.34 
If the end be clearly comprehended within any of the specified powers, & if 
the measure have an obvious relation to that end, and is not forbidden by 
any particular provision of the constitution – it may safely be deemed to 
come within the compass of the national authority….  Does the proposed 
measure abridge a preexisting right of any State, or of any individual?  If it 
does not, there is a strong presumption in favour of its constitutionality…   
(PAH, 8, p. 107) 
 
Hamilton’s economic proposals for america: Resolution of the constitutional conflict by 
president washington and its aftermath. 
 
 On Friday, February 25, 1791, President Washington “signed the bank bill into law” 
(McDonald, 1979, p. 210).  He hadn’t needed Madison’s veto message, which was fortunate for 
the country’s financial condition.  The bank represented the capstone of Hamilton’s plan “to use 
his administration of the public finances as an instrument for forging the American people into a 
prosperous, happy, and respected nation” (McDonald, 1979, p. 117). 
 To complete the contextual picture surrounding the constitutional questions raised by the 
interplay of the Tenth Amendment and the Necessary & Proper Clause, it would be instructive to 
examine the effects of Hamilton’s program upon American economic prosperity.  American 
exports rose from $20 million in 1790 to over $61 million by 1811 while imports increased from 
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$23 million to $53 million during the same period (Brogan, p. 256).  The New York Stock 
Exchange was founded in 1792 while “the price of farm products went up by between 50 and 
100 per cent between 1790 and 1814 – very satisfactory for a nation still overwhelmingly 
committed to agriculture” (Brogan, p. 256).  Work also began on improving the difficult problem 
of transportation in colonial America.  “Beginning with the Lancaster Road in Pennsylvania in 
1792, turnpikes were built everywhere to supplement the rivers” (Brogan, p. 256).  Finally, and 
somewhat ironically for Jefferson who had raised constitutional objections to Hamilton’s 
financial program, the Hamiltonian financial system enabled President Jefferson to accomplish 
his “greatest achievement,” the Louisiana Purchase, that “was made possible only by foreign 
loans, which would not have been forthcoming if Hamilton had not established the credit of the 
United States so solidly” (Brogan, p. 270). Henry Cabot Lodge, a  noted historian, editor, and 
politician, described Hamilton’s influence upon America. 
Hamilton is one of the statesmen of creative minds who represent great 
ideas.  It is for this reason that he left the deep mark of his personal 
influence upon our history.  His principles of finance, of foreign affairs, of 
political economy, and of the powers and duties of government under the 
Constitution, may be found on every page of our history…  (Lodge, p. 278) 
 
Lodge, believing that one mark of a person’s greatness could be found in the writings of ones 
opponents, cited an evaluation of Hamilton by a judge, Ambrose Spencer, “who had many 
conflicts with Hamilton” (Lodge, p. 273).  In Spencer’s words, Hamilton “was the greatest man 
this country ever produced” (Lodge, p. 273).  He continued, “It was he, more than any other 
man, who thought out the Constitution of the United States and the details of the government of 
the Union” (Lodge, pp. 273-274). 
 The kentucky & virginia resolutions and their subsequent influence. 
 Overview. 
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 The American political fault line between state rights and federal supremacy was next 
revealed during the latter years of the eighteenth century and represented the third constitutional 
issue raised during the early years of American government under the Constitution that preceded 
Supreme Court involvement in refereeing the conflict (For the second, which also involved 
Madison, see Appendix K).  Actions taken by Jefferson and Madison in response to the passage 
of congressional legislation favored by President Adams, popularly called the Alien and Sedition 
Acts, on July 14, 1798, raised the question of procedural response to congressional acts thought 
to be unconstitutional.  The reaction of Madison and Jefferson to legislation they vehemently 
opposed also resurrected the spectre of “States as Sovereign Entities” and laid the theoretical 
groundwork for subsequent actions taken by southern states during the Nullification Controversy 
and during the secession from the Union followed by the formation of the Confederacy that 
precipitated the deadliest conflict in American history, the Civil War. 
 Jefferson and Madison secretly drafted the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions that were 
approved by the state legislatures of Kentucky and Virginia on November 13th and December 
24th respectively, 1798.  These resolutions were the first to declare that the states had the right to 
determine whether a law of Congress was constitutional.  Both resolutions declared that the 
Alien and Sedition Acts violated the Constitution by giving the President judicial powers that 
denied aliens the right to jury trial.  Before calling upon other states to join in condemning the 
acts as unconstitutional, the resolutions also claimed that the Alien and Sedition Acts violated 
freedom of speech and of the press.35  Evidence that a person’s position respective to the major 
fault line regarding political sovereignty determines how one will interpret the Constitution is 
provided by the following historical interpretation of the resolutions: 
Both sets of resolutions were argued on a strict-construction basis and a 
view of the Constitution as a compact among the several states, a compact 
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that had been violated by recently enacted federal legislation.  They asserted 
… that the Constitution to which the contracting states had assented 
delegated certain powers to the federal government, specifically 
enumerated, all others not so delegated being reserved to the states;  (Elkins 
and McKitrick, pp. 719-720) 
 
In addition, besides challenging the concept of judicial review, both sets of resolutions 
questioned the preeminence of the federal government in making constitutional determinations.  
“Historically,” according to two historians, “the immediate context of the Resolutions came to be 
overshadowed by implications that far outlived the occasion which inspired them and for which 
they were designed” (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 719). 
 Judicial review. 
 Judicial review, a concept most Americans take for granted today, was not definitively 
established in a judicial sense until Chief Justice John Marshall issued his classic statement in 
Marbury v. Madison (1803), “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department 
to say what the law is” (5 U.S. 137, 177).36  Actually, the foregoing statement is used as a sort of 
shorthand tool to refer to Marshall’s elaboration of judicial review in Marbury.  The oft-quoted 
statement merely served as the introduction to Marshall’s step-by-step discussion of judicial 
review.  His next statement of importance for establishing judicial review occurred two 
paragraphs later when he said, “If, then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the 
constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such 
ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply” (5 U.S. 137, 178).  Four paragraphs 
later, Marshall used a statement from the Constitution to ask and answer a rhetorical question.  
The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under 
the constitution. 
 
Could it be the intention of those who gave this power, to say that in using it 
the constitution should not be looked into?  That a case arising under the 
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constitution should be decided without examining the instrument under 
which it arises? 
 
This is too extravagant to be maintained.  (5 U.S. 137, 178-179) 
 
Marshall next noted that not only the legislature, but also the courts were to act in a 
constitutional manner.  “[I]t is apparent, that the framers of the constitution contemplated that 
instrument as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature” (Emphasis in 
original) (5 U.S. 137, 179-180).  Marshall then concluded: 
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States 
confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all 
written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and 
that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.  
(Emphasis in original) (5 U.S. 137, 180) 
 
In discussing the principle of written constitutions, Marshall continued a line of reasoning stated 
by Hamilton in The Federalist whereby Hamilton derived judicial review from the theory of 
governments limited by constitutions.  Hamilton had written: 
In the first place, there is not a syllable in the plan under consideration 
which directly empowers the national courts to construe the laws according 
to the spirit of the Constitution…  I admit, however, that the Constitution 
ought to be the standard of construction for the laws, and that wherever 
there is an evident opposition, the laws ought to give place to the 
Constitution.  But this doctrine is not deducible from any circumstance 
peculiar to the plan of convention, but from the general theory of a limited 
Constitution; and as far as it is true is equally applicable to most if not to all 
the State governments.  (Federalist No. 81, p. 450) 
 
Notwithstanding its importance, Marshall’s enshrinement of judicial review as a cornerstone of 
American government did not occur until after the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions.   
 However, before the ruling in Marbury, judicial review as the procedural response to 
constitutional questions was neither an unknown nor an unarticulated concept in the United 
States.  Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling and previous to the Kentucky & Virginia 
Resolutions, judicial review had been clearly articulated, both in public and in closed 
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governmental session (attended and recorded by Madison), as the proper mechanism for 
addressing the constitutionality of congressional acts.  The historical record of such discussions 
includes state court decisions that invalidated state legislative acts on constitutional grounds, the 
Constitutional Convention, The Federalist Papers, the state ratifying conventions, the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, federal circuit court decisions that voided state and federal legislation, Supreme 
Court decisions that invalidated state legislative actions, and a Supreme Court decision that ruled 
on the constitutionality of a congressional act. 
 During the 1780s when the country operated under the Articles of Confederation, a 
period immediately prior to the Constitutional Convention, state high courts struck down 
legislative acts deemed to violate state constitutions in New Jersey, Virginia, Connecticut, Rhode 
Island, and North Carolina.  In Holmes v. Walton (1780), the New Jersey State Supreme Court 
struck down a state statute requiring the use of six jurors, instead of the traditional twelve, for 
certain cases (Gerber, p. 15, n. 1).37  In 1782, the Virginia Court of Appeals, the state’s highest 
court, ruled on the constitutionality of a Virginia statute that had transferred the pardon power 
from the executive to the legislature (Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va {4 Call} 5).  Two future 
delegates to the Constitutional Convention served as members of the tribunal adjudicating the 
case – John Blair and George Wythe (Beard, pp. 18 & 49).  In the Symsbury Case (1785) the 
Connecticut high court invalidated a state act that had granted land belonging to the community 
of Symsbury to the town of New Hartford, ruling that the legislature’s act “could not legally 
operate to curtail the land before granted to the proprietors of the town of Symsbury, without 
their consent” (1 Kirby 444, 447).  In Trevett v. Weeden (1786), the Rhode Island high court 
invalidated a state statute requiring merchants to accept paper money as a form of legal payment.  
Besides empowering the constabulary to arrest merchants refusing to accept paper money, the act 
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also denied a jury trial to defendants.38  The final case, Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 5 (1787), 
involved the confiscation of property belonging to British loyalists by North Carolina during the 
Revolution.  The state high court struck down a state law requiring judges to dismiss any action 
brought by individuals attempting to recover such confiscated property, ruling that such 
individuals were entitled to a jury trial to determine the merits of claims (1 N.C. 5, 7).  One of 
the attorneys in that case, William R. Davie, who had “served audaciously” in the Revolutionary 
War as a cavalry officer, attended the Constitutional Convention as a delegate from North 
Carolina (Rossiter, p. 128; 1 N.C. 5, 10). 
 Although not discussed publicly, the Framers had fully discussed the concept of judicial 
review during the Constitutional Convention (see Appendix L).  Besides occurring in Madison’s 
presence, the discussions were recorded by him in his notes of the proceedings.  Additionally, 
Madison served as an active participant in some of the discussions.  Madison’s initial proposal 
for a “council of revision” (see Appendix L) “was a stronger limit on the Congress than either 
the executive veto or judicial review” (Wills, 1981/2001, p. 152).  At the Convention, Madison 
“was earnestly promoting a much stronger role for the Supreme Court [stronger than simply that 
of judicial review] at that time.  He wanted it to join with the executive in vetoing congressional 
legislation” (Wills, 1981/2001, p. 151; see also Appendix L).  According to Wills, “The fact that 
the Convention expressly rejected the revisionary council, but did not exclude the weaker 
scheme of judicial review, seems to indicate that the framers took the latter as given in the draft 
already on the table” (Wills, 1981/2001, p. 152).  That the Framers assumed the existence of 
judicial review is verified through an examination of remarks made at the Convention (see 
Appendix L).  The record of the debates clearly indicates both Madison’s awareness and 
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acceptance of judicial review as a check (although a weaker check than his original proposal) 
upon unconstitutional legislation.39 
 According to one expert in constitutional law, Hamilton offered the “definitive 
justification of judicial review” in Federalist No. 78 (Hall, 1992, p. 359).40  First, Hamilton 
established the maxim of judicial review.  
No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid.  To 
deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal; that 
the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are 
superior to the people themselves.  (Federalist No. 78, p. 435) 
 
Then, Hamilton framed the concept: 
It is not otherwise to be supposed that the Constitution could intend to 
enable the representatives of the people to substitute their will to that of their 
constituents.  It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were designed 
to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature in order, 
among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their 
authority.  (Emphasis in original) (Federalist No. 78, p 435) 
 
Next, Hamilton articulated specific arguments and details in favor of judicial review: 
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the 
courts.  A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges as, a 
fundamental law.  It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as 
well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative 
body.  (Federalist No. 78, p 435) 
 
And then Hamilton provided the solution regarding conflicts between legislation and the 
Constitution: 
If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that 
which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be 
preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their 
agents.  (Federalist No. 78, p 435) 
 
 According to a notable historian, a member of both the American Academy of Arts & 
Sciences and the American Academy of Arts & Letters, Hamilton was responding to the 
argument put forth by Robert Yates in his “Letters of Brutus”, “that judicial review would 
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amount to judicial supremacy” (Emphasis in original) (Yates, quoted in Wills, 1981/2001, p. 
130).  According to Wills, Hamilton argued for legislative supremacy, that not only were 
legislative supremacy and judicial review “compatible, but that judicial review demands a theory 
of legislative supremacy – in the constitution-making act – as its necessary justification” 
(Emphasis in original) (Wills, 1981/2001, p. 135).  Far from being “at odds with legislative 
supremacy,” judicial review depended on it (Wills, 1981/2001, p. 135).  Without the recognition 
of legislative supremacy, “judicial review would make no sense at all” (Wills, 1981/2001, p. 
135).  In support of his contention, Wills then pointed to Hamilton’s own words (Wills, 
1981/2001, p. 135): 
Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial 
to the legislative power.  It only supposes that the power of the people is 
superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature declared in its 
statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people declared in the 
constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter, rather than the 
former.  (Federalist No. 78, pp. 435-436) 
 
Thus the supreme legislative authority would be the actions taken by the people to approve and 
adopt the Constitution.  As Wills explained, “Over and over in this paper Hamilton is stressing 
one thing – legislative supremacy, the supremacy of the more democratic ratifying conventions 
over indirect representation by majority vote in the Congress” (Wills, 1981/2001, p. 134).  
Legislative supremacy proved to be the cornerstone upon which was built the supremacy of the 
Constitution for American government.  Summarizing Hamilton’s position, Wills concluded, 
“The Constitution came about by the people’s legislative act” (Emphasis in original) (Wills, 
1981/2001, p. 133). 
 Hamilton’s views received independent corroboration at a much later date by a noted 
professor of American constitutional law, who arrived at the same understanding via a study of 
political philosophy.  According to Professor Corwin, “[I]n the American written Constitution, 
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higher law at last attained a form which made possible the attribution to it of an entirely new sort 
of validity, the validity of a statute emanating from the sovereign people” (Emphasis in original) 
(Corwin, 1965, p. 89).  As Hamilton saw the necessity of judicial review to uphold the legislative 
supremacy of the people in establishing the Constitution, so Corwin viewed the theory of judicial 
review as preserving the nation’s higher law, the Constitution. 
[E]ven statutory form could hardly have saved the higher law as a recourse 
for individuals had it not been backed up by judicial review.  Invested with 
statutory form and implemented by judicial review, higher law, as with 
renewed youth, entered upon one of the great periods of its history, and 
juristically the most fruitful one since the days of Justinian.  (Emphasis in 
original) (Corwin, 1965, p. 89) 
 
 The primary purpose of judicial review, therefore, was to protect the concepts of liberty 
applied to government through the Constitution.  Quoting Montesquieu without specifically 
identifying him, Hamilton wrote, “For I agree that ‘there is no liberty if the power of judging be 
not separated from the legislative and executive powers” (Federalist No. 78, p 434).41 
 Regarding the state ratifying conventions, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, Oliver 
Ellsworth of Connecticut, and John Marshall of Virginia presented arguments “that the national 
government would be limited by the judicial check” (Hall, 1992, p. 465).  At the 1788 Virginia 
Ratifying Convention (in Madison’s presence, with his support, and as part of the federalists’ 
plan to secure a favorable vote for ratification), future Chief Justice John Marshall pointed to 
judicial review as a safeguard against undue usurpation of power by the proposed national 
government.42  Marshall observed, “If Congress were to make a law not warranted by any of the 
powers enumerated, it would be considered by the judges as an infringement of the Constitution 
which they are to guard….  They would declare it void” (Hall, 1992, p. 465).  At the Connecticut 
convention, Oliver Ellsworth presented judicial review as a check upon the usurpation of 
unwarranted power.  Ellsworth explained: 
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This constitution defines the extent of the powers of the general 
government.  If the general legislature should at any time overleap their 
limits, the judicial department is a constitutional check.  If the United States 
go beyond their powers, if they make a law which the Constitution does not 
authorize, it is void; and the judicial power, the national judges, who, to 
secure their impartiality, are to be made independent, will declare it to be 
void.  (Bailyn, 1, p. 883) 
 
In the Pennsylvania convention James Wilson explained to delegates that the judiciary would act 
as a check against unconstitutional legislation.  According to Wilson: 
[U]nder this constitution, the legislature may be restrained, and kept within 
its prescribed bounds, by the interposition of the judicial department….  
[T]he power of the constitution was paramount to the power of the 
legislature, acting under that constitution.  For it is possible that the 
legislature, when acting in that capacity, may transgress the bounds assigned 
to it, and an act may pass, in the usual mode, notwithstanding that 
transgression; but when it comes to be discussed before the judges – when 
they consider its principles, and find it to be incompatible with the superior 
power of the constitution, it is their duty to pronounce it void…  (Bailyn, 1, 
pp. 822-823) 
 
 Under Article III, § 1 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 
1789 that established the framework and structure for judicial review of federal questions 
involving constitutional issues and congressional statutes.  Senator Oliver Ellsworth, former 
justice of the Connecticut high court and delegate to the Constitutional Convention, served as 
both the chair of the Senate committee that drafted the act and as the main author of the bill 
(Beard, p. 21; Elkins & McKitrick, p. 63; Graber & Perhac, p. 263; Hall, 1992, p. 252).  After 
creating a three-tiered system of federal trial courts, similar to the current system, the act “gave 
the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over those courts’ decisions in civil cases and over state 
courts’ decisions based on determinations of federal law” (Hall, 1992, p. 457).  Thus, the act 
funneled constitutional issues into the state court systems to be first dealt with by the state 
judiciaries and their high courts prior to any consideration by the Supreme Court for the issuance 
of a writ of error to re-examine, reverse, or affirm the state high court’s decision (Elkins & 
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McKitrick, pp. 63-64; Graber & Perhac, p. 264; Hall, 1992, p. 457).  As explained by a 
constitutional scholar in greater detail: 
The most significant restriction in the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the trial of 
federal question suits to the state courts.  Only upon appeal to the Supreme 
Court after a final decision was had in the highest court of a state might a 
federal question actually reach a federal court.  (Except for a brief interlude 
in 1801-1802, federal courts did not obtain general trial jurisdiction over 
federal questions until 1875).  (Hall, 1992, p. 474) 
 
Described as “the enduring blueprint for American’s judicial structure,” the Judiciary Act of 
1789 received the approval of eight senators who had served as delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention.43  Furthermore, both James Madison, then a member of the House of 
Representatives, and Thomas Jefferson, then Secretary of State, were aware of the Judiciary Act 
of 1789 and the procedural framework it established regarding constitutional issues.   
 Penultimately prior in the precedential listings for judicial review, the Supreme Court 
invalidated state laws in the period following the adoption of the Constitution and the passage of 
the Judiciary Act, either as justices on circuit or sitting as a full Court.  Unfortunately the 
opinions of the early circuit courts were not written.  However, Justices Jay and Cushing, while 
on circuit, invalidated the following state legislative actions (Gerber, p. 12): 
• Connecticut statute in April, 1791 that conflicted with the Treaty of Peace with 
England as ratified in 1783. 
• Rhode Island statute (re: legal tender) in May, 1791 that conflicted with Article I, § 
10 of the Constitution, which stated that “No State shall … make any Thing but gold 
and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts.” 
• Rhode Island statute (pro-debtor) in June, 1792 that conflicted with Article I, § 10 of 
the Constitution, which stated that “No State shall … pass any … Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts.” 
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In Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796), the Supreme Court voided a Virginia statute conflicting 
with the Treaty of Paris (1783), thus officially establishing the supremacy of treaties over 
conflicting state laws.  The treaty contained a provision assuring that creditors would not meet 
with legal obstructions to recovering pre-Revolutionary War debts.  Virginia had “enacted 
legislation enabling its citizens to pay debts owed to British subjects into the state treasury in 
depreciated currency and thereby obtain a certificate of discharge” (Hall, 1992, p. 910).  Such 
state action was ruled a violation of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution.  
Since the case involved Virginia, both Madison and Jefferson had to be aware of the Court’s use 
of judicial review as well as the steps taken under the Judiciary Act of 1789 to address the 
constitutional issue in their home state. 
 Also, in the first recorded instance of judicially reviewing the constitutionality of a 
congressional act, the federal circuit courts for New York, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina 
refused on constitutional grounds to implement provisions of the Invalid Pensioners Act of 1792.  
The objectionable provisions required federal courts to assume duties that were not judicial in 
nature, which violated the separation of powers whereby “neither the legislative nor the 
executive branches, can constitutionally assign to the judicial any duties, but such as are properly 
judicial” (2 U.S. 409, 410).  The Supreme Court considered the matter in Hayburn’s Case , 2 
U.S. 409 (1792).  The Court decided “that they would hold the [matter] under advisement, until 
the next term” (2 U.S. 409).  The case became moot when Congress revised the statute by 
removing the provisions assigning courts nonjudicial duties on February 28, 1793 (2 U.S. 409, 
410).   
 Finally, judicial review had been implicitly established by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Hylton v. United States (1796), the first case under the new Constitution in which the Court ruled 
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on the constitutionality of an act of Congress (Hall, 1992, p. 419; Warren, pp. 146-147).  Since 
the constitutional question was the only one argued, it could be contended, quite plausibly, that 
Hylton directly established judicial review.  According to the opinion by Justice Chase, the only 
question before the Court was “whether the law of congress of the 5th of June 1794, entitled, 
“An act to lay duties upon carriages for the conveyance of persons,’ is unconstitutional and void” 
(3 U.S. 171, 172).  Interestingly Alexander Hamilton presented the federal government’s 
argument for the constitutionality of the act in question, an act that had been “passed on his 
recommendation in 1794” (McDonald, 1979, p. 314).  His resignation as Secretary of the 
Treasury had taken effect January 31, 1795 (McDonald, 1979, p. 303).  Hylton also marked the 
first time that Hamilton argued a case before the Court, appearing as a “special counsel for the 
Government” (Warren, p. 148).  One of the justices before whom Hamilton argued later wrote: 
Mr. Hamilton spoke in our Court, attended by the most crowded audience I 
ever say there, both Houses of Congress being almost deserted on the 
occasion.  Though he was in ill health, he spoke with astonishing ability, 
and in a most pleasing manner, and was listened to with the profoundest 
attention.  (Warren, p. 148) 
 
James Madison was one of the unnamed members of Congress who was absent from the House 
of Representatives and present in the Supreme Court chambers.  In writing to Thomas Jefferson 
about the case, Madison did not mention Hamilton by name, although he disparaged Hamilton’s  
presentation, which had so impressed other members of the audience, including the Court.44  
What is important for our purposes, however, is that Madison was both aware and 
knowledgeable of the first case that directly addressed constitutional issues raised by 
congressional legislation.  And, just as importantly, Jefferson also was aware of Hylton due to 
Madison efforts.  Furthermore, the facts in Hylton exemplified the procedural approach to be 
taken in questioning the constitutionality of congressional actions.  Hylton, impacted by the 
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legislation, had filed a complaint in federal court challenging the law.  When the lower court 
ruled against him, Hylton had appealed to the Supreme Court which granted him the right of 
appeal.  And although the Court ruled against Hylton, the procedural aspects of mounting a 
constitutional challenge to federal legislation should have been quite clear, both to Madison as a 
legislator witnessing the case and to Jefferson, hearing about the case from Madison. 
 Specific contents of the resolutions. 
 The details of actually getting two states to pass the resolutions were somewhat 
complicated.  The plan, developed after Jefferson had withdrawn from presiding over the Senate 
as vice president while the Alien and Sedition Acts were passed, was initially developed in 
Montpelier where Jefferson stopped “to recruit Madison” for a campaign of resistance to the acts 
(Wills, 2002, p. 48).  Madison and Jefferson agreed that Madison should lead the effort in 
Virginia while Jefferson would use a third party to have a second state issue a similar call to 
other state legislatures to “nullify the Alien and Sedition Acts,” thus “creating the sense of a 
groundswell of opposition at the state level (Wills, 2002, pp. 48 & 49).  Madison would also be 
forced to use a third party in the Virginia Assembly since he wasn’t a member of the state 
legislature.  Jefferson initially planned to involve North Carolina, “but a friend from Kentucky 
said he could it passed there without betraying its authorship” (Wills, 2002, p. 49).  Jefferson 
drafted the Kentucky Resolutions, which were introduced in the state legislature by John 
Breckinridge, while Madison drafted the Virginia Resolutions that were formally introduced into 
that state’s legislature by John Taylor (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 719).  The Kentucky Resolutions 
were passed on November 13, 1798, a little over a month before the Virginia Assembly approved 
the Virginia Resolutions on Christmas Eve, December 24, 1798 (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 719). 
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 After declaring that Kentucky was “determined … to submit to undelegated and 
consequently unlimited powers in no man, or body of men on earth,” Jefferson’s original draft 
contained the following: 
[W]here powers are assumed which have not been delegated, a nullification 
of the act is the rightful remedy: that every State has a natural right in cases 
not within the compact, (casus non foederis,) to nullify of their own 
authority all assumptions of power by others within their limits.”  (Peterson, 
1984, p. 453) 
 
Breckinridge deleted this statement along with other references to nullification prior to his 
presentation of the resolution to the Kentucky legislature.  In its place he substituted language 
that called the acts unconstitutional and called for the states to join a campaign to “repeal the 
‘unconstitutional and obnoxious acts’” (Smith, p. 1070; see also Ketcham, p. 396).  Although 
Jefferson didn’t include secession as the next step should nullification fail, he did contemplate 
the idea as evidenced in his letter to Madison on August 23, 1799, when he proposed an 
additional three-part plan for follow-up action to the Resolutions.  After responding to the 
various states, after strongly protesting the Alien & Sedition Acts, after restating the Tenth 
Amendment, after expressing attachment to the Union, after stating an unwillingness to sacrifice 
the “rights of self government,” and after declaring a willingness to be patient while the rest of 
the country decides to “rally with us round the true principles of our federal government,” 
Jefferson arrived at the course of action should they “be disappointed in this” (PJM, 17, p. 258).  
Should they fail in their endeavor to correct what they regarded as a federal abuse, they must be 
“determined … to sever ourselves from that union we so much value, rather than give up the 
rights of self government which we have reserved, & in which alone we see liberty, safety, & 
happiness” (PJM, 17, p. 258).   
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 Madison’s draft did not use the word nullification.  The Virginia Resolutions opened by 
declaring Virginia’s resolve to “maintain and defend” both the federal and state constitutions 
while “watch[ing] over and oppos[ing] every infraction” of the “principles which constitute the 
only basis” of the “Union of the States” (PJM, 17, pp. 188 & 189).  When an infraction occurred, 
Madison proposed the following: 
that in case of a deliberate, palpable and dangerous exercise of other powers 
not granted by the said compact, the states … have the right, and are in duty 
bound, to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining 
within their respective limits, the authorities, rights and liberties 
appertaining to them.  (PJM, 17, p. 189) 
 
Madison did not clarify what was meant by having the state “interpose” itself or how 
unconstitutional usurpations of power were to be arrested.45  Instead he left the meaning and 
interpretation vague, to be clarified “by the states responding to his call” (Wills, 2002, p. 49). 
 Although Jefferson’s nullification language was removed in favor of the state 
legislature’s pronouncement of the acts being unconstitutional and while Madison had the states 
interpose themselves in some undefined manner, the conclusions of both the Kentucky and 
Virginia Resolutions “were for practical purposes interchangeable” (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 
719).  What was noticeably absent from both sets of resolutions was a call to get the 
constitutional questions adjudicated, commencing first in the state court system with possible 
appellate jurisdiction by the U.S. Supreme Court according to the procedures established by both 
the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the judicial precedents established by state courts (which included 
Virginia) and the U.S. Supreme Court.  One historian offered the following assessment of 
Madison’s and Jefferson’s campaign against the Alien and Sedition Acts: “Their nullification 
effort, if others had picked it up, would have been a greater threat to freedom than the misguided 
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laws, which were soon rendered feckless by ridicule and electoral pressure” (Wills, 2002, p. 49).  
Another historian, commenting upon Jefferson’s Kentucky Resolutions, observed: 
This sweeping claim in the name of states’ rights, had it been implemented, 
would have placed Kentucky in open defiance of federal law; it was an 
extreme argument that was potentially as dangerous to the Union as the 
oppressive laws were to individual liberty.  (Smith, p. 1070) 
 
 One of Madison’s principal biographers evaluated Madison’s Virginia Resolutions:  
“Though Madison emphasized that the states would not ‘interpose’ for light or transient reasons, 
he was nevertheless perfectly clear in asserting their primacy, in judging constitutionality, over 
the federal courts.  They themselves, he observed, might aid and abet usurpations” (Ketcham, p. 
397).  Madison’s position on state interposition directly countered the position he had taken in 
both the Constitutional Convention and the Federalist regarding separation of powers and the 
danger posed to republican government by state legislative abuses.  In discussing the purposes of 
the Convention, Madison had criticized Roger Sherman of Connecticut for leaving out the 
critical reason for the meeting in Philadelphia, that of “Parliamentary injustice” whereby state 
legislatures endangered “the rights of the minority” (Farrand, I, p. 135).  Citing examples drawn 
from “Rome, Athens & Carthage,” Madison also had cited examples closer to home for the 
delegates whereby state legislatures had aided debtors in defrauding “their creditors” and helped 
the “landed interest” to bear “hard on the mercantile interest” (Farrand, I, p. 135).  According to 
Madison, the Convention faced 
the necessity, of providing more effectually for the security of private rights, 
and the steady dispensation of Justice.  Interferences with these were evils 
which had more perhaps than any thing else, produced this convention.  Was 
it to be supposed that republican liberty could long exist under the abuses of 
it practiced in <some of> the States.  (Farrand, I, p. 134) 
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A noted constitutional historian pointed to the contrast between what early state legislatures said 
and what they actually did regarding Montesquieu’s doctrine of the separation of powers.   
According to Professor Corwin: 
That the majority of the Revolutionary constitutions recorded recognition of 
the principle of the separation of powers is, of course, well known.  What is 
not so generally understood is that the recognition was verbal merely, for the 
reason that the material terms in which it was couched still remained 
undefined; and this was true in particular of “legislative power” in relation 
to “judicial power.”  (Corwin, 1925, p. 514) 
 
Using New Hampshire as an example of the “practices … in several other states,” Professor 
Corwin, after citing New Hampshire’s constitutional acknowledgement of separation of powers, 
described the state legislature’s practice (Corwin, 1925, p. 515): 
Notwithstanding which the laws of New Hampshire for the years 1784-1792 
are replete with entries showing that throughout this period the state 
legislature freely vacated judicial proceedings, suspended judicial actions, 
annulled or modified judgments, cancelled executions, reopened 
controversies, authorized appeals, granted exemptions from the standing 
law, expounded the law for pending cases, and even determined the merits 
of disputes.46  (Corwin, 1925, p. 514) 
 
It was this general, widespread practice among state legislatures in the aftermath of the 
Declaration of Independence to which Madison referred when he protested “against 
‘interferences with the steady dispensation of justice’” on the floor of the Constitutional 
Convention in response to Roger Sherman’s omission of state legislative abuses as a leading 
cause for the Convention to remedy (Corwin, 1925, p. 513).  In The Federalist, Madison also 
explained the Convention’s response in the article entitled “NO. 47: THE PARTICULAR 
STRUCTURE OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER 
AMONG ITS DIFFERENT PARTS (MADISON)” [sic] (Federalist No. 47, p. 268).  Madison 
first observed that “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the 
same hands, … may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny” (Federalist No. 47, p. 
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269).  Madison next observed that “the preservation of liberty requires that the three great 
departments of power should be separate and distinct” (Federalist No. 47, p. 269).  Finally, and 
more pointedly, in terms of earlier concerns about legislative abuses and threats to republican 
government, Madison emphatically stated, “The entire legislature can perform no judiciary act” 
(Federalist No. 47, p. 271).  Slightly more than a decade later, Madison would recommend 
exactly the opposite in the Virginia Resolutions. 
 Aftermath of the resolutions. 
 All states received copies of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions condemning the 
Alien and Sedition Acts.  What was their response?  According to one historian, the Resolutions 
“provoked counter-resolutions by all the states north of Virginia, asserting that the right of 
interpretation rested with the courts” (Brogan, p. 269).  According to another historian, 
“Massachusetts and several other states adopted resolutions upholding the acts….  Washington 
wrote Patrick Henry on January 15, 1799, that the doctrines of the Virginia Resolutions, if 
‘systematically and pertinaciously pursued [will] … dissolve the Union or produce coercion’” 
(Ketcham, p. 397).  Two historians summarized the actions taken by the other member states of 
the Union: 
Ten, that is, took action, though only seven of those (Delaware, New York, 
Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont) 
sent actual replies; the others (Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey) 
dismissed them by resolution after debate, without then officially 
transmitting the result to the legislatures of Kentucky and Virginia.  The 
remaining four states, whose legislatures took no action at all, were North 
and South Carolina, Tennessee, and Georgia.  (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 902, 
n. 72) 
 
Vermont’s reply to Virginia declared, “It belongs not to state legislatures to decide on the 
constitutionality of laws made by the general government; this power being exclusively vested in 
the judiciary courts of the Union” (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 720).   
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 In the southern states, the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions were subsequently referred 
to as the “Principles of ‘98” (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 720).  Fearing reprisal under the Alien and 
Sedition Acts, Madison and Jefferson had concealed their authorship of the Resolutions.  
Although his own role in authoring the Virginia Resolutions had become known before 1832, 
according to historian Garry Wills, “Madison hid as long as he could the fact that Jefferson was 
the author of the Kentucky Resolutions, and that the original draft of those Resolutions contained 
nullifying language” (Wills, 2002, p. 162).  However, in 1832 during the height of the 
nullification movement in South Carolina, papers of Jefferson came to public light that contained 
his original, unamended draft of the Kentucky Resolutions (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 720).  Their 
effect was described: 
Jefferson’s conception of state rights, expressed in terms that were a mixture 
of the extravagant, the threatening, and the vague, were exactly suited to the 
nullifiers’ purposes.  The “principles of ‘98” thereupon became their 
rallying cry and would be a bible of state-rights particularism down to the 
Civil War, with Jefferson as its prophet.  (Elkins & McKitrick, pp. 720-721) 
 
Also, during the nullification controversy, Madison got to witness Calhoun using Madison’s 
arguments for state primacy over federal courts regarding constitutionality being used to justify 
nullification of federal acts by the states (Ketcham, p. 400).   
 Actually, at the time they were written, no states distinguished between the Kentucky 
Resolutions and the Virginia Resolutions.  Also, no other states found either of them acceptable 
(Elkins & McKitrick, p. 720).  Further adding to the conjunction of the two sets of resolutions 
was the fact that Madison defended the major assertions of the Resolutions when invited to do so 
by the Virginia Assembly (Ketcham, pp. 397-400).  In doing so, he adamantly argued that the 
states had primacy over the federal courts “in judging constitutionality” (Ketcham, p. 400).   
However, most southerners and subsequent writers equated Jefferson rather than Madison with 
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state rights advocacy.47  Historians noted that southern secessionists later drew sustenance from 
the Resolutions.  “[A] new edition of the Resolutions published in 1859 gave southern 
spokesmen a renewed warrant for construing from them a complete theory of state sovereignty 
accompanied by the right of peaceable secession,” according to Elkins & McKitrick (p. 721).  
Another historian, noting that the new edition had been published in Richmond, summarized the 
state rights theory contained in the Resolutions: 
The people were sovereign, not collectively as “one people,” but separately as 
several states; therefore, they could by the exercise of their sovereignty in state 
conventions secede from the Union…  Generally, however, the secession 
movement was a remarkable testament to the compact theory of government, 
which Jefferson, more than anyone, had fixed upon the American political 
mind.  (Peterson, 1970, p. 213) 
 
Jefferson Davis, in his inaugural address as President of the Confederacy, relied heavily upon 
Jefferson’s writings, primarily the Declaration of Independence and the state rights theory set 
forth in the Kentucky Resolutions.  According to a historian quite familiar with Jefferson, the 
new chief executive of the Confederacy 
appealed to “the American idea that governments rest on the consent of the 
governed, and that it is the right of the people to alter or abolish them at will 
whenever they become destructive to the ends for which they were 
established.”  The Confederate states, he said, had “merely asserted the rights 
which the Declaration of Independence in 1776 had defined to be inalienable.”  
What was inalienable?  Not the rights of man, but the rights of the people as 
members of sovereign polities called states to secede from the union.  
(Peterson, 1970, pp. 213-214) 
 
In a speech to the U.S. Senate on May 8, 1860, Jefferson Davis had clearly articulated the 
compact theory of government articulated in the Resolutions when he offered the following:  
“That, in the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the States adopting the same acted severally as 
free and independent sovereignties, delegating a portion of their powers to be exercised by the 
Federal Government for the increased security of each against dangers, domestic as well as 
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foreign…” (Emphasis in original) (Cooper, p. 172).  And, in his farewell speech to the U.S 
Senate, Jefferson Davis noted the logical end of state sovereignty when he observed that “an 
essential attribute of State sovereignty” was “the right of a State to secede from the Union” 
(Cooper, p. 190).  Andrew White, a university history professor, fought for the Union in the Civil 
War.  One of his Yale classmates, Randall Gibson, had served as a Confederate general and then 
later as a U.S. Senator from Louisiana.  According to White, Gibson “absolutely detested 
Thomas Jefferson” because he “considered Jefferson the real source of the extreme doctrine of 
state sovereignty” (White, p. 443).  White offered his own assessment. 
[A]fter the Civil War, Jefferson, though still interesting to me, was by no 
means so great a man in my eyes as he had been.  Perhaps no doctrine ever cost 
any other country so dear as Jefferson’s pet theory of State rights cost the 
United States: nearly a million of lives lost on battle-fields, in prisons, and in 
hospitals; nearly ten thousand millions of dollars poured into gulfs of hatred.  
(White, p. 501) 
 
Writing about Jefferson, one historian summarized Henry Cabot Lodge’s assessment of the 
conflict between Federalism and the Resolutions: 
Nevertheless, Lodge held, contrary to Federalist expectations, the revolution of 
1800 did not destroy the national foundations, partly because of Jefferson’s 
timidity in action, partly because of Marshall and the Supreme Court, 
ultimately because of the Civil War.  The Federalist system proved stronger 
than its strongest foe, and the Constitution vindicated its energy in the course 
of American history.  (Peterson, 1970, p. 226) 
 
 The reach, however, of the Nullification Doctrine extended far into the Twentieth 
Century.  Besides extending forward in time, the idea that a state could nullify federal action was 
also extended to include Supreme Court decisions as well as congressional action.  In the 
aftermath of the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, oppositional resolutions, or 
“rhetorical gestures of defiance,” were enacted in southern states (Woodward, p. 157).  
Interestingly two approaches to state action were used, which mirrored the two approaches 
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initially proposed by Kentucky and Virginia – the twin ideas of nullification and state 
interposition between its citizens and federal action.  Senator Harry Byrd from Virginia “called 
upon the South for ‘massive resistance’” (Woodward, p. 156).  Conservative leaders from 
Virginia were the first to claim “the right of ‘interposition’ of state authority against alleged 
violation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court, and who pointed the way toward the private-
school plan as a means of evading the Court’s decision and preserving segregation” (Woodward, 
p. 156).  Alabama’s legislature “was the first actually to apply the fateful words, ‘null, void, and 
of no effect’ to the Supreme Court school decision” (Woodward, p. 156).  Georgia followed 
Alabama’s “null and void” approach while Mississippi modified its act to eliminate the actual 
words, “null and void,” but maintained the same meaning through substituting the declaration 
that the Brown decision was “unconstitutional and of no lawful effect” (Woodward, p. 157).  
Like Virginia, Louisiana “adopted its interposition resolution without a single negative vote in 
either house” (Woodward, p. 157).  The two Carolinas steered a somewhat milder course than 
either nullification or interposition.  According to C. Vann Woodward, Professor of History at 
Yale University, “South Carolina contented herself with ‘condemnation of and protest against 
the illegal encroachment of the central government’” (Woodward, 1966, p. 157).  As Professor 
Vann Woodward noted, “The North Carolina legislature defeated interposition but adopted a 
‘resolution of protest’ against the Supreme Court decision” (Woodward, 1966, p. 157). 
 Four southern states journeyed beyond “rhetorical gestures,” however, and “bluntly 
proclaimed a policy of open resistance by imposing sanctions and penalties against compliance 
with the Supreme Court’s decision” (Woodward, 1966, p. 157).  Although each state focused on 
public education, the approaches varied somewhat.  Georgia’s legislature focused on school 
officials and “made it a ‘felony for any school official of the state or any municipal or county 
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schools to spend tax money for public schools in which the races [were] mixed’” (Woodward, 
1966, p. 157).  Louisiana’s legislature focused on accreditation and withheld state “approval and 
funds ‘from any school violating the segregation provisions’ of its laws” (Woodward, 1966, p. 
157).  Mississippi’s state legislature focused on the authority of state law and “made it unlawful 
for the races to attend publicly supported schools together at the high school level or below” 
(Woodward, 1966, p. 157).  North Carolina’s legislature focused on public school funding, 
broadened coverage beyond school officials to include school boards, and denied “funds to local 
authorities who integrated their schools” (Woodward, 1966, p. 157).  Not content with the 
passage of mere legislation, both Louisiana and Mississippi “amended their constitution[s]” to 
require the separation of public schools “for white and Negro children” in order “to promote 
public health and morals” (Woodward, 1966, pp. 157-158). 
 The lead taken by the seven southern states influenced other southern states as well.48  By 
New Year’s Eve, 1956, “eleven southern states had placed a total of 106 pro-segregation 
measures on their law books” in defiance of the Supreme Court’s ruling that segregated public 
schools were both unlawful and unconstitutional (Woodward, 1966, p. 162).  Florida, Arkansas, 
Tennessee, and Texas had both followed the lead set by the other seven states and also responded 
to Senator Byrd’s call for massive resistance to the Court’s Brown ruling that held “Separate But 
Equal” to be unconstitutional when applied to public education.  “Nullification” and 
“Interposition” had traveled some distance since their first articulation by Jefferson and Madison.  
Beginning as simple opposition to federal acts deemed unconstitutional, the twin doctrines 
subsequently became wedded to the South during the Nullification Crisis, lent legitimacy to the 
idea of secession when the southern states felt the continuation of their slave-based economy was 
threatened, and finally were completely committed to racism after the United States Supreme 
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Court undercut the legal underpinnings of segregation in public education.  What remained 
constant throughout the journey, however, was the rejection of judicial review as an accepted 
procedure of conflict resolution. 
 Summary of the historical background. 
 Just as geographic faults are revealed by the movement of subterranean tectonic plates, so 
the political fault line in United States history is revealed by the movement from colonies 
asserting their rights against a king to sovereign states dominating the national government under 
the Articles of Confederation to a national government with continued arguments about 
sovereignty under the Constitution of the United States.  The fault line issues illustrate a long and 
arduous process of adaptive work that has taken place in our country and, in some respects, 
remains ongoing.  As Heifetz defined adaptive work, it is the learning required “to diminish the 
gap between” where people are and the goal they have set for themselves (Heifetz, 1994, p. 22).  
According to Heifetz, “Adaptive work requires change in values, beliefs, or behavior” (Heifetz, 
1994, p. 22).  For the new republic emerging under the newly adopted Constitution, adaptive 
work meant closing the gap between the realities of a life as governed by colonial-state 
supremacy towards the vision of an American nation envisioned by the Constitution.  Primary 
attachment and loyalty needed to be changed from the state in which one resided to the nation, 
for example, from the Commonwealth of Virginia to the United States.  The task was made more 
difficult in that there were no clear models from history, either current or past, to guide them. 
 Many of the arguments that were heard later in courtrooms derived from disagreements 
heard long before McCullough v. Maryland, the first case before the Supreme Court involving a 
dispute between national and state supremacy, between the Necessary & Proper Clause and the 
Tenth Amendment, as well as a dispute over what the Constitution was and how it should be 
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interpreted.  The early pre-McCullough constitutional disputes examined in this paper always 
involved Madison and centered on Hamilton’s economic proposals, Jay’s Treaty, the Kentucky 
& Virginia Resolutions, and, indirectly, Marbury v. Madison.  Issues included broad versus strict 
construction of the Constitution’s meaning, the nature of the Constitution (was it “a charter for 
government” or a “legalistic code of government operations”)49, whether the Constitution was in 
fact a constitution springing from the people or a compact between the states, judicial review 
versus state review of congressional acts, and the limits of governments, both state and federal.  
While some of the issues have been resolved, a few issues continue to be argued today, most 
notably the interplay of state and national sovereignties under federalism as well as questions 
about how to interpret the Constitution. 
 In many ways, Madison’s (and Jefferson’s) opposition to the adaptive work taking place 
in our nation’s early history occurred for political, as opposed to principled, reasons.  Because he 
opposed current political developments, Madison turned his back on previously stated positions 
that each had a long, public history.  With his opposition to the First Bank of the United States, 
Madison turned from a long record of espousing implied powers through a broad interpretation 
to a position advocating strict construction.  With his opposition to Jay’s Treaty, Madison turned 
his back on his own record in the Constitutional Convention (the Senate as the legislative body 
involved with foreign treaties) to a position whereby the House (of which he was a member) 
should also be involved.  With his opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts through the 
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, Madison turned his back on judicial review (previously 
supported in the Constitutional Convention, in The Federalist Papers, and the Judiciary Act of 
1789) in favor of a vague, unclear form of state review, itself the nucleus of a state rights’ 
position that would later be expanded.  Ironically, with his promotion of state review, Madison 
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also contradicted his views regarding pre-Constitutional state legislative abuses as well as 
contravened the doctrine regarding the separation of governmental powers.  And, as Secretary of 
State, Madison acted illegally in withholding Marbury’s commission, again for political reasons.  
Given these examples, it is difficult to argue against the proposition that Madison played politics 
with the Constitution, that his behavior was both opportunistic and unprincipled.  Yet, Madison 
possessed constitutional strengths as well and enjoyed being the “power behind the throne” for a 
while.  His Virginia Plan dominated the discussions of the Constitutional Convention.  In the 
early years of the first administration, Madison was the person Washington frequently turned to 
regarding procedural questions.  Madison, more than any other person, was responsible for the 
fact that our Constitution has a Bill of Rights.  Yet, in the final analysis, it is extremely difficult 
to effectively argue against the validity of George Washington’s final assessment of his old 
friend and confidant, Madison, as “duplicitous and dishonorable” (Wills, 2002, p. 43). 
 Madison and Jefferson were the most prominent men to speak in favor of strict 
construction.  One of the problems with strict construction is its negation of implied powers, 
without which in some form, the country could not be governed.   Strict construction, as two 
historians noted, 
is in a special sense the resort of persons under ideological strain.  It 
represents a willingness to renounce a range of positive opportunities for 
action in return for a principle which will inhibit government from 
undertaking a range of things one does not approve of.  It marks the point at 
which one prefers to see the Constitution not as a sanction for achieving 
one’s own ends but as a protection against those designs of others which 
have come to be seen as usurping and corrupting.  (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 
234) 
 
A limit to implied powers exists, but, in this writer’s opinion, it does not center on the negation 
of implied powers.  Rather the limit may be found in federalism, both in a constitutional and a 
public policy sense. 
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Case Law of the Tenth Amendment 
The tenth amendment as-a restriction/not-as-a-restriction on federal government 
activity. 
 
 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
 Facts & procedural history. 
 McCullough marks the first courtroom clash between two component portions of the 
Constitution, the Tenth Amendment and the Necessary & Proper Clause.  The technical issue 
focused on the constitutionality of an act of Congress creating a national bank with a subsidiary 
issue being the ability of a state to levy taxes on a federal bank located within its borders.  The 
underlying fundamental issues involved two deep-seated strains of American polity that 
intricately intertwined: first, the jurisdictional clash between states’ rights advocates and those 
favoring a strong national government; second, an ongoing dispute about how the Constitution 
should be interpreted between those favoring a strict construction of its meaning and those 
favoring a broader, more expansive construction.  In the latter clash, each side drew advocates 
from the original framers into an argument that pitted two of the three co-authors of The 
Federalist Papers against each other.  James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, author of the 
Declaration of Independence, believed in a strict construction of the Constitution’s meaning 
while Alexander Hamilton and George Washington, Chair of the Constitutional Convention, 
firmly believed that the Constitution should be interpreted in a broader sense.   
 As discussed in greater detail earlier in this chapter, the issue of the Bank of the United 
States first surfaced in President Washington’s presidency when Alexander Hamilton proposed it 
in his capacity as Secretary of the Treasury.  James Madison, U.S. Representative from Virginia, 
and Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, both opposed Hamilton’s proposal as being 
“unauthorized by the Constitution” (Hall, 1992, p. 536).  The proposed federal bank provided the 
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foundation by which Hamilton intended to move the United States to a solid financial position 
through a combination of “government borrowing and private finance” designed to finance both 
the national debt (instead of repudiating it) and the “outstanding debts of the states from the 
Revolutionary War” (some “£80 million of worthless, or nearly worthless, paper debts”) 
(Brogan, p. 266).  Virginia opposed the assumption of the states’ war debts because it had 
already paid its debts and would be now forced to contribute to paying for the debts of states that 
had not been fiscally responsible (Elkins & McKitrick, pp. 120). 
 Both President Washington and Congress were persuaded by Hamilton’s arguments and 
the Bank was chartered for a twenty-year period.  Although Jefferson was not President when the 
charter was set to expire in 1811, his followers dominated Congress and refused to renew the 
Bank’s charter.  This provided some irony since the Louisiana Purchase by President Jefferson 
was financed primarily through foreign loans made possible by Hamilton’s policy to strengthen 
the country’s financial condition centering on the U.S. Bank – without the foreign loans there 
would have been no Louisiana Purchase (Brogan, p. 270).  The next five years also coincided 
with the War of 1812 and resulted in inflation, discredited state bank notes, and “economic 
chaos” (Hall, 1992, p. 537).  To remedy the poor financial conditions existing in the country, 
Congress reversed its position and enacted legislation chartering the Second Bank of the United 
States in 1816.   
 Opposition to the bank on constitutional grounds continued to exist.  Maryland, 
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, and Ohio each passed state legislation to tax 
the federal bank and its branch offices within their respective borders.  James McCulloch, head 
of the Baltimore branch of the U.S. Bank, refused to pay the tax levied by Maryland.  The State 
of Maryland filed suit in Baltimore County Court where the state law taxing the U.S. Bank was 
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upheld.  Upon appeal the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the state’s highest court, affirmed the 
judgment of the Baltimore County Court upholding the legality of the state tax.  Upon appeal by 
McCullough and the U.S. Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case on a writ of 
error. 
 Legal questions. 
 First, does Congress have the constitutional authority to incorporate a bank?  Second, 
supposing Congress does have the authority to charter a bank, can that bank establish branches in 
the several states on its own authority without further congressional action?  Third, does a state 
government have the power to tax a federal bank without violating the Constitution? 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 In retrospect, it is difficult to imagine a more intimidating team of attorneys than those 
arguing for the original defendant in the case, subsequently designated the plaintiff in error 
through the appeal process, the federal government.  If Ruth, Gehrig, and Lazzeri formed the 
heart of “Murders’ Row” for the dominating New York Yankees major league baseball team, 
then Webster, Wirt, and Pinkney, the trio of legal advocates for the federal government in 
McCullough, would constitute their counterpart on any team of historical attorneys with winning 
records before the U.S. Supreme Court.  Individually, each posed a formidable legal adversary.  
In tandem the three legal advocates formed what must have been a dominating and 
overwhelming team of indomitable attorneys possessing an overpowering aura of invincibility.  
Daniel Webster argued 249 cases before the Supreme Court where he made “many eloquent 
arguments” (Hall, 1992, p. 921).  William Pinkney served as the U.S. Attorney General from 
1811-1815 and was described as “the leading member of the Supreme Court bar” in his later 
years (Hall, 1992, p. 635).  William Wirt served as the U.S. Attorney General from 1817-1824 
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and argued 174 cases before the Court, “some as attorney general for the government and more 
as counsel for private clients” (Hall, 1992, p. 934).  Subsequent to McCullough, he served as an 
advocate for the Cherokee Nation in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), a landmark case 
in American Indian law. 
 Daniel Webster opened the argument for the United States.  He began by noting that it 
was somewhat late to be challenging the constitutionality of a law originally passed in 1791, 
some twenty-eight years ago.  Observing that the constitutional issue “arose early after the 
adoption of the constitution, and was discussed and settled, so far as legislative decision could 
settle it, in the first congress,” Webster pointed out that “each succeeding congress has acted and 
legislated on the presumption of the legal existence of such a power in the government” (p. 323).  
Noting further that “[t]he executive government has acted upon it; and the courts of law have 
acted upon it,” Webster concluded: 
When all branches of the government have thus been acting on the existence 
of this power, nearly thirty years, it would seem almost too late to call it in 
question, unless its repugnancy with the constitution were plain and 
manifest.  (p. 323) 
 
Pinkney, the last member of the federal government’s legal team to argue before the Court, 
expanded this point.  He first reiterated Webster: 
The constitutionality of the establishment of the bank, as one of the means 
necessary to carry into effect the authorities vested in the national 
government, is no longer an open question.  It has been long since settled by 
decisions of the most revered authority, legislative, executive, and judicial.  
(p. 378) 
 
Pinkney then argued that the original legislative construction of the act chartering the First Bank 
of the United States entitled it to respect because of two major points: 
The first is, that it was a contemporaneous construction; the second is, that it 
was made by the authors of the constitution themselves.  The members of 
the convention who framed the constitution, passed into the first congress, 
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by which the new government was organized; they must have understood 
their own work.  (pp. 378-379) 
 
Wirt, too, argued that the previous practices of approving and implementing the legislation 
deserved the status of precedence.  According to Wirt, “After a lapse of time, and so many 
concurrent acts of the public authorities, this exercise of power must be considered as ratified by 
the voice of the people, and sanctioned by precedent” (p. 176). 
 Wirt presented a strong argument linking the government’s action in chartering a bank 
with the Necessary & Proper Clause.   
The power to establish such a corporation is implied, and involved in the 
grant of specific powers in the constitution; because the end involves the 
means necessary to carry it into effect.  A power without the means to use it, 
[sic] is a nullity.  But we are not driven to seek for this power in implication: 
because the constitution, after enumerating certain specific powers, 
expressly gives to congress the power “to make all laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and 
all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United 
States, or in any department or officer thereof.”  (p. 353) 
 
Wirt continued: 
If, therefore, the act of congress establishing the bank was necessary and 
proper to carry into execution any one or more of the enumerated powers, 
the authority to pass it is expressly delegated to congress by the constitution.  
We contend, that it was necessary and proper to carry into execution several 
of the enumerated powers, such as the powers of levying and collecting 
taxes …; of paying the public debts …; of borrowing money …; of 
regulating commerce …; of raising and supporting armies and a navy; and 
of carrying on war.  (pp. 353-354) 
 
Wirt concluded his argument by stating, “To make a law constitutional, nothing more is 
necessary than that it should be fairly adapted to carry into effect some specific power given to 
congress” (p. 356).   
 The federal government’s legal team recognized that the argument favoring the 
supremacy of the Necessary & Proper Clause depended upon a loose construction of the 
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Constitution emphasizing implied powers.  Pinkney addressed this issue directly.  After 
observing that many members of the first congress, which followed the adoption of the 
Constitution, had participated in the Constitutional Convention and that they must have 
“understood their own work” in legislating for the establishment of a national bank, Pinkney 
analyzed the implications of such activity. 
They determined that the constitution gave to congress the power of 
incorporating a banking company.  It was not required, that this power 
should be expressed in the text of the constitution; it might safely be left to 
implication.  An express authority to erect corporations generally, would 
have been perilous; since it might have been constructively extended to the 
creation of corporations entirely unnecessary to carry into effect the other 
powers granted…  (p.379) 
 
Pinkney concluded, “The power of erecting corporations is not an end of any government; it is a 
necessary means of accomplishing the ends of all governments.  It is an authority inherent in, and 
incident to, all sovereignty” (p. 383).   
 The issue of implied powers also, according to the plaintiff’s attorneys, followed from the 
nature of a constitution as a blueprint and not a detailed legal code.  Wirt observed: 
[T]o have enumerated the power of establishing corporations, among the 
specific powers of congress, would have been to change the whole plan of 
the constitution; to destroy its simplicity, and load it with all the complex 
details of a code of private jurisprudence.  The power of establishing 
corporations is not one of the ends of government; it is only a class of means 
for accomplishing its ends,  An enumeration of this particular class of 
means, omitting all others, would have been a useless anomaly in the 
constitution.  (pp. 357-358) 
 
Noting the difference between means and end, Wirt concluded that the constitution dealt with the 
end or purpose of government to which the means for achieving designated purposes needed to 
relate. 
Among the multitude of means to carry into execution the powers expressly 
given to the national government, congress is to select, from time to time, 
such as are most fit for the purpose.  It would have been impossible to 
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enumerate them all in the constitution; and a specification of some, omitting 
others, would have been wholly useless.  The court, in inquiring whether 
congress had made a selection of constitutional means, is to compare the law 
in question with the powers it is intended to carry into execution…  (pp. 
356-357) 
 
 Pinkney straightforwardly addressed the intersection of the Tenth Amendment and the 
idea of implied powers implicit in the promulgation of the supremacy of the Necessary & Proper 
Clause for the issue at hand by grounding his presentation in the events of the Constitutional 
Convention.   
The reservation in the 10th amendment to the constitution, of “powers not 
delegated to the United States,” is not confined to powers not expressly 
delegated.  Such an amendment was indeed proposed; but it was perceived, 
that it would strip the government of some of its most essential powers, and 
it was rejected.  Unless a specific means be expressly prohibited to the 
general government, it has it, within the sphere of its specified powers.  (p. 
384) 
 
Intertwined within Pinkney’s argument were comments about the nature of the Constitution as a 
blueprint for government, not as a legal code detailing an endless catalog of minutiae, and 
remarks about the impossibility of legislating in detailed fashion for an unforeseen future. 
It was impossible for the framers of the constitution to specify, 
prospectively, all these means, both because it would have involved an 
immense variety of details, and because it would have been impossible for 
them to foresee the infinite variety of circumstances, in such an unexampled 
state of political society as ours, for ever changing and for ever improving.  
How unwise would it have been, to legislate immutably for exigencies 
which had not then occurred, and which must have been foreseen but dimly 
and imperfectly!  (p. 385) 
 
Pinkney added yet another plank into the platform erected upon the Necessary & Proper Clause, 
that of congressional action constituting a political action within the boundary of the Constitution 
that lies beyond the judgment of the other branches of government. 
The power of passing all laws necessary and proper to carry into effect the 
other powers specifically granted, is a political power; it is a matter of 
legislative discretion, and those who exercise it, have a wide range of choice 
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in selecting means….  Congress alone has the fit means of inquiry and 
decision.  (pp. 386-387) 
 
Pinkney concluded that it was “the duty of the court to construe the constitutional powers of the 
national government liberally, and to mould them so as to effectuate its great objects” (p. 386).   
 Webster did not address the second legal question in his arguments, but Wirt, following 
Webster and Hopkinson (the first attorney to argue for the State of Maryland), did.  Assuming 
the congressional action to be constitutional, Wirt stated that “the right to establish the branches 
of that bank in the different states of the Union follows, as an incident of the principal power” (p. 
178).  Wirt provided clarification: 
The right, then, to establish these branches, is a necessary part of the means.  
This right is not delegated by congress to the parent bank.  The act of 
congress for the establishment of offices of discount and deposit, leaves the 
time and place of their establishment to the directors, as a matter of detail.  
When established, they rest, not on the authority of the parent bank, but on 
the authority of congress.  (pp. 359-360) 
 
 The third legal question focused on the ability of the State of Maryland to tax the 
Baltimore branch of the Second Bank of the United States.  Webster addressed the issue by 
reviewing federalism and posing questions about the resolution of possible conflicts between the 
federal and state governments. 
The people of the United States have seen fit to divide sovereignty, and to 
establish a complex system.  They have conferred certain powers on the 
state governments, and certain other powers on the national government.  As 
it was easy to foresee that question must arise between these governments 
thus constituted, it became of great moment to determine, upon what 
principle these questions should be decided, and who should decide them.  
(p. 326) 
 
Answering the questions rhetorically posed, Webster undercut a portion of the states’ rights 
position by affirming that the Court was the final adjudicator and by pointing to the Supremacy 
Clause without mentioning it by name or specifying its location in the Constitution. 
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The constitution, therefore, declares, that the constitution itself, and the laws 
passed in pursuance of its provisions, shall be the supreme law of the land, 
and shall control all state legislation and state constitutions which may be 
incompatible therewith; and it confides to this court the ultimate power of 
deciding all question arising under the constitution and laws of the Untied 
States.  (pp. 326-327) 
 
Given this understanding, Webster concluded, the act of Congress “must have its full and 
complete effects” (p. 330).  He continued: 
Its operation cannot be either defeated or impeded by acts of state 
legislation.  To hold otherwise, would be to declare, that congress can only 
exercise its constitutional powers, subject to the controlling discretion, and 
under the sufferance, of the state governments.  (p. 330) 
 
 Wirt brought the Supremacy Clause to bear directly on the Tenth Amendment.  First, he 
posed Maryland’s argument in favor of state taxation of the Second Bank of the United States: 
But it is objected, that, by the 10th amendment of the constitution, all 
powers not expressly delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the 
states, are reserved to the latter.  It is said, that this being neither delegated 
to the one, nor prohibited to the other, must be reserved: and it is also said, 
that the only prohibition on the power of state taxation, which does exist, 
excludes this case, and thereby leaves it to the original power of the states.  
The only prohibition is, as to laying any imposts, or duties on imports and 
exports, or tonnage duty, and this, not being a tax of that character, is said 
not to be within the terms of the prohibition; and consequently, it remains 
under the authority of the states.  (p. 360) 
 
Having posed the objection to the federal government’s position, Wirt then proceeded to trump it 
with the Supremacy Clause which he spelled out in clear and certain terms.  First, Wirt observed, 
the State of Maryland did not correctly note “the whole sum of constitutional restrictions on the 
authority of the states” (p. 360).  Continuing, Wirt drew attention to the Supremacy Clause. 
There is another clause in the constitution, which has the effect of a 
prohibition on the exercise of their authority, in numerous cases.  The 6th 
article of the constitution of the United States declares, that the laws made in 
pursuance of it, “shall be the supreme law of the land, anything in the 
constitution, or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.”  By this 
declaration, the states are prohibited from passing any acts which shall be 
repugnant to a law of the United States.  (pp. 360-361) 
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Wirt then asserted that the same constitutional ground upholding Congress’ ability to establish a 
national bank also “excludes all interference with the exercise of the power by the states” (p. 
361).  The authority of Congress to ordain a bank “to carry into execution its specified powers” 
is a power that “cannot be interfered with, or controlled in any manner, by the states, without 
putting at hazard the accomplishment of the end…” (p. 361).  Wirt concluded by portraying 
Maryland’s arguments as being consistent with the repudiated Articles of Confederation, a 
position that placed the state in opposition to the current Constitution. 
But, surely, the framers of the constitution did not intend, that the exercise 
of all the powers of the national government should depend upon the 
discretion of the state governments.  This was the vice of the former 
confederation, which it was the object of the new constitution to eradicate.  
(p. 362) 
 
 Pinkney addressed the issue of the origin of government undergirding Maryland’s 
argument for supremacy of the Tenth Amendment.  Jones had previously articulated the states’ 
rights argument for the State of Maryland that linked the Tenth Amendment with the compact 
theory of the Constitution. 
It is insisted, that the constitution was formed and adopted, not by the people 
of the United States at large, but by the people of the respective states.  To 
suppose, that the mere proposition of this fundamental law threw the 
American people into one aggregate mass, would be to assume what the 
instrument itself does not profess to establish.  It is, therefore, a compact 
between the states, and all the powers which are not expressly relinquished 
by it, are reserved to the states.  (p. 363) 
 
Countering the compact theory presented by Jones, Pinkney declared: 
[T]he constitution acts directly on the people, by means of powers 
communicated directly from the people.  No state, in its corporate capacity, 
ratified it; but it was proposed for adoption to popular conventions.  It 
springs from the people, precisely as the state constitution springs from the 
people, and acts on them in a similar manner….  The state sovereignties are 
not the authors of the constitution of the United States.  They are preceding 
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in point of time, to the national sovereignty, but they are postponed to it, in 
point of supremacy, by the will of the people.  (pp. 377-378) 
 
 Attorneys for the State of Maryland favored a strict construction of the Constitution’s 
meaning.  They interpreted “necessary and proper” to indicate absolute necessity with no other 
alternative.  According to Hopkinson, the State of Maryland agreed that the power of 
establishing a national bank was not a power “expressly granted by the constitution,” that it had 
“been obtained by implication … by reasoning from the 8th section of the 1st article of the 
constitution; and asserted to exist, not of and by itself, but as an appendage to other granted 
powers, as necessary to carry them into execution” (p. 331).  However, what was once a 
necessity might not later be considered a necessity.  Such a power, Hopkinson reasoned,  
has relation to circumstances which change; in a state of things which may 
exist at one period, and not at another.  The argument might have been 
perfectly good, to show the necessity of a bank, for the operations of the 
revenue, in 1791, and entirely fail now, when so many facilities for money 
transactions abound, which were wanting then.  (p. 331) 
 
Jones, following Webster, Hopkinson, and Wirt in arguing before the Court, further articulated 
how the phrase “necessary and proper” should be interpreted. 
No terms could be found in the language, more absolutely excluding a 
general and unlimited discretion than these.  It is not “necessary or proper,” 
but “necessary and proper.”  The means used must have both these qualities.  
It must be, not merely convenient – fit – adapted – proper, to the 
accomplishment of the end in view; it must likewise be necessary for the 
accomplishment of that end.  (pp. 366-367) 
 
To ensure correct understanding of strict construction, Jones further explained: 
Many means may be proper, which are not necessary; because the end may 
be attained without them.  The word “necessary,” is said to be a synonyme 
[sic] of “needful.”  But both these words are defined “indispensably 
requisite;” and, most certainly, this is the sense in which the word 
“necessary” is used in the constitution.  (p. 367) 
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 Jones further expanded the argument for a strict construction of the Constitution, 
declaring that both the ends and means of governmental powers were spelled out in the federal 
document.  Jones argued, “The constitution does not profess to prescribe the ends merely for 
which the government was instituted, but also to detail the most important means by which they 
were to be accomplished” (p. 364).  He continued: 
[W]e contend, that the government of the United States must confine 
themselves, in the collection and expenditure of revenue, to the means 
which are specifically enumerated in the constitution, or such auxiliary 
means as are naturally connected with the specific means.  But what natural 
connection is there between the collection of taxes, and the incorporation of 
a company of bankers?  (pp. 364-365) 
 
Martin, the Attorney-General of Maryland, immediately followed Jones and argued against 
implied powers and for a strictly literal interpretation of the Constitution.  Martin first opined, 
“That the scheme of the framers of the constitution, intended to leave nothing to implication, will 
be evident, from the consideration, that many of the powers expressly given are only means to 
accomplish other powers expressly given” (p. 373).   He asked: 
If, then, the convention has specified some powers, which being only means 
to accomplish the ends of government, might have been taken by 
implication; by what just rule of construction, are other sovereign powers, 
equally vast and important, to be assumed by implication?  (pp. 373-374) 
 
Martin responded: 
We insist, that the only safe rule is, the plain letter of the constitution; the 
rule which the constitutional legislators themselves have prescribed in the 
10th amendment, which is merely declaratory; that the powers not delegated 
to the United States, nor prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states 
respectively, or to the people.  (p. 374) 
 
Martin then applied a strict construction of the Constitution’s meaning to the issue being argued 
before the Court. 
The power of establishing corporations is not delegated to the United States, 
nor prohibited to the individual states.  It is, therefore, reserved to the states, 
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or to the people.  It is not expressly delegated, either as an end, or a means, 
of national government.  It is not to be taken by implication, as a means of 
executing any or all of the powers expressly granted…  (p. 374) 
 
 Addressing the second question, which presumed the constitutionality of the act 
establishing the national bank, Hopkinson began by reframing the question in language more 
favorable to Maryland’s position.   
If this Bank of the United States has been lawfully created and incorporated, 
we next inquire, whether it may, of its own authority, establish its branches 
in the several states, without the direction of congress, or the assent of the 
states?  (p. 334) 
 
In language expressing incredulity at the very notion of possibility, Hopkinson further asked: 
[C]an it be contended, that the state rights of territory and taxation are to 
yield for the gains of a money-grading corporation; to be prostrated at the 
will of a set of men who have no concern, and no duty but to increase their 
profits?  (p. 335) 
 
Maryland’s attorneys responded by again arguing that “necessary and proper” indicated 
necessity.  Hopkinson declared, “This power to establish branches, by the directors of the bank, 
must be maintained and justified, by the same necessity which supports the bank itself, or it 
cannot exist” (p. 334).  Such a necessity did not currently exist, according to the attorneys for the 
defendant-in-error.  And, Hopkinson noted, the action being contested constituted an 
unconstitutional delegation of authority: 
If this power belongs to congress, it cannot be delegated to the directors of a 
bank, any more than any other legislative power may be transferred to any 
other body of citizens….  The establishment of a bank in a state, without its 
assent … is a higher exercise of authority, than the creation of the parent 
bank….  Such an exercise of sovereign power, should, at least, have the 
sanction of the sovereign legislature, to vouch that the good of the whole 
requires it, that the necessity exists which justifies it.  (pp. 336-337).  
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 The third legal question formed the crux of the matter, whether a state could tax a federal 
entity, in this case, the Second Bank of the United States.  Hopkinson for the State of Maryland 
quickly reframed the question in terms of sovereignty. 
[I]f a state may no longer decide, whether a trading association, with 
independent powers and immunities, shall plant itself in its territory, carry 
on its business, make a currency and trade on its credit, raising capitals for 
individuals as fictitious as its own; it all this must be granted, the third and 
great question in this cause presents itself for consideration; that is, shall this 
association come there with rights of sovereignty, paramount to the 
sovereignty of the state, and with privileges possessed by no other persons, 
corporations or property in the state?  in [sic] other words, can the bank and 
its branches, thus established, claim to be exempt from the ordinary and 
equal taxation of property, as assessed in the states in which they are 
placed?  (p. 337) 
 
Hopkinson then connected not only the issue of sovereignty with the idea of a strict construction 
of the Constitution’s meaning, but also linked the third legal question to the previous two 
questions. 
As this overwhelming invasion of state sovereignty is not warranted by any 
express clause or grant in the constitution, and never was imagined by any 
state that adopted and ratified that constitution, it will be conceded, that it 
must be found to be necessarily and indissolubly connected with the power 
to establish the bank, or it must be repelled.  (pp. 337-338) 
 
At this point, Hopkinson refreshed the Court’s memory regarding past attitudes brought to bear 
by the Court regarding possible conflicts between the federal government and the states which 
also served to communicate a fall-back position should the Court not be convinced of 
Maryland’s linking the three questions into a unified whole. 
The Court has always shown a just anxiety to prevent any conflict between 
the federal and state powers; to construe both so as to avoid an interference, 
if possible, and to preserve that harmony of action in both, on which the 
prosperity and happiness of all depend.  If therefore, the right to incorporate 
a national bank may exist, and be exercised consistently with the right of the 
state, to tax the property of such bank within its territory, the court will 
maintain both rights; although some inconvenience or diminution of 
advantage may be the consequence.  (p. 338) 
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Having connected state sovereignty to a strict construction of the Constitution and having 
reminded the Court of its responsibility when state and federal sovereignties collide, Hopkinson 
next proceeded to connect both to a strict interpretation of “necessary and proper” as meaning 
“necessity.” 
It is not for the directors of the bank to say, you will lessen our profits by 
permitting us to be taxed; if such taxation will not deprive the government 
of the uses it derives from the agency and operations of the bank.  The 
necessity of the government is the foundation of the charter; and beyond that 
necessity, it can claim nothing in derogation of state authority.  (p. 338) 
 
Finally, after offering a false premise to highlight what he believed to be the strength of the 
state’s position, Hopkinson firmly anchored his full argument for the State of Maryland in the 
constitutional provisions of the Tenth Amendment. 
If the power to erect this corporation were expressly given in the 
constitution, still, it would not be construed to be an exclusion of any state 
right, not absolutely incompatible and repugnant.  The states need no 
reservation or acknowledgment of their right; all remain that are not 
expressly prohibited, or necessarily excluded…  (p. 338)  
 
As Hopkinson noted later in his argument, “Whatever may be the right of the United States to 
establish a bank, it cannot be better than that of the states.  Their lawful power to incorporate 
such institutions has never yet been questioned…” (p. 350).  Having illustrated the power of 
establishing corporations as a co-equal power, Hopkinson next proceeded to establish taxation as 
another co-equal power that was grounded in the Tenth Amendment. 
Granting, that these rights are equal in the two governments; and that the 
sovereignty of the state, within its territory, over this subject, is but equal to 
that of the United States; and that all sovereign power remains undiminished 
in the states, except in those cases in which it has, by the constitution, been 
expressly and exclusively transferred to the United States: the sovereign 
power of taxation (except on foreign commerce) being, in the language of 
the Federalist, co-equal to the two governments…  (pp. 350-351) 
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Refuting the argument that states were prohibited from “passing laws, which shall impair the 
obligation of contracts,” Hopkinson concluded his arguments on behalf of the state by 
articulating what he believed to be the natural conclusion resulting from the state rights’ position: 
[T]he United States cannot, either by a direct law, or by a contract with a 
third party, take away any right from the states, not granted by the 
constitution; they cannot do, collaterally and by implication, what cannot be 
done directly.  Their contracts must conform to the constitution, and not the 
constitution to their contracts.  (pp. 351-352) 
 
 Holding & disposition. 
 The federal government’s arguments as presented by Daniel Webster, William Wirt, and 
William Pinkney prevailed on all three legal questions.  Chief Justice John Marshall delivered 
the Court’s decision.  Regarding the first question as to the ability of Congress to charter a bank, 
the Court unanimously declared: 
After the most deliberate consideration, it is the unanimous and decided 
opinion of this court, that the act to incorporate the Bank of the United 
States is a law made in pursuance of the constitution, and is a part of the 
supreme law of the land.  (p. 424) 
 
The Court’s decision on the second question regarding the constitutionality of the chartered 
bank’s decisions to establish branch banks in various states flowed from the Court’s ruling on the 
first question. 
The branches, proceeding from the same stock, and being conducive to the 
complete accomplishment of the object, are equally constitutional.  It would 
have been unwise, to locate them in the charter, and it would be 
unnecessarily inconvenient, to employ the legislative power in making those 
subordinate arrangements.  The great duties of the bank are prescribed; 
those duties require branches; and the bank itself may, we think, be safely 
trusted with the selection of places where those branches shall be fixed; 
reserving always to the government the right to require that a branch shall be 
located where it may be deemed necessary.  (pp. 424-425) 
 
The Court framed the third question as, “Whether the state of Maryland may, without violating 
the constitution, tax that branch” (p. 425)?  Several pages later, the Court provided a definitive 
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ruling that left no doubt that the national government had made the transition to the Constitution 
and no longer operated in any manner similar to the previous restrictions placed upon it by the 
states under the old Articles of Confederation. 
The court has bestowed on this subject its most deliberate consideration.  
The result is a conviction that the states have no power, by taxation or 
otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the 
operations of the constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry into 
execution the powers vested in the general government.  This is, we think, 
the unavoidable consequence of that supremacy which the constitution has 
declared.  We are unanimously of opinion, that the law passed by the 
legislature of Maryland, imposing a tax on the Bank of the United States, is 
unconstitutional and void.  (p. 436) 
 
The Court “reversed and annulled” the judgment of the Court of Appeals of the State of 
Maryland as well as the original judgment reached by the Baltimore County Court (p. 437).   The 
Court also ordered “that judgment be entered in the said Baltimore country court for the said 
James W. McCulloch,” the head of the Baltimore branch of the Second Bank of the United States 
(p. 437). 
 Court’s rationale. 
 Writing for the unanimous Court, Chief Justice John Marshall first struck down the 
states’ rights position that the federal government owed its existence to the states.  He first 
summarized the states’ rights argument:  “The powers of the general government, it has been 
said, are delegated by the states, who alone are truly sovereign; and must be exercised in 
subordination to the states, who alone possess supreme dominion” (p. 402).  Marshall then 
declared, “It would be difficult to sustain this proposition” (p. 403).  The Chief Justice dismissed 
the notion that because the ratifying conventions were held in the states that such activity 
represented state action by holding it up to ridicule:   
It is true, they assembled in their several states – and where else should they 
have assembled?  No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of 
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breaking down the lines which separate the states, and of compounding the 
American people into one common mass.  (p. 403) 
 
Marshall continued by noting what that action actually represented:  “Of consequence, when they 
act, they act in their states.  But the measures they adopt do not, on that account, cease to be the 
measures of the people themselves, or become the measures of the state governments” (p. 403).  
The Chief Justice further noted the determining line of demarcation that made the ratification an 
act of the people and not one of the state governments: 
The assent of the states, in their sovereign capacity, is implied, in calling a 
convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the people.  But the 
people were at perfect liberty to accept or reject it; and their act was final.  It 
required not the affirmance, and could not be negatived, by the state 
governments.  (p. 404) 
 
Chief Justice Marshall summarized the Court’s position on the origin of American government 
under the U.S. Constitution. 
The government of the Union, then … is, emphatically and truly, a 
government of the people.  In form, and in substance, it emanates from 
them.  Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on 
them, and for their benefit.  (pp. 404-405) 
 
 Preliminary to addressing the question of how to interpret the Constitution, the Chief 
Justice addressed the issue of constitution-as-blueprint versus constitution-as-legal-code.  
Marshall began by discussing the nature and end result of constitution-as-legal-code: 
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which 
its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be 
carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and 
could scarcely be embraced by the human mind.  It would, probably, never 
be understood by the public.  (p. 407) 
 
The Chief Justice next proceeded to discuss constitution-as-blueprint, grounding it in both the 
nature of constitutions and the intentions of the constitutional framers: 
Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, 
its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose 
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those objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.  That 
this idea was entertained by the framers of the American constitution, is not 
only to be inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from the language.  
(p. 407) 
 
Later Marshall also noted the separate purposes of legal codes and constitutions.  He additionally 
commented on the difficulties of foreseeing all possible future difficulties and requirements.  An 
attempt to turn the constitution into a legal code with complex specificity would have also 
negated attempts of future governments to avail “itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and 
to accommodate its legislation to circumstances” (p. 415): 
To have prescribed the means by which government should, in all future 
time, execute its powers, would have been to change, entirely, the character 
of the instrument, and give it the properties of a legal code.  It would have 
been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies 
which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best 
provided for as they occur.  (p. 415) 
 
It is within this context that Chief Justice Marshall uttered his famous and oft-quoted statement, 
“[W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding” (Emphasis in original) (p. 
407). 
 As might be surmised, constitution-as-legal-code links with a strict construction of the 
Constitution’s meaning while constitution-as-blueprint favors a broader construction.  Regarding 
the issue of implied powers, the Chief Justice pointed out a critical difference between the 
Articles of Confederation and the Constitution.  Whereas the Articles of Confederation contained 
wording which excluded “incidental or implied powers,” the Constitution contained no such 
wording nor did it contain any phrases that would require “that everything granted shall be 
expressly and minutely described” (p. 406).  This constitutional concept carried over into the 
Tenth Amendment that was adopted subsequent to constitutional ratification, according to the 
Chief Justice. 
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Even the 10th amendment, which was framed for the purpose of quieting the 
excessive jealousies which had been excited, omits the word “expressly,” 
and declares only, that the powers “not delegated to the United States, nor 
prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states or to the people;” thus 
leaving the question, whether the particular power which may become the 
subject of contest, has been delegated to the one government, or prohibited 
to the other, to depend on a fair construction of the whole instrument.  The 
men who drew and adopted this amendment had experienced the 
embarrassments resulting from the insertion of this word in the articles of 
confederation, and probably omitted it, to avoid those embarrassments.  (pp. 
406-407) 
 
In other words, the U.S. Constitution was to be interpreted as a constitutional blueprint for 
American government in broad terms, not as a legal code with exacting and strict minutiae 
covering every specific possibility that might be encountered for all time.   Having established 
the Constitution as proceeding from the people and not from the states, having expounded the 
nature of a constitution and how it should be interpreted, the Court proceeded to examine how 
the Necessary and Proper Clause should be interpreted.  Was it, as Maryland urged, a “clause, 
though, in terms, a grant of power, …not so in effect…” (p. 412)?  Was the Necessary and 
Proper Clause “really restrictive of the general right, which might otherwise be implied, of 
selecting means for executing the enumerated powers” as claimed by Maryland (p. 412)?  Did 
the word necessary control “the whole sentence,” limit “the right to pass laws for the execution 
of the granted powers,” and exclude “the choice of means” (p. 413)?  Does the word necessary 
“always import an absolute physical necessity, so strong, that one thing to which another may be 
termed necessary, cannot exist without that other” (p. 413)?  Chief Justice Marshall answered 
these questions with a single declaration, “We think it does not” (p. 413).  He explained: 
To employ the means necessary to an end, is generally understood as 
employing any means calculated to produce the end, and not as being 
confined to those single means, without which the end would be entirely 
unattainable.  Such is the character of human language, that no word 
conveys to the mind, in all situations, one single definite idea….  It is 
essential to just construction, that many words which import something 
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excessive, should be understood in a more mitigated sense – in that sense 
which common usage justifies….  This word, then, like others, is used in 
various senses; and, in its construction, the subject, the context, the intention 
of the person using them, are all to be taken into view.  (pp. 413-414) 
 
The Chief Justice further noted that the Necessary and Proper Clause was constitutionally 
“placed among the powers of congress, not among the limitations of those powers”  and that 
“[i]ts terms purport to enlarge, not to diminish the powers vested in the government” (p. 419, p. 
420).  A strictly literal interpretation that excluded recourse to usage, context, and intent was a 
“baneful influence” that rendered “the government incompetent to [the attainment of] its great 
objects” (p. 417, p. 418).  Although the powers of government were limited, the Chief Justice 
observed, a  
[S]ound construction of the constitution must allow to the national 
legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it 
confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to 
perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the 
people.  (p. 421) 
 
The Chief Justice then concluded with an oft-quoted remark that is attributed to him by 
subsequent Court opinions, but which really is an almost word-for-word paraphrase of the 
argument originally used by Alexander Hamilton to the cabinet of President Washington’s first 
cabinet some 18 years previous.50 
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and 
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, 
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional.  (p. 421) 
 
 Having laid the groundwork for the concept of the Constitution as a blueprint for 
government with implied powers and having justified the idea of a broad construction of the 
Constitution’s meaning, the Court ruled that the Second Bank of the United States was one of the 
means by which the federal government chose to enact several constitutionally enumerated 
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powers, e.g., “to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce” (p. 407).  As a 
corollary, the Court also ruled that the branches were constitutional and that having prescribed 
the bank’s duties through legislation, Congress could constitutionally leave “the selection of 
places where those branches” should be located to the “bank itself” (p. 425, p. 424). 
 Regarding the issue of the states being able to tax a federal operation within its 
boundaries, Chief Justice Marshall observed that the arguments by the bank’s attorneys against 
the states didn’t rest on a specific constitutional provision.  Instead, it rested on a principle that 
“so entirely pervades the constitution, is so intermixed with the materials which compose it, so 
interwoven with its web, so blended with its texture, as to be incapable of being separated from 
it, without rending it into shreds” (p. 426).  And what was this principle upon which the federal 
government based its argument?  According to Marshall, “This great principle is, that the 
constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme; that they control the 
constitution and laws of the respective states, and cannot be controlled by them” (p. 426).  
Against this position Maryland constructed its argument, that the states “may exercise their 
acknowledged powers upon [a law of Congress], and that the constitution leaves them this right, 
in the confidence that they will not abuse it” (pp. 427-428).  The Chief Justice noted that the 
logical outcome of such a position would be to change “totally the character” of the Constitution 
and would enable states to arrest “all the measures of the government” and prostrate the federal 
government “at the foot of the states (p. 432).  Such a position would contravene the intent of the 
American people who ratified the Constitution, according to the Court’s opinion. 
The American people have declared their constitution and the laws made in 
pursuance thereof, to be supreme; but this principle would transfer the 
supremacy, in fact, to the states….  This was not intended by the American 
people.  They did not design to make their government dependent on the 
states.  (p.432) 
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In ruling that the Maryland law, which taxed the federal bank, was unconstitutional, the Court 
dealt with the nullification argument of the states’ rights position, implicit in the state’s 
arguments and explicit in the original Kentucky Resolution penned by Thomas Jefferson.   
Speaking for the entire Court, Chief Justice Marshall declared that “the states have no power, by 
taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the 
constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general 
government” (p. 436). 
 Concurring/dissenting opinions. 
 There were no dissenting opinions. 
 Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135 (1892). 
 Location of case previously briefed/summarized. 
 This case was summarized under the Guarantee Clause section entitled “The Guarantee 
Clause Requires Federal Intervention to Secure Protection Against Abusive State Governments.”  
The case summary is located on pages 139-143.  Briefly, the case involved an attempt by a 
losing candidate for governor to oust the duly elected governor of Nebraska from office on the 
question of citizenship that, in turn, involved a dispute between state and federal jurisdictions. 
 Significance for the tenth amendment. 
 The interest of Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer for the Tenth Amendment is Justice 
Field’s dissenting opinion in which he unsuccessfully argued that the Tenth Amendment was a 
limit on the federal government’s ability to intervene in state affairs under the provisions of the 
Constitution’s Guarantee Clause.  Justice Field’s dissent was based, by implication, on the states’ 
rights theory regarding the origin of government that was disallowed in McCullough v. 
Maryland.  Briefly, that theory held that the current constitutional system originated from the 
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state governments who ceded specific powers to the national government.  According to Justice 
Fields: 
They [the states] are qualified sovereignties, possessing only the powers of 
an independent political organization which are not ceded to the general 
government or prohibited to them by the Constitution.  But, except as such 
powers are ceded to the general government or prohibited to them, the States 
are independent political communities.  (p. 182) 
 
Opposed to that theory is the idea that triumphed in McCullough, that American government 
flows from the people, not the states.  It was the people who determined that power should be 
divided between the federal and state governments as outlined in the Constitution.   
 Although receiving judicial sanction in McCullough, this concept stemmed from the 
Framers in the Constitutional Convention.  That the Constitution flowed from the people was the 
primary reason that Madison’s Virginia Plan provided for ratification of the new Constitution by 
“assemblies of Representatives … expressly chosen by the people” (Farrand, I, p. 22).  Madison 
himself declared this reasoning before the Convention on June 5, 1787, when he stated that “he 
thought it indispensable that the new Constitution should be ratified in the most unexceptionable 
form, and by the supreme authority of the people themselves” (Farrand, I, p. 123).  Madison had 
earlier observed that the Articles of Confederation “were defective in this respect” because they 
rested “on the Legislative sanction only” which made it seem “as a Treaty only of a particular 
sort, among the Governments of Independent States” (Farrand, I, p. 122).  The resolution to refer 
the new Constitution “to the people of the States for ratification” was adopted by the Convention 
on June 12, 1787 (Farrand, I, p. 214) and thereafter never challenged, the only question being the 
number of states ratifying that would be sufficient for adoption.   
 Examining changes made in the preamble during the Convention provides further 
evidence that the Framers wished the Constitution to be viewed as springing from the people.  
   
   
364
On July 26, 1787, the Convention selected a “Committee of Detail” to prepare a draft of the 
Constitution containing the resolutions that had been approved” (Farrand, II, p. 128; Farrand, III, 
pp. 64-65).  The members, representing the major geographic areas of the country, were John 
Rutledge from South Carolina (chairman, deep South), Edmund Randolph from Virginia (upper 
South), James Wilson from Pennsylvania (Middle States), Oliver Ellsworth from Connecticut 
(lower New England), and Nathaniel Gorham from Massachusetts (the “heart of New England”) 
(Rossiter, p. 200).  The preamble they submitted to the Convention on August 6, 1787, read: 
We the people of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode-
Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-
Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare, and establish the following 
Constitution for the Government of Ourselves and our Posterity.  (Farrand, 
II, p. 177) 
 
After another month of further deliberation, the Convention appointed a Committee of Style “by 
Ballot to revise the stile [sic] of and arrange the articles which had been agreed to” (Farrand, II, 
p. 553).  Members included William Johnson of Connecticut (chairman), Alexander Hamilton of 
New York, James Madison of Virginia, Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, and Rufus King of 
Massachusetts (Farrand, II, p. 554; Bowen, pp. xviii-xix).  As one constitutional historian noted, 
Gouverneur Morris served as the “penman of the Constitution” (Rossiter, p. 225).  According to 
a fellow committee member, James Madison: 
The finish given to the style and arrangement of the Constitution fairly 
belongs to the pen of Mr. Morris; the task having, probably, been handed 
over to him by the chairman of the Committee, himself a highly respectable 
member, and with the ready concurrence of the others.  A better choice 
could not have been made, as the performance of the task proved.  (Farrand, 
III, p. 499) 
 
 However, “whether he worked under the gaze of his four colleagues or went at it largely alone, 
whether the committee kept to itself or accepted help from other delegates – these are questions 
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to which, alas, we have no answers” (Rossiter, p. 225).  More important for our purpose, the 
finished preamble removed all reference to states.  Instead of beginning with, “We the people of 
the States of …” as noted previously, the preamble now read: 
We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, 
establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common 
defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to 
ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the 
United States of America.  (Farrand, II, p. 651) 
 
Given both the final text of the preamble to the Constitution and the actions taken at the 
Constitutional Convention, the inescapable conclusion is that the people, not the states, are the 
“real sovereign source of the Constitution” (Rossiter, p. 229; see also Federalist No. 78, pp. 435-
436 [Alexander Hamilton]; Corwin, 1965, p. 89; Wills, 1981/2001, pp. 131-134; McCullough v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 – for Daniel Webster’s arguments, 17 U.S. 316, 326; for William 
Pinkney’s arguments, see 17 U.S. 316, 377-378; for Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion, see 
17 U.S. 316, 404-405, 432).  Premised as it was on the compact theory of the Constitution, 
Justice Fields’ dissent rested on non-existent constitutional ground. 
 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
 Facts & procedural history. 
 This case focuses on a dispute between the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment.  
Technically, legal action was brought in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North 
Carolina by a father on behalf of himself and his two minor sons who were employed by a cotton 
mill in Charlotte, North Carolina.  The original case name was Roland H. Dagenhart, and 
Reuben Dagenhart and John Dagenhart v. Fidelity Manufacturing Company and William C. 
Hammer (Wood, 1968, n. 47, p. 96).  The suit sought to enjoin the textile manufacturer, Fidelity 
Manufacturing, from complying with the provisions of the federal Keating-Owen Child Labor 
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Act by discharging its child laborers and to permanently enjoin the district attorney, William 
Hammer, from “enforcing the statute against the company or from instituting proceedings 
against it” (Wood, 1968, p. 97).  Both the House and Senate had passed the Keating-Owen Child 
Labor Act with large majorities in each legislative chamber favoring the measure.  Enacted in 
1916 as part of the Progressive movement’s drive to enact “regulatory legislation to ameliorate 
social problems deemed national in character,” the Child Labor Act barred products 
manufactured by children from interstate commerce (Hall, 1999, p. 122).  Leaving untouched the 
transportation of such goods within the boundaries of any state, the act defined child labor as 
labor committed by “children under the age of fourteen” and  
children between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years … permitted to 
work more than eight hours in any day, or more than six days in any week, 
or after the hour of seven o’clock P.M. or before the hour of 6 o’clock A.M.   
(p. 269) 
 
Both of the Hammer boys, Reuben and John, fell under the definition of children as defined by 
the act, one being under the age of fourteen and the other being between the ages of fourteen and 
sixteen years of age. 
 In actuality, David Clark, editor of the Southern Textile Bulletin and organizer of the 
Executive Committee of Southern Cotton Manufacturers, engineered the lawsuit.  Clark’s father 
had served as the chief justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court after participating in the 
Civil War as a colonel in the Confederate Army while his grandfather had served as governor, 
U.S. senator, and confederate senator from North Carolina in addition to a stint as U.S. Secretary 
of the Navy (Wood, 1968, pp. 42-44).  Described as “a crusty, uncompromising conservative,” 
Clark later admitted in testimony before a congressional committee that he had prepared the test 
case in Hammer v. Dagenhart because he wanted the Child Labor Act “declared 
unconstitutional”; he also admitted that he had difficulty finding employees willing to test the 
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law (Wood, 1968, pp. 94-95).  The difficulty was overcome when the company, Fidelity 
Manufacturing, posted a copy of the statute and listed the employees who would be discharged 
after August 31 to comply with the act when it became effective on Labor Day, 1917. 
 The District Court for the Western District of North Carolina ruled that the Child Labor 
Act was unconstitutional and entered a decree enjoining enforcement of the act in western North 
Carolina.  The judge in the case did not explain his reasons in a written opinion, which was 
described as “a severe breach of judicial canons for a district judge” (Wood, 1968, p. 105).  The 
lack of a written opinion also meant that no applicable precedents were cited to support the 
ruling.  The Supreme Court agreed to review the case on appeal. 
 Legal question. 
 “Is it within the authority of Congress in regulating commerce among the States to 
prohibit the transportation in interstate commerce of manufactured goods” produced in a factory 
employing legislatively defined children (p. 269)? 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 John W. Davis, U.S. Solicitor General, argued the case for the appellants.  Later, as a 
private attorney for a leading Wall Street firm, he “became a founding member of the anti-New 
Deal Liberty League in 1934” (Hall, 1992, p. 219).  As the lead counsel for the steel industry in 
1952, he successfully “challenged the constitutionality of the Truman administration’s seizure of 
the industry” in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Hall, 1992, p. 219).  Davis also 
defended school segregation unsuccessfully in Brown v. Board of Education and was portrayed 
by Burt Lancaster in the 1991 movie focusing on the Clarendon County, South Carolina portion 
of that same ruling, “Separate But Equal.”  However, in 1918, Davis led the arguments for the 
government in defending the constitutionality of the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act.  The head 
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of the Harvard Law School, Roscoe Pound, who had received a special appointment as Assistant 
Attorney General specifically for this case, assisted Hammer at the district court level, as did 
Thomas Parkinson who also received a special appointment as Assistant Attorney General upon 
the urging of the reform groups (Wood, 1968, pp. 100-101).  Parkinson had helped draft the 
Child Labor Act, had made presentations before congressional committees on the topic, and had 
helped draft the administrative regulations that were needed once the Keating-Owen legislation 
was passed by Congress.  Their arguments were used by Davis in his brief to the Court.  William 
Frierson, already serving as an Assistant Attorney General, participated in the brief as well.  No 
information could be located about Robert Szold, an attorney listed in the court record as 
assisting with the brief.  Davis as Solicitor General conducted the oral arguments before the 
Court (Wood, 1968, p. 151). 
 Davis and his team focused on the following points: 
• The point at which “the actual transportation begins” is the point at which “the 
jurisdiction of Congress at once attaches” under the Commerce Clause (p. 252). 
• The Child Labor Act distinguished “between the manufacture, which lies within one 
State, and the interstate movement” (p. 253). 
• “No prohibitions are extended to manufacturers of goods as such” by the act.  “A 
manufacturer may, notwithstanding the act, employ such children as he pleases.  The 
law springs into activity only when actual transportation to another State begins” (p. 
253). 
• “There is no right to use the channels of interstate commerce to affect injuriously the 
health of the people in competing States; nor to consummate the injury to the 
producing child; nor in unfair competition” (p. 256). 
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• “The act is a legitimate exercise of legislative power for the protection of the public 
health” (p. 256).  “Congress acted reasonably in putting child-made goods in the same 
class” as “liquor, lottery tickets, and misbranded food” (p. 257). 
• “Congress was attempting to regulate commerce in good faith…  It sought only to 
prevent the evil resulting from the interstate transportation of child-made goods” (p. 
259). 
• Congress has discretion under the Commerce Clause “to determine which of the 
various business elements of the Nation is entitled to protection” (p. 258).  It 
determined that products made by children didn’t deserve the protection offered by 
interstate commerce. 
• “it was not fanciful to class shipment of child-made goods as unfair competition.  
Fraud and deceit are recognized acts of unfairness.  An advantage derived by drawing 
on the blood of children is also immoral…” (p. 258).   
In concluding its arguments, the defense attorneys for the appellant argued that any attempt to 
invoke the “reserved powers of the States” under the Tenth Amendment was “to beg the 
question.  The reserved powers of the States do not begin until the power of Congress leaves off” 
(p. 259).  Observing that the Child Labor Act did not encroach “upon the reserved powers of the 
States,” the defense team quoted a Court decision reached in 1913 whereby the principle was 
established that Congress could prohibit such interstate transportation as was deemed necessary 
to protect and promote the welfare of the nation: 
As said by Mr. Justice McKenna in Hoke v. United States51, 227 U.S. 308, 
320,  “The power of Congress under the commerce clause of the 
Constitution is the ultimate determining question.  If the statute be a valid 
exercise of that power, how it may affect persons or States is not material to 
be considered.”  (p. 259) 
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 A team of six attorneys presented written and oral arguments for the appellees.  All six 
lawyers came from the same Wall Street firm, O’Brien, Boardman, Parker, and Fox, a law firm 
described as “one of the best-known corporate law organizations in the country” that had been 
retained earlier by Clark to represent the Executive Committee of Southern Cotton 
Manufacturers (Wood, 1968, p. 85).  Morgan J. O’Brien, the law firm’s senior partner, was 
characterized as “one of the select group of business lawyers who argued most of the important 
litigation heard by the Supreme Court” while another participating partner in the case, Junius 
Parker, served as general counsel for the American Tobacco Company (Wood, 1968, p. 85).  
Thus, both the appellant and appellees in Hammer v. Dagenhart had top-notch legal 
representation. 
 The attorney team for the cotton manufacturers sought to draw a distinction between 
production and commerce because such a distinction “is still effective to prevent direct 
congressional regulation of production as distinguished from sale and transportation” (pp. 261-
262).  They also worked to establish that the actual goods produced were harmless and thus 
shouldn’t be denied the right of interstate commerce as “outlaws of commerce,” particularly 
since it was impossible to detect any difference between goods produced by child labor and those 
produced by non-child labor (p. 261).  Attorneys for the textile manufacturers questioned the 
ability of Congress to stretch the Commerce Clause to harmless, manufactured goods by asking, 
“Does the power to regulate commerce extend to and include the power to prohibit harmless and 
useful commodities because of pre-commerce conditions of labor” (p. 261)?  This allowed them 
to reframe the legal question in terms favorable to a Tenth Amendment defense. 
Is the act a regulation of commerce in the constitutional sense?  Or is it a 
regulation of some one of the many internal affairs of the States which 
Congress is not empowered to deal with….  A regulation of “all of these 
delicate, multiform and vital interests – interests which in their nature are, 
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and must be, local in all the details of their successful management.”  (p. 
260) 
 
Attorneys from the powerful Wall Street firm argued that both the purpose and the effect of the 
Keating-Owens Child Labor Act were to “prevent the employment of children, and not to 
safeguard or promote commerce” (p. 261).  Power over manufacture was a police power with no 
specific delegated authority to the federal government in the Constitution and was therefore 
reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.   
Whatever menace there is in child labor has a locality….  The menace, if it 
exists, is confined to where the child is employed.  In invoking the police 
power, Congress is operating outside the domain of interstate commerce.  A 
process of manufacture cannot obstruct or injuriously affect commerce when 
the product of that process is indistinguishable from the products of other 
processes.  (p. 263) 
 
Furthermore, in direct contradistinction to the Progressive impulse that gave rise to the Keating-
Owens Act, the manufacturers’ attorneys stated that child labor did not “taint” the products it 
produced: 
It cannot reasonable and fairly be said that the product of the factory where 
children are employed is so tainted by its origin that during or after 
transportation it constitutes a menace to health or morals or to any other 
subject within the domain of Congress.  (p. 263) 
 
Because the Child Labor Act’s intent was to regulate a manufacturing process and not to regulate 
commerce, it represented more than an abuse of power. 
[W]hen power is called into play, not for the purpose for which it was given, 
but for a covert purpose, it becomes not an abuse of power, but the exercise 
of an unconferred power, and the duty is incumbent upon the court to 
determine this matter….  Covert legislation is legislation whose 
constitutional support bears no sincere relation to the legislative and popular 
purpose sought to be attained.  (p. 265) 
 
Finally, the attorneys for the textile manufacturers posed a closing question:  “Is there a line 
between ‘the commercial power of the Union and the municipal power of the State?’  Has 
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Congress absorbed the police power of the States” (p. 268)?  The attorney closed their argument 
by observing, “If Congress has the power here asserted, it is difficult to conceive what is left to 
the States” (p. 268). 
 Holding & disposition. 
 In a narrow 5-4 decision the Court held that the Child Labor Act exceeded “the 
constitutional authority of Congress” under the Commerce Clause and exerted “a power as to a 
purely local matter to which the federal authority” did not extend as it was reserved to the state 
under the Tenth Amendment (pp. 276-277).  The slim majority thus affirmed the decision of the 
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina that declared the act unconstitutional.  
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes penned a strong dissent that was joined by Justices Brandeis, 
McKenna, and Clarke. 
 Court’s rationale. 
 To fully understand the thinking of the five majority justices, one needs to understand the 
ideological doctrine of laissez-faire constitutionalism.  As can be seen in the following 
description by a professor of public law and legislation, hostility to federal regulatory powers 
constituted one of the tenets of laissez-faire constitutionalism. 
The ideology reflected classical liberal economics, with its commitment to 
market control of the economy, a preference for entrepreneurial liberty, and 
a concomitant hostility to governmental regulation; social Darwinism, which 
extolled competition in the struggle for social existence and survival of the 
economically fittest; … traditional American values, including 
individualism, access to opportunity, and hostility to restraints on 
competition…  (Hall, 1992, p. 492) 
 
Critics of the doctrine included Justice Holmes, Justice Brandeis, Roscoe Pound as Dean of the 
Harvard Law School, and Theodore Roosevelt, particularly during “his Bull Moose campaign of 
1912” (Hall, 1992, p. 493).   Described as an ideology that “was only intermittently dominant,” 
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laissez-faire constitutionalism “led to decisions restrictive of federal regulatory power, including 
… the Child Labor Cases (Hammer v. Dagenhart, 1918, and Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 
1922)” (Hall, 1992, p. 492). 
 In the nontheoretical world of jurisprudence, justices bring mental models to work which 
guide perceptions, both in terms of what is perceived and how it is perceived.  The mental model 
guiding the majority justices in Hammer v. Dagenhart was laissez-faire constitutionalism.  
Mental models sometimes work to preclude (or enhance, depending on one’s perspective) 
success in constitutional litigation as demonstrated below: 
The really basic question is: what difference [do written briefs and oral 
advocacy] make?  What is the significance or consequence of the role of the 
lawyer in Supreme Court litigation? 
 
The answer depends very heavily upon the class of cases involved.  If the 
case is in an area in which the Justices have marked opinions to start with, 
they may be unpersuadable, and in that situation the arguments are 
unimportant.  John P. Frank, Marble Palace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1958), p. 97.  (Wood, 1968, p. 144) 
 
Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson made a similar point in speaking about the practice of 
making oral arguments before the Court. 
[The period of time in the courtroom] is utterly inadequate to educate an 
uninformed judge or to overcome old convictions or predilections, or to win 
a convert to a new position.  Success in such an enterprise is apt to be 
accidental or the result of predetermination.  (Jackson, p. 301) 
 
In this particular case, the older doctrine of laissez-faire constitutionalism triumphed over the 
newer, more recent Progressive Movement doctrine that viewed federal regulation as necessary 
to provide a level economic playing field and to promote a social policy in which children were 
allowed to be children and students instead of factory workers. 
 The majority’s rationale closely followed the arguments presented by the cotton 
manufacturers’ Wall Street attorneys.  First, the majority justices focused on the effect of the 
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Child Labor Act, the prohibition of child labor.  They also drew attention to the fact that the 
manufactured goods that were being shipped were harmless. 
The thing intended to be accomplished by this statute is the denial of the 
facilities of interstate commerce to those manufacturers in the States who 
employ children within the prohibited ages.  The act in its effect does not 
regulate transportation among the States, but aims to standardize the ages at 
which children may be employed in mining and manufacturing within the 
States.  The goods shipped are of themselves harmless.  (pp. 271-272) 
 
The Court’s majority next stated that while Congress had “ample” power over interstate 
transportation, “the production of articles, intended for interstate commerce, is a matter of local 
regulation” (p. 272).  After noting that one intent of the law was to reduce the economic 
advantage enjoyed by manufacturers using lower-priced child labor and thereby promote a fairer 
form of economic competition, the majority opinion, endorsing a basic tenet of laissez-faire 
constitutionalism, declared, “There is no power vested in Congress to require the States to 
exercise their police power so as to prevent possible unfair competition” (p. 273).  Noting what it 
perceived to be the limits of the Commerce Clause, the majority opinion next brought the Tenth 
Amendment into play.   
The grant of power to Congress over the subject of interstate commerce was 
to enable it to regulate such commerce, and not to give it authority to control 
the States in their exercise of the police power over local trade and 
manufacture. 
 
The grant of authority over a purely federal matter was not intended to 
destroy the local power always existing and carefully reserved to the States 
in the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.  (pp. 273-274) 
 
Having interpreted manufacturing as a local activity to be regulated by the individual states, the 
majority justices focused on state governments as a primary component of federalism. 
The maintenance of the authority of the States over matters purely local is as 
essential to the preservation of our institutions as is the conservation of the 
supremacy of the federal power in all matters entrusted to the Nation by the 
Federal Constitution.  (p. 275) 
   
   
375
 
Building upon its prior reasoning, the Court majority announced its conclusion. 
To sustain this statute would not be in our judgment a recognition of the 
lawful exertion of congressional authority over interstate commerce, but 
would sanction an invasion by the federal power of the control of a matter 
purely local in its character, and over which no authority has been 
delegated to Congress in conferring the power to regulate commerce 
among the States.  (p. 276) 
 
 Concurring/dissenting opinions. 
 Justice Holmes wrote a scathing dissent with which Justices Brandeis, McKenna, and 
Clarke concurred.  Described by a professor of political science as “one of the most notable 
dissenting opinions in the Court’s history,” Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes castigated the five 
majority justices for intruding their personal judgments “upon questions of policy [and] morals” 
(Hall, 1992, p. 360; 247 U.S. 251, 280).  Noting that commerce and national public policy were 
matters for congressional decision, Justice Holmes declared, “It is not for this Court to 
pronounce when prohibition is necessary to regulation if it ever may be necessary – to say that it 
is permissible as against strong drink but not as against the product of ruined lives” (p. 280).  
Noting that civilized countries were more in agreement over the evils of child labor than they 
were regarding intoxicants, he ironically observed, “I should have thought that if we were to 
introduce our own moral conceptions where in my opinion they do not belong, this was 
preëminently a case for upholding the exercise of all its powers by the United States” (p. 280).   
 Justice Holmes also felt obligated to point out the obvious: 
The first step in my argument is to make plain what no one is likely to 
dispute – that the statute in question is within the power expressly given to 
Congress if considered only as to its immediate effects and that if invalid it 
is so only upon some collateral ground.  (p. 277) 
 
He continued to explain with simple, declarative sentences that contained no ambiguity and 
which proceeded in logical order: 
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The statute confines itself to prohibiting the carriage of certain goods in 
interstate or foreign commerce.  Congress is given the power to regulate 
such commerce in unqualified terms.  It would not be argued today that the 
power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit.  Regulation means 
the prohibition of something….  So I repeat that this statute in its immediate 
operation is clearly within the Congress’s constitutional power.  (pp. 277-
278) 
 
And then Justice Holmes proceeded directly to the heart of the cotton manufacturers’ and 
majority justices’ mistaken argument, that an “otherwise constitutional power by Congress 
[could] be pronounced unconstitutional because of its possible reaction upon the conduct of the 
States in a matter upon which I have admitted that they are free from direct control,” namely the 
question of child labor (p. 278).  His sarcasm is reminiscent of Justice Harlan’s notable dissents. 
I should have thought that that matter had been disposed of so fully as to 
leave no room for doubt.  I should have thought that the most conspicuous 
decisions of this Court had made it clear that the power to regulate 
commerce and other constitutional powers could not be cut down or 
qualified by the fact that it might interfere with the carrying out of the 
domestic policy of any State.  (p. 278) 
 
And then Holmes began to cite and discuss the court cases serving as precedents for the matter at 
hand:  McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27; Veazie Bank v. Fenno 8 Wall.533; Hipolite Egg 
Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45; Weeks v. United States, 245 U.S. 618;  and Hoke v. United 
States, 227 U.S. 308, to mention only a few of the cases cited by Holmes.  Then, much like a 
schoolteacher working with students having difficulty understanding a simple, but abstract 
concept, Justice Holmes explained the intersection of the Commerce Clause and the Keating-
Owen Child Labor Act to the five majority justices. 
The act does not meddle with anything belonging to the States.  They may 
regulate their internal affairs and their domestic commerce as they like.  But 
when they seek to send their products across the state line they are no longer 
within their rights….  Under the Constitution such commerce belongs not to 
the States but to congress to regulate.  It may carry out its views of public 
policy whatever indirect effect they may have upon the activities of the 
States.  (p. 281) 
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And, like any good teacher would do in similar circumstances, Holmes drew an analogy between 
something he felt certain the justices understood and the abstract concept not fully understood. 
Instead of being encountered by a prohibitive tariff at her boundaries the 
State encounters the public policy of the United States which it is for 
Congress to express.  The public policy of the United States is shaped with a 
view to the benefit of the nation as a whole.  (p. 281) 
 
Justice Holmes concluded his dissent with the following observation: 
The national welfare as understood by Congress may require a different 
attitude within its sphere from that of some self-seeking State.  It seems to 
me entirely constitutional for Congress to enforce its understanding by all 
the means at its command.  (p. 281) 
 
Focusing as Holmes did upon what he viewed as a legitimate application of congressional 
authority derived from the Commerce Clause, which was substantiated by multiple precedents, 
Holmes’ dissent paved the way for later success in protecting the nation’s social and economic 
welfare through a focus upon using the “channels of commerce to achieve social welfare 
purposes” (Hall, 1992, p. 217).   
 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company, 259 U.S. 20 (1922). 
 Case summary. 
 The eloquence of Justice Holmes’ dissent and the narrowness of the decision’s majority 
in Dagenhart combined to affirm, for many people, the wisdom of regulating child labor on a 
national scale.  In many people’s minds, the Keating-Owens Child Labor Act was inherently just 
as well as constitutional.  The Dagenhart decision “provoked an outpouring of popular demands 
for new federal child labor legislation” (Wood, 1968, p. 178).  Congress responded by enacting a 
second measure to regulate child labor, in this instance by attaching a rider, the Pomerene 
amendment, to the Revenue Bill of 1918.  The Pomerene amendment incorporated the vast 
majority of the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act, but replaced reliance on the Commerce Clause 
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to prohibit interstate commerce with the taxing power of Congress.  The Pomerene amendment 
levied a tax of ten cents per dollar of net profits received by manufacturers who violated the 
child labor provisions, thus greatly reducing the economic incentive to use lower-priced child 
labor.  The Pomerene amendment differed from the Keating-Owen Act in another important 
aspect as well.  It was much more comprehensive in scope, applying child labor standards to 
every “mine, mill, cannery, workshop, factory or manufacturing establishment” in the United 
States (Wood, 1968, p. 203).   
 The child labor amendment passed by overwhelming majorities in both houses, 50-12 in 
the Senate and 312-11 in the House.  Southerners cast eleven of the negative Senate votes with 
eight of those coming from the four “principal cotton textile manufacturing states – North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama” (Wood, 1968, p. 205).  Unlike the previous 
Keating-Owen Child Labor Act, no significant northern Senate votes were cast against the 
measure, the lone vote coming from a Colorado senator who "reflected the Colorado sugar beet 
raisers' economic stake in thousands of agricultural child workers" (Wood, 1968, p. 206).  
Senators absent from the vote because of starting their Christmas vacation early (the Senate vote 
took place on December 18, 1918) had announced their intention to support the Pomerene 
amendment (Wood, 1968, pp. 205-206).  The vote in the House of Representatives took place 
February 8, 1919 with the only negative votes being cast by southerners.  The amendment took 
effect on April 25, 1919 (Wood, 1968, pp. 215-216). 
 Clark and the Executive Committee of Southern Cotton Manufacturers searched for a 
likely candidate to provide a test case that would challenge the constitutionality of the Child 
Labor Tax Act.  Clark, in particular, did not want to go outside the friendly confines of the 
federal Western District of North Carolina; however, all of the textile plants had either paid the 
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tax without protest or had abandoned the practice of using child labor (Wood, 1968, p. 260).  
Using information obtained from J.W. Bailey, the Collector of Internal Revenue for the District 
of North Carolina, Clark obtained a list of assessments for other manufacturers in the Western 
District and approached them, striking a responsive chord with officials of the Drexel Furniture 
Company, described as “representative of another southern industry that general resisted 
progressive economic reforms” (Wood, 1968, p. 260). 
 Meanwhile, the U.S. Attorney General’s office also desired a test case to establish the 
constitutionality of the Child Labor Tax Act and remove any doubt about the act’s legitimacy.  
However, James M. Beck had replaced Davis upon his resignation as the Solicitor General.  The 
Solicitor General’s office and the Executive Committee’s attorneys communicated and worked 
with each other to establish and bring forward a test case as quickly as possible.  The Solicitor 
General, in turn, communicated with the federal district attorney’s office in North Carolina as 
well as with the internal revenue office in Raleigh, North Carolina to ensure an expeditious 
handling of the case that involved priority treatment and no delays on the federal government’s 
part (Wood, 1968, pp. 261-265).  Drexel Furniture Company paid the tax under protest and then 
initiated proceedings in U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina in 
Greensboro to recover the amount paid for the contested tax.  After the judge ordered Bailey, the 
internal revenue officer for North Carolina, to appear in court to answer the charges, the federal 
district attorney “filed a demurrer contending that the child labor tax was constitutional” (Wood, 
1968, p. 264).  After argument, the federal judge dismissed the demurrer and ruled that the Child 
Labor Tax Act was unconstitutional as a violation of the Tenth Amendment as determined in the 
Dagenhart case.  Subsequent activity was both described and characterized by a political 
historian: 
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After receiving Judge Boyd’s ruling, District Attorney Linney filed an 
assignment of errors; then he requested and was granted a writ for appeal.  
The entire performance was well-nigh perfunctory, as if the legal drama had 
been repeatedly rehearsed, as in fact it had.  Everyone concerned with the 
litigation anticipated a negative holding…  (Wood, 1968, p. 265) 
  
 Two critical differences differentiated how the Supreme Court would hear this case.  
Former President William Howard Taft now served as the Chief Justice.  His views, based upon 
his writings and speeches, were summarized: 
For Taft, judicial review was the fundamental institution of American 
government, distinguishing it from other democratic societies.  Its purpose 
was to ensure considered public action, to restrain popular passions, and to 
impose strict prohibitions upon political interference in social and economic 
affairs in order to protect personal liberty and the fundamental rights of 
property.  These freedoms, he deeply believed, were indispensable to the 
existence and progress of society.  (Wood, 1968, p. 259) 
 
In other words, Taft was a fervent believer in and articulate spokesman for laissez-faire 
constitutionalism.  As Chief Justice he worked hard (and effectively, as we will soon see) to 
overcome the “serious divisions” that existed on the Court he inherited as Chief Justice by 
moderating conflict and by massing individual justices behind the majority decision.   
Beyond all else, he sought to recreate the conception of a tribunal that spoke 
decisively upon the constitutional questions that came before it.  His 
purpose was to strengthen judicial review and to put the Court beyond 
popular control and above criticism.  (Wood, 1968, p. 259) 
 
The other critical difference involved the new Solicitor General who replaced Davis.  First, 
James M. Beck had much less experience arguing cases before the Supreme Court.  More 
importantly, he was opposed to federal regulation of child labor because, as he wrote previously 
in a journal article entitled “Nullification by Indirection,” regulating child labor was “a subject 
beyond question exclusively within the police power of the state” (Wood, 1968, pp. 269).  
Described as having “heartily approved the Dagenhart decision” and as being “thoroughly 
convinced of the unconstitutionality of the child labor tax,” he was now confronted with having 
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to argue its constitutionality (Wood, 1968, pp. 269, 268).  Furthermore, three weeks before 
Drexel was to be argued, Beck observed to the St. Louis Bar Association “that if the courts 
continued to sustain congressional taxation without inquiry into motive, ‘little will be left of the 
rights of the State’” (Wood, 1968, p. 269).  “Propriety dictated that Beck choose one of two 
alternatives: submerge his personal convictions and present a wholehearted defense of the 
legislation entrusted to his care or acknowledge its irremedial defects despite the political 
hazards” (Wood, 1968, p. 268).  Beck chose neither of the alternatives.  Two historians, 
substantiated (in this writer’s opinion) by a careful reading of the case and comparison with 
arguments used in Dagenhart, reached similar conclusions.  Professor Stephen B. Wood, citing 
Morton Keller’s In Defense of Yesterday: James M. Beck and the Politics of Conservatism 
published in 1958 by Coward-McCann with which he agreed, described Beck’s course of action. 
To resolve his dilemma, he tried to give his brief and oral advocacy the 
appearance of an energetic defense while, in fact, he contrived a self-
defeating argument, one deliberately calculated to destroy rather than 
preserve the statute.  He could not escape from his past and his conservative 
convictions.  (Wood, 1968, pp. 268-269) 
 
How exactly did this happen?   
In form, his brief was a strong argument for legislative supremacy and 
against judicial supervision….  But Beck drastically overstated the argument 
and presented a sweeping conception of congressional power, one almost 
certain to antagonize the judicial mind.  Indeed, he virtually challenged the 
Court to override the principle of judicial impotence.  At the same time, he 
repeatedly undercut the child labor tax with numerous candid admissions 
that it carried far – clearly beyond political limitations, and in effect beyond 
constitutional ones.  (Wood, 1968, pp. 269-270) 
 
By contrast, the brief by the Wall Street attorneys retained by the Executive Committee of 
Southern Cotton Manufacturers “was characterized by vigorous but restrained advocacy.  It … 
incorporated long passages from the Dagenhart brief” (Wood, 1968, p. 271). 
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 Chief Justice Taft delivered the Court’s opinion.  After reviewing the procedural facts of 
the case, Taft summarized the two positions: 
The law is attacked on the ground that it is a regulation of the employment 
of child labor in the States – an exclusively state function under the Federal 
Constitution and within the reservations of the Tenth Amendment.  It is 
defended on the ground that it is a mere excise tax levied by the Congress of 
the United States under its broad power of taxation conferred by § 8, Article 
I, of the Federal Constitution.  (p. 36) 
 
The legal questions raised by the two positions were: first, “Does this law impose a tax with only 
that incidental restraint and regulation which a tax must inevitably involve;” and second, “Or 
does it regulate by the use of the so-called tax as a penalty” (p. 36)?  Without using the term, Taft 
observed that the legal issues centered on federalism.  “In the maintenance of local self 
government, on the one hand, and the national power, on the other, our country has been able to 
endure and prosper for near a century and a half” (p. 37).  Examining the intersection of the 
congressional action and the Tenth Amendment, Taft declared: 
But, in the act before us, the presumption of validity cannot prevail, because 
the proof of the contrary is found on the very face of its provisions.  Grant 
the validity of this law, and all that Congress would need to do, hereafter, in 
seeking to take over to its control any one of the great number of subjects of 
public interest, jurisdiction of which the States have never parted with, and 
which are reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment, would be to enact a 
detailed measure of complete regulation of the subject and enforce it by a 
so-called tax upon departures from it.  (pp. 37-38) 
 
Taft concluded, “To give such magic to the word ‘tax’ would be to break down all constitutional 
limitation of the powers of Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of the States” (p. 
38). 
 Next, Taft tried to articulate the difference between a tax and a penalty, which he 
admitted was “difficult to define” (p. 38).  Nevertheless, Taft proceeded with an attempt to 
distinguish the current case from the  precedents whereby the Court “had legitimated using the 
   
   
383
taxing power for regulatory purposes” (Hall, 1992, p. 56).  The most notable precedents were 
McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, which upheld a special tax on oleomargarine as “a 
substitute for butter;” United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, which upheld “a special tax on the 
manufacture, importation and sale or gift of opium or coca leaves or their compounds or 
derivatives;” and Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533, in which the Court upheld a special tax 
imposed on “circulating notes of persons and state banks” in order to help control the national 
currency as well as raise money to finance the costs of the Civil War (pp. 40, 42-43).  Judicial 
legitimacy, like beauty, lies in the eye of the beholder.  Taxes imposed on “subjects … with the 
incidental motive of discouraging them by making their continuance onerous … do not lose their 
character as taxes because of the incidental motive” (p. 38).  “But,” Taft continued, “there comes 
a time in the extension of the penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as 
such and becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punishment” (p. 38).  
The criteria to judge the point at which a tax law crosses the line between legitimacy and 
illegitimacy was left vague, other than the suggestion that its “prohibitory and regulatory effect 
and purpose are palpable” (p. 37). 
 Announcing the Court’s first finding, Taft declared, “The case before us can not be 
distinguished from that of Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251….  This court held the law in 
that case to be void” (p. 39).  Taft found that “the necessary effect” of the act being challenged 
was “to regulate the hours of labor of children in factories and mines within the States, a purely 
state authority” (p. 39).  Taft further noted that “the so-called tax is a penalty to coerce people of 
a State to act as Congress wishes them to act in respect of a matter completely the business of the 
state government under the Federal Constitution” (pp. 39).  The Court affirmed the judgment of 
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the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina and declared “the Child Labor 
Tax Law invalid” (p. 44). 
 Significance for the tenth amendment. 
 The decision in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company, the second of the Child Labor 
Cases, was one of the “decisions restrictive of federal regulatory power” that flowed from the 
mental model formed by the ideology of laissez-faire constitutionalism (Hall, 1992, p. 493; see 
also previous discussion in this paper of “Court’s Rationale” in Hammer v. Dagenhart, pp. 372-
373).  It would hold sway for two more decades before being overcome.  Federal regulation to 
protect and preserve the nation’s economic and social welfare, part of the mental model of the 
Progressive Movement, would require more adaptive work in terms of changing beliefs and 
attitudes before it would triumph over laissez-faire constitutionalism.  The current mental model, 
focused upon the welfare of business, which enjoyed success in this case, derived legal sanction 
from the Tenth Amendment while the alternative mental model, springing forth as part of the 
Progressive Movement that focused upon people’s social and economic welfare, would, in the 
future, abandon reliance upon federal taxing authority and would cite the Commerce Clause for 
legal authority, thus following the pathway illuminated by Justice Holmes’ dissent in Hammer v. 
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (see previous discussion of this case).  It would take a world-wide 
depression for the Progressive Movement’s mental model to be incorporated by the New Deal 
and eventually gain acceptance by all three branches of government. 
 United States v. Darby Lumber Company, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 Facts & procedural history. 
 Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938 as “the last major piece of New 
Deal legislation” (Hall, 1992, p. 217).  Using its powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate 
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interstate commerce, Congress established “minimum wages and maximum hours” for workers 
“engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce” (p. 100).  The maximum hours 
provision established “forty-one hours a week” as the point beyond which “increased 
compensation for overtime” became effective while the minimum wage provision provided that 
workers would be paid at least “25¢ per hour” of work (p. 110).  The Fair Labor Standards Act 
established fines and/or imprisonment for employers who violated the wage and hours 
provisions, who shipped goods across state lines that were produced in violation of the wage and 
hours requirements, and who failed to keep records documenting the wages and hours of each 
employee. 
 Darby operated a lumber mill in Georgia that purchased raw timber and turned it “into 
finished lumber with the intent … to ship it in interstate commerce to customers outside the 
state” (p. 111).  The indictment submitted to the “federal district court for southern Georgia” 
charged Darby with paying workers less than the minimum wage, not paying overtime wages for 
hours worked beyond the maximum amount, with violating the interstate commerce provisions 
for goods produced under conditions that violated the wages and hours provisions, and with 
“failure to keep records showing the hours worked each day a week by each of his employees” 
(pp. 108 & 111).   
 Darby’s legal counsel filed a demurrer that challenged the Act’s validity because it 
exceeded powers granted by the Commerce Clause and because it violated rights guaranteed 
under “the Fifth and Tenth Amendments” (p. 111).  The district court’s ruling (32 F.Supp. 734) 
declared the Fair Labor Standards Act to be unconstitutional because it regulated the 
manufacture of goods “within the states” which was not “interstate commerce” (p. 111).  The 
district court also ruled that the Act’s regulation of wages and hours was “not within the 
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congressional power to regulate interstate commerce” (p. 112).  Acting on the demurrer filed by 
Darby, the “district court quashed the indictment in its entirety” (p. 111).  The federal 
government appealed directly to the Supreme Court “under § 238 of the Judicial Code” which 
authorized direct appeals to the Court “when the judgment sustaining the demurrer ‘is based 
upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment is founded’” (pp. 108 
& 109).  The Court granted the appeal “under the Criminal Appeals Act, from a judgment 
quashing an indictment” (p. 101). 
 Legal questions. 
 First, does Congress have “constitutional power” to prohibit from interstate commerce 
goods produced under conditions violating the wage and hours provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (p. 108)?  Second, does Congress have legitimate authority to set minimum wage 
and maximum hours provisions for workers engaged in manufacturing goods intended for 
interstate commerce?  Third, in relation to the previous prohibitions, does Congress have the 
power to require employers “to keep records showing the hours worked each day and week by 
each of his employees” (p. 108)? 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 The Solicitor General and the Assistant Attorney General, assisted by six other 
individuals, made the arguments that asserted the constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act.  The arguments closely resembled the arguments made in Hammer v. Dagenhart almost two 
decades previously, e.g., firms with “lower labor standards possess an unfair advantage in 
interstate competition,” the legislation derives its authority from the Commerce Clause, the 
power of Congress over interstate commerce is not “limited to articles in themselves harmful or 
deleterious,” and that the commerce power “is measured by what it regulates, not by what it 
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affects” (pp. 102 & 103).  As previously in Hammer v. Dagenhart, government attorneys noted 
the inapplicability of the Tenth Amendment.  “The Tenth Amendment merely reserves to the 
States ‘the powers not delegated to the United States.’  That it is not a limitation upon the 
exercise of the powers which are delegated to the Federal Government is confirmed by the 
history of its adoption” (p. 104). 
 New arguments, however, were made as well.  Under the Commerce Clause, states are 
prohibited “from forbidding importation of goods produced under substandard conditions;” 
conversely, “The commerce clause was designed to empower the national government to deal 
with such problems” (p. 102).  Unlike Hammer v. Dagenhart, no attempts were made to 
distinguish between commerce and manufacture.  Instead appellant attorneys noted the changed 
meaning of the word, commerce.  “Lexicographers, economists, and authors used the term 
‘commerce’ to refer not only to the narrow concept of sale or exchange, but to include the entire 
moneyed economy, embracing production and manufacturing as well as exchange” (p. 103).  
Also new to the arguments made for the constitutionality of an act using the Commerce Clause to 
regulate labor conditions was the assertion that Hammer v. Dagenhart had “been repudiated by 
subsequent decisions of this Court” (p. 103).  Cited cases included Shreveport Case which held 
that “intrastate acts lie within the power of Congress when necessary effectively to control 
interstate transactions, and Congress need not wait until transportation commences in its effort to 
protect the flow of commerce;” and the Labor Board Cases “because Congress found that [a 
provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act] will diminish the obstructions to interstate commerce 
which flow from labor disputes” (p. 104).  Attorneys concluded with the flat assertion, “The Act 
does not violate the Fifth Amendment” (p. 104).  The Court’s record doesn’t contain evidence 
that the government substantiated that declaration beyond the mere statement. 
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 No new arguments were introduced by the attorney for Darby, the appellee in the case.  
The same arguments, which had proven successful in Hammer v. Dagenhart and Bailey v. 
Drexel Furniture Company, were employed once again.  And, why not?  Those arguments had 
also proven successful in striking down a multitude of New Deal congressional acts that were 
predicated on the belief that “the commerce power granted Congress extensive authority to 
regulate labor relations, commercial activities, agriculture and the like” (Hall, 1992, p. 128).  
Decisions striking down key provisions of the New Deal program designed to facilitate the 
economic recovery of the country’s economy included Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
a 1935 decision that invalidated the New Deal’s National Industrial Recovery Act by ruling that 
the poultry codes drawn up under the NIRA regulated local transactions not subject to 
congressional control of interstate commerce (in addition to ruling that Congress had 
unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to the president); United States v. Butler, a 
1936 decision that struck down the New Deal’s agricultural production control program 
established by the Agricultural Adjustment Act; Carter v. Carter Coal Company, an another 
1936 decision that voided the New Deal’s attempts to regulate mining under the Commerce 
Clause through the National Bituminous Coal Act; and Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 
yet another 1936 Court ruling that invalidated New York’s efforts to establish a minimum wage 
for women and children.  The latter ruling, while having a possible impact on the Fair Labor 
Standards Act’s attempt to establish minimum wages, was based primarily on the Contract 
Clause as well as due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Yet the case was a 
success for laissez-faire constitutionalism, as were the others previously cited, in keeping the 
government from interfering with capitalism and the sacrosanct, yet invisible, hand of the market 
(see pp. 372-373 of this paper).  The doctrine of laissez-faire constitutionalism, employed by the 
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Court majorities in cases subsequent to Hammer v. Dagenhart, but prior to United States v. 
Darby, effectively gutted the New Deal’s economic program.  As a result, no reason existed to 
change arguments that had a proven track record of success, no reason except for two possibly 
dangerous storm clouds on the horizon – West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, a 1937 decision 
upholding a Washington minimum wage law for women “that was almost identical to the one 
struck down the previous year” in Morehead, and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., a 1937 
decision upholding the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), legislation 
that used the commerce power to guarantee workers the right to unionize and to prohibit 
companies from subsequently discriminating against union employees (Hall, 1992, p. 204).  Still, 
these seemed to not deal directly with the issues in the Fair Labor Standards Act, reasonably 
considered to be controlled by the Court’s precedent established in Hammer v. Dagenhart. 
 Archibald B. Lovett, arguing the case for Darby, opened by noting the Fair Labor 
Standards Act attempted to regulate manufacturing which had previously been prohibited, thus 
alluding to the Act as an infringement upon the state’s police powers, which had not been 
expressly delegated and were consequently reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.  
Lovett then cited the Hammer v. Dagenhart and Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. rulings 
indicating that “[a] prohibition of shipment in interstate commerce is not necessarily within the 
congressional power” (p. 105).  The argument wasn’t different from that used by attorneys in 
Hammer v. Dagenhart, but the citations were.  Next, Lovett pointed to the distinction between 
harmful and useful products, noting that prohibiting harmful products from interstate commerce 
“does not infringe upon, but supplements, the powers of the” state governments in contrast to 
prohibitions against useful products which did “unequally” affect the states (p. 105).  Lovett used 
updated citations to assert that “Congressional power over intrastate commerce is limited to” 
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those “intrastate activities which directly affect interstate commerce,” the new citations being the 
relatively recent Schechter and Carter decisions.  Lovett also used Schechter to re-frame the 
federal government’s position as an attack upon federalism that was “established by the 
Constitution” (p. 107).   
 In a somewhat different tact, Lovett also utilized a propaganda technique, that of 
reasoning from a false premise, with the premise being that the government was arguing for an 
open-ended grant of legislative power under Article I, § 8 of the Constitution:  “The proposition 
that every conceivable legislative power is conferred by § 8 of Article I of the Constitution is in 
direct conflict with the doctrine that the Federal Government is a government of enumerated 
powers” (p. 106).  Lovett immediately followed that argument with a Tenth Amendment 
assertion of reserved powers.  Responding to the Government’s argument that the Commerce 
Clause prevented state governments from acting to prevent the importation of products from 
other states, Lovett asserted that such a fact did not act “to vest in the national government 
unqualified power to regulate competition in those interstate markets” (p. 107).  Lovett also 
employed the “false claim” technique in arguing that the “power to control the conditions of 
production” was also “the power to impose the standard of living of one section of the country 
upon another” (p. 107).  Finally, Lovett concluded with Fifth Amendment arguments, that the 
Fair Labor Standards Act deprived his client of “liberty and property without due process of law, 
and of the freedom of contract guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment,” concluding that the Act was 
“arbitrary and capricious” (p. 108). 
 Holding & disposition. 
 In answer to the first legal question, the Court stated, “[W]e conclude that the prohibition 
of the shipment interstate of goods produced under the forbidden substandard labor conditions is 
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within the constitutional authority of Congress” (p. 115).  Regarding the second question, in 
connecting wage and hours requirements to interstate commerce, Congress  made a “legislative 
judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and over which the 
courts are given no control” (p. 115).  According to the Court, “Whatever their motive and 
purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional prohibition are with 
the plenary power conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause” (p. 115).  In answering the 
third legal question regarding the Act’s requirements of employer records for employee wages 
and hours, the Court noted, “These requirements are incidental to those for the prescribed wages 
and hours, and hence validity of the former turns on validity of the latter” (pp. 124-125).  The 
Court concluded: 
Since, as we have held, Congress may require production for interstate 
commerce to conform to those conditions, it may require the employer, as a 
means of enforcing the valid law, to keep a record showing whether he has 
in fact complied with it.  (p. 125) 
 
As might be surmised from the previous holdings in this case, the Court overruled Hammer v. 
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251.  Immediately preceding its ruling, the Court observed, “The 
conclusion is inescapable that Hammer v. Dagenhart, was a departure from the principles which 
have prevailed in the interpretation of the Commerce Clause both before and since the decision 
and that such vitality, as a precedent, as it then had has long since been exhausted” (pp. 116-
117). 
 Court’s rationale. 
 In reviewing the facts of the case, the Court noted the Act’s purpose, included in the text 
of the Act as a congressional “declaration of policy,” which established a nexus between 
commerce and workers’ well-being (p. 109).  According to the Court, the Fair Labor Standard 
Act’s purpose was: 
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to exclude from interstate commerce goods produced for the commerce and 
to prevent their production for interstate commerce, under conditions 
detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standards of living 
necessary for health and general well-being; and to prevent the use of 
interstate commerce as the means of competition in the distribution of goods 
so produced, and as the means of spreading and perpetuating such 
substandard labor conditions among the workers of the several states.  (pp. 
109-110) 
 
Prior to reaching its holding in answering the first legal question, whether Congress had 
authority to prohibit goods from interstate commerce whose manufacture violated the Fair Labor 
Standards Act’s requirements, the Court asserted, “The power of Congress over interstate 
commerce ‘is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no 
limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution.’  Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, 196” (p. 
114).  Citing Hoke v. United States, among others, the Court observed: 
Congress, following its own conception of public policy concerning the 
restrictions which may appropriately be imposed on interstate commerce, is 
free to exclude from the commerce articles whose use in the states for which 
they are destined it may conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals 
or welfare, even though the state has not sought to regulate their use.  (p. 
114) 
 
Continuing its line of reasoning, the Court next dealt with appellee arguments regarding the 
Act’s alleged infringement of the police power of the states. 
Such regulation is not a forbidden invasion of state power merely because 
either its motive or its consequence is to restrict the use of articles of 
commerce within the states of destination…  It is no objection to the 
assertion of the power to regulate interstate commerce that its exercise is 
attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the police power 
of the states.  (p. 114) 
 
Drawing implicit attention to the doctrine of Separation of Powers embedded in the Constitution, 
the Court drew upon the following precedents (p. 115): 
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• “’The judicial cannot prescribe to the legislative department of the government 
limitations upon the exercise of its acknowledged power.’  Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 
Wall. 533.” 
• “The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the 
legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction 
and over which the courts are given no control.  McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 
27.” 
Immediately preceding the announcement of its first holding, the Court declared, “Whatever 
their motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional 
prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause” (p. 
115). 
 After holding that Congress did possess authority to prohibit substandard goods from 
interstate commerce, the Court next proceeded to address the Court’s former ruling in Hammer v. 
Dagenhart, first drawing attention to Justice Holmes’ dissenting opinion in that case. 
In that case it was held by a bare majority of the Court over the powerful 
and now classic dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes setting forth the fundamental 
issues involved, that Congress was without power to exclude the products of 
child labor from interstate commerce.  (pp. 115-116) 
 
The Court then noted the conflict posed by the majority opinion’s opposition [in Hammer] to 
both Holmes’s dissent and the Court’s first holding in Darby: 
The reasoning and conclusion of the Court’s opinion there cannot be 
reconciled with the conclusion which we have reached, that the power of 
Congress under the Commerce Clause is plenary to exclude any article from 
interstate commerce subject only to the specific prohibitions of the 
Constitution.  (p. 116) 
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 Confronting the distinction between “harmful” and “useful” as applied to interstate commerce, 
the Court characterized it as “a distinction which was novel when made and unsupported by any 
provision of the Constitution” (p. 116).   
 After announcing that Hammer v. Dagenhart was overruled, the Court addressed the 
issues of the second legal question, whether or not Congress had authority to set production 
standards for goods in interstate commerce.  The Court rephrased the question to consider 
whether the “prescribed labor standards, of employees engaged in the production of goods for 
interstate commerce is so related to the commerce and so affects it as to be within the reach of 
the power of Congress to regulate it” (p. 117).  Addressing that issue, the Court noted that the 
Act’s purpose “was not only to prevent the interstate transportation of the proscribed product, but 
to stop the initial step toward transportation, production with the purpose of so transporting it” 
(p. 117).  And then the Court drew on the observation, first made by Alexander Hamilton in 1791 
(see p. 312 of this paper) and subsequently articulated almost three decades later by Chief Justice 
Marshall in McCullough v. Maryland (see p. 360 of this paper) regarding means to legitimate 
ends where a nexus between ends and means can be made: 
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the 
regulation of commerce among the states.  It extends to those activities 
intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power 
of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the 
attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce.  See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 
Wheat. 316, 421.  (pp. 118-119) 
 
After spending time discussing other aspects and precedents upholding other activities with “a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce” (p. 119), the Court (150 years after Hamilton first 
stated its legal conceptualization) reiterated its previous point regarding means and legitimate 
ends: 
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Congress … may choose the means reasonably adapted to the attainment of 
the permitted end, even though they involve control of intrastate activities.  
Such legislation has often been sustained with respect to powers, other than 
the commerce power … when the means chosen, although not themselves 
within the granted power, were nevertheless deemed appropriate aids to the 
accomplishment of some purpose within an admitted power of the national 
government.  (p. 121) 
 
 While acknowledging the legitimacy of implied powers through the recognition of means 
being employed for the achievement of a legitimate power of government, the Court also 
recognized that Tenth Amendment arguments would not be applicable because “the amendment 
has been construed as not depriving the national government of authority to resort to all means 
for the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted 
end” (p. 124).  According to the Court: 
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been 
surrendered.  There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it 
was more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and state 
governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the 
amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new 
national government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the 
states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers.  (p. 124) 
 
The Court also summarily dismissed as inapplicable the Fifth Amendment protection sought by 
Darby’s attorney: 
Since our decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, it is no 
longer open to question that the fixing of a minimum wage is within the 
legislative power and that the bare fact of its exercise is not a denial of due 
process under the Fifth more than under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Nor is 
it any longer open to question that it is within the legislative power to fix 
maximum hours.  (p. 125) 
 
 Concurring/dissenting opinions. 
 The decision in United States v. Darby Lumber Company was unanimous, the only 
opinion being the Court’s official opinion written by Justice Harlan Fiske Stone before he 
became the Chief Justice.   
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 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
 Case summary. 
 Beginning in 1961 Congress initiated a series of amendments to the Fair Labor Standards 
Acts to expand the Act’s coverage of types of workers.  Amendments in 1961 “extended its 
coverage to persons who were employed in ‘enterprises’ engaged in commerce or in the 
production of goods for commerce” (p. 837).  Exemptions had been provided “to the States and 
their political subdivisions” in the original Act and were maintained in the 1961 amendment to 
that act (p. 837).  However, in 1966 Congress reduced these exemptions as it again amended the 
FLSA to include “employees of state hospitals, institutions, and schools” (p. 838).  When 
challenged, the Court upheld “the validity of the combined effect of these two amendments in 
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)” (p. 838).   
 In 1974 Congress again amended the Fair Labor Standards Act, this time by removing all 
exemptions still remaining for states and their political subdivisions.  Exemptions were removed 
through the Act’s definition of “public agency,” which was defined to include “the government 
of a State or political subdivision; any agency of … a State, or a political subdivision of a State” 
(p. 838).  As described by the Court, the amended Act imposed “upon almost all public 
employment the minimum wage and maximum hour requirements previously restricted to 
employees engaged in interstate commerce” (p. 839). 
 The National League of Cities, the National Governors’ Conference, 19 states (including 
Iowa), and four municipalities joined in a suit filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia seeking “both declaratory and injunctive relief against the amendments’ application to 
them” (pp. 836-837, 839).52  In a separate action (consolidated with the National League of 
Cities et al suit upon appeal), the State of California filed a separate suit (California v. Usery, 
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Secretary of Labor) to seek federal court relief from the 1974 amendments to the FLSA (p. 837).  
The District Court for the District of Columbia “granted appellee Secretary of Labor’s motion to 
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief might be granted” (p. 839).  
In its opinion, the three-judge District Court stated, “[A]s a Federal district court we feel obliged 
to apply the Wirtz opinion as it stands” (National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826, 
828 {DC 1974}; cited on p. 839).  The Court granted appeal and first heard arguments on April 
16, 1975.   The case was subsequently reargued March 2, 1976. 
 Justice Rehnquist wrote and delivered the Court’s 5-4 opinion, which was joined by 
Chief Justice Burger as well as Justices Stewart, Powell, and Blackmun.  Justice Blackmun also 
wrote a separate concurring opinion.  Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined 
by Justices White and Marshall.  Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting opinion.  In a 
narrowly held opinion, the Court overruled Maryland v. Wirtz.  The slim 5-4 majority also 
invalidated the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act “insofar as the challenged 
amendments operate to directly displace the States’ freedom to structure integral operations in 
areas of traditional governmental functions” because “they are not within the authority granted 
Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3” (p. 852). 
 According to Rehnquist’s opinion, the challenge was not to congressional authority to 
regulate commerce, but to the 1974 amendments extending the reach of the FLSA to state 
employees. 
Appellants in no way challenge these decisions establishing the breadth of 
authority granted Congress under the commerce power.  Their contention, 
on the contrary, is that when Congress seeks to regulate directly the 
activities of States as public employers, it transgresses an affirmative 
limitation on the exercise of its power akin to other commerce power 
affirmative limitations contained in the Constitutions.  (p. 841) 
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The majority opinion then provided two recent examples of constitutional limitations upheld by 
the Court, the Sixth Amendment’s right to trial by jury in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 
(1968) and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 
(1969).  According to Rehnquist, the cities and states were contending “that the 1974 
amendments to the Act … encounter a similar constitutional barrier because they are to be 
applied directly to the States and subdivisions of States as employers” (p. 841).  Rehnquist next 
declared, “This Court has never doubted that there are limits upon the power of Congress to 
override state sovereignty, even when exercising its otherwise plenary powers to tax or to 
regulate commerce which are conferred by Art. I of the Constitution” (p. 842).  After referring to 
the Court’s assurance in the Wirtz decision, which declared that the Court possessed “ample 
power to prevent … ‘the utter destruction of the State as a sovereign political entity,’” Rehnquist 
focused attention upon the Tenth Amendment as a limitation upon congressional authority (p. 
842).  In particular, Rehnquist noted the Court’s clarification in Fry v. United States (1975) of 
the statement made in Darby regarding the Tenth Amendment. 
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a “truism,” stating 
merely that “all is retained which has not been surrendered,” United States 
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941), it is not without significance.  The 
Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may 
not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States’ integrity or their 
ability to function effectively in a federal system.  421 U.S., at 547 n. 7  (pp. 
842-843) 
 
Wishing to connect recent rulings “recognizing the essential role of the States in our federal 
system of government” with “earlier decisions of this Court,” Rehnquist cited dicta from “Texas 
v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869), [which] declared that ‘[t]he Constitution, in all its provisions, 
looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States’” (p. 844).  Ironically, the 
subject matter of Texas v. White contradicted Rehnquist’s point as the Court in that case upheld 
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the federal government’s use of the Guarantee Clause to override state actions and restore the 
State to its proper constitutional relations with the Union (Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 709, 727-728 
(1869); see also pp. 118-119 of this paper). 
 Apparently the Solicitor General, in presenting the Government’s case, had argued  
that the cases in which this Court has upheld sweeping exercises of authority 
by Congress, even though those exercises pre-empted state regulation of the 
private sector, have already curtailed the sovereignty of the States quite as 
much as the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act.53  (pp. 844-
845) 
 
Justice Rehnquist didn’t directly note those precedents, which must have been cited by the 
Solicitor General in his arguments, nor did Rehnquist address them in the remainder of his 
opinion.  These precedents were neither cited nor discussed until Justice Brennan focused upon 
them in his dissenting opinion (see 426 U.S. 833, 857-880; also, pp. 412-418 of this paper).  
Instead of addressing the precedents presented by the Solicitor General in argumentation, 
Rehnquist dismissed them with a simple declaration, “We do not agree” (p. 845).  He continued: 
It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws 
regulating individual businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty 
of the government of the Nation and of the State in which they reside.  It is 
quite another to uphold a similar exercise of congressional authority 
directed, not to private citizens, but to the States as States.  (p. 845) 
 
And then, Rehnquist offered a novel explanation of the intersection of a constitutionally granted 
power (the Commerce Clause) with the Tenth Amendment which ignored the fact that the Tenth 
Amendment didn’t apply by virtue of the states having delegated the power to regulate 
commerce to the federal government, that as a result of that delegation, the phrase, “powers not 
delegated … are reserved,” of that amendment was not applicable (Farrand, IV, p. 95). 
We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty 
attaching to every state government which may not be impaired by 
Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative 
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authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from 
exercising the authority in that manner.  (Emphasis added) (p. 845) 
 
After noting that an “undoubted attribute of state sovereignty [was] the States’ power to 
determine the wages which shall be paid to those whom they employ,” Rehnquist framed, for the 
first time in the Court’s report of the case, the legal question to be addressed (p. 845). 
The question we must resolve here, then, is whether these determinations 
[for wages] are “functions essential to separate and independent existence,” 
[Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)] at 580, quoting from Lane 
County v. Oregon, [7 Wall. 71 (1869)], at 76, so that Congress may not 
abrogate the States’ otherwise plenary authority to make them.  (pp. 845-
846) 
 
 Rehnquist proceeded next to examine the “substantial costs which will be imposed upon 
[states and cities] by the 1974 amendments” (p. 846).  Costs examined by Rehnquist included 
financial amounts as well as “forced relinquishment of important governmental activities,” e.g., 
shortened training programs for law enforcement, access to training programs through 
affirmative action, possible involvement of volunteer fire departments under the new 
amendments, and reduced fire and police protection services (p. 847).  Completing his review of 
the additional costs to the states and cities required by the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, Rehnquist concluded that “the Act displaces state policies regarding the manner 
in which they will structure delivery of those governmental services which their citizens require” 
(p. 847).  Rehnquist further stated: 
The only “discretion” left to [the States] is either to attempt to increase their 
revenue to meet the additional financial burden imposed upon them …, or to 
reduce that complement [of employees] to a number which can be paid the 
federal minimum wage without increasing revenue.  (p. 848). 
 
 Observing that some might have trouble distinguishing between “private employers” and 
public employers, i.e., state and municipal governments, Rehnquist declared there was, in fact, a 
difference (p. 848).  He explained: 
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The difference, however, is that a State is not merely a factor in the “shifting 
economic arrangements” of the private sector of the economy, Kovacs v. 
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), but is itself a 
coordinate element in the system established by the Framers for governing 
our Federal Union.  (p. 849) 
 
Rehnquist continued.  “The degree to which the FLSA amendments would interfere with 
traditional aspects of state sovereignty can be seen even more clearly upon examining the 
overtime requirements of the Act” (p. 849).  According to Rehnquist, the Act would   
have the effect of coercing the States to structure work periods in some 
employment areas, such as police and fire protection, in a manner 
substantially different from practices which have long been commonly 
accepted among local governments of this Nation.  (p. 850) 
 
Seeking to further buttress his argument, Rehnquist employed the “Sacred Cow” technique by 
discussing the danger posed to “volunteer firemen, a source of manpower crucial to many of our 
smaller towns’ existence” by the 1974 amendments (p. 850).54  Besides possibly infringing upon 
state sovereignty, the amendments threatened traditional values as well.  According to Rehnquist, 
“It goes without saying that provisions such as these contemplate a significant reduction of 
traditional volunteer assistance which has been in the past drawn on to complement the operation 
of many local governmental functions” (pp. 850-851).  Rehnquist concluded: 
Our examination of the effect of the 1974 amendments, as sought to be 
extended to the States and their political subdivisions, satisfies us that both 
the minimum wage and the maximum hour provisions will impermissible 
interfere with the integral governmental functions of these bodies.  (p. 851) 
 
Furthermore, the application” of the 1974 amendments would act to “significantly alter or 
displace the States’ abilities to structure employer-employee relationships in such areas as fire 
prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation” (p. 851).  The 
afore-mentioned activities “are typical of those performed by state and local governments” and 
are “functions,” both for “which governments are created to provide” and “which the States have 
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traditionally afforded their citizens” (p. 851).  And, continued Rehnquist, Congress has 
threatened the very existence of states as independent entities. 
If Congress may withdraw from the States the authority to make those 
fundamental employment decisions upon which their systems for 
performance of these functions must rest, we think there would be little left 
of the States’ “separate and independent existence.”  Coyle, 221 U.S., at 
580.  (p. 851) 
 
The major factor, according to Rehnquist, doesn’t involve the possibility that “appellants may 
have overestimated the effect which the Act will have upon their current levels and patterns of 
governmental activities” (pp. 851-852).  According to Rehnquist’s thinking: 
[T]he dispositive factor is that Congress has attempted to exercise its 
Commerce Clause authority to prescribe minimum wages and maximum 
hours to be paid by the States in their capacities as sovereign governments.  
In so doing, Congress has sought to wield its power in a fashion that would 
impair the States’ “ability to function effectively in a federal system,” Fry, 
421 U.S., at 547 n. 7.  (p. 852) 
 
Rehnquist then announced the verdict reached by five of the Court’s nine justices: 
This exercise of congressional authority does not comport with the federal 
system of government embodied in the Constitution.  We hold that insofar 
as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the States’ 
freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental 
functions, they are not within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, 
cl. 3.  (p. 852) 
 
In a footnote at the end of his announcement of the 5-4 majority’s holding, Rehnquist offered the 
following disclaimer: 
We express no view as to whether different results might obtain if Congress 
seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by exercising 
authority granted it under other sections of the Constitution such as the 
spending power, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  (p. 
852, n. 17) 
 
Readers, as well as this writer, may wonder why the distinction between specific delegated 
powers granted the federal government.  If the arguments put forth by the majority opinion are 
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valid constructions of the proposition that delegated powers can be limited by the Tenth 
Amendment, one struggles to reason why that proposition would apply to the Commerce Clause, 
but not to the clause that permits Congress to implement the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, particularly as that clause specifically allowed a federal override of any state 
sovereignty concerns regarding the content of the Fourteenth Amendment.55 
 Prior to officially stating that the District Court decisions were reversed (both in the 
District of Columbia and California), Rehnquist addressed the Wirt decision upon which the 
lower courts had based their rulings.  After observing that “the reasoning in Wirtz” was no longer 
“regarded as authoritative,” Rehnquist returned to his essential theme, that “Congress may not 
exercise that power [to regulate commerce] so as to force directly upon the States its choices as 
to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are to be 
made” (pp. 854, 855).  Rehnquist continued: 
While there are obvious differences between the schools and hospitals 
involved in Wirtz, and the fire and police departments affected here, each 
provides an integral portion of those governmental services which the States 
and their political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their citizens.  We 
are therefore persuaded that Wirtz must be overruled.  (p. 855) 
 
Rehnquist concluded the opinion by declaring, “The judgment of the District Court is 
accordingly reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion” (p. 856). 
 Neither Justice Brennan nor Justices White, Marshall, and Stevens agreed with the 
proposition contained within the majority opinion, which was that the Tenth Amendment could 
act to limit the application of a constitutionally delegated power.  Justice Brennan wrote a 
lengthy dissent, which was joined by Justices White and Marshall, while Justice Stevens 
delivered a briefer dissenting opinion.  According to Justice Stevens’ analysis of the majority 
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opinion, “The principle on which the holding rests is difficult to perceive” (p. 880).  Although 
Stevens disagreed “with the wisdom of this legislation,” he couldn’t let personal feelings “affect 
my judgment with respect to its validity” (p. 881).  Justice Stevens concluded, “Since I am 
unable to identify a limitation on that federal power [to regulate commerce] that would not also 
invalidate federal regulation of state activities that I consider unquestionably permissible, I am 
persuaded that this statute is valid” (p. 881).  
 Justice Brennan’s dissent could be described as caustic and hard-hitting.  He, and not the 
majority opinion, rested his position on the judicial precedents illuminating congressional 
exercise “of its plenary commerce power” (p, 857).  In his opinion, Justice Brennan extensively 
discussed the long line of precedential decisions not addressed by Rehnquist in the majority 
opinion which illustrated his contention that the Court ignored the rule of stare decisis governing 
three basic constitutional principles, each of which possessed a long legal history, the last 
principle also possessing two corollary strands, each of which traced its beginnings to eighteenth 
century Court opinions; offered various characterization’s of the five-member majority opinion; 
articulated a basic principle underlying delegated powers; criticized the test offered by Rehnquist 
to determine what was constitutional and what was not under the new ruling; and sounded a 
constitutional concern regarding the implications of the majority opinion.  The three 
constitutional principles, as well as the two corollary strands of the third constitutional maxim, 
presented by Justice Brennan along with their illuminating cases were: 
• Restraints on congressional exercise of the Commerce Power lie in the political 
realm, not the judicial sphere. 
• Specific constitutional limits on congressional exercise of a delegated power do exist, 
e.g., impairment of contracts, First Amendment, etc. 
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• No constitutional constraints resting on state sovereignty act to restrain congressional 
exercise of a delegated power. 
• Federal government actions are supreme within their sphere of action with 
state power being correspondingly reduced by constitutional delegations of 
power to the federal government. 
• The Tenth Amendment does not act to limit the federal exercise of a delegated 
power. 
 Justice Brennan began his dissent by noting one feature the majority opinion got right, its 
concession “that Congress enacted the 1974 amendments pursuant to its exclusive power under 
Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution ‘[t]o regulate Commerce … among the several States’” (pp. 
856-857).  He therefore found the majority opinion “surprising” because, at that particular 
moment in time (“the bicentennial year of our independence”), the Court chose “to repudiate 
principles governing judicial interpretation of our Constitution settled since the time of Mr. Chief 
Justice John Marshall” (p. 857).  And so, Justice Brennan launched his examination of various 
legal lines of thought serving as precedents, which, in his opinion, should have been examined 
by the five-member majority, but weren’t. 
 The first line of thought involved the concept that restraints upon congressional exercise 
of the commerce power “lie in the political process and not in the judicial process” (p. 857).  
Brennan cited the original precedent for this legal principle offered by Chief Justice Marshall 
“152 years ago”: 
[T]he power over commerce … is vested in Congress as absolutely as it 
would be in a single government…  The wisdom and the discretion of 
Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their 
constituents possess at elections, are … the sole restraints on which they 
have relied, to secure them from its abuse.  They are the restraints on which 
the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments 
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[emphasis Justice Brennan].  Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 197 (1824)  (p. 
857) 
 
Justice Brennan illustrated the grounding of this legal principle in the Constitutional Convention 
as reflected by Alexander Hamilton’s writing in The Federalist. 
A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the full 
accomplishment of the objects committed to its care, and to the complete 
execution of the trusts for which it is responsible; free from every other 
control, but a regard to the public good and to the sense of the people.  The 
Federalist No. 31, p. 195 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).  (p. 857, n. 1) 
 
As Justice Brennan noted, this principle was most recently reaffirmed by the Court in “Wickard 
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942)” where the Court stated, “At the beginning Chief Justice 
Marshall … made emphatic the embracing and penetrating nature of [Congress’ commerce] 
power by warning that effective restrains on its exercise must proceed from political rather than 
from judicial processes” (pp. 857-858).  Based upon his reading of the majority opinion in light 
of the precedents governing the principle of political restraint, Justice Brennan characterized the 
five-member majority’s action as a “patent usurpation of the role reserved for the political 
process” (p. 858). 
 The next legal principle addressed by Justice Brennan’s dissent focused on specific 
constitutional limits upon congressional exercise of a delegated power, in this instance, upon the 
commerce power.  Brennan traced this principle back to its origin in the Marshall Court, 
observing, “Mr. Chief Justice recognized that limitations ‘prescribed in the constitution,’ 
Gibbons v. Ogden, [9 Wheat. 1 (1824)], at 196, restrain Congress’ exercise of the power” (p. 
858).  Justice Brennan next listed the Court decisions upholding that principle, first established in 
1824: “Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U.S. 184, 191 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 
294, 305 (1964); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941)” (p. 858).  Brennan then cited 
decisions, which held that: 
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laws within the commerce power may not infringe individual liberties 
protected by the First Amendment, Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 
327 U.S. 178 (1946); the Fifth Amendment, Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 
6 (1969); or the Sixth Amendment, United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 
(1968).  (p. 858) 
 
 The third legal principle illustrated by Justice Brennan focused upon the absence of a 
constitutional restraint, “based upon state sovereignty,” that acted to restrain congressional 
exercise of a delegated power (p. 858).  The origin of this legal principle again resided in the 
Marshall Court and was “emphasized by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall”: 
If any one proposition could command the universal assent of mankind, we 
might expect it would be this – that the government of the Union, though 
limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action….  The 
government of the United States, then, though limited in its powers, is 
supreme; and its laws, when made in pursuance of the constitution, form the 
supreme law of the land, “any thing in the constitution or laws of any State 
to the contrary not withstanding.”  M’Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 
405-406 (1819).  (p. 859) 
 
Justice Brennan proceeded to cite subsequent Court opinions upholding the third legal principle 
that had a bearing on the case at hand.  The Court stated, “’The framers of the Constitution never 
intended that the legislative power of the nation should find itself incapable of disposing of a 
subject matter specifically committed to its charge.’  In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 562 (1891)” (p. 
860).  Brennan cited The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230, U.S. 352, 399 (1913), and observed 
through a partial quote of the Court’s opinion: 
The Constitution reserves to the States “only … that authority which is 
consistent with and not opposed to the grant to Congress.  There is no room 
in our scheme of government for the assertion of state power in hostility to 
the authorized exercise of Federal Power” (pp. 859-860). 
 
Justice Brennan summarized and quoted the following Court opinion: 
“[It] is not a controversy between equals” when the Federal government “is 
asserting its sovereign power to regulate commerce ….  [T]he interests of 
the nation are more important than those of any State.”  Sanitary District v. 
United States, 266 U.S. 405, 425-426 (1925).  (p. 859) 
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Carrying forth the legal principle first established by the Court in 1819, Justice Brennan cited 
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 184 (1936), which stated:  “The sovereign power of 
the states is necessarily diminished to the extent of the grants of power to the federal 
government…. [T]he power of the state is subordinate to the constitutional exercise of the 
granted federal power” (p. 859).  Justice Brennan also cited North American Co. v. SEC, 327 
U.S. 686, 705 (1946) in which the Court noted that the commerce power “is an affirmative 
power commensurate with the national needs” (p. 859). 
 According to Justice Brennan’s summarization of the majority opinion’s attempt to find 
Tenth Amendment restrictions on a delegated power: 
My brethren thus have today manufactured an abstraction without 
substance, founded neither in the words of the Constitution nor on 
precedent.  An abstraction having such profoundly pernicious consequences 
is not made less so by characterizing the 1974 amendments as legislation 
directed against the “States qua States.” (p. 860) 
 
After noting, unbelievingly, that the Court didn’t base its annulment of a congressional statute on 
a claim that the 1974 amendments were not indeed regulations of commerce (the only ruling 
permitted, according to the precedents presented), Justice Brennan continued: 
The reliance of my Brethren upon the Tenth Amendment as “an express 
declaration of [a state sovereignty] limitation,” ante, at 842, not only 
suggests that they overrule governing decisions of this Court that address 
this question but must astound scholars of the Constitution.  (pp. 861-862) 
 
Brennan then cited early nineteenth century precedents, all with the same basic holding: 
For not only early decisions, Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., at 196; 
M’Culloch v. Maryland, supra, at 404-407; and Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 
Wheat. 304, 324-325 (1816), hold that nothing in the Tenth Amendment 
constitutes a limitation on congressional exercise of powers delegated by the 
Constitution to Congress.  (p. 862) 
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Bringing the precedents up to the mid-twentieth century, Justice Brennan next observed that “the 
Tenth Amendment’s significance was more recently summarized:” 
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been 
surrendered.  There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it 
was more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and 
state governments as it had been established by the constitution before the 
amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new 
national government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the 
states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers….  
(Emphasis in original) (p. 862) 
 
The Court’s opinion cited by Justice Brennan continued: 
From the beginning and for many years the amendment has been construed 
as not depriving the national government of authority to resort to all means 
for the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and plainly 
adapted to the permitted end.  United States v. Darby, 312 U.S., at 124.  (pp. 
862-863) 
 
Justice Brennan then noted: 
My Brethren purport to find support for their novel state-sovereignty 
doctrine in the concurring opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Stone in New York v. 
United States, 326 U.S. 572, 586 (1946).  That reliance is plainly 
misplaced….   The Court sustained the federal tax [against a state’s mineral 
water business].  (p. 863) 
 
Furthermore, according to Justice Brennan, Chief Justice Stone was not addressing “the question 
of a state-sovereignty restraint upon the exercise of the commerce power, but rather the principle 
of implied immunity of the States and Federal Government from taxation by the other” (pp. 863-
864).  Brennan was likewise puzzled by Rehnquist’s “reliance on Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 
725 (1869)” which recognized the power of the federal government over that of the state 
governments, particularly the power of “Congress to form a new government in a State if the 
citizens of that State were being denied a republican form of government” (pp. 867-868, n. 8).  
According to Justice Brennan, “[N]o precedent justifies today’s result” (p. 869).  Brennan 
declared elsewhere in his dissent, “Today’s repudiation of this unbroken line of precedents that 
   
   
410
firmly reject my Brethren’s ill-conceived abstraction can only be regarded as a transparent cover 
for invalidating a congressional judgment with which they disagree” (p. 867).  Justice Brennan 
continued: 
The only analysis even remotely resembling that adopted today is found in a 
line of opinions dealing with the Commerce Clause and the Tenth 
Amendment that ultimately provoked a constitutional crisis for the Court in 
the 1930’s.  E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); United 
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 
(1918).  (pp. 867-868) 
 
What Brennan didn’t explicitly mention was the fact than Rehnquist’s opinion ignored the thrust 
of these cases.  Justice Brennan did, however, cite the cases that first undermined and then 
finally overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart: “see, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); 
Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 
(1937);” and also remarked, “[B]ut my Brethren today are transparently trying to cut back on that 
recognition of the scope of the commerce power” (p. 868).  Continuing to express his incredulity 
regarding the majority opinion’s treatment of the legal principle that the Tenth Amendment not 
only did not act to diminish the exercise of a delegated power, but also reserved only those 
powers that were not delegated to the federal government, Justice Brennan declared: 
I cannot recall another instance in the Court’s history when the reasoning of 
so many decisions covering so long a span of time has been discarded in 
such a roughshod manner.  That this is done without any justification not 
already often advanced and consistently rejected, clearly renders today’s 
decision an ipse dixit reflecting nothing but displeasure with a congressional 
judgment.  (pp. 871-872) 
 
Sadly, Justice Brennan felt forced to explain a basic principle underlying delegated powers to the 
five members of the Court’s majority, namely that the “Supremacy Clause dictates [federal 
supremacy over states regarding a delegated power] under ‘the federal system of government 
embodied in the Constitution.’  Ante, at 852” (p. 875).  Incredulity gave way to pain.  According 
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to his last remarks concerning the third legal principle being ignored by the majority opinion, 
Justice Brennan observed: 
My Brethren’s disregard for precedents recognizing these long-settled 
constitutional principles is painfully obvious in their cavalier treatment of 
Maryland v. Wirtz.  Without even a passing reference to the doctrine of stare 
decisis, Wirtz – regarded as controlling only last Term, Fry v. United States, 
421 U.S. , at 548, and as good law in Employees v. Missouri Public Health 
Dept., 411 U.S., at 283 – is by exercise of raw judicial power overruled.  (p. 
879) 
 
 Justice Brennan next focused attention upon the test offered by Rehnquist and his four 
colleagues to determine the line of demarcation between constitutional and unconstitutional 
federal actions regarding a resurrected state supremacy.  Based upon phraseology used by 
Rehnquist, Brennan referred to the constitutional-determination test as the “essential-function 
test” (pp. 879, 880).  According to Justice Brennan, the “standard is … meaningless,” 
“unworkable,” and “conceptually unworkable” because of the “Brethren’s inability to articulate 
any meaningful distinctions” (pp. 871, 880).  Brennan characterized the majority opinion as “a 
catastrophic judicial body blow at Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause” (p. 880).  
Justice Brennan concluded his dissent by sounding a constitutional concern about the structure of 
government provided by the Constitution which was imperiled by the majority opinion.  
According to Brennan, “[T]here is an ominous portent of disruption of our constitutional 
structure implicit in today’s mischievous decision” (p. 880). 
 Significance for the tenth amendment. 
 Earlier decisions limiting congressional use of the Commerce Power based their 
determination on whether or not the regulated activity was indeed a part of the Commerce 
Power, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company, Schechter Poultry 
Corporation v. United States, Carter v. Carter Coal Co., etc.  Decisions upholding congressional 
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use of the Commerce Power did so because the regulated activity was judged to be included 
within the definition of commerce, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, Hoke v. United States, Brooks v. 
United States, etc.  The current decision, however, did not claim that the regulated activity was 
not a part of commerce, a point made by Justice Brennan in opening his dissent.  Even more 
fundamentally troubling, the majority opinion disregarded the literal text of the Tenth 
Amendment, which declares that only “[t]he powers not delegated … are reserved to the States” 
(Emphasis added) (Farrand, IV, p. 95).  The Commerce Power represents a delegated power 
according to Article I, § 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution, which reads, “The Congress shall have 
Power To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes.”  It is most difficult to ascertain how the language of the Tenth Amendment can 
be construed as a limitation on a power specifically delegated to the federal government, in this 
case, to Congress.  Such, however, appears to be the nature of the fault line running through 
America’s political history, the division between federal and state sovereignty, which is 
embedded via the concepts of federalism and separation of powers.  The nature of the fault line 
in this instance seems to have precluded sound legal reasoning being used that was based upon 
established constitutional principles and upon stare decisis, one of the few instances of such a 
fault having been discovered thus far in the examination of cases in this paper. 
 More troubling to contemporaries who had to function in accordance with the Court’s 
ruling, the test drawing the line between permissible and impermissible behavior on the part of 
the federal government towards the states was not clearly defined.  The majority opinion used the 
following descriptions of impermissible congressional infringement upon state government 
operations without providing any definition:  “functions essential to separate and independent 
existence” (p. 845), “traditional aspects of state sovereignty” (p. 849), “essential governmental 
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decisions” (p. 850), “integral governmental functions” (pp. 851, 855), “integral operations in 
areas of traditional government functions” (p. 852), “essentials of state sovereignty” (p. 855), 
and “traditional operations of state and local governments” (p. 855).  Unanswered were questions 
about the meaning of traditional, essential, and integral as they applied to the operation of state 
and municipal governments.  Rehnquist did provide examples of state and municipal services 
that would be off-limits to the federal government, which included “fire prevention, police 
protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation,” with “schools and hospitals” 
being added later (pp. 851, 855).   
 The decision in National League of Cities v. Usery (1976) would only be controlling for 
the next nine years before it was overturned by the Court’s decision in Garcia v. San Antonio 
Transit Authority (1985).  During the intervening period, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor would 
replace Justice Potter Stewart, but would vote in Garcia as Justice Stewart had voted in National 
League of Cities.  The swing vote in Garcia would be that of Justice Harry Blackmun, who 
would vote against the precedent of National League of Cities that he had supported previously.  
In a separate concurring opinion in National League of Cities, Justice Blackmun indicated that he 
was “not untroubled by certain possible implications of the Court’s opinion” (p. 856).  Instead of 
becoming less troubled over the course of the intervening years, Blackmun became more 
troubled, especially by “the Court’s inability to arrive at meaningful and clear distinctions under 
the National League of Cities precedent” (Hall, p. 325).  Blackmun, in fact, would write the 
majority opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 530 (1985) that 
would overturn the National League of Cities decision. 
 FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). 
 Case summary. 
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 FERC is the acronym for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission that was supervised 
by the Secretary of Energy.  In 1978 Congress enacted the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 
(PURPA) “as part of a legislative package designed to combat the nationwide energy crisis” (p. 
744).  President Carter signed it into law on November 9, 1978 (p. 745).  The law was based on 
the following findings by Congress:  “generation of electricity consumed more than 25% of all 
energy resources used in the United States;” “one-third of the electricity in this country was 
generated through use of oil and natural gas;” “because of their reliance on oil and gas, 
electricity utilities were plagued with increasing costs and decreasing efficiency in the use of 
their generating capacities;” and “each of these factors had an adverse effect on rates to 
consumers and on the economy as a whole” (pp. 745, 746).  Based on its investigative findings, 
Congress  
determined that conservation by electricity utilities of oil and natural gas 
was essential to the success of any effort to lessen the country’s dependence 
on foreign oil, to avoid a repetition of the shortage of the shortage of natural 
gas that had been experienced in 1977, and to control consumer costs.   (p. 
746) 
 
 The various titles within PURPA shared “three goals: (1) to encourage ‘conservation of 
energy supplied by … utilities’; (2) to encourage ‘the optimization of the efficiency of use of 
facilities and resources’ by utilities; and (3) to encourage ‘equitable rates to … consumers’” (p. 
746).  To aid in the achievement of the act’s goals, PURPA directed “state utility regulatory 
commissions and nonregulated utilities to ‘consider’ the adoption and implementation of specific 
‘rate design’ and regulatory standards” (p. 746).  PURPA also prescribed that “certain 
procedures … be followed by the state regulatory authority and the nonregulated utility when 
considering the proposed standards,” e.g., “public hearing after notice, and a written statement of 
reasons … be made available to the public if the standards [were] not adopted” (p. 748).  The act 
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also stipulated that each state authority and nonregulated utility was to submit annual reports to 
the Secretary of Energy “respecting its consideration of the standards established” (p. 749).  
PURPA contained a provision making it clear that neither states nor unregulated utilities were 
required “to adopt or implement the specified rate design or regulatory standards” (pp. 749-750).   
 A particular section of PURPA focused on encouraging “the development of 
cogeneration and small power production facilities” (p. 750).  In its investigation, Congress had 
discovered two problems that interfered with  
the development of nontraditional generating facilities: (1) traditional 
electricity utilities were reluctant to purchase power from, and to sell power 
to, the nontraditional facilities, and (2) the regulation of these alternative 
energy sources by state and federal utility authorities imposed financial 
burdens upon the nontraditional facilities and thus discouraged their 
development.  (pp. 750-751) 
 
To help overcome the identified obstacles, the act directed FERC to develop rules it deemed 
necessary “to encourage cogeneration and small power production” that could include “rules 
requiring utilities to offer to sell electricity to, and purchase electricity from, qualifying 
cogeneration and small power production facilities” (p. 751).  PURPA also directed FERC “to 
prescribe rules exempting the favored cogeneration and small power facilities from certain state 
and federal laws governing electricity utilities” (p. 751).   
 The State of Mississippi and the Mississippi Public Service Commission filed suit against 
FERC and the Secretary of Energy in United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Mississippi in April, 1979.  They sought a declaratory judgment that PURPA was 
unconstitutional because the act “was beyond the scope of congressional power under the 
Commerce Clause and that it constituted an invasion of state sovereignty in violation of the 
Tenth Amendment” (p. 752).  The district court delivered “an unreported opinion,” which held 
that PURPA’s requirements went beyond the commerce powers granted to Congress “under the 
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Commerce Clause” (p. 753).  The district court also relied on the Court’s ruling in National 
League of Cities v. Usery to conclude that “PURPA trenche[d] on state sovereignty” (p. 753).  
The district court ruled that PURPA was unconstitutional because the act’s provisions constituted 
“a direct intrusion of integral and traditional functions of the State of Mississippi” (p. 753).  Not 
explained were the district court’s reliance on the Guarantee Clause and the Supremacy Clause in 
helping it reach its conclusions (p. 753).  Appealing directly to the Supreme Court, FERC and 
the Secretary of Energy were granted the right to argue their case before the Court, which had 
“noted probable jurisdiction” in granting the appeal (p. 753). 
 Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority, which overturned the lower 
court’s ruling.  Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens, joining him, provided the 
Court’s majority.  Justices Powell and O’Connor each wrote opinions, “concurring in part and 
dissenting in part” (p. 743).  Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger joined in O’Connor’s 
dissent. 
 Justice Blackmun opened the Court’s opinion by stating, “We readily conclude that the 
District Court’s analysis and the appellees’ arguments are without merit so far as they concern 
the Commerce Clause” (p. 753).  Immediately Justice Blackmun established that, unlike 
National League of Cities, this decision would be based upon established legal principles 
governed by stare decisis.  Directly confronting the issue ignored previously in National League 
of Cities (see p. 415 of this paper; see also 426 U.S. 833, 861), Justice Blackmun cited a recent 
opinion that carried forward a principle first established by the Court in Gibbons v. Ogden 
(1824): 
A court may invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only 
if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional finding that the 
regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there is no reasonable 
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connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends.  
[Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981)], at 323-324.  (p. 754) 
 
The State of Mississippi, citing Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936), had argued, “Congress is 
powerless to regulate anything which is not commerce, as it is powerless to do anything about 
commerce which is not regulation” (p. 754).  Mississippi also put forth the distinction sanctioned 
by Carter, but overruled by Darby, that the “’governance of commerce’ by the State” was a 
different matter from “commerce itself,” and that governance of commerce lay “outside the 
plenary power of Congress” (p. 755).  According to Justice Blackmun, “The difficulty with these 
arguments is that they disregard entirely the specific congressional finding … that the regulated 
activities have an immediate effect on interstate commerce” (p. 755).  Blackmun described the 
findings, which he summarized below, as “clear and specific”: 
Congress there determined that “the protection of the public health, safety, 
and welfare, the preservation of national security, and the proper exercise of 
congressional authority under the Constitution to regulate interstate 
commerce require,” among other things, a program for increased 
conservation of electric energy, increased efficiency in the use of facilities 
and resources by electricity utilities, and equitable retail rates for electricity 
consumers…”  (p. 755) 
 
The basic question to be addressed was “whether the congressional findings have a rational 
basis” (pp. 755-756).  Answering the question, Justice Blackmun observed, “The legislative 
history provides a simple answer: there is ample support for Congress’ conclusions” (p. 756).  
Examples providing support included investigations by both House and Senate committees that 
reached the same conclusion, “that the energy problem was nationwide in scope” and 
“demonstrated the need to establish federal standards regarding retail sales of electricity, as well 
as federal attempts to encourage conservation and more efficient use of scarce energy resources” 
(pp. 756-757).  The Court concluded that Congress did have a rational basis and that there was a 
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connection between congressional action and interstate commerce.  As the Court stated in its 
opinion: 
It is not for us to say whether the means chosen by Congress represent the 
wisest choice.  It is sufficient that Congress was not irrational in concluding 
that limited federal regulation of retail sales of electricity and natural gas, 
and of relationships between cogenerators and electric utilities, was essential 
to protect interstate commerce.  That is enough to place the challenged 
portions of PURPA within Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.  
(p. 758) 
 
 The State of Mississippi’s reliance on Carter v. Carter Coal Co. illustrated the tangled 
and somewhat complicated web woven by court opinions acting to serve as judicial precedents 
for legal principles, some of which were diametrically opposed.  The Carter decision, which 
invalidated the New Deal’s Bituminous Coal Conservation Act in 1936 that established 
minimum wage requirements and collective bargaining, was described as representing “the 
twilight of the Tenth Amendment and states’ rights” (Hall, 1992, p. 129).  Two items, aside from 
the nature of the conflict between the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause, made 
Carter especially appealing to Mississippi in the aftermath of National League of Cities.  First, 
Carter distinguished between items of production and commerce itself (Hall, 1992, p. 129).  
Second, the majority 5-4 opinion “argued that the benefits of preserving the boundaries between 
states and the federal government were central to the integrity of the constitutional system” 
(Hall, 1992, p. 128).  Justice Sutherland, the author of the Court’s opinion in Carter, wrote using 
imagery suggestive of the seduction of a virtuous state sovereignty (feminine liberty) by a 
guileful federal government (rapacious male power) bent on serving its own ends by ignoring 
constitutional (ethical and moral) restraints: 
Every journey to a forbidden end begins with the first step; and the danger 
of such a step by the government in the direction of taking over the powers 
of the states is that the end of the journey may find the states so despoiled of 
their powers, or … so relieved of the responsibilities … as to reduce them to 
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little more than geographical subdivisions of the national domain.  298 U.S. 
238, 266.  (Cited in Hall, 1992, pp. 128-129) 
 
This line of thought resonated with Rehnquist’s opinion in National League of Cities (see 426 
U.S. 833, 847-852; also, pp. 406-409 of this paper).  The problem with Carter began when 
portions of its holdings (re: collective bargaining) were overruled by NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).  There the Court upheld the New Deal’s National Labor 
Relations Act under the Commerce Power by asserting, “Congress can reach and regulate not 
only interstate commerce itself but also any activity [collective bargaining] affecting commerce, 
whether directly or indirectly” (Hall, 1992, p. 572).  The remaining portions of Carter as well as 
Hammer v. Dagenhart were overruled by a unanimous Court in Darby, which upheld the validity 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (312 U.S. 100).56  Darby’s holding was extended by the Court’s 
1968 decision in Maryland v. Wirtz (392 U.S. 183).  However, National League of Cities 
overruled Wirtz, thus calling into question both Darby and NLRB, which in turn possibly 
resurrected Carter v. Carter Coal Co.  Thus FERC provides an interesting illustration of 
precedents and the resulting implications when precedents are either ignored (as happened in 
National League of Cities) or are overruled (as happened with Hammer in Darby or with Plessy 
in Brown).  The difference in impact can be seen by comparing the Court majorities in Darby 
(unanimous), Brown (unanimous), and National League of Cities (narrowly split 5-4).  Brown 
continues to serve as a precedent fifty-two years later, Darby served as a precedent for thirty-five 
years before being overruled temporarily and subsequently reinstated, and National League of 
Cities served as a precedent for less than ten years before being overturned by Garcia.   
 Justice Blackmun characterized the Tenth Amendment issue in FERC as being 
“somewhat novel” because in one respect it was similar to National League of Cities, but in 
another respect it was different (p. 758).  Both cases featured “principles of state sovereignty” (p. 
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758).  However, whereas National League of Cities dealt with “the extent to which state 
sovereignty shields the States from generally applicable federal regulations,” FERC dealt with 
“the Federal Government attempts to use state regulatory machinery to advance federal goals” 
(p. 759).  According to Blackmun, PURPA did this through three federal requirements: “(1) § 
210 has the States enforce standards promulgated by FERC; (2) Titles I and III direct the States 
to consider specified ratemaking standards; and (3) those Titles impose certain procedures on 
state commissions” (p. 759).  Justice Blackmun proceeded to examine each. 
 Regarding the § 210 requirements, Blackmun observed: 
[I]t does nothing more than pre-empt conflicting state enactments in the 
traditional way.  Clearly, Congress can pre-empt the States completely in the 
regulation of retail sales by electricity and gas utilities and in the regulation 
of transactions between such utilities and cogenerators.  (p. 759) 
 
 Justice Blackmun also cited the ruling in Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) which directed state 
courts “to heed the constitutional command that ‘the policy of the federal Act is the prevailing 
policy in every state … and should be respected accordingly in the courts of the State’” (p. 760).  
Blackmun also cited the principle established by Martin v. Hunter’s Lesee, 1 Wheat. 304, 340-
341 (1816) which established “the pre-eminent position held by federal law throughout the 
Nation” (p. 761). 
 Justice Blackmun then moved to consideration of PURPA’s requirements directing states 
to consider federal standards.  After reviewing Titles I and III of the act, Blackmun concluded, 
“There is nothing in PURPA ‘directly compelling’ the States to enact a legislative program” (p. 
765).  The Court concluded: 
[B]ecause the two challenged Titles simply condition continued state 
involvement in a pre-emptible area on the consideration of federal 
proposals, they do not threaten the States’ “separate and independent 
existence,” … and do not impair the ability of the States “to function 
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effectively in a federal system.”  …To the contrary, they offer the States a 
vehicle for remaining active in an area of overriding concern.  (pp. 765-766) 
 
And, perhaps to demonstrate its continued validity as a judicial precedent, Justice Blackmun 
discussed another Court opinion that cited Darby: 
The Tenth Amendment, the Court declared [in Oklahoma v. CSC, 330 U.S. 
127 (1947)], has been consistently construed “as not depriving the national 
government of authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted 
power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end,” … 
quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)…  (p. 766) 
 
Justice Blackmun compared the issue in FERC to that in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981): 
[T]he most that can be said is that the … Act establishes a program of 
cooperative federalism that allows the States, within limits established by 
federal minimum standards, to enact and administer their own regulatory 
programs, structured to meet their own particular needs.  (p. 767) 
 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association made an apt comparison in another 
respect as well because Hodel established a constitutional test to help determine legitimacy 
regarding the Court’s opinion in National League of Cities:  “Did congressional legislation 
regulate states as states, indisputably impinge on an attribute of state sovereignty, and directly 
impact integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions” (Hall, 1992, p. 834)?  
The fourth aspect of the test asked, “Is ‘the nature of the federal interest’ substantial enough to 
justify state submission” (Hall, 1992, p. 325).  Although the criteria for each question were still 
vague, Justice Blackmun ascertained that PURPA passed the test:  “Whatever the constitutional 
problems associated with more intrusive federal programs, the ‘mandatory consideration’ 
provisions of Titles I and III must be validated under the principle of Hodel v. Virginia Surface 
Mining & Recl. Assn.” (p. 770). 
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 With regards to the procedural requirements of Titles I and III of PURPA, the Court 
noted, “[W]e uphold the procedural requirements under the same analysis [the Hodel test] 
employed above in connection with the ‘consideration’ provisions” (p. 771).  Justice Blackmun 
continued by summarizing the Court’s holdings: 
If Congress can require a state administrative body to consider proposed 
regulations as a condition to its continued involvement in a pre-emptible 
field – and we hold today that it can – there is nothing unconstitutional 
about Congress’ requiring certain procedural minima as that body goes 
about undertaking its tasks.  The procedural requirements obviously do not 
compel the exercise of the State’s sovereign powers…  (p. 771) 
 
The majority opinion announced its final verdict, “The judgment of the District Court is 
reversed.  It is so ordered” (Emphasis in the original) (p. 771). 
 Significance for the tenth amendment. 
 FERC, in reversing a lower court decision based on National League of Cities, served as 
a possible harbinger of what lay ahead.  In FERC Justice Blackmun joined the four justices who 
had dissented in National League of Cities.  Of significance, this case got the Court back on track 
procedurally by its consideration of established legal principles and through its examination of 
judicial precedents governing constitutional issues.  The dissenters in FERC, however, disagreed 
with what they regarded as the majority opinion’s “undervaluing National League of Cities” 
while expressing confidence that “today’s decision is not intended to overrule National League 
of Cities” (p. 769, n. 32; p. 782, n. 9).57  National League of Cities would be overruled four years 
later by Garcia, and the same jurist, Justice Blackmun, would write the opinion in that case as 
well as the current one. 
 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 Case summary. 
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 The facts and history of Garcia form a somewhat complicated web regarding: the history 
of mass transit in San Antonio and its movement from a private company to a private company 
that was publicly regulated (1913) to a public transit system (1959) to a county-wide 
metropolitan transit authority (1978); the history of the Fair Labor Standards Act in relation to 
transit authorities; the legal filings in the dispute; and the legal history subsequent to the legal 
filings (p. 531). 
 The essentials of mass transit history in San Antonio were briefly summarized in the 
preceding paragraph.  The Fair Labor Standards Act, as originally enacted in 1938, did not 
include “mass-transit employees” or “employees of state and local governments” (p. 533).  
Through an amendment to the act in 1961, Congress extended minimum-wage requirements to 
employees of private mass-transit companies whose gross revenues exceeded $1 million.  In 
1966 Congress again amended the FLSA by “withdrawing the minimum-wage and overtime 
exemptions from public hospitals, schools, and mass-transit carriers whose rates and services 
were subject to state regulation” (p. 533).  The 1966 amendments were challenged, but were 
upheld by the Court in Maryland v. Wirtz in 1968.  The San Antonio Transit System complied 
with the Fair Labor Standards Act’s requirements until the Court overruled Maryland v. Wirtz 
with its 1976 decision in National League of Cities.  In 1979 a sub-agency of the Department of 
Transportation “issued an opinion that SAMTA’s operations ‘are not constitutionally immune 
from the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act’ under National League of Cities” (p. 534).  
One month after the ensuing legal challenge was filed, the Department of Labor officially 
amended the FLSA “interpretive regulations” by withdrawing immunity under the National 
League of Cities ruling from all “publicly owned local mass-transit systems” (p. 534). 
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 Two months after the sub-agency of the Department of Transportation made its initial 
recommendation, the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority filed suit in the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Texas.  SAMTA “sought a declaratory judgment that, contrary 
to the Wage and Hour Administration’s determination, National League of Cities precluded the 
application of the FLSA’S overtime requirements to SAMTA’s operations” (p. 534).  The 
Secretary of Transportation filed a counterclaim in the District Court for the Western District of 
Texas seeking “enforcement of the overtime and recordkeeping requirements of the FLSA” (p. 
534).  At the same time, Garcia and other SAMTA employees filed suit against SAMTA for 
overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act.  The District Court stayed action in Garcia’s 
suit “pending the outcome” of the two other legal actions, but “allowed Garcia to intervene in the 
present litigation as a defendant in support of the Secretary” (p. 534). 
 The legal history of court rulings commenced two years later (November 17, 1981), when 
the District Court for the Western District of Texas “granted SAMTA’s motion for summary 
judgment” while denying the Secretary of Transportation’s (and Garcia’s, as co-defendant) 
“cross-motion for partial summary judgment” (p. 535).  Without explaining its ruling, the 
District Court held “that ‘local public mass transit systems (including [SAMTA]) constitute 
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions’ under National League of 
Cities” (p. 535).  Under federal law, Garcia and the Secretary of Transportation appealed the 
District Court’s decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.  While the appeals were pending, the Court 
ruled in Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Company, 455 U.S. 678 (1982), “that 
commuter rail service provided by the state-owned Long Island Rail Road did not constitute a 
‘traditional governmental function’ and hence did not enjoy constitutional immunity, under 
National League of Cities…” (p. 535).  In accordance with its recent ruling, the Court “vacated 
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the District Court’s judgment in the [San Antonio] cases and remanded them for further 
consideration in the light of Long Island” (p. 535).  Once back in Texas, the District Court stuck 
with its former view and ruled once again in favor of SAMTA.  Citing the Court’s ruling in 
National League of Cities as controlling, the District Court examined mass transit in light of the 
“list of functions identified as constitutionally immune in National League of Cities and 
concluded that it did not differ from those functions in any material respect.  In explaining its 
conclusion, the District Court observed: 
If transit is to be distinguished from the exempt [National League of Cities] 
functions it will have to be by identifying a traditional state function in the 
same way pornography is sometimes identified: someone knows it when 
they see it, but they can’t describe it.  557 F. Supp., at 453.  (p. 536) 
 
As before, Garcia and the Secretary of Transportation appealed directly to the Supreme Court, 
which “noted probably jurisdiction” (p. 536).  After initial arguments were presented by both 
sides, the Court set a date for reargument with attorneys from both sides “requested to brief and 
argue the following additional question: Whether or not the principles of the Tenth Amendment 
as set forth in National League of Cities … should be reconsidered” (p. 536). 
 Justice Blackmun delivered the Court’s opinion for the 5-4 majority, which overruled 
National League of Cities and reversed the District Court decision.  Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
Stevens, and White joined Blackmun to constitute the Court’s majority.  The four minority 
justices (Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist and O’Connor) wrote three 
dissenting opinions in a veritable mix-match of which justices joined or didn’t join each of the 
dissents. 
 Justice Blackmun opened the Court’s opinion by announcing the holding, after which he 
spent the remainder of the opinion explaining the legal reasoning and rationale behind the 
Court’s ruling.  As Justice Blackmun announced: 
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Our examination of this “function” standard applied in these and other cases 
over the last eight years now persuades us that the attempt to draw the 
boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of “traditional 
governmental function” is not only unworkable but is also inconsistent with 
established principles of federalism and, indeed, with those very federalism 
principles on which National League of Cities purported to rest.  (p. 531) 
 
After reviewing the facts and procedural history of the case, Justice Blackmun addressed the 
difficulties posed by the Hodel tests based upon the Court’s ruling in National League of Cities.  
Upon examining multiple federal cases, he concluded that courts found the following functions 
to be protected from federal intrusion:  “regulating ambulance services, … licensing automobile 
drivers, … operating a municipal airport, … performing solid waste disposal, … and operating a 
highway authority” (p. 538).  According to Blackmun’s analysis of opinions, the following 
functions were “not entitled to immunity” [J. Blackmun’s emphasis] from the Fair Labor 
Standards Act:  “issuance of industrial development bonds, … regulation of intrastate natural gas 
sales, … regulation of traffic on public roads, … regulation of air transportation, …. operation of 
a telephone system, … leasing and sale of natural gas, … operation of a mental health facility, … 
and provision of in-house domestic services for the aged and handicapped” (Emphasis in 
original) (pp. 538-539).  Justice Blackmun observed: 
We find it difficult, if not impossible, to identify an organizing principle that 
places each of the cases in the first group on one side of a line and each of 
the cases in the second group on the other side.  The constitutional 
distinction between licensing drivers and regulating traffic, for example, … 
is elusive at best.  (p. 539) 
 
 Having analyzed the performance of the lower federal courts, Justice Blackmun admitted 
the Court’s record was not much better. 
Thus far, this court itself has made little headway in defining the scope of 
the governmental functions deemed protected under National League of 
Cities.  In that case the Court set forth examples of protected and 
unprotected functions, … but provided no explanation of how those 
examples were identified.  (p. 539) 
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Justice Blackmun noted that the Court “did not offer an explanation of what makes one state 
function a ‘basic prerogative’ and another function not basic”(p. 540).  According to Blackmun, 
the Court’s own opinions reflected “an inability to specify precisely what aspects of a 
governmental function made it necessary to the ‘unimpaired existence’ of the States” (p. 541). 
 From his analysis, Justice Blackmun discovered “a more fundamental problem at work 
… that explain[ed] why the Court was never able to provide a basis for … distinctions with 
respect to federal regulatory authority under National League of Cities” (p. 545).  The 
fundamental problem at work was that no distinction “that purports to separate out important 
governmental functions can be faithful to the role of federalism in a democratic society” (p. 546).  
Justice Blackmun cited Justice Black’s concurring opinion in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S., at 
427:   
There is not, and there cannot be, any unchanging line of demarcation 
between essential and non-essential governmental functions.  Many 
governmental functions of today have at some time in the past been non-
governmental.  The genius of our government provides that, within the 
sphere of constitutional action, the people – acting not through the courts but 
through their elected legislative representatives – have the power to 
determine as conditions demand, what services and functions the public 
welfare requires.  (p. 546) 
 
According to Justice Blackmun, the intrinsic nature of federalism required that it remain open-
ended and flexible as opposed to being bound by rigid definitions. 
The essence of our federal system is that within the realm of authority left 
open to them under the Constitution, the States must be equally free to 
engage in any activity that their citizens choose for the common weal, no 
matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else – including the judiciary  
- deems state involvement to be.  Any rule of state immunity that looks to 
the “traditional,” “integral,” or “necessary” nature of governmental 
functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions 
about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes.  (p. 546) 
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Citing the Court’s judgment in 1821, which observed, “The science of government … is the 
science of experiment,” and Justice Brandeis’ classic dissenting observation in 1932, which 
characterized the states as “laboratories for social and economic experiment,” Justice Blackmun 
announced the Court’s conclusion: 
We therefore now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in 
practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a 
judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is “integral” 
or “traditional.”  Any such rule leads to inconstant results at the same time 
that it disserves principles of democratic self-governance, and it breeds 
inconsistency precisely because it is divorced from those principles…  (pp. 
546-547) 
 
 The dissenting opinions were long on the use of rhetorical devices and propaganda 
techniques, but were short on legal analyses relating to the central question of the Tenth 
Amendment’s lack of ability to limit the exercise of a delegated power.  The Court majority got 
back on track with precedents, but ironically, Justice Powell thought that any departures from 
stare decisis demanded special attention (p. 559).  The irony derived from three facts: first, the 
Court was getting back to a more established rule of law in Garcia; second, the Court’s departure 
from stare decisis in National League of Cities with no “special justification” had provoked no 
such outcry from Justice Powell; and third, a judicious use of precedents would have focused on 
the question of whether or not the regulation in question established the necessary nexus with 
commerce.  Justice Powell also made inaccurate statements.  He characterized Garcia as a 
radical departure “from long-settled constitutional values” when in actuality just the opposite 
occurred (p. 561).  Powell also falsely claimed that Garcia “ignore[d] the role of judicial review 
in our system of government,” a claim that is hard to fathom given the Court’s use of judicial 
review to correct the judicial mistakes of National League of Cities.  Powell combined a false 
claim with a glittering generality in mischaracterizing National League of Cities as being 
   
   
429
“faithful to history in its understanding of federalism” when in fact the opposite was true (p. 
573).  In Garcia, the Court overruled National League of Cities precisely because National 
League of Cities had not been “faithful to the role of federalism in a democratic society” (p. 
546).  Finally, Justice Powell trotted out the long discredited states’ rights claim that the 
Constitution represented a pact by the states instead of flowing from the people when he referred 
to “the States’ ratification of the Constitution” as illustrating the states’ “major role” in 
federalism (p. 568).58 
 Justice O’Connor began her dissent with the following hyperbole, “The Court today 
surveys the battle scene of federalism and sounds a retreat” (p. 580).  Similarly to Justice Powell, 
Justice O’Connor did not address the central legal question of how exactly the Tenth 
Amendment could be construed as a limitation upon a power delegated by the Constitution to the 
federal government.  She cited the Tenth Amendment without addressing the issue of its use as a 
limitation upon a delegated power (p. 582).  O’Connor ignored precedent which would have 
dictated an effort to separate the regulated behavior from commerce so as to then legitimately 
bring the Tenth Amendment into play.  Some irony attached to O’Connor’s desire to see a strict 
construction placed upon the commerce power, while at the same time she desired to ignore the 
text of the Tenth Amendment which specified that only those powers not delegated were 
reserved to the states or to the people (p. 583).  Since the text of the Tenth Amendment didn’t 
serve her needs, Justice O’Connor searched for a mystical explanation.  “The spirit [emphasis 
O’Connor’s] of the Tenth Amendment, or course, is that the States will retain their integrity in a 
system in which the laws of the United States are nevertheless supreme” (p. 585).  She 
continued, “It is not enough that the ‘end be legitimate’; the means to that end chosen by 
Congress must not contravene the spirit of the Constitution” (p. 585).  Exactly what criteria were 
   
   
430
to be employed in divining the “spirit of the Constitution” remained, however, elusive, as Justice 
O’Connor didn’t spell them out. 
 Justice Rehnquist offered a one-paragraph dissent in which he again chose to ignore the 
central legal question, “How can the language of the Tenth Amendment be construed so that the 
Tenth serves as a limitation upon a specifically delegated power?”  Disappointed that his opinion 
in National League of Cities had been overruled, Rehnquist elected to not “spell out further the 
fine points of a principle that will … in time again command the support of a majority of this 
Court” (p. 580).  The dissenting opinions provide illumination as to the use of rhetorical devices 
and propaganda techniques employed to disguise the fact of a poor constitutional foundation 
erected through weak, in some cases, irrelevant legal arguments.   
 Significance for the tenth amendment. 
 In fashion similar to FERC, Garcia got the Court back on track procedurally through its 
consideration of established legal principles and by its examination of judicial precedents 
governing constitutional issues.  Garcia also moved the Court to a sounder footing regarding the 
Tenth Amendment’s inability to serve as a limitation upon a delegated power.  It would seem to 
portend that future constitutional challenges to legislation would have to focus upon separating 
the regulated behavior from a delegated power in order to legitimately bring the Tenth 
Amendment into play.  What remained unclear was the extent to which the Court’s 
characterization of the Constitution as providing structural restraints upon congressional power 
(through the political process as opposed to substantive restraints through the Tenth Amendment) 
referred only to those intersections of the Tenth Amendment with delegated powers, or whether 
instead it would be expanded to include those clashes between the states and Congress over 
powers not delegated by the Constitution to the federal government. 
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 The majority opinion in National League of Cities, combined with the dissenting 
opinions in both FERC and Garcia, provoked the following analysis by a constitutional 
historian:  “Some classic issues of state sovereignty have also centered on efforts by the Court’s 
new conservative justices to restore the force of the Tenth Amendment as a substantive limitation 
on Congress’s commerce powers” (Hall, 1992, p. 286). 
 South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988). 
 Case summary. 
 The case centers on the case law surrounding taxation, particularly upon the intersection 
of the Tenth Amendment, the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity, and tax legislation.  
The particular tax legislation precipitating this controversy involved § 310 of the Tax Equity and 
Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982, which emerged after House and Senate hearings 
centering upon revenues lost through evasion of the nation’s tax laws.  Specifically the Act 
removed “the federal income tax exemption for interest earned on publicly offered long-term” 
bearer bonds (p. 505).  TEFRA, however, left intact the federal income tax exemption on 
registered bonds.59 
 Congress’ purpose in enacting TEFRA was “to reduce the federal deficit by promoting 
compliance with the tax laws” (p. 508).  According to testimony received by the Subcommittee 
on Oversight of the Internal Revenue Service of the Senate Committee on Finance, unreported 
income on which no taxes were paid had increased dramatically during the period 1973 – 1981 
by approximately 300%, from a range of $31.1 – $32.2 billion in 1973 to a range of $93.3 - $97 
billion in 1981 (pp. 508-509).  Attention was soon focused on bearer bonds “because they left no 
paper trail and thus facilitated tax evasion” (p. 509).  Testimony before the House Ways and 
Means Committee by an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy indicated that “bearer 
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bonds were being used to avoid estate and gift taxes and as a medium of exchange in the illegal 
sector” (p. 509).  Because of their use in financing illegal activities as well as in avoiding taxes, § 
310 of TEFRA addressed unregistered, or bearer, bonds issued by the federal government, state 
governments, and private corporations (p. 510).  Besides prohibiting the federal government 
from issuing nonregistered bonds, § 310 imposed “a series of tax penalties” on nonregistered 
bonds, which included “denying the federal income tax exemption for interest earned on state 
bonds to owners of long-term publicly offered state bonds that are not issued in registered form” 
(p. 510). 
 The State of South Carolina “invoked the original jurisdiction of [the] Court” by 
“contending that § 310(b)(1) [was] constitutionally invalid under the Tenth Amendment and the 
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity” (p. 510).  The Court granted South Carolina 
permission to file a complaint against Treasury Secretary Regan and appointed a Special Master 
with authority to conduct hearings, take evidence, and recommend a judgment.  The complaint 
was filed in 1984.  Subsequently the National Governors’ Association requested and was granted 
permission to intervene in the case against the Secretary of the Treasury.  The Special Master 
completed his work and filed his report with the Supreme Court in early 1987, which “concluded 
that § 310(b)(1) was constitutional and recommended entering judgment for the defendant” (pp. 
510-511).  The National Governors’ Association and the State of South Carolina “filed 
exceptions to various factual findings of the Special Master and to the Master’s legal conclusions 
concerning their constitutional challenges” (p. 511).  On October 5, 1987, the Court set the date 
for oral arguments regarding the “Exceptions to the Report of the Special Master” (484 U.S. 
808).  South Carolina v. Baker, Secretary of the Treasury, which had begun as South Carolina v. 
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Regan, 465 U.S. 367 (1984), was argued on December 7, 1787, and decided on April 20, 1988 
(p. 505). 
 Justice Brennan delivered the decision for the 5-3 majority.  Justice Kennedy did not 
participate in the case.  Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined Justice Brennan.  
Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and concurring in part with the 
opinion.  Chief Justice Rehnquist filed an opinion that concurred in the judgment.  Justice 
O’Connor filed a dissenting opinion. 
 Separate attorneys for the National Governors’ Association and South Carolina each 
presented oral arguments to the Court.  The Solicitor General argued the case for the federal 
government.  Plaintiff attorneys contended that in effectively banning bearer bonds, the States 
have no other option than to offer registered bonds, which constitutes a violation of the States’ 
sovereignty guaranteed under the Tenth Amendment (p. 511).  The Solicitor General argued that 
“a blanket prohibition by Congress on the issuance of bearer bonds [could] apply to States 
without violating the Tenth Amendment” (p. 511).  Both plaintiff and defendant attorneys, as 
well as the Court, interpreted the Garcia ruling to mean that “Tenth Amendment limits on 
Congress’ authority to regulate state activities … are structural, not substantive – i.e., that States 
must find their protection from congressional regulation through the national political process, 
not through judicially defined spheres of unregulable state activities” (p. 512).  Attorneys for 
South Carolina argued that the political process failed “because Congress had no concrete 
evidence quantifying the tax evasion attributable to unregistered state bonds and relied instead on 
anecdotal evidence” (p. 512).  They further contended that the political process failed because 
“Congress chose an ineffective remedy by requiring registration because most bond sales are 
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handled by brokers who must file information reports regardless of the form of the bond” (p. 
512).   
 In response to the argument that “§ 310(b)(1) was ‘imposed by the vote of an uninformed 
Congress relying upon incomplete information,” the Court noted that South Carolina did not 
argue it was “deprived of any right to participate in the national political process or that it was 
singled out in a way that left it politically isolated and powerless” (p. 513).  Since the “national 
political process [emphasis Brennan’s] did not operate in a defective manner, the Tenth 
Amendment [was] not implicated” (p. 513).  Furthermore, in response to plaintiff contentions 
that § 310(b)(1) was not an effective remedy for the stated problem, the Court stated that 
“nothing in Garcia or the Tenth Amendment authorize[d] [the] courts to second-guess the 
substantive basis for congressional legislation” (p. 513).   
 Attorneys for the National Governors’ Association had argued that § 310 was 
unconstitutional “because it commandeer[ed] the state legislative and administrative process by 
coercing States into enacting legislation authorizing bond registration and into administering the 
registration scheme” (p. 513).  In support of their argument, they cited FERC as having “left 
open the possibility that the Tenth Amendment might set some limits on Congress’ power to 
compel States to regulate on behalf of federal interests” (p. 513).  Noting that “the claim 
discussed in FERC” was inapplicable to § 310,” the Court further noted that § 310, while 
regulating state activities, did not “seek to control or influence the manner in which States 
regulate private parties” (p. 514).  The simple fact that state legislatures were required to amend 
statutes regarding the issuance of bonds was “an inevitable consequence of regulating a state 
activity” (p. 514).  The Court continued: 
Any federal regulation demands compliance.  That a State wishing to 
engage in certain activity must take administrative and sometimes legislative 
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action to comply with federal standards regulating that activity is a 
commonplace that presents no constitutional defect.  After Garcia, for 
example, several States and municipalities had to take administrative and 
legislative action to alter the employment practices or raise the funds 
necessary to comply with the wage and overtime provisions of the Federal 
Labor Standards Act.  (pp. 514-515) 
 
After discussing precedents and exploring the legal ramifications of the NGA’s argument, the 
Court ruled, “We find the theory foreclosed by precedent, and uphold the constitutionality of § 
310 under the Tenth Amendment” (p. 515). 
 The Court next examined plaintiff claims under the doctrine of intergovernmental tax 
immunity.  The Court agreed with South Carolina’s claim that the Court’s holding in Pollock v. 
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (1895), which ruled “that any interest earned on a state bond was 
immune from federal taxation” (p. 516).  The legal rationale behind the ruling was that taxing the 
interest from state bonds constituted a direct tax on the State, which was unconstitutional.  
However, both the Solicitor General and the Special Master recommended that § 310 be upheld 
without overturning Pollock because § 310 didn’t entirely abolish the tax exemption for state 
bond interest because it left the exemption for interest from registered bonds issued by the State.  
The Court declined to follow the suggestion of the Solicitor General and the Special Master, 
noting, “If this constitutional rule [Pollock] still applies, Congress cannot threaten to tax the 
interest on state bonds that do not conform to congressional dictates” (p. 516).  The Court further 
noted, “Congress cannot employ unconstitutional means to reach a constitutional end” (p. 516).   
 And so, the Court began to examine the rationale behind Pollock and then proceeded to 
examine the case law of taxation by re-stating the underlying principle.  According to the Court: 
This general rule [of tax immunity] was based on the rationale that any tax 
on income a party received under a contract with the government was a tax 
on the contract and thus a tax “on” the government because it burdened the 
government’s power to enter into the contract….  Thus, although a tax was 
collected from an independent private party, the tax was considered to be 
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“on” the government because the tax burden might be passed on to it 
through the contract.  This reasoning was used to define the basic scope of 
both federal and state tax immunities with respect to all types of government 
contracts.  (p. 518) 
 
Thus, federal bond interest, salaries of federal employees, income derived from federal leases, 
and vendor sales to the federal government were all exempt from state taxation (pp. 515-517).  
Likewise, similar contracts with the state governments were exempt from federal taxation (p. 
517).  However, according to the Court: 
The rationale underlying Pollock and the general immunity for government 
contract income has been thoroughly repudiated by modern 
intergovernmental immunity case law.  In Graves v. New York ex rel. 
O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939), the Court announced: “The theory … that a 
tax on income is legally or economically a tax on its source, is no longer 
tenable.”  Id., at 480.  (p. 520)  
 
The Court then cited the case law by which “the government contract immunities recognized 
under [Pollock] were, one by one, eliminated” (pp. 521-522).  Summarizing the current doctrine 
of intergovernmental tax immunity, the Court reported, “[T]he States can never tax the United 
States directly but can tax any private parties with whom it does business….  The rule with 
respect to state tax immunity is essentially the same” (p. 523).  The Court officially “confirm[ed] 
that subsequent case law has overruled the holding in Pollock that state bond interest is immune 
from a nondiscriminatory federal tax” (p. 524).  Next, the Court announced its official finding: 
TEFRA § 310 thus clearly imposes no direct tax on the States.  The tax is 
imposed on and collected from bondholders, not States, and any increased 
administrative costs incurred by States in implementing the registration 
system are not “taxes” within the meaning of the tax immunity doctrine.  (p. 
526)  
 
The Court’s second finding followed: 
Nor does § 310 discriminate against States.  The provisions of § 310 seek to 
assure that all [emphasis Brennan’s] publicly offered long-term bonds are 
issued in registered form, whether issued by state or local governments, the 
Federal Government, or private corporations.  (pp. 526-527) 
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The Court then announced its ruling: 
Because the federal imposition of a bond registration requirement on States 
does not violate the Tenth Amendment and because a nondiscriminatory 
federal tax on the interest earned on state bonds does not violate the 
intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, we uphold the constitutionality of 
§ 310(b)(1), overrule the exceptions to the Special Master’s Report, and 
approve his recommendation to enter judgment for the defendant.  (p. 527) 
 
 The separate opinions added some complexity to the case.  Justice Scalia’s opinion 
concurred with the judgment and with most of the opinion excepting that part dealing with the 
Tenth Amendment, which was Part II of the opinion.  According to Justice Scalia: 
I do not read Garcia as adopting – in fact I read it as explicitly disclaiming – 
the proposition attributed to it in today’s opinion … that the “national 
political process” is the States’ only constitutional protection, and that 
nothing except the demonstration of “some extraordinary defects” in the 
operation of that process can justify judicial relief.  We said in Garcia: 
“These cases do not require us to identify or define what affirmative limits 
the constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the 
States under the Commerce Clause.  See Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 
(1911).”  469 U.S., at 556 (emphasis added).  (p. 528) 
 
The complexity in Scalia’s opinion arose from not knowing his position regarding two key 
issues: 1) the Tenth Amendment’s textual inability to sustain a limiting influence upon a 
delegated power; and 2) whether the political process serves as a buffer to state sovereignty only 
in conflicts involving a delegated power, or whether the political process is construed as 
providing the only buffer in all state-federal conflicts.   
 Justice Rehnquist offered a separate opinion that concurred in the judgment, but not in 
the opinion.  We know Rehnquist’s stance on the previously mentioned issues.  Regarding the 
first key issue, he was not bothered by the Tenth Amendment’s textual inability to sustain a 
limiting influence upon a delegated power.  In some undefined way, as stated in his opinion in 
National League of Cities, the Tenth Amendment buffered federal intrusion into state 
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sovereignty irregardless of whether or not the power had been delegated to the federal 
government.  Regarding the second issue, he rejected the notion that the political process would 
provide any effective safeguard against federal intrusion into state matters, regardless whether 
the power had been delegated to the federal government or reserved to the states and the people. 
 Justice O’Connor dissented from both the opinion and the judgment.  O’Connor objected 
to the Court’s overruling of Pollock, which is most difficult to understand.  As the Court pointed 
out, Pollock had already been effectively overruled on all counts except for bond interest.  All 
the Court did was pronounce official sentence on what was already a fait accompli.  Also, Justice 
O’Connor ignored stare decisis which helped her propagate yet another propaganda technique, 
that of the false premise.  According to O’Connor, “Federal taxation of state activities is 
inherently a threat to state sovereignty” (p. 533).  However, in 1939 the Court stated in Graves v. 
New York ex rel. O’Keefe (a case to which Justice O’Connor had access since it was cited in the 
current Court opinion), “The theory … that a tax on income is legally or economically a tax on 
its source, is no longer tenable” (p. 520).  Thus, the precedent made her phrase “[f]ederal 
taxation of state activities” a false premise.  The false premise was followed two sentences later 
by O’Connor’s use of hyperbole: “If this Court is the States’ sole protector against the threat of 
crushing taxation…” (p. 533).  Justice O’Connor’s failure to acknowledge the precedent of 
Graves v. New York also permitted her to utilize a logical fallacy, the unwarranted conclusion, 
which O’Connor combined with hyperbole, as exemplified in her statement, “If Congress may 
tax the interest paid on state and local bonds, it may strike at the very heart of state of local 
government activities” (p. 532).  The most complicated use of propaganda techniques occurred 
when Justice O’Connor combined the appeal to fear, slippery slope, unwarranted extrapolation, 
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and the more subtle form of name calling (the use of words or phrases selected because they 
possess a negative emotional charge, e.g., tyranny, gutted shell): 
Although Congress has taken a relatively less burdensome step in subjecting 
only income from bearer bonds to federal taxation, the erosion of state 
sovereignty is likely to occur a step at a time.  “If there is any danger, it lies 
in the tyranny of small decisions – in the prospect that Congress will nibble 
away at state sovereignty, bit by bit, until someday essentially nothing is left 
but a gutted shell.”  (p. 533) 
 
Of interest, Justice O’Connor did cite the Guarantee Clause as a possible protection of “the 
States’ autonomy … from substantial federal incursions” (p. 531).  However, O’Connor failed to 
clarify how the Guarantee Clause might work to restrain federal action against state sovereignty. 
 Significance for the tenth amendment. 
 The question remaining after Garcia, regarding whether structural restraints (i.e., the 
political process) would apply only to delegated powers or whether it would be the only 
safeguard against federal intrusion into state sovereignty, received a partial answer in South 
Carolina v. Baker.  A majority of the justices viewed the political process as providing the only 
restraints upon federal power being imposed upon the states.  A minority of the justices opposed 
that view, believing that the Tenth Amendment provided a restraint against both delegated and 
assumed powers of the federal government.  What remained unclear was the position of Justice 
Scalia regarding the Tenth Amendment.  He clearly rejected the notion that the political process 
constituted the sole defense of states against federal intrusion.  However, it would seem that the 
Tenth Amendment would serve as a restraint against congressional assumption of nondelegated 
powers.  Whether or not Justice Scalia would ignore the textual difficulties in applying the Tenth 
Amendment as a limitation upon delegated powers remained an unanswered question. 
 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 Case summary. 
   
   
440
 By the early 1980s, 31 of 50 states faced an impending shortage of sites in which to 
dispose the low-level radioactive waste that was produced within their respective boundaries (p. 
144).  By 1978 only three states (South Carolina, Nevada, and Washington) had disposal sites in 
operation (p. 150).  However, in 1979 the Nevada and Washington sites shut down (p. 150).  At 
first the shut-downs were temporary, but the governors of both states soon “announced plans to 
shut their sites permanently” (p. 150).  In response, Congress passed the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 that imposed an obligation upon each state to arrange for 
the disposal of low-level radioactive waste that was generated within its borders.  In addition, 
Congress provided three sets of incentives to provide motivation for the states to comply with the 
obligations set forth in the act: 1) monetary incentives by which states with disposal sites could 
levy a surcharge on wastes received from other sites; 2) access incentives which permitted states 
with sites to gradually increase “the cost of access to their sites” by other states; and 3) a take 
title provision by which those states failing to make provision “for the provision of all internally 
generated waste by a particular date” were required to “take title to and possession of the waste 
and become liable for all damages suffered … as a result of the State’s failure” (p. 144).  The 
legislation was “based largely on a proposal submitted by the National Governors’ Association” 
as a result of a compromise it brokered “among the sited and unsited States” by which “sited 
States agreed to extend for seven years the period in which they would accept low level 
radioactive waste from other States.  In exchange, the unsited States agreed to end their reliance 
on the sited States by 1992” (p. 151).   
 The State of New York, described by the Court as “a State whose residents generate a 
relatively large share of the Nation’s low level radioactive waste,” and two of its counties filed 
suit against the United States in federal district court  
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seeking a declaratory judgment that, inter alia, the three incentives 
provisions are inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment – which  declares 
that “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States” – and with the 
Guarantee Clause of Article IV, § 4 – which directs the United States to 
“guarantee to every State … a Republican Form of Government.”  (pp. 154; 
144) 
 
The original suit also contained arguments that the congressional action violated the Eleventh 
Amendment and the Due Process Clause requirements of the Fifth Amendment.  The U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed the suit.  When the suit was filed 
by New York in 1990, the only sited states in the country (South Carolina, Nevada, and 
Washington) “intervened as defendants” (p. 154).  Upon appeal the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal.  Subsequently the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.  As the Court noted, “Petitioners … abandoned their due process and Eleventh 
Amendment claims on their way up the appellate ladder” (p. 154).  Seventeen unsited states, plus 
the Council of State Governments, filed briefs of amici curiae in support of New York’s 
challenge to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (p. 148).  
Strangely, attorneys for the National Governors’ Conference, whose recommendations basically 
comprised the challenged legislation, remained noticeable by their noninvolvement in the case.  
Since the challenge based on the Guarantee Clause was addressed in a previous chapter (see pp. 
234-238), this discussion will focus on the Court’s ruling on the Tenth Amendment claims. 
 Justice O’Connor authored the 6-3 opinion in which the Court ruled that the monetary 
and access incentives passed constitutional muster, but the take title provision did not.  Thus the 
lower court decisions were affirmed in part and overruled in part.  Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices Souter, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Justice O’Connor to form the Court’s 
majority.  Justices Blackmun, White, and Stevens joined in part.  Separate opinions were filed by 
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Justices White and Stevens, which concurred in part and dissented in part from the majority.  
Justice White’s opinion was joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. 
 Justice O’Connor began by noting the contrasting ages of the two problems involved in 
the suit, the relative new public policy problem centering on radioactive waste and the “oldest 
question of constitutional law” centering on “discerning the proper division of authority between 
the Federal Government and the States” (p. 149).  Affected constitutional components included 
the Commerce Clause, the Spending Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Tenth 
Amendment.  After presenting the historical context of the challenged legislation, Justice 
O’Connor began addressing the central issue, “the task of ascertaining the constitutional line 
between federal and state power” (p. 155).  Questions concerning the Tenth Amendment 
involved “determining whether particular sovereign powers have been granted by the 
Constitution to the Federal Government or have been retained by the States” (p. 155).  According 
to O’Connor, the question could be examined in either of two different ways.  One method 
involved an inquiry as to “whether an Act of Congress [was] authorized by one of the powers 
delegated to Congress in Article I of the Constitution” (p. 155).  Benchmark cases for this 
approach included the early McCullough v. Maryland (1819) and the more recent Perez v. United 
States (1971).  The other method focused on attempts “to determine whether an Act of Congress 
invade[d] the province of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment” (p. 155).  
Benchmarks for invasions of the Tenth Amendment included Lane County v. Oregon (1869) and 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985).  According to Justice O’Connor, 
the two methods were “mirror images of each other” (p. 156).  She continued: 
If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth 
Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; 
if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth 
Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on 
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Congress….  It is in this sense that the Tenth Amendment “states but a 
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.”  United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).  (p. 156) 
 
Justice O’Connor next linked this principle with a more recent case: 
The States unquestionably do retai[n] a significant measure of sovereign 
authority … to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their 
original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government.  
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, supra, at 549.  (p. 
156) 
 
As in the National League of Cities v. Usery opinion, the Court next discussed constitutional 
limitations on delegated powers.  After noting that the First Amendment limited congressional 
power emanating from the Commerce Clause, Justice O’Connor made a somewhat shocking 
statement that the Tenth Amendment also acted to restrain a delegated power, but its limiting 
power did not derive from the text of that amendment. 
The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this 
limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which, as 
we have discussed, is essentially a tautology.  Instead, the Tenth 
Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject 
to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States.  The 
Tenth Amendment thus directs us to determine, as in this case, whether an 
incident of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I 
power.  (pp. 156-157) 
 
No cases were cited in support of this novel interpretation, not even the National League of 
Cities ruling reaching essentially the same position.  Perhaps that was because Garcia had 
subsequently overruled it.  Yet the Court now treaded on similar ground.   
 Unable to find support for her position in either the text of the Tenth Amendment or in 
existing relevant case law, O’Connor announced that the source of limitations by the Tenth 
Amendment upon federal exercise of a delegated power lay within the “federal structure” of 
American government, which provides concrete meaning to the concept of “federalism” (p. 157).  
Notwithstanding the benefits of federalism, the Court’s task “consists not of devising our 
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preferred system of government, but of understanding and applying the framework set forth in 
the Constitution” (p. 157).  First noting that the constitutional “framework ha[d] been sufficiently 
flexible over the past two centuries to allow for enormous changes in the nature of government,” 
Justice O’Connor next observed that “the powers conferred upon the Federal Government by the 
Constitution were phrased in language broad enough to allow for the expansion of the Federal 
Government’s role” (p. 157).  According to O’Connor, the three major constitutional sources of 
federal power that converged in this case were the Commerce Clause, the Spending Clause, and 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, the latter clause serving to guide the “Court’s broad 
construction of Congress’ power under the Commerce and Spending Clauses” (p. 159).  
Returning to her mirror image portrayal of the issue posed by the constitutional structure, Justice 
O’Connor pontificated: 
In the end, just as a cup may be half empty or half full, it makes no 
difference whether one views the question at issue in these cases as one of 
ascertaining the limits of the power delegated to the Federal Government 
under the affirmative provisions of the Constitution or one of discerning the 
core of sovereignty retained by the States under the Tenth Amendment.  
Either way, we must determine whether any of the three challenged 
provisions … oversteps the boundary between federal and state authority. 
(p. 159) 
 
 After a review of later twentieth century cases involving the Tenth Amendment focused 
on “the authority of Congress to subject state governments to generally applicable laws,” Justice 
O’Connor rephrased the primary legal question as a focus upon “the circumstances under which 
Congress may use the States as implements of regulation” (pp. 160, 161).  In beginning the 
Court’s examination of the preceding question, O’Connor began with a premise derived from a 
1981 case: 
As an initial matter, Congress may not simply “commandee[r] the legislative 
process of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a 
federal regulatory program.”  Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
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Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981).  In Hodel, the Court 
upheld the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 precisely 
because it did not [emphasis O’Connor’s] “commandeer” the States into 
regulating mining.  (p. 161) 
 
However, O’Connor did not discuss the case law ending with Garcia whereby the states did have 
to adjust their programs, statutes, and administrative law in order to meet federal requirements.  
O’Connor did not yet address the underlying issue of where the line should be drawn between 
Garcia and “commandeering” a state’s legislative processes, not to mention the differences 
between delegated and nondelegated powers. 
 Justice O’Connor subsequently discussed FERC, noting that the Court observed in that 
case “that ‘this Court never has sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to 
promulgate and enforce laws and regulations.  [FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742], at 761-762’” 
(p. 161).  O’Connor next cited an older case to buttress the contention drawn from Hodel and 
FERC: 
While Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, 
including in areas of intimate concern to the States, the Constitution has 
never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the 
States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.  See Coyle v. Smith, 
221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911).  (p. 162) 
 
 Thereafter Justice O’Connor trotted out the same citation from Texas v. White used by 
Justice Rehnquist in National League of Cities, a quote which Justice Brennan had found ironic 
in his dissent of the same case because the legal issue concerned the federal government’s 
authority under the Guarantee Clause to restructure state government following the denial of a 
republican government caused by an attempted secession.60  Involving the “quoting out of 
context” technique, this device was used “to gain credibility for an idea that is not supported by 
the full context” (see Appendix M; hereafter, refer to Appendix M for information about 
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identified propaganda techniques discussed in the remainder of this paper).  According to Justice 
O’Connor: 
In Chief Justice Chase’s much-quoted words, “the preservation of the States, 
and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design 
and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the 
maintenance of the National government.  The Constitution, in all its 
provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible 
States.”  Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869).  (p. 162) 
 
Lifting another citation from its original context, O’Connor quoted Alexander Hamilton’s 
observation from The Federalist: 
The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation 
is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in 
their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as 
contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of whom they consist.”  The 
Federalist No. 15, p. 108 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) [emphasis in original].  (p. 
163)61 
 
Of course, what Justice O’Connor didn’t mention was the context of Hamilton’s remarks, which 
took place in the midst of an attempt to reduce the state sovereignty of the Confederation by the 
adoption of the Constitution, an effort that the Founders recognized required the ability of the 
federal government to enact legislation directly affecting the people without requiring the 
approval of each of the states. 
 O’Connor then proceeded to take remarks made at the Constitutional Convention out of 
their context as well by citing Edmund Randolph’s objections to the New Jersey Plan proposed 
by William Patterson.  Due to the involved and complicated context, the quote will be first 
presented (see following sentence) followed by an explanation of the context (see pp. 447-449), 
after which will be presented Justice O’Connor’s misuse of the quote (see pp. 449-450).  
O’Connor’s citation of Randolph was: “Coercion [is] impracticable, expensive, cruel to 
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individuals….  We must resort therefore to a national Legislature over individuals…  (emphasis 
in original)” p. 164). 
 The context for Randolph’s remarks is somewhat more complex than the statement.  
Resolution six of the New Jersey plan as presented to the Convention dealt with acts and treaties 
made by Congress, one part of which stated: 
[I]f any State, or any body of men in any State shall oppose or prevent ye. 
carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the federal Executive shall be 
authorized to call forth ye power of the Confederated States, or so much 
thereof as may be necessary to enforce and compel an obedience to such 
Acts,..  (Farrand, I, p. 245) 
 
Of course, since Randolph had offered the Virginia Plan to the Convention, he would speak 
against the New Jersey Plan, particularly since the New Jersey Plan simply amended the existing 
Articles of Confederation which meant that Articles II and IX remained intact (except with 
regards to the specifically delegated powers enumerated by Patterson’s New Jersey Plan).62  
Article II of the Articles read: “Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and 
every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the 
United States, in Congress” (Rossiter, p. 351).  Article IX, ¶ 4 of the Articles read: “The united 
states in congress assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power of … 
regulating the trade … providing that the legislative right of any state within its own limits be not 
infringed or violated” (Rossiter, p. 356).  Article IX, ¶ 6 of the Articles read: The united states in 
congress assembled shall never [exercise its delegated powers] … unless nine states assent to the 
same” (Rossiter, p. 357). 
 Randolph’s remarks about “coercion” were made in the context of his opposition to the 
Articles of Confederation and their enthronement of state sovereignty which had impeded 
national legislation.  According to Madison’s notes, “He painted in strong colours [sic], the 
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imbecility of the existing confederacy, & the danger of delaying a substantial reform” (Farrand, 
I, p. 253).  Given the history of noncompliance by the states with congressional legislation as 
well as the ineffectiveness resulting from waiting for states to approve what Congress had 
passed, Patterson’s recommendation for coercion only made sense.  If, however, the Articles 
were replaced as proposed by the Virginia Plan, there would be no need of coercion since the 
“National Legislature” would be empowered “to legislate in all cases to which the separate States 
are incompetent” and “to negative all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the 
opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union” (Farrand, I, p. 21).  Thus, in comparing 
the two plans, Randolph was trying to distinguish the two plans by drawing attention to the 
openly coercive nature of the New Jersey Plan.  Randolph was not opposed to force or coercion 
in upholding the national government, but he was clever in framing the issue so as to avoid the 
appearance of naked force.  Subsequent to his quoted remark, Randolph noted that the states 
were “always encroaching on the authority of the U[nited] States.  A provision for harmony 
among the States, as in trade, naturalization &c. – for crushing rebellion whenever it may rear its 
crest – and for certain other general benefits, must be made” (Farrand, I, p. 256). 
 Another indication of Randolph’s opposition to the ability of the states under the Articles 
to impede the national government as well as his support of coercive means to overcome such 
opposition may be gleaned from the text of Resolution 6 of the Virginia Plan that he had 
presented to the Convention on May 29th, 1787: “Resolved that … the National Legislature 
ought to be impowered [sic] … to call forth the force of the Union agst. any member of the 
Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof” (Farrand, I, p. 21).  In short, Randolph 
did not object to coercive means to achieve the aims of the national government nor did he 
   
   
449
support state sovereignty as a vehicle to obstruct national efforts to meet its obligations to the 
people of the nation. 
 Given that context, Justice O’Connor’s following interpretation lacked any credibility 
whatsoever.  By removing the statement from its context, O’Connor could then attempt to make 
a false claim (or, at best, an unwarranted assumption), which would be credible to those 
unfamiliar with the context, the claim being that Randolph was actually opposed to coercion of 
the states in order to respect national legislation.  According to O’Connor, “One frequently 
expressed objection to the New Jersey Plan was that it might require the Federal Government to 
coerce the States into implementing legislation” (p. 164).  And then she cited Randolph’s 
remark, which was taken so completely out of context as to be given a different interpretation.   
 To review, given the political context of the time, national legislation under the Articles 
of Confederation had to first pass muster with the respective state legislatures before the proposal 
could become law.  More importantly, the Articles were construed as acting upon the states, not 
directly upon the citizens who were first citizens of their respective states.  The Constitution 
would change that by carving out powers by which the federal legislation would act directly on 
citizens, thus bypassing the intermediary states. Of course, another reality dealt with the fear of 
strong central governments.   Any remarks made at the time need to be considered in light of that 
context which was far more nuanced than O’Connor would have us believe.  Fear of tyranny 
resulting from a strong central government had driven the revolutionary impulse.  However, state 
sovereignty, which emasculated a central government under the Articles, had not worked.  At the 
time of the Constitutional Convention, there were many points along the continuum between the 
absolutes of state sovereignty at one end and national sovereignty at the other end that were 
taken by various individuals at different times and on varying issues.  The Founders were 
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searching for solutions to the failure of the Articles of Confederation.  Justice O’Connor would 
have us ignore that context by creating a false dichotomy consisting of the two extremes.  The 
context in which Randolph’s remarks were made focused on discussion regarding the relative 
merits and disabilities of two plans presented at the Convention.  The discussion involved the 
underlying question of whether to simply amend the Articles by the New Jersey Plan or to 
replace the Articles and make provision for a stronger central government with reduced, but still 
existent, state sovereignty through the Virginia Plan.  Justice O’Connor continued her opinion by 
taking other isolated statements made in the ratifying conventions to support her initial 
contention that Congress may not regulate states.  Whether or not they were also, like the 
previous examples, taken out of context will not be examined further.  Given Justice O’Connor’s 
record, perhaps they should be examined at a later date. 
 Also of importance, O’Connor didn’t deal with the case law contradicting such a flat 
assertion as she made, which was then supported primarily through a somewhat sophisticated use 
of propaganda techniques that are somewhat difficult to detect.  The case law not examined 
illustrated multiple instances whereby states were required to change state rules, regulations, and 
laws in order to comply with federal legislation, e.g., Garcia’s overruling of National League of 
Cities regarding hours and wages of state employees under Congress use of the Commerce 
Power in the Fair Labor Standards Act and its subsequent amendments.  Of course such an 
examination would have required that differentiation be made between the case law supporting 
Garcia and O’Connor’s coercion contention.  The difficulty in providing a clear-cut line of 
demarcation between the two positions had ultimately proven fatal to National League of Cities 
as a precedent.  Also forgotten in the “coercion” discussion was the limitation imposed by the 
original case cited by Justice O’Connor, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn. 
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(1981).  The limitation involved “enforc[ing] a federal regulatory program” which was not in an 
activity that could be constitutionally pre-empted by the federal government vis-à-vis FERC (p. 
161). 
 Instead of addressing the preceding legal issues, Justice O’Connor made a somewhat 
exaggerated, or unsupported, claim for which she provided no supporting evidence. 
Where Congress encourages state regulation rather than compelling it, state 
governments remain responsive to the local electorate’s preferences; state 
officials remain accountable to the people.  By contrast, where the Federal 
Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and 
federal officials is diminished.  (p. 168) 
 
A skeptical observer might wonder how the state government could be viewed as being 
responsive to the local electorate’s preferences when those local preferences might happen to 
conflict with the federal requirements the state is “volunteering” to meet, either through 
encouragement or through conditional spending requirements.  One wonders about the attitude of 
state lawmakers across the nation and whether they felt they remained accountable to local 
preferences in the wake of Garcia and FERC as they were changing state rules, regulations, and 
code to meet federal requirements.  Also, from a local perspective, it is often difficult to discern 
differences between federal encouragement and federal compulsion, e.g., the No Child Left 
Behind Act.63  O’Connor did discuss what she meant by the second statement above, but 
provided no concrete examples.  However, the line between coercion and encouragement 
remained unclear, particularly from the local point of view. 
  Justice O’Connor focused on each of the three incentives individually as part of the total 
incentive package contained within the whole act.  O’Connor began by stating, “The first set of 
incentives works in three steps” (p. 171).  The first step, authorizing sited states to impose a 
surcharge on waste received from unsited states, represented “an unexceptionable exercise of 
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Congress’ power” authorized by the Commerce Clause (p. 171).  The second step of the first 
incentive, “the Secretary’s collection of a percentage of the surcharge,” amounted to “no more 
than a federal tax on interstate commerce,” which was clearly within Congress’ commerce 
powers (p. 171).  The third step, the disbursement of the surcharge fund to those states who had 
waste disposal sites in operation by January 1, 1993, was “a conditional exercise of Congress’ 
authority under the Spending Clause” to place “conditions … on the receipt of federal funds” (p. 
171).  Upon examination, Justice O’Connor found they met four of the tests required of 
conditional spending which were articulated in South Dakota v. Dole:  first, “[t]he expenditure 
[was] for the general welfare;” second, [t]he conditions imposed [were] unambiguous;” third, 
“[t]he conditions imposed [were] reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure;” and 
finally, “the conditions imposed by the Act [did not] violate any independent constitutional 
prohibition” (pp. 172, 173).  Justice O’Connor concluded: 
The Act’s first set of incentives, in which Congress has conditioned grants 
to the States upon the States’ attainment of a series of milestones, is thus 
well within the authority of Congress under the Commerce and Spending 
Clauses.  Because the first set of incentives is supported by affirmative 
constitutional grants of power to Congress, it is not inconsistent with the 
Tenth Amendment.  (p. 173) 
 
It is unclear why Justice O’Connor omitted the fifth test related to “economic hardship” should 
the conditional spending not be accepted by an individual state. 
 Moving to the second set of incentives that allowed sited states “to increase the cost of 
access to the sites, and then to deny access altogether, to radioactive waste generated in States 
that [did] not meet federal deadlines”, O’Connor observed that this, too, was “within the power 
of Congress to authorize the States to discriminate against interstate commerce” (p. 173).  Citing 
case law, O’Connor also noted that Congress had the power “to offer States the choice of 
regulating that activity [falling within the scope of the Commerce Clause] according to federal 
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standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation” (pp. 173-174).  Justice O’Connor 
issued the Court’s ruling regarding the constitutionality of the second set of incentives: 
The Act’s second set of incentives thus represents a conditional exercise of 
Congress’ commerce power, along the lines of those we have held to be 
within Congress’ authority.  As a result, the second set of incentives does 
not intrude on the sovereignty reserved to the States by the Tenth 
Amendment.  (p. 174) 
 
 Justice O’Connor set an ominous tone at the beginning of her analysis of the third set of 
incentives by stating, “The take title provision is of a different character [from the previous two 
sets of incentives]” (p. 174).  Two sentences later, O’Connor declared, “In this provision, 
Congress has crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion” (p. 175).  She 
explained: 
The take title provision offers state governments a “choice” of either 
accepting ownership of waste or regulating according to the instructions of 
Congress.  Respondents [the federal government and sited states] do not 
claim that the Constitution would authorize Congress to impose either 
option as a freestanding requirement.  (p. 175) 
 
After examining each requirement as if “standing alone,” Justice O’Connor summarized: 
Either type of federal action would “commandeer” state governments into 
the service of federal regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be 
inconstant with the Constitution’s division of authority between federal and 
state governments.  On the other hand, the second alternative held out to 
state governments – regulating pursuant to Congress’ direction – would, 
standing alone, present a simple command to state governments to 
implement legislation enacted by Congress.  (pp. 175-176) 
 
Justice O’Connor continued her line of reasoning: 
Because an instruction to state governments to take title to waste, standing 
alone, would be beyond the authority f Congress, and because a direct order 
to regulate, standing alone, would also be beyond the authority of Congress, 
it follows that Congress lacks the power to offer the States a choice between 
the two.  (p. 176) 
 
O’Connor concluded: 
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A choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is 
no choice at all.  Either way, “the Act commandeers the legislative 
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a 
federal regulatory program,” Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Assn., Inc., [452 U.S.], at 288, an outcome that has never been 
understood to lie within the authority conferred upon Congress by the 
Constitution.  (p. 176) 
 
Addressing the federal government’s argument that states were given latitude in implementing 
Congress’ plan, O’Connor noted: “This line of reasoning, however, only underscores the critical 
alternative a State lacks: A State may not decline to administer the federal program.  No matter 
which path the State chooses, it must follow the direction of Congress” (pp. 176-177).  
Regarding the government’s contention that “the federal interest is sufficiently important to 
justify state submission,” Justice O’Connor replied: 
No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution 
simply does not give Congress the authority to require the States to 
regulate….  Where a federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress 
to legislate, it must do so directly; it may not conscript state governments as 
its agents.  (p. 178) 
 
In reply to the federal government’s argument “that the Constitution does, in some 
circumstances, permit federal directives to state governments,” Justice O’Connor noted that the 
case law offered in support of that argument discussed “the well established power of Congress 
to pass laws enforceable in state courts,” but, according to O’Connor, didn’t “support” the 
government’s argument (p. 178).  In her explanation, Justice O’Connor finally drew a distinction 
between “coercive” and constitutionally permissive legislation: 
These cases involve no more than an application of the Supremacy Clause’s 
provision that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land,” 
enforceable in every State.  More to the point, all involve congressional 
regulation of individuals, not congressional requirements that States 
regulate.  (p. 178) 
 
Justice O’Connor continued: 
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Federal statutes enforceable in state courts do, in a sense, direct state judges 
to enforce them, but this sort of federal “direction” of state judges is 
mandated by the text of the Supremacy Clause.  No comparable 
constitutional provision authorizes Congress to command state legislatures 
to legislate.  (p. 179) 
 
Addressing the case law upholding “the power of federal courts [emphasis O’Connor’s] to order 
state officials to comply with federal law,” O’Connor again pointed to the Supremacy Clause and 
to Article III, § 2 regarding the judicial power, and observed, “The Constitution contains no 
analogous grant of authority to Congress” (p. 179).  Detecting an implied power, Justice 
O’Connor further noted, “Moreover, the Supremacy Clause makes federal law paramount over 
the contrary positions of state officials; the power of federal courts to enforce federal law thus 
presupposes some authority to order state officials to comply” (p. 179).  O’Connor concluded: 
In sum, the cases relied upon by the United States hold only that federal law 
is enforceable in state courts and that federal courts may in proper 
circumstances order state officials to comply with federal law, propositions 
that by no means imply any authority on the part of Congress to mandate 
state regulation.  (p. 179) 
 
 Attorneys for the sited states who had intervened on behalf of the federal government had 
presented a somewhat more troublesome argument.  They had pointed out to the Court “that 
public officials representing the State of New York lent their support to the Act’s enactment” (p. 
181).  Sited states’ attorneys also noted “that the Act embodie[d] a bargain among the sited and 
unsited States, a compromise to which New York was a willing participant and from which New 
York ha[d] reaped much benefit” (p. 181).  Posing the following question, legal counsel for the 
sited states asked the Court, “How can a federal statute be found an unconstitutional 
infringement of state sovereignty when state officials consented to the statute’s enactment” (p. 
181)? 
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 The Court responded by first pointing out that the Constitution did not “protect the 
sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state governments” (p. 181).  The Court 
explained: 
To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state 
governments for the protection of individuals.  State sovereignty is not just 
an end in itself: “Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that 
derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.”  Coleman v. Thompson, 501 
U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  (p. 181) 
 
The Court continued its explanation: 
“Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the 
Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power 
in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the 
Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either 
front.”  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S., at 458.  See the Federalist No. 51, p. 
323 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).  (pp. 181-182) 
 
According to the Court, when the federal government exceeded its powers, “the departure from 
the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state officials (p. 182).  Suggestive 
of the notion that no precedents existed, the Court cited no judicial precedents in support of its 
contention.  Instead, the Court drew an analogy to a similar situation, the horizontal separation of 
powers between the branches of government, for which case law did exist to support the 
principle that the Constitution was “violated where one branch invades the territory of another, 
whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment” (p. 182).  Cases cited 
included Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-137 (1976), and INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-
959 (1983).  The legal principle surrounding the Separation of Powers doctrine applied to both 
the horizontal separation of powers and the vertical separation of powers.  According to the 
Court: 
The constitutional authority of Congress cannot be expanded by the 
“consent” of the governmental unit whose domain is thereby narrowed, 
whether that unit is the Executive Branch of the States.  State officials thus 
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cannot consent to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those 
enumerated in the Constitution.  (p. 182) 
 
Furthermore, the Court also noted: “Nor does the State’s prior support for the Act estop it from 
asserting the Act’s unconstitutionality” (p. 183).  Addressing the issue that the Act represented “a 
compromise among the States,” the Court stated that such an agreement did not “elevate the Act 
… to the status of an interstate agreement requiring Congress’ approval under the Compact 
Clause.  Cf. Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 572 (1840) (plurality opinion)” (p. 183).   
 Concluding its opinion, the Court opined that the Constitution protected “us from our 
own best intentions” by dividing power “so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate 
power in one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day” (p. 187).  According to 
the Court: 
States are not mere political subdivisions of the United States.  State 
governments are neither regional offices or administrative agencies of the 
Federal Government.  The positions occupied by state officials appear 
nowhere on the Federal Government’s most detailed organizational chart.  
The Constitution instead “leaves to the several States a residuary and 
inviolable sovereignty,” The Federalist No. 39, p. 245 (C. Rossiter ed. 
1961), reserved explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amendment.  (p. 188) 
 
The Court, prior to announcing that it “affirmed in part and reversed in part” the “judgment of 
the Court of Appeals,” concluded: “Whatever the outer limits of that sovereignty [i.e., state] may 
be, one thing is clear:  The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer 
a federal regulatory program” (p. 188). 
 The separate opinion by Justice White, which was joined by Justices Blackmun and 
Stevens, called attention to Justice O’Connor’s use of the “Suppressed Evidence” propaganda 
technique without labeling it as such when it observed: 
To read the Court’s version of events, see ante, at 150-151, one would think 
that Congress was the sole proponent of a solution to the Nation’s low-level 
radioactive waste problem.  Not so.  The Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
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Policy Act of 1980 … and its amendatory 1985 Act, resulted from the 
efforts of state leaders to achieve a state-based set of remedies to the waste 
problem.  They sought not federal pre-emption or intervention, but rather 
congressional sanction of interstate compromises they had reached.  (pp. 
189-190) 
 
Justice White cited actions taken by the State Planning Council on Radioactive Waste 
Management, the National Governors’ Association, and the Governors’ Task Force aimed at a 
federal law to deal with the problem.  Justice White also noted that Congress had considered a 
“’federal’ solution,” which had encountered strong opposition from “one of the sited State’s 
Senators,” Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina (p. 192).  Senator Thurmond “introduced 
an amendment to adopt and implement the recommendations of the State Planning Council on 
Radioactive Waste Management” (p. 192).  Thus, “[t]he ‘state-based’ solution carried the day” 
and was enacted into law in 1980 (p. 192).  However, between passage of the 1980 Act and the 
January 1, 1986 “’drop-dead’ date, on which the regional compacts could begin excluding the 
entry of out-of-region waste,” the “sited States grew increasingly and justifiable frustrated by the 
seeming inaction of unsited States in meeting the projected actions called for in the 1980 Act” (p. 
193).  This situation, coupled with the very real danger that the three sited states would begin to 
exclude radioactive waste from outside their “compact regions,” gave rise to the efforts to 
achieve some sort of compromise between the sited and unsited states (p. 193).  Justice White 
characterized the activity resulting in the 1985 amendments: “In sum, the 1985 Act was very 
much the product of cooperative federalism, in which the States bargained among themselves to 
achieve compromises for Congress to sanction” (p. 194).  He continued: 
Unlike legislation that directs action from the Federal Government to the 
States, the 1980 and 1985 Acts reflected hard-fought agreements among 
States as refereed by Congress.  The distinction is key, and the Court’s 
failure properly to characterize this legislation ultimately affects its analysis 
of the take title provision’s constitutionality.  (p. 194) 
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In other words, the suppressed evidence technique resulted in a faulty analysis, which in turn 
gave rise to a faulty conclusion based on only partial evidence.   
 Justice White also faulted O’Connor’s analysis because of its isolated approach and 
because of its use of the “Straw Man” propaganda technique.  It is instructive to follow Justice 
White’s discussion of O’Connor’s use of propaganda techniques.  First: 
Without attempting to understand properly the take title provision’s place in 
the interstate bargaining process, the Court isolates the measure analytically 
and proceeds to dissect it in a syllogistic fashion.  The Court candidly begins 
with an argument respondents do not make: that “the Constitution would not 
permit Congress simply to transfer radioactive waste from generators to 
state governments.”  [Ante, at 175].  “Such a forced transfer,” it continues, 
“standing alone, would in principle be no different than a congressionally 
compelled subsidy from state governments to radioactive waste producers.  
Ibid.  (Emphasis J. White) (pp. 194-195) 
 
After tracing his own thought processes in reading O’Connor’s opinion, Justice White then 
identified the propaganda technique: 
Since this is not an argument respondents [the federal government and the 
sited states] make, one naturally wonders why the Court builds its analysis 
that the take title provision is unconstitutional around this opening premise.  
But having carefully built its straw man, the Court proceeds impressively to 
knock him down.  “As we have seen,” the Court teaches, “the Constitution 
does not empower Congress to subject state governments to this type of 
instruction.”  Ante, at 176.  (Emphasis J. White) (p. 195) 
 
As Justice White observed, “Curiously absent from the Court’s analysis is any effort to place the 
take title provision within the overall context of the legislation” (p. 195).  Of course, if it had, the 
majority opinion would not have been able to effectively utilize the straw man technique.   
 Justice White noted the irony of the situation in which the federal government found 
itself.  In trying to follow the wishes of the states, it found itself crossways of the Court majority: 
Congress could have pre-empted the field by directly regulating the disposal 
of this waste pursuant to its powers under the Commerce and Spending 
Clauses, but instead it unanimously assented to the States’ request for 
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congressional ratification of agreements to which they had acceded.  
(Emphasis J. White) (p. 195) 
  
Justice White clearly favored a different interpretation of the Commerce Clause than did 
O’Connor who had dismissed respondent attorneys’ attempts to provide the take title provision 
with the “status of an interstate agreement requiring Congress’ approval under the Compact 
Clause,” which, given the additional information supplied by Justice White, it appeared to be (p. 
183; see also p. 467 of this paper).  Quickly summarizing, White placed the act in what he 
judged to be the correct characterization: 
First, the States – including New York – worked through their Governors to 
petition Congress for the 1980 and 1985 Acts.  As I have attempted to 
demonstrate, these statutes are best understood as the products of collective 
state action, rather than as impositions placed on States by the Federal 
Government.  (p. 196) 
 
Justice White opined: 
The chief executives of the States proposed this approach, and I am 
unmoved by the Court’s vehemence in taking away Congress’ authority to 
sanction a recalcitrant unsited State now that New York has reaped the 
benefits of the sited States’ concessions.  (p. 196) 
 
Justice White, after reviewing the measures undertaken by New York to comply with the two 
Acts, concluded: “[O]ur cases support the view that New York’s actions signify assent to a 
constitutional interstate ‘agreement’ for purposes of Art. I, § 10, cl. 3” (p. 198).  He continued by 
citing the same case referenced by O’Connor, but, unlike O’Connor, from which he quoted (p. 
183): 
In Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540 (1840), Chief Justice Taney stated that 
“[t]he word ‘agreement,’ does not necessarily import any direct and express 
stipulation; nor is it necessary that it should be in writing.  If there is a 
verbal understanding to which both parties have assented, and upon which 
both are acting, it is an ‘agreement.’  And the use of these terms, ‘treaty,’ 
‘agreement,’ ‘compact,’ show that it was the intention of the framers of the 
Constitution to use the broadest and most comprehensive terms; …and we 
shall fail to execute that evident intention, unless we give to the word 
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‘agreement’ its most extended signification…”  Id., at 572.  (Emphasis 
added).  (p. 198) 
 
Justice White also cited and quoted from Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in West Virginia 
ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 35-36 (1951), which stated, “After Congress and sister States 
had been induced to alter their positions and bind themselves to terms of a covenant, West 
Virginia should be estopped from repudiating her act” (Emphasis J. White) (p. 199).   
 Justice White continued by noting the practical effects of the Court majority’s opinion, 
“that because [New York] is unwilling to honor its obligations to provide in-state storage 
facilities for its low-level radioactive waste, other States with such plants must accept New 
York’s waste, whether they wish to or not” (p. 199).  White offered a trenchant observation: 
The Court’s refusal to force New York to accept responsibility for its own 
problem inevitably means that some other State’s sovereignty will be 
impinged by it being forced, for public health reasons, to accept New York’s 
low-level radioactive waste.  I do not understand the principle of federalism 
to impede the National Government from acting as referee among the States 
to prohibit one from bullying another.  (Emphasis added).  (p. 199) 
 
  Although Justice White did not identify the specific propaganda technique used by 
Justice O’Connor, his critique, which will follow shortly, revealed a quite sophisticated use by 
Justice O’Connor of the Suppressed Evidence technique that was combined with the Straw Man 
fallacy.  The combination of the two techniques was sophisticated in that the Straw Man was not 
set up, as it normally is, to be defeated.  Instead this Straw Man would provide the basis for the 
majority Court’s ruling that state officials could not consent to the incursion of its authority.  The 
Straw Man consisted of the analogy drawn by Justice O’Connor, which did have case law 
precedents; the Suppressed Evidence was the judicial precedent not cited by O’Connor in her 
discussion, which, if noted, would have not supported O’Connor’s need to draw an analogy (p. 
282; see also pp. 450-451 & 456-457 of this paper). 
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 Justice White began by observing the Court’s declaration “that the incursion of state 
sovereignty ‘cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state officials,’ ante, at 182, is flatly wrong” 
(p. 200).  Justice White proceeded to provide the context, the holding, and the case that 
contradicted the Court’s assertion: 
In a case involving a congressional ratification statute to an interstate 
compact, the Court upheld a provision that Tennessee and Missouri had 
waived their immunity from suit.  Over their objection, the Court held that 
“[t]he States who are parties to the compact by accepting it and acting under 
it assume the conditions that Congress under the Constitution attached.”  
Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S. 275 281-282 (1959) 
(Emphasis added).  (p. 200) 
 
Describing, but not naming the technique, Justice White indicated he had difficulty 
understanding how the Court determined which sovereignty to examine and which to ignore, he 
first recapitulated the holding in Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm’n: 
In so holding, the Court determined that a State may be found to have 
waived a fundamental aspect of its sovereignty – the right to be immune 
from suit – in the formation of an interstate compact even when in 
subsequent litigation it expressly denied its waiver.  (p. 200) 
 
Then Justice White expressed his difficulty in comprehending the Court’s rationale:  “I fail to 
understand the reasoning behind the Court’s selective distinctions among the various aspects of 
sovereignty that may and may not be waived and do not believe these distinctions will survive 
close analysis in future cases” (p. 200). 
 Regarding the Court’s pronouncement that it did not intend to “revisit the holdings of any 
of [the “recent cases interpreting the Tenth Amendment”], e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, South 
Carolina v. Baker, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, EEOC v. Wyoming, 
National League of Cities v. Usery, Justice White announced the difficulties he had “with the 
Court’s analysis in this respect” (pp. 160, 201).  White elaborated: 
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[O’Connor’s analysis] builds its rule around an insupportable and illogical 
distinction in the types of alleged incursions on state sovereignty; it derives 
its rule from cases that do not support its analysis; it fails to apply the 
appropriate tests from the cases on which it purports to base its rule; and it 
omits any discussion of the most recent and pertinent test for determining 
the take title provision’s constitutionality.  (p. 201) 
 
 Justice White next drew attention to O’Connor’s use of the Quoting Out of Context 
propaganda technique (again, without naming it as such), which was then used to support a 
contention different from the statement’s original context.  Justice O’Connor used the Quoting 
Out of Context technique twice in rapid succession involving two separate cases.  First, White 
pointed out, “[T]he Court’s ‘anticommandeering’ principle cannot persuasively be read as 
springing from the two cases cited for the proposition, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Assn., Inc. … and FERC v. Mississippi” (p. 202).  The quote, which O’Connor 
lifted out of context from Hodel and to which she supplied part of the wording, was: “As an 
initial matter, Congress may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by 
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program’” (p. 161).  Justice 
White characterized the statement and supplied the legal question in Hodel: 
That statement was not necessary to the decision in Hodel, which involved 
the question whether the Tenth Amendment interfered with Congress’ 
authority to pre-empt a field of activity that could also be subject to state 
regulation and not whether a federal statute could dictate certain actions by 
States; the language about “commandeer-[ing]” States was classic dicta.  (p. 
202) 
 
White then completed the contextual picture by summarizing and quoting from the Court’s 
holding in Hodel. 
In holding that a federal statute regulating the activities of private coal mine 
operators was constitutional, the Court observed that “[i]t would … be a 
radical departure from long-established precedent for this Court to hold that 
the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from displacing state police 
power laws regulating private activity.”  452 U.S., at 292.  (p. 202) 
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 The second quote O’Connor lifted out of context came from FERC.  According to 
O’Connor, “We observed that ‘this Court never has sanctioned explicitly a federal command to 
the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations’” (p. 161).  As Justice White observed 
the effects of O’Connor’s use of the Quoting Out of Context technique, “In so reciting, the Court 
extracts from the relevant passage in a manner that subtly alters the Court’s meaning” (p. 203).  
White then provided the full quotation: 
While this Court never has sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the 
States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations, cf. EPA v. Brown, 
431 U.S. 99 (1977), there are instances where the Court has upheld federal 
statutory structures that in effect directed state decisionmakers to take or to 
refrain from taking certain actions.  Ibid. (citing Fry v. United States, 421 
U.S. 542 (1975) (Emphasis added).  (p. 203) 
 
In other words, the use of the Quote Taken Out of Context technique was used by O’Connor to 
derive a false premise upon which was subsequently drawn a false conclusion. 
 Much in the way a tutor would address a student’s mistake, Justice White observed, 
“Moreover, it should go without saying that the absence of any on-point precedent from this 
Court has no bearing on the question whether Congress has properly exercised its constitutional 
authority under Article I” (Emphasis in original) (p. 203).  White added, “Silence by this Court 
on a subject is not authority for anything” (p. 203).  Much harder hitting criticism about the 
majority opinion’s lack of proper legal reasoning, as well as its improper reasoning, followed 
immediately: 
The Court can scarcely rest on a distinction between federal laws of general 
applicability and those ostensibly directed solely at the activities of States, 
therefore, when the decisions from which it derives the rule not only made 
no such distinction, but validated federal statutes that constricted state 
sovereignty in ways greater than or similar to the take title provision at issue 
in these cases.  (pp. 203-204) 
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Specifically spelling out the fact that not only did the cases cited by O’Connor not support her 
conclusion, they also directly contradicted her assertion re: directing the states, Justice White 
noted, “As Fry, Hodel, and FERC make clear, our precedents prior to Garcia upheld provisions 
in federal statutes that directed States to undertake certain actions” (p. 204).   
 Justice White next observed a critical omission by the Court’s majority, which amounted 
to the Suppressed Evidence technique.  The Court relied upon FERC through use of the Quoting 
Out of Context technique in order to reach an unsupported conclusion, i.e., the Court never 
sanctioning explicit “federal commands to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and 
regulations” (pp. 161, 202).  However, having announced its reliance upon FERC, the Court 
proceeded to ignore the “test stated in FERC for determining the circumstances [whereby 
Congress could or could not “dictate that the States take specific actions”],” a somewhat 
sophisticated use of the Suppressed Evidence technique because of its nexus with other 
propaganda techniques (p. 204).  According to White, “The crucial threshold inquiry in that case 
[FERC] was whether the subject matter was pre-emptible by Congress” (p. 204).  Noting that the 
O’Connor majority had conceded that Congress was legislating in a pre-emptible field in the 
current case, White continued explaining the test applied by the FERC Court, which occurred 
before the Garcia decision: 
[T]he proper test before our decision in Garcia was to assess whether the 
alleged intrusions on state sovereignty “do not threaten the States’ ‘separate 
and independent existence,’ Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76 (1869); 
Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911), and do not impair the ability of 
the States ‘to function effectively in a federal system.’  Fry v. United States, 
421 U.S., at 547, n. 7; National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S., at 852.”  
FERC, supra, at 765-766.  (p. 204) 
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After applying the two-pronged FERC, pre-Garcia test, Justice White concluded, “On neither 
score does the take title provision raise constitutional problems” (pp. 204-205).  White 
explained: 
It [the take title provision] does not threaten New York’s independent 
existence nor impair its ability to function effectively in the system, all the 
more so since the provision was enacted pursuant to compromises reached 
among state leaders and then ratified by Congress.  (p. 205) 
 
The preceding information perhaps explains why the Court majority chose to ignore the basic 
test contained within a case, a case from which a quote was taken out of context and used to 
falsely derive a key proposition central to the Court’s ruling. 
 Justice White was troubled by the Court majority’s use of “selective quotations,” of the 
attempt to substitute “historical analysis” for existing case law in an attempt to provide 
“elaborate window dressing,” to the “scanty textual support for the majority’s position,” and 
finally to a reading of history done “so selectively as to restrict the proper scope of Congress’ 
powers under Article I, especially when the history not mentioned by the majority fully supports 
a more expansive understanding of the legislature’s authority” (p. 207, n. 3).  Because of these 
problems, White noted, “[T]he Court’s civics lecture has a decidedly hollow ring” (p. 207).  
Justice White concluded by illustrating the irony of the majority’s decision: 
The ultimate irony of the decision today is that in its formalistically rigid 
obeisance to “federalism,” the Court gives Congress fewer incentives to 
defer to the wishes of state officials in achieving local solutions to local 
problems.  This legislation was a classic example of Congress acting as 
arbiter among the States…   (p. 210) 
 
White continued: 
The States urged the National Legislature not to impose from Washington a 
solution to the country’s low-level waste management problems.  Instead, 
they sought a reasonable level of local and regional autonomy consistent 
with Art. I, § 10, cl. 3, of the Constitution.   (p. 210) 
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Justice White concluded by noted the additional complications placed upon state sovereignty by 
the Court’s majority opinion. 
By invalidating the measure designed to ensure compliance for recalcitrant 
States, such as New York, the Court upsets the delicate compromise 
achieved among the States and forces Congress to erect several additional 
formalistic hurdles to clear before achieving exactly the same objective.  (p. 
210) 
 
 An irony not noted by Justice White involved the refusal of the O’Connor opinion to 
acknowledge the 1980 and 1985 Acts as interstate compacts.  Supposedly concerned about state 
sovereignty, the O’Connor majority opinion denied the one vestige of state sovereignty 
remaining from the colonial days, the power of states under Article I, § 10 of the Constitution to 
form agreements with other states with the consent of Congress.  Although Justice White noted 
this power, he didn’t describe it as did a professor of American constitutional history: “As a 
vestige of the power to make treaties enjoyed by sovereign nations, the Constitution (Art. I, sec. 
10) permits states, with the consent of Congress, to enter into an agreement or compact with 
another state” (Hall, 1992, p. 438).  The professor further noted that “interstate compacts was a 
means by which states retain control over some local issues and preserve a modicum of power in 
an increasingly centralized polity” (Hall, 1992, p. 438).  Such interstate compacts were described 
as the “hope of many students of federalism … that interstate cooperation … could provide an 
alternative to consolidation of policy making in the national government” (Hall, 1992, p. 438). 
 Justice Stevens’ dissent also noted the incorrectness of O’Connor’s position “that 
Congress does not have the power to issue ‘a simple command to state governments to 
implement legislation enacted by Congress” (p. 211).  Such a notion was “incorrect and 
unsound” (p. 211).  According to Justice Stevens: 
There is no such limitation in the Constitution.  The Tenth Amendment 
surely does not impose any limit on Congress’ exercise of the powers 
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delegated to it by Article I.  Nor does the structure of the constitutional order 
or the values of federalism mandate such a formal rule.  (p. 211) 
 
In a separate note, Justice Stevens supported his contention that the Tenth Amendment imposed 
no restraints upon congressional exercise of a delegated power by citing United States v. Darby: 
From the beginning and for many years the amendment has been construed 
as not depriving the national government of authority to resort to all means 
for the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and plainly 
adapted to the permitted end.  (p. 211, n. 2) 
 
In addition to citing relevant case law, Justice Stevens conducted a brief historical analysis.  
According to the Articles of Confederation, “the Federal Government had the power to issue 
commands to the States” (p. 210).64  After citing the specific articles providing that power, 
Stevens observed: 
Because that indirect exercise of federal power proved ineffective, the 
Framers of the Constitution empowered the Federal Government to exercise 
legislative authority directly over individuals within the States, even though 
that direct authority constituted a greater intrusion on state sovereignty.  (p. 
210) 
 
Justice Stevens concluded his brief historical analysis by noting the purpose of the Constitution’s 
displacement of the Articles of Confederation:  “Nothing in that history suggests that the Federal 
Government may not also impose its will upon the several States as it did under the Articles.  
The Constitution enhanced, rather than diminished, the power of the Federal Government” (p. 
210).  This was yet another slice of history neglected by the Court majority’s opinion, which 
represented either an incomplete analysis or use of the Suppressed Evidence propaganda 
technique. 
 Justice Stevens discussed yet another omission by the O’Connor opinion. This suppressed 
evidence focused on the “body of ‘interstate common law’” crafted by the Court, which 
supported the assertion, “The Constitution gives this Court the power to resolve controversies 
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between the States” (pp. 212, 211).  The particular body of interstate common law dealt with 
“disputes between States involving interstate waters” (p. 212) with four cases being cited in 
support of the assertion.  As Justice Stevens noted, “In such contexts, we have not hesitated to 
direct States to undertake specific actions” (p. 212).  Finally, Justice Stevens pointed out that 44 
states had joined regional interstate compacts, all of which incorporated “take title provision” (p. 
212, n. 3).  He further observed, “These compacts, the product of voluntary interstate 
cooperation, unquestionable survive the ‘invalidation’ of [the take title provision] as it applies to 
New York” (p. 212, n. 3).   
 Significance for the tenth amendment. 
 A key question (Can government officials consent to an unconstitutional infringement of 
their sovereign powers by another branch or level of government?) appeared to be answered by 
the majority opinion.  However, no case law directly bearing on the point of federal infringement 
of state sovereignty was cited by O’Connor.  Also, O’Connor’s use of propaganda techniques to 
obtain her answer casts further doubts upon the continued viability of her answer beyond the 
immediate case, the majority opinion notwithstanding.  Justices White and Stevens placed severe 
doubt upon the majority opinion’s answer by citing case law bearing upon the federal-state 
aspect of the question.  As a result, it is difficult to discern how future judicial opinions will 
answer the question. 
 More troubling was the absence in the majority opinion of sound legal reasoning that 
considers all aspects and legal issues bearing on the case at hand.  In its place one found 
propaganda techniques employed profusely throughout the opinion to achieve a desired result, a 
finding that the Tenth Amendment serves to limit a delegated power despite the absence of any 
textual support for that position, either directly or by implication.  The fault lines of an issue as 
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old as this country’s political history continued to shift centuries later, revealing the old divide.  
The fault reveals an issue so deeply embedded in American polity that apparently trickery is 
justified in order to maintain the viability of a position lying on ones preferred side of the fault.  
So deep-seated is the issue that six justices signed on to the majority opinion in spite of the 
pervasive use of propaganda techniques utilized to reach the Court’s position.  It appeared as if 
judgment was reached instinctively without careful analysis, and was followed by a search for 
reasons.  The case had points that would have provided constitutional problems for NCLB; 
however, the legitimacy of the points is problematic.  Because of the combined use of 
propaganda techniques and absence of legitimate legal reasoning, it is most difficult to discern 
the significance of this case regarding the Tenth Amendment.  The points raised by Justice 
White’s dissent will be most difficult to ignore, let alone refute. 
 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 Case summary. 
 In 1968 Congress enacted the Gun Control Act establishing “a detailed federal scheme 
governing the distribution of firearms” under its commerce powers (p. 902).  The Brady Act, 
passed by Congress in 1993, amended the Gun Control Act by requiring the Attorney General 
“to establish a national instant background-check system” by a certain date (p. 902).  During the 
interim period before the Attorney General’s system became operative, the Brady Act required 
firearms dealers to do the following before selling a handgun to a customer: 
• receive a completed Brady Form listing the purchaser’s name, address, and date of 
birth “along with a sworn statement that the [purchaser was] not among any of the 
classes of prohibited purchasers” (p. 903). 
• verify the identity of the handgun purchaser via an identification document. 
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• send a copy of the Brady Form to the “chief law enforcement officer” (CLEO) in 
which the purchaser resided (p. 903). 
• wait for five business days (“unless the CLEO earlier notifies the dealer that he has 
no reason to believe the transfer would be illegal”) to complete the sale (p. 903). 
Congress created two exceptions to the scheme detailed above, which had the effect of dividing 
states into two classifications, those with some type of system for background checks and those 
without any provision for background checks.  First, gun dealers could sell a handgun 
immediately if the purchaser presented “a state handgun permit issued after a background check” 
(p. 903).  Second, dealers could also sell a handgun immediately if state law provided for “an 
instant background check” (p. 903).  In states without either of the above provisions, the Brady 
Act required the CLEO “to perform certain duties” (p. 903).  These duties included making “a 
reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business days” whether the purchaser was in a class 
prohibited from owning handguns (p. 903).  Although the Brady Act did not require the CLEO to 
notify the gun dealer in those instances determined to be illegal, the Act did require the CLEO to 
“provide the would-be purchaser with a written statement of the reasons for that determination” 
if requested to do so (p. 904).  The Act also required the CLEO to destroy the records in his or 
her possession if the sale did not violate the Act’s provisions regarding eligibility for handgun 
ownership.   
 Jay Printz, the Sheriff for Ravalli County, Montana, filed suit in the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Montana challenging the constitutionality of the Brady Act’s requirements.  In 
particular, he objected “to being pressed into federal service” and contended “that congressional 
action compelling state officers to execute federal laws” was unconstitutional (p. 905).  The 
federal district court in Montana ruled that the background check requirement was 
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unconstitutional.  The lower federal court also ruled that this portion was severable from the Act, 
which, in effect, left “a voluntary background-check system in place” (p. 904).  Similarly, 
Richard Mack, Sheriff of Graham County, Arizona, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Arizona.  The U.S. District Court in Arizona also ruled that the background check 
requirement by state and local law enforcement officials was both unconstitutional and 
severable.  Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit where they 
were consolidated.  In a divided opinion the Ninth Circuit Court reversed the district court 
rulings, ruling that “none of the Brady Act’s interim provisions” violated the Constitution (p. 
904).  Upon appeal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
 Justice Scalia delivered the 5-4 majority opinion, which overruled the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals ruling and upheld the initial district court holdings.  Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Justice Scalia to form the five-member 
majority.  Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented.  Justice Stevens filed a 
dissenting opinion, which was joined by the other dissenting justices.  Justice Breyer also filed a 
dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice Stevens.   
 Noting that there was “no constitutional text speaking … to the CLEOs’ challenge,” 
Justice Scalia stated that the answer to the legal question involved “must be sought in historical 
understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this 
Court” (p. 905).  Regarding historical practice, Scalia first confronted the U.S. Government’s 
contention “that ‘the earliest Congresses enacted statutes that required the participation of state 
officials in the implementation of federal laws,’ Brief for United States 28” (p. 905).  The 
examples cited by the Government included statutes requiring state courts “to record applications 
for citizenship … and to transmit abstracts of citizenship applications … to the Secretary of 
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State,” to hear “claims of slave owners who had apprehended fugitive slaves,” to order “the 
deportation of alien enemies in times of war,” and to take “proof of the claims of Canadian 
refugees who had assisted the United States during the Revolutionary War” (pp. 906, 907).  
According to Scalia: 
These early laws establish, at most, that the Constitution was originally 
understood to permit imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce 
federal prescriptions, insofar as those prescriptions related to matters 
appropriate for the judicial power.  That assumption was perhaps implicit in 
one of the provisions of the Constitution, and was explicit in another.  
(Emphasis in original) (p. 907) 
 
The implicit assumption derived from Article III, § 1 of the Constitution that created the 
Supreme Court and left the creation of lower federal courts to Congress “even though it was 
obvious that the Supreme Court alone could not hear all federal cases throughout the United 
States” (p. 907).  The explicit requirement that state courts enforce federal law derived from the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution contained in Article VI, cl. 2, which stated that “the Laws 
of the United States … shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby” (p. 907).  Continuing, Justice Scalia announced: 
For these reasons, we do not think the early statutes imposing obligations on 
state courts imply a power of Congress to impress the state executive into its 
service.  Indeed, it can be argued that the numerousness of these statutes, 
contrasted with the utter lack of statutes imposing obligations on the States’ 
executive (notwithstanding the attractiveness of that course to Congress), 
suggests an assumed absence of such power.  (Emphasis in original)  (pp. 
907-908) 
 
Justice Scalia also noted that the only congressional action imposing a duty upon “state executive 
officers” to arrest and deliver “fugitive[s] from justice” from other states was the Extradition Act 
of 1793, which, as Scalia pointed out, “was in direct implementation … of the Extradition Clause 
of the Constitution itself, see Art. IV, § 2” (p. 909). 
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 Continuing the majority opinion’s examination of historical practice as presented by 
attorneys for the U.S. Government, Justice Scalia moved to the latter nineteenth century and 
early twentieth century legislation by observing, “[W]e must note that there is not only an 
absence of executive-commandeering statutes in the early Congresses, but there is an absence of 
them in our later history as well, at least until very recent years” (p. 916).  Noting an immigration 
act passed in 1882 that “enlisted state officials ‘to take charge of the local affairs of immigration 
in the ports within such State,’” Scalia observed: 
The statute did not, however, mandate those duties, but merely empowered 
the Secretary of the Treasury “to enter into contracts with such State … 
officers as may be designated  for that purpose by the governor of any 
State.” (Emphasis added).  (p. 916) 
 
Justice Scalia next focused attention on the selective service act passed during World War I, 
which  
authorized the President “to utilize the service of any or all departments and 
any or all officers or agents of the United States and of the several States, 
Territories, and the District of Columbia, and subdivisions thereof, in the 
execution of this Act,” and mad any person who refused to comply with the 
President’s directions guilty of a misdemeanor.  Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 
15, § 6, 40 Stat. 80-81 (Emphasis added).  (pp. 916-917) 
 
Noting that it was “far from clear that the authorization ‘to utilize the service’ of state officers 
was an authorization to compel the service of state officers,” Scalia drew attention to what 
President Wilson actually did  in implementing the requirements of the Selective Service Act by 
observing, “It is interesting that in implementing the Act President Wilson did not commandeer 
the services of state officers, but instead requested the assistance of the States’ Governors” 
(Emphasis in original) (p. 917).  According to Scalia’s synopsis of events, the President 
“requested [the governors] to act under the regulations and rules prescribed by the President …, 
obtained the consent of each of the Governors, … and left it to the Governors to issue orders to 
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their subordinate state officers” (p. 917).  Scalia observed, “It is impressive that even with 
respect to a wartime measure the President should have been so solicitous of state independence” 
(p. 917). 
 Concluding the Court majority’s review of historical precedence as cited by attorneys for 
the U.S. Government, Scalia turned to congressional legislation “enacted within the past few 
decades” that “require[d] the participation of state or local officials in implementing federal 
regulatory schemes” (p. 917).  Without mentioning any specific legislative acts, Scalia divided 
them into two categories, those “more accurately described as conditions upon the grant of 
federal funding than as mandates to the States” and those acts requiring “only the provision of 
information to the Federal Government” (pp. 917-918).  The Court majority found these 
legislative acts to be “of little relevance” because they did “not involve the precise issue before 
us here, which is the forced participation of the States’ executive in the actual administration of a 
federal program” (p. 918).  Scalia concluded, “Their persuasive force is far outweighed by 
almost two centuries of apparent congressional avoidance of the practice” (p. 918). 
 In addition to citing previous legislation in support of its position, the U.S. Government 
also cited portions of The Federalist, which dealt with critical remarks by opponents of the 
proposed Constitution that “Congress’s power to tax will produce two sets of revenue officers” 
(p. 910).  Hamilton responded in Federalist No. 36 that Congress would “probably ‘make use of 
the State officers and State regulations, for collecting’ federal taxes,” while Madison noted in 
Federalist No. 45 that “the eventual collection [of internal revenue] under the immediate 
authority of the Union, will generally be made by the officers, and according to the rules, 
appointed by the several States” (p. 910).  Justice Scalia did not find these statements relevant.  
According to Scalia: 
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But none of these statements necessarily implies – what is the critical point 
here – that Congress could impose these responsibilities without the consent 
of the States.  They appear to rest on the natural assumption that the States 
would consent to allowing their officials to assist the Federal Government, 
… an assumption proved correct by the extensive mutual assistance the 
States and Federal Government voluntarily provided one another in the early 
days of the Republic, see generally White, [The Federalists (1948)], at 401-
404, including voluntary federal implementation of state law…  (Emphasis 
in original) (pp. 910-911) 
 
 Justice Scalia next confronted a passage from The Federalist, which was not cited by the 
U.S. Government, but upon which Justice Souter and others relied in the two dissents.  The 
passage was written by Alexander Hamilton and follows as cited in the majority opinion. 
It merits particular attention … that the laws of the Confederacy as to the 
enumerated and legitimate objects of its jurisdiction will become the 
SUPREME LAW of the land; to the observance of which all officers, 
legislative, executive, and judicial in each State will be bound by the 
sanctity of an oath.  Thus, the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the 
respective members will be incorporated into the operations of the national 
government as far as its just and constitutional authority extends; and will 
be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.  The Federalist No. 27, 
at 177 (A. Hamilton) (Emphasis in original).  (p. 911) 
 
According to Scalia, Justice Souter interpreted the phrases “will be incorporated into the 
operations of the national government” and “will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its 
laws” to mean that the federal government would have “authority …, when exercising an 
otherwise legitimate power (the commerce power, say), to require state ‘auxiliaries’ to take 
appropriate action” (pp. 911-912).  The major objection, in Justice Scalia’s opinion, was that 
such an interpretation would make “state legislatures subject to federal direction,” which would 
conflict with the holding in New York v. United States “that state legislatures are not subject to 
federal direction” (Emphasis in original) (p. 912).  A significant problem with Scalia’s position 
in using the New York holding to refute Justice Souter’s interpretation is that the New York ruling 
was reached through a marked use of propaganda techniques in place of solid legal reasoning by 
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a divided Court (see previous discussion of New York v. United States).  Justice Scalia was on 
sounder legal footing when he subsequently argued that Hamilton’s remarks should be 
interpreted to mean  
nothing more (or less) than the duty owed to the National Government, on 
the part of all state officials, to enact, enforce, and interpret state law in such 
fashion as not to obstruct the operation of federal law, and the attendant 
reality that all state actions constituting such obstruction, even legislative 
Acts, are ipso facto invalid.  (Emphasis in original) (p. 913). 
 
Strangely, Scalia didn’t cite Hamilton’s own clarification of the meaning of his remarks, which 
Hamilton provided four pages later.  Hamilton stated: 
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will 
at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, 
and these will have the same disposition towards the central government….  
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system that the State 
governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security 
against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority.  (Federalist 
No. 28, p. 149) 
 
Instead of citing the previous remarks by Hamilton, Justice Scalia took a circuitous route that 
avoided Hamilton and involved inferential reasoning based upon suppositions and discredited 
source interpretations.  This allowed Scalia later to set up a false dichotomy, a division between 
Hamilton & Madison in The Federalist.  The false dichotomy of The Federalist permitted Scalia 
to set up Hamilton as a straw man in reference to the question at hand, a proponent of the federal 
government running roughshod over state powers without any constitutional check.  Having set 
up Hamilton as a straw man, Scalia then employed an ad hominem attack to discredit Hamilton.  
Omitting Hamilton’s clarification in No. 28 also allowed Scalia to make a false half-claim:   
Even if we agreed with Justice Souter’s reading of The Federalist No. 27, it 
would still seem to us most peculiar to give the view expressed in that one 
piece, not clearly confirmed by any other writer, the determinative weight he 
does.  That would be crediting the most expansive view of federal authority 
ever expressed, and from the pen of the most expansive expositor of federal 
power.  (p. 916, n. 9) 
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Of course, Souter’s interpretation was not necessarily confirmed by either Hamilton or Madison 
in writing as Publius, the pseudonymic author of The Federalist; it could be, in fact, contradicted 
regarding the issue at hand by focusing on an interpretation of the critical phrase, “as far as its 
just and constitutional authority extends,” as rendering the action unconstitutional, an 
interpretation which could be supported by Hamilton’s discussion of power in Federalist No. 28 
referenced on the preceding page (Federalist No. 27, p. 177).  Scalia then proceeded to both 
paraphrase and partially quote a secondary source.  According to Scalia, “[I]t is widely 
recognized that ‘The Federalist reads with a split personality’ on matters of federalism,” itself a 
questionable assertion not backed up by any supporting evidence (p. 916, n. 9).  In fact, Scalia 
had to go back as far as 1948 to find a source to back his questionable assertion regarding a 
“schizophrenic Publius,” a characterization effectively refuted by the award-winning and noted 
historian, Garry Wills, in Explaining America: The Federalist, which was first published some 
33 years after the work cited by Scalia, but some 16 years prior to Scalia’s opinion in Printz 
(Wills, 1981/2001, p. 73).  In light of Scalia’s slanted selectivity, it is instructive to review the 
introductory comments Professor Wills presented in his work. 
Though the assembled “numbers” of the series [The Federalist] transcended 
its original purpose, those writing the Numbers never forgot that purpose, 
nor should we.  The argument is focused on the objections to the 
Constitution raised by the Anti-Federalists – that the new government would 
swallow up the states, that too much power was given it, that the Articles of 
Confederation could still be made to work (with a little tinkering).  (Wills, 
1981/2001, p. ix) 
 
Wills continued by noting the logic of The Federalist’s central argument: 
Much of the time Publius is being placatory, emphasizing that the states still 
have a role to play (which is why “federalist” would later be taken as more a 
defense of the states than of the federal government, a view that misreads 
the logic of the argument – which is for the new federal power).  (Emphasis 
in original) (Wills, 1981/2001, p. ix) 
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After discussing both the purpose and the central argument of The Federalist, Wills directly 
confronted the mistaken notion of any duality in Publius’ writings in The Federalist: 
The two main authors of the series knew what their task was, and made a 
common front in performing it.  Those who look for any deep difference 
between them as they work in the same trench together are forgetting the 
occasion.  I emphasized this by taking passages from Madison that sound 
“Hamiltonian,” and from Hamilton that sound “Madisonian,” in terms of 
later stereotypes formed of the two men.  (Wills, 1981/2001, p. ix) 
 
 Of course, neither Wills’ work nor Hamilton’s own words suited Scalia’s purpose.  Scalia 
then made Souter’s interpretation of Hamilton’s particular remarks a straw fact, which he then 
knocked down:  
To choose Hamilton’s view, as Justice Souter would, is to turn a blind eye to 
the fact that it was Madison’s – not Hamilton’s – that prevailed, not only at 
the Constitutional Convention and in popular sentiment, but in the 
subsequent struggle to fix the meaning of the Constitution by early 
congressional practice.  (p. 916, n. 9) 
 
It is interesting to note that in knocking down the straw man he created, Scalia had to resort to 
making a false claim that it was Madison who alone fixed “the meaning of the Constitution by 
early congressional practice” (p. 916, n. 9).  Of course, Madison did much to fix the meaning of 
the Constitution as a House member, but such a claim ignored the work done by Hamilton as 
Secretary of the Treasury in writing legislation to get the nation back on its feet economically.  
And, in the constitutional showdown resulting from Hamilton’s proposals, it was Hamilton who 
prevailed, not Madison (See Appendix J; see also previous discussion of the historical 
background in the section “Hamilton’s Economic Proposals for America: Resolution of the 
Constitutional Conflict by President Washington and its Aftermath”).  Such a claim by Scalia 
also ignored Madison’s role in promoting the ideology leading to nullification, secession, and 
state rights’ support of the “Separate But Equal” socio-legal doctrine, as well as Madison’s 
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reversals on and calling into question the role of judicial review, the very activity in which Scalia 
was currently engaged (see previous discussion of the historical background under “The 
Kentucky & Virginia Resolutions and Their Subsequent Influence”; see also Appendix L).  And, 
finally, Scalia’s claim ignored the mischief Madison created regarding treaty making, another 
instance in which neither Madison’s opinion nor his proposed course for congressional action 
prevailed (see Appendix K).  Of course, all these developments were subsequent to The 
Federalist, a political enterprise in which Hamilton and Madison were in agreement with each 
other. 
 Justice Scalia dealt with the prior record of congressional practice in convincing fashion 
with solid legal reasoning.  In his response to The Federalist, however, he was less convincing as 
he felt the need to use propaganda techniques to make his case instead of using solid 
argumentation.  If he had used legitimate argumentation supported by valid evidence, he could 
have refuted Justice Souter’s interpretation of Hamilton’s quotation.  However, he would not 
have been able to present a Madisonian version of Publius as the champion of state rights, a 
position not supported by The Federalist, but supported by Madison’s later actions regarding the 
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions (see previous discussion of the historical background under 
“The Kentucky & Virginia Resolutions and Their Subsequent Influence”). 
 Justice Scalia next turned to “consideration of the structure of the Constitution, to see if 
[the Court] can discern among its ‘essential postulate[s] … a principle that controls the present 
cases” (p. 917).  Scalia began by citing Gregory v. Ashcroft dicta “that the Constitution 
established a system of ‘dual sovereignty,’” a case decided in 1991 by a 5-4 Court majority, 
hardly an auspicious precedent (p. 917).  It would seem that such a fundamental point would 
possess a more extensive record of case law, but the only case cited in its support was a 1990 
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decision.  Having previously set up Madison as the spokesperson for state rights, Scalia 
paraphrased and partially quoted his statement in Federalist No. 39, the principles forming the 
basis of the Tenth Amendment.  According to Scalia, “Although the States surrendered many of 
their powers to the new Federal Government, they retained ‘a residuary and inviolable 
sovereignty,’ The Federalist No. 39, at 245 (J. Madison)” (pp. 918-919).  Scalia next trotted out 
the conservative majority’s favorite citation, Texas v. White, using dicta from a decision whose 
context and holding contradicted Scalia’s purpose in quoting it (See previous discussion of the 
Court’s original decision in Texas v. White; for Rehnquist’s use of the dicta from Texas v. White, 
see discussion of his majority opinion in National League of Cities; for Brennan’s criticism of 
Rehnquist’s use of that dicta, see discussion of J. Brennan’s dissent in National League of Cities; 
for O’Connor’s use of the Texas dicta in her majority opinion, see discussion of New York v. 
United States).  Justice Scalia moved to firmer ground when he began listing examples of the 
Constitution’s text that revealed the residual sovereignty of the states: 
“[T]he prohibition on any involuntary reduction or combination of a State’s 
territory, Art. IV, § 3; the Judicial Power Clause, Art. III, § 2, and the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, Art. IV, § 2, which speak of the 
“Citizens” of the States; the amendment provision, Article V, which requires 
the votes of three-fourths of the States to amend the Constitution; and the 
Guarantee Clause, Art. IV, § 4, which “presupposes the continued existence 
of the states and … those means and instrumentalities which are the creation 
of their sovereign and reserved rights,” Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S., 
405, 414-415 … (1938).  (p. 919) 
 
Justice Scalia also surmised that a “[r]esidual state sovereignty” was implied by Article I, § 8, 
which listed powers delegated by the Constitution to Congress; the same “[r]esidual state 
sovereignty” was made explicit by the Tenth Amendment (p. 919).   
 In discussing the reasons for abandoning the Articles of Confederation and moving 
towards the Constitution, Scalia relied upon the arguments made by Justice O’Connor in New 
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York v. United States regarding acting upon individuals as opposed to states, arguments that did 
not involve legal reasoning, but instead relied upon the use of propaganda techniques to reach an 
unsupported position (See the previous discussion of New York v. United States for the 
following: O’Connor’s use of propaganda techniques, White’s separate opinion noting 
O’Connor’s use of propaganda techniques, Stevens’ separate opinion noting O’Connor’s use of 
propaganda techniques).  Scalia then noted that Justice Stevens’ dissenting argument had been 
“squarely rejected by the Court in New York” (p. 920, n. 10).  What Scalia didn’t note was that it 
was rejected through the use of propaganda techniques, not through logical reason supported by 
evidence.  It appeared that Justice Scalia believed two wrongs make a right.  Justice Scalia 
moved to firmer ground in discussing federalism’s benefits and design that provided for “two 
political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other” as 
articulated by the Court in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton as derived from, in addition to 
Hamilton and Madison in The Federalist, abundant case law (p. 920).  By citing specific 
constitutional text and discussing federalism as interpreted through case law, Justice Scalia 
provided what was missing from Justice O’Connor’s opinion in New York, fleshed-out, concrete 
examples of the constitutional structure supporting a residual state sovereignty.   
 Justice Scalia also noted an additional problem with the Brady Act’s requirements for 
CLEOs, its impact upon “the separation and equilibrium of powers between the three branches of 
the Federal Government itself” (p. 922).  Scalia explained: 
The Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to administer the laws 
enacted by Congress; the President, it says, “shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed….  The Brady Act effectively transfers this 
responsibility to thousands of CLEOs in the 50 States, who are left to 
implement the program without meaningful Presidential control (if indeed 
meaningful Presidential control is possible without the power to appoint and 
remove).  (p. 922) 
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Justice Scalia observed that the Framers had insisted “upon unity in the Federal Executive – to 
ensure both vigor and accountability” (p. 922).  Scalia concluded, “That unity would be 
shattered, and the power of the President would be subject to reduction, if Congress could act as 
effectively without the President as with him, by simply requiring state officers to execute its 
laws” (p. 923). 
 Turning to the case law underlying the issue at hand, Justice Scalia pointed out its 
relatively recent emergence. 
Federal commandeering of state governments is such a novel phenomenon 
that this Court’s first experience with it did not occur until the 1970’s, when 
the Environmental Protection Agency promulgated regulations [under 
congressional authorization] requiring States to prescribe auto emissions 
testing, monitoring and retrofit programs, and to designate preferential bus 
and carpool lanes.  (p. 925) 
 
When the EPA regulations had been challenged in court, the “Courts of Appeals for the Fourth 
and Ninth Circuits,” as well as the “District of Columbia Circuit” Court, invalidated the 
regulations (p. 925).  On appeal the cases were consolidated into one case, EPA v. Brown (see 
previous discussion of EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99, located in the previous chapter’s presentation 
of the Guarantee Clause case law).  Justice Scalia misstated the situation somewhat when he 
declared, “After we granted certiorari to review the statutory and constitutional validity of the 
regulations, the Government declined even to defend them, and instead rescinded some and 
conceded the invalidity of those that remained” (p. 925).  What actually transpired was that, 
during the appeal process, the EPA changed the challenged provisions so that they were no 
longer offensive to the states, a change that was noted by U.S. Government attorneys in oral 
argument before the Court: 
[F]ederal attorneys stated the changed position of the EPA which the Court 
included in its ruling:  “The Administrator … concedes the necessity of 
removing from the regulations all requirements that the States submit legally 
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adopted regulations; the [Administrator’s] regulations contain no 
requirement that the State adopt laws” (431 U.S. 99, 103).  (p. 240 of this 
paper) 
 
Interestingly, although provided with the opportunity, Scalia did not quote from either of the 
three Circuit Court rulings invalidating the EPA regulations.  In light of Scalia’s opinion that this 
is the first time the issue of federal commandeering of state governments for regulatory purposes 
confronted the courts, such an omission raises questions about motive and purpose, especially 
given such relevant lower court dicta in alignment with both the holding of the case and the 
current issue.  Consider this linkage of the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause by state 
attorneys: 
[T[he Commerce Power does not extend to requiring a state to undertake 
such governmental tasks as might be assigned to it by Congress, or its 
proper delegate, with respect to activities which admittedly are within reach 
of the Commerce Power.  The Constitution’s Tenth Amendment and Article 
IV, Section 4, which obligates the United States to guarantee to every state a 
Republican Form of government, precludes such an extension of the 
Commerce Power….  Moreover, insofar as the Necessary and Proper Clause 
is concerned the petitioners contend that the means, compulsory state 
administration and enforcement, is inappropriate and inconsistent with the 
letter and spirit of the Constitution.  (Brown v. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 521 F.2d 827,  838) 
 
Also, consider the Court of Appeals response to the above argument: 
To treat the governance of commerce by the states as within the plenary 
reach of the Commerce Power would in our opinion represent such an 
abrupt departure from previous constitutional practice as to make us 
reluctant to adopt an interpretation of the Clean Air Act which would force 
us to confront the issue.  Such treatment, for example, would authorize 
Congress to direct the states to regulate any economic activity that affects 
interstate commerce in any manner Congress sees fit….  A commerce 
Power so expanded would reduce the states to puppets of a ventriloquist 
Congress.  (Brown v. Environmental Protection Agency, 521 F.2d 827, 839) 
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Or reflect upon this quote that would have connected the Rehnquist Court with an issue 
extending all the way back to the Marshall Court, not to mention the prior existence of the fault 
line between central and local governments predating the Marshall Court: 
We hasten to point out that our reluctance to accept the Administrator’s 
interpretation of the Act is not an effort at this late date to ignore Chief 
Justice Marshall’s triumph over Mr. Jefferson with regard to the power of 
the Federal government vis-à-vis the states.  Our concern, as we believe was 
Justice Marshall’s, is to preserve and protect a strong government of the 
United States and viable governments of the states. (Brown v. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 521 F.2d 827, 840) 
 
Finally, consider the Ninth Circuit Court’s citation of a previous Supreme Court ruling, also 
ignored by Scalia: 
Finally, we are encouraged by the Supreme Court’s footnote 7 in Fry v. 
United States.  In describing the Tenth Amendment, it was said in the 
footnote:  “The [Tenth] Amendment expressly declares the constitutional 
policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the 
States’ integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.”  
421 U.S. at 547 n.7, 95 S.Ct. at 1795.  (Brown v. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 521 F.2d 827, 842) 
 
Of course, these decisions occurred before Rehnquist replaced Burger as Chief Justice, before 
O’Connor replaced Stewart and Scalia replaced Rehnquist as justices, and before the Court 
enjoyed a fairly solid five-member majority of conservative justices (Hall, 1999, p. 394).   
 So, instead of mentioning any of the pertinent citations listed above, Justice Scalia next 
mentioned Hodel and FERC as examples of Court rulings making it “clear that the Federal 
Government may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal 
regulatory programs” (p. 925).  He also noted that in both Hodel and FERC, the Court “sustained 
statutes against constitutional challenge only after assuring ourselves that they did not require the 
States to enforce federal law” (p. 925; for FERC, see pp. 413-422 of this paper; for Hodel, see 
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pp. 421-422 of this paper).  Justice Scalia mentioned (without quoting or citing) that the Court, in 
reaching its decision in Hodel,  
cited the lower court cases in EPA v. Brown, supra, but concluded that the 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 did not present the 
problem they raised because it merely made compliance with federal 
standards a precondition to continued state regulation in an otherwise pre-
empted field…  (p. 926) 
 
In his discussion of FERC, Scalia lifted a quote out of its full context, which allowed him to 
attribute a different purpose and meaning to the lifted portion of the quote.  First, Scalia’s use of 
the propaganda technique: “We warned that ‘this Court never has sanctioned explicitly a federal 
command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations,’ [456 U.S.,] at 761, 762, 
102 S.Ct., at 2138-2139” (p. 926).  Now, for the full statement and the preceding sentence to 
help establish the full context as delivered by Justice Blackmun in the FERC decision: 
Recent cases, however, demonstrate that this rigid and isolated statement 
from Kentucky v. Dennison [1861] – which suggests that the States and the 
Federal Government in all circumstances must be viewed as coequal 
sovereigns – is not representative of the law today.  While this Court never 
has sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate and 
enforce laws and regulations, cf. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977), there 
are instances where the Court has upheld federal statutory structures that in 
effect directed state decisionmakers to take or to refrain from taking certain 
actions.  (FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761-762) 
 
Justice Blackmun’s next four sentences provided examples of such instances where federal law 
had the effect of “direct[ing] state decisionmakers to take or refrain from taking certain actions” 
(FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 762).  The first two succeeding sentences: 
In Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), for example, state executives 
were held restricted, with respect to state employees, to the wage and salary 
limitations established by the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.  
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel 
Assn., 443 U.S. 658 (1979), acknowledged a federal court’s power to 
enforce a treaty by compelling a state agency to “prepare” certain rules 
“even if state law withholds from [it] the power to do so.”  Id., at 695.  
(FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 762) 
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Thus far, neither the statements nor the full context appeared to constitute the warning desired by 
Scalia.  Nor, as we shall see, did the following two sentences. 
And certainly Testa v. Katt [330 U.S. 386 (1947)], by declaring that “the 
policy of the federal Act is the prevailing policy in every state,” 330 U.S., at 
393, reveals that the Federal Government has some power to enlist a branch 
of state government – there the judiciary – to further federal ends.  In doing 
so, Testa clearly cut back on both the quoted language and the analysis of 
the Dennison case of the preceding century. (FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 
742, 762-763) 
 
The only way that Scalia could mischaracterize the quote he lifted from the FERC decision was 
to utilize a propaganda technique, in this case, the Quoting Out of Context technique, which 
allowed him to distort and mislead. 
 Finally, Justice Scalia came to New York v. United States, which he somewhat 
misleadingly highlighted (which is perhaps the reason why the previously mentioned citations 
were omitted from Scalia’s opinion).  According to Scalia: 
When we were at last confronted squarely with a federal statute that 
unambiguously required the States to enact or administer a federal 
regulatory program, our decision should have come as no surprise.  At issue 
in New York v. United States …  (p. 926) 
 
Justice Scalia’s statement implying the primacy of New York v. United States ignored EPA v. 
Brown, a case confronting the federal court system with the same identical issue, “requir[ing] the 
States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program” (p. 926).  While the issue was 
rendered moot before the Supreme Court, three separate Circuit Courts of Appeal had issued 
rulings, which in all probability, would not have differed from a Supreme Court ruling had the 
issue remained justiciable.  It should not be forgotten that Scalia was a majority member of the 
split decision in New York, a case marked by an absence of solid legal analysis and reasoning 
combined with a plethora of propaganda techniques utilized in place of such reasoning and 
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analysis (see pp. 439-470 of this paper).  Justice Scalia quoted the holding in New York:  “The 
Federal Government,” we held, “may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal 
regulatory program” (p. 926). 
 Justice Scalia lifted another quote out of context, the same quote from Texas v. White that 
caused disbelief by Justice Brennan when used by Justice Rehnquist in National League of Cities 
v. Usery, an opinion subsequently overruled by Garcia (See the following previous discussions:  
the previous chapter’s Guarantee Clause case law for the Court’s original decision in Texas v. 
White; this chapter’s discussion of National League of Cities v. Usery for Rehnquist’s use of the 
Texas dicta and for Brennan’s criticism of Rehnquist’s use of the Texas dicta,).  The quote was 
used subsequently by Justice O’Connor in New York and then twice by Scalia in the current case 
(For O’Connor’s use, see previous discussion of New York v. United States; see also 505 U.S. 
142, 162).  Since a cohort of justices with similar conservative outlooks (who seldom opposed 
each other but rather formed an ideological team – Rehnquist, O’Connor, & Scalia) have 
misused the same quote with the same propaganda technique in three Court cases (1977, 1991, & 
1997), it is perhaps appropriate to examine the situation in greater detail. When first used by 
Rehnquist, it was done in the context of his discussion of the “essential role of the States in [the] 
federal system of government” during the course of an opinion seeking to find a state 
sovereignty limitation on an expressly delegated power to the federal government by the 
Constitution (National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 844).  According to Justice 
Rehnquist:  “In Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869), [Chief Justice Chase] declared that 
‘[t]he Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of 
indestructible States’” (426 U.S. 833, 844).  However, what Justice Rehnquist neglected to 
mention was that Texas v. White was not seeking to limit the authority of the federal government 
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through any state rights limitation; instead it was justifying the Federal Government’s use of the 
Guarantee Clause to reinstate a republican form of government in Texas following the 
conclusion of the Civil War in the aftermath of Texas’ illegal attempt to secede from the Union. 
 The immediate context of Chief Justice Chase’s statement was an attempt to answer two 
closely related questions:  “Did Texas, in consequence of these acts [seceding from the Union 
and joining the Confederacy], cease to be a State?  Or, if not, did the State cease to be a member 
of the Union” (7 Wall. [74 U.S.] 700, 724)?  After reviewing the growth of the “Union of the 
States” as it moved from “Colonies” to the “perpetual” Union under the Articles of 
Confederation to the “more perfect Union” under the Constitution, Chief Justice Chase asked a 
rhetorical question, “What can be indissoluble if a perpetual Union, made more perfect, is not” (7 
Wall., at 724, 725)?  After further examining the issue, Chase provided the answer to the initial 
two questions:  “The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, 
composed of indestructible States” (7 Wall., at 725).  Since Texas had never ceased to be a state 
(even though it had rebelled against the Union, had refused to “recognize [its] constitutional 
obligations,” had “assumed the character of enemies,” and had “incurred the consequences of 
rebellion”), it could pursue a law suit against the defendant White (7 Wall., at 727, 732).  The 
foregoing was the actual context in which the statement was originally made.  Chief Justice 
Chase, in making the statement, was not searching for a limitation upon the power of the federal 
government.  Instead the case revolved around the issues of the nature of the Union and the 
federal government’s ability to crush rebellion by the states and to restore them to republican 
forms of government, which had been destroyed by illegal actions.  To use this quote in an 
argument seeking a state rights limitation upon the federal government, particularly to limit a 
delegated power, was to impart an interpretation counter to its original use.  Such a misuse could 
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only occur through utilizing the propaganda technique of Quoting Out of Context.  Three 
Supreme Court justices utilized the same propaganda technique with the same quotation to 
achieve the same purpose, all done through their status as authors of majority opinions – Justice 
Rehnquist in National League of Cities v. Usery (426 U.S. 833, 844), Justice O’Connor in New 
York v. United States (505 U.S. 144, 162), and Justice Scalia, twice in the same opinion (Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919, 928).65 
 Justice Scalia followed his use of the Quoting Out of Context propaganda technique with 
another propaganda technique, a False Analogy.  In fact, the Out of Context technique was used 
to set up the false analogy.  First, Scalia stated:  “It is an essential attribute of the States’ retained 
sovereignty that they remain independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of 
authority (Emphasis added).  See Texas v. White, 7 Wall., at 725” (p. 928).  Then came the false 
analogy, the falseness deriving from an implied equality of sovereign powers between the states 
and the federal government, a concept derived from the discredited theory of the Constitution as 
a “compact between the states” (See the following previous discussions of this paper: “The 
Kentucky & Virginia Resolutions and Their Subsequent Influence,” historical background of the 
Tenth Amendment, for Hamilton’s opinion and for discussion of the discredited notion in the 
context of the Kentucky & Virginia Resolutions; this chapter’s discussion of McCullough v. 
Maryland for Pinkney’s arguments against and also for the Court’s opinion in McCullough).  
According to Scalia: 
It is no more compatible with this independence and autonomy that their 
officers be “dragooned” … into administering federal law, than it would be 
compatible with the independence and autonomy of the United States that its 
officers be impressed into service for the execution of state laws.  (p. 928) 
 
Scalia then proceeded to repeat the use of Quoting Out of Context propaganda technique with 
precisely the same quote from FERC as used previously (see previous discussion of this FERC 
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quote).  Given Justice Scalia’s proclivity for using the Quoting Out of Context technique to 
distort and change meaning, it is somewhat ironic to note his protestation of the same technique 
allegedly being employed by Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion (See subsequent 
discussion of Justice Stevens’ dissent).  Scalia protested: 
The dissent’s suggestion, post, at 2398-2399, n. 27, that New York v. United 
States, … itself embraced the distinction between congressional control of 
States (impermissible) and congressional control of state officers 
(permissible) is based upon the most egregious wrenching of statements out 
of context.  (p. 931, n. 16) 
 
One is reminded of the line from Shakespeare’s Hamlet, “The lady doth protest too much, 
methinks” (Act III, Scene 2, Line 239).66 
 In order to reach his conclusion without conducting a “’balancing’ analysis,” Justice 
Scalia resorted to another propaganda technique that was, at best, Hyperbole, at worst, an 
Unwarranted Conclusion (p. 932).  Scalia characterized the Brady Act as “direct[ing] the 
functioning of the state executive” (p. 932).  What the Brady Act did do, according to Scalia’s 
own description of the Act, was require that the gun dealer “provide the ‘chief law enforcement 
officer’ (CLEO) of the transferee’s residence with notice of the contents (and a copy) of the 
Brady Form, §§ 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(II)” (p. 903).  The CLEO cited by both Scalia and the Brady Act 
could be either a county sheriff in a rural area, or the chief of police in either a small town or 
city.  The CLEO of a potential gun buyer’s residence is most definitely neither the governor nor 
the attorney general for any state.  The Brady Act mentioned neither of these top state 
executives.  While both county sheriffs and chiefs of police administer state laws, their 
immediate supervisors are not the state attorney general or the governor.  Local law enforcement 
officers are as subject to state legislative direction as to anything else, a fact ignored by Scalia’s 
propaganda technique.  As the states are to the federal government in federalism, so the counties 
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and municipalities are to the state in which they are located.  Counties and municipalities are 
political subdivisions of the states, not the “state executive” as Scalia would have us believe (p. 
932).  Justice Scalia’s original objection to the Brady Act was that it by-passed the executive 
machinery of the federal government and transferred “this responsibility to thousands of CLEOs 
in the 50 states, who are left to implement the program without meaningful Presidential control” 
(p. 923).  In his own words, the act is aimed at CLEOs, not the state executive; hence, the use of 
a propaganda technique to generate his desired purpose.  It is not clear why Justice Scalia didn’t 
simply refer to the fact that Congress was directing local law enforcement officers in violation of 
federalism principles.  Conceivably the use of a “balancing” test could reach the same conclusion 
desired by Justice Scalia, or it could be that a balancing test could be refused through solid legal 
reasoning, but to refuse its use through a propaganda technique does not promote respect for the 
Court’s reasoning nor its subsequent opinions.   Scalia’s propaganda technique provided the 
penultimate step to his destination: 
But where, as her, it is the whole object of the law to direct the functioning 
of the state executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of 
dual sovereignty, such a “balancing” analysis is inappropriate.  It is the very 
principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law offends, and no 
comparative assessment of the various interests can overcome that 
fundamental defect.  (Emphasis in original) (p. 932) 
 
 As can be seen in the preceding quotation, Justice Scalia also misstated the object of the 
law, which contradicted his opening statements of the opinion.  The major purpose of the Brady 
Act, in Scalia’s words “the whole object of the law,” was, as he described it, to prohibit 
“firearms dealers from transferring handguns to any person under 21, not resident in the dealer’s 
State, or prohibited by state or local law from purchasing or possessing firearms, § 922(b)” (pp. 
932, 902).  Justice Scalia described the involvement of CLEO’s as part of the “interim 
provisions” of the Brady Act put into place “until that system (the “national instant background-
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check system”) [became] operative” (p. 902). However, near the end of his opinion, the major 
purpose of the Brady Act now becomes an effort “to direct the functioning of the state executive” 
(p. 932).  His earlier characterization of the Act’s purpose was substantiated by reference to 
specific sections of the Brady Act.  His later statement contains no such reference, nor could it.  
 A lengthy quotation from New York v. United States immediately followed Justice 
Scalia’s use of two propaganda techniques, which, in turn, was immediately followed by a 
preliminary announcement of how the Court would rule: 
[We] conclude categorically, as we concluded categorically in New York:  
“The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer 
a federal regulatory program.”  Id., at 188, 112 S.Ct., at 2435.  The 
mandatory obligation imposed on CLEOs to perform background checks on 
prospective handgun purchasers plainly runs afoul of that rule.  (p. 933) 
 
The official holding of the Court’s narrow majority was announced four paragraphs later by 
Justice Scalia: 
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or 
enforce a federal regulatory program.  Today we hold that Congress cannot 
circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State’s officers directly.  The 
Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to 
address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of 
their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory 
program.  (p. 935) 
 
Perhaps realizing his dismissal of the “balancing” test was a bit shady, Justice Scalia mentioned 
it again in the penultimate sentence of the paragraph announcing the holding.  Not really 
necessary to the holding, the quotation below immediately followed the above-listed citation. 
It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case 
weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are 
fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual 
sovereignty.  Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit is reversed.  (p. 935) 
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 Justice Stevens’ dissent offered a direct counterpoint to Scalia’s opinion.  Justices Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined the major dissenting opinion.  Justice Stevens began by reminding 
the Court that the Brady Act involved the congressional use of a power delegated to it by the 
Constitution: 
When Congress exercises the powers delegated to it by the Constitution, it 
may impose affirmative obligations on executive and judicial officers of 
state and local governments as well as ordinary citizens.  This conclusion is 
firmly supported by the text of the Constitution, the early history of the 
Nation, decisions of this Court, and a correct understanding of the basic 
structure of the Federal Government.  (p. 939) 
 
Justice Stevens and his fellow dissenting justices framed the legal question differently than did 
the five-member majority.  For Scalia, the question had centrally focused on federal 
commandeering of “state and local law enforcement officers” (p. 902).  For Justice Stevens and 
the four-member minority, the central focus was congressional use of a delegated power to solve 
a national problem.  According to Justice Stevens, “The question is whether Congress, acting on 
behalf of the people of the entire Nation, may require local law enforcement officers to perform 
certain duties during the interim needed for the development of a federal gun control program” 
(p. 939).  Citing facts and figures from the congressional investigation of gun violence in the 
United States, Justice Stevens observed, “The Brady Act was passed in response to what 
Congress described as an ‘epidemic of gun violence’” (p. 940).  Noting the intertwined issues of 
“power” and “national emergency,” Justice Stevens listed examples of national problems that 
“may require a national response before federal personnel can be made available to respond” (p. 
940).  Based on this reasoning, Justice Stevens posed an additional legal question: 
If the Constitution empowers Congress and the President to make an 
appropriate response, is there anything in the Tenth Amendment, “in 
historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, 
[or] in the jurisprudence of this Court,” ante, at 2370, that forbids the 
enlistment of state officers to make that response effective?  (p. 940) 
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Justice Stevens framed his succeeding question in a manner that: 1) characterized the majority 
opinion as being questionably based on a not-written rule in the Constitution; and 2) implied the 
majority-opinion had overstepped its constitutional bounds. 
More narrowly, what basis is there in any of those sources for concluding 
that it is the Members of this Court, rather than the elected representatives of 
the people, who should determine whether the Constitution contains the 
unwritten rule that the Court announces today?  (p. 940) 
 
 In fashion similar to that of a schoolmaster expounding basic principles to uneducated 
students, Justice Stevens began to answer the questions he had posed.  Stevens first noted that 
Article I, § 8 of the Constitution granted “Congress the power to regulate commerce among the 
States” (p. 941).  Justice Stevens next pointed out the obvious nexus between the Commerce 
Power and the Brady Act’s “regulation of commerce in handguns” (p. 941).  For added measure, 
Stevens explained the obvious connections between the Necessary & Proper Clause, a 
constitutionally delegated power, and the Brady Act: 
Moreover, the additional grant of authority in that section of the 
Constitution “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers” is surely adequate to support 
the temporary enlistment of local police officers in the process of identifying 
persons who should not be entrusted with the possession of handguns.  (p. 
941) 
 
Pointing out the obvious conclusion to this stage of the judicial lesson, Justice Stevens declared, 
“In short, the affirmative delegation of power in Article I provides ample authority for the 
congressional enactment” (p. 941).   
 Having completed the first portion of his lesson, Justice Stevens next turned to an 
explanation of the basic principles of the Tenth Amendment.  Stevens first pointed out a 
fundamental difference between the Tenth Amendment and other constitutional restrictions on 
government power. 
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Unlike the First Amendment, which prohibits the enactment of a category of 
laws that would otherwise be authorized by Article I, the Tenth Amendment 
imposes no restriction on the exercise of delegated powers.  Using language 
that plainly refers only to powers that are “not” delegated to Congress, it 
provides:  “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. Const., Amdt. 10.  (Emphasis in 
original) (pp. 941-942) 
 
As if to students whose powers of reasoning were limited, Justice Stevens explicitly spelled out 
the implications of this critical difference: 
The Amendment confirms the principle that the powers of the Federal 
Government are limited to those affirmatively granted by the Constitution, 
but it does not purport to limit the scope or the effectiveness of the exercise 
of powers that are delegated to Congress.  (p. 942) 
 
After quoting from previous Court opinions ranging from 1876 to 1912 upholding the 
“paramount sovereignty” of the federal law over state laws “in the exertion of the power 
confided to it by the Constitution,” Justice Stevens summarized the unequivocal end result: 
There is not a clause, sentence, or paragraph in the entire text of the 
Constitution of the United States that supports the proposition that a local 
police officer can ignore a command contained in a statute enacted by 
Congress pursuant to an express delegation of power enumerated in Article 
I.  (p. 944) 
 
 Justice Stevens next addressed the historical development of federalism.  Stevens first 
noted that under the Articles of Confederation the federal government could only issue 
commands to the states, but not individuals, a “method of governing [that] proved to be 
unacceptable, not because it demeaned the sovereign character of the several States, but rather 
because it was cumbersome and inefficient” (p. 945).  Justice Stevens then connected that 
development to the case at hand: 
The basic change in the character of the government that the Framers 
conceived was designed to enhance the power of the national government, 
not to provide some new, unmentioned immunity for state officers.  Because 
indirect control over individual citizens (“the only proper objects of 
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government”) was ineffective under the Articles of Confederation, 
Alexander Hamilton explained that “we must extend the authority of the 
Union to the persons of the citizens.”  The Federalist No. 15, at 101 
(Emphasis added).   (p. 945) 
 
Stevens then drew a conclusion directly opposite of Scalia’s opinion (See previous discussion, 
pp. 495-500): 
Indeed, the historical materials strongly suggest that the founders intended 
to enhance the capacity of the Federal Government by empowering it – as a 
part of the new authority to make demands directly on individual citizens – 
to act through local officials.  (p. 945) 
 
Based on a re-reading of the remarks by both Hamilton and Madison, as well as the discussion 
by Justice Stevens, one must question Scalia’s dismissal of such an interpretation by his 
interjection of an extraneous factor not involved in the original discussions of The Federalist, 
that factor being “the consent of the States” (p. 911; see also previous discussion, pp. 511-516).  
Justice Stevens buttressed his interpretation by drawing upon further comments by Hamilton 
made in a different portion of The Federalist: 
Hamilton made clear that the new Constitution, “by extending the authority 
of the federal head to the individual citizens of the several States, will 
enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each in the 
execution of its laws.”  The Federalist No. 27, at 180.  Hamilton’s meaning 
was unambiguous; the Federal Government was to have the power to 
demand that local officials implement national policy programs.  (pp. 945-
946) 
 
As Justice Stevens explained further with specific source citations, “More specifically, during the 
debates concerning the ratification of the Constitution, it was assumed that state agents would act 
as tax collectors for the Federal Government” (p. 946).  According to the historical record, both 
Federalists and Antifederalists “recognized the likelihood that the Federal Government would 
rely on state officials to collect its taxes” (p. 947, n. 6).  Based upon the preceding evidence, 
Justice Stevens then questioned the validity of the Court’s opinion: 
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The wide acceptance of this point by all participants in the framing casts 
serious doubt on the majority’s efforts, see ante, at 2375, n. 9, to suggest 
that the view that state officials could be called upon to implement federal 
programs was somehow an unusual or peculiar position.  (p. 947, n. 6) 
 
Justice Stevens further declared: 
The Court’s response to this powerful historical evidence is weak.  The 
majority suggests that “none of these statements necessarily implies … 
Congress could impose these responsibilities without the consent of the 
States.”  Ante, at 2372 (Emphasis deleted).  No fair reading of these 
materials can justify such an interpretation.  (p. 947) 
 
 Stevens next turned to Scalia’s declaration that “the utter lack of statutes imposing 
obligations on the States’ executive .. suggests an assumed absence of such power” (Emphasis in 
original) (pp. 907-908).  Justice Stevens pointed to this statement as being critical for justifying 
the Court majority’s opinion while simultaneously highlighting the actual lack of support 
provided by The Federalist for the Court’s position when he observed: 
Bereft of support in the history of the founding, the Court rests its 
conclusion on the claim that there is little evidence the National Government 
actually exercised such a power in the early years of the Republic.  See ante, 
at 2371.  This reasoning is misguided in principle and in fact.  (pp. 948-949) 
 
Justice Stevens continued: 
[W]e have never suggested that the failure of the early Congresses to 
address the scope of federal power in a particular area or to exercise a 
particular authority was an argument against its existence.  That position, if 
correct, would undermine most of our post-New Deal Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.  As Justice O’Connor quite properly noted in New York, 
“[t]he Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have been 
unimaginable to the Framers.”  505 U.S., at 157, 112 S.Ct., at 2418.  (p. 
949) 
 
 Justice Stevens objected to Justice Scalia’s description of the early statutes in which 
Congress relied “on state judges and the clerks of state courts to perform a variety of executive 
functions” as being merely “related to matters appropriate for the judicial power” under the 
Supremacy Clause (pp. 949, 908).  In Justice Stevens’ opinion, “The majority’s description of 
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these early statutes is both incomplete and at times misleading” (p. 949).  Citing legislation 
enacted by the First Congress “requiring state courts to serve, functionally, like contemporary 
regulatory agencies in certifying the seaworthiness of vessels, Stevens stated, “The majority casts 
this as an adjudicative duty, ante, at 2371, but that characterization is misleading” (p. 951).  
Justice Stevens spelled out what was actually required: 
The law provided that upon a complaint raised by a ship’s crew members, 
the state courts were (if no federal court was proximately located) to appoint 
an investigative committee of three persons “most skilful in maritime 
affairs” to report back.  On this basis, the judge was to determine whether 
the ship was fit for its intended voyage.  (p. 951) 
 
According to Justice Stevens’ characterization of the act, “The statute sets forth, in essence, 
procedures for an expert inquisitorial proceeding, supervised by a judge but otherwise more 
characteristic of executive activity” (p. 951).  Nor was this the only act “wrongly 
mischaracterized as involving essentially judicial matters” by Justice Scalia (p. 951, n. 10).  
Justice Stevens explained: 
For example, the Fifth Congress enacted legislation requiring state courts to 
serve as repositories for reporting what amounted to administrative claims 
against the United States Government, under a statute providing 
compensation in land to Canadian refugees who had supported the United 
States during the Revolutionary War.  (p. 951, n. 10) 
 
He continued: 
Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, that statute did not amount to a 
requirement that state courts adjudicate claims, see ante, at 2371, n. 2; final 
decisions as to the appropriate compensation were made by federal 
authorities, see Act of Apr. 7, 1798, ch. 26, § 3, 1 Stat. 548.  (p. 951, n. 10) 
 
Without specifying the propaganda technique, Justice Stevens accused Justice Scalia of using 
either the Lie By Omission or the Suppressed Evidence propaganda technique.  Not only was the 
accusation made, but supporting evidence was provided by Justice Stevens.  Furthermore, the 
wrong test was being applied to the situation.  Instead of a literal placement test, e.g., to which 
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branch of government did the official belong, Justice Stevens advocated a functional test, e.g., 
what was the nature of the duties being performed.  In Stevens’ view, “We are far truer to the 
historical record by applying a functional approach in assessing the role played by these early 
state officials” (p. 951).  Justice Stevens elaborated: 
The use of state judges and their clerks to perform executive functions was, 
in historical context, hardly unusual.  As one scholar has noted, “two 
centuries ago, state and local judges and associated judicial personnel 
performed many of the functions today performed by executive officers, 
including such varied tasks as laying city streets and ensuring the 
seaworthiness of vessels.”  Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: 
May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 
Colum.L.Rev. 1001, 1045, n. 176 (1995).  (pp. 951-952) 
 
Besides ignoring the historical context, Scalia’s insistence on the literal placement test 
constituted faulty reasoning.  Justice Stevens first leveled the charge and then explained. 
The majority’s insistence that this evidence of federal enlistment of state 
officials to serve executive functions is irrelevant simply because the 
assistance of “judges” [i.e., the literal placement test] was at issue rests on 
empty formalistic reasoning of the highest order.  (p. 952) 
 
By means of an extensive footnote, Justice Stevens provided the substance underlying his 
accusation. 
Able to muster little response other than the bald claim that this argument 
strikes the majority as “doubtful,” ante, at 2371, n. 2, the Court proceeds to 
attack the basic point that the statutes discussed above called state judges to 
serve what were substantially executive functions.  The argument has little 
force.  The majority’s view that none of the statutes referred to in the text 
required judges to perform anything other than “quintessentially 
adjudicative tasks,” ibid., is quite wrong.  (p. 952, n. 11) 
 
Note that Justice Stevens just accused Justice Scalia of using the False Premise propaganda 
technique, a technique that provided a critical underpinning of the majority’s decision.  The 
conclusion resulting from the untrue premise would be that the statutes provided no historical 
illustration supporting federal use of state executive functions, thus supporting the sheriffs’ 
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charges and the Court’s ruling.  Justice Stevens continued his explanation and pointed to an 
example of the Court’s reasoning which undermined its ruling: 
The evaluation of applications for citizenship and the acceptance of 
Revolutionary War claims, for example, both discussed above, are hard to 
characterize as the sort of adversarial proceedings to which common-law 
courts are accustomed.  As for the majority’s suggestion that the substantial 
administrative requirements imposed on state-court clerks under the 
naturalization statutes are merely “ancillary” and therefore irrelevant, this 
conclusion is in considerable tension with the Court’s holding that the minor 
burden imposed by the Brady Act violates the Constitution.  (p. 952, n. 11) 
 
Justice Stevens concluded by drawing attention again to the difference between the executive 
functions required of court officials by the acts and the essential nature of judicial activities 
involving legal disputes being argued at the bar of justice: 
Finally, the majority’s suggestion that the early statute requiring state courts 
to assess the seaworthiness of vessels is essentially adjudicative in nature is 
not compelling.  Activities of this sort, although they may bear some 
resemblance to traditional common-law adjudication, are far afield from the 
classical model of adversarial litigation.  (Emphasis added) (p. 952, n. 11) 
 
 Justice Stevens next noted another omission by Justice Scalia, the failure of his 
“evaluation of the historical evidence … to acknowledge the important difference between policy 
decisions that may have been influenced by respect for state sovereignty concerns, and decisions 
that are compelled by the Constitution” (pp. 952-953).  Justice Stevens further elaborated on the 
difference between a policy preference and a constitutional requirement: 
Indeed, an entirely appropriate concern for the prerogatives of state 
government readily explains Congress’ sparing use of this otherwise “highly 
attractive,” ante, at 2370, 2371, power.  Congress’ discretion, contrary to the 
majority’s suggestion, indicates not that the power does not exist, but rather 
that the interests of the States are more than sufficiently protected by their 
participation in the National Government.  See infra, at 2394-2395.  (p. 953, 
n. 12) 
 
Before turning to the structural argument used by the Court majority, Justice Stevens highlighted 
the lack of both textual and historical support for the majority’s position through the following 
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descriptions:  “judicial inferences drawn from a silent text,” “a historical record that surely 
favors the congressional understanding,” and “judge-made rules of constitutional law” (p. 954; p. 
953, n. 14).  He summarized the majority opinion’s position as it thus far stood: 
Indeed, the majority’s opinion consists almost entirely of arguments against 
the substantial evidence weighing in opposition to its view; the Court’s 
ruling is strikingly lacking in affirmative support.  Absent even a modicum 
of textual foundation for its judicially crafted constitutional rule, there 
should be a presumption that if the Framers had actually intended such a 
rule, at least one of them would have mentioned it.  (p. 954) 
 
Justice Stevens elaborated on the last point in the preceding citation: 
Indeed, despite the exhaustive character of the Court’s response to this 
dissent, it has failed to find even an iota of evidence that any of the Framers 
of the Constitution or any Member of Congress who supported or opposed 
the statutes discussed in the text ever expressed doubt as to the power of 
Congress to impose federal responsibilities on local judges or police 
officers.  (p. 954, n. 15) 
 
Continuing his elaboration, Justice Stevens noted the majority’s failure to abide by rudimentary 
legal rules governing evidence and argumentation: 
Even plausible rebuttals of evidence consistently pointing in the other 
direction are no substitute for affirmative evidence.  In short, a neutral 
historian would have to conclude that the Court’s discussion of history does 
not even begin to establish a prima facie case.  (p. 954, n. 15. 
 
 Justice Stevens began his examination of the issues and questions surrounding federalism 
by noting that the “’structural’ arguments” used by the Court were “not sufficient to rebut that 
presumption” [the presumption being “that if the Framers had actually intended such a rule, at 
least one of them would have mentioned it” (p. 954)] (p. 955).  Stevens accused the Court 
majority of raising a description of federalism to prominence that was unrelated to the real 
question at hand: 
The fact that the Framers intended to preserve the sovereignty of the several 
States simply does not speak to the question whether individual state 
employees may be required to perform federal obligations, such as 
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registering young adults for the draft, … creating state emergency response 
commissions designed to manage the release of hazardous substances, … 
collecting and reporting data on underground storage tanks that may pose an 
environmental hazard, … and reporting traffic fatalities … and missing 
children … to a federal agency.  (p. 955) 
 
In effect Justice Stevens accused the majority of using the Red Herring propaganda technique, 
the red herring being preservation of state sovereignty that drew attention away from the critical 
issue identified by Justice Stevens (and supported by numerous examples of unchallenged 
federal legislation through which state employees performed a variety of federal services). 
 At the same time, Stevens highlighted the difference in the current case (as well as the 
acts just cited from p. 955) between state employees and employees of local governments, i.e., 
counties and municipalities.  Justice Stevens noted: 1) the preceding pieces of federal legislation 
did “not involve the enlistment of state officials at all, but only an effort to have federal policy 
implemented by officials of local government;” 2) “[b]oth Sheriffs Printz and Mack are county 
officials;” and 3) “the Brady Act places its interim obligations on chief law enforcement officers 
(CLEO’s), who are defined as ‘the chief of police, the sheriff, or an equivalent officer,’ 18 
U.S.C. § 922(s)(8)” (Emphasis J. Stevens) (p. 955, n. 16).  These facts combined to make the 
“majority’s argument … particularly peculiar,” the peculiarity deriving from the fact of the 
majority’s overwhelming dependence upon “state” employees in its argumentation (p. 955, n. 
16).  Justice Stevens concluded, “[I]t seems likely that most cases would similarly involve local 
government officials” (p. 955, n. 16).   
 Continuing his discussion of differences between state and local government officials 
within the context of federalism, Stevens further observed, “This Court has not had cause in its 
recent federalism jurisprudence to address the constitutional implications of enlisting nonstate 
officials for federal purposes” (p. 955, n. 16).  And then Justice Stevens dropped a judicial 
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bombshell by noting that the majority’s reasoning and ensuing decision conflicted with the Court 
decisions involving the Eleventh Amendment. 
It is therefore worth noting that the majority’s decision is in considerable 
tension with our Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity cases.  Those 
decisions were designed to “accor[d] the States the respect owed them as 
members of the federation.”  Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. 
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146…  (p. 955, n. 16) 
 
Justice Stevens continued by spelling out the difference between state and local governments that 
had been carved out by Eleventh Amendment case law. 
But despite the fact that “political subdivisions exist solely at the whim and 
behest of their State,” Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 
U.S. 299, 313 … (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment), we have “consistently refused to construe the Amendment to 
afford protection to political subdivisions such as counties and 
municipalities.”  Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401 … (1979); see also Hess v. Port Authority Trans-
Hudson Corporation, 513 U.S. 30, 47 … (1994).  (p. 955, n. 16) 
 
Posing the hypothetical (in Justice Stevens’ analysis) proposition that “[e]ven if the protections 
that the majority describes as rooted in the Tenth Amendment ought to benefit state officials,” 
Justice Stevens logically concluded that it was “difficult to reconcile the decision to extend these 
principles to local officials with our refusal to do so in the Eleventh Amendment context” (p. 
955, n. 16).   
 Stevens pointed to the Garcia decision as illuminating federalism, a decision in which the 
Court stated: 
[T]he principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States 
in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself.  
It is no novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal Government 
was designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by 
Congress.  (p. 956) 
 
Noting that “the Members of Congress are elected by the people of the several States,” Justice 
Stevens concluded: 
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[I]t is quite unrealistic to assume that they will ignore the sovereignty 
concerns of their constituents.  It is far more reasonable to presume that their 
decisions to impose modest burdens on state officials from time to time 
reflect a considered judgment that the people in each of the States will 
benefit therefrom.  (p. 956) 
 
Stevens then connected the federalism described in Garcia with both constitutional text and 
history: 
The majority points to nothing suggesting that the political safeguards of 
federalism identified in Garcia need to be supplemented by a rule, grounded 
in neither constitutional history nor text, flatly prohibiting the National 
Government from enlisting state and local officials in the implementation of 
federal law.  (p. 957) 
 
He concluded, “[U]nelected judges are better off leaving the protection of federalism to the 
political process in all but the most extraordinary circumstances” (p. 959). 
 Justice Stevens next turned to address the negative impact of the Court’s ruling upon both 
the health of state governments and cooperative federalism.  In his opinion, the majority opinion, 
somewhat ironically, actually damaged “the safeguards against tyranny provided by the existence 
of vital state governments” (p. 959).  Stevens explained: 
By limiting the ability of the Federal Government to enlist state officials in 
the implementation of its programs, the Court creates incentives for the 
National Government to aggrandize itself.  In the name of State’s rights, the 
majority would have the Federal Government create vast national 
bureaucracies to implement its policies.  (p. 959) 
 
Not only did the majority opinion threaten federalism, it also conflicted with the Federalists and 
their assurances to Antifederalist opponents that the new government wouldn’t create a huge 
federal bureaucracy.  According to Justice Stevens: 
This is exactly the sort of thing that the early Federalists promised would not 
occur, in part as a result of the National Government’s ability to rely on the 
magistracy of the States.  See, e.g., The Federalist No. 36, at 234-235 (A. 
Hamilton); id., No. 45, at 318 (J. Madison).  (p. 959) 
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Stevens accused Justice Scalia of using hyperbole when he suggested “that the unity in the 
Executive Branch of the Federal Government ‘would be shattered, and the power of the 
President would be subject to reduction, if Congress could … requir[e] state officers to execute 
its laws’” (pp. 959-960).  What Justice Stevens’ discussion revealed was Justice Scalia’s 
sophisticated use of the Unwarranted Extrapolation propaganda technique, sophisticated because 
it also contained an Appeal to Fear technique as well.  Stevens noted “the obvious tension 
between the majority’s claim that impressing state police officers will unduly tip the balance of 
power in favor of the federal sovereign and this suggestion that it will emasculate the 
Presidency” (p. 960).  It is arguable whether or not the first claim (tipping “the balance of power 
in favor” of the executive branch) represented use of the Unsupported Claim propaganda 
technique.  The image of the Presidency being emasculated combined hyperbole and an appeal to 
fear in the form of unwarranted extrapolation.  This, however, was not the major point for Justice 
Stevens.  The major problem with this portion of the majority’s opinion lay in the fact that “the 
Court’s reasoning contradict[ed] New York v. United States” (p. 960).  Stevens explained: 
That decision squarely approved of cooperative federalism programs, 
designed at the national level but implemented principally by state 
governments.  New York disapproved of a particular method of putting such 
programs into place, not the existence of federal programs implemented 
locally.  (Emphasis in original)  (p. 960) 
 
Justice Stevens next drew attention to the approved ways “by which Congress may urge a State 
to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests” (p. 960). 
Indeed, nothing in the majority’s holding calls into question the three 
mechanisms for constructing such programs that New York expressly 
approved.  Congress may require the States to implement its programs as a 
condition of federal spending, in order to avoid the threat of unilateral 
federal action in the area, or as a part of a program that affects States and 
private parties alike.  (p. 960) 
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The interplay between the majority opinion and Stevens’ dissent over this issue became 
complicated at this point, the complexity arising from Justice Scalia’s incorrect citation and his 
use of another propaganda technique to respond to Justice Stevens’ criticism.  Justice Scalia first 
noted that “[t]he dissent is correct, post, at 2396, that control by the unitary Federal Executive is 
also sacrificed when States voluntarily administer federal programs” (p. 923, n. 12).  However, 
Justice Stevens made no such remark on the page in the Supreme Court Reporter to which 
Justice Scalia referred.  Nor was the remark made on either the preceding or succeeding page.  
Continuing the line of thought begun with Scalia’s reference to the states’ voluntary assumption 
of federal program requirements, Justice Scalia proceeded to utilize the Unsupported Premise 
propaganda technique.  According to Scalia, “[T]he condition of voluntary state participation 
significantly reduces the ability of Congress to use this device as a means of reducing the power 
of the Presidency” (p.923, n. 12).  Justice Stevens’ response to Justice Scalia’s remarks follows: 
The majority’s suggestion in response to this dissent that Congress’ ability 
to create such programs is limited, ante, at 2378, n. 12, is belied by the 
importance and sweep of the federal statutes that meet this description, some 
of which we described in New York.  See 505 U.S., at 167-168, … 
(mentioning, inter alia, the Clean Water Act, the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 
1976).  (pp. 960-961) 
 
Justice Stevens continued by declaring, “Nor is there force to the assumption undergirding the 
Court’s entire opinion that if this trivial burden on state sovereignty is permissible, the entire 
structure of federalism will soon collapse” (p. 961).  He explained: 
These cases [brought by the sheriffs] do not involve any mandate to state 
legislatures to enact new rules.  When legislative action, or even 
administrative rulemaking, is at issue, it may be appropriate for Congress 
either to pre-empt the State’s lawmaking power and fashion the federal rule 
itself, or to respect the State’s power to fashion its own rules.  But these 
cases, unlike any precedent in which the Court has held that Congress 
exceeded its powers, merely involve the imposition of modest duties on 
individual officers.  (Emphasis added) (p. 961) 
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Stevens drew attention to the Constitution, to The Federalist, and to the state ratifying 
conventions by noting, “Neither explicitly nor implicitly did the Framers issue any command that 
forbids Congress from imposing federal duties on private citizens or on local officials” (p. 961).  
He continued by drawing a distinction between policy and constitutional authority: 
As a general matter, Congress has followed the sound policy of authorizing 
federal agencies and federal agents to administer federal programs.  That 
general practice, however, does not negate the existence of power to rely on 
state officials in occasional situations in which such reliance is in the 
national interest.  (pp. 961-962) 
 
Justice Stevens concluded his analysis of the majority opinion’s impact on the health of state 
governments and cooperative federalism by quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:  “Rather, 
the occasional exceptions confirm the wisdom of Justice Holmes’ reminder that ‘the machinery 
of government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints.’  Bain Peanut Co. 
of Tex v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501” (p. 962). 
 Justice Stevens next addressed the Court’s claim “that the ‘prior jurisprudence of this 
Court’ is the most conclusive support for its position” (p. 962).  Although the Court had cited 
FERC and Hodel, Stevens observed, “Neither case addressed the issue presented here.  Hodel 
simply reserved the question….  The Court’s subsequent opinion in FERC did the same” (p. 962, 
n. 26).  The remaining “prior jurisprudence” was New York v. United States, which Stevens 
proceeded to analyze (p. 962).  After briefly summarizing the issue presented in New York, 
Justice Stevens noted that the Court had held the first two incentives to be constitutional by “not 
[being] inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment” (p. 962).  Stevens proceeded to discuss the 
third incentive that the Court had determined to be unconstitutional, the take-title provision of 
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act.  Mixing his own summary with quotations from the 
Court’s New York decision, Justice Stevens described the Court’s ruling: 
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After noting that the “take title provision appears to be unique” because no 
other federal statute had offered “a state government no option other than 
that of implementing legislation enacted by Congress,” the Court concluded 
that the provision was “inconsistent with the federal structure of our 
Government established by the Constitution.”  [505 U.S.,] at 177, 112 S.Ct., 
at 2429.  (p. 963) 
 
So far, a fairly straight-forward account of the holding in New York.  Justice Stevens next 
statement, however, removed any linkage between the current case and the holding in New York: 
“Our statements, taken in context, clearly did not decide the question presented here, whether 
state executive officials – as opposed to state legislators – may in appropriate circumstances be 
enlisted to implement federal policy” (p. 963).  Stevens also noted the reliance upon dictum by 
the Court majority in the current case.  “The majority relies upon dictum in New York to the 
effect that ‘[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal 
regulatory program.’  Id., at 188, … (Emphasis added)” (p. 963).  In ironical fashion, Justice 
Stevens further commented on the dictum just provided by citing a previous opinion authored by 
Justice Scalia: 
But that language was wholly unnecessary to the decision of the case.  It is, 
of course, beyond dispute that we are not bound by the dicta of our prior 
opinions.  See, e.g., U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall 
Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 24 … (1994) (Scalia, J.) (invoking our customary 
refusal to be bound by dicta”).  (p. 963) 
 
Stevens further described the dictum in question: 
To the extent that it has any substance at all, New York’s administration 
language may have referred to the possibility that the State might have been 
able to take title to and devise an elaborate scheme for the management of 
the radioactive waste through purely executive policymaking.  (pp. 963-964) 
 
Using the preceding, Justice Stevens drew attention to the difference between the Court’s 
reliance upon New York and the requirements of the Brady Act. 
But despite the majority’s effort to suggest that similar activities [executive 
policymaking] are required by the Brady Act, see ante, at 2380-2381, it is 
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hard to characterize the minimal requirement that CLEO’s perform 
background checks as one involving the exercise of substantial 
policymaking discretion on that essentially legislative scale.  (p. 964) 
 
Justice Stevens next made a point that drew the ire of Justice Scalia.  First, the point:  Stevens 
observed that the same distinction between requiring state officials to comply with federal law 
and requiring that states directly regulate an activity was “made in the New York opinion itself” 
(p. 964, n. 27).  After quoting sections of the New York opinion to substantiate his point, Justice 
Stevens observed: 
The Brady Act contains no command directed to a sovereign State or to a 
state legislature [like the Low Level Radioactive Waste Act did in New 
York].  It does not require any state entity to promulgate any federal rule.  In 
these cases [brought by Sheriffs Printz and Mack], the federal statute is not 
even being applied to any state official.  (p. 964, n. 27) 
 
Justice Stevens then used a quote from New York to: 1) characterize the portion of the Brady Act 
found to be unconstitutional by the Court majority; 2) form the premise for a conclusion that 
local law enforcement officials were also governed by the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution; 
and 3) lay the groundwork for the proposition that the New York decision was improperly used 
by the Court majority as a basis for its holding in the current case: 
It [the Brady Act] is a “congressional regulation of individuals,” New York, 
505 U.S., at 178, 112 S.Ct., at 2430, including gun retailers and local police 
officers.  Those officials, like the judges referred to in the New York 
opinion, are bound by the Supremacy Clause to comply with federal law.  
Thus, if we accept the distinction identified in the New York opinion itself, 
that decision does not control the disposition of these cases [the cases 
brought by Sheriffs Printz and Mack].  (p. 964, n. 27) 
 
With a major underpinning of his opinion threatened, Justice Scalia responded by accusing 
Stevens of using the Quoting Out of Context propaganda technique (See also previous discussion 
of Justice Scalia’s opinion, pp. 502-503): 
The dissent’s suggestion, post, at 2398-2399, n. 27, that New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S., 144, … itself embraced the distinction between 
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congressional control of States (impermissible) and congressional control of 
state officers (permissible) is based upon the most egregious wrenching of 
statements out of context.  (p. 931, n. 16) 
 
However, instead of substantiating his charge, Scalia remarked, “It would take too much to 
reconstruct the context here, but by examining the entire passage cited, id., at 178-179, the reader 
will readily perceive the distortion” (p. 931, n. 16).  Thus Scalia’s charge became an 
Unsubstantiated Claim, itself constituting yet another propaganda technique used by Scalia in 
writing the majority opinion.  From this reader’s perspective, the only thing that appears to have 
been “egregiously wrenched” (See penultimate citation, J. Scalia) was the heretofore unnoticed 
reliance by the Court majority upon dicta in New York and other cases for its opinion as noted by 
Stevens.  Justice Stevens clearly distinguished the differences between the actual holding in New 
York and the dicta pertaining to that case. This distinction, combined with further analysis by 
Justice Stevens, thereby wrenched a major underpinning from the majority opinion’s justification 
of its holding. 
 Justice Stevens continued his analysis of the Court’s claim that prior jurisprudence 
justified its ruling by quoting Justice Kennedy’s distinction between another case and New York, 
which also involved federalism.  Stevens introduced the quote with the statement that Kennedy’s 
“recent comment about another case that was distinguishable from New York applies to these [the 
cases brought by Sheriffs Printz and Mack] as well”: 
This is not a case where the etiquette of federalism has been violated by a 
formal command from the National Government directing the State to enact 
a certain policy, cf. New York v. United States, … (1992), or to organize its 
governmental functions in a certain way, cf. FERC v. Mississippi…  (pp. 
964-965) 
 
At this point of his dissent, Justice Stevens responded to a response by Scalia to the difference, 
pointed out by Stevens, between the New York decision and the Brady Act.  That difference 
   
   
512
centered upon the distinction between individuals and state officials (individuals being subject to 
federal law, state officials being either subject or not-subject to federal law in their official 
capacity, the decision depending upon other factors as determined by Tenth Amendment case 
law), a difference that, in turn, was governed by the Eleventh Amendment case law’s distinctions 
between individuals not entitled to immunity from prosecution and those persons considered to 
be state officials who were thereby eligible for Eleventh Amendment immunity.  As can be seen 
from the preceding, both the issue and the clash of the two justices were complex.  To ease the 
complexity somewhat, Justice Scalia’s response will be presented first, followed by Justice 
Stevens’ response to Scalia, which will then be followed by an analysis of the two positions.  
Justice Scalia’s response follows: 
The Brady Act, the dissent asserts, is different from the “take title” 
provisions invalidated in New York because the former is addressed to 
individuals – namely, CLEO’s – while the latter were directed to the State 
itself.  That is certainly a difference, but it cannot be a constitutionally 
significant one.  (p. 930) 
 
In explaining his thinking, Justice Scalia stated, “While the Brady Act is directed to 
‘individuals,’ it is directed to them in their official capacities as state officers; it controls their 
actions, not as private citizens, but as the agents of the State” (p. 930).  Justice Stevens 
responded to Scalia’s response as follows: 
In response to this dissent, the majority asserts that the difference between a 
federal command addressed to individuals and one addressed to the State 
itself “cannot be a constitutionally significant one.”  Ante, at 2382.  But as I 
have already noted, n. 16, supra, there is abundant authority in our Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence recognizing a constitutional distinction between 
local government officials, such as the CLEO’s who brought this action, and 
state entities that are entitled to sovereign immunity.  (p. 965) 
 
The difference between the two positions hinges on the application of Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence as a factor determining the classification of local government officials as either 
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individuals or as state officials.  Scalia’s position on the applicability of the Eleventh 
Amendment was spelled out in a footnote to his opinion: 
Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, post, at 2394-2395, n. 16, and 2399, the 
distinction in our Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence between States and 
municipalities is of no relevance here.  We long ago made clear that the 
distinction is peculiar to the question of whether a governmental entity is 
entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity…  (p. 931, n. 15) 
 
Scalia cited two cases to support his contention, a 1978 ruling and National League of Cities v. 
Usery.  However, National League of Cities was subsequently overruled by Garcia, so it’s 
supporting value was questionable.  To a student of American government, the fact that both the 
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments focus on state sovereignty would seem to indicate a nexus of 
some sort between the two.  Furthermore, Justice Scalia’s own words established a nexus, which 
belied his statement disavowing Eleventh Amendment applicability.  In his discussion of the 
difference between action directed at officials and that directed towards individuals, Scalia 
noted: 
The distinction between judicial writs and other government action directed 
against individuals in their personal capacity, on the one hand, and in their 
official capacity, on the other hand, is an ancient one, principally because it 
is dictated by common sense.  We have observed that “a suit against a state 
official in his or official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is 
a suit against the official’s office….  As such, it is no different from a suit 
against the State itself.”  Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 
71 … (1989).  (pp. 930-931) 
 
In the same sense that the Eleventh Amendment determined whether one was considered an 
individual or a state official regarding prosecution for official acts, the Eleventh Amendment also 
determined applicability of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence regarding congressional legislative 
requirements.  Such was Justice Stevens’ position, which seemed to be confirmed in part by 
Justice Scalia in the preceding citation.  Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, at the time of the 
Printz ruling, had established that CLEO’s were not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; 
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hence, they were considered individuals.  Such a position, however, fundamentally undermined 
the Court’s ruling in Printz.  That reality, and not any legal reasoning, determined the majority’s 
position in both Justice Stevens’ and this writer’s judgment. 
 Having concluded his discussion of the Court’s claim that prior jurisprudence justified its 
determination of the case at hand, a claim depending upon one critical case, New York v. United 
States, a claim severely damaged by Stevens’ analysis showing critical differences between New 
York and the questioned provision of the Brady Act, Justice Stevens proceeded to discuss three 
cases, which “the majority either misconstrue[d] or ignore[d],” that, according to Stevens, were 
“more directly on point” (p. 965).  Justice Stevens then proceeded to discuss FERC v. 
Mississippi, 546 U.S. 742 (1982), Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987), and Testa v. 
Katt, 330 u.s. 386 (1947).  The discussion broke no new ground, but did support earlier points 
made by Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion.  Nearing the conclusion of his dissent, Stevens 
characterized the challenged portion of the Brady Act through the use of an analogy.  Justice 
Stevens observed: 
The provision of the Brady Act that crosses the Court’s newly defined 
constitutional threshold is more comparable to a statute requiring local 
police officers to report the identity of missing children to the Crime Control 
Center of the Department of Justice than to an offensive federal command to 
a sovereign State.  (p. 970) 
 
Stevens then concluded: 
If Congress believes that such a statute will benefit the people of the Nation, 
and serve the interests of cooperative federalism better than an enlarged 
federal bureaucracy, we should respect both its policy judgment and its 
appraisal of its constitutional power.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  (p. 
970) 
 
 Justices Souter and Breyer each offered briefer dissenting opinions, neither of which 
broke new ground that significantly undercut the majority opinion.  Justice Stevens joined Justice 
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Breyer’s dissent, but not that of Justice Souter.  Justice Breyer emphasized the question 
originally posed by Justice Stevens: 
Why, or how, would what the majority sees as a constitutional alternative – 
the creation of a new federal gun-law bureaucracy, or the expansion of an 
existing federal bureaucracy – better promote either state sovereignty or 
individual liberty?  See ante, at 2389, 2396 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  (p. 
977) 
 
Breyer also re-emphasized points made by Stevens that “the Constitution itself [was] silent on 
the matter” (a point with which all Justices were in agreement), and that “[p]recedent support[ed] 
the Government’s position” (p. 978).  Justice Souter’s dissent focused primarily upon his 
interpretation of The Federalist, which, in his opinion, conflicted with the majority opinion. 
 Significance for the tenth amendment. 
 The true significance of this case for Tenth Amendment case law is most difficult to 
assess.  The difficulty arises from the majority opinion’s extensive and varied use of propaganda 
techniques as well as a heavy reliance upon dicta in place of solid legal reasoning based upon 
prior case law holdings, constitutional jurisprudence, and accurate portrayals of the historical 
background.  In addition, the decision was one that was narrowly reached.  Some time in the 
future, a Court will acknowledge the absence of solid legal reasoning in this case and will 
overturn any precedents involved in the Printz ruling.  A future Court will be appalled by the 
prevalence of propaganda techniques utilized by the majority opinion to provide the appearance, 
but not the substance, of logical argument utilizing solid legal reasoning.   
 Justice Stevens’ dissent appeared to be aimed at such a future Court.  Stevens utilized no 
propaganda techniques that this writer could detect.  Justice Stevens focused upon the holdings 
of case law and discussed the legal issues centrally involved.  His analysis destroyed the majority 
opinion’s reasoning and proposed legal underpinnings.  All Justice Stevens lacked was one more 
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justice of the Supreme Court unwilling to tolerate such prevalent use of propaganda techniques 
as was displayed in this opinion.  Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens discussed The Federalist 
without employing propaganda techniques in his argumentation.  Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice 
Stevens did not rely upon dicta to make legal points, but instead discussed points related to 
actual case holdings.  Unlike Scalia, Stevens substantiated his position regarding the interplay of 
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence with the legal issues and determinations involved in this 
case.  Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens differentiated between dicta and the actual holding in 
discussing the relevance of the New York decision for the Brady Act.  Finally, unlike Justice 
Scalia’s multiple and varied uses of propaganda techniques, Justice Stevens used no such 
techniques in his dissenting opinion.  A future Court may realize these factors and be amazed at 
such a state of law. 
 In the short term, Printz will serve notice that the Tenth Amendment can be construed as 
a limitation upon a constitutionally delegated power if it infringes state sovereignty in other than 
the three accepted ways, e.g., conditional spending, provides for continued participation in an 
otherwise pre-emptible field, and makes the same provisions for private citizens and government 
officials.  
The tenth amendment as a guarantee of republican government for the states. 
 
 Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135 (1892). 
 Case summary. 
 The issue originated in Nebraska and involved citizenship with a resulting effect upon 
eligibility to hold state office.  Boyd, born in Ireland of parents who immigrated to Ohio when he 
was ten, was elected governor of Nebraska.  Thayer, the previous governor who hadn’t run for 
re-election, sought to invalidate the election results by claiming that Boyd was not a citizen 
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because first, his immigrant father didn’t get citizenship papers until after Boyd turned twenty-
one and second, because Boyd did not apply for citizenship after reaching legal age.  Because the 
state attorney general would not prosecute the case, Thayer obtained permission from the 
Nebraska Supreme Court “to file an information against James E. Boyd to establish the relator’s 
right to the office of governor of that State, and to oust the respondent therefrom” (p. 137).   
Boyd responded that his father “in open court declared it to be his bona fide intention to 
become a citizen of the United States” on March 5, 1849, and thereafter exercised full rights of 
citizenship, including being elected to public office (p. 139).  Believing that he was a citizen by 
virtue of his father’s declaration, Boyd asserted that he voted in Ohio before moving to Iowa and 
then on to the Nebraska Territory as a young man where he had resided continuously since 
August of 1856.  During his Nebraska residency Boyd had been elected county clerk, had served 
as a U.S. soldier on Nebraska’s frontier, had been elected to the territorial legislature, had also 
been elected to serve in two state constitutional conventions, and had served two terms as 
Omaha’s mayor before being elected governor.  Boyd had continuously exercised his right to 
vote during his tenure in Nebraska.  After learning that his citizenship was being questioned, 
Boyd had gone before the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska “for the purpose of 
removing all doubts that might arise” concerning his citizenship (p. 149).  The U.S. District 
Court “found, determined and adjudged that he was in fact and law a full citizen of the United 
States” (p. 149). 
The Nebraska Supreme Court, with two of three justices concurring while one dissented, 
ruled that Boyd was not a U.S. citizen as required by the state constitution because his father 
hadn’t received naturalization papers until after Boyd had turned twenty-one.   Accordingly the 
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court issued a “judgment of ouster” against Boyd as well as an order reinstating Thayer to the 
governor’s office (p. 150).  Boyd appealed on a writ of error to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 Chief Justice Fuller delivered the Court’s opinion, which overturned the ruling by the 
Nebraska Supreme Court.  Justice Field dissented, relying on the Tenth Amendment and the 
Guarantee Clause to support his position.  Chief Justice Fuller began by citing Justice Waite’s 
observation in United States v. Cruikshank, in which Waite noted, “Citizens are the members of 
the political community to which they belong” (p. 158).  The Court asserted its jurisdiction 
because a defense had been “interposed under the Constitution or laws of the United States” that 
“involved the denial of a right or privilege under the Constitution and laws of the United States” 
and had been overruled by “the highest court of the State” (p. 161).   
According to the Court, the critical question involved congressional authority over the 
Nebraska Territory before Nebraska became a state because Boyd had moved to and resided in 
the Nebraska Territory.  “What the State had power to do after its admission is not the question.  
Before Congress let go its hold upon the Territory, it was for Congress to say who were members 
of the political community” (p. 175).  This position (viewing the critical issues as arising while 
Nebraska was still a territory and not a state) allowed the Court to avoid any issues presented 
under authority of the Tenth Amendment.  The Court noted that the “organic law under which 
the Territory of Nebraska was organized” stipulated that “every free white male inhabitant above 
the age of twenty-one years who shall be an actual resident of said Territory, and shall possess 
the qualifications hereinafter prescribed, shall be entitled to vote… and shall be eligible to any 
office within the said Territory” (pp. 170-171).  Also, the act of Congress “to enable the people 
of Nebraska to form a constitution and state government, and for the admission of such State into 
the Union on an equal footing with the original states” stipulated that “the inhabitants of … the 
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Territory of Nebraska … are hereby authorized to vote for and choose representatives to form a 
convention…” (pp. 172-173).  Finally, the Court cited another ruling by Chief Justice Waite, this 
time from Minor v. Happersett in which he observed, “Whoever, then, was one of the people of 
either of these States when the Constitution of the United States was adopted, became ipso facto 
a citizen – a member of the nation created by its adoption” (p. 176).  Because new states were 
admitted to the Union “on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever,” 
including “equality of constitutional right and power” (p. 170), Boyd  
was within the intent and meaning, effect and operation of the acts of 
Congress in relation to citizens of the Territory, and was made a citizen of 
the United States and of the State of Nebraska under the organic and 
enabling acts and the act of admission.  (p. 179) 
 
The Court ruled that Boyd was a citizen, reversed the decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court, 
and remanded “the cause” to be “proceeded in according to law and in conformity with this 
opinion” (p. 182). 
 Significance for the tenth amendment. 
 The defense had argued that Boyd was not a citizen since he was foreign-born and had 
never been naturalized, that the admission of Nebraska as a state by Congress had not made him 
a citizen, and that the constitution and legislation of Nebraska controlled the issue.  Specifically, 
defense attorneys argued: 
The distinction made in the constitution and the legislation of that State 
between citizens and aliens is at war with the suggestion that all the 
inhabitants of Nebraska were citizens of Nebraska and made ipso facto 
citizens of the United States by the admission of the State into the Union.  
(p. 156) 
 
By moving the critical issue to a time period before Nebraska achieved statehood, however, the 
Court defused the Tenth Amendment issue.  However, Justice Field rested his dissenting opinion 
on both Tenth Amendment and Guarantee Clause grounds, arguing that the Tenth Amendment 
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and the Guarantee Clause prohibited any interference with the ruling of the Nebraska Supreme 
Court.  Such a position implied no significant political differences between a territory and a state, 
which proved to be a proposition too difficult to defend.  Justice Field made several remarks 
regarding states, state sovereignty, and reserved powers; however, such remarks applied to states 
as states, not to their prior status as territories.  Ironically, the remark made by Justice Field 
regarding the Guarantee Clause could have been viewed as a reason to ignore Tenth Amendment 
concerns, had the Tenth Amendment possessed any viability in the case at hand.  Regarding the 
Guarantee Clause, Justice Field stated: 
Its [the federal government] power of interference with the administration of 
the affairs of the State and the officers through whom they are conducted 
extends only so far as may be necessary to secure to it a republican form of 
government….  Except as required for these purposes, it can no more 
interfere with the qualifications, election and installation of the state 
officers, than a foreign government.  And all attempts at interference with 
them in those requests … are in my judgment so many invasions upon the 
reserved rights of the States and assaults upon their constitutional authority.  
(p. 183) 
 
What Field ignored, and what could have been argued, should it have been necessary, was that 
the Guarantee Clause required intervention by the United States in order to restore the will of the 
people who had elected Boyd under a republican form of government to be their chosen 
governor.  However, by correctly avoiding the Tenth Amendment issue, the Court rendered it 
unnecessary to make such an argument. 
 Chimento v. Stark, 353 F.Supp. 1211 (1973); 414 U.S. 802 (1973). 
 Case summary. 
 This case involved a conflict between the right of a state, under the Tenth Amendment, to 
determine qualifications for the office of governor, and the right of an individual to pursue the 
governorship.  It was decided by a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the 
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District of New Hampshire, whose decision was subsequently affirmed without comment by the 
United States Supreme Court. 
 Dating back to its adoption in 1784, the New Hampshire Constitution specified a 
residency requirement of seven years for all candidates for Governor of that state.  Carmen 
Chimento, the plaintiff in the case, had resided in New Hampshire for three years when he 
formally announced his candidacy for the office of Governor.  Robert Stark, then the Secretary 
of State for New Hampshire, refused to place his name on the ballot for the primary election 
because Chimento didn’t meet the residency requirement.  This action precipitated the initiation 
of the lawsuit.  Chimento sought an injunction to stay the primary election until the question of 
his candidacy was resolved, but his request was denied.  Thereupon, Chimento announced he 
would run as an independent candidate for Governor of New Hampshire.  The Attorney General 
of New Hampshire directed Stark, as Secretary of State of New Hampshire, “not to accept his 
filing papers as an independent candidate … for the general election” (p. 1213).  Chimento then 
sought “a temporary restraining order to enjoin the Secretary of State from not accepting his 
filing papers” (p. 1213).  This, too, was denied.   
 At the hearing before the U.S. District Court in New Hampshire, Chimento asked the 
Court “to declare unconstitutional and permanently enjoin the enforcement of Part Second, 
Article 42, [the residency requirement] of the New Hampshire Constitution” because it violated 
his rights guaranteed by “the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First 
Amendment, [and] the constitutional right of unrestricted interstate travel” (p. 1212).  Chimento 
argued that the residency requirement created a class of citizens, i.e., those citizens not meeting 
the residency requirement, who were denied the right to run for office and thus denied the equal 
protection of the law.  Because he couldn’t run for office, Chimento argued that his “right to 
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association” and to freely express “his political views” under the First Amendment were also 
violated (p. 1217).  Finally, he argued that “[c]andidate durational residency requirements” 
penalized “the right to travel” (p. 1218). 
 The State of New Hampshire argued that the constitutional residency requirement for 
candidates for Governor represented a “compelling state interest” in “maintaining a responsive 
and responsible government through the democratic process” (p. 1215).  First, according to New 
Hampshire, the residency requirement  
ensure[d] that the chief executive officer of New Hampshire [was] exposed 
to the State and its people, thereby giving him familiarity with and 
awareness of the conditions, needs, and problems of both the State of New 
Hampshire and the various segments of the population within the State, 
while at the same time giving the voters of the State an opportunity to gain 
by observation and personal contact some firsthand knowledge of the 
candidates for Governor…  (p. 1215) 
 
Also, the residency requirement acted “to prevent frivolous candidacy by persons who have had 
little previous exposure to the problems and desires of the people of New Hampshire” (p. 1215).   
 District Judge Bownes delivered the District Court’s opinion.  Circuit Judge Campbell 
wrote a separate concurring opinion with which Judge Gignoux concurred.  After noting the facts 
of the case, Judge Bownes cited a Supreme Court ruling describing the ability to run for office as 
a basic constitutional right: 
It is well settled that there exists “a federal constitutional right to be 
considered for public service without the burden of invidiously 
discriminatory disqualifications,” and a state “may not deny to some the 
privilege of holding public office that it extends to others on the basis of 
distinctions that violate federal constitutional guarantees.”  Turner v. 
Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362-363 … (1970).  (p. 1213) 
 
Bownes observed that the “Supreme Court ha[d] developed two basic tests” to determine 
whether or not the discrimination was “invidious,” the “traditional ‘reasonable basis’ test versus 
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the stricter ‘compelling state interest’ test” (p. 1213).  Paraphrasing another Supreme Court 
ruling, Judge Bownes stated the criteria for the stricter test: 
In general, if the challenged law directly affects a “fundamental” or “basic” 
right or draws lines which result in a “suspect classification, [e.]g., a 
classification based on race, religion, national origin, or personal wealth[,] 
the proponents of the law must make a “clear showing that the burden 
imposed is necessary to protect a compelling and substantial governmental 
interest.”  Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, 405 U.S. 341…  (p. 1213) 
 
Bownes further explained, “Semantics aside, the question is resolved judicially by determining 
what is more important to our form of government; the rights protected by the state law in 
question or the rights infringed by it” (p. 1214).  After discussing further case law noting the 
nexus of “the right to run for public office” with other fundamental rights, e.g., the “right to 
vote,” the “right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs,” the “right of 
qualified voters … to cast their votes effectively,” the District Court ruled that “the ‘compelling 
interest’ test” was required (p. 1214).   
 District Court Judge Bownes summarized the case law involving a clash of Tenth 
Amendment state rights with individual constitutional rights: 
A state’s right to impose restrictions on one seeking public office is a power 
reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  However, if the state’s exercise of this right invades an 
individual’s constitutional rights, the restrictions become unconstitutional 
unless there is a showing of a compelling state interest justifying them.  
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 … (1969); Kramer v. Union Free 
School District, 395 U.S. 621 … (1969); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 
U.S. 701 … (1969). 
 
After examining the impact of the residency requirement on both candidates and voters, the 
District Court concluded “that the seven year residency requirement acts only as a minimal 
infringement upon the ability of the plaintiff to participate in the election process and that “its 
limiting effect upon the voters’ choice of candidates [was] more hypothetical than real” (pp. 
   
   
524
1215-1216).  “Moreover,” the Court observed, “the seven year period does not act as an outright 
ban on anyone’s candidacy for Governor; rather it delays the eligibility of a candidate to the 
office of Governor until a time when he has been a resident of the State for seven years” (p. 
1216).  The Court further noted that: 1) this was the first time in the New Hampshire 
Constitution’s history that the residency requirement had been challenged; 2) the New 
Hampshire Constitution was modeled on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 that had been 
“written primarily by John Adams,” one of the nation’s founders;67 and 3) “[f]orty-three states 
currently [had] durational residency or citizenship requirements as conditions of eligibility for 
the office of Governor” (p. 1217).  The only states not having durational residency requirements 
to run for the office of Governor were Connecticut, Kansas, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington, 
West Virginia, and Wisconsin.68  The three-judge District Court concluded that “the residency 
requirement of the New Hampshire Constitution does promote legitimate state interests” (p. 
1217).  The opinion continued: 
It ensures that the chief executive officer of New Hampshire is exposed to 
the problems, needs, and desires of the people whom he is to govern, and it 
also gives the people of New Hampshire a chance to observe him and gain 
firsthand knowledge about his habits and character.  While the length of the 
residency requirement may approach the constitutional limit, it is not 
unreasonable in relation to its objective.  (p. 1217) 
 
The District Court also rejected Chimento’s contention that the residency requirement 
“abridge[d] rights guaranteed to him and others similarly situated under the First Amendment” 
(p. 1217).  Judge Bownes explained, “This restriction does not deprive anyone of his right to 
association or of the freedom of expression of his political views” (p. 1217).  Also rejecting 
Chimento’s last contention that the residency requirement restricted his “constitutional right to 
travel freely interstate,” the District Court observed: “It cannot be seriously argued that the 
inability to run for Governor is a real impediment to interstate travel” (p. 1218).   
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 Significance for the tenth amendment. 
 Chimento v. Stark established that the right of a state to determine qualifications for the 
office of Governor is one of the powers reserved to states by the Tenth Amendment.  Implicitly, 
the district court ruling, affirmed by the Supreme Court, also established a basic criterion for the 
meaning of republican government under the Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  The 
Chimento ruling also provided a glimpse into how judicial proceedings resolve conflicts between 
two fundamental rights. 
 Finally, it should be noted that although the opinion in Chimento emanated from a federal 
district court, it was an opinion affirmed without comment by the U.S. Supreme Court upon 
appeal by Mr. Chimento.  Thus the opinion by the federal District Court of New Hampshire has 
the status of a Supreme Court decision, a status subsequently confirmed by the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Woodward v. City of Deerfield Beach when the Circuit Court opinion noted, 
“Moreover, in Chimento v. Stark, 353 F.Supp. 1211 (D.N.H.), aff’d mem., 414 U.S. 802, 94 
S.Ct. 125, 38 L.Ed.2d 39 (1973), the Supreme Court upheld a seven-year durational residence 
requirement for gubernatorial candidates in New Hampshire” (538 F.2d 1081, 1084 [1976]).  
 Henderson v. Fort Worth Independent School District, 526 F.2d 286 (1976). 
 Case summary. 
 This case involved a conflict between the right of a state, under the Tenth Amendment, to 
determine qualifications for school board candidates, and the right of an individual to pursue 
public service by serving as a member of the school board.  The case originated in the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Texas.  District Court Judge Mahon ruled in favor of 
the State of Texas and denied relief to two candidates denied access to the ballot as well as one 
voter who supported both potential candidates.  They appealed, and the case was argued before 
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Judges Bell, Thornberry, and Morgan of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals who subsequently 
overruled the district court’s decision. 
 The case centered on a Texas statute that required candidates for school boards in Texas 
to have been “qualified voters of said district for a period of three years” (p. 287).  Thomas Earl 
Henderson, Jr., and Mr. Puente wished to serve on their community’s school board, but were not 
placed on the ballot by district officials because they did not meet the voter registration 
requirement.  Ms. Boles was a “qualified voter of the Fort Worth Independent School District” 
who had desired to cast her vote for both Henderson and Puente (p. 288, n. 1).  Henderson, 
Puente, and Boles filed suit in U.S. District Court.  District Court Judge Mahon applied the 
“traditional ‘rational relationship’ formula” to the Texas statute and found that the Texas 
legislature had a rational basis for the statute by which two classes of school district residents 
were created, i.e., one class “of all residents who [were] not registered to vote or who [had] been 
registered to vote for … less than three years” and another class made up “of all residents who 
[had] been registered voters for a period of three years or more” (p. 290).  The rational basis 
consisted of the desire of Texas legislators to ensure “that persons seeking a school board 
position be familiar with the workings of the board and the concerns of the district, and by reason 
of that familiarity possessed of a modicum of expertise” (p. 289). 
 Circuit Judge Thornberry delivered the opinion of the three-member U.S. Court of 
Appeals, Fifth Circuit.  Two questions provided the focus for resolving the legal conflict.  First, 
was the dispute moot?  Second, did the Texas statute with the “three-year ‘qualified voter’ 
requirement” pass constitutional muster (p. 288)?  Regarding the first question, the Circuit Court 
ruled that the question was moot for Mr. Puente because he would meet the eligibility 
requirements at the next school board election.  According to Judge Thornberry, “[A]ppellant 
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Puente’s claim falls within the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ exception to the 
mootness doctrine” (p. 288, n. 1).  Mr. Henderson, however, would still be ineligible under the 
current statute to run for the school board at the next election.  On that basis, the Circuit Court 
ruled that Henderson’s case was “not moot” (p. 288).  For Ms. Boles, the question of mootness 
centered on another issue, whether or not she possessed legal standing “to challenge the statute 
under which the potential candidate was denied access to the ballot” (p. 287).  Finding that she 
was “a resident and qualified voter of the Fort Worth Independent School District who wishe[d] 
to cast her vote for appellants Henderson and Puente,” the Fifth Circuit Court ruled that she 
possessed the necessary standing to challenge the statute with regards to “appellant Henderson” 
(p. 288, n. 1). 
 In examining the merits of Mr. Henderson’s claim under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Circuit Court drew attention to the distinction between residency 
and voter registration requirements.  After observing that the Texas statute went beyond 
residency and age requirements, Judge Thornberry noted: 
The importance of this distinction – between residency and registration – is 
no more amply demonstrated than by the fact that appellant Henderson has 
been a resident of the Fort Worth School District for thirteen years, but will 
still be ineligible as a candidate in the 1976 election.  (p. 290) 
 
In examining the question of “the appropriate standard of review” for judging “the statutory 
classification in question,” the Fifth Circuit Court ruled that “the district court erred in its choice 
of the appropriate standard of review” (pp. 290; 291).  Instead of using “the traditional ‘rational 
relationship’ formula,” the district court should have used “the more stringent ‘strict scrutiny’ 
standard” (pp. 290; 291).  Proceeding with an examination of the “barrier erected” by the 
challenged Texas statute (p. 291), Judge Thornberry observed: 
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It is absolute in its operation.  No exception is made for expertise, 
familiarity, or the extent of political support in fact possessed by a potential 
candidate.  Not unlike the exorbitant filing fees in Bullock v. Carter, section 
7 [the Texas statute] denies access to what must be assumed is a significant 
number of potential school board candidates, and on that basis the statute’s 
impact on voters is substantial.  (pp. 291-292) 
 
After noting that “a majority of courts have employed a standard of strict scrutiny” when they 
examined “less restrictive, but somewhat analogous durational requirements,” Judge Thornberry 
again concluded that the Texas statute “must withstand strict scrutiny” (p. 292). 
 Beginning the Circuit Court’s analysis of the constitutional conflict, Thornberry 
articulated the basic requirement that the challenged statute had to meet.  “When subjected to 
strict scrutiny, a statute or legislative scheme must be shown necessary to promote a compelling 
state interest.  Shapiro v. Thompson, [394 U.S. 618 (1969)]; Bullock v. Carter, [405 U.S. 134 
(1972)]” (p. 292).  The Fifth Circuit Court dealt with arguments presented by school district 
attorneys that Chimento controlled the current case, thus Texas could “without violating the 
Equal Protection Clause … impose a three year ‘qualified voter’ requirement,” by noting two 
“important” distinctions between Chimento and the “instant case” (p. 292).  The first difference 
was that Chimento could have legally run for a variety of other “public offices below that of 
governor” and was thus “not completely barred from offering himself for service in state 
government” (p. 292).  Mr. Henderson, however, in wishing to serve on the school board, had 
“no lesser offices available to satisfy this particular desire to serve the public” (p. 293).  The 
second difference was that the issue in Chimento “was residency, not registration” (p. 293).  The 
Fifth Circuit Court opinion pointed again to the importance of this distinction by commenting, 
“As the situation of appellant Henderson demonstrates, the difference between the former and 
the latter can be crucial” (p. 293; see also p. 290 of the opinion wherein the difference was 
spelled out as noted on p. 551 of this paper).   
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 The Circuit Court discussed the constitutional underpinning of the State of Texas’ 
position. 
The state is clearly vested with the power, derived from the Tenth 
Amendment, to prescribe reasonable citizenship, age, and residency 
requirements on the availability of the ballot … and the power to prescribe 
reasonable qualifications extends to candidates for office.  (p. 292) 
 
The Fifth Circuit Court also noted the state’s justification for its law as being “the state’s interest 
in a ballot composed of knowledgeable and qualified candidates for the increasingly complex job 
of school board member” (p. 292).  “However,” the Circuit Court pointed out, “voter registration 
for a period of three years is, at best, a crude index of the capabilities of a potential candidate” (p. 
292).  The opinion continued by noting better indices of the state’s goal:  “The background, 
experience, and political views of the potential candidate are, among others, the indicia of merit 
and capability” (p. 292).  Instead of mandating those qualifications, however, a better and more 
democratic method is to allow the electorate to make those determinations through the political 
process. 
[T]he power to make necessarily subjective discriminations on the basis of 
background, experience, or political philosophy rests with the voters of the 
Fort Worth School District.  It can be assumed that opposing candidates will 
bring deficiencies in any of these areas to the attention of the voters.  (p. 
292) 
 
In its decision to reverse the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Texas, the Fifth Circuit Court held that the challenged statute, enacted under authority of the 
Tenth Amendment, didn’t meet the strict scrutiny requirements and thus denied Mr. Henderson 
of a fundamental right guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment.   
We hold that the three year “qualified voter” requirement of section 7 goes 
beyond the necessary power of the state to prescribe minimal candidate 
qualifications and denies appellant Henderson rights secured by the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  (p. 293) 
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 Significance for the tenth amendment. 
 Henderson v. Fort Worth School District highlighted two parallel conflicts of rights, one 
being explicit with the other being implicit, in the text of the opinion.  The first conflict, 
explicitly described in the Fifth Circuit Court’s opinion, involved the state’s right to determine 
candidate qualifications versus an individual citizen’s right to run for public office in a 
constitutionally-based democratic republic.  More specifically, the disagreement pitted the Tenth 
Amendment against the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In this instance, 
the Circuit Court upheld individual rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause, holding that a durational voter registration requirement for candidate 
eligibility exceeded the state’s power “to prescribe minimal candidate qualifications” as it did 
not meet the required standard of strict scrutiny (p. 293).  While the state had authority under the 
Tenth Amendment to “prescribe reasonable qualifications” for candidates running for public 
office, the durational voter registration requirement was both unreasonable and addressed in only 
a “crude” fashion the “capabilities of a potential candidate” (p. 292).  The facts in the case also 
distinguished Henderson from Chimento.   
 The second conflict, implicit in the text of the Circuit Court’s opinion, involved the right 
of the state to “make necessarily subjective discriminations” of the various candidates’ abilities 
versus the rights of the “voters of the Fort Worth School District” to determine which candidate 
is best qualified to fulfill the duties of elected office (p. 292).  The Circuit Court stated that the 
state has the power “to prescribe reasonable citizenship, age, and residency requirements” (p. 
292).  By implication, anything lying outside of the aforementioned requirements became 
unreasonable and intruded into areas best determined by voters through the political process of 
election campaigns.  The right of voters to make “subjective discriminations” about which 
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candidates will make the best public officials implicitly became a benchmark of republican 
government guaranteed to each state by the Guarantee Clause. 
 Woodward v. City of Deerfield Beach, 538 F.2d 1081 (1976). 
 Case summary. 
 The legal dispute began in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida and 
ended in the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.  Wayne B. Woodward had wanted to run for 
the position of City Commissioner in Deerfield Beach, Florida.  City officials excluded Mr. 
Woodward’s name from the ballot because “he did not meet the requirements of the city’s 
charter that candidates for that office be freeholders and residents for six months prior to the 
election” (p. 1081).  At that point, Woodward filed suit in the U.S. District Court for Southern 
Florida in which he sought to “enjoin enforcement of those two charter provisions” by arguing 
that they violated his rights to equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment (p. 1081).  The federal Southern Florida District Court “held for the plaintiff” and 
enjoined “the city from omitting his name from the ballot,” whereupon the City of Deerfield 
Beach appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court (p. 1081). 
 Attorney James Kincaid argued that Deerfield Beach’s requirements for candidate 
qualification were “necessary to guarantee the election of responsible, knowledgeable city 
commissioners,” particularly in a fast-growing city like Deerfield Beach that had become a 
“winter home community” for “10% to 25%” of its total residents (p. 1082).  He argued that the 
freeholder requirement was necessary because a city commissioner “would participate 
responsibly … only if he owned real property” (p. 1082).  Kincaid also defended Deerfield 
Beach’s residency requirement as being “necessary to insure voter knowledge of the candidate 
and candidate knowledge of the issues and problems of the area” (p. 1083).  Attorney Steven 
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Squire, arguing for the plaintiff and appellee, Wayne Woodward, argued that the freeholder 
candidacy requirement was unconstitutional and cited the controlling Supreme Court decision on 
that point, Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970), where “[t]he Court rejected the argument that 
only taxpayers will act responsibly by pointing out that a resident who rents his home effectively 
pays the property taxes of his lessor as part of his rent” (p. 1082).  Attorney Squire also attacked 
the legitimacy of the durational residency requirement, “arguing that there [was] no reason to 
presume that six months residence in a community would insure better knowledge of the 
problems or better voter knowledge of the candidate” (pp. 1083-1084).  Squire, on behalf of 
Woodward, argued “that the voters should be the ones to decide the qualifications of the 
candidate and to determine whether they [felt] confident that they kn[e]w him” (p. 1084). 
 Circuit Court Judge Lewis Morgan delivered the opinion for the three-judge Fifth Circuit 
Court in which the Circuit Court “[a]ffirmed in part and reversed in part” the lower court’s 
decision (p. 1081).  Also citing Turner v. Fouche, the Circuit Court affirmed the lower federal 
court’s holding that declared the freeholder candidacy requirement of Deerfield Beach was 
unconstitutional.  According to Circuit Court Judge Morgan: 
Limiting at any level the rights of members of the community to participate 
in the political process because of their economic station in life offends our 
most basic understanding of the nature of our government and society.  … 
[T]he promise of the Declaration of Independence “that all men are created 
equal” and that “Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed,” requires that all members of the 
political community be considered equals.  (p. 1083) 
 
The Circuit Court opinion concluded its discussion of the freeholder requirement by citing from 
the 1964 Supreme Court opinion in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565: “’[R]epresentative 
government is in essence self-government through the medium of elected representatives of the 
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people, and each and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective participation in 
the political processes …’” (p. 1083).   
 The Fifth Circuit Court reversed the “district court’s ruling that the durational residency 
requirement [was] unconstitutional” (p. 1084).  Noting that the three-judge court found “Mr. 
Woodward’s line of argument” about the durational residency requirement to be “persuasive,” 
the Fifth Circuit Court stated that such a line of argument was “precluded by certain provisions 
in the Constitution and by the Supreme Court” (p. 1084).  Circuit Court Judge Morgan drew 
attention to the U.S. Constitution’s durational residency requirements: 
[M]embers of the House of Representatives must be residents of the United 
States for nine years (U.S. Const., art. I, § 2), Senators must be residents of 
the United States for nine years (U.S. Const., art. I, § 3), and the President 
must be a resident of the United States for fourteen years (U.S. Const., art. 
II, § 1).  (p. 1084) 
 
The Fifth Circuit Court also cited Supreme Court rulings in Chimento v. Stark and Sununu v. 
Stark in which the Court rejected equal protection challenges to durational residency 
requirements in New Hampshire for “gubernatorial” and “state senator” candidates (p. 1084).  
Judge Morgan concluded for the Fifth Circuit Court: 
In light of the inclusion of residency requirements in the Constitution and 
the recent Supreme Court decision upholding the constitutionality of a 
seven-year durational residence requirement for the office of state senator, 
we cannot find a durational residency requirement of six months for the 
office of city commissioner to be a violation of the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  (p. 1084) 
 
 Significance for the tenth amendment. 
 Applying case law and the text of the U.S. Constitution to the legal dispute in Woodward 
v. City of Deerfield Beach, 538 F.2D 1081 (1976), the Fifth Circuit Court extended the Tenth 
Amendment legality of durational residency requirements to a political subdivision of a state, the 
City of Deerfield Beach.  The Circuit Court also applied case law in declaring that the city’s 
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freeholder requirement for candidacy to office deprived Woodward of the equal protection of the 
law guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment.  By implication, the ruling continued 
Chimento’s delineation of candidate qualifications as being related to reasonableness of age, 
citizenship, and residency. 
 Antonio v. Kirkpatrick, 453 F.Supp. 1161 (1978); 579 F.2d 1147 (1978). 
 Case summary. 
 This case arose in Missouri and centered on a clash between the police powers of the 
state reserved by the Tenth Amendment (a ten-year durational residency requirement for the 
office of State Auditor) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
federal district and circuit court opinions provide interest because, while reaching the same 
outcome, they purportedly did so by different means.  The U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Missouri, employing the more rigorous strict scrutiny test, held that the ten-year 
durational residency requirement for the office of State Auditor violated the plaintiff of the equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and was thus unconstitutional.  
Upon appeal by the State of Missouri, the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals: 1) ruled that the 
District Court had used the wrong test; 2) applied the less rigorous rational basis test; and 3) 
reached the same holding as the lower court.  The case also provides interest because one of the 
unsuccessful defendants was later appointed to be the Attorney General for the United States.  
Finally, it is interesting to note that while the Circuit Court announced its decision on August 5th 
(in time to affect the then upcoming primary election), a written opinion wasn’t provided until 
September 28, 1978. 
 James F. Antonio sought to be a Republican candidate for the office of Missouri State 
Auditor in “the August 1978 primary election” (453 F.Supp. 1161, 1162; hereafter cited as D.Ct., 
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p. 1162).  James C. Kirkpatrick, Missouri Secretary of State, upon advice from John D. Ashcroft, 
Missouri Attorney General, refused to certify Antonio as a State Auditor candidate because 
Antonio failed to meet the durational residency requirement.  Two “active Republicans,” J. 
Anthony Dill and Julian J. Ossman, joined Antonio as plaintiffs in this action against defendants 
Kirkpatrick and Ashcroft in the federal Western Missouri District Court (D.Ct., p. 1162).  Dill’s 
and Ossman’s joined because they were “citizens and voters” who wished “to have Antonio’s 
name on the ballot so that they [could] vote for him in the Republican primary” (D.Ct., p. 1162).   
 Plaintiff’s challenged the constitutionality of the ten-year durational residency 
requirement on several constitutional grounds.  First the requirement violated the Equal 
Protection Clause “by creating a discriminatory classification which [was] not necessary to 
promote a compelling governmental interest of the State of Missouri” (D.Ct., p. 1163).  The 
residency requirement also “infringed” plaintiffs’ “First Amendment rights of association and 
expression” (D.Ct., p. 1163).  In addition “Antonio’s constitutional right to travel and right to be 
a candidate for public office [were] violated by the residency requirement” (D.Ct., p. 1163).  
Finally, the ten-year residency requirement violated  
the guarantee of republican form of government set forth in Article IV, 
Section 4, of the United States Constitution, and abridge[d] the rights of 
plaintiffs Dill and Ossman to vote for the candidate of their choice and to 
associate in support of him.  (D.Ct., p. 1163) 
 
Relief sought by the plaintiffs included two holdings and two orders, one each directed 
separately at each of the two defendants.  The desired holdings centered on a declaration that the 
ten-year durational residency requirement for Missouri State Auditor violated the U.S. 
Constitution “and the federally protected rights of these plaintiffs” as well as a “declaration that 
plaintiff Antonio [met] the lawful qualifications for the office of Missouri State Auditor” (D.Ct., 
p. 1163).  The first court order sought by the plaintiffs involved 
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an Order directing defendant Kirkpatrick to accept the declaration of 
candidacy filed by plaintiff Antonio and to certify Antonio’s name to local 
election authorities for the Republican ballot as a candidate for State Auditor 
at the August 1978 primary election.  (D.Ct., p. 1163) 
 
The second court order was to be directed to Missouri Attorney General Ashcroft in order to 
enjoin “defendant Ashcroft from enforcing in any manner the ten-year residency requirement so 
as to preclude plaintiff Antonio from being a candidate for the office of State Auditor or 
plaintiff’s Dill and Ossman from voting for plaintiff Antonio” (D.Ct., p. 1163). 
 The Assistant Attorney General of Missouri provided legal representation for defendants 
Kirkpatrick and Ashcroft, Missouri’s Secretary of State and Attorney General, respectively.  He 
articulated “four ‘rational bases’ for Missouri’s [ten-year durational residency] requirement” for 
candidates for Missouri State Auditor, which also represented “compelling state interests” as 
well (D.Ct., p. 1165).  According to the defense arguments as described by District Court Judge 
Elmo B. Hunter, the ten-year residency requirement was necessary in order: 
(1) to ensure that a public official holding a state-wide office has close ties 
with the state so that he has the interests of the state at heart and can 
understand its problems and needs; (2) to prevent frivolous, fraudulent or 
unqualified candidates; (3) to ensure a candidate’s familiarity with the 
constituency and the problems of the state; and (4) to thoroughly expose the 
voters to the candidate prior to election.  (D.Ct., p. 1165) 
 
 District Court Judge Hunter presented convincing reasons for using the strict scrutiny test 
to examine the challenged requirement.  After discussing the existence of “two tests for use when 
an allegedly unconstitutional classification is at issue” that were developed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court and after briefly describing each test, Judge Hunter observed that the decision as to which 
test to use “depend[ed] upon ‘the interests affected and the classification involved.’  Dunn v. 
Blumstein, … 405 U.S. at 335” (D.Ct., pp. 1163-1164).  Hunter then stated a legal observation 
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based upon a Supreme Court case, which in turn formed the basis for subsequent federal district 
and circuit court decisions. 
The United States Constitution does not guarantee a right to hold public 
office to any person, but the equal protection clause does guarantee the right 
to be considered for such an office without the burden of invidiously 
discriminatory disqualifications.  Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 … (1970); 
Wellford v. Battaglia, 485 F.2d 1151, 1152, (3d Cir. 1973); McKinney v. 
Kaminsky, 340 F.Supp. 289, 294 (M.D.Ala.1972).  (D.Ct., p. 1164) 
 
The District Court Judge next drew upon another Supreme Court decision when he declared, 
“Although the right to run for public office may not be as important or fundamental as the right 
to vote itself, the Supreme Court noted the interrelation between restrictions on the right to 
candidacy and restrictions on the right to vote in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43, … 
(1972)” (D.Ct., p. 1164).  Judge Hunter proceeded to connect Bullock and the current case by 
stating: 
In Bullock, the Supreme Court mandated strict scrutiny where the limitation 
has a “real and appreciable impact on the exercise of the franchise.”  405 
U.S. at 144…  Such an impact is present in this case.  See Lubin v. Panish, 
415 U.S. 709 … (1974).  (D.Ct., p. 1164) 
 
Judge Hunter buttressed the preceding citation with a citation drawn from another Supreme 
Court case involving candidacy requirements that he both summarized and quoted: 
In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized that any limitations imposed 
by a state on the ability of candidates to obtain a position on the ballot 
necessarily places: “burdens on two different, although overlapping, kinds 
of rights – the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of 
political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political 
persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.  Both of these rights, of course, 
rank among our most precious freedoms.”  Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 
30 … (1968).  (D.Ct., p. 1164) 
 
District Court Judge Hunter concluded: 
This court’s determination of the applicability of the strict scrutiny standard 
in this case is not a novel approach to the issue.  Almost unanimously, 
   
   
538
federal courts have adopted the same standard in dealing with the issue of 
durational residency requirements for public office.  (D.Ct., pp. 1164-1165) 
 
In support of his conclusion, Hunter cited 12 federal court cases and characterized candidacy for 
public office as residing at “the heart of government” (D.Ct., p. 1165). 
 Although Judge Hunter announced the strict scrutiny test was the appropriate lens with 
which to examine the challenged ten-year durational residency requirement for Missouri State 
Auditor, he also stated that either the rational basis or the strict scrutiny test would yield the same 
outcome.  According to Hunter, “As this opinion will outline, the result is the same under either 
test” (D.Ct., p. 1165, n. 3). 
 After reviewing the State of Missouri’s arguments, Judge Hunter noted their 
constitutional underpinning:  “It is true that states, including Missouri, have the unquestioned 
right to impose reasonable restrictions on availability of the ballot….  That right is a police 
power reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution” 
(D.Ct., p. 1165).  And then the District Court Judge noted the limitation upon the State’s Tenth 
Amendment power:  “But a state ‘may not deny to some the privilege of holding public office 
that it extends to others on the basis of distinctions that violate federal constitutional guarantees.’  
Turner v. Fouche, supra, 396 U.S. at 362-63” (D.Ct., p. 1165).  At this point in the District Court 
opinion, Judge Hunter announced his preliminary finding, which he then proceeded to justify 
through a point-by-point analysis.  According to District Court Judge Hunter, “In this case, 
plaintiffs’ rights are impermissibly burdened, for it is difficult to conceive how the requirement 
of ten years’ prior residency is necessary to effectuate any of Missouri’s stated objectives” 
(D.Ct., 1165).  As Hunter explained, much in similar fashion to the federal New Hampshire 
District Court opinion’s emphasis upon the political process’s ability to provide both 
illumination about and discrimination between the various candidates and their abilities:  
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In these times of media and mass transportation, voters are thoroughly 
exposed to a candidate, and vice versa, throughout the rigorous primary and 
election campaign process, without the necessity of ten years’ prior 
residency for that purpose.  Certainly candidates who so desire can become 
familiar with their constituency and the problems of the state without 
residing here for ten years.  (D.Ct., pp. 1165-1166) 
 
Judge Hunter addressed each of the “rational bases” presented by the State of Missouri and 
found that the ten-year residency requirement lacked the ability to achieve the desired ends 
(D.Ct., p. 1165).  Noting that “[a] residency requirement exclude[d] legitimate as well as 
frivolous candidates,” Judge Hunter further explained the classification deficiencies of the ten-
year residency requirement for State Auditor: 
The Missouri constitutional provision permits a ten-year resident of 
Missouri to  be a candidate for State Auditor regardless of his lack of 
knowledge of the state and its problems, while it excludes more recent 
arrivals – for example, those who have resided in this state for nine and one-
half years – who have had experience in government elsewhere or like 
plaintiff Antonio have experience in Missouri government, or who simply 
have made diligent efforts to become well acquainted with Missouri and its 
governmental operations.  (D.Ct., p. 1166) 
 
Having discussed the failure of Missouri’s ten-year residency requirement to theoretically meet 
its intended objective, Judge Hunter next directed specific attention to how the residency 
requirement actually worked to exclude qualified candidates by examining the excluded 
plaintiff’s qualifications and experience.  Judge Hunter’s fact-finding included the following 
educational qualifications of plaintiff Antonio that were relevant to the State Auditor’s duties:  a 
B.A. “degree in business, and both Masters and Doctor of Philosophy degrees in accounting” 
(D.Ct., p. 1167, n. 6).  In addition Antonio was “a certified public accountant in the State of 
Missouri” (D.Ct., p. 1167, n. 6).  Employment experience relevant to being the State Auditor 
included work “experience with several different accounting firms” as well as university 
experience in teaching accounting “at the University of Illinois, the University of South Florida, 
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and the University of Missouri” (D.Ct., p. 1167, n. 6).  Specific work experience with the 
Missouri State Auditor’s office included the following as determined by Judge Hunter: 
Mr. Antonio presently is Deputy State Auditor of the State of Missouri, a 
position he has held under three State Auditors.  In that position, he is chief 
operating officer of the Auditor’s office, second in command, and 
responsible for the day-to-day management of the office and 100 staff 
members.  He has experience as Acting State Auditor of Missouri, having 
been appointed to that position by governor Joseph P. Teasdale in 1977.  
(D.Ct., p. 1167, n. 7) 
 
District Court Judge Hunter began to summarize the intersection of Missouri’s ten-year 
residency requirement for State Auditor with James Antonio’s qualifications, experience, and 
residence in Missouri. 
It is conceded that plaintiff Antonio meets all other qualifications for the 
office of State Auditor, and the record herein further reveals that he is well-
educated in the field of accounting and imminently knowledgeable about 
and experienced in the affairs of the State Auditor’s office.  (D.Ct., p. 1167) 
 
Judge Hunter continued: 
He has resided in Missouri for almost eight of the past twelve years.  
Missouri’s durational residency requirement operates to exclude him from 
consideration by the voters of the State, and no compelling state interest has 
been shown to justify that exclusion.  (D.Ct., p. 1167) 
 
Hunter concluded: 
[T]he instrument chosen by the State of Missouri to reach those objectives 
[the rational basis asserted by defendants] is far too imprecise to justify its 
continued use.  Even though a governmental purpose may be legitimate and 
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle 
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly reached.  
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 … (1960).  (D.Ct., p. 1167) 
 
 Judge Hunter next conducted “a survey of the state of the law throughout the nation” and 
found that “[d]urational residency requirements for State Auditor are the exception rather than 
the rule.  Only nine states currently have durational residency requirements as conditions of 
eligibility for the office of Auditor” (D.Ct., p. 1168).  Regarding a ten-year residency 
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requirement for offices higher than that of State Auditor, Judge Hunter discovered “that only 
Missouri, Oklahoma, and Louisiana even have a ten-year residency requirement for the office of 
Governor” (Emphasis in original) (D.Ct., p. 1168).  Hunter concluded, “Thus it is apparent that 
Missouri’s durational residency requirement for the office of State Auditor is the most stringent 
of any state in the nation” (D.Ct., p. 1168).  According to Judge Hunter, the “survey of the state 
of the law throughout the nation supports this Court’s determination of the unconstitutionality of 
Missouri’s residency requirement for the office of State Auditor” (D.Ct., p. 1168). 
 The District Court Judge next examined “Missouri history with respect to the office of 
State Auditor” and found that a historical review failed “to support the finding of any compelling 
state interest in the ten-year residency requirement” (D.Ct., p. 1168).  First of all, according to 
Hunter’s findings: 
From 1820 until 1852, all State Auditors were appointed; the Constitution of 
1820 provided no durational residency requirements for the office of State 
Auditor, Secretary of State, State Treasurer, or Attorney General, though 
there were five-year residency requirements for the offices of Governor and 
Lieutenant Governor.  (D.Ct., p. 1168) 
 
A constitutional amendment was adopted in 1850 requiring that “the offices of State Auditor …, 
Secretary of State, Attorney General, and State Treasurer … be elected by the qualified voters of 
the State” (D.Ct., p. 1168).  The 1865 Constitution of Missouri, the State’s third constitution, was 
the first constitution in Missouri’s history to specifically list a residency requirement of five 
years for all “statewide elected officials” (D.Ct., p. 1168).  Those requirements were carried forth 
into the 1875 Constitution of Missouri: however: 
The 1945 Constitution, under which Missouri functions today, did not carry 
forth the five-year residency requirement from … the 1875 Constitution.  
Instead, that requirement was deleted in its entirety and no durational 
residency requirement was imposed in the 1945 Constitution for the offices 
of Secretary of State, State Treasurer and Attorney General.  (Emphasis in 
original) (D.Ct., p. 1169) 
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In fact, it was revealed that the residency requirement did not rest upon the actual text of the 
Missouri Constitution.  Instead, it rested upon an interpretation of the Constitution, which, in 
turn, was not based upon any debates occurring in the 1945 Constitutional Convention.  Article 
IV, § 13 of the 1945 Missouri Constitution stated, “The state auditor shall have the same 
qualifications as the governor” (D.Ct., p. 1169).  Plaintiffs argued that the residency requirement 
for State Auditor “was imposed by the 1945 Constitution accidentally through the general 
requirement that he possess the same qualifications as the Governor” (D.Ct., p. 1169).  Of 
course, a major source for resolving questions about constitutional interpretation was to be found 
in the records of the 1945 Missouri Constitutional Convention, a basic consideration that 
apparently never crossed the mind of the Missouri Attorney General, John Ashcroft, before he 
delivered his opinion to his fellow defendant in the case, Secretary of State Kilpatrick.  As a 
result of examining the constitutional records, District Court Judge Hunter observed: 
There is support for that argument in the transcribed record of the 
Constitutional Convention, which reveals that the ten-year requirement 
never was debated or even discussed.  Instead, the focus of the Convention’s 
discussions was the provisions concerning the duties of the State Auditor, 
which prior to the adoption of Article IV, Section 13, in 1945, never had 
been set forth in the Missouri Constitution.  (D.Ct., p. 1169) 
 
Not content to have consulted only the text of the constitution and the debates of the 
constitutional convention, Judge Hunter also conducted an analysis of the State Auditor’s duties 
before and after the 1945 Missouri Constitutional Convention.  This analysis showed a restriction 
in the duties of the Missouri State Auditor.  According to the District Court Judge: 
Prior to 1945, the State Auditor was responsible for collection of the state 
sales and income taxes and certain other fiscal matters.  Those functions 
after 1945 were placed in a new Department of Revenue.  In addition, rather 
than endowing the State Auditor with a comptroller function – a proposal 
specifically discussed and rejected by the Constitutional Convention – the 
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1945 Constitution expressly limited the State Auditor to post-audit 
functions.  (D.Ct., p. 1169) 
 
As Judge Hunter summarized: 
[T]he 1945 Constitution, in restricting the duties of the office of State 
Auditor to post-audit functions, runs counter to any compelling interest in 
increasing the residency requirement for that office beyond the five years 
required by the Constitution of 1875.  (Emphasis in original) (D.Ct., p. 
1169) 
 
  Having considered the constitutional text and the records of the constitutional convention, as 
well as having conducted a pre-post 1945 analysis of the duties of the Missouri State Auditor, 
District Court Judge Hunter next conducted a comparative analysis of the residency requirements 
for State Auditor with those of other elected state officials in Missouri.  He communicated his 
finding by stating, “Finally, it is significant that the 1945 Constitution imposed no durational 
residency requirement for the offices of Secretary of State, State Treasurer, or Attorney General” 
(D.Ct., p. 1170).  Judge Hunter concluded: 
Considering the functions and powers of these other statewide elective 
offices, and the impact of their exercise of power on the lives of the 
electorate, it appears patent that no compelling interest has been urged for 
the disparity in durational residency requirements between candidates for 
these offices and the office of State Auditor.  (D.Ct., p. 1170) 
 
 Having completed his review of “Missouri history with respect to the office of State 
Auditor,” District Court Judge Hunter delivered the Court’s finding regarding the compelling 
interest argument of Missouri for the State Auditor residency requirement, which was followed 
immediately by the announcement of the Court’s first holding in the case (D.Ct., p. 1168; see 
also p. 557 previous): 
Thus the history of the office of State Auditor in Missouri reveals no 
compelling state interest which ever has been expressed – or which now is 
apparent – for imposing a ten-year durational residency qualification for the 
office.  Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, the requirement must fall 
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as violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.  (D.Ct., p. 1170) 
 
Judge Hunter next addressed the rational basis aspect of Missouri’s durational residency 
requirement for State Auditor. 
“…[I]t further is the opinion of this Court that the ten-year requirement fails 
to satisfy the so-called “rational basis” test for the reason that it has neither 
logic, reason, nor experience to support it.  The requirement of the Missouri 
Constitution that candidates for State Auditor must reside ten years in this 
state prior to election simply is not reasonably related to any of the 
objectives asserted by defendants or to any requirements of that office.  
(D.Ct., p. 1170) 
 
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri next issued three orders.  The first 
declared that the residency requirement for State Auditor violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  The second enjoined John Ashcroft as Missouri Attorney General 
“from enforcing in any manner the ten-year residency requirement for the Office of State 
Auditor” (D.Ct., p. 1170).  The third enjoined James Kirkpatrick as Secretary of State “from 
refusing to accept plaintiff Antonio’s declaration of candidacy for the office of State Auditor” as 
well as “from refusing to certify plaintiff Antonio’s name to local election authorities to appear 
on the Republican ballot at the August 1978 primary election as a candidate for State Auditor” 
(D.Ct., p. 1170). 
 Secretary of State Kirkpatrick and Attorney General Ashcroft appealed Judge Hunter’s 
decision to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals who agreed to hear the case.  Chief Judge Gibson 
announced the decision reached by himself as well as Circuit Judges Bright and Ross, which 
“affirmed the judgment of the District Court” (579 F.2d 1147, 1148; hereafter cited as C.Ct., p. 
1148).  While the decision was announced “on August 5,” the Eighth Circuit Court did not 
produce an “opinion set[ting] forth the reasons for that ruling” until September 28 of the same 
year (C.Ct., p. 1148).  Although the federal Western Missouri District Court decision was 
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affirmed, the Eighth Circuit Court held that the District Court, in using the strict scrutiny test, 
had used the wrong test.  According to Circuit Court Chief Judge Gibson: 
Before abandoning the traditional standard of review [the rational basis test], 
a court must determine whether a State’s limitation has a “real and 
appreciable impact” upon the fundamental rights allegedly affected.  See 
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 … (1972).  (C.Ct., p. 1149) 
 
The Circuit Court concluded that the durational residency requirement for State Auditor “only 
minimally infringe[d] upon the rights of voters to participate in the election process,” that “the 
requirement [did] not irretrievable foreclose a person from running for the office of State 
Auditor,” and that “the relationship between the requirement at issue and the right to travel 
interstate [was] too attenuated to warrant invocation of the strict standard of review” (C.Ct., p. 
1149).  In the opinion of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, “the proper standard for reviewing 
the provision of the Missouri Constitution imposing a durational residency requirement on 
aspirants to the office of State Auditor [was] the traditional reasonable basis test” (C.Ct., p. 
1149).  This, of course, ignored the part of the District Court opinion that had addressed the 
reasonable basis claims put forth by Missouri and had found them unconvincing (See D.Ct., p. 
1165, n. 2; pp. 1165-1169; and p. 1170; see also p. 560 of this paper).  Or, perhaps the Circuit 
Court simply expressed disagreement with the District Court’s pronouncement that the strict 
scrutiny test was the appropriate one to apply.  The latter interpretation appeared likely in light of 
additional statements made by the Circuit Court regarding the lower court’s ruling that focused 
on a reasonable relationship between the requirement and the end sought:  1) “the district Court 
found that the ten-year requirement is not reasonably related to any of the asserted State interests 
or to any of the requirements of the office of State Auditor” (C.Ct., p. 1150); 2) paraphrased the 
District Court’s statement that the decision was not “a novel approach,” but fell within a 
considerable body of case law and directed readers to “[s]ee cases cited in District Court 
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opinion” (D.Ct., p. 1165; C.Ct., p. 1150, n. 4); 3) stated, “we are satisfied that the District Court 
correctly determined that the requirement of a ten-year residency for candidates for State Auditor 
does not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate State end” (C.Ct., p. 1151).  The use of a 
functional analysis regarding the duties of the Governor and the State Auditor represented a 
unique aspect of the Circuit Court’s opinion.  The Constitution explicitly required a ten-year 
durational residency for Governor while implicitly requiring the same durational residency 
requirement for State Auditor.  However, the duties of each were quite different.  According to 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals: 
The duties of State Auditor greatly differ from those of the Governor of a 
State.  The latter position is the highest office of the State and involves 
broad discretion and policymaking powers.  The position of State Auditor is 
more ministerial as its primary responsibility is post-auditing.  These 
differences influence our evaluation of the State’s interests in maintaining 
the ten-year durational residency requirement as a qualification for the 
position of State Auditor.  (C.Ct., p. 1151) 
 
In such fashion was the opinion by the federal District Court for the District of Western Missouri 
affirmed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 Significance for the tenth amendment. 
 Antonio v. Kirkpatrick represented a clash between the Tenth Amendment powers 
reserved to the State of Missouri and the individual rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the rational basis for a ten-
year durational residency requirement for State Auditor did not legally exist.  Without either a 
rational basis or a compelling state interest, constitutional infringements by the state cannot 
prevail. 
 Bullock v. Minnesota, 611 F.2d 258 (1979). 
 Case summary. 
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 This case continued the case law of clashes between Tenth Amendment powers reserved 
to the states (to establish minimum qualifications for office) and the Fourteenth Amendment 
protection of individual rights through the Equal Protection Clause (the right to be a candidate 
for public office).  Arising out of a decision by the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Minnesota that was appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Bullock v. Minnesota 
presents difficulties in understanding the full array of facts underlying the legal clash that would 
provide a richer contextual picture.  This situation occurred because: a) the lower federal court 
opinion was unwritten and therefore not cited in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion; 
and b) the Circuit Court opinion’s chief characteristic was its extreme brevity. 
 Listed plaintiffs included three clerics:  “Rev. Dick Bullock, Rev. Sharon Scarrella, and 
Rev. Lyle V. Rambo” (p. 259).  Neither their denominations nor their current ministerial status 
were discussed.  Because of their titles, it can be inferred that the three ministers belong to some 
branch of Protestant Christianity.  The second-listed plaintiff, Rev. Scarrella, was the plaintiff 
who was actually denied access to candidacy “for the office of Minnesota Supreme Court 
Justice” because of a “Minnesota constitutional provision restricting candidacy to ‘individuals 
admitted or entitled to be admitted to the practice of law in Minnesota” (p. 259).  Bullock’s and 
Rambo’s involvement in the case as co-plaintiffs was not discussed.  Also neither stated nor 
discussed was the question underlying the legal clash regarding the motivation of a person for 
seeking the highest judicial position in a state who was trained in the ministry, but not in the law.   
 Plaintiffs argued that the Minnesota Secretary of State’s “refusal to file nonattorney 
plaintiff Scarrella’s papers for the office of Minnesota Supreme Court Justice” violated 
“Scarrella’s civil rights” and that “membership in the Minnesota legislature of lawyers violate[d] 
the separation of powers clause of the Minnesota constitution” (p. 259).  District Court Judge 
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Alsop “dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction” and because the “constitutional 
challenge to the candidacy restriction [was] barred by res judicata,” whereupon plaintiffs 
appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals (p. 259).  Circuit Court Judges Heaney, Ross, 
and Henley upheld the District Court’s dismissal of “the separation of powers claim” because it 
was a claim “based entirely upon the Minnesota constitution” and thus didn’t “present a federal 
question” (p. 259).  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with Judge Alsop’s reasons 
for dismissing the challenge to the candidacy restriction, but affirmed “the district court’s 
dismissal for the reason that this argument is without merit” (p. 259).   
 More fully confronting the clash between the Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments, the 
Eighth Circuit Court began by citing relevant case law, e.g., “The right to regulate elections and 
prescribe qualifications for statewide political offices is reserved to the states under the tenth 
amendment of the United States” (p. 259).  Cases cited in support of the foregoing legal principle 
included Antonio v. Kirkpatrick and Bullock v. Carter.  The Circuit Court also presented the 
counterbalancing legal principle, i.e., “States may not, however, regulate in a manner that 
violates equal protection.  See Williams v. Rhodes…” (pp. 259-260).  Of course case law also 
governed the process of determining which legal principle should prevail.  According to the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals: 
The Supreme Court has indicated that the standard of review in access to 
public office cases must be determined by weighing the interests involved 
and the nature of the barrier’s impact upon voters.  See Bullock v. Carter, 
supra, 405 U.S. , at 143 …; Antonio v. Kirkpatrick, supra, 579 F.2d at 1149.  
(p. 260) 
 
Although case law also governed the selection of which test should be used by the courts in 
determining the legal principle that should prevail in a particular clash of constitutional powers 
and rights, the Eight Circuit Court stated that the issue was irrelevant in the current case since 
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“the provision [of the Minnesota Constitution] withstands constitutional scrutiny under both the 
rationally related and strict scrutiny tests” (p. 260).  Noting that the Equal Protection Clause 
didn’t “prohibit a state legislature from adopting more rigorous standards for ensuring excellence 
in the judiciary than for other elective offices,” the Eighth Circuit Court concluded: 
The requirement that candidates be eligible to practice law in Minnesota 
clearly advances the state’s compelling need to obtain candidates who are 
qualified to understand and deal with the complexities of the law.  We 
conclude, therefore, that the restriction does not violate the equal protection 
clause.  (p. 260) 
 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed both the reasoning and the judgment of the federal 
Minnesota District Court regarding the jurisdictional issue.  Regarding the challenge to the 
candidacy requirements, the Circuit Court affirmed only the judgment, but not the District 
Court’s reasoning.  In doing so, the Eighth Circuit Court demonstrated the reasoning that should 
have been used by the lower federal court. 
 Significance for the tenth amendment. 
 Bullock v. Minnesota illustrates the application of case law in resolving a conflict of two 
opposing legal principles, each of which is based on the U.S. Constitution.  In this particular 
instance, the Tenth Amendment power of the State of Minnesota prevailed over individual rights 
protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because a compelling 
state interest was successfully argued and legally demonstrated to undergird the candidacy 
requirement for state political office.  The fact that the political office resided in the judicial 
branch of government (as opposed to either the executive or the legislative branches, both of 
which are more readily associated with public elections in the eyes of the electorate) provided 
additional interest. 
 Matthews v. City of Atlantic City, N.J., 417 A.2d 1011 (1980). 
   
   
550
 Case summary. 
 This is a New Jersey Supreme Court case that based its ruling on the case law emanating 
from federal court decisions.  Like the previous cases, Matthews v. City of Atlantic City centered 
on the conflict between the two constitutional principles contained in the Tenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, between the state’s authority “to prescribe minimum 
qualifications for elective positions” and “the voter’s right to exercise his franchise” without 
undue discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause (pp. 1016 & 1013). 
 Michael Matthews, a registered voter of Atlantic City, wished to run for the office as one 
of five members of the board of commissioners, which was the elected governing body of 
Atlantic City having “all the executive, administrative, judicial and legislative powers” of the 
city’s government (p. 1013, n. 1).  Having lived previously in a different municipality in the 
same county as Atlantic City, Matthews had been a resident of Atlantic City for approximately 
five months before seeking election.  His candidacy violated New Jersey’s statutory “two-year 
residency requirement on candidates for office of city commissioner” (p. 1012).  Matthews 
initiated legal action in the state court system “seeking a declaration that the two-year residency 
requirement for the office [of city commissioner] was unconstitutional” as well as a court order 
directing that his name be placed on the ballot for the upcoming municipal election (p. 1013). 
 Both the initial New Jersey trial court and the subsequent Superior Court, Appellate 
Division, upheld the constitutionality of the durational residency requirement for the office of 
city commissioner.  Both courts based their ruling on a previous New Jersey Supreme Court 
decision, Stothers v. Martini, 6 N.J. 560, 79 A.2D 857 (1951), in which the N.J. Supreme Court 
“had upheld [the same durational residency requirement] against a similar attack,” i.e., “an equal 
protection challenge” (p. 1013).  Neither lower state court found any “basis for departing from 
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the reasoning or the result in that case” (p. 1013).  Matthews appealed to the lower court 
decisions, arguing “that an examination of developments in constitutional law since Stothers 
leads to a result contrary to that reached in 1951” (p. 1014).  The N.J. Supreme Court “granted 
certification” and “directed that the parties’ submit supplemental briefs to address the 
constitutionality of [the durational residency requirement for city commissioner candidates] 
under Gangemi v. Rosengard,” a 1965 N.J. Supreme Court decision that had invalidated a 
durational residency requirement for “officers in cities of the first class governed by the Faulkner 
Act [a New Jersey statute]” (p. 1013; p. 1013, n. 4; p. 1021).   
 After examining two Supreme Court decisions from 1972 in detail, Bullock v. Carter and 
Dunn v. Blumstein, the N.J. Supreme Court concluded: 
We agree with plaintiff that since this Court decided Stothers, state 
legislation affecting the electoral process has been subjected to closer 
constitutional scrutiny.  We should therefore reassess the reasoning and 
result of Stothers in the light of contemporary approaches to issues of equal 
protection.  (p. 1015) 
 
 To outline the judicial approach that needed to be taken in the current legal dispute, the 
state Supreme Court offered the following quotation from Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 335: 
To decide whether a law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we look, in 
essence, to three things: the character of the classification in question; the 
individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental 
interests asserted in support of the classification.  (p. 1015) 
 
Noting first that the classification’s character was “not based on any ‘suspect’ criterion” and that 
the law drew “a distinction between residents solely on the basis of length of residence,” the state 
high court proceeded to examine the “individual interests affected by the classification” (p. 
1015).  Using existing case law, the N.J. Supreme Court recounted that while “the right to be a 
candidate for office has never been held by either the United States Supreme Court or this Court 
to enjoy ‘fundamental’ status,” it was also true that “the relationship between the right to vote 
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and the right to run for elective office cannot be ignored” (p. 1016).  Citing state case law, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court observed, “An individual candidate’s fitness – including the depth or 
intensity of his knowledge or interest in local affairs – is ultimately an issue for the voters” (p. 
1016).  Proceeding to counterbalance the previous principle, the Court next opined, “Yet the 
existence of legislative authority to prescribe minimum qualifications for elective positions is as 
clear as the public’s right to be the ultimate judge of fitness” (p. 1016).  Having fully established 
the dilemma presented the state’s high court, the N.J. Supreme Court proceeded to provide the 
next step in the form of another disagreement: 
The extent to which the interests of the State may infringe upon the 
individual’s freedom of electoral choice determines the proper standard of 
judicial review.  The parties here disagree over the content of that standard.  
Plaintiff claims that Bullock and Dunn require “strict scrutiny”; defendant 
and intervenors contend that because these cases do not address the present 
question, minimal scrutiny is all that is required.  (p. 1016) 
 
 After an extensive review of federal case law governing the choice of the “proper 
standard” to be employed in examining a legislative classification, the state high court 
concluded, “Because here no fundamental right or basic necessity of life is denied, the burden 
does not assume constitutional proportions” (p. 1019).  But, while strict scrutiny was not 
required, more than just a rational basis for the classification was needed since “the impact of a 
durational residency requirement for candidates” acted as “a significant intrusion into the voter’s 
freedom of choice” (p. 1020).  In its attempt to balance “legislative interests in maintaining the 
integrity of the electoral process” with the “electorate’s freedom of choice,” the N.J. Supreme 
Court announced its first holding: 
[W]e hold that a requirement or restriction for candidates for elective office 
must be reasonably and suitably tailored to further legitimate governmental 
objectives.  We believe this to be consistent with the approach outlined in 
Bullock of “examining[ing] in a realistic light the extent and nature of [the] 
impact on voters of barriers to candidacy.  (p. 1020) 
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In examining New Jersey’s durational residency requirement for city commissioner candidates, 
the high court found that the requirement applied “to only 40 out of 567 municipalities in the 
State” as only approximately 7% of the state’s municipalities operated under the “commission 
form of government” (p. 1021).  In light of this fact, “the alleged justifications for the residency 
requirement [for city commissioners] los[t] meaning,” according to the state high court (p. 1021).  
Pointing to its later ruling in Gangemi, the New Jersey Supreme Court quoted, “The purpose of 
the two-year registration provision being … to assure an adequate interest in or understanding of 
civil affairs, the question is why like assurance is not equally appropriate to all municipalities” 
(Emphasis in original) (p. 1021).  Noting that municipalities in New Jersey operated under 
various governmental structures, the state high court declared, “[T]hose differences cannot 
support distinctions among residency requirements under the various forms of local government” 
(p. 1022).  The high court further noted that “[t]he vast majority of municipalities have no 
durational residency requirement for candidacy” (Emphasis in original) (p. 1022). 
 The New Jersey Supreme Court summarized its findings regarding the durational 
residency requirement for city commissioner candidates and pointed out the implications: 
Because the right to vote is fundamental, the State has the affirmative 
burden of justifying why voters in some municipalities may vote only for 
candidates satisfying a two-year residency requirement while voters in other 
municipalities are not so restricted.  It has failed to provide any sound 
justification why municipalities … should be treated differently.  (p. 1022) 
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court announced its decision reversing the decisions by the two lower 
courts:  “Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the durational residency requirement at issue 
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” (p. 1022).  The plaintiff, 
Michael Matthews, also received the order he had sought when he first initiated the legal action 
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bearing his name, that his name be “placed on the ballot for election to the office of city 
commissioner” (p. 1022). 
 Significance for the tenth amendment. 
 Matthews v. Atlantic City illustrates a state supreme court fulfilling its obligations under 
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and 
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.  (U.S. 
Constitution, Article VI, ¶ 2) 
 
In resolving the conflict between Tenth Amendment rights asserted by the state and personal 
liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the New Jersey Supreme Court based its 
decision primarily upon the federal case law generated by previous disputes of a similar nature.  
However, it also sprinkled in applicable New Jersey case law where appropriate.  The case also 
illuminates the judicial mind at work in resolving conflicting constitutional claims, in sorting out 
conflicting legal arguments, in making findings of fact, and in applying the legal principles from 
existing case law to the case at hand.  In this particular instance the state high court demonstrated 
the lack of a rational basis by the state for a differential classification scheme that negatively 
impacted the personal liberties of its citizens.  
The commerce clause versus the tenth amendment – Actions to diminish state 
autonomy in federal spheres. 
 
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1 
(1937). 
 
 Facts & procedural history. 
 As part of the New Deal legislation attempting to deal with the country’s economic 
malaise at a national level, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in 1935 
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under its Commerce Clause authority to regulate interstate commerce.  The NLRA established 
“the right of employees to self-organization and to bargain collectively through representatives 
of their own choosing” in businesses engaged in interstate commerce as well as businesses 
whose activities impacted interstate commerce (p. 24).  In addition to defining “the terms 
‘commerce’ and ‘affecting commerce,’” the Act also defined “unfair labor practices” and created 
a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to enforce the NLRA.  The Act empowered the Board 
“to prevent the described unfair labor practices affecting commerce” and “prescribe[d] the 
procedure to that end” (p. 24).  After providing notice, conducting a hearing, and making a 
finding supported by evidence, the NLRB was “authorized to petition designated courts to secure 
the enforcement of its orders” (p. 24).  Finally, any party not satisfied with the final 
determination of the NLRB could “obtain a review in the designated courts” through the same 
procedure used by the Board to obtain a court order enforcing its decision (p. 24). 
 The Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation discharged ten workers from its plant in 
Aliquippa, Pennsylvania where both steel and steel products were made.  The workers fired by 
the company “were active leaders in the labor union” – “[s]everal were officers and others were 
leaders of particular groups” of employees (p. 28).  The “Beaver Valley Lodge No. 200, 
affiliated with the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers of America,” filed a 
complaint with the NLRB.  The complaint charged 
that the corporation was discriminating against members of the union with 
regard to hire and tenure of employment, and was coercing and intimidating 
its employees in order to interfere with their self-organization.  The 
discriminatory and coercive action alleged was the discharge of certain 
employees.  (p. 22) 
 
Following the procedures detailed by the Act, the Board sustained the complaint and ordered the 
corporation to “cease and desist from such discrimination and coercion,” to reinstate the 
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discharged employees, to reimburse the employees for their lost pay, and to post a notice for 
thirty days stating that the corporation would not “discharge or discriminate against” current and 
prospective union members (p. 22).  Following the Act’s procedures, the NLRB filed a petition 
with the Circuit Court of Appeals to have the NLRB’s order enforced.  The Fifth Circuit Court 
“denied the petition, holding that the order lay beyond the range of federal power” (p. 22).  Upon 
appeal, the Supreme Court “granted certiorari” (p. 22). 
 Legal questions. 
 Did the NLRA lie within the constitutional powers granted the federal government by the 
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, or instead, did the NLRA intrude into local affairs, 
the governance of which was reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment?  Did the NLRA 
requirements violate the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment governing liberty of 
contract rights between employer and employee?  Did the NLRA’s provisions regarding the 
NLRB and its procedural path in implementing the NLRA’s statutory requirements violate the 
Seventh Amendment or Article III, § 2, ¶ 1 of the Constitution? 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 The context in which the legal reasoning of both the federal government and the steel 
corporation occurred illuminates the issues represented by the legal controversy.  Previous Court 
rulings supported the steel companies position in challenging the NLRA’s constitutionality.  The 
Court had held “that labor relations associated with manufacturing or production enterprises” had 
only an indirect effect upon interstate commerce, a holding which placed industrial labor 
disputes “beyond the legitimate scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause” 
(Hall, 1992, pp. 572-573).  Another line of Court holdings regarding employer-employee 
relations further bolstered the steel company’s legal challenge of congressional action.  The 
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Court had formerly held “that liberty of contract was protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment” (Hall, 1992, p. 572).  This meant, accordingly, that “under liberty of contract 
employers and employees had the right to bargain free of governmental interference” (Hall, 
1992, p. 572). 
 Stare decisis regarding due-process liberty of contract and the indirect effects test of the 
validity of Commerce Clause legislation was countered by evidence that changing 
socioeconomic conditions had eroded the viability of the world view represented by previous 
Court holdings.  Labor disputes had disrupted the nation’s commerce.  A world-wide economic 
depression provided further evidence that a national response, as opposed to piecemeal, state-by-
state or even laissez-faire approaches, was necessary to restore the country’s economic health.  
Furthermore, both the legislative and executive branches of government were united in the view 
that the federal government had the “national power to regulate the economy” (Hall, 1992, p. 
573).  President Roosevelt had “compared the depression to war” and had “proposed drastic and 
innovative legislation to deal with the crisis” which had been enacted by Congress (Hall, 1992, p. 
393).  Conservatives “opposed the government’s efforts to regulate the economy and especially 
its efforts to help labor and other underprivileged groups” (Hall, 1992, p. 393).  The vast 
majority of the American people, “as evidenced in the 1936 election, overwhelmingly supported 
the New Deal” (Hall, 1992, p. 393).  Not only had President Roosevelt carried every state in the 
Union except for Maine and Vermont, he also “had carried along with him so many Democratic 
candidates that when the new Congress met in January, 1937, it would be impossible to squeeze 
all seventy-five Democrats in the customary left side of the Senate chamber, and twelve 
freshmen would have to sit with the Republicans” (Leuchtenburg, p. 196).  In terms of the 
popular vote, Roosevelt recorded “the largest plurality ever,” outpolling his opponent’s votes by 
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27, 476, 673 to 16, 679, 583 (Culver & Hyde, p. 168).  Bolstered by the public support shown in 
the recent landslide elections and frustrated by the conservative bloc on the Court that had 
invalidated earlier New Deal legislation, Roosevelt proposed in early 1937 that legislation be 
approved “authorizing him to appoint additional justices to the Court in order to obtain a pro-
New Deal majority” (Hall, 1992, p. 573).  NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation was 
argued and decided in the immediate aftermath of both the 1936 national elections and President 
Roosevelt’s Court-expansion proposal. 
 Attorneys for the federal government included both the Solicitor General and the 
Attorney General of the United States, who were assisted by eight additional attorneys.  
According to the federal attorneys, “The National Labor Relations Act [was] an exercise of the 
power of Congress to protect interstate commerce from injuries caused by industrial strife” (p. 
6).  They pointed out that the language of the NLRA consisted of words “plainly patterned upon 
language used in decisions of this Court in cases arising under other statutes enacted by Congress 
under the commerce power” (p. 7).  Summing up the government’s position, the federal 
attorney’s stated: 
[T]he National Labor Relations Act is designed solely to eliminate the 
burden on interstate commerce caused by industrial strife.  Such strife 
constitutes an interruption to commerce operating directly without “an 
efficient intervening agency or condition.”  Thus it deals with matters 
closely connected with commerce, does not go beyond what is necessary for 
the protection of commerce, and does not attempt “a broad regulation of 
industry within the State.”  (p. 11) 
 
 The triumvirate of attorneys for the nation’s fourth-largest steel corporation argued “that 
the National Labor Relations Act [was], in reality, a regulation of labor relations, and not of 
interstate commerce, and that, as a consequence, it [was] not within the power of Congress to 
enact” (p. 12).  This opening statement evoked Fifth Amendment stare decisis regarding due 
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process and liberty of contract between employer and employee that was to be free of 
government involvement.  So ingrained in the fabric of the Court and the tenor of the times was 
this concept that it required no explicit mention by the by the industrial corporation’s attorneys.  
The corporate attorneys attempted to paint the case as “a controversy between ten  individuals 
who were formerly employed by the respondent in production work at this plant, and the [steel 
company]” (p. 12). Presenting the Tenth Amendment argument, the steel company’s attorneys 
stated: 
The jurisdiction of Congress under the commerce clause includes the power 
to regulate, restrict and protect interstate commerce; but not the right to use 
such jurisdiction as a pretext for legislation which interferes with the local 
sovereignty of the separate States.  Gibbons, v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1.  The use 
of an admitted power of Congress as a pretext to interfere with local 
activities which are not subject to its jurisdiction, is to be condemned.  (p. 
13) 
 
According to the corporation’s legal team, “the protection and establishment of labor 
organizations … bear no reasonable relation to interstate commerce” (p. 14).  Invoking stare 
decisis regarding the indirect effects test of the validity of Commerce Clause legislation, the 
corporate attorneys declared: 
An unbroken line of decisions under the commerce clause has established 
that manufacturing and production activities are not in or a part of interstate 
commerce, even though they may be preceded or followed by the movement 
of materials between States.  (p. 15) 
 
To illustrate the corporation’s contention that labor relations had nothing to do with interstate 
commerce, the corporate attorneys opined: 
Like Congress, [the NLRB attorneys, or the petitioner], it has found itself 
faced with the task of piling premise upon premise and hypothesis upon 
hypothesis to reach the conclusion that the discharge of a few production 
employees at the respondent’s plant has a vital bearing upon the movement 
of interstate commerce.  (pp. 14-15) 
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Later the attorneys provided a concrete example of the previous abstraction just cited.  The afore-
mentioned premise was the government’s contention “that strikes may and frequently do produce 
an inhibitory effect on the movement of interstate trade to and from the affected area” (p. 18).  
An added assumption, representing a “fundamental error in the petitioner’s argument,” was that 
the government needed “only [to] establish the connection between strikes and the stoppage of 
commerce” (p. 18).   
There has been no strike or labor dispute in the present case.  In actuality, 
the petitioner means that the respondent’s discharge of ten employees might 
have led to dissatisfaction, which might have led to a labor dispute, which 
might have led to a strike and a consequent interruption of interstate 
commerce.  (pp. 18-19) 
 
 Finally, the steel corporation’s attorneys creatively linked together the Fifth Amendment, 
the Seventh Amendment, and Article III, § 2, ¶ 1 of the U.S. Constitution to argue that the 
NLRA was unconstitutional.  Article III, § 2, ¶ 1 declares, “The judicial Power shall extend to all 
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States…”  The 
Fifth Amendment requires that “[n]o person shall be … deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”  The Seventh Amendment states, “In Suits at common law, where 
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved…”  According to the corporate legal defense team, the NLRA was invalid “because it 
authorize[d] the Board to award a money judgment, depriving the employer of his right to trial 
by jury in cases involving more than twenty dollars” (pp. 19-20).  The money judgment was the 
“restoration to employment of the complaining employees, with back pay” (p. 20).  However, if 
the government’s arguments construing the case as “a suit in equity” were correct, “then the Act 
violate[d] the provision of Art. III of the Constitution, for it deprive[d] the constitutional courts 
of their authority to try constitutional and jurisdictional issues” (p. 20).  Furthermore, The 
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NLRB’s order directing the re-employment of discharged employees along with back pay 
violated the Fifth Amendment’s due process and liberty of contract requirements by 
“constitut[ing] an unlawful interference with the right of the [steel corporation] to manage its 
own business” regarding “questions of employer-employee relationships” (p. 20).  The steel 
corporation’s legal team concluded by stating its opinion that “the underlying philosophy of the 
National Labor Relations Act [was] a constant threat to the respondent’s normal right to manage 
its own business” (p. 21). 
 Holding & disposition. 
 With a 5-4 majority the Court overturned the Court of Appeals decision.  The Court held 
that “the order of the NLRB was within its competency and that the Act [was] valid as here 
applied” (p. 49).  The narrow Court majority also held that the “contention under the Seventh 
Amendment [was] without merit” (p. 49).  Regarding the conflict between the Commerce Clause 
and the Tenth Amendment, the Court stated, “We think it clear that the National Labor Relations 
Act may be construed so as to operate within the sphere of constitutional authority” (p. 30).  The 
Court swept away the Fifth Amendment due process arguments regarding liberty of contract, 
stating that “the right of employees to self-organization and to select representatives of their own 
choosing for collective bargaining .. without restraint or coercion by their employer” constituted 
“a fundamental right” (p. 33).  The case was “remanded [to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals] 
for further proceedings in conformity with [the Court’s] opinion” (p. 49). 
 Court’s rationale. 
 Chief Justice Hughes delivered the Court’s opinion that upheld the constitutionality of the 
NLRA, an act by which the federal government used its powers under the Commerce Clause to 
guarantee workers the right to unionize and to prohibit companies from subsequently 
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discriminating against union employees.  NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation was one 
of five opinions delivered by the Court on April 12, 1937, which sustained the NLRA’s 
constitutionality. 
 The Court first reviewed the facts of the case, discussed the requirements of the Act, and 
summarized the arguments presented by the steel company’s attorneys.  The Chief Justice 
devoted three pages of the opinion to a discussion of the Labor Board’s findings.  The 
description of the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation’s operations dispelled any idea of a 
localized operation engaged only in the production of steel.  The picture painted by the Board’s 
findings was that of a gigantic, vertically and horizontally integrated industrial giant.  Jones & 
Laughlin owned nineteen subsidiaries and represented “a completely integrated enterprise, 
owning and operating [iron] ore, coal and limestone [mines], lake and river transportation 
facilities and terminal railroads located at its manufacturing plants” (p. 26).  Citing the Labor 
Board’s summary of the steel corporation’s operations, the Court stated: 
[T]he Labor Board concluded that the works in Pittsburgh and Aliquippa 
“might be likened to the heart of a self-contained, highly integrated body.  
They draw in the raw materials from Michigan, Minnesota, West Virginia, 
Pennsylvania in part through arteries and by means controlled by the [steel 
company]; they transform the materials and then pump them out to all parts 
of the nation through the vast mechanism which the respondent has 
elaborated.”  (p. 27) 
 
The Court continued: 
To carry on the activities of the entire [Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corporation’s] industry, 33,000 men mine ore, 44,000 men mine coal, 4,000 
men quarry limestone, 16,000 men manufacture coke, 343,000 men 
manufacture steel, and 83,000 men transport its product.  Respondent has 
about 10,000 employees in its Aliquippa plant, which is located in a 
community of about 30,000 persons.  (p. 27) 
 
In examining the findings and orders of the NLRB, the Court ruled: 
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Upon that point it is sufficient to say that the evidence supports the findings 
of the Board that [the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation] discharged these 
men “because of their union activity and for the purpose of discouraging 
membership in the Union.”  (p. 29) 
 
 Having thus set the stage, the Court began its analysis of the legal dispute’s “questions of 
law” advanced by the steel company’s attorneys in challenging the constitutionality of the 
NLRA.  Noting the Tenth Amendment assertions, the Commerce Clause limits, and the claims 
that the Act’s purpose was to put “all industrial labor relations within the nation” under the 
control of the federal government, the Court observed: 
If this conception of terms, intent and consequent inseparability were sound, 
the Act would necessarily fall by reason of the limitation upon the federal 
power which inheres in the constitutional grant, as well as because of the 
explicit reservation of the Tenth Amendment.  (pp. 29-30) 
 
However, after introducing the legal principle that “an interpretation which conforms a statute to 
the Constitution must be preferred to another which would render it unconstitutional or of 
doubtful validity,” the Court thought “it clear that the National Labor Relations Act may be 
construed so as to operate within the sphere of constitutional authority” (p. 1; p. 30).  Explaining 
its position, the Court noted that the definitions of “commerce” and “affecting commerce” 
contained in the Act were critical.  According to the Court, “There can be no question that the 
commerce thus contemplated by the Act … is interstate and foreign commerce in the 
constitutional sense” (p. 31).  At this point, the Chief Justice directly connected, in a legal sense, 
labor relations to interstate commerce, which swept away previous Fifth Amendment due 
process considerations centered on freedom of contract.  According to the Chief Justice: 
It is a familiar principle that acts which directly burden or obstruct interstate 
or foreign commerce, or its free flow, are within the reach of the 
congressional power.  Acts having that effect are not rendered immune 
because they grow out of labor disputes….  It is the effect upon commerce, 
not the source of the injury, which is the criterion.  (Emphasis added) (pp. 
31-32) 
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Regarding the Act’s definitions of unfair labor practices, the Court raised the rights of workers to 
a level commensurate with that of owners.  The right of workers to organize unions was “a 
fundamental right” (p. 33).  In the Court’s words, “Employees have as clear a right to organize 
and select their representatives for lawful purposes as the respondent has to organize its business 
and select its own officers and agents” (p. 33).  According to the Court, unions were “essential to 
give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with their employer” in resisting “arbitrary and 
unfair treatment” by the employer (p. 33).   
 After dealing with various court cases cited by the corporation’s team of attorneys and 
finding that they were “not controlling here,” the Court dealt with the steel company’s contention 
that its “manufacturing operations” lay outside of the “stream of commerce,” a contention 
bolstered by prior Court decisions.  This discussion by the Chief Justice offered further 
explanation of the Court’s finding that the NLRA operated within constitutional bounds.  
However, given the importance of the decision, it appeared that the Court wished to address each 
of the steel corporation’s separate legal contentions.  The Court asserted:  
[T]he fact remains that the stoppage of those [manufacturing] operations by 
industrial strife would have a most serious effect upon interstate commerce.  
In view of respondent’s far-flung activities [detailed earlier in the decision], 
it is idle to say that the effect would be indirect or remote.  (p. 41; for the 
Court’s description of the steel company’s operations, see pp. 562-563 of 
this paper) 
 
The Court continued: 
It is obvious that it would be immediate and might be catastrophic.  We are 
asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national life and to deal 
with the question of direct and indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum.  (p. 
41) 
 
Similar in fashion to Cicero’s conception of “true law” as being “right reason,” a notion 
corresponding to the English common law’s “test of ‘reasonableness’” in reaching judicial 
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decisions that was described by Edward Coke as representing “common right and reason,” the 
Chief Justice sought to connect the law to practicality and actual experience (Corwin, 1965, pp. 
10, p. 44).  In this manner, C.J. Hughes seemed to be saying, prior decisions need to be 
disregarded when their corresponding case law no longer applies to changed conditions.69  The 
Chief Justice accomplished this by first asking a rhetorical question: 
When industries organize themselves on a national scale, making their 
relation to interstate commerce the dominant factor in their activities, how 
can it be maintained that their industrial labor relations constitute a 
forbidden field into which Congress may not enter when it is necessary to 
protect interstate commerce from the paralyzing consequences of industrial 
war?  (p. 41) 
 
Answering his own question, Chief Justice Hughes made explicit the need to connect legal 
decisions with the practical realities of current life.  According to the Chief Justice, “We have 
often said that interstate commerce itself is a practical conception.  It is equally true that 
interferences with that commerce must be appraised by a judgment that does not ignore actual 
experience” (pp. 41-42).  The Chief Justice continued: 
Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the recognition of the right of 
employees to self-organization and to have representatives of their own 
choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining is often an essential 
condition of industrial peace.  Refusal to confer and negotiate has been one 
of the most prolific causes of strife.  This is such an outstanding fact in the 
history of labor disturbances that it is a proper subject of judicial notice and 
requires no citation of instances.  (Emphasis added) (p. 42) 
 
 Nearing the end of its decision, the Court dealt with the “procedural provisions of the 
Act” that were characterized by the steel corporation’s attorneys as violating either the Seventh 
Amendment or Article III, § 2, ¶ 1 of the Constitution.  “But,” the Court noted, “these provisions, 
as we construe them, do not offend against the constitutional requirements governing the creation 
and action of administrative bodies” (pp. 46-47).  “The Act,” the Court observed, “establishes 
standards to which the Board must conform.  There must be complaint, notice and hearing.  The 
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Board must receive evidence and make findings.  The findings as to the facts are to be 
conclusive, but only if supported by evidence” (p. 47).  Finally, as the Court noted, the Board’s 
procedures and findings were subject to judicial review before any action could be taken. 
The order of the Board is subject to review by the designated court, and only 
when sustained by the court may the order be enforced.  Upon that review 
all questions of the jurisdiction of the Board and the regularity of its 
proceedings, all questions of constitutional right or statutory authority, are 
open to examination by the court.  (p. 47) 
 
According to the Court, judicial review was embedded in the Act through its procedural 
requirements and thus refuted corporate attorneys’ arguments regarding Article III. 
We construe the procedural provisions as affording adequate opportunity to 
secure judicial protection against arbitrary action in accordance with the 
well-settled rules applicable to administrative agencies set up by Congress 
to aid in the enforcement of valid legislation….  Respondent has no just 
ground for complaint on this score.  (p. 47) 
 
 At the end of its opinion, the Court dealt with the Seventh Amendment argument 
presented by the corporate attorneys that the reinstatement of the discharged workers and 
reimbursement for lost pay amounted to a “money judgment” in contravention of the 
requirement regarding “trial by jury” (p. 48).  After quoting the relevant portion of the 
amendment, the Court observed, “The Amendment thus preserves the right which existed under 
the common law when the Amendment was adopted” (p. 48).  However, as the Court noted, the 
Seventh Amendment “has no application to cases where recovery of money damages is an 
incident to equitable relief” or “where the proceeding is not in the nature of a suit at common 
law” (p. 48).  Was the current case a “suit at common law” or did it represent an “incident to 
equitable relief” (p. 48)?  According to the Court: 
The instant case is not a suit at common law or in the nature of such a suit.  
The proceeding is one unknown to the common law.  It is a statutory 
proceeding.  Reinstatement of the employee and payment for time lost are 
requirements imposed for violation of the statute and are remedies 
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appropriate to its enforcement.  The contention under the Seventh 
Amendment is without merit.  (pp. 48-49) 
 
In announcing that the Fifth Circuit Court’s judgment was “reversed,” the Court concluded “that 
the order of the Board was within its competency and that the Act [was] valid as here applied” 
(p. 49). 
 Concurring/dissenting opinions. 
 The four remaining die-hard conservative justices who had formed the Court’s core in 
striking down previous New Deal legislation dissented.  Known as the “Four Horsemen” for 
their consistent opposition to the economic and social legislation of the New Deal, Justices 
George Sutherland, Willis Van Devanter, Pierce Butler, and James McReynolds based their 
dissent upon liberty of contract as protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and 
upon the indirect effects test reasoning of the Commerce Clause, i.e., “the view that labor 
relations associated with production enterprises were local in nature and affected interstate 
commerce only indirectly” (Hall, 1992, p. 309, p. 573).70  The four justices had previously been 
joined in their views by the Chief Justice and Justice Owen Roberts, both of whom now voted to 
uphold the constitutionality of the NLRA.   
 The decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation overruled Carter v. Carter 
Coal Company with respect to collective bargaining and paved the way for the Court’s ruling in 
Darby (See pp. 390-395 of this paper).  The Court’s view of the Commerce Clause now held that 
Congress could “reach and regulate not only interstate commerce itself but also any activity 
affecting commerce, whether directly or indirectly” (Hall, 1992, p. 573).  The chain of decisions 
reflecting this view ran from NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation through Darby 
(1941) and Maryland v. Wirtz (1968) through Garcia (1985).  More recently, the New York and 
Printz decisions shakily construed the Tenth Amendment as acting to limit the application of the 
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Commerce Clause by congressional action, which is a modification of the previous case law 
emanating from NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation (See the following discussions in 
this chapter: National League of Cities v. Usery for Rehnquist’s “Tenth as a Declaration of 
Constitutional Policy” argument in the absence of a textual basis in the Amendment for the 
National League of Cities ruling; National League of Cities v. Usery for Brennan’s critique of 
Rehnquist’s position in the absence of textual support; FERC v. Mississippi for O’Connor’s 
reiteration of Rehnquist’s “Tenth as a Declaration of Constitutional Policy” argument in her 
dissenting opinion and for Blackmun’s critique of O’Connor’s lack of judicial reasoning in his 
majority opinion in FERC v. Mississippi; Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 
for O’Connor’s “Spirit of the Tenth Amendment” argument in her Garcia dissent, which was not 
based on either the text or existing case law; New York v. United States for O’Connor’s opinion 
in New York, which was not based on either the text or existing case law of the Tenth 
Amendment, but upon an understanding and application of the federal framework; New York v. 
United States for Stevens’ dissent in New York criticizing O’Connor’s advocacy of the federal 
framework as justification for use of the Tenth Amendment; Printz v. United States for Scalia’s 
“Structure of the Constitution” explanation; Printz v. United States for Stevens’ critique in his 
Printz dissent of a) Scalia’s structural argument, b) lack of textual and historical support for 
Scalia’s argument, c) lack of precedent for Court’s Printz ruling; and Printz for this author’s 
comparison of Stevens’ and Scalia’s arguments). 
 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 Facts & procedural history. 
 Described as “the decision that best indicated how completely the Supreme Court had 
come in acquiescing to the nationalist economic philosophy of President Franklin Roosevelt,” 
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Wickard v. Filburn, along with Mulford v. Smith (1939), upheld the constitutionality of the 
Second Agricultural Adjustment Act , AAA II (Hall, 1992, p. 930).  While Mulford v. Smith 
validated the tobacco quotas established under AAA II, Wickard v. Filburn upheld those for 
wheat, a more prevalently grown crop as it was grown in 47 of the 48 states at the time the case 
was decided (p. 125).  Once again the legal battle involved a clash between the Commerce 
Clause and the Tenth Amendment regarding the Act’s regulation of production.  A secondary 
battle pitted differing interpretations of the Act’s provisions.  The Government’s interpretation 
portrayed the Act as offering alternatives between sanctioned and penalized activities that didn’t 
involve due process.  In the opposing interpretation, Filburn’s attorneys argued that the due 
process provisions of the Fifth Amendment were required since Filburn’s wheat production and 
ensuing home-consumption lay outside the scope of permissible government regulation.  From 
an historical perspective, the Court’s opinion provided interest for its description of four 
categorical epochs regarding Commerce Clause adjudication by the nation’s high court. 
 Roscoe C. Filburn, a small Midwestern farmer, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of Ohio against “the Secretary of Agriculture of the United States, three 
members of the County Agricultural Conservation Committee for Montgomery County, Ohio, 
and a member of the State Agricultural Conservation Committee for Ohio” (p. 113).  Filburn’s 
small farming operation consisted of “maintaining a herd of dairy cattle, selling milk, raising 
poultry, and selling poultry and eggs” (p. 114).  Each year Filburn planted and harvested a small 
crop of winter wheat, some of which he sold, some he fed to his livestock (a portion of which 
was sold), some was ground into flour for “home consumption,” and some was kept for seeding 
the following year’s crop (p. 114).  His acreage allotment for wheat under AAA II was 11.1 acres 
@ 20.1 bushels per acre; however, Filburn planted and harvested 23 acres of wheat.  Filburn was 
   
   
570
subsequently assessed a penalty of 49¢ per bushel of excess wheat, which amount totaled 
$117.11 (pp. 114-115).  
 In his suit Filburn contested the government’s assessment and sought: 1) an order 
enjoining enforcement of the marketing penalty against himself for his 1941 wheat crop; 2) a 
declaratory judgment by the District Court “that the wheat marketing quota provisions of the Act 
… were unconstitutional because not sustainable under the Commerce Clause or consistent with 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment” (pp. 113-114).  The District Court, consisting 
of three judges, “permanently enjoined the Secretary of Agriculture” from enforcing the Act 
against Filburn in a 2-1 decision (p. 113).  Whereupon the federal government appealed the 
decision of the federal Southern Ohio District Court to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 Legal questions. 
 Does the Commerce Clause (Article I, § 8, clause 3) authorize Congress to regulate 
production of goods “not intended in any part for commerce but wholly for consumption on the 
farm,” or is such production “local in character,” whose regulation is reserved to the states by the 
Tenth Amendment (p. 118; p. 119)?  Does the penalty proscribed in the Act deprive Filburn of 
property without due process of law in contravention of the Fifth Amendment, or do sanctions 
result from the choice made by Filburn between desired and undesired activities in a field that is 
within Congress’s power to regulate? 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 Three attorneys argued on behalf of Filburn and were supported by three additional 
attorneys as amici curiae.  The Solicitor General, assisted by the Assistant Attorney General and 
four other attorneys, provided legal representation for the Secretary of Agriculture and the other 
appellants named by Filburn. 
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 Filburn’s attorneys argued that the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 regulated the 
“production and consumption of wheat,” which were “beyond the reach of Congressional power 
under the Commerce Clause” because such activities were “local in character” and thus reserved 
to the states by the Tenth Amendment (p. 119).  The production of wheat for home consumption 
had “at most” an indirect effect upon interstate commerce, and, since such production didn’t 
constitute interstate commerce, it thus lay outside of Congress’s power to regulate (p. 119).  
Filburn’s attorneys further argued that the Act constituted “an unfair promotion of the markets 
and prices of specializing wheat growers” by “forcing some farmers into the market” to buy 
wheat for home use and consumption that they could have raised themselves (p. 129). 
 U.S. Government attorneys argued that the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 
regulated “only marketing,” not production or consumption (p. 119).  The Act defined “market,” 
established “marketing quotas,” and defined wheat that was produced on excess acreage as 
“available for marketing” (p. 119).  Production and consumption were secondary to the 
regulation of marketing.  Government attorneys posed a fallback position in case the Court ruled 
that the Act went “beyond the regulation of marketing” – in such a case, the Act was “sustainable 
as a ‘necessary and proper’ implementation of the power of Congress over interstate commerce” 
(p. 119).   
 Regarding the Fifth Amendment issue, Filburn’s attorneys argued that since Filburn’s 
production of wheat for home consumption lay outside of congressional power to regulate, the 
“Fifth Amendment require[d] that he be free from penalty for planting wheat and disposing of 
his crop as he [saw] fit” (p. 130).  Government attorneys argued that the Act defined any wheat 
produced as wheat “available for market,” that in regulating the market of wheat through control 
of the total supply, “the Government gave the farmer a choice which was … designed to 
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encourage cooperation and discourage non-cooperation” (p. 119; p. 130).  Penalties flowed from 
choices made by individual farmers and did not represent a denial of due process. 
 Holding & disposition. 
 The lower court decision was reversed.  The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 
represented a valid exercise of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause.  Penalties 
provided by the Act did not constitute a denial of due process under the Fifth Amendment. 
 Court’s rationale. 
 Justice Robert Jackson delivered the 9-0 decision of the Court in Wickard v. Filburn 
upholding the constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, a decision which 
further validated the U.S. Government’s ability to establish marketing quotas in its regulation of 
the nation’s commerce.  The Court’s ruling gave additional judicial sanction to an increased 
federal commerce power based upon economic realities, not upon predetermined formulas or 
abstract definitions.  In the words of the Court: 
[Q]uestions of the power of Congress [under the Commerce Clause] are not 
to be decided by reference to any formula which would give controlling 
force to nomenclature such as “production” and “indirect” and foreclose 
consideration of the actual effects of the activity in question upon interstate 
commerce.  (Emphasis added) (p. 120) 
 
 In reviewing the history of “the course of decision[s] under the Commerce Clause,” the 
Court delineated four main periods of judicial activity.  The first period was represented by Chief 
Justice Marshall’s articulation of the Commerce Clause powers of the federal government in 
Gibbons v. Ogden.  Justice Jackson emphasized Chief Justice Marshall’s description of “the 
embracing and penetrating nature of this power” and summarized Marshall’s warning “that 
effective restraints on its exercise must proceed from political rather than from judicial 
processes” (p. 120).   
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 The second period of Court decisions, however, “dealt rarely with questions of what 
Congress might do” under the Commerce Clause and focused “almost entirely with the 
permissibility of state activity” that interfered or not with interstate commerce (p. 121).  During 
this period, as well as the period immediately following, the frame of reference was not “what 
was ‘necessary and proper’ to the exercise by Congress of its granted power;” instead the focal 
point was state sovereignty, or as the Court phrased it, “some concept of sovereignty though to 
be implicit in the status of statehood” (p. 121).  This time period witnessed the emergence of 
case law defining “[c]ertain activities such as ‘production,’ ‘manufacturing,’ and ‘mining’” as 
being “within the province of state governments and beyond the power of Congress under the 
Commerce Clause” (p. 121). 
 The third period of Court decisions commenced in 1887 “with the enactment of the 
Interstate Commerce Act,” which was “followed in 1890 by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act” (p. 
121).  Described by Justice Jackson as the beginning of a period when “the interstate commerce 
power began to exert positive influence in American law and life,” these two statutes “required 
the Court to approach the interpretation of the Commerce Clause in the light of an actual exercise 
by Congress of its power thereunder” (p. 121).  However, although the focus now became the 
federal use of the commerce power instead of state activity, “the Court adhered to its earlier 
pronouncements, and allowed but little scope to the power of Congress” (pp. 121-122).  The 
child labor cases (Hammer v. Dagenhart & Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company) and the 
decisions striking down previous New Deal legislation are representative of this period.  
Although the period was dominated by the reasoning just described, there were a few other cases 
that “called forth broader interpretations of the Commerce Clause” that were “destined to 
supercede the earlier ones, and to bring about a return to the principles first enunciated by Chief 
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Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden” (p. 122).  The period generally illustrated Heifetz’ 
conception of adaptive work in progress whereby old beliefs and values were being challenged 
by the urged adoption of new values and beliefs, such work requiring time and difficult 
adjustments on the part of people and societal institutions (See pp. 83-87 of this paper). 
 The fourth period of Court decisions marked a complete return to the judicial principles 
articulated by Marshall and commenced with “[t]he Court’s recognition of the relevance of the 
economic effects in the application of the Commerce Clause … [that] has made the mechanical 
application of legal formulas no longer feasible” (pp. 123-124).  If the third period is dated from 
the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 to the Darby decision in 1941, the period 
of adaptive work required in order to make the focal-point transition from Tenth Amendment 
state sovereignty to the Court’s original conception of the Commerce Clause in Gibbons v. 
Ogden lasted approximately 64 years.  The Court explained what no longer worked in 
adjudicating questions arising from Congressional regulation of interstate commerce: 
Once an economic measure of the reach of the power granted to Congress in 
the Commerce Clause is accepted, questions of federal power cannot be 
decided simply by finding the activity in question to be “production,” nor 
can consideration of its economic effects be foreclosed by calling them 
“indirect.”  (p. 124) 
 
The Court then explained what would be material for deciding questions of federal power under 
the Commerce Clause.  According to the Court, “[E]ven if appellee’s activity be local and 
though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by 
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce” (p. 125). 
 The Court next summarized the “economics of the wheat industry” and reached certain 
findings (p. 125).  First, the decline in the export trade of wheat from the 1920’s to 1940 “left a 
large surplus in production which … caused congestion in a number of markets” (p. 125).  
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Second, the other three large wheat-exporting countries (Argentina, Australia, and Canada) had 
“sought to modify the impact of the world market conditions on their own economy,” had “all 
undertaken various programs for the relief of growers” which “have generally evolved towards 
control by the central government,” and all possessed “federated systems of government” (p. 
125; p. 126; p. 126; p. 126, n. 27).  The third finding of the Court combined an analysis of the 
world wheat situation with the effect of regulation on wheat production in the United States: 
In the absence of regulation, the price of wheat in the United States would 
be much affected by world conditions.  During 1941, producers who 
cooperated with the Agricultural Adjustment program received an average 
price on the farm of about $1.16 a bushel, as compared with the world 
market price of 40 cents a bushel.  (p. 126) 
 
Continuing its survey of the national wheat economy, the Court next focused attention on the 
issue of “consumption of home-grown wheat” and its effects upon interstate commerce (p. 127).  
“Consumption on the farm where grown” amounted to more than “20 per cent” of the nation’s 
total production of wheat (p. 127).  While Filburn’s own wheat production for home 
consumption was “trivial by itself,” it was part of a much larger picture (p. 127).  Filburn and 
“others similarly situated” had an effect on the demand for wheat that was “far from trivial” (p. 
128).  The consumption of home-grown wheat supplied “a need of the man who grew it which 
would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market.  Home-grown wheat in this sense 
compete[d] with wheat in commerce” (p. 128).  Turning to the intersection of national wheat 
economics and the policy enacted by Congress in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, the 
Court noted that Congress had “considered that wheat consumed on the farm where grown, if 
[left] outside the scheme of regulation, would have a substantial effect in defeating and 
obstructing [the Act’s] purpose to stimulate trade therein at increased prices” (p. 129).  The 
Court concluded, “It is well established by decisions of this Court that the power to regulate 
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commerce includes the power to regulate the prices at which commodities in that commerce are 
dealt in and practices affecting such prices” (p. 128). 
 The Court next turned to the Fifth Amendment issues raised by Filburn regarding the 
Act’s penalties.  Agreeing with arguments presented by the Government’s attorneys, the Court 
ruled that farmers were given a choice.  According to the Court, “The farmer who planted within 
his allotment was in effect guaranteed a minimum return much above what his wheat would have 
brought if sold on a world market basis” (p. 130).  Farmers choosing to plant in excess of their 
allotted acreage were also given further options, ranging from no penalty to being assessed a 
penalty.  Such farmers could “escape penalty by delivering [the excess wheat] to the Secretary” 
or he could store it “with the privilege of sale without penalty in a later year to fill out his quota” 
(p. 130).  The Court further noted that because of the Act, Filburn was “able to market his wheat 
at a price ‘far above any world price based on the natural reaction of supply and demand’” (p. 
131).  According to the Court, “We can hardly find a denial of due process in these 
circumstances….  It is hardly lack of due process for the Government to regulate that which it 
subsidizes” (p. 131).  The Court concluded: 
That appellee is the worse off for the aggregate of this legislation does not 
appear; it only appears that, if he could get all that the Government gives 
and do nothing that the Government asks, he would be better off than this 
law allows.  To deny him this is not to deny him due process of law.  (p. 
133) 
 
 If Darby marked the Court’s return to the Court’s original conception of the Commerce 
Clause powers of the federal government as articulated by the Court in Gibbons v. Ogden, the 
decision in Wickard v. Filburn confirmed the Court’s reinstatement of the nation’s ability to 
regulate its commerce.  Wickard’s additional contribution was its stipulation that economic 
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realities and actual effects upon commerce would determine what fell within the legitimate reach 
of the Commerce Clause. 
 Concurring/dissenting opinions. 
 Being a unanimous decision, no dissenting opinions were offered. 
 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
 Facts & procedural history. 
 Constitutionally, this case represented a clash between the powers reserved to the states 
by the Tenth Amendment on the one hand and both the Supremacy Clause and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the other hand.  The subject matter centered 
on the registration of aliens in the United States. 
 In the absence of federal legislation governing the registration of aliens, several states 
enacted their own legislation requiring aliens to register with state authorities.71  On June 21, 
1939, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania passed the Alien Registration Act which required all 
aliens “18 years or over” to register annually with the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and 
Industry, to pay an annual registration fee of $1 in return for an “alien identification card,” and to 
“show the card whenever it may be demanded by any police officer or any agent of the 
Department of Labor and Industry” (p. 59).  The Pennsylvania legislation also required the 
Department of Labor and Industry to classify the alien registrations “for ‘the purpose of ready 
reference,’” and to furnish “a copy of the classification to the Pennsylvania Motor Police” (p. 
59). 
 Davidowitz, an alien, and “one naturalized citizen” filed suit against Hines, the 
Pennsylvania Secretary of Labor and Industry, and other state officials in the U.S. District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  The “three-judge District Court enjoined enforcement 
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of the Act, holding that it denied aliens equal protection of the laws, and that it encroached upon 
legislative powers constitutionally vested in the federal government” (p. 60).  Pennsylvania’s 
appeal to the nation’s high court was granted; however, in the intervening time between the 
Court’s granting the appeal and hearing arguments from the two parties, Congress “enacted a 
federal Alien Registration Act” (p. 60).  Accordingly, the Court reviewed the legal questions 
surrounding Pennsylvania’s alien registration law “in the light of the Congressional Act” (p. 60) 
 Legal questions. 
 Does the Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act represent a valid exercise of state police 
power under the Tenth Amendment, or does it contravene the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution as articulated in Article VI, Clause 2?  Does the Pennsylvania statute deny aliens 
within its borders the equal protection of the law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment?  
Does the Pennsylvania legislation violate § 16 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870?72 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 Mrs. Rutherford and Mr. Rial, Deputy Attorneys General of Pennsylvania, along with 
Mr. Reno, Attorney General, provided legal representation for the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania.  Attorneys Ostroff and Steerman represented Davidowitz and other appellees.  “By 
special leave of Court, Solicitor General Biddle, with whom Assistant Attorney General Shea 
and Messrs. … Siegel, … Demuth, and … Davis were on the brief, for the United States, as 
amicus curiae” in support of Davidowitz (p. 56). 
 Using a Commerce Clause approach, attorneys for Pennsylvania argued that their state’s 
legislation didn’t impair the “right of the Federal Government to control immigration, 
naturalization or interstate and foreign commerce” (p. 53).  While conceding that Article I, § 8, 
Cl. 3 of the Constitution gave “exclusive power” to Congress over immigration and 
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naturalization, the Commerce Clause did “not place entire jurisdiction over aliens” with 
Congress (p. 54).  According to Pennsylvania’s attorneys, “the States under the police power can 
place restrictions and limitations upon aliens” (pp. 54-55). 
 As a fallback position in the event that the Court viewed “control of aliens [as being] 
within the exclusive power of Congress,” the Commonwealth’s legal team argued that “the State 
still [had] the right, as a local police measure, to regulate aliens resident within its borders, so 
long as such regulations [were] not repugnant to or inconsistent with federal enactments” (p. 55).  
This, in effect, represented a Tenth Amendment argument as case law upheld state police powers 
over their citizens.  According to Commonwealth attorneys, “Congress ha[d] no general power to 
enact police regulations operative within the territorial limits of the State” (p. 53).  Such power 
had been “left with the individual States” by the Tenth Amendment and could not “be taken from 
them either wholly or in part” (p. 53).  The general rule provided that “the States may exercise 
any power possessed by them prior to the adoption of the Constitution, unless the exercise of 
such power [was] expressly or by necessary implication prohibited thereby” (p. 53).  
Furthermore, “[l]egislation under the police power of the State [would] not be stricken down 
unless it plainly and palpably conflict[ed] with some authority granted to the Federal 
Government” (p. 54).  Commonwealth attorneys cited two previous Court decisions embodying 
the principle that “[a] State may pass a law which aids or cooperates with the Federal 
Government in the exercise of its federal power” (p. 54).  According to Pennsylvania’s legal 
counsel, “The only question is whether the State Act is in abeyance or whether the state and 
federal Governments have concurrent jurisdiction to register aliens for the protection of 
inhabitants and property” (p. 55).  Regarding the federal Middle District Court of Pennsylvania 
ruling that the Pennsylvania statute “denied aliens equal protection of the laws,” Pennsylvania’s 
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attorneys offered no argument other than to simply state, “The Act does not deny equal 
protection of the laws to aliens” (p. 60; p. 55). 
 Arguments by attorneys for Davidowitz were summarized in three sentences and 
supported by five case citations: 
The Act is discriminatory, unreasonable, inconsistent and capricious.  The 
Act encroaches upon a field reserved to federal action.  People v. Baum, 251 
Mich. 187; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39; Arrowsmith v. Voorhies, 55 
F.2d 310; Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259; Chy Lung v. 
Freeman, 92 U.S. 275.  The Act denies equal protection of the laws to aliens 
in Pennsylvania.  (p. 56) 
 
As can be detected from reading the citations, three were U.S. Supreme Court decisions, one a 
federal lower court decision, and one a state court decision.  One can only surmise from the 
previous success gained by Davidowitz that arguments presented by his attorneys to the U.S. 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania contained greater elaboration than those 
reported here.  Of course, such argumentation would be contained in the lower court’s decision, 
which had been forwarded to the Supreme Court, and thus would have been available for review 
by the Justices. 
 Arguments presented by the Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, and three 
additional attorneys as amicus curiae focused exclusively on the Supremacy Clause.  Their 
opening statement declared, “The federal Act of 1940 has superseded the Pennsylvania statute” 
(p. 56).  Citing fourteen Supreme Court decisions in support of the following contention, the 
federal attorneys stated, “The enactment by Congress of this comprehensive and integrated alien 
registration system precludes the exercise of any concurrent authority by the States” (p. 56).    
 Government attorneys obliquely addressed the issue of equal protection of the laws as 
part of their Supremacy Clause arguments by pointing to the conflict between state law and 
federal policy as enacted by Congress: 
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The Pennsylvania statute is also unenforceable because it is in conflict with 
the Congressional policy embodied in the federal law.  Congress provided 
various safeguards to protect the civil liberties of aliens and to guard them 
against the vexation of intrusive police surveillance. (Emphasis added) (p. 
57) 
 
Worse yet, the federal attorneys continued, “The Pennsylvania statute contain[ed] no similar 
safeguards; to the contrary, it [was] fraught with the very dangers which Congress sought to 
prevent” (p. 57).   In order to enforce “the Congressional purpose to protect the civil liberties of 
aliens,” it was required that “the federal government retain the power to control and coordinate 
all activities with respect to registration and surveillance” (p. 58).  Government attorneys 
contended that the Congressional policy could not be enforced if the states were “permitted to 
enact and administer independent registration systems” (p. 58).  State action in this field would 
require “the express consent of Congress,” which had not been given (p. 58).  Finally, the federal 
attorneys stated that the Pennsylvania Act was “in conflict with § 16 of the civil Rights Act of 
1870” (p. 59). 
 Holding & disposition. 
 The Court held that “the Pennsylvania Act cannot be enforced,” and thus affirmed the 
judgment of the lower federal court.  The Court’s decision, similar in structure to the arguments 
presented by the federal attorneys, rested upon the Supremacy Clause through which the Court 
addressed, again under the color of Article VI, Cl. 2 of the Constitution, the equal protection 
concerns arising under the Civil Rights Act of 1870 and the Fourteenth Amendment.  In this 
particular instance, equal protection was treated as a federal policy that was embodied by 
Congressional legislation. 
 Court’s rationale. 
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 Justice Black delivered the 8-1 decision of the Court.  After discussing the facts of the 
case, Justice Black summarized the contentions of opposing attorneys.  Noting that all 
contentions were subsidiary to the question involving the conflict between the Tenth Amendment 
and the Supremacy Clause, Justice Black launched into an analysis of the intersection of Article 
VI, Clause 2 with the subject matter of the two legislative actions.  The Court quickly established 
the contextual grounding of alien registration in “the field affecting foreign relations” and noted 
that the Federal Government was “entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the 
conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties” (p. 63).  Taking care to illustrate the reasons for the 
commitment of foreign affairs to the Federal Government, Justice Black brought to bear 
explanations expounded by the Court as well as three of the Founding Fathers.  In the Chinese 
Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889), the Supreme Court stated, “For local interests the 
several States of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign 
nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power” (p. 63).73  Introducing Thomas Jefferson 
as one “who was not generally favorable to broad federal powers,” Justice Black provided the 
following from Jefferson’s writings: “My own general idea was, that the States should severally 
preserve their sovereignty in whatever concerns themselves alone, and that whatever may 
concern another State, or any foreign nation, should be made a part of the federal sovereignty” 
(p. 63, n. 11).  Black immediately followed by quoting James Madison who wrote “in Federalist 
paper No. 42”: 
The second class of powers, lodged in the general government, consist of 
those which regulate the intercourse with foreign nations….  This class of 
powers forms an obvious and essential branch of the federal administration.  
If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to 
other nations.  (Emphasis in original) (p. 63, n. 11) 
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Justice Black concluded the reasoning behind federal control of foreign relations by citing 
Alexander Hamilton’s writing “in Federalist paper No. 80: ‘The peace of the whole ought not to 
be left at the disposal of a part.  The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for 
the conduct of its members’” (Emphasis in original) (p. 64, n. 12).   Having grounded alien 
registration in foreign affairs, having established the constitutional control of foreign affairs by 
the Federal Government, and having illustrated the Founders’ explanations as to the reasons for 
federal control of foreign affairs, Justice Black proceeded to illustrate that Congress was aware 
of the grounding of alien registration in the nation’s foreign affairs.  To establish the nexus 
between constitutional requirements and Congressional understanding “of the possible 
international repercussions of registration legislation,” Justice Black quoted Congressman 
Coffee’s remarks from the floor when he spoke against an earlier version of the contested federal 
Alien Registration Act:  “Are we not guilty of deliberately insulting nations with whom we 
maintain friendly diplomatic relations?  Are we not humiliating their nationals?  Are we not 
violating the traditions and experiences of a century and a half” (p. 64, n. 12)? 
 Based on the reasoning previously presented, the Court concluded: 
Consequently the regulation of aliens is so intimately blended and 
intertwined with responsibilities of the national government that where it 
acts, and the state also acts on the same subject, “the act of Congress, or the 
treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of 
powers not controverted, must yield to it.  (p. 66) 
 
Proceeding cautiously, the Court majority confronted Pennsylvania’s claim that the Pennsylvania 
Alien Registration Act represented “concurrent jurisdiction” by the state and national 
governments “to register aliens” (p. 55).  The Court concluded that appellee arguments presented 
by the federal attorneys as amicus curiae were “correct in [their] contention that the power to 
restrict, limit, regulate, and register aliens as a distinct group is not an equal and continuously 
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existing concurrent power of state and nation” (p. 68).   The Court next proceeded to 
examine whether or not Congress had “acted in such manner that its action should preclude 
enforcement of Pennsylvania’s law” (p. 69).  This maneuver provided the stage for the Court to 
address the equal protection concerns raised by both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1870.  Following a lengthy examination of federal action regarding aliens in terms 
of laws and treaties, grounded in objections historically made to harsh measures, the Court 
observed that most opposition to registration bills was grounded in the fact “that their 
requirements were at war with the fundamental principles of our free government” (p. 71).  
According to the Court, equal protection concerns constituted a national policy enacted into law 
by Congress through the U.S. Alien Registration Act. 
[Congress] plainly manifested a purpose to [“obtain the information deemed 
to be desirable in connection with aliens”] in such a way as to protect the 
personal liberties of law-abiding aliens through one uniform national 
registration system, and to leave them free from the possibility of 
inquisitorial practices and police surveillance that might not only affect our 
international relations but might also generate the very disloyalty which the 
law has intended guarding against.  (p. 74) 
 
Because of the Supremacy Clause, and because the Pennsylvania Act opposed a federal policy 
bent on preserving the right of equal protection of the laws for aliens, “the Pennsylvania Act 
cannot be enforced” (p. 74).  Thus the result of the lower court decision was affirmed, but the 
ground for the decision shifted from primary focus on the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to a primary focus on the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution that incorporated, but did not rest upon, equal protection concerns. 
 Concurring/dissenting opinion. 
 Justice Stone was the lone Justice voting against the 8-1 Court majority.  He dissented 
because of his reluctance to “strike down a state law which [was] immediately concerned with 
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the social order,” because he didn’t believe the Pennsylvania statute violated “some right granted 
or secured to the national government by the Constitution,” and because he didn’t view the 
Pennsylvania Act as “encroach[ing] upon the exercise of some authority delegated to the United 
States for the attainment of objects of national concern” (p. 75). 
 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
 Facts & procedural history. 
 This case represented a critical constitutional challenge to the public accommodations 
provisions contained in Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  The challenge pitted the 
Commerce Clause against an implied Tenth Amendment argument, i.e., it was charged the “Act 
exceeded its power to regulate commerce;” this could only happen if the Act regulated 
something other than interstate commerce that was reserved to state jurisdiction by the Tenth 
Amendment; hence, although not specifically stating the Tenth Amendment, the Amendment’s 
authority was implied by the charge (p. 243).  The challenge also involved Fifth Amendment due 
process and Thirteenth Amendment involuntary servitude concerns. 
 On June 19, 1963, approximately five months before he was assassinated in Dallas, 
Texas, President John F. Kennedy proposed to Congress that it enact civil rights legislation.  In 
his speech to Congress, President Kennedy stated the purpose of the proposed civil rights bill, 
which was: 
to promote the general welfare by eliminating discrimination based on race, 
color, religion, or national origin in … public accommodations through the 
exercise by Congress of the powers conferred upon it … to enforce the 
provisions of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, to regulate 
commerce among the several States, and to make laws necessary and proper 
to execute the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution.  (p. 245) 
 
Following President Kennedy’s speech, bills “embodying the President’s suggestion” were 
introduced in both the Senate and the House (p. 246).  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was not 
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passed, however, until July 2, 1964, when President Johnson intervened and recommended its 
passage.  In constructing the final form of the Act, Congress used the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution as its primary authority.  They did so “because the Civil Rights Cases (1883), as 
then interpreted, prohibited [Congress] from enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment against 
privately owned restaurants and hotels” (Hall, 1992, p. 369).  Title II of the Act provided that: 
All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place 
of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination 
or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.  (p. 
247) 
 
To establish the nexus with commerce, the Act declared “that ‘any inn, hotel, motel, or other 
establishment which provides lodging to transient guests’ affects commerce per se” (p. 247).  § 
201 of Title II listed “four classes of business establishments, each of which ‘serve[d] the public’ 
and ‘[was] a place of public accommodation’” (p. 247).  The term, “a place of public 
accommodation” was defined as a place whose “operations affect[ed] commerce, or if 
discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action” (p. 247).  Discrimination or 
segregation was “supported by state action when carried on under color of any law, statute, 
ordinance, regulation or any custom or usage required or enforced by officials of the State or any 
of its subdivisions” (p. 248).  Thus, any public accommodation located within a city, county, or 
state governed by laws supporting or requiring racial segregation was now prohibited from such 
practice by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
 The owner of the Heart of Atlanta Motel “had 216 rooms available to transient guests” (p. 
243).  Located close to two interstate highways as well as two state highways, the Heart of 
Atlanta Motel solicited “patronage from outside the State of Georgia through various national 
advertising media, including magazines of national circulation” (p. 243).  As a result of its 
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proximity to interstate & highway travel and the solicitation of out-of-state business, 
“approximately 75% of its registered guests [were] from out of State” (p. 243). 
 The Heart of Atlanta Motel owner had long followed “a practice of refusing to rent rooms 
to Negroes” (p. 243).  In order to “perpetuate” his policy of discrimination, the motel owner filed 
action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia suing “for declaratory 
relief” and seeking an order “to enjoin enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964” (p. 241).  
The owner of the Heart of Atlanta Motel also sought “damages against [the Government] based 
on allegedly resulting injury in the event compliance was required” (p. 243).  The Federal 
Government filed a counterclaim seeking enforcement of the Civil Rights Act and “asked for a 
three-judge court” to hear the case (p. 243).  During the district court proceedings, the motel 
owner “offered no evidence,” but instead submitted “the case on the pleadings, admissions and 
stipulation of facts” (p. 244).  The facts to which the motel owner admitted were that “the 
operation of the motel” brought it under the Act’s provisions, that the Heart of Atlanta Motel 
“refused to provide lodging for transient Negroes because of their race or color,” and that the 
motel owner intended “to continue that policy unless restrained” (p. 249).  The Federal 
Government, on the other hand, provided witnesses and depositions that proved the Hear of 
Atlanta Motel had refused “to accept Negro transients after the passage of the Act” (p. 244).  
Accordingly a three-judge panel of the federal Northern Georgia District Court  
sustained the validity of the Act and issued a permanent injunction on [the 
Federal Government’s] counterclaim restraining [the Heart of Atlanta 
Motel] from continuing to violate the Act which remains in effect on order 
of Mr. Justice Black, 85 S.Ct. 1.  (p. 243) 
 
Whereupon the Heart of Atlanta Motel owner filed an appeal, which was granted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
 Legal questions. 
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 Does Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act represent a valid constitutional exercise “of 
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause as applied to a place of public accommodation 
serving interstate travelers” (p. 241)?  Does the “prohibition in Title II of racial discrimination in 
public accommodations affecting commerce … violate the Fifth Amendment as being a 
deprivation of property or liberty without due process of law” (pp. 241-242)?  Does the 
prohibition of racial discrimination in Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act “violate the 
Thirteenth Amendment as being ‘involuntary servitude’” (p. 242)? 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 Archibald Cox, Solicitor General of the United States, “argued the cause for the United 
States” (see Appendix N) while “Moreton Rolleston, Jr., argued the cause” for the Heart of 
Atlanta Motel owner (p. 242).  The motel owner’s legal counsel argued that Congress exceeded 
its authority to regulate commerce under the Commerce Clause contained in Article I, § 8, cl. 3, 
of the U.S. Constitution.  He also put forth the typical Fifth Amendment argument regarding due 
process.  According to legal counsel for the Heart of Atlanta Motel, the motel was “deprived of 
the right to choose its customers and operate its business as it wishe[d], resulting in a taking of 
its liberty and property without just compensation” (p. 244).  Finally, in a perverse twist of the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude, Attorney Rolleston 
advanced a Thirteenth Amendment in support of his client’s suit.  According to the argument put 
forth, the requirement that the Heart of Atlanta Motel “rent available rooms to Negroes against 
its will, Congress [was] subjecting it to involuntary servitude in contravention of the Thirteenth 
Amendment” (p. 244). 
 Solicitor General Cox argued that “the unavailability to Negroes of adequate 
accommodations interfere[d] significantly with interstate travel, and that Congress, under the 
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Commerce Clause, ha[d] power to remove such obstructions and restraints.  In counterpose to 
appellant’s claim, the Solicitor General argued that the Fifth Amendment did not “forbid 
reasonable regulation and that consequential damage [did] not constitute a ‘taking’ within the 
meaning of that amendment” (p. 244).  Finally, regarding the Thirteenth Amendment claim, 
Solicitor General Archibald Cox declared that such a claim failed 
because it [was] entirely frivolous to say that an amendment directed to the 
abolition of human bondage and the removal of widespread disabilities 
associated with slavery place[d] discrimination in public accommodations 
beyond the reach of both federal and state law.  (p. 244). 
 
 Holding & Disposition 
 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Georgia, which upheld the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
as a valid exercise by Congress of its powers under the Commerce Clause.  The Court also held 
that prohibiting “racial discrimination in public accommodations affecting commerce” did not 
violate the Fifth Amendment due process provisions nor did such prohibition constitute 
“involuntary servitude” in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment (p. 241; p. 242). 
 Court’s rationale. 
 Justice Tom Clark delivered the Court’s unanimous 9-0 decision.  After discussing the 
facts of the case, the Court examined the congressional history of civil rights legislation, which 
began with the Civil Rights Act of 1866 followed by the Slave Kidnapping Act, the Peonage 
Abolition Act of 1967, the Civil Rights Act of 1870, the Anti-Lynching Act of 1871, and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875.  The Court noted that its decision in the Civil Rights Cases “struck 
down the public accommodations sections of the 1875 Act, after which no civil rights legislation 
was enacted by Congress until the Civil Rights Act of 1957 (p. 245).  An intervening piece of 
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legislation, the Civil Rights Act of 1960, was enacted prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
Act being challenged by the racist owner of the Heart of Atlanta Motel. 
 After reviewing the legislative history of the 1964 Act’s passage, the Court proceeded to 
examine the particulars of Title II of the Act embodying the public accommodations 
requirements.  Following this examination, the Court discussed the actual application of the 
Act’s requirements to the operations of the Heart of Atlanta Motel.  This scrutiny revealed that 
the motel owner not only had admitted to violating the 1964 Civil Rights Act, he also had 
announced his intention “to continue that policy unless restrained” (p. 249).  At this point, the 
Court declared that the only question of importance remaining in the case before it involved “the 
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to these facts” (p. 249). 
 Commencing its examination of the constitutional question before it, the Court stated that 
the Act’s legislative history revealed “that Congress based the Act on § 5 and the Equal 
Protection Clause [§ 1] of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as its power to regulate interstate 
commerce under Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution” (p. 249).  § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment stated, “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article.”  Of course, the relevant portion in §  1 of the Amendment declared, 
“… nor shall any State … deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”  Given the opportunity to examine two constitutional questions, the Court next stated that 
the “Senate Commerce Committee made it quite clear that the fundamental object of Title II [of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act] was to vindicate the ‘deprivation of personal dignity that surely 
accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments,’” and furthermore, that such a 
purpose “could be readily achieved by ‘congressional action based on the commerce power of 
the Constitution’” (p. 250).  The commerce power of the federal government, as set forth in 
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Article I, § 8, clause 3 of the Constitution, declared, “The Congress shall have Power … To 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”  In light of this evidence, the Court concluded “that since the commerce power is 
sufficient for our decision here we have considered it alone” (p. 250).  Given the choice of the 
Fourteenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause, the Court’s decision to rely upon the 
commerce power helped the Court confront a major precedent regarding the issue of public 
accommodations. 
 Proceeding next to relevant case law in its examination of the constitutional issues, the 
Court analyzed the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), which represented the landmark Court 
decision for the current Court because it had declared unconstitutional the public 
accommodations provisions of the 1875 Civil Rights Acts.74  In confronting this precedent, the 
Court declared that the Civil Rights Cases decision was “inapposite, and without precedential 
value in determining the constitutionality of the present Act” (p. 250).  The Court explained its 
reasoning by noting that the 1875 Civil Rights Act “was not ‘conceived’ in terms of the 
commerce power,” a fact that was “specifically” noted by the nineteenth century Court (p. 251).  
The 1964 Civil Rights Act, however, relied upon the commerce power of Congress.  As the 
current Court pointed out, “In contrast, the applicability of Title II is carefully limited to 
enterprises having a direct and substantial relation to the interstate flow of goods and people, 
except where state action is involved” (pp. 250-251).  An additional distinction between the two 
civil rights actions of Congress lay in the changed nature of commerce between the two time 
periods.  Drawing attention to the changed circumstances between 1875 and 1964, while at the 
same time pointing out that the legal principles to be applied by the Justices remained the same, 
the Court stated: 
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Our populace had not reached its present mobility, nor were facilities, goods 
and services circulating as readily in interstate commerce as they are today.  
Although the principles which we apply today are those first formulated by 
Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), the 
conditions of transportation and commerce have changed dramatically, and 
we must apply those principles to the present state of commerce.  (p. 251) 
 
Announcing the determination of its reasoning, the Court reiterated its prior finding, “We, 
therefore, conclude that the Civil Rights Cases have no relevance to the basis of decision here 
where the Act explicitly relies upon the commerce power…” (p. 252). 
 Continuing its analysis of the constitutional issues, the Court moved next to an 
examination of the basis for congressional action.  Noting that the “Act as adopted carried no 
congressional findings,” the Court stated that congressional records of the Act’s legislative 
proceedings were “replete with evidence of the burdens that discrimination by race or color 
place[d] upon interstate commerce” (p. 252).  According to extensive testimony  in the Senate 
Commerce Committee Hearings, “These exclusionary practices were found to be nationwide” (p. 
253).  The Under Secretary of Commerce testified “that there [was] ‘no question that this 
discrimination in the North still exists to a large degree’ and in the West and Midwest as well” 
(p. 253).  Discrimination in public accommodations occurred outside the South despite the fact 
that “[t]hirty-two States [had] on their books either by statute or executive order” public 
accommodation requirements regarding discrimination that had been enacted by state legislatures 
or promulgated by the governor (p. 259).75  According to the Court, “[T]here was evidence that 
… racial discrimination had the effect of discouraging travel on the part of a substantial portion 
of the Negro community” (p. 253).  In a communication to the Chairman of the Senate 
Commerce Committee, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency wrote “that it was his 
‘belief that air commerce [was] adversely affected by the denial to a substantial segment of the 
traveling public of adequate and desegregated public accommodations” (p. 253).  The Court 
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concluded that “voluminous testimony present[ed] overwhelming evidence that discrimination 
by hotels and motels impede[d] interstate travel” (p. 253). 
 Concluding that Congress had abundant evidence for its action, the Court next turned its 
attention to an examination of congressional power “to deal with these obstructions” under the 
Commerce Clause (p. 253).  Beginning with its first enunciation “140 years ago by the great 
Chief Justice John Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden,” the Court presented seven paragraphs of 
Marshall’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause and concluded (pp. 253-254): 
In short, the determinative test of the exercise of power by the Congress 
under the Commerce Clause is simply whether the activity sought to be 
regulated is “commerce which concerns more States than one” and has a 
real and substantial relation to the national interest.  (p. 255) 
 
The Court next proceeded to cite case law defining commerce as including: a) “the movement of 
persons through more States than one;” b) “the transportation of persons and property;” and c) 
“transportation” that was not “commercial in character” (pp. 255-256; p. 256; p. 256).  The 
unanimous Court opinion then cited fourteen different subject matters (and the corresponding 
Court decision upholding each action’s constitutionality) in which Congress had “extend[ed] the 
exercise of its power [under the Commerce Clause]” (p. 257).  Addressing the criticism that the 
law represented legislation on a moral issue, not commerce, the Court opined, “But that fact does 
not detract from the overwhelming evidence of the disruptive effect that racial discrimination has 
had on commercial intercourse” (p. 257).  The Court continued by noting that Congress had a 
rational, as well as a constitutional, basis for enacting Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act: 
It was this burden which empowered Congress to enact appropriate 
legislation, and given this basis for the exercise of its power, Congress was 
not restricted by the fact that the particular obstruction to interstate 
commerce with which it was dealing was also deemed a moral and social 
wrong.  (p. 257) 
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 Responding to the argument that the Heart of Atlanta Motel’s operation was “of a purely 
local character,” the Court reasoned, “But, assuming this to be true, ‘[i]f it is interstate commerce 
that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze.’  
United States v. Women’s Sportswear Mfrs. Assn., 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949)” (p. 258).  The 
opinion then cited a portion of the Court’s ruling in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 
(1941), which was a paraphrase of Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), 
which, in turn, was a paraphrase of Alexander Hamilton’s opinion (1791) submitted to President 
Washington regarding the constitutionality of his proposed economic measures:76 
The power of Congress over interstate commerce … extends to those 
activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of 
the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate 
means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted 
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.  (p. 258) 
 
The Court concluded, “One need only examine the evidence which we have discussed above to 
see that Congress may – as it has – prohibit racial discrimination by motels serving travelers, 
however ‘local’ their operations may appear” (p. 258). 
 Although the Court had already addressed the issues of a rational basis for congressional 
action and the reasonableness of the means selected by Congress, the Court chose to re-
emphasize both issues when it addressed the Fifth Amendment arguments put forth by the Heart 
of Atlanta Motel.  Besides the re-emphasis, this approach allowed the Court to bring more case 
law to the specific issues raised by the Fifth Amendment argument, thus obliquely addressing 
Fourteenth Amendment issues that the Court had earlier in this opinion chosen not to deal with 
directly.  
 First, in addressing the Fifth Amendment argument, the Court revisited the rational basis 
issues.  Since the commerce power of Congress was both “a specific and plenary” power 
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“authorized by the Constitution itself,” the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not “deprive appellant of 
liberty or property under the Fifth Amendment” (p. 258).  Instead of a Fifth Amendment 
question, the “only questions” pertaining to the legitimacy of the Act were:  
1) whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial 
discrimination by motels affected commerce, and 2) if it had such a basis, 
whether the means it selected to eliminate that evil are reasonable and 
appropriate.  If they are, appellant has no “right” to select its guests as it sees 
fit, free from governmental regulation.  (pp. 258-259) 
 
The Court here noted that legislation regarding public accommodations represented “nothing 
novel” since “32 States now have such provisions and no case has been cited to us where the 
attack on a state statute has been successful, either in federal or state courts” (p. 259; p. 260; see 
also note #73 of this paper).  Furthermore, the Court noted, “Some of these Acts go back 
fourscore years” (p. 259).   
 Next the Court examined case law regarding public accommodations requirements and 
Fifth Amendment loss of liberty claims.  According to the Court: 
[I]n a long line of cases this Court has rejected the claim that the prohibition 
of racial discrimination in public accommodations interferes with personal 
liberty.  See District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100 
(1953), and cases there cited, where we concluded that Congress had 
delegated law-making power to the District of Columbia “as broad as the 
police power of a state” which included the power to adopt “a law 
prohibiting discriminations against Negroes by the owners and managers of 
restaurants in the District of Columbia.”  (For the “long line of cases,” see 
Appendix O) (pp. 260-261) 
 
Although the Court didn’t mention it, the “long line of cases” to which it referred occurred, with 
one notable exception, after Plessy v. Ferguson (for further information regarding the “long line 
of cases,” see Appendix O).  Regarding allegations of the Act’s infringement of Fifth 
Amendment due process requirements, the Court, citing its decisions in 1870, 1923, and 1958, 
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declared, “Neither do we find any merit in the claim that the Act is a taking of property without 
just compensation.  The cases are to the contrary” (p. 261).   
 Completing its constitutional analysis, the Court dismissed the “involuntary servitude” 
argument as containing “no merit” (p. 261).  It did so, however, in a unique manner which linked 
the laws in 32 states prohibiting “racial discrimination in public accommodations” with the 
English common law, which became rooted in this country during colonial times.  Referring to 
the state laws, the Court noted, “These laws but codify the common-law innkeeper rule which 
long predated the Thirteenth Amendment.  It is difficult to believe that the Amendment was 
intended to abrogate this principle” (p. 261).  The Court announced its ruling in the case: 
We, therefore, conclude that the action of the Congress in the adoption of 
the Act as applied here to a motel which concededly serves interstate 
travelers is within the power granted it by the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution, as interpreted by this Court for 140 years.  (p. 261) 
 
The Court closed with a reminder that policy questions rested “entirely with the Congress not 
with the courts” (p. 261).  In removing obstructions to commerce, “what means are to be 
employed” is a matter that “is within the sound and exclusive discretion of the Congress” (p. 
262).  In affirming the decision by the U.S. District Court for Northern Georgia in Heart of 
Atlanta Motel v. United States, the Court described the judiciary’s role: 
[The choice of means by Congress] is subject only to one caveat – that the 
means chosen by it must be reasonable adapted to the end permitted by the 
Constitution.  We cannot say that its choice here was not so adapted.  The 
Constitution requires no more. 
 
 Concurring/dissenting opinions. 
 The unanimous 9-0 decision of the Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States 
meant there were no dissenting opinions.  There were, however, two concurring opinions, which, 
in effect, concurred with each other.  While agreeing with the Commerce Clause grounds of the 
   
   
597
ruling, both Justice Black and Justice Douglas thought the Court should have also ruled on the 
Fourteenth Amendment issues.  In Justice Black’s opinion, the Civil War Amendments, acting in 
tandem with the Commerce Clause, provided an unassailable legitimacy for the Act’s prohibition 
of discrimination in public accommodations.  After discussing the “legitimate end” of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act under the Commerce Clause, Justice Black stated: 
In view of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, it is not 
possible to deny that the aim of protecting Negroes from discrimination is 
also a legitimate end.  The means adopted to achieve these ends are also 
appropriate, plainly adopted to achieve them and not prohibited by the 
Constitution but consistent with both its letter and spirit.  (pp. 276-277) 
 
 Justice Douglas, on the other hand, wanted the Court’s opinion to rest squarely on the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  He explained his thinking by partially quoting from his own dissenting 
opinion in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177.  After stating his reluctance “to rest solely 
on the Commerce Clause,” Justice Douglas declared: 
My reluctance is not due to any conviction that Congress lacks power to 
regulate commerce in the interests of human rights.  It is rather my belief 
that the right of people to be free of state action that discriminates against 
them because of race … “occupies a more protected position in our 
constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal 
across state lines.”  (p. 279) 
 
Specifically, Justice Douglas preferred to place the constitutional basis for the Court’s decision 
on the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which is contained in § 5 of the 
Amendment and states, “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article” (p. 280).  Justice Douglas explained the effects flowing from such a 
decision. 
A decision based on the Fourteenth Amendment would have a more settling 
effect, making unnecessary litigation over whether a particular restaurant or 
inn is within the commerce definitions of the Act or whether a particular 
customer is an interstate traveler.  Under my construction, the Act would 
apply to all customers in all the enumerated places of public 
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accommodation.  And that construction would put an end to all 
obstructionist strategies and finally close one door on a bitter chapter in 
American history. (Emphasis added) (p. 280) 
 
 And so, Justice Douglas spent the remainder of his concurring opinion illustrating what a 
Court decision resting on the Fourteenth Amendment would look like.  Because of the Court’s 
use of common law to help support state legislation prohibiting discrimination in public 
accommodations, Justice Douglas’ opinion provides particular interest.  According to Douglas, 
the Senate demonstrated the connection not only between English common law and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but also between property rights and human liberty.  Justice Douglas 
quoted an extensive section from the Senate Report (S.Rep. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 
22-23) to illustrate both the legal and rational basis for the 1964 Civil Rights Act’s prohibitions 
of discrimination in the nation’s public accommodations.  First, Douglas presented the question 
posed by the Senate Report and its immediate answer. 
Does the owner of private property devoted to use as a public establishment 
enjoy a property right to refuse to deal with any member of the public 
because of that member’s race, religion, or national origin?  As noted 
previously, the English common law answered this question in the negative.  
(p. 284) 
 
Next, the reasoning: 
It [the English common law] reasoned that one who employed his private 
property for purposes of commercial gain by offering goods or services to 
the public must stick to his bargain.  It is to be remembered that the right of 
the private property owner to serve or sell to whom he pleased was never 
claimed when laws were enacted prohibiting the private property owner 
from dealing with persons of a particular race.  Nor were such laws ever 
struck down as an infringement upon this supposed right of the property 
owner.  (pp. 284-285) 
 
And then, the Senate Report connected property rights to individual freedom by showing that the 
purpose of property rights was to protect human liberty. 
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But there are stronger and more persuasive reasons for not allowing 
concepts of private property to defeat public accommodations legislation.  
The institution of private property exists for the purpose of enhancing the 
individual freedom and liberty of human beings.  This institution assures 
that the individual need not be at the mercy of others, including government, 
in order to earn a livelihood and prosper from his individual efforts.  Private 
property provides the individual with something of value that will serve him 
well in obtaining what he desires or requires in his daily life.  (p. 285) 
 
So, if property rights protected individual liberties, can property rights provide the basis for 
denying equality to others differently situated?  As can be seen in the following, the Senate 
Report both asked and answered this question. 
Is this time honored means to freedom and liberty now to be twisted so as to 
defeat individual freedom and liberty?  Certainly denial of a right to 
discriminate or segregate by race of religion would not weaken the attributes 
of private property that make it an effective means of obtaining individual 
freedom.  (p. 285) 
 
Furthermore, according to the Senate Report, property rights must be kept in the service of the 
rights of the individual and the liberty of the community. 
In fact, in order to assure that the institution of private property serves the 
end of individual freedom and liberty it has been restricted in many 
instances.  The most striking example of this is the abolition of slavery….  
There is not any question that ordinary zoning laws place far greater 
restrictions upon the rights of private property owners than would public 
accommodations legislation.  (pp. 285-286) 
 
After describing in detail the restrictions of zoning laws, the Senate Report surmised, “Surely the 
presence of such restrictions does not detract from the role of private property in securing 
individual liberty and freedom” (p. 286).  And then, the Senate Report severed discrimination 
from private property rights because it violated the purpose of property, that of ensuring 
individual rights and community liberty; furthermore, such discrimination violated America’s 
national purpose: 
Nor can it be reasonable argued that racial or religious discrimination is a 
vital factor in the ability of private property to constitute an effective vehicle 
   
   
600
for assuring personal freedom.  The pledge of this Nation is to secure 
freedom for every individual; that pledge will be furthered by elimination of 
such practices.  (p. 286) 
 
Thus, Justice Douglas concluded that while “Congress in fashioning the present Act used the 
Commerce Clause to regulate racial segregation, it also used (an properly so) some of its power 
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment” (p. 286).  In closing his concurring opinion, Justice 
Douglas argued that, in this case, the Fourteenth Amendment protected human liberty, both more 
effectively and efficiently, than did the Commerce Clause. 
I repeat what I said earlier, that our decision should be based on the 
Fourteenth Amendment, thereby putting an end to all obstructionist 
strategies and allowing every person – whatever his race, creed, or color – to 
patronize all places of public accommodation without discrimination 
whether he travels interstate or intrastate. 
 
In Justice Douglas’ view, the Court’s use of the Fourteenth Amendment would also demonstrate 
that human rights and liberties possessed, in this particular instance and at this particular time, a 
higher priority than did the movement of commerce across state lines. 
The commerce clause versus the tenth amendment – Congressional delegation to 
regulatory bureaucracies. 
 
 Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940). 
 Facts & procedural history. 
 Although this case didn’t specifically raise the issue of the Tenth Amendment, it 
presented a pragmatic, state rights type of defense against increased federal power.77  The 
pragmatism arose from the success of other challenges to increased federal authority that focused 
on the issue of legislation as an improper delegation of legislative authority to nonlegislative 
entities.  The first time that the Court invalidated an Act of Congress because the legislation 
represented an “unconstitutional delegation of legislative power” occurred in Panama Refining 
Co. v. Ryan in 1935 (Hall, 1992, p. 619).  In this ruling the Court invalidated the provisions of 
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the National Industrial Recovery Act governing the oil industry.  According to one historian, 
“[T]he administration paid the price for its sloppy procedures in delegating powers…” 
(Leuchtenburg, p. 144). 
 Four months later the Supreme Court delivered the coup de grace to the remaining 
portions of the National Industrial Recovery Act in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States 
(1935).  This unanimous 9-0 decision rested on both an invalid extension of the Commerce 
Power into intrastate commerce and on an improper delegation of legislative power.  “The 
NIRA’s sweeping delegation of legislative power, declared Justice Cardozo, was ‘delegation 
running riot’” (Leuchtenburg, p. 145). 
 Ten months later the Court invalidated the Bituminous Coal Act of 1935 in Carter v. 
Carter Coal Co. (1936).78  Although the Carter decision was a narrow 5-4 decision, the Court 
rested part of its decision on the “Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment work[ing] in 
tandem to define the appropriate spheres of state and federal governments” (Hall, 1992, p. 128).  
The Court also ruled that the Bituminous Coal Act constituted a delegation of powers “in its 
most obnoxious form, for it is not even delegation to an official or an official body, 
presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be and are adverse to the 
interests of others in the same business” (Hall, 1992, p. 224). 
 In the space of fifteen months, three Court rulings had invalidated portions of New Deal 
legislation on the grounds that the acts each represented an improper delegation of authority by 
Congress.  So, it was not surprising to find that same argument being used against the federal 
government in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins.  The decision in Carter v. Carter Coal 
Co., however, represented the high water mark of the improper delegation of authority argument 
as no subsequent congressional legislation was invalidated on that ground.   One positive 
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outcome emerged from the decisions, however.  “As a result of well-founded criticism of 
administrator-made law, the government launched the Federal Register, which printed federal 
orders with the force of law” (Leuchtenburg, p. 144, n. 5).  Another positive outcome was the 
greater care taken by Congress in drafting future laws so they would pass judicial muster.  As a 
constitutional scholar noted, “Invalid delegation is spoken of as a constitutional question, but it is 
more likely to be used as a standard of statutory construction than one of constitutional validity” 
(Hall, 1992, p. 225).  The truth of this observation was verified by the Sunshine Anthracite Coal 
case (See succeeding pp. 643-646). 
 After Carter v. Carter Coal Co. invalidated the Bituminous Coal Act of 1935 (also 
known as the Guffey-Snyder Act), Congress passed the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 (a.k.a. the 
Guffey-Vinson Act), “which re-enacted the original Guffey law, save for the wages and hours 
provisions, to which the Court had taken exception” (Leuchtenburg, p. 162).  The Bituminous 
Coal Act of 1937 was also more carefully drafted, the authors taking cognizance of the Court’s 
criticisms of previous legislation that had improperly delegated legislative authority (See 
“Court’s Rationale” section of this case analysis).  The Act established the National Bituminous 
Coal Commission to regulate the sale and distribution of bituminous coal in order to stabilize the 
coal industry “through price-fixing and the elimination of unfair competition” (p. 388).  Coal 
producers who accepted membership were to be organized under the Bituminous Coal Code.  
“The sale, delivery, or offer for sale of coal below the minimum or above the maximum prices 
established by the Commission [was] made a violation of the code” (p. 388).  Section 3 (b) of the 
Act imposed a 19 1/2% tax on all sales of bituminous coal, based on either the sales price or the 
fair market value; however, code members were exempt from the tax. § 17 (b) of the Act 
provided a definition of bituminous coal.  The Act provided procedures for obtaining exemptions 
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from the Bituminous Coal Commission, which “after notice and opportunity for hearing,” either 
granted or denied the request based on facts and evidence (p. 390).  According to the Court’s 
explanation of the Act, “The findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by 
substantial evidence, [were] conclusive” (p. 390).  The Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 also 
provided an appeal process to the Commission’s decisions through “the Court of Appeals in the 
circuit where [the aggrieved party] resides or has his principal place of business” (p. 390). 
 The owner of Sunshine Anthracite Coal Company leased coal lands in Arkansas, from 
which his company mined and shipped coal.  Neither subscribing to nor accepting the provisions 
of the Bituminous Coal Code contained in the Act, Sunshine Anthracite Coal Company “filed an 
application for exemption on the grounds that its coal was not bituminous coal as defined [by] … 
the Act” (p. 390).  The National Bituminous Coal Commission created by the Act “held a public 
hearing on that application” in which the “[a]ppellant appeared, introduced evidence, and was 
heard on oral argument” (p. 390).  While the hearing was held in October 1937, the Commission 
didn’t deliver its opinion “with findings of fact and conclusions of law” until August 1938 (p. 
390).  The Commission’s opinion denied Sunshine Anthracite Coal Company’s “application for 
exemption on the grounds that its coal was bituminous within the meaning of [the Act]” (pp. 
390-391).  Subsequently, the coal company filed and was granted a review of the Coal 
Commission’s decision with the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, as provided for by the Act.  
The Eighth Circuit Court “held that the Commission had jurisdiction to determine the status of 
coal claimed to be exempt and that the Commission’s decision was based on substantial 
evidence,” and thus affirmed the National Bituminous Coal Commission’s order in Sunshine 
Anthracite Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission, 105 F. 2d 559 (P. 391).  Upon 
appeal, the Supreme Court “denied certiorari,” 308 U.S. 604 (p. 391).   
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 While the above action was still in progress, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service insisted 
that Sunshine Anthracite Coal Company “pay the taxes, penalties and interest accruing under … 
the Act for the period ending February 1938” (p. 391).  This demand, accompanied by “a notice 
of tax lien against [Sunshine Anthracite Coal Company’s] property,” was put forth in May 1938, 
which was after the hearing, but before the National Bituminous Coal Commission had issued its 
opinion and, of course, previous to the ensuing step, formal legal action in the form of an appeal 
of the Commission’s determination to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, i.e., Sunshine 
Anthracite Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission (p. 391).  In response, the coal 
company filed action against Adkins, the Internal Revenue Service collector, in the District 
Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas “to enjoin the collection of the 
tax” (p. 391).  A three-judge panel “issued a temporary injunction,” after which no further action 
was taken until the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision in Sunshine Anthracite 
Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission. 
 Following the Circuit Court’s decision, the Internal Revenue Service filed “a 
supplemental answer stating that the decision in that case was res judicata as to the status of 
appellant’s coal under the Act and that the district court had no jurisdiction over that subject 
matter” (p. 391).  In Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, the federal Eastern District Court of 
Arkansas ruled that the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 was constitutional and “dismissed the bill 
on the merits” (p. 391).  Aware that Sunshine Anthracite Coal Company had appealed the Eighth 
Circuit Court’s ruling, the U.S. District Court for Eastern Arkansas granted “a permanent 
injunction against collection of taxes prior to December 4, 1939 the date on which [the Supreme 
Court] denied a petition for rehearing on the petition for certiorari” (p. 391, n. 8).  Subsequently, 
following the Court’s denial of certiorari in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. National 
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Bituminous Coal Commission, the U.S. Eastern Arkansas District Court “granted a stay with 
respect to collection to taxes accruing after December 4, 1939, pending final disposition of [the] 
appeal” in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins (p. 391, n. 8).  After the Supreme Court 
granted the coal company’s appeal of the district court’s decision, the case was argued April 29, 
1940, and decided on May 20, 1940 (p. 381). 
 Legal questions. 
 Are the regulatory provisions, including price-fixing, of the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 
“a valid exercise of the federal commerce power” (p. 384)? Do the price-fixing provisions of the 
Act violate the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment? Do the provisions of the Act 
giving regulatory powers to the National Bituminous Coal Commission constitute “an invalid 
delegation of legislative power” (p. 382)?  Do the provisions of the Act empowering the 
Commission to determine “whether a particular coal producer falls within its provisions” 
constitute an “invalid delegation of judicial power to the Commission” (p. 382)? 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 As previously mentioned, the attack on the Bituminous Coal Act’s legitimacy combined 
the recently successful arguments regarding unconstitutional delegations of power as well as the 
older component of previous arguments regarding the Fifth Amendment.  Attorneys for the 
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Company argued that the Act’s delegation of power to the Bituminous 
Coal Commission “to determine the object to which the law [was] to be applied” represented “an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power” (p. 383).  According to the coal company’s 
attorneys, “Construction of the Act as to the meaning of ‘bituminous, semi-bituminous and sub-
bituminous’ [was] a judicial function and [could] not be delegated to an administrative tribunal” 
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(p. 383).  The Act’s delegation of authority to the Commission to make that determination of 
meaning constituted “an unlawful delegation of judicial power” (p. 383).   
 Furthermore, the division of coal producers “into artificial classes of code and non-code 
for regulatory purposes [was] unreasonable and arbitrary, and violate[d] the Fifth Amendment” 
(p. 384).  The coal company’s attorneys again attacked the Act’s classification scheme as 
violating Fifth Amendment requirements, this time through criticism of the 19 1/2% tax.  
According to attorneys, “The so-called 19 1/2% tax on sale price of coal [was] not a tax, but a 
confiscatory penalty assessed without fault on the part of the appellant” (p. 384).  Since the 
application of the “so-called tax” was based not upon “difference in either conduct or product, 
but solely upon membership in the code,” the assessment was “unreasonable and arbitrary, and 
not in any wise a proper method of accomplishing a proper congressional purpose, and violate[d] 
the Fifth Amendment” (p. 384).   
 The government’s highest official legal talent presented arguments in defense of the 
Bituminous Coal Act of 1937.  Besides including the Solicitor General, the Attorney General, 
and the Assistant Attorney General, the government team also featured a rising young attorney 
described as a “protégé” of Justice William O. Douglas, Abe Fortas (Hall, 1992, p. 308).79  The 
team of government attorneys argued that the Act did constitute “a valid exercise of the federal 
commerce power” because the Act’s regulatory provisions applied “only to sales in or directly 
affecting interstate commerce” (p. 384).  The Act’s price-fixing provisions were substantially 
“the same as those contained in the … Act of 1935, which the dissenting opinions in Carter v. 
Carter Coal Co. indicated “were valid” and must be considered controlling as the “majority of 
the Court … did not pass upon the validity of these provisions” (p. 384).  Furthermore, according 
to the government’s attorneys, the Act’s fixing of prices did “not violate the due process clause” 
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of the Fifth Amendment because “the burden of proving that the regulation [was] arbitrary or 
capricious and of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality” was “upon the person 
assailing the validity of the statute,” a burden that was not “sustained by appellant here” (p. 385).  
Moreover, the attorneys continued, “both the record in this case and facts subject to the Court’s 
notice demonstrate[d] that the regulatory provisions [were] not arbitrary, capricious, or 
unreasonable” (p. 385).   
 Government attorneys countered the argument that the Act improperly delegated 
legislative power to the Bituminous Coal Commission by pointing out that “[t]he definition of 
‘bituminous coal’ in § 17 (b) constitute[d] a satisfactory standard;” therefore, the coal company’s 
argument was “without substance” (p. 385).  Neither did the Act constitute “an invalid delegation 
of judicial power” by granting the Bituminous Coal Commission authority “to determine the 
question of fact as to the status of coal under the Act” because the Act provided for the 
Commission’s “decision [to be] reviewable by the courts” (p. 385).  Finally, according to the 
government’s attorneys, it didn’t matter whether the 19 1/2% tax was “a tax or a penalty” 
because it was “aimed to effectuate … a legitimate exercise of the commerce power” (p. 386).  
As stated by the government attorneys, “There can be no question of the power of Congress to 
impose penalties in order to enforce laws enacted under any of the enumerated powers” (p. 386).  
They continued, “If the tax be a penalty, there can be no improper classification in applying it 
only to those who fail to comply with the regulatory plan which it is designed to enforce” (p. 
386).  As such, “the differentiation between code members and non-code members [was] valid” 
because it was “a means of equalizing the burdens imposed upon the two groups” (p. 386). 
 As can be seen from the preceding, the arguments presented a somewhat complex picture 
of the issues in that many of the facts of the case were each addressed by multiple points of law.  
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To illustrate, consider the following discussion depicting groupings of the facts with their 
multiple legal arguments.  Regarding the 19 1/2% tax, two legal arguments were presented: 1) it 
was not a tax, but a confiscatory penalty; 2) the 19 1/2% tax, based upon an improper 
classification scheme of code & noncode coal producers, violated the Fifth Amendment.  
Regarding the issue of the Act’s regulation of coal prices, two legal arguments were presented: 
1) such regulation exceeds the commerce powers of Congress; 2) the regulation of coal prices 
violates the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment.  Regarding the issue of the Act’s 
constituting an improper delegation of powers by Congress, two legal arguments were presented.  
The first argument involved yet another complication in that, besides addressing the improper 
delegation of power issue, it also addressed the preceding issue, regulating prices.  The two 
arguments that addressed the improper delegation of powers by Congress were: 1) the regulation 
of coal prices by the Coal Commission constituted an improper delegation of legislative 
authority; 2) the determination by the Coal Commission of what was bituminous coal and what 
was nonbituminous coal constituted an improper delegation of judicial authority.  The Court 
began its opinion by addressing the 19 1/2% tax versus confiscatory penalty contention; it 
concluded its opinion by addressing the Fifth Amendment arguments concerning the 19 1/2% 
tax.  The Court addressed the remaining issues in the portions of the opinion intermediary to the 
19 1/2% tax arguments. 
 Holding & disposition. 
 According to the Court, the constitutionality of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 
1937 was: 
upheld over the contentions that the 19 1/2% tax [was] not a tax but a 
penalty; that Congress lack[ed] power to fix minimum prices for bituminous 
coal sold in interstate commerce; that there ha[d] been an invalid delegation 
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of legislative and judicial power; and that the division of bituminous coal 
into code and non-code classes [was] improper.  (p. 381) 
 
More specifically, the “standards specified by … the Bituminous Coal Act to control the 
Commission” and the “definition[s] of bituminous coal [were] adequate as a standard for the 
Commission’s action in determining what coal [was] subject to the Act” passed judicial muster 
in terms of providing adequate guidance to an administrative agency “for carrying out the 
general policy and purpose of the Act” (pp. 382, 398).  Finally, the Act’s provisions for judicial 
review of its actions provided due process for the Sunshine Anthracite Coal Company (pp. 382, 
400). 
 Court’s rationale. 
 Justice William O. Douglas, a former professor from Columbia and Yale Law Schools 
and former chairman (1937) of the SEC who had been appointed by President Roosevelt to fill 
the seat left vacant by Justice Brandeis’ retirement from the Court in 1939, delivered the Court’s 
8-1 decision (See Hall, 1992, p. 233).  After reviewing the facts of the case, Justice Douglas 
addressed the questions surrounding the 19 1/2% tax provisions of the Act.  According to the 
Court, “[I]t seems plain that the tax was intended to apply only to those sales by non-code 
members which ‘would be’ subject to regulation under § 4” (Emphasis in original) (p. 392).  If 
the Court did as the coal company wished, the Court reasoned, “The essential sanction of the Act 
would then disappear and its effectiveness would be seriously impaired” (p. 392).  The Court 
continued, “To sustain appellant’s position …, we would have to override the express 
Congressional plan to make the 19 1/2% tax ‘in aid of the regulation of interstate commerce’ in 
bituminous coal” (pp. 392-393).  “Such a task,” the Court concluded, “is not for the courts” (p. 
393).  The Court re-stated that the “purpose and effect” of the 19 1/2% tax was not “merely for 
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revenue purposes,” but was “primarily a sanction to enforce the regulatory provisions of the Act” 
(p. 393).  According to the Court, such a purpose was legitimate: 
Congress may impose penalties in aid of the exercise of any of its 
enumerated powers.  The power of taxation, granted to Congress by the 
Constitution, may be utilized as a sanction for the exercise of another power 
which is granted it.  (p. 393) 
 
 Addressing the question whether or not the regulatory provisions of the Bituminous Coal 
Conservation Act of 1937 exceeded Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause, the Court 
stated, “The regulatory provisions are clearly within the power of Congress under the commerce 
clause of the Constitution” (p. 393).  As the government attorneys had urged this position by 
citing the dissenting opinions of Carter v. Carter Coal Co., so the Court decided, observing:  
As stated by Mr. Justice Cardozo in his dissent in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 
supra, p. 326, “To regulate the price for such transactions is to regulate 
commerce itself, and not alone its antecedent conditions or its ultimate 
consequences.”  (pp. 393-394) 
 
 The Court continued: 
Since this power when it exists is complete in itself, Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 
Wheat. 1, 196, there can be no question but that the provisions of this Act 
are an exertion of the paramount federal power over interstate commerce.  
(p. 394). 
 
 Next, the Court addressed the Fifth Amendment arguments regarding the price-fixing 
provisions of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1937.  The Court began, “Nor does the 
Act violate the Fifth Amendment” (p. 394).  According to the Court, “Price control is one of the 
means available to the states … and to the Congress … in their respective domains … for the 
protection and promotion of the welfare of the economy” (p. 394).  The claims made by 
attorneys for the Sunshine Anthracite Coal Company, e.g., “that the ills of the industry are 
attributable to overproduction; that the increase of prices will cause a further loss of markets and 
add to the afflictions which beset the industry,” are, in the Court’s view, “matters [that] relate to 
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questions of policy, to the wisdom of the legislation, and to the appropriateness of the remedy 
chosen – matters that are not our concern” (p. 394).  According to the Court evaluation of the 
situation, “If we endeavored to appraise them [the questions of the wisdom of Congress’ policy 
choices] we would be trespassing on the legislative domain” (p. 394).  Without mentioning the 
term, rational basis, the Court proceeded to examine the underlying record providing evidence of 
the rational basis for congressional passage of the Bituminous Coal Act, which included another 
citation from Justice Cardozo’s dissent in Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 
The investigations preceding the 1935 and 1937 Acts are replete with an 
exposition of the conditions which have beset that industry.  Official and 
private records give eloquent testimony to the statement of Mr. Justice 
Cardozo in the Carter case (p. 330) that free competition had been 
“degraded into anarchy” in the bituminous coal industry.  (p. 395) 
 
The Court examined the conclusions drawn by Congress regarding the nation’s coal industry. 
It was the judgment of Congress that price-fixing and the elimination of 
unfair competitive practices were appropriate methods for prevention of the 
financial ruin, low wages, poor working conditions, strikes, and disruption 
of the channels of trade which followed in the wake of the demoralized price 
structures in this country.  (p. 395) 
 
Evaluating the justifications used by Congress to justify its enactment of the Act, the Court 
declared, “If the strategic character of this industry in our economy and the chaotic conditions 
which have prevailed in it do not justify legislation, it is difficult to imagine what would” (p. 
395).  In response to the implied question, “What would it take for the Court to declare the Act 
unconstitutional,” the Court replied: 
To invalidate this Act we would have to deny the existence of power on the 
part of Congress under the commerce clause to deal directly and specifically 
with those forces which in its judgment should not be permitted to dislocate 
an important segment of our economy and to disrupt and burden interstate 
channels of trade.  (pp. 395-396) 
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The Court concluded, “That step could not be taken without plain disregard of the Constitution” 
(p. 396).  According to the Court’s interpretation of congressional power under the Constitution, 
Congress under the commerce clause is not impotent to deal with what it 
may consider to be dire consequences of laissez-faire.  It is not powerless to 
take steps in mitigation of what in its judgment are abuses of cut-throat 
competition.  And it is not limited in its choice between unrestrained self-
regulation on the one hand and rigid prohibitions on the other.  (p. 396) 
 
And, in illustration of the principle that yesterday’s dissent can, with changed conditions, provide 
the basis for a future majority opinion, the Court announced: 
There is nothing in the Carter case which stands in the way.  The majority 
of the Court in that case did not pass on the price-fixing features of the 
earlier Act.  The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Cardozo in separate minority 
opinions expressed the view that the price-fixing features of the earlier Act 
were constitutional.  We rest on their conclusions for sustaining the present 
Act.  (pp. 396-397) 
 
 Having concluded its examination of the coal company attorneys’ due process 
contentions under the Fifth Amendment, the Court turned next to consideration of the assertions 
by legal counsel for the Sunshine Anthracite Coal Company that the Bituminous Coal 
Conservation Act of 1937 was invalid because Congress had improperly delegated governmental 
powers (both legislative and judicial) to the Bituminous Coal Commission.  Addressing the claim 
of improper delegation of legislative powers by the Act to the Bituminous Coal Commission, the 
Court declared, “Nor does the Act contain an invalid delegation of legislative power” (p. 397).  
The Court explained by first noting the Commission’s authority under the Act to establish both 
maximum and minimum prices “in the public interest” (p. 397).  After discussing the Act’s 
standards for setting maximum prices, the Court devoted 16 lines of its opinion to a listing of the 
standards to which minimum prices had to “conform” (p. 397).  Next the Court made 
comparisons between “fixing reasonable prices for bituminous coal” under the Bituminous Coal 
Conservation Act and “fixing rates under the Interstate Commerce Act … and the Packers and 
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Stockyards Act” (p. 398).  Drawing attention to the fact that the constitutionality of the rate-
fixing portions of the two latter Acts had been upheld in previous decisions, the Court next listed 
the standards which had also been upheld by previous Court rulings: “the standard of ‘just and 
reasonable’ to guide the administrative body,” “the appropriateness of the criterion of the ‘public 
interest’ in various contexts,” and “the standard of ‘unreasonable obstruction’” (p. 398).  
According to the Court, “[A]ll make it clear that there is a valid delegation of authority in this 
case” (p. 398).  The Court further noted: 
The standards which Congress has provided here far exceed in specificity 
others which have been sustained.  Certainly in the hands of experts the 
criteria which Congress has supplied are wholly adequate for carrying out 
the general policy and purpose of the Act.  To require more would be to 
insist on a degree of exactitude which not only lacks legal necessity but 
which does not comport with the requirements of the administrative process.  
(p. 398) 
 
Reminiscent of the arguments regarding the nature of the Constitution (was it a general blueprint 
or a detailed plan), the Court continued by noting the differing requirements of the two 
processes, legislating and administering (See preceding pp. 282-283 re: nature of the 
Constitution).80 
But the effectiveness of both the legislative and administrative processes 
would become endangered if Congress were under the constitutional 
compulsion of filling in the details beyond the liberal prescription here.  
Then the burdens of minutiae would be apt to clog the administration of the 
law and deprive the agency of that flexibility and dispatch which are its 
salient virtues. (Emphasis added) (p. 398)  
 
Prepared to announce its holding regarding the issue of improper delegation of legislative 
authority by Congress to the Bituminous Coal Commission, the Court ruled, “For these reasons 
we hold that the standards with which Congress has supplied the Commission are plainly valid” 
(pp. 398-399).  The Court then addressed the issue of delegating legislative authority to the coal 
industry by reason of favoring members of the Bituminous Coal Code.  According to the Court, 
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“The members of the code function subordinately to the Commission.  It, not the code 
authorities, determines the prices.  And it has authority and surveillance over the activities of 
these authorities” (p. 399).  “Since law-making is not entrusted to the industry,” the Court 
declared, “this statutory scheme is unquestionably valid” (p. 399). 
 Having confronted the issue of improper delegation of legislative authority, the Court 
turned its attention to the arguments advanced by the coal company attorneys in support of the 
contention that the Act represented an improper delegation of judicial authority to the 
Bituminous Coal Commission.  Attorneys for Sunshine Anthracite Coal Company had argued 
that the determination of what was and what was not bituminous coal within the meaning of the 
Act was “a judicial function” that could not be “delegated to an administrative tribunal” (p. 383).  
Responding to that argument, the Court declared that Congress could delegate to [an 
administrative agency] the determination of the question of fact whether a particular coal 
producer fell within the Act” (p. 400).  By way of further explanation, the Court drew a 
comparison between what the Bituminous Coal Commission was required to do and what the 
Interstate Commerce Commission had been required to do under the Railway Labor Act, the 
latter requirement having been upheld by the Court. 
The fact that such a determination involved an interpretation of the term 
“bituminous coal” is of no more significance here than was the fact that in 
the Shields case, a decision by the Interstate Commerce Commission of 
what constituted an “interurban” electric railway was necessary for the 
ultimate finding as the applicability of the Railway Labor Act to carriers.  
(p. 400) 
 
In the Court’s view, the critical issue was not an improper delegation of authority; instead the 
problem centered on “the adequacy of the standard governing the exercise of the delegated 
authority” (p. 400).  Addressing that issue, the Court provided the Act’s definition of 
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“bituminous coal,” a definition that occupied seven lines of the Court’s opinion (p. 399).  In 
announcing its opinion of the Act’s definition, the Court stated: 
[W]e think the definition of bituminous coal is wholly adequate as a 
standard for administrative action.  The fact that it is not a chemist’s or an 
engineer’s definition is not fatal.  The definition is not devoid of meaning.  
We are unable to say that it cannot be applied so as to delineate the areas in 
which Congress intended to make this system of control effective.  (p. 399) 
 
And then the Court connected the twin problems of legislating law and administering law. 
The fact that many instances may occur where its application may be 
difficult is merely to emphasize the nature of the administrative problem and 
the reason for the grant of latitude by the Congress.  The difficulty or 
impossibility of drawing a statutory line is one of the reasons for supplying 
merely a statutory guide…  That guide is sufficiently precise for an 
intelligent determination of the ultimate questions of fact by experts.  (pp. 
399-400) 
 
Finally, the Court noted that the Sunshine Anthracite Coal Company had “received all the 
judicial review to which it [was] entitled” (p. 400).  Two actions against the company stemming 
from activities of the Bituminous Coal Commission had been appealed by the company, not only 
to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, but also to the nation’s highest judicial tribunal, the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  Accordingly, the Act neither violated due process requirements of the Fifth 
Amendment nor constituted an “invalid delegation of judicial power” (p. 400). 
 Concurring/dissenting opinions. 
 Justice McReynolds disagreed with the Court majority, but didn’t offer a separate 
dissenting opinion.  McReynolds believed that the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 was “beyond 
any power granted to Congress” and that the district court’s decision should have been 
“reversed” (p. 404).  Other than his belief being summarized by Justice Douglas, no arguments in 
support of that belief were presented, either by Justice McReynolds or on his behalf. 
 American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
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 Facts & procedural history. 
 Although the record of the Court’s decision did not include separate sections detailing the 
legal arguments presented by both teams of attorneys, Justice Brennan’s majority opinion 
provided sufficient information regarding legal arguments to permit use of the full brief format.  
The case centered on congressional use of its Commerce Power via an administrative agency, 
which Congress had empowered to provide for worker health in the nation’s various work 
settings.  According to the Court: 
In its statement of findings and declaration of purpose encompassed in the 
Act itself, Congress announced that “personal injuries and illnesses arising 
out of work situations impose a substantial burden upon, and are a hindrance 
to, interstate commerce in terms of lost production, wage loss, medical 
expenses, and disability compensation payments….  Senator Eagleton 
summarized: “Whether we, as individuals, are motivated by simple 
humanity or by simple economics, we can no longer permit profits to be 
dependent upon an unsafe or unhealthy worksite.  (pp. 521-522) 
 
The cotton industry challenged the congressional action as implemented by the Secretary of 
Labor, the major focus of such implementation being attempts to reduce and eliminate working 
conditions causing “’brown lung’ disease, … a serious and potentially disabling respiratory 
disease primarily caused by the inhalation of cotton dust” (p. 495).  The legal challenge was 
quite sophisticated because instead of challenging the constitutionality of either the 
congressional action or administrative implementation of the act in question, the legal objections 
centered upon the interpretation of the legislative requirements and upon an attempt to require an 
elaborate and cumbersome process designed to defeat the actual implementation of the act’s 
provisions. 
 In 1970 Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act in order “to assure so 
far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working 
conditions” (p. 493).  The Act required the Secretary of Labor “to establish, after notice and 
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opportunity to comment, mandatory nationwide standards governing health and safety in the 
workplace” (p. 493).  The Secretary of Labor delegated such authority to the Assistant Secretary 
for Occupational Safety and Health who was responsible for administering the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration, or OSHA.  Because the lines of administrative authority 
converged on the Secretary of Labor, the Court used “the terms OSHA and the Secretary 
interchangeably [throughout the opinion] when referring to the agency, the Secretary of Labor, 
or the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health” (p. 494, n. 1).   
 With specific regards to the cotton industry, OSHA  
promulgated a standard limiting occupational exposure to cotton dust, an 
airborne particle byproduct of the preparation and manufacture of cotton 
products, exposure to which induces a “constellation of respiratory effects” 
known as “byssinosis.”  43 Fed. Reg. 27352, col. 3 (1978).  This disease 
was one of the expressly recognized health hazards that led to passage of the 
Act.  (p. 494) 
 
“Byssinosis [was] known in its more severe manifestations as ‘brown lung’ disease” (p. 495).  
The Act defined cotton dust as: 
dust present in the air during the handling or processing of cotton, which 
may contain a mixture of many substances including ground up plant matter, 
fiber, bacteria, fungi, soil, pesticides, non-cotton plant matter and other 
contaminants which may have accumulated with the cotton during the 
growing, harvesting and subsequent processing or storage periods.  (pp. 495-
496, n. 6).   
 
The Act defined byssinosis “as a ‘continuum … disease,’ that has been categorized into four 
grades” (p. 496).  The Court described the Act’s description of both the disease’s least and most 
serious forms.  According to the Court: 
In its least serious form, byssinosis produces both subjective symptoms, 
such as chest tightness, shortness of breath, coughing, and wheezing, and 
objective indications of loss of pulmonary functions.  In its most serious 
form, byssinosis is a chronic and irreversible obstructive pulmonary disease, 
clinically similar to chronic bronchitis or emphysema, and can be severely 
disabling.  At worst, … byssinosis can create an additional strain on 
   
   
618
cardiovascular functions and can contribute to death from heart failure.  (p. 
496) 
 
 Regarding the history of the disease, the Court noted, “Byssinosis is not a newly 
discovered disease, having been described as early as in the 1820’s in England, … and observed 
in Belgium in a study of 2,000 cotton workers in 1845…” (p. 497, n. 9, ¶ 6).  However, it was 
not until “the early 1960’s” that byssinosis was “recognized in the United States as a distinct 
occupational hazard associated with cotton mills” (p. 498).  According to the Court’s citation 
from the Senate Report on the Act, the late date of this recommendation occurred because the 
cotton industry ignored “repeated warnings over the years from other countries that their cotton 
workers suffered from lung disease” (p. 499, n. 13).  The legislative history of the Act revealed 
that at the time the Act was being considered, approximately 25% of “active cotton-preparation 
and yarn-manufacturing workers suffer[ed] at least some form of the disease” while at least 8% 
of “employed and retired cotton mill workers” suffered “from the most disabling form of 
byssinosis” or, in other words, from brown-lung disease (p. 498). 
 The OSHA standard did not represent the government’s first attempt to regulate worker 
exposure to cotton dust.  In 1968, after Congress had passed “the Walsh-Healey Act,” the 
Secretary of Labor established standards for “airborne contaminant threshold limit values” that 
were “applicable to public contractors” only (p. 499).  The standard used by the Secretary of 
Labor had been developed two years previously by a private organization, “the American 
Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH),” in 1966 (P. 499).  The ACGIH 
standard, and the Secretary of Labor’s as well, “recommended that exposure to total cotton dust 
be limited to a ‘threshold limit value’ of 1,000 micrograms per cubic meter of air (1,000 µg/m3) 
averaged over an 8-hour workday” (p. 499).  In 1974, which was four years after the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 was passed and four years before OSHA 
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promulgated “its final Cotton Dust Standard – the one challenged in the instant case – on June 
23, 1978,” ACGIH adopted a different measurement unit resulting in a lower threshold limit (p. 
501).  Instead of total dust, the unit adopted by ACGIH was “respirable” dust (p. 499).  
Comparatively speaking, “1,000 µg/m3 of total dust [was] roughly equivalent to 500 µg/m3 of 
respirable dust” (p. 500, n. 17).  As a result of changing its unit of measure from total dust to 
respirable dust in 1974, the new exposure to cotton dust recommendation by the ACGIH was 200 
µg/m3 (pp. 499-500).81  OSHA, on December 28, 1976, “published a proposal to replace the 
existing federal standard on cotton dust [1,000 µg/m3] with a new permanent standard … [which] 
contained a PEL [permissible exposure limit] of 200 µg/m3” (p. 501).  Following three public 
hearings, which involved “widespread” public participation of “representatives from industry 
and the work force, scientists, economists, industrial hygienists, and many others.” OSHA 
modified the originally proposed Cotton Dust Standard [a permissible exposure limit (PEL) of 
200 µg/m3] official on June 23, 1978 (p. 501).  As officially modified, the originally proposed 
200 µg/m3 PEL requirement applied only to yarn manufacturing.  The OSHA Cotton Dust 
Standard “for slashing and weaving operations” became 750 µg/m3, while “for all other 
processes in the cotton industry,” the standard was set at 500 µg/m3 (p. 503).  Such was the 
nature of the standard being challenged by the cotton industry and its friends, the American Farm 
Bureau Federation and the Chamber of Commerce. 
 Regarding the implementation strategy for meeting the requirements of the Cotton Dust 
Standard, OSHA “depended primarily on a mix of engineering controls, such as installation of 
ventilation systems, and work practice controls, such as special floor-sweeping procedures” with 
full compliance of the PEL’s (permissible exposure limits) being “required within four years” (p. 
502).  During the four-year compliance period, OSHA also required “employers to provide 
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respirators to employees” (p. 503).  OSHA also required cotton manufacturers to monitor cotton 
dust exposure, provide “medical surveillance of all employees,” conduct “employee education 
and training programs,” provide annual medical examinations, and to post warning signs (p. 
503).  In a specific provision that was also challenged by the cotton manufacturers, OSHA 
required “employers to transfer employees unable to wear respirators to another position, if 
available, having a dust level at or below the Standard’s PEL’s, with ‘no loss of earnings or other 
employment rights or benefits as a result of the transfer’” (p. 503). 
  The American Textile Manufacturers Institute and the National Cotton Council of 
America filed separate suits in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia against 
Donovan, the Secretary of Labor.  The suits challenged the validity of the Cotton Dust Standard 
as well as the requirement “that employers guarantee the wages and benefits of employees who 
are transferred to other positions because of their inability to wear respirators” (p. 495, n. 5).  
The Circuit Court “upheld the Standard in all major respects” (p. 504).  More specifically, the 
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia ruled that, contrary to arguments by the cotton 
industry attorneys, Congress had already conducted a cost-benefits analysis in passing the 
legislation, that instead of such an analysis, OSHA was charged with developing a health 
standard that would “protect employees against material health impairment subject only to the 
limits of technological and economic feasibility” (p. 504).  The Circuit Court also “held that 
OSHA ha[d] such authority” to require that employees be guaranteed their current wages and 
benefits if forced to request a transfer for health reasons because of an inability to wear a 
respirator (p. 537).  Finally, the Circuit Court “held that the agency’s determination of 
technological and economic feasibility was supported by substantial evidence in the record as a 
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whole” (p. 505).  The U.S. Supreme Court “granted certiorari, 449 U.S. 817 (1980)” and 
combined the two suits into one legal case (pp. 495, 491). 
 Legal questions. 
 Does the Occupational Safety and Health Act require the Secretary of Labor, “in 
promulgating a standard pursuant to [the Act’s requirements], to determine that the costs of the 
standard bear a reasonable relationship to its benefits” (p. 506)?  Does the determination by the 
Secretary of Labor regarding the Cotton Dust Standard’s economic feasibility meet the 
“substantial evidence” requirement of the Act (p. 522)?  Did OSHA exceed its “statutory 
authority when it issued the wage guarantee regulation” (p. 540)? 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 Robert Bork, who later would be nominated for the Supreme Court by President Reagan 
and rejected by both the Senate Judiciary Committee and the full Senate, headed the legal team 
for the cotton manufacturers, which consisted of thirteen attorneys in addition to Bork.82  Of 
interest to Iowans and other rural Americans, the American Farm Bureau Federation lined up on 
the side of the cotton manufacturers in opposing the new requirements for reducing the 
prevalence of “brown lung” disease in the cotton industry and for safeguarding workers’ health 
(p. 493).  The Chamber of Commerce also opposed the new health requirements for the cotton 
industry.  In challenging the validity of the Cotton Dust Standard established by OSHA, the legal 
team for the cotton industry argued that the Act required “OSHA to demonstrate that its Standard 
reflect[ed] a reasonable relationship between the costs and benefits associated with the Standard” 
(p. 494).  More specifically, in addition to showing that “a standard addresse[d] a significant risk 
of material health impairment,” OSHA was also required to “demonstrate that the reduction in 
risk of material health impairment [was] significant in light of the costs of attaining that 
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reduction” (p. 506).  The cotton industry’s legal team also argued that “OSHA’s determination of 
the Standard’s ‘economic feasibility’ was not supported by substantial evidence” (p. 491).  
Finally, the cotton industry lawyers contended “that the wage guarantee requirement was beyond 
OSHA’s authority” (p. 491).   
 The Deputy Solicitor General headed the federal government’s legal team of seven 
attorneys.  The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations provided 
separate legal argument to the Court through a team of eight attorneys.  Attorneys for the 
Secretary of Labor and the labor organization argued that OSHA was not required to balance the 
costs and benefits of its health requirements because Congress had already done that “in the Act 
itself” (p. 494).  The labor attorneys contended that the Act constituted a mandate to OSHA to 
“enact the most protective standard possible to eliminate a significant risk of material health 
impairment, subject to the constraints of economic and technological feasibility” (p. 495).  
Attorneys further argued that not only had OSHA “explained the economic impact it projected 
for the textile industry,” but also OSHA had “substantial support in the record for its … findings 
of economic feasibility for the textile industry” (p. 536).  Finally, the government attorneys 
argued that the wage guarantee requirement was necessary to “minimize any adverse economic 
impact on the employee by virtue of the inability to wear a respirator” (p. 538).  They further 
argued: 
Experience under the Act has shown that employees are reluctant to disclose 
symptoms of disease and tend to minimize work-related health problems for 
fear of being discharged or transferred to a lower paying job….  It may 
reasonably be expected, therefore, that many employees incapable of using 
respirators would continue to breathe unhealthful air rather than request a 
transfer, thus destroying the utility of the respirator program.  (p. 539) 
 
 Holding & disposition. 
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 Justice Powell took no part in the proceedings.  Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Stevens formed the majority.  Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion as did 
Justice Rehnquist, which was joined by Chief Justice Burger.  The 5-3 Court majority 
“affirm[ed] in part, and vacate[d] in part,” the Circuit Court ruling (p. 505).   
 Regarding the first legal question, the Court held that OSHA was not required to develop 
a cost-benefit analysis before “promulgating a standard” under the Act’s requirements because, 
instead of such an analysis, the Act required a “feasibility analysis” (p. 509).  The Court also 
held that the Circuit Court had not “’misapprehended or grossly misapplied’ the substantial 
evidence test when it found that ‘OSHA reasonably evaluated the cost estimates before it, 
considered criticisms of each, and selected suitable estimates of compliance costs’” (p. 530).  
Regarding the third legal question challenging OSHA’s authority under the Act to issue the wage 
guarantee regulation, the Court held “that OSHA acted beyond statutory authority when it issued 
the wage guarantee regulation” (p. 540). 
 Court’s rationale. 
 Justice Brennan delivered the Court’s 5-3 opinion.  The figure on the following page 
portrays the structure of the Court’s opinion, which illustrates its approach to the legal issues and 
questions (See Figure 3). With regards to the first legal question centering on a cost-benefit 
versus economic-technological feasibility analysis, the Court noted and ruled: 
In effect then, as the Court of Appeals held, Congress itself defined the basic 
relationship between costs and benefits, by placing the “benefit” of worker 
health above all other considerations save those making attainment of this 
“benefit” unachievable.  Any standard based on a balancing of costs and 
benefits … would be inconsistent with the command set forth in § 6 (b) (5).  
Thus, cost-benefit analysis by OSHA is not required by the statute because 
feasibility analysis is.  (p. 509) 
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In support of its analysis and holding, the Court cited testimony by senators and representatives, 
including the following remarks by Congressman Dent: 
Although I am very much disturbed over adding new costs to the operation 
of our production facilities because of the threats from abroad, I would say 
there is a greater concern and that must be for the production men who do 
the producing – the men who work in the service industries and the man and 
women in this country who daily go out and keep the economy moving and 
make it safe for all of us to live and to work and to be able to prosper in it.  
(p. 521, n. 39) 
 
The Court concluded: 
Nowhere is there any indication that Congress contemplated a different 
balancing by OSHA of the benefits of worker health and safety against the 
costs of achieving them.  Indeed Congress thought that the financial costs of 
health and safety problems in the workplace were as large as or larger than 












 Addressing the second legal question regarding the cotton industry’s claim that OSHA’s 
Cotton Dust Standard was not based on substantial evidence, the Court declared that it would  
apply the familiar rule that “[t]his Court will intervene only in what ought to 
be the rare instance when the [substantial evidence] standard appears to have 
been misapprehended or grossly misapplied” by the Court below.  Universal 
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra, at 491” (p. 523) 
I. Facts and Legal History of the Case. 
II. Legal Question and Examination. 
A. Language of the Statute. 
B. Plain Meaning of the Language. 
C. Legislative History of the Act. 
III. Examination of OSHA Findings to Determine If They Met 
the “Substantial Evidence” Test. 
A. Cost Estimates of Compliance. 
B. Economic Feasibility of Industry Compliance. 
IV. Wage Guarantee Requirements Issue. 
V. Summary of Ruling. 
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Prior to its examination of OSHA’s examination of the problem, its findings, and its proposals 
based on those findings, the Court restated its previous definition of substantial evidence. 
In statutes with provisions virtually identical to § 6 (f) of the Act, we have 
defined substantial evidence as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Universal Camera 
corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951).  (pp. 522-523) 
 
After examining “OSHA’s findings and the record upon which they were based,” the Court 
announced its position (p. 523).  According to the Court, “On the basis of the whole record, we 
cannot conclude that the Court of Appeals ‘misapprehended or grossly misapplied’ the 
substantial evidence test” (p. 536). 
 Finally, the Court examined the issues surrounding OSHA’s promulgation of the wage 
and benefit guarantee.  The Court began its examination by noting that the Cotton Dust Standard 
placed “heavy reliance on the use of respirators to protect employees from exposure to cotton 
dust, particularly during the 4-year interim period necessary to install and implement feasible 
engineering controls” (p. 536).  The Court noted that the Act required the Secretary of Labor “to 
include ‘a statement of the reasons’ for” actions taken to implement the provisions of the Act 
which “shall be published in the Federal Register” (Emphasis in original) (p. 538).  The Court 
further noted: 
But OSHA never explained the wage guarantee provision as an approach 
designed to contribute to increased health protection.  Instead the agency 
stated that the “goal of this provision is to minimize any adverse economic 
impact on the employee by virtue of the inability to wear a respirator.”  [43 
Fed. Reg.], at 27387, col. 3 [(1978)].  (pp. 538-539) 
 
The Court further noted the argument used by government attorneys to connect the wage 
requirement to health: 
Experience under the Act has shown that employees are reluctant to disclose 
symptoms of disease and tend to minimize work-related health problems for 
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fear of being discharged or transferred to a lower paying job….  It may 
reasonably be expected, therefore, that many employees incapable of using 
respirators would continue to breathe unhealthful air rather than request a 
transfer, thus destroying the utility of the respirator program.  (p. 539) 
 
Noting that the argument had “merit,” the Court also noted that it amounted to a “post hoc 
rationalization” that didn’t meet the Act’s requirements (p. 539).  Although there was “evidence 
in the record that might support” the determination made by OSHA in terms of the connection 
made by government attorneys after the fact, the Court further explained (p. 539): 
However, the courts will not be expected to scrutinize the record to uncover 
and formulate a rationale explaining an action, when the agency in the first 
instance has failed to articulate such rationale.  See Automotive Parts & 
Accessories Assn. v. Boyd, 132 U.S. App. D.C. 200, 208, 407 F. 2d 330, 338 
(1968).  (p. 539, n. 73) 
 
According to the Court, “Congress gave OSHA the responsibility to protect worker health and 
safety, and to explain its reasons for its actions” (p. 540).  However, the Act didn’t authorize 
OSHA to repair general unfairness to employees that [was] unrelated to achievement of health 
and safety goals …” (p. 540).  Because OSHA related the wage guarantee regulation to an effort 
to reduce adverse economic effects on workers, which was not authorized by the Act, and 
because OSHA didn’t relate the wage requirement to worker health and safety as required by the 
Act, the Court ruled that “OSHA acted beyond statutory authorization when it issued the wage 
guarantee regulation” (p. 540). 
 Concurring/dissenting opinions. 
 Justice Stewart’s dissent focused on what he perceived to be a failure by OSHA to 
“justify its estimate of the cost of the Cotton Dust Standard on the basis of substantial evidence” 
(p. 542).  Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice Burger, expressed his 
belief “that the Act exceed[ed] Congress’ power to delegate legislative authority to nonelected 
officials” (p. 543).  In his expressed opinion, “Congress simply left the crucial policy choices in 
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the hands of the Secretary of Labor” (p. 548).  For Rehnquist, the critical issue revolved around a 
cost-benefit analysis which Congress should have “either mandated, permitted, or prohibited” (p. 
548).  However, according to the majority opinion and according to the record, such an analysis 
had been considered by Congress and had been rendered secondary to the more important issue 
of providing feasible requirements to ensure workers’ health in the cotton industry. 
The commerce clause/spending power versus the tenth amendment – Attachment of 
conditions to federal legislation by congress that require state government 
compliance to access federal funds. 
 
 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
 Facts & procedural history. 
 As part of the New Deal’s efforts to address the impact of the Great Depression upon 
agriculture by promoting economic recovery, Congress enacted the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
(AAA) of 1933.  The Act empowered the Secretary of Agriculture (Henry Wallace, a native 
Iowan) to enter into voluntary agreements with farmers to reduce planted acreage in return for 
government payments, the proceeds of which were to be provided by taxes levied upon the first 
processor of the particular commodity involved.  The amount of taxes levied upon processors 
depended upon three factors: first, the identity of the commodity; second, the corresponding 
difference between the current market price and the parity price (the ideal price) measured in 
terms of purchasing power; and third, the amount needed to close the gap between the current 
price and the parity price as expressed in a tax rate figured by the Secretary of Agriculture.  The 
parity price for cotton, as for most agricultural products, was the price received during the 
Golden Age of Agriculture, when rural America thrived economically, the “pre-war period from 
1909 to 1914,” (p. 25).  Before becoming finalized, the initial parity price was adjusted for 
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inflation in order to equalize purchasing power between the current period and the ideal period 
(p. 25).   
 William M. Butler, “a wealthy textile manufacturer who had served as Calvin Coolidge’s 
campaign manager and as chairman of the Republican National Committee,” became involved 
with a company that refused to pay the tax to its cotton processor (Culver & Hyde, p. 158).  The 
cotton processor, Franklin Process Company, filed suit in the federal District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts, to recover “a balance due on processing and floor stock taxes” that 
was presented as “a claim of the United States for $81,694.28” (8 F. Supp. 552, 553).  The 
defendant, Hoosac Mills Corporation, appointed Butler and “James A. McDonough, both of 
Boston,” as receivers for itself (8 F. Supp. 552, 553).  A good portion of Butler’s funding for the 
legal battle came from Frederick Prince, an “implacable opponent of the New Deal” who “was 
said to have spent a million dollars in legal challenges to Roosevelt’s programs” (Culver & 
Hyde, p. 158). 
 The federal district court, in Franklin Process Co. v. Hoosac Mills Corp., ruled in favor 
of the federal government’s claim as presented by the Franklin Process Company.  The opinion, 
written by District Judge Elisha H. Brewster for the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts, 
presented four features of interest.  First, Butler and McDonough’s attorneys argued that the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 was “repugnant to the constitutional guarantee of a 
Republican form of government” because in its regulation of agricultural production, the 
Government was intruding into an area reserved to the states (8 F. Supp. 552, 562).  Judge 
Brewster dismissed the claim by repeating a quote of the Court in Mountain Timber Co. v. 
Washington:  “As has been decided repeatedly, the question whether this guaranty has been 
violated is not a judicial but a political question, committed to Congress and not to the courts” (8 
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F. Supp. 552, 562).  What Judge Brewster neglected was the origin of the principle he used and 
the succeeding opinions cited by the Court in Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington as 
substantiation for its summarization of the legal principle, a principle which began with Luther v. 
Borden in the neighboring state of Rhode Island involving the political disenfranchisement of 
textile workers and was continued by subsequent Court opinions in Pacific States Telephone & 
Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, Kiernan v. Portland, Oregon, Marshall v. Dye, and Davis v. Ohio.   
 Second, the District Court did not find that the Act violated the Tenth Amendment.  First, 
Judge Brewster noted that “the commerce powers … could not be extended to reach a crop of 
wheat or cotton” (8 F. Supp. 552, 561).  As he further explained, “If, therefore, Congress had 
undertaken by coercive measures to regulate the amount of wheat or cotton a farmer should 
produce, a serious constitutional question would arise whether Congress had not extended the 
frontier of federal bureaucratic activities too far” (8 F. Supp. 552, 561).  And, as Judge Brewster 
concluded, coercive measures were not involved.  According to the federal Massachusetts 
District Court’s opinion: 
But, as has already been noted, the authority delegated to the Secretary of 
Agriculture by the first sub-division of section 8 cannot be brought to bear 
upon any one who does not voluntarily submit to it and this for a monetary 
consideration. (8 F. Supp. 552, 561) 
 
 Third, Judge Brewster’s opinion included an informative discussion focused on the issue 
of unlawful delegations of legislative power.  Tracing the origins of the “doctrine” back to 
Montesquieu, Brewster noted its first recognition by Chief Justice Marshall and discussed 
subsequent case law dealing with the issue (8 F. Supp. 552, 557).  Brewster also noted the issue 
was “not peculiar to the United States,” observing that English courts “have given serious 
consideration to the growing mass of administrative law in that country” (8 F. Supp. 552, 557).  
Pointing to the centrality of the issue to the case at hand, Judge Brewster opined, “It must, I 
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think, be conceded that legislative functions are conferred upon administrative officers by the 
act” (8 F. Supp. 552, 558). “But,” he continued, “whether there has been an unlawful delegation 
of power is to be doubted upon the authorities” (8 F. Supp. 552, 558).  District Court Judge 
Brewster explained by alluding to the relationship of lower federal courts with the Supreme 
Court and the role of stare decisis in lower federal court decisions, an explanation that provided 
the fourth feature of interest presented by this federal lower court decision: 
The courts have not as yet clearly defined the line between lawful and 
unlawful delegation of legislative power.  While the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act would seem to come near the line, it would be 
presumptuous for this court to undertake to put the act outside the circle of 
the Constitution in view of earlier acts already cited which have received the 
sanction of the Supreme Court.  (8 F. Supp. 552, 558-559) 
 
 Upon appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeals, the case became officially known as 
Butler et al. v. United States.  One factor had changed during the interim between the district 
court’s ruling and that of the circuit court.  The U.S. Supreme Court issued two decisions that 
further defined the line between lawful and unlawful delegation of legislative power, the 
“Panama Refining Co. Case and the Schechter Poultry Corporation Case” (78 F.2d 1, 12).83  For 
the First Circuit Court of Appeals, these decisions “clearly condemn[ed] it [the AAA’s 
delegation of power to the Secretary of Agriculture] as unwarranted under the Constitution” (78 
F.2d 1, 12).   To further buttress its delegation of authority reasoning, the First Circuit Court 
connected the delegation issue to the doctrine of the separation of powers.  The Circuit Court of 
Appeals did so by quoting a portion of the Constitution of Massachusetts that contained John 
Adam’s answer to a question posed centuries ago by Aristotle.  Although Adams had answered 
Aristotle’s question partly by referencing the separation of powers doctrine, the Circuit Court 
used that answer to connect separation of powers to the delegation of authority issue, perhaps 
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unaware of the ancient line of political thought involved (See n. # 67).  The portion of the state 
constitution cited read: 
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall 
never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: the 
executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either 
of them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive 
powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not 
of men.  (78 F.2d 1, 8) 
 
 The First Circuit Court also thought the AAA “attempted to invade a field over which 
[Congress] has no control, since its obvious purpose, viz. to control or regulate the production of 
agricultural products in the several states … [was] beyond the power of Congress” (78 F.2d 1, 7).  
Government attorneys contended the Court’s focus should be fixed upon taxation to provide for 
the general welfare while Butler’s attorneys argued for a focus upon the Tenth Amendment via 
the effects and purpose of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.  According to the Court: 
The issue is not, as the government contends, whether Congress can 
appropriate funds raised by general taxation for any purpose deemed by 
Congress in furtherance of the “general welfare,” but whether Congress has 
any power to control or regulate matters left to the states and lay a special 
tax for that purpose.  (78 F.2d 1, 7) 
 
 The following statement by the First Circuit Court of Appeals foreshadowed Attorney 
Pepper’s argument used before the Supreme Court on Butler’s behalf, a Tenth Amendment 
argument focused on constitutional limitations to which Pepper added imagery in the form of a 
question about the nature of the federal legislature, i.e., was it an unrestricted parliament or a  
constitutionally restricted congress.  The Court stated: 
If Congress can take over the control of any intrastate business by a 
declaration of an economic emergency and a public interest in its regulation, 
it would be difficult to define the limits of the powers of Congress or to 
foretell the future limitations of local self-government.  (78 F.2d 1, 11) 
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 By a 2-1 majority, the First Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the district court’s 
ruling, holding that the AAA unconstitutionally: 1) delegated legislative authority to the 
Secretary of Agriculture; and 2) “invaded a field over which it ha[d] no control under the 
Constitution since it was a field reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment (78 F.2d 1, 12).  
With Butler’s position regarding the unconstitutionality of the AAA being upheld by the First 
Circuit Court, the federal government appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 Legal questions. 
 Does the processing tax represent a valid exercise by Congress of its taxing authority? 
Does the Agricultural Adjustment Act regulate production, an activity reserved to the States, in 
contravention of the Tenth Amendment?  Does the Act unconstitutionally delegate legislative 
authority to an administrative agency? 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 The legal team for the federal government included the Attorney General, the Solicitor 
General, two Assistant Attorneys General, and six government attorneys, at least one of whom, 
Alger Hiss, worked for the legal division of the Department of Agriculture (p. 13).84  Solicitor 
General Reed provided oral argument while all attorneys contributed to the written brief 
submitted to the Court. 
 Although Congress cited the Commerce Clause in enacting the AAA, the government 
attorneys did not defend the Act on that basis.85  Instead the Act was portrayed as a legitimate 
exercise of the taxing and spending power of Congress.  Article I, § 8. cl. 1 of the Constitution, 
the General Welfare Clause, “gave Congress power to expend it [the processing tax] for rental 
and benefit payments” (p. 12).  The Act made use  
of a tax levied on processors in the form of an excise passed on the general 
consuming public, the purpose of which [was] to raise money to be used by 
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the Government in contracts with farmers, for the reduction of surplus 
production that was pressing on the price and pressing on the supply…  (p. 
13) 
 
According to the government attorneys, both the “processing and floor-stock taxes [were] 
excises; not direct taxes” that were forbidden (p. 13).  The Solicitor General stated the 
Government’s position, “Our contention is that the welfare clause gives the right to tax and the 
right to appropriate, so long as the appropriations are limited to the general welfare” (p. 49).  The 
Government attempted to re-frame the issue to avoid the Tenth Amendment issue regarding the 
allegation that the Act regulated agricultural production, which was a power reserved to the 
states.  According to Solicitor General Reed: 
The vital point of assault and defense upon the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
seems to me not to be in the Tenth Amendment, … but as to whether the 
Government has the power to appropriate money which it raises by taxation 
for the benefit of individuals in the States, or to carry out contracts which 
the Government makes with those individuals.  (p. 49) 
 
 The following arguments were addressed in the written brief, but not mentioned in oral 
argument:   
• “Powers were not unlawfully delegated” (p. 14). 
 •  “The processing and floor-stock taxes do not contravene the Fifth Amendment” (p. 
14). 
•  “The general welfare clause should be construed broadly to include anything 
conducive to the national welfare; it is not limited by the subsequently enumerated 
powers” (p. 16).  
• “Power of control over or regulation of agriculture has not been asserted” (p. 21). 
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• “The contracts are a matter of negotiation and voluntary agreement” whereby “the 
Secretary of Agriculture sees that the money appropriated goes to persons in the class 
specified by Congress” (p. 21). 
• “The distinction between an application of the law-making power to enforce 
compliance, and the use of the spending power to persuade, was pointed out in 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529” (p. 22). 
 The government’s arguments presented difficulty in terms of coherence and logical 
structure, possibly because of the nature of their argument in trying to assert that the AAA was 
not a regulation of agricultural production, when if fact that was the stated purpose of the Act.  
Section 2 of the Act declared the policy of Congress to be “[t]o establish and maintain such 
balance between the production and consumption of agricultural commodities, and such 
marketing conditions therefore…” (p. 54).  Section 8 spelled out congressional policy more 
specifically when it authorized the Secretary of Agriculture “[t]o provide for reduction in the 
acreage or reduction in the production for market … in such amounts as the Secretary deems fair 
and reasonable” (p. 54).  In contrast to the structure of the Government’s arguments, those 
presented by the cotton attorneys were quite masterful and persuasive in terms of framing the 
critical issues they wanted to be viewed as controlling the case.   
 The legal team for the cotton manufacturers was headed by George Wharton Pepper, who 
was assisted by an additional six attorneys.  Mr. Pepper, formerly a professor of law at the 
University of Pennsylvania and U.S. Senator for Pennsylvania, provided the major portion of 
oral argument while two other attorneys provided oral argument challenging the Act as an 
improper delegation of authority by Congress (For Pepper, see Hall, 1992, pp. 630-631; for 
attorney team, see pp. 44-45 of the opinion).  Pepper also happened to be “the close friend and 
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political patron of Justice Owen J. Roberts,” the justice who would write the majority opinion for 
the Court (Culver & Hyde, p. 159). 
 As mentioned previously, the arguments presented by the attorneys for the cotton 
manufacturers, particularly those advanced by Mr. Pepper, were both masterful and persuasive in 
framing the legal issues to which they wished to draw attention.  The arguments were organized 
in a step-by-step logical progression accompanied by a convincing legal analysis, supplemented 
at various points by the use of propaganda techniques, all of which were woven into a spell-
binding narrative supported by illustrations drawn from the existing case law.  And it was the 
existing case law regarding regulation of production as a matter of control reserved to the states 
by the Tenth Amendment that proved a source of strength for the cotton manufacturers and 
conversely, proved to be the downfall for the Government until that case law was changed, first 
in being modified by NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation and other cases before being 
completely overthrown by the Court’s later decision in Darby. 
 According to Mr. Pepper, the two most important questions involved the constitutionality 
of the taxes levied by the AAA and the validity of the delegation of authority by Congress to the 
Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace.  After summarizing the major points of the 
Government’s argument as presented by Solicitor General Reed, Mr. Pepper drew a clear line of 
demarcation by way of characterization between the Government’s position and that of the 
cotton manufacturers.  The line drawn by Mr. Pepper involved an issue going back to the 
Revolutionary War, the difference in legislative systems between England’s Parliament and 
America’s Congress, an issue that prompted Lord Acton to characterize the Revolution “as a 
contest between two ideas of legislative power” (Corwin, 1965, p. 83).   According to Mr. 
Pepper: 
   
   
636
It seems to me that a reversal of the judgment appealed from would justify 
the conclusion that Congress, originating as a federal legislature with limited 
powers, has somehow been transformed into a national parliament subject to 
no restraint except self-restraint.  (p. 24) 
 
 For those not familiar with England’s parliamentary system, a brief explanation is needed 
in order to fully understand the contrast being framed by Attorney Pepper.  The great English 
commentator on law, Sir William Blackstone, observed, “So long … as the English Constitution 
lasts, we may venture to affirm that the power of Parliament is absolute and without control” 
(Corwin, 1965, p. 87).  Commenting on Blackstone’s observation, an American professor of law 
further explained, “This absolute doctrine was summed up by De Lolme a little later in the oft-
quoted aphorism that ‘Parliament can do anything except make a man a woman or a woman a 
man” (Corwin, 1965, p. 87).  The roots of the English system of legislative sovereignty traced 
back to Roman law.  According to Professor Corwin: 
Thus legislative sovereignty, a derivative from the notion of popular 
sovereignty in the famous text from Justinian … was recruited afresh from 
the parent stream, with the result that all the varied rights of man were 
threatened with submergence in a single right, that of belonging to a popular 
majority, or more accurately, of being represented by a legislative majority.  
(Corwin, 1965, p. 88) 
 
The text referred to by Professor Corwin in the previous quote came from Justinian’s Institutes 
and read, “Whatever has pleased the prince has the force of law, since the Roman people by the 
lex regia enacted concerning his imperium, have yielded up to him all their power and authority” 
(Corwin, 1965, p. 4). 
 All of the preceding paragraph would have been called to mind by the justices in hearing 
Mr. Pepper’s remark about “a national parliament subject to no restraint except self-restraint” (p. 
24).  Of course, everyone present in the Court was familiar with the contrasting American system 
of government based on “the American invocation of a constitution setting metes and bounds to 
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Parliament,” or, as stated by Attorney Pepper, “a federal legislature with limited powers” 
(Corwin, 1965, p. 83; p. 24 of the opinion).  This framing of the contrasts between the two 
positions put forth by Mr. Pepper resonated with the Court majority, as will be shown 
subsequently in discussing the Court’s rationale for its holding in the case.   
 To properly frame the issues in a manner advantageous to the cotton processors, Pepper 
made what he termed “a brief restatement” that occupied the next four pages of the Court’s 
record of the case (p. 24).  Pepper’s purpose, as he admitted later, was to present a “basic 
statement of the significant parts of the Act and of the facts which it seems to me it is important 
to bear in mind in approaching the constitutional questions” (p. 29).  Mr. Pepper restated the case 
on his terms, much in the same manner as he might have used in explaining points of law to his 
students during the seventeen years he spent as a professor of law, by making five basic points:86 
• “[T]he declared policy of the AAA” was “to re-create for the farmer the favorable 
financial conditions which, under the operation of economic law, he for a short time 
enjoyed about a quarter of a century ago” (p. 25).  After discussing how this policy 
was to be implemented, Pepper re-summarized his first point by stating that the 
“ultimate objective of the Act was to adjust “production to consumption by closing 
the gap [between current & parity prices] in order to increase the purchasing power of 
agricultural commodities” (p. 26). 
• “[T]he adjustment [to bring current prices to the level of parity] is to be accomplished 
by a reduction in acreage, or reduction in the production for market, or both” (p. 26).  
Pepper recast this point to be “that what is really proposed is such a reduced 
production as will secure for the farmer his parity price” (p. 27). 
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• “[T]he closing of the gap through reduction of production is to be accomplished 
principally through agreements with producers containing provisions for … 
payments” with the producer “agreeing to act in conformity with the federal policy” 
(p. 27). 
• “[I]n order to raise the money with which to purchase the promise of the farmer to 
limit his production and otherwise submit to regulation, a processing tax is levied 
upon processors” with the “rise and fall of the so-called tax … dependent upon 
factors wholly unrelated to the business of the processor” (p. 27).  Having established 
the processing tax as a focal point, Pepper later described the processing tax as 
“merely a cog, though an essential cog, in the regulatory machine” (p. 30). 
• “The next point to be noted is that the proceeds of the tax when received by the 
Secretary of Agriculture are to be available for specific purposes [outlined in the 
Act]” (pp. 27-28). 
 Having focused attention upon what he deemed to be five critical points of the AAA, Mr. 
Pepper next proceeded to reduce the Act’s five essential points to two “constitutional questions” 
(p. 29).  As can be seen from the following quotation, Pepper used his framing of the processing 
tax issue as a means to move to what became the deciding constitutional question, that issue 
being the Tenth Amendment.  According to Mr. Pepper: 
I affirm, first, that the processing exaction is not in its nature the exercise of 
the taxing power of the United States, but is wholly regulatory in character, 
and is part of a nation-wide scheme for the Federal regulation of local 
agricultural production; and, second, that if that scheme as a whole is 
unconstitutional as an invasion of the reserved powers of the States, then the 
whole scheme falls and the processing tax falls with it.  (p. 29) 
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Later in his argument, Pepper restated the Tenth Amendment argument that the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act represented “a scheme to regulate farm production and fix farm prices [which 
was] an invasion of the field reserved by the Tenth Amendment” (p. 37). 
 After noting that the Government had used the Commerce Clause to justify the NRA 
when it was challenged, Mr. Pepper drew attention to the “significant silence on the part of the 
Government as to the commerce clause” in defending the AAA, which was as it should be “in 
the light of the Schechter decision” invalidating the NRA (p. 38).  Bereft of the ability to use the 
Commerce Clause, “[t]he whole reliance of the Government [was] accordingly placed upon the 
proposition that we have nothing to consider but an unimpeachable tax and an uncontrollable 
appropriation” (p. 38).  Continuing to pick at what he perceived to be a weakness in the 
Government’s position, Pepper then observed, “To support the tax argument, the Government 
invokes the general welfare clause.  This seems to me to afford the coldest kind of cold comfort” 
(p. 38).  And then, in a series of statements, Mr. Pepper connected the tax issue, the General 
Welfare Clause, and the Tenth Amendment to his earlier imagery, the contrast between an 
omnipotent parliament and a constitutionally limited Congress.  First, Pepper noted that 
problems with taxes didn’t arise unless Congress stipulated a purpose, an act which required the 
ability to specify “some recognized congressional power” (p. 38).  “But,” Pepper observed, 
“suppose (as here) that the only specific power that might plausibly be invoked (to wit, the 
commerce power) falls far short of what is required” (p. 38).  And then, Pepper proceeded to 
provide an answer to his rhetorical supposition: 
It is then, and then only, that recourse is had to the proposition that it is 
within the exclusive power of Congress to determine that a particular 
measure will promote the general welfare and that accordingly a tax to be 
applied for the purposes of that measure is a valid tax.  (pp. 38-39) 
 
Mr. Pepper continued his line of argument: 
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This proposition, as far as I can see, means this: that Congress may 
determine that a certain nation-wide policy is necessary to the welfare of the 
nation; ergo that legislation to effectuate such policy must be within the 
power of Congress; and that, if you cannot find an applicable specific power 
which covers the case, you invoke the general welfare clause.  (p. 39) 
 
Noting that this amounted to a de facto doctrine of “inherent national power” which the Court 
rejected in Kansas v. Colorado, Pepper then portrayed the Government’s position as a violation 
of the Tenth Amendment, which if allowed to proceed unchecked, would turn Congress into an 
uncontrollable parliament. 
Whether Congress invokes “inherent power” or wallows in the welfare 
clause – in either event the powers reserved by the Tenth Amendment 
disappear and that against which I solemnly protest ensues – namely the 
conversion of a federal legislature into a national parliament – with the 
consequent destruction of the right of local self-government.  (p. 39) 
 
All in all, a quite convincing, persuasive, and patriotic argument – that is, if one ignored the 
misstatement of the Government’s position which allowed Pepper to create the straw man of 
inherent national power, subsequently demolished with valid case law, as well as the concluding 
use of an unwarranted extrapolation to make an appeal based on fear.   
 Continuing to push the idea of the tax and ensuing appropriation as an attempt to destroy 
state sovereignty, an attempt which was illogically based upon the General Welfare Clause, 
Pepper also continued to frame that issue within the context of an imaginary battle between two 
opposing legislative schemes, i.e., parliamentary versus congressional.  Without a clear reference 
in support of his argument, Pepper even enlisted the support of Hamilton, although that support 
was obtained through the mere mention of his name, which was then attached to Pepper’s 
position.  According to Pepper: 
But I did not know, until this statute [AAA] proposed it, of any 
interpretation which begins where Hamilton stops, and asserts that because 
you may appropriate for anything which Congress thinks is consonant with 
the public welfare, you may, through that appropriation, control the local 
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conduct of the producer in a particular reserved to the States under the Tenth 
Amendment.  That, it seems to me, is the general welfare clause gone mad.  
(pp. 39-40) 
 
Pepper, the lead attorney for Butler and the cotton manufacturers, continued: 
It seems to me it is impossible to sustain any such view without throwing 
overboard once and for all the idea that Congress is a federal legislature with 
limited powers.  It carries you all the way to the other extreme, which is that 
of the national parliament subject to no restrain but self-restraint…  (p. 40) 
 
 Before concluding his arguments before the Court, Mr. Pepper addressed what he 
perceived to be Fifth Amendment issues.  Noting that the Government had argued that the Fifth 
Amendment had nothing to do with the case at hand, Pepper stated that he agreed only “if this 
processing exaction is merely part of a regulatory scheme that is beyond the power of Congress” 
because in that circumstance, “the reason for the invalidity of the tax is, not the Fifth 
Amendment, but the lack of power to control local production” (p. 42).  If, however, he were 
wrong, Pepper observed, “the Fifth Amendment applie[d] to the exercise of … the regulatory 
power of Congress no matter whence derived” (p. 42).  Mr. Pepper suggested “that there [was] 
something essentially unjust in compelling the first handler of an agricultural commodity to 
contribute whatever [was] necessary to make up deficiencies in the income of the man who 
produce[d] that commodity” (p. 43).  After discussing the tax rate issue, Pepper surmised: 
It would be hard enough on the processor to have to submit to assessment 
merely to increase the producer’s income; but when we reflect that the 
increase is accomplished by using the proceeds of the tax to raise the price 
which the processor has to pay for his raw material, the question arises 
whether this is the due process which the Fifth Amendment guarantees.  (p. 
43) 
 
Mr. Pepper concluded, “It seems clear to me that it is not due process to measure an excise on 
processing by a deficiency in producer’s income” (p. 43).  Finally, in concluding his oral 
arguments before the Court, Pepper uttered a statement, couched in humility and deference to the 
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Court and delivered in the form of a prayer, that combined hyperbole, waving-the-flag, and an 
appeal to fear based on an unwarranted extrapolation.  According to Mr. Pepper: 
Indeed, may it please your Honors, I believe I am standing here today to 
plead the cause of the America I have loved; and I pray Almighty God that 
not in my time may “the land of the regimented” be accepted as a worthy 
substitute for “the land of the free.”  (p. 44) 
 
 At this point, Mr. Pepper turned to two other attorneys on his legal team to deliver 
arguments focused on the AAA as an unconstitutional delegation of authority.  They, however, 
devoted the vast majority of their argument (slightly more than four pages of the Court’s report 
of the case) rehashing what Pepper had already argued.  Their argument regarding the delegation 
of authority issue consisted of a single sentence followed by nine case citations.  Their sentence 
read, “The Act is invalid in that it delegates legislative power to the Secretary of Agriculture” (p. 
48).  How, and in what way, the Act delegated such authority was not presented.  It was, 
however, explained more fully by Pepper in one of his side comments to the Court during the 
presentation of his arguments.  After restating the case in terms of his own five major points, but 
previous to his reducing those essential points to two constitutional questions, Mr. Pepper 
pointed out to the Court that he had “carefully refrained from stating such features of the act as 
give rise to the question of delegated power” because it would be more “conduc[ive] to clearness 
to reserve a reference to those features until the argument on delegation [was] made” (pp. 28-29).  
However, having raised the issue of delegated power, Pepper couldn’t refrain from further 
comment.  Using a measure of hyperbole, Mr. Pepper observed: 
I merely remark in passing that the whole scheme of the act necessarily calls 
fro so many determinations, adjustments and decisions on points of policy 
that it might fairly be described as a scheme for the government of 
agriculture with the Secretary of Agriculture as Governor General. 
 
 Holding & disposition. 
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 The Court affirmed the ruling of the First Circuit Court of Appeals.  The Court held that 
the “act invade[d] the reserved rights of the states” guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment because 
the AAA was “a statutory plan to regulate and control agricultural production, a matter beyond 
the powers delegated to the federal government” (p. 68).  The processing tax and the subsequent 
appropriation of the tax funds were “but parts of the plan” and were “but means to an 
unconstitutional end” (p. 68).  The Court did not rule on the delegation of power issue. 
 Court’s rationale. 
 Justice Owen Roberts delivered the 6-3 decision of the Court.  He was joined by Chief 
Justice Hughes and the Four Horsemen (Justices Butler, Van Devanter, Sutherland, and 
McReynolds).87  Justice Harlan Fiske Stone delivered a dissenting opinion that was joined by 
Justices Brandeis and Cardozo.  The majority opinion was described by a historian as “a 
wretchedly argued opinion,” by Justice Stone in his dissenting opinion as a “tortured 
construction of the Constitution,” by legal scholar Leonard Levy as “monumentally inept,” by 
another historian as “one of the worst decisions in its [the Court’s] history,” and later by Justice 
Felix Frankfurter as “discredited” (Leuchtenburg, p. 170; p. 87; Hall, 1992, p. 111; Brogan, p. 
554; Hall, 1992, p. 112).  Deep in the nation’s heartland, in Iowa, the reaction took the form of 
physical action as “the six justices who handed down the decision were hanged in effigy” 
(Leuchtenburg, p. 171).  Farm prices reacted to the Court’s decision as well by exhibiting “a 
sharp decline” (Leuchtenburg, p. 171).  Furthermore, the opinion did not control subsequent 
Court action as its underlying case law was modified in a series of decisions before being 
overturned by the Darby decision.  A professor of political science described the changing 
judicial scene: 
The tax provisions of the Social Security Act were upheld in Steward 
Machine Co. v. Davis (1937), and the agricultural program struck down in 
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Butler was reenacted by Congress under the commerce power and upheld in 
Mulford v. Smith (1939) and Wickard v. Filburn (1942).  (Hall, 1992, p. 
112) 
 
Also contributing to the change in subsequent Court rulings were the isolation of the Four 
Horsemen by swing justices (Roberts and the Chief Justice) as well as the one-by-one 
replacement of the justices known as the Four Horsemen during the next four to five years (See 
n. # 70).   
 Admittedly the opinion was somewhat difficult to read.   A number of reasons existed, 
each of which served as a cause of this difficulty.  First, the opinion wandered.  For example, in 
addressing the issue of standing, the Court began by articulating the two opposing positions, then 
discussed the Government’s argument for separating the Act into two statutes, then discussed the 
tax, then discussed the purpose of the Act, then compared the Act to a previous immigration act, 
then jumped back to discussing what a tax was, and then concluded that the Act regulated 
agricultural production with the tax being “a mere incident of such regulation and that the 
respondents have standing to challenge the legality of the exaction” (p. 61).  As can be seen from 
the previous example, both the structural and the logical components of the Court’s majority 
opinion, or more precisely, the seeming absence of such components, presented difficulty for the 
reader.   
 A second area of difficulty involved simplistic reasoning that challenged credulity.  For 
example, in discussing the General Welfare Clause, the Court abruptly began discussing the 
nature of the Court’s role and how it reached its judgments regarding constitutionality.  As the 
Court explained: 
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not 
conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the 
Government has only one duty, - to lay the article of the Constitution which 
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is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the 
latter squares with the former.  (p. 62) 
 
Such an explanation ignored fundamental considerations involving the nature of the issue, the 
intersection of facts and legal rules, which rules should be applied and why, previous 
understandings, and prior court decisions, just to name a few omissions from the Court’s 
explanation of how constitutionality is determined. 
 A third area of difficulty involved determining, after wading through wandering 
discourses and simplistic reasoning, when the Court made valid points in its opinion, a 
determination of which required both tenacity and prior knowledge.  One  such possibility 
involved the Court’s comments about the nature of the Constitution as a general blueprint as 
opposed to a detailed plan.  While discussing the General Welfare Clause, the Court noted, “As 
elsewhere throughout the Constitution the section in question lays down principles which control 
the use of the power, and does not attempt meticulous or detailed directions” (p. 67).   
 A fourth area of difficulty involved the Court’s making a unique determination, which it 
then rendered irrelevant, and which it later contradicted in making a subsequent ruling.  The 
unique determination centered on the taxing power of Congress as linked to the General Welfare 
Clause (Article I, § 8, cl. 1), “to provide for the general welfare of the United States” (p. 65).  
Prior to Butler, the issue had not been definitively resolved.  Disagreements about this issue 
traced back to differing opinions on the matter that were offered by Alexander Hamilton and 
James Madison.  After observing that “sharp differences of opinion have persisted as to the true 
interpretation of the phrase” going all the way back to “the foundation of the Nation,” the Court 
summarized each position, beginning with Madison (p. 65). 
Madison asserted it amounted to no more than a reference to the other 
powers enumerated in the subsequent clauses of the same section; that, as 
the United States is a government of limited and enumerated powers, the 
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grant of power to tax and spend for the general national welfare must be 
confined to the enumerated legislative fields committed to the Congress.  In 
this view the phrase is mere tautology, for taxation and appropriation are or 
may be necessary incidents of the exercise of any of the enumerated 
legislative powers.  (p. 65) 
 
Turning to Hamilton, the Court stated: 
Hamilton, on the other hand, maintained the clause confers a power separate 
and distinct from those later enumerated, is not restricted in meaning by the 
grant of them, and Congress consequently has a substantive power to tax 
and to appropriate, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised 
to provide for the general welfare of the United States.  (pp. 65-66) 
 
After noting that “Mr. Justice Story … espouse[d] the Hamiltonian position,” the Court 
announced its conclusion by stating, “Study of all these [the writings of Story, of public men, 
and of commentators as well as legislative practice] leads us to conclude that the reading 
advocated by Mr. Justice Story is the correct one” (p. 66).  The Court explained further: 
While, therefore, the power to tax is not unlimited, its confines are set in the 
clause which confers it, and not in those of § 8 which bestow and define the 
legislative powers of the Congress.  It results then that the power of 
Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is 
not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the 
Constitution.  (p. 66) 
 
However, the Court noted, the issue was irrelevant.  This occurred despite the Court’s earlier 
assertion that the General Welfare Clause “present[ed] the great and the controlling question in 
the case” (p. 62).  However, according to the Court, “We are not now required to ascertain the 
scope of the phrase ‘general welfare of the United States’ or to determine whether an 
appropriation in aid of agriculture falls within it” (p. 68).  Introducing its shift to a completely 
different argument, the Court next stated, “Wholly apart from that question, another principle 
embedded in our Constitution prohibits the enforcement of the Agricultural Adjustment Act” (p. 
68).  The other principle, as the Court announced, turned out to be the Tenth Amendment.  And 
in this manner, the Court reached its major holding.  The Court continued: 
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The act invades the reserved rights of the states.  It is a statutory plan to 
regulate and control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers 
delegated to the federal government.  The tax, the appropriation of the funds 
raised, and the direction for their disbursement, are but parts of the plan.  
They are but means to an unconstitutional end.  (p. 68) 
 
On the one hand, the processing tax and the appropriation to farmers, if in the general welfare of 
the United States as stipulated by Congress, were constitutional.  On the other hand, it didn’t 
matter since both were part of an overall scheme to invade “the reserved rights of the states” (p. 
68).  The contradiction arose from the Court’s use of Hamilton.  As discussed, it had first 
officially noted that Hamilton’s interpretation of the General Welfare Clause was the correct one, 
which would have made the tax and subsequent appropriation constitutional.  In shifting to the 
Tenth Amendment argument, the Court then used Hamilton’s original opinion on the Bank’s 
constitutionality as summarized by Chief Justice Marshall to justify its Tenth Amendment 
holding on the unconstitutionality of the AAA.  The Court introduced its twist of logic by 
quoting from a previous ruling dealing with an entirely different issue, the delegation of power, 
in which it stated, “Congress cannot, under the pretext of executing delegated power, pass laws 
for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the Federal Government” (p. 69).  After 
verbally connecting the issue of delegated power to the issue of taxation without providing any 
explanation, the Court then quoted Chief Justice Marshall’s paraphrase of Hamilton (See n. # 
50): 
These principles are as applicable to the power to lay taxes as to any other 
federal power.  Said the court, in McCullough v. Maryland, supra, 421:  
“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and 
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, 
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional.”  (p. 69) 
 
In effect, the Court had Hamilton arguing with himself.  It was a basic figure-ground perceptual 
switch that contained no logic.  Bringing Hamilton’s view on the General Welfare Clause 
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validated the constitutional figure of taxation and appropriation.  If the view was abruptly shifted 
so that the constitutional figure of the Tenth Amendment case law’s prohibition on regulating 
production by the federal government became the focus, one arrived at a different result.  The 
two views did not match.  And then, bringing in Hamilton to justify the illogical shift in the 
Court’s focus compounded an existing juxtaposition that was not entirely logical. 
 A fifth area of difficulty lay in the Court’s explanation of the working of the Tenth 
Amendment in this case.  Instead of a single explanation, there existed two discernible lines of 
exegesis regarding the applicability of the Tenth Amendment to the case, although the second 
line was harder to detect because its different parts lay scattered throughout the opinion.  The 
first line of reasoning involved the case law of the Tenth Amendment prohibiting the federal 
government from regulating production, whether industrial or agricultural, which was presented 
previously.  The second exegetical line focused on the taxing power as outlined in Article I, § 8, 
cl. 1 of the Constitution, the reasoning of which foreshadowed future Justices’ explanations of 
the Tenth Amendment limitations as expressed, not in terms of the actual text or of existing case 
law, but in terms of the Tenth as the “embodiment of the federal system, the “spirit of the Tenth 
Amendment,” the “federal framework,” and the “structure of the Constitution” (For more 
information about the preceding phrases, see the parenthetical note on p. 595 of this paper).  In 
this case, the explanatory line of thought began with the following statements. 
There are, indeed, certain virtual limitations, arising from the principles of 
the Constitution itself.  It would undoubtedly be an abuse of the [taxing] 
power if so exercised as to impair the separate existence and independent 
self-government of the States or if exercised for ends inconsistent with the 
limited grants of power in the Constitution.  Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 
533, 541.  (pp. 69-70) 
 
The Court picked up this line of reasoning several pages later: 
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If, in lieu of compulsory regulation of subjects within the states’ reserved 
jurisdiction, which is prohibited, the Congress could invoke the taxing and 
spending power as a means to accomplish the same end, clause I of § 8 of 
Article I would become the instrument for total subversion of the 
governmental powers reserved to the individual states.  (p. 75) 
 
Later the Court enlisted both Hamilton’s and Justice Story’s assistance, which it combined with 
the use of both hyperbole and an unwarranted extrapolation, in its exegetical explication from 
mystical sources of a reason for the Court’s position: 
Hamilton himself, the leading advocate of broad interpretation of the power 
to tax and to appropriate for the general welfare, never suggested that any 
power granted by the Constitution could be used for the destruction of local 
self-government in the states.  Story countenances no such doctrine.  It 
seems never to have occurred to them, or to those who have agreed with 
them, that the general welfare of the United States, (which has aptly been 
termed “an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States,”) might 
be served by obliterating the constituent members of the Union.  (For use of 
the parenthetical dicta, see note #61 of this paper) (p. 77) 
 
The conclusion to this exegesis of the workings of the Tenth Amendment incorporated the 
imagery first suggested by the lead attorney for the cotton manufacturers, Claude Pepper, 
regarding the distinction between an English Parliament and an American Congress.  The 
conclusion also featured the use of an unwarranted extrapolation, which was combined with both 
hyperbole and an appeal to fear. 
And its [the doctrine that the General Welfare Clause justified the 
destruction of state governments] sole premise is that … the makers of the 
Constitution, in erecting the federal government … so as to reserve to the 
states and the people sovereign power, … they nevertheless by a single 
clause gave power to the Congress to tear down the barriers, to invade the 
states’ jurisdiction, and to become a parliament of the whole people, subject 
to no restrictions save such as are self-imposed.  (p. 78) 
 
 Finally, a sixth area of difficulty centered on the Court’s continuation of a rambling 
discourse after it had already invalidated the AAA, a discussion that occupied eight more pages 
and which contained ten additional holdings.  With a total of thirteen holdings in the case, it was 
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somewhat difficult to determine which holding related to what legal point, and then, in turn, 
determine what legal bearing it had on which constitutional issue.  The continued discussion 
after the Act had already been invalidated contained some remarks about conditional spending 
which had no bearing on the outcome of the Court’s ultimate decision.  For example, the Court 
declared, “The regulation of the farmer’s activities under the statute, though in form subject to 
his own will, is in fact coercion through economic pressure; his right of choice is illusory” (p. 3).  
Then, as if having had second thoughts about the previous statement, the Court re-stated its 
position by stating, “Even if the farmer’s consent were purely voluntary, the Act would stand no 
better.  At best it is a scheme for purchasing with federal funds submission to federal regulation 
of a subject reserved to the States” (p. 3).  Although the foregoing remarks were cited from their 
summary on page three of the Court’s opinion, they actually were taken from pages 70 and 72.  
One page later, the Court picked up the same thread again when it observed, “There is an 
obvious difference between a statute stating the conditions upon which moneys shall be 
expended and one effective only upon assumption of a contractual obligation to submit to a 
regulation which otherwise could not be enforced” (p. 73).  However, the Court did not render 
the Act unconstitutional on the basis of conditional spending stipulations. 
 All in all, the Court’s opinion did not constitute a model of clear, focused, and logical 
legal reasoning.  The vast majority of Supreme Court decisions reviewed thus far in this paper 
didn’t require examination of the preceding lower court decisions in order to provided 
elucidation of legal points, arguments, and reasoning.  In this case, however, a reading of the 
lower court decisions provided a clearer focus than did the Court’s Butler decision. 
 Concurring/dissenting opinions. 
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 Justice Harlan Fiske Stone delivered a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice 
Louis Brandeis and by Justice Benjamin Cardozo.  Described as a “scathing rebuttal,” Justice 
Stone wrote a dissent that could have served as the Court’s majority opinion if enough justices 
had been so inclined at the time (Hall, 1992, p. 112).  Stone took the Court’s unique 
determination regarding the General Welfare Clause, framed that determination perceptually as 
figure (in Gestalt terms), and, unlike the Court majority in backing away from the implications of 
its own decision regarding the general welfare, applied the now official interpretation of the 
General Welfare Clause to the facts of the case.  In the process, Justice Stone also delivered dicta 
regarding principles of judicial review that were collectively described as “the most enduring 
feature of the [Butler] decision” and which were subsequently “invoked on many subsequent 
occasions by Court minorities, both liberal and conservative” (Hall, 1992, p. 112).   
 Justice Stone first identified what was not questioned by the Court’s majority opinion.  
Congressional authority to “levy an excise tax upon the processing of agricultural products [was] 
not questioned” (p. 79).  Neither did the Court declare that using public funds to aid farmers was 
“not within the specifically granted power of Congress to levy taxes to ‘provide for the …. 
general welfare’” (p. 79).  While it was true that the Court majority had invalidated the AAA’s 
levy, it had done so “because the use to which its proceeds [were] put [was] disapproved” (p. 
79).  Drawing attention to the “pivot on which the decision of the Court [was] made to turn,” 
Justice Stone provided elucidation: 
It is that a levy unquestionably within unquestionably within the taxing 
power of Congress may be treated as invalid because it is a step in a plan to 
regulate agricultural production and is thus a forbidden infringement of state 
power.  (p. 80) 
 
The Justice then made a critical point that differentiated him from the Court majority when he 
pointed out, “The levy is not any the less an excise of taxing power because it is intended to 
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defray an expenditure for the general welfare rather than for some other support of government” 
(p. 80).  Referring to the payments made to farmers who had willingly curtailed “their productive 
acreage,” Justice Stone further noted (p. 80): 
In saying that this method of spending public moneys is an invasion of the 
reserved powers of the states, the Court [did] not assert that the expenditure 
of public funds to promote the general welfare is not a substantive power 
specifically delegated to the national government, as Hamilton and Story 
pronounced it to be.  (pp. 80-81) 
 
Furthermore, according to Justice Stone, the Court majority didn’t deny that the payment of 
funds to farmers who agreed to curtail their agricultural production was “within the specifically 
granted power” (p. 81). 
 Continuing to keep the focus on the taxing and spending authority contained in the 
General Welfare Clause, Justice Stone noted the Court majority’s position prefatory to critiquing 
that position, “It is upon the contention that state power is infringed by purchased regulation of 
agricultural production that chief reliance is placed” (p. 83).  And then, precursory to later 
dissents regarding the Court’s application of the Tenth Amendment without textual support for 
negating congressional use of a delegated power, Justice Stone pointed out:88 
It is insisted that, while the Constitution gives to Congress, in specific and 
unambiguous terms, the power to tax and spend, the power is subject to 
limitations which do not find their origin in any express provision of the 
Constitution and to which other expressly delegated powers are not subject.  
(p. 83) 
 
Regarding the conditional offer (i.e., in exchange for money, the producer agrees to reduce crop-
production acreage), Justice Stone observed: 
Although the farmer is placed under no legal compulsion to reduce acreage, 
it is said that the mere offer of compensation for so doing is a species of 
economic coercion which operates with the same legal force and effect as 
though the curtailment were made mandatory by Act of Congress.  (p. 81) 
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And then, noting the Court’s apparent unsureness about what was covered by the term 
“coercive,” Stone reported: 
In any event it is insisted that even though not coercive the expenditure of 
public funds to induce the recipients to curtail production is itself an 
infringement of state power, since the federal government cannot invade the 
domain of the states by the “purchase” of performance of acts which it has 
no power to compel.  (p. 81) 
 
Responding to the Court’s assertion of coercion regarding the offer, Justice Stone pointed out, 
“[I]t is enough to say that no such contention is pressed by the taxpayer, and no such 
consequences … appear to have resulted from the administration of the Act” (p. 81).  Stone 
continued, “The suggestion of coercion finds no support in the record or in any data showing the 
actual operation of the Act” (p. 81).  According to Stone, not only did the Court lack textual 
support for its application of the Tenth Amendment to eliminate congressional use of a delegated 
power, the Court also lacked evidentiary support for its contention regarding the Act’s 
coerciveness.  Justice Stone felt compelled to remind the Court what coercion actually was by 
stating, “Threat of loss, not hope of gain, is the essence of economic coercion” (p. 81).  Stone 
then noted that one-third of the “total number of farms growing cotton” did not participate in the 
AAA in 1934 (p. 82).  Justice Stone reminded the Court, “The presumption of constitutionality 
of a statute is not to be overturned by an assertion of its coercive effect which rests on nothing 
more substantial than groundless speculation” (p. 83).   
 Maintaining a focus on the General Welfare Clause, Justice Stone discussed the 
constitutional requirement “that public funds shall be spent for a defined purpose, the promotion 
of the general welfare” (p. 83).  Stone further noted that the expenditure of public funds required 
“terms” in order to insure that they would be used for their intended “constitutional purpose” (p. 
83).  Justice Stone concluded: 
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Expenditures would fail of their purpose and thus lose their constitutional 
sanction if the terms of payment were not such that by their influence on the 
action of the recipients the permitted end would be attained.  The power of 
Congress to spend is inseparable from persuasion to action over which 
Congress has not legislative control.  (p. 83) 
 
Stone pointed to the example of the Morrill Act as an example.  The Act didn’t command state 
universities to teach the “science of agriculture,” but it did grant money to state universities who 
promised to use the funds for that purpose (p. 83).  Justice Stone noted, “Condition and promise 
are alike valid since both are in furtherance of the national purpose for which the money is 
appropriated” (p. 84).  Getting to what he perceived to be the heart of the matter, Justice Stone 
declared that the Court’s use of the Tenth Amendment to limit congressional use of the delegated 
power of the General Welfare Clause was “contradictory and destructive of the power to 
appropriate for the public welfare;” furthermore, such an interpretation was “incapable of 
practical application” (p. 85).  Justice Stone continued: 
The spending power of Congress is in addition to the legislative power and 
not subordinate to it….  It is a contradiction in terms to say that there is 
power to spend for the national welfare, while rejecting any power to 
impose conditions reasonably adapted to the attainment of the end which 
alone would justify the expenditure.  (p. 85) 
 
Justice Stone concluded by noting that the Court needed to give “frank recognition” to the 
proposition “that language, even of a constitution, may mean what it says:  that the power to tax 
and spend includes the power to relieve a nation-wide economic maladjustment by conditional 
gifts of money” (p. 88). 
 As mentioned at the outset of this section, Justice Stone made statements regarding 
principles of judicial review in his dissenting opinion.  At the outset Justice Stone observed, 
“The power of courts to declare a statute unconstitutional is subject to two guiding principles of 
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decision which ought never to be absent from judicial consciousness” (p. 78).  For the Court’s 
benefit, Stone then proceeded to spell out what those two “guiding principles” were: 
One is that courts are concerned only with the power to enact statutes, not 
with their wisdom.  The other is that while unconstitutional exercise of 
power by the executive and legislative branches of the government is subject 
to judicial restraint, the only check upon our own exercise of power is our 
own sense of self-restraint.  For the removal of unwise laws from the statute 
books appeal lies not to the courts but to the ballot and to the processes of 
democratic government.  (pp. 78-79) 
 
Justice Stone presented his other major point regarding judicial review near the conclusion of his 
dissent, which he began by stating, “Courts are not the only agency of government that must be 
assumed to have capacity to govern.  Congress and the courts both unhappily may falter or be 
mistaken in the performance of their constitutional duty” (p. 87).  Justice Stone provided further 
elucidation in the form of a warning: 
But interpretation of our great charter of government which proceeds on any 
assumption that the responsibility for the preservation of our institutions is 
the exclusive concern of any one of the three branches of government, or 
that it alone can save them from destruction is far more likely, in the long 
run, “to obliterate the constituent members” of “an indestructible union of 
indestructible states”…  (pp. 88-89) 
 
 Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939). 
 Case summary. 
 The Court’s report of this case did not contain separate sections for attorney arguments 
by either appellant or appellee.  Neither did the opinion elaborate on the two opposing sides’ 
legal arguments except to summarize the three major points urged by attorneys for the tobacco 
producers.  As a result the shorter brief format was used. 
 In order to fully comprehend why, given that both acts (the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
of 1933 and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938) aimed to control agricultural production, 
one act failed and the other act succeeded, in terms of passing constitutional muster, several 
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contexts need to be understood.  When it came time for the Court to rule on the second 
Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) of 1938, the Court had changed significantly since it had 
declared the first AAA to be an unconstitutional infringement of the Tenth Amendment (For the 
holding in United States v. Butler, see pp. 642-643 of this paper).  The Four Horsemen were now 
down to two members, Pierce Butler and James McReynolds (See n. # 70).  In the aftermath of 
FDR’s court-packing plan, as well as the shift of Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts away 
from the conservative Four Horsemen and towards the liberal justices (Brandeis, Cardozo, and 
Stone) in the case upholding the constitutionality of the New Deal’s National Labor Relations 
Act (National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.), one of the Horsemen, 
Justice Willis Van Devanter, announced his retirement to become effective June 2, 1937 (Hall, 
1992, pp. 894-895, 986).  Hugo Black filled the seat left vacant by Van Devanter’s retirement 
(Hall, 1992, p. 986).  The second Horseman to leave the Court, George Sutherland, subsequently 
resigned from the Court seven months later on January 17, 1938, and was immediately replaced 
by Stanley Reed (Hall, 1992, pp. 848, 986).  Subsequent to the departure of two justices 
committed to laissez-faire constitutionalism, Justice Cardozo died on July 9, 1938, but Felix 
Frankfurter did not fill his seat until January 30, 1939 (For laissez-faire constitutionalism, see 
previous discussion of Hammer v. Dagenhart, “Court’s Rationale,” pp. 372-373) (Hall, 1992, pp. 
126-127, 986).  Justice Brandeis retired from the Court on February 13, 1939, and was replaced 
on the bench by William O. Douglas, who appeared for his first Court decision in this case (Hall, 
1992, p. 986; 307 U.S. 38).   
 The basis for the AAA had changed as well.  While the first Act of 1933 was argued on 
the basis of congressional taxing power under the General Welfare Clause, Congress explicitly 
based the second Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 on the Commerce Clause.  Government 
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attorneys accordingly argued for the second Agricultural Adjustment Act’s constitutionality on 
the basis of the commerce power of Congress.   
 Political factors also played a role.  Butler had been decided prior to both the 
overwhelming vote of confidence given FDR’s New Deal programs in the 1936 elections, an 
election which swept conservative Republicans from public office.  As one historian described 
the election results, “For the fourth election running the Democrats increased their numbers in 
Congress; for the first time since 1894 there were fewer than a hundred Republican 
Congressmen; and there were only sixteen Republican Senators” (Brogan, p. 561).  Butler had 
also been decided before FDR revealed his court-packing plan immediately following his re-
elective public mandate to continue his course of action.  Although the plan was defeated, two 
moderate Justices of the Court (Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts) who were the swing 
votes between the conservative Four Horsemen and the three liberal Justices (Justices Brandeis, 
Cardozo, and Stone), never again sided with the Four Horsemen in cases involving national 
attempts to regulate the economy.  According to one assessment:  
Mr. Justice Roberts and the Chief Justice himself had at last understood the 
danger to the Court of constantly challenging the Presidency, Congress and 
the voters, and adopted the doctrines of judicial caution which Stone and 
Brandeis had been vainly urging upon them for years.  (Brogan, p. 564) 
 
Yet another assessment stated, “Roosevelt lost the legislative battle, but won the war.  His 
reforms were thereafter upheld by the Supreme Court” (Hall, 1992, p. 204).  Describing both the 
plan and its consequences, another account read: 
[T]he ill-conceived court-packing plan of 1937, which, though a tactical 
failure, was strategically successful in forcing a turnabout in the Court’s 
judicial direction.  Beginning with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937), 
the Court accepted state and federal regulatory legislation.  (Hall, 1992, p. 
584) 
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 Economic conditions during the interval between the two major agricultural Acts also 
demonstrated the need for curbing agricultural production.  Political forces as well as 
philosophical proclivities of the Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace, also played an 
important role in developing comprehensive agricultural legislation.  The Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938 emerged from the convergence of several factors, which influenced its 
construction: 
• the failure of the farm acts passed in the wake of the Court’s Butler decision to 
effectively curb agricultural production and thus increase prices for farm commodities 
(Culver & Hyde, p. 176; Leuchtenburg, p. 254).89 
• the recession of 1937, caused in large part by the retreat by FDR from deficit 
spending which severely impacted the 25% of Americans engaged in agricultural 
production, which resulted in a rapid drop in farm prices, a result of both the 
recession and of overproduction of agricultural commodities (Brogan, p. 554; Culver 
& Hyde, pp. 176-177; Leuchtenburg, pp. 244-245, 254-255). 
• the domination of congressional committees by powerful Southern Democrats 
(Brogan, p. 554; Leuchtenburg, pp. 186, 252, 255). 
• Henry Wallace’s desire for the implementation of his concept of an “ever-normal 
granary” (Brogan, p. 554; Culver & Hyde, pp. 178-179; Leuchtenburg, p. 255).90 
 The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, described as “a complex, unwieldy bill full of 
compromise and gimmickry” by one source, “gave the farm bloc most of what it wanted” 
(Culver & Hyde, p. 178; Leuchtenburg, p. 255).  The second of the triple A acts  
made a start toward an ever-normal granary, established soil conservation as 
a permanent program, authorized crop loans, offered crop insurance for 
wheat to give better protection against drought, and empowered the 
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Secretary of Agriculture to assign national acreage allotments and subsidies 
to staple farmers.  (Leuchtenburg, p. 255) 
 
The last statement regarding “acreage allotments” was not quite true.  Instead of acreage 
allotments, what was assigned were marketing quotas.  The probable source of confusion resided 
in the fact that the marketing quotas were based on a per acre average of commodity production 
derived from previous years of production.  It was this aspect of the new farm bill that drew the 
legal challenge in Mulford v. Smith, an objection that focused on the agricultural commodity 
known as “flue-cured tobacco” (p. 41). 
 According to the provisions of the Act, whenever the supply of any farm commodity 
exceeded the ever-normal granary figure, defined by the Act as the “reserve supply level,” 
Congress authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to establish a “national marketing quota,” a 
quota that was to “be apportioned to the farms on which tobacco [was] grown” (p. 41).  
Regarding the nation’s supply of flue-cured tobacco, the Agriculture Secretary was required to 
make the determination by November 15th of each year whether the “total supply of tobacco as 
of July 1st exceeded the reserve supply level which was defined in the Act” (p. 42).  If existing 
supplies exceeded the ever-normal granary level, the Secretary was then required to “proclaim 
the total supply” by December 1st and announce that “a national marketing quota [would] be in 
effect throughout the marketing year” that began “the following July 1st” (p. 42).  The Act 
directed that the national marketing quota was to be the amount, as determined by the Secretary, 
“equal to the reserve supply level” (pp. 42-43).   
 Embedding a political concept, known as “consent of the governed,” into the Act’s 
operations as a check on the powers of the Secretary designed to prevent autocratic and 
dictatorial behavior, the Act required the Secretary “to conduct a referendum of the producers of 
the crop of the preceding year to ascertain whether they favor[ed] or oppose[d] the imposition of 
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a quota” (p. 43).  The referendum was required to take place “[w]ithin thirty days after [the 
Secretary’s] proclamation” (p. 43).  According to the Act, “If more than one-third oppose, the 
Secretary is to proclaim the result before January 1st and the quota is not to be effective” (p. 43).  
Citizen participation continued after the quota was approved and was described by the Court: 
Apportionment of the quota amongst individual farms is to be by local 
committees of farmers according to standards prescribed in the Act, 
amplified by regulations and instructions issued by the Secretary.  Each 
farmer is to be notified of his marketing quota and the quotas of individual 
farms are to be kept available for public inspection in the county or district 
where the farm is located.  If the farmer is dissatisfied with his allotment he 
may have his quota reviewed by a local review committee, and, if 
dissatisfied with the determination of that committee, he may obtain judicial 
review.  (p. 44) 
 
These aspects of the Act caused one historian to remark that “the activities of the AAA taught 
the farmers, far better than the Populists had ever managed, how to unite and organize” (Brogan, 
p. 554).  He further explained: 
Under the AAA it was the farmers, meeting and voting, who decided how 
many acres should be taken out of production every year and supervised 
each other to make sure that the reduction actually occurred.  All the other 
programmes [sic] were administered in the same manner.  By the end of the 
thirties, the farmers were no longer the desperate clients of Washington: 
they gave terms to the bureaucracy.91  (Brogan, p. 554). 
 
The Act further provided penalties for a producers who attempted to market farm commodities in 
excess of  their allotted quotas.  When marketed, the “warehouseman” was required to pay the 
Secretary of Agriculture “a penalty equal to fifty percent of the market prices of the excess” 
which he was allowed to deduct “from the price paid the producer” (p. 44). 
 Since Congress didn’t pass the Act until after the November 15th deadline in 1937 for the 
upcoming year, the Act “provided with respect to the marketing year beginning July 1, 1938, … 
that the determination and proclamation of the national marketing quota should be made within 
fifteen days after the statute’s approval” (p. 43).  According to the Court’s summation of events, 
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which also provided insight to the workings of the Act’s requirements, the following actions took 
place: 
The Act was approved February 16, 1938.  The Secretary proclaimed a 
quota for flue-cured tobacco on February 18th and, on the same date, issued 
instructions for holding a referendum on March 12th.  March 25th the 
Secretary proclaimed the result of the referendum which was favorable to 
the imposition of a national marketing quota.  In June he issued regulations 
governing the fixing of farm quotas within the states.  July 22nd he 
determined the apportionment as between states and issued regulations 
relative to the records to be kept by warehousemen and others.  Shortly 
before the markets opened each appellant received notice of the allotment to 
his farm.  (p. 50) 
 
Describing the referendums, one historian noted: 
A month later [after the passage of the Act], farmers filed into grange halls 
and filling stations to ballot on the first AAA referendums under the 1938 
act.  Cotton farmers approved a compulsory marketing quota by the lopsided 
tally of 1,189,000 to 97,000; dark-tobacco growers, 38,000 to 9,000; flue-
cured growers, 213,000 to 34,000.  (Leuchtenburg, p. 255) 
 
 James H. Mulford and other flue-cured tobacco farmers in southern Georgia and northern 
Florida filed suit in the Superior Court of Georgia seeking an injunction “to enjoin 
warehousemen from deducting, and remitting to the Secretary of Agriculture, the penalties 
inflicted by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 on tobacco sold by the plaintiffs in excess 
of the quotas assigned to their respective farms” (p. 40).  Nat Smith and the other “tobacco 
warehousemen [were] doing business in Valdosta, Ga” (24 F. Supp. 919, 920).  The Georgia 
state court “granted a preliminary injunction and ordered the defendant warehousemen to pay the 
amounts of the penalties into the registry of the court” (p. 45).  Attorneys for the warehousemen 
succeeded in removing the case to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, 
which continued the injunction while modifying the state court’s order so that payments would 
be made to the federal district court instead of the state court.  At this point the federal 
government “was permitted to intervene as a defendant” (p. 45).  A three-judge panel, after 
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hearing the case, dismissed “the bill” filed by the tobacco growers (p. 46).  The federal District 
Court for the Middle District of Georgia also “adjudged [costs] against the plaintiffs,” (24 F. 
Supp. 919, 924).  Upon appeal, the case was argued before the U.S. Supreme Court on March 8, 
1939 (p. 38). 
 Attorneys for the tobacco producers argued in much the same vein as the attorneys had 
argued in successfully challenging the constitutionality of the first AAA.  The arguments 
centered on the Tenth Amendment, on unlawful delegation of legislative power, and on the due 
process requirements of the Fifth Amendment.  First, they argued, the Act was “a statutory plan 
to control agricultural production,” which was “beyond the powers delegated to Congress,” 
which powers had been reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment (p. 47).  Second, the 
Act’s “standard for calculating farm quotas [was] uncertain, vague, and indefinite, resulting in an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Secretary” (p. 47).  Finally, the Act took 
the tobacco producers’ 1938 crop “without due process of law” (p. 47).  While not elaborated by 
the Court nor specified in its legal reasoning, one may surmise that arguments presented by the 
Government’s attorneys were similar to those used by the Court in explaining its official 
decision. 
 Justice Owen Roberts, author of the Butler opinion invalidating the first AAA, authored 
this opinion, which upheld the constitutionality of the second AAA.  The opinion for the 7-2 
Court majority, in effect, said the Butler opinion was a mistake by the Court, that “the problems 
confronting agriculture were national in scope and required national legislative attention” (Hall, 
1992, p. 563).  Justice Roberts was joined by Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Stone, 
Frankfurter, Reed, Black, and Douglas.  As mentioned previously, Mulford v. Smith marked 
Justice Douglas’ inaugural appearance on the Court.  Justices Butler and McReynolds, the last 
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remaining members of the Four Horsemen, joined in a dissenting opinion authored by Butler, 
which followed the line of reasoning previously laid out by the Court majority in United States v. 
Butler. 
 Whereas the Butler Court framed the issue around the figure of the effects of the law, i.e., 
the regulation of agricultural production, the Mulford Court framed the issue around the figure of 
congressional authority to regulate commerce, thus relegating the regulatory effects of the law to 
ground, in terms of Gestalt figure-ground perception theory.  According to the Mulford Court, 
“The statute does not purport to control production” (p. 47).  The Court explained: 
It sets no limit upon the acreage which may be planted or produced and 
imposes no penalty for the planting and producing of tobacco in excess of 
the marketing quota.  It purports to be solely a regulation of interstate 
commerce, which it reaches and affects at the throat where tobacco enters 
the stream of commerce, - the marketing warehouse.  (p. 47) 
 
The Court had earlier summarized the portion of the Act containing a congressional finding, 
which undergirded both congressional authority for and the purpose of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938.  According to the Court: 
Section 311 is a finding by the Congress that the marketing of tobacco is a 
basic industry which directly affects interstate and foreign commerce; that 
stable conditions in such marketing are necessary to the general welfare; … 
that without federal assistance the farmers are unable to bring about orderly 
marketing, with the consequence that abnormally excessive supplies are 
produced and dumped indiscriminately on the national market; that this 
disorderly marketing of excess supply burdens and obstructs interstate and 
foreign commerce, causes reduction in prices and consequent injury to 
commerce; … and that the establishment of quotas as provided by the Act is 
necessary and appropriate to promote, foster and obtain an orderly flow of 
tobacco in interstate and foreign commerce.  (p. 42) 
 
Regarding the attempt by the tobacco growers to assert the Tenth Amendment as a limit on the 
Commerce Power of Congress, the Court held, “The provisions of the Act under review 
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constitute a regulation of interstate and foreign commerce within the competency of Congress 
under the power delegated to it by the Constitution” (p. 48). 
 Addressing the claim that the Act unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to the 
Secretary of Agriculture, the Court declared that its summarization of the Act’s provisions 
disclosed “that definite standards are laid down for the government of the Secretary, first, in 
fixing the quota and, second, in its allotment amongst states and farms” (p. 48).  The Court 
further noted the following: 
The Congress has indicated in detail the considerations which are to be held 
in view in making these adjustments, and in order to protect against arbitrary 
action, has afforded both administrative and judicial review to correct errors.  
This is not to confer unrestrained arbitrary power on an executive officer.  
(p. 49) 
 
The Court announced its ruling, “In this aspect the Act is valid within the decisions of this Court 
respecting delegation to administrative officers” (p. 49).  In a footnote, the Court indicated the 
controlling cases regarding “delegation to administrative officers:”   
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506; Avent v. United States, 266 U.S. 
127; Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394; New York Central 
Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12; Currin v. Wallace, [306 U.S. 
1].  (p. 49, n. 20) 
 
 Finally, in response to the tobacco growers’ assertion that they were being deprived of 
their property in contravention of the Fifth Amendment’s due process requirements because they 
had already planted their tobacco crops before the Act became law, the Court responded by 
noting the flawed reasoning used by the growers’ attorneys: 
The argument overlooks the circumstance that the statute operates not on 
farm production, as the appellants insist, but upon the marketing of their 
tobacco in interstate commerce.  The law, enacted in February, affected the 
marketing which was to take place about August 1st following, and so was 
prospective in its operation upon the activity it regulated.  (p. 51) 
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The Court pointed out further actions that the growers could have taken in compliance with the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 that would have avoided the Act’s marketing penalties.  
According to the Court: 
The Act did not prevent any producer from holding over the excess tobacco 
produced, or processing and storing it for sale in a later year; and the 
circumstance that the producers in Georgia and Florida had not provided 
facilities for these purposes is not of legal significance.  (p. 51) 
 
Thus, the Court affirmed the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 
Georgia that had dismissed the tobacco growers’ challenge to the constitutionality of the second 
Agricultural Adjustment Act. 
 Significance for the tenth amendment. 
 Mulford v. Smith was one of a series of cases sandwiched between NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corporation and United States v. Darby Lumber Company that legitimized 
Government regulation of the nation’s economic life under the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution by removing the Tenth Amendment as a bar to such regulation.  These cases also 
“systematically dismantled the entire structure of laissez-faire constitutionalism” (Hall, 1992, p. 
584).  Laissez-faire constitutionalism was based on a set of beliefs that included hostility to 
government regulation of economic activities, a “commitment to market control of the 
economy,” and the conviction that social Darwinism (a pernicious view of life as a 
socioeconomic competition that ensures survival of the economically strongest with a corollary 
belief, derived from Protestant predetermination, that a person’s resulting station in life is 
ordained from above) best explained life (Hall, 1992, p. 492).  By reinterpreting the Commerce 
Clause to include activities related to production, the Court expanded the reach of the nation’s 
power to regulate commerce.  Since production was no longer viewed as lying outside of 
interstate or foreign commerce, nor was it deemed to be solely a function of the State’s police 
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powers, the Tenth Amendment could not come into play since neither its text nor case law 
viewed the Tenth Amendment as a limit on a delegated power.  While the Butler decision 
seemed to indicate the latter view, the Mulford Court decisively repudiated it as a mistaken view. 
 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 Case summary. 
 The Court’s report of this case did not contain separate sections for attorney arguments 
by either appellant or appellee.  Neither did the opinion elaborate on the two opposing sides’ 
legal arguments except for the arguments regarding the Twenty-first Amendment.  Although the 
Court presented South Dakota’s arguments regarding the applicability of the Twenty-first 
Amendment to the fourth conditional spending test used by the Court, the opinion did not present 
the Government’s argument regarding that issue.  Instead the Court responded to South Dakota’s 
arguments with its own argument.  As a result the shorter brief format was used. 
 The subject matter involved the minimum drinking age, a requirement which varied 
among the states.  South Dakota v. Dole also involved a congressional desire to establish a 
national minimum drinking age, a condition of which it subsequently attached to a bill allocating 
federal highway funds to the various states.  The constitutional issues implicated the Twenty-first 
Amendment and the Spending Clause contained in Article I, § 8, cl. 1 of the Constitution.  The 
name of the case derived from the two parties involved, the State of South Dakota and the United 
States Secretary of Transportation, Elizabeth Dole. 
 Many are familiar with § 1 of the Amendment, which repealed the Eighteenth 
Amendment’s prohibition on the manufacture, sale, and transportation of intoxicating liquor and 
that also provided authorization for the Volstead Act by which Congress banned the 
consumption of beer, wine, and distilled liquor across the nation.  Many, however, are not 
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familiar with § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment that re-established state control of alcoholic 
beverages.  § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment reads, “The transportation or importation into 
any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating 
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”  As one journalist summarized the 
implications of § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment: 
The Supreme Court has ruled that Section 2, although it doesn’t specifically 
say so, gives the states extensive authority to regulate alcoholic beverages.  
Normally, states would be prohibited by the Commerce Clause from 
restricting the transport of alcoholic beverages in interstate commerce.  
However, the Court has also held that states may only regulate alcohol in 
order to control consumption, not for economic protectionism.  (Monk, p. 
247) 
 
 South Dakota was one of the states that permitted “persons 19 years of age or older to 
purchase beer containing up to 3.2% alcohol” (p. 205).  One result of the lower drinking age in 
South Dakota was that young people in nearby states with higher minimum drinking ages drove 
into South Dakota where they could both purchase and consume beer legally.  The President 
appointed a commission “to study alcohol-related accidents and fatalities on the Nation’s 
highways” and “concluded that the lack of uniformity in the States’ drinking ages created ‘an 
incentive to drink and drive’ because ‘young persons commut[e] to border States where the 
drinking age is lower’” (p. 209).  In 1984 Congress tacked on § 158 to a law allocating federal 
highway funds to the various states. § 158 directed 
the Secretary of Transportation to withhold a percentage [5%] of federal 
highway funds otherwise allocable from States “in which the purchase or 
public possession … of any alcoholic beverage by a person who is less than 
twenty-one years of age is lawful.”  (p. 205) 
 
South Dakota initiated a lawsuit in federal District Court for the District of South Dakota in order 
to obtain “a declaratory judgment that § 158 violate[d] the constitutional limitations on 
congressional exercise of the spending power and violate[d] the Twenty-first Amendment to the 
   
   
668
United States Constitution” (p. 205).  The U.S. District Court ruled against South Dakota’s 
request for the requested declaratory judgment and upheld the legitimacy of § 158.  Upon appeal 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s ruling, whereupon South 
Dakota successfully appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the 7-2 Court, which held that § 158 
represented “a valid use of the spending power” (p. 203).  Joining the Chief Justice were Justices 
Blackmun, Marshall, Powell, Scalia, Stevens, and White.  Justices Brennan and O’Connor filed 
separate dissenting opinions. 
 The Court first directed attention to opposing arguments regarding the applicability of the 
Twenty-first Amendment to the legal dispute under consideration.  According to the Court, the 
Attorney General of South Dakota cited California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal 
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980), a case in which the Court held “that the ‘Twenty-first 
Amendment grants the States virtually complete control over whether to permit importation or 
sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution system’” (p. 205).  South Dakota then 
“assert[ed] that the setting of minimum drinking ages  [was] clearly within the ‘core powers’ 
reserved to the States under § 2 of the Amendment” (p. 205).  Finally, South Dakota claimed that 
§ 158 of the federal transportation bill “usurp[ed] that core power” that had been reserved to the 
states by § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment (pp. 205-206). 
 In response to the South Dakota Attorney General’s argument, the Deputy Solicitor 
General denied that § 158 contravened the Twenty-first Amendment.  Instead, the Government 
continued, § 2 of the Amendment “confirm[ed] the States’ broad power to impose restrictions on 
the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages but [did] not confer on them any power to permit 
sales that Congress [sought] to prohibit” (Emphasis in original) (p. 206).  As the Court opined, 
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that reasoning would permit Congress to enact “a national minimum drinking age more 
restrictive than that provided by the various state laws” (p. 206).  And then the Court announced 
that it wouldn’t be basing its ruling on the “meaning of the Twenty-first Amendment, the bounds 
of which have escaped precise definition” (p. 206).  According to the Court: 
Despite the extended treatment of the question by the parties, however, we 
need not decide in this case whether that Amendment would prohibit an 
attempt by Congress to legislate directly a national minimum drinking age.  
Here, Congress has acted indirectly under its spending power to encourage 
uniformity in the States’ drinking ages.  As we explain below, we find this 
legislative effort within constitutional bounds even if Congress may not 
regulate drinking ages directly.  (p. 206) 
 
 So, instead of determining whether the Twenty-first Amendment prevented Congress 
from enacting a minimum drinking age under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, the 
Court selected the Spending, or the General Welfare, Clause as the controlling constitutional 
authority in the legal dispute between South Dakota and the U.S. Government.  After quoting the 
relevant portion of the Clause as contained in Article I, § 8, cl. 1 of the Constitution, the Court 
observed: 
Incident to this power, Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of 
federal funds, and has repeatedly employed the power “to further broad 
policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon 
compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative 
directives.”  Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (opinion of 
Burger, C.J.).  (p. 206) 
 
The Court continued its focus on the Spending Clause by citing from and commenting on the 
Court’s ruling in Butler: 
The breadth of this power was made clear in United States v. Butler … 
where the Court, resolving a longstanding debate over the scope of the 
Spending Clause, determined that “the power of Congress to authorize 
expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct 
grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.”  Thus, objectives not 
thought to be within Article I’s “enumerated legislative fields,” id., at 65, 
   
   
670
may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power and the 
conditional grant of federal funds.  (p. 207) 
 
So, while it was possible that Congress couldn’t directly legislate to establish a national 
minimum drinking age, it was possible to attain the same result though conditional spending.   
 Remarking that the “spending power” was “not unlimited,” the Court next proceeded to 
lay out the “several general restrictions articulated in our cases” (p. 207).  The first requirement 
was “derived from the language of the Constitution itself; the exercise of the spending power 
must be in pursuit of ‘the general welfare.’  See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-641 
(1937); United States v. Butler, supra, at 65” (p. 207).  In determining if “a particular 
expenditure” meets this requirement, “courts should defer substantially to the judgment of 
Congress.  Helvering v. Davis, supra, at 640, 645” (p. 207).  In the current case, the Court ruled 
that § 158 was “designed to serve the general welfare” (p. 208). 
 The second requirement for successful attachment of spending conditions to legislation 
emerged from the case, Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 
(1981).  According to the Court, “[W]e have required that if Congress desires to condition the 
States’ receipt of federal funds, it ‘must do so unambiguously …, enabl[ing] the States to 
exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation’” (p. 207).  
In South Dakota v. Dole, the Court declared that the “conditions upon which States receive the 
funds, moreover, could not be more clearly stated by Congress” as was done in § 158 (p. 208). 
 The third requirement derived from the case, Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 
444, 461 (1978), which, in turn, cited Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. V. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 
(1958).  As the Court articulated the general rule, “conditions on federal grants” needed to be 
related “to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs” (p. 207).  The Court 
observed that this rule was “without significant elaboration” (p. 207).  Commenting further, the 
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Court pointed out that South Dakota was not “challenging the germaneness of the condition [§ 
158’s requirement regarding the minimum drinking age] to federal purposes” (p. 208).  In a 
separate note, the Court explained, “Our cases have not required that we define the outer bounds 
of the ‘germaneness’ or ‘relatedness’ limitation on the imposition of conditions under the 
spending power” (p. 208, n. 3).   
 The fourth and final Court-enumerated requirement was stated somewhat differently, the 
difference arising from a shift away from what requirement must be met to consideration of other 
constitutional requirements that might act as “an independent bar to the conditional grant of 
federal funds” (p. 208).  The Court also described the fourth requirement as the possible 
existence of an “’independent constitutional bar’ limitation on the spending power” (p. 209).  
The Court cited three cases in support of the final requirement: “Lawrence County v. Lead-
Deadwood School Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-270 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976) 
(per curiam);” and “King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333, n. 34 (1968)” (p. 208). 
 Although the Court only enumerated four restrictions on congressional spending power, it 
noted another requirement later in the opinion.  According to the Court: 
Our decisions have recognized that in some circumstances the financial 
inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at 
which “pressure turns into compulsion.”  Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 
[301 U.S. 548 (1937)], at 590.  (p. 211) 
 
Since South Dakota would lose only “5% of the funds otherwise obtainable under specified 
highway grant programs” if it wished to maintain its minimum drinking age of 19, the Court 
noted that “the argument as to coercion is shown to be more rhetoric than fact” (p. 211). 
 Of the first three requirements listed, the Court pointed out that “South Dakota [did] not 
seriously claim that § 158 [was] inconsistent with any of the first three restrictions mentioned” 
(p. 208).  Instead, “the basic point of disagreement” between South Dakota and the Federal 
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Government centered on the fourth requirement as to “whether the Twenty-first Amendment 
constitute[d] an ‘independent constitutional bar’ to the conditional grant of federal funds” (p. 
209).  The Court noted the South Dakota Attorney General’s argument, observing that the State 
relied “on its view that the Twenty-first Amendment prohibit[ed] direct regulation of drinking 
ages by Congress” (Emphasis in original) (p. 209).  Accordingly, South Dakota “assert[ed] that 
‘Congress may not use the spending power to regulate that which it is prohibited from regulating 
directly under the Twenty-first Amendment’” (p. 209).  In response, the Court presented a 
questionable assertion: 
But our cases show that this “independent constitutional bar” limitation on 
the spending power is not of the kind petitioner suggests.  United States v. 
Butler, supra, at 66, for example, established that the constitutional 
limitations on Congress when exercising its spending power are less 
exacting than those on its authority to regulate directly.  (p. 209) 
 
The problem arose from the Court’s interpretation of Butler as establishing “less exacting” 
“constitutional limitations on Congress” when Congress chose to use “its spending power” rather 
than  its power to directly regulate an activity as derived from one of its other constitutional 
sources of federal action (p. 209).  What the Butler Court actually said was that the Spending 
Clause served as the source of congressional spending authority and, as such, “the power of 
Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes [was] not limited by the 
direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution” (297 U.S. 1, 66).  As such, the limits 
on the spending authority of Congress were contained in the Spending Clause, which stated 
Congress had the power “to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence [sic] and general 
Welfare of the United States” (Article I, § 8, cl. 1).  The Butler Court did not directly confront 
the issue of conditional spending, which is a special case of the spending power of Congress with 
its own set of requirements.  What the Butler Court actually addressed was the issue of 
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congressional authority to spend money “for public purposes” as required by the Spending 
Clause, not the attachment of conditions to money bills.  Whereas the spending power is 
restricted only by the three stipulations regarding debts, national defense, and the national 
welfare, conditional spending must meet four additional requirements in order to pass legal 
muster.  In effect, the Rehnquist Court sidestepped the issue of the fourth requirement of 
conditional spending, that being the stipulation that such legislation should not violate an 
existing “independent constitutional bar” by its use of a questionable assertion regarding Butler 
(p. 209). 
 The Court did, however, continue to discuss other cases that dealt with the constitutional 
bar requirement.  Citing a Tenth Amendment challenge in 1947 to the Hatch Act’s requirement 
that prohibited political activities by state officials “financed in whole or in part with federal 
funds,” the Rehnquist Court noted that the Court had held in Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm’n, 
330 U.S. 127 (1947) “that the Federal Government ‘does have power to fix the terms upon which 
its money allotments to states shall be disbursed.’  Id., at 143” (p. 210).  In that case, the 
Rehnquist Court observed, the Supreme Court found no contravention of the Tenth Amendment 
“because the State could, and did, adopt ‘the simple expedient of not yielding to what she 
[regarded was] federal coercion’” (p. 210).  The Rehnquist Court quoted from the 1947 Court’s 
ruling, “The offer of benefits to a state by the United States dependent upon cooperation by the 
state with federal plans, assumedly for the general welfare, is not unusual” (p. 210).  
Summarizing its review of Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm’n and dicta selected from Steward 
Machine Co. v. Davis, the Rehnquist Court interpreted the meaning of the “independent 
constitutional bar” requirement: 
These cases establish that the “independent constitutional bar” limitation on 
the spending power is not, as petitioner [South Dakota] suggests, a 
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prohibition on the indirect achievement of objectives which Congress is not 
empowered to achieve directly.  Instead, we think that the language in our 
earlier opinions stands for the unexceptionable proposition that the power 
may not be used to induce the States to engage in activities that would 
themselves be unconstitutional.  (Emphasis added) (p. 210) 
 
Applying its interpretation of the constitutional bar requirement, the Rehnquist Court opined, 
“Were South Dakota to succumb to the blandishments offered by Congress and raise its drinking 
age to 21, the State’s action in so doing would not violate the constitutional rights of anyone” (p. 
211).  In other words, the constitutional bar does not restrict congressional action; instead, it 
must be applied to the exercise of the condition by the subsequent parties in accepting the 
condition.   
 After discussing the additional “coercive nature” requirement, the Rehnquist Court 
summarized its determination of the intersection of facts and legal issues in announcing its 
ruling.  In affirming the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals judgment in South Dakota v. Dole, the 
Court stated: 
Here Congress has offered relatively mild encouragement to the States to 
enact higher minimum drinking ages than they would otherwise choose.  
But the enactment of such laws remains the prerogative of the States not 
merely in theory but in fact.  Even if Congress might lack the power to 
impose a national minimum drinking age directly, we conclude that 
encouragement to state action found in § 158 is a valid use of the spending 
power.  (pp. 211-212) 
 
 Both Justices Brennan and O’Connor dissented, each of them authoring their own 
opinion.  Both Justices believed the Twenty-first Amendment acted as a restraint on federal 
power, a belief not shared by the Court majority who viewed the Amendment through the lens of 
the constitutional bar requirement for conditional spending.  Viewing it through that lens, the 
majority Justices viewed the Amendment as applying to actions taken by those accepting the 
conditions offered by Congress.  Justice Brennan’s dissent consisted of a paragraph in which he 
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stated his belief “that regulation of the minimum age of purchasers of liquor falls squarely within 
the ambit of those powers reserved to the States by the Twenty-first Amendment” (p. 212).  In 
Justice Brennan’s view, “[t]he Amendment, itself, [struck] the proper balance between federal 
and state authority” (p. 212).  Justice Brennan viewed § 158 as violating the constitutional bar 
requirement for successful attachment of spending conditions on the receipt of federal funds.  
According to the Justice, “Since States possess this constitutional power, Congress cannot 
condition a federal grant in a manner that abridges this right” (p. 212). 
 Justice O’Connor thought § 158 violated the third requirement of conditional spending as 
discussed by the majority opinion, the stipulation whereby the conditions needed to reasonably 
relate “to the federal interest in the project” (p. 208).  According to Justice O’Connor, “…§ 158 
is not a condition on spending reasonably related to the expenditure of federal funds and cannot 
be justified on that ground” (p. 212).  Justice O’ Connor explained: 
But the Court’s application of the requirement that the condition imposed be 
reasonably related to the purpose for which the funds are expended is 
cursory and unconvincing.  We have repeatedly said that Congress may 
condition grants under the spending power only in ways reasonably related 
to the purpose of the federal program.  Massachusetts v. United States, 
supra, at 461; Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 Y,S, 275m 295 
(1958)…; Steward Machine Co. v Davis, supra, at 590…  In my view, 
establishment of a minimum drinking age of 21 is not sufficiently related to 
interstate highway construction to justify so conditioning funds appropriated 
for that purpose.  (pp. 213-214) 
 
Furthermore, according to Justice O’Connor, the majority Justices were mistaken when they 
stated “that South Dakota conceded the reasonable relationship point” (p. 214).  Justice 
O’Connor elaborated: 
In support of its contrary conclusion, the Court relies on a supposed 
concession by counsel for South Dakota that the State “has never contended 
that the congressional action was … unrelated to a national concern in the 
absence of the Twenty-first Amendment.” (p. 214) 
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Justice O’Connor continued: 
The fact that the Twenty-first Amendment is crucial to the State’s argument 
does not, therefore, amount to a concession that the condition imposed by § 
158 is reasonably related to highway construction.  The Court also relies on 
a portion of the argument transcript in support of its claim that South Dakota 
conceded the reasonable relationship point.  (p. 214) 
 
 In her next two sentences, Justice O’Connor supplied new information by establishing a 
nexus between the Court’s faulty reasoning, the unpreparedness of the South Dakota Attorney 
General to discuss the reasonable relationship requirement for the successful attachment of 
spending conditions upon receipt of federal funds, and an Amici Curiae brief submitted by 
attorneys for the National Conference of State Legislatures that contained extensive arguments 
about the reasonable relationship requirement.  According to Justice O’Connor: 
But counsel’s [the Attorney General for South Dakota] statements there [the 
argument transcript] are at best ambiguous.  Counsel essentially said no 
more than that he was not prepared to argue the reasonable relationship 
question discussed at length in the Brief for the National Conference of 
State Legislatures et al. as Amici Curiae.  (p. 214) 
 
Continuing to hammer at the unrelatedness of highway construction to the establishment of a 
minimum drinking age, Justice O’Connor argued the following: 
When Congress appropriates money to build a highway, it is entitled to 
insist that the highway be a safe one.  But it is not entitled to insist as a 
condition of the use of highway funds that the State impose or change 
regulations in other areas of the State’s social and economic life because of 
an attenuated or tangential relationship to highway use or safety.  Indeed, if 
the rule were otherwise, the Congress could effectively regulate almost any 
area of a State’s social, political, or economic life on the theory that use of 
the interstate transportation system is somehow enhanced.  (p. 215) 
 
 And then, Justice O’Connor proposed what initially appeared to be a sixth requirement 
for the attachment of spending conditions, but in actuality represented further clarification of the 
reasonable relationship requirement that had been articulated by attorneys “Benna Ruth 
Solomon, Beate Bloch, and Larry L. Simms” in the brief they submitted on behalf of the 
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National Conference of State Legislatures (p. 204).  This brief was the one referred to earlier as 
containing an argument on “the reasonable relationship question discussed at length,” but which 
the South Dakota Attorney General indicated in oral argument with the Court that he “was not 
prepared to argue” (p. 214).  This brief is also the one to which the Court referred when it stated: 
Amici urge that we take this occasion to establish that a condition on federal 
funds is legitimate only if it relates directly to the purpose of the expenditure 
to which it is attached.  See Brief for National Conference of State 
Legislatures et al. as Amici Curiae 10.  (p. 208, n. 3) 
 
Continuing its comments regarding Amici Curiae 10 (which further illuminate the nexus drawn 
by Justice O’Connor between the Court’s reasoning, the unpreparedness of the SD Attorney 
General to argue the reasonable relationship requirement, and the Amici Curiae 10 brief), the 
Court further stated: 
Because petitioner has not sought such a restriction, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 19-
21, and because we find any such limitation on conditional federal grants 
satisfied in this case in any even, we do not address whether conditions less 
directly related to the particular purpose of the expenditure might be outside 
the bounds of the spending power.  (p. 208, n. 3) 
 
Although the Court elected to “not address” this aspect of the reasonable relationship question, 
Justice O’Connor elected to address the issue because of what she perceived to be its central 
bearing on the case (p. 208, n. 3).  First, Justice O’Connor introduced the idea of a new 
demarcation line dividing acceptable and unacceptable conditions on receiving and spending 
federal funds by stating: 
There is a clear place at which the Court can draw the line between 
permissible and impermissible conditions on federal grants.  It is the line 
identified in the Brief for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. 
as Amici Curiae…  (p. 215) 
 
Justice O’Connor then quoted the following two paragraphs from the cited brief: 
Congress has the power to spend for the general welfare, it has the power to 
legislate only for delegated purposes… 
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The appropriate inquiry, then, is whether the spending requirement or 
prohibition is a condition on a grant or whether it is regulation.  The 
difference turns on whether the requirement specifies in some way how the 
money should be spent, so that Congress’ intent in making the grant will be 
effectuated.  Congress has no power under the Spending Clause to impose 
requirements on a grant that go beyond specifying how the money should be 
spent.  A requirement that is not such a specification is not a condition, but a 
regulation, which is valid only if it falls within one of Congress’ delegated 
regulatory powers.  (Emphasis in original) (p. 216) 
 
According to Justice O’Connor, § 158 represented “an attempt to regulate the sale of liquor, an 
attempt that lies outside Congress’ power to regulate commerce because it falls within the ambit 
of § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment” (p. 212).   
 In O’Connor’s view, three classes of conditions existed under the reasonable relationship 
requirement for conditional spending.  The dividing line consisted of the question posed by the 
attorneys for the National Conference of State Legislatures asking whether the spending 
requirement “specifie[d] in some way how the money should be spent” or instead “a regulation” 
that was “valid only if it [fell] within one of Congress’ delegated regulatory powers” (p. 216).  
Accordingly, the first class consisted of those conditions which appropriately related “to how 
federal moneys were to be expended” (p. 217).  The example Justice O’Connor provided was the 
case cited by the Court majority, Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm’n, which involved the Hatch 
Act’s applicability to state officials funded by federal dollars. 
 The second class comprised those conditions that regulated but the regulation could be 
“independently justified under some regulatory power of Congress” (p. 217).  Justice O’Connor 
provided two examples.  Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) “upheld a condition on 
federal grants that … money be ‘set aside’ for contracts with minority enterprises” because it 
was “a valid regulation under the commerce power and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment” (p. 
217).  Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), upheld “nondiscrimination provisions” that were 
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“applied to local schools receiving federal funds” because the condition was a valid regulation as 
well. 
 The third class contained those conditions “fall[ing] into neither class,” which was the 
situation posed by the current case, South Dakota v. Dole.  In other words, the condition didn’t 
relate to how the money should be spent and instead represented a regulation, but it was a 
regulation that lay outside of Congress’ delegated powers.  Justice O’Connor commented: 
[A] condition that a State will raise its drinking age to 21 cannot fairly be 
said to be reasonably related to the expenditure of funds for highway 
construction.  The only possible connection, highway safety, has nothing to 
do with how the funds Congress has appropriated are expended.  Rather than 
a condition …, it is a regulation determining who shall be able to drink 
liquor.  As such it is not justified by the spending power.  (p. 218) 
 
Having demonstrated that § 158 didn’t belong to the first class of reasonable relationship 
requirement conditions, but to either the second or third class of conditions that regulated, Justice 
O’Connor examined the question further to determine a possible source of constitutional 
authority for the regulation. 
Of the other possible sources of congressional authority for regulating the 
sale of liquor only the commerce power comes to mind.  But in my view, the 
regulation of the age of the purchasers of liquor, just as the regulation of the 
price at which liquor may be sold, falls squarely within the scope of those 
powers reserved to the States by the Twenty-first Amendment.  (p. 218) 
 
According to Justice O’Connor, the Twenty-first Amendment prohibited Congress from using 
the Commerce Clause to regulate the minimum drinking age across the nation.  Under the 
Spending Clause, the regulatory character of § 158, viewed through the reasonable relationship 
requirement for conditional spending, also failed to find constitutional authority. Because § 158 
could not be justified by either the spending power or the commerce power, it was “not 
authorized by the Constitution” and the Court erred “in holding it to be the law of the land” (p. 
218). 
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 Significance for the tenth amendment. 
 South Dakota v. Dole’s significance lies in its exposition, both in the majority and 
dissenting opinions, of the five requirements that need to be met in order for conditions to be 
legally attached to the receipt and expenditure of federal funds.  These requirements, which must 
be met for the successful attachment of conditions to congressional spending bills, are listed 
below in the order in which the Court presented them: 
• General Welfare Requirement. 
• Unambiguous Conditions Requirement. 
• Relevant Relationship Requirement. 
• Absence of a Constitutional Bar Requirement. 
• Absence of Financial Coercion Requirement. 
Succeeding Courts may differ in how they apply the requirements (especially the constitutional 
bar, the reasonable relationship, and the financial coercion tests as those have not been clearly 
defined by the Court) to the specifics of particular pieces of legislation.  For example, neither 
South Dakota v. Dole (1987) nor Steward Machine Co. v. Davis (1937) (the latter case being 
cited by the Court as the source of the requirement) provided any clarification about the line 
between persuasion and coercion.  As a result questions continue about the practical applicability 
to subsequent legislation of the “not coercive” requirement for conditional spending.  In this 
particular case, a loss of 5% of a state’s allocation of federal funds for noncompliance with 
federal conditions placed the statute’s conditions on spending in the persuasive, and not the 
coercive, category. 
 Observers are also left wondering what might have been the outcome of the case had the 
Attorney General for South Dakota been prepared to argue the Relevant Relationship 
   
   
681
Requirement, an issued inquired about by the Court during oral argument.  As it was, the 
different interpretations placed upon that exchange between the Court and the South Dakota 
Attorney General marked a fundamental point of separation between the Court’s majority 
opinion and Justice O’Connor’s dissent (for the exchange between the Court and the SD 
Attorney General, see Appendix P).  The issue regarding the Relevant Relationship Requirement 
also formed the heart of the Amici Curiae brief submitted by attorneys for the National 
Conference of State Legislatures, a brief that was cited by both Justice Rehnquist in the majority 
opinion and Justice O’Connor in her dissenting opinion (for both the “Table of Contents” and the 
“Summary of Argument” sections contained in the brief, see Appendix Q). 
 Finally, South Dakota v. Dole provided us with a flow chart, as it were, of the Spending 
Power of Congress in terms of hierarchical propositions within a logical framework.  These 
propositions (in descending order according to their hierarchical position in a logical reasoning 
structure that proceeds from the general power to more specific applications of that power) will 
be presented as they were discussed in South Dakota v. Dole by both Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
majority opinion and Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion.  First, United States v. Butler 
established the proposition “that the reach of the spending power ‘is not limited by the direct 
grants of legislative power found in the Constitution’” (O’Connor, J., in dissent) (pp. 212-213).  
As the Court explained, United States v. Butler resolved “a longstanding debate over the scope of 
the Spending Clause” (Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court) (p. 207). 
 Second, Court rulings established the proposition that “Congress may attach conditions 
on the receipt of federal funds to further ‘the federal interest in particular national projects of 
programs’” (O’Connor, in dissent) (p. 212).  Or, as explained by Chief Justice Rehnquist: 
Incident to this power [the Spending Power as articulated in Article I, § 8, 
cl. 1 of the Constitution], Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of 
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federal funds, and has repeatedly employed the power “to further broad 
policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon 
compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative 
directives.”  Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (opinion of 
Burger, C.J.).  (p. 206) 
 
The cases cited by Rehnquist’s majority and O’Connor’s dissenting opinions, while both 
agreeing on the foundational status of Steward Machine Co. v. Davis (1937) and Oklahoma v. 
Civil Service Commission (1947), differed beyond that point.  Justice O’Connor further cited 
only the case, Massachusetts v. United States (1978), while the Chief Justice, in addition to 
having already cited Fullilove v. Klutznick in the passage quoted above, also cited the following 
two cases, Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken (1958) and Lau v. Nichols (1974).  These 
cases represent the case law bearing on the proposition that Congress may, under its Spending 
Power, attach conditions to the receipt and expenditure of federal funds.  South Dakota v. Dole 
also interpreted United States v. Butler to support the following corollary to the proposition that 
Congress could use the Spending Power to attach conditions upon how federal funds are spent:  
“Thus objectives not thought to be within Article I’s ‘enumerated legislative fields’ … may 
nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of 
federal funds” (Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court) (p. 207). 
 Third, a series of Court rulings established the proposition that “the spending power is … 
subject to several general restrictions” (Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court) (p. 207).  Or, as articulated 
by Justice O’Connor’s dissent, “[T]here are four separate types of limitations on the spending 
power” (O’Connor, J., in dissent) (p. 213).  For unexplained reasons, Justice O’Connor did not 
include the fifth restriction noted by the Court majority regarding the Absence of Financial 
Coercion Requirement.  However, as noted previously, the lines of demarcation between 
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acceptable and unacceptable conditions regarding the five requirements of conditional spending 
have not been fully delineated by the Court regarding some of the requirements. 
Summary of Salient Points 
 A number of critical threads composing the tapestry of American government were 
uncovered during this chapter’s investigation of Tenth Amendment case law.  This most likely 
occurred because the major arguments over sovereignty and over the location of the state-federal 
boundaries involved the federalism issues inherent in the Tenth Amendment.  These threads 
included the identification of two great forces moving throughout our nation’s history, sometime 
in harmony, sometimes clashing against each other in ways that revealed an ancient rift between 
local and central government sovereignty issues.  The case law emerging from this clash of 
forces duplicated in many respects the political discussions and arguments that preceded the 
courtroom battles.  This chapter revealed much of the preceding political battle in an attempt to 
provide a deeper understanding of the subterranean forces at work in the visible courtroom 
clashes.  Wherever possible, contextual information was also presented in recognition of its 
importance as an aid to increased understanding.   
 Individual strands within the thread of disputed sovereignty included two different types 
of actions, both by the same man, James Madison.  One Madison was the statesman viewed by 
George Washington as the person who best “understood the nature of the new” constitutional 
republic, the man who authored the Virginia Plan that underlies much of the Constitution, the 
man who co-authored significant portions of The Federalist in collaboration with Hamilton and 
Jay (Wills, 2002, p. 42).  The other Madison was the petty politician finally adjudged by 
Washington to be “duplicitous and dishonorable,” a man so caught up in partisan politics that 
winning one’s argument justified abandoning principled positions (Wills, 2002, p. 43).  
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Madison’s behavior particularly illustrates an observation drawn centuries earlier by Aristotle, 
who observed: 
[T]o invest a man [with the authority of government] is to introduce a beast, 
as desire is something bestial and even the best of men in authority are liable 
to be corrupted by anger.  We may conclude then that the law is intelligence 
without passion and is therefore preferable to any individual.  (Aristotle, 
Book III, ch. xvi; Welldon, p. 154) 
 
So, on the one hand, we have Madison the individual who became “corrupted by anger,” 
possessed of “bestial” desires for victory at any cost (Aristotle, Book III, ch. xvi; Welldon, p. 
154).  On the other hand, we have Madison the statesman focused on the primacy of law and of 
“intelligence without passion” (Aristotle, Book III, ch. xvi; Welldon, p. 154).  Madison’s actions 
in the Constitutional Convention and in his collaborative writing of  The Federalist were focused 
on the rule of law, on how best to structure government as a means of ensuring the rule of law in 
America.  Madison’s multiple actions in opposition to Hamilton, to the retention of the nation’s 
capital in Philadelphia, to Jay’s Treaty, and to the Alien and Sedition Acts were so focused on 
achieving victory for his viewpoint that the end (winning) justified the abandonment of 
principled positions that had been reached through a focus on a government ruled by law. 
 In addition to the thread of disputed sovereignty, the thread representing the political and 
legal thought of Alexander Hamilton ran throughout the case law contained in this chapter.  One 
strand in particular, regarding the use of constitutionally implied powers to reach a 
constitutionally authorized end, cropped up in multiple Court opinions that were examined.  
Following Hamilton’s initial authorship in his opinion regarding the constitutionality of the Bank 
Bill in President Washington’s first administration, Chief Justice Marshall used Hamilton’s 
thought in McCullough v. Maryland.  Later, the same thought reappeared in United States v. 
Darby and again in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States.  Other strands of the Hamiltonian 
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thread involved views of the Constitution as flowing from the sovereignty of the people instead 
of flowing from a compact made by the states, of the Constitution as a general blueprint instead 
of a detailed plan or comprehensive legal code, and most importantly, Hamilton’s views 
regarding judicial review.  In addition to revealing that the majority of articles contained in The 
Federalist were authored by Alexander Hamilton, this chapter also drew attention to Hamilton’s 
authorship of the articles focused on the judiciary. 
 Another thread discovered in this chapter’s represented the various answers given in our 
nation’s history to an ancient question first posed by Aristotle more than two millennia 
previously.  Discussing the question posed by Aristotle in chapters xv-xvi of Book III in his 
Politics, one of America’s renowned constitutional scholars (Professor Edward S. Corwin, 
Princeton University) identified Aristotle’s question as asking, “whether the rule of law or the 
rule of an individual is preferable,” which had been interpreted in 1708 by an English political 
theorist (James Harrington, in his The Commonwealth of Oceana) to read “[whether a] 
government of laws and not of men [is preferable]” (Corwin, 1965, p. 8).   
 The first American response to Aristotle’s question was supplied on January 9, 1776, by 
Thomas Paine in his pamphlet, Common Sense (Liell, p. 83; Corwin, 1965, p. 1).  Calling for a  
“Continental Conference” to write a “Continental Charter … of the United Colonies,”  Paine 
described the status that should be accorded the American successor to England’s Magna Carta 
(Paine, p. 33): 
But where says some is the King of America [sic]?  I’ll tell you Friend, he 
reigns above, and doth not make havoc of mankind like the Royal Brute of 
Britain.  Yet that we may not appear to be defective even in earthly honors, 
let a day be solemnly set apart for proclaiming the charter; let it be brought 
forth placed on the divine law, the word of God, let a crown be placed 
thereon, by which the world may know, that so far as we approve of 
monarchy, that in America THE LAW IS KING.  For as in absolute 
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governments the King is law, so in free countries the law ought to be King; 
and there ought to be no other.  (Emphasis in original) (Paine, p. 34) 
 
 Some six months later, the Declaration of Independence implied America’s second 
response to Aristotle’s question through its discussion of “unalienable Rights,” the purpose of 
government being to “secure these rights,” the source of government being “the consent of the 
governed,” and its detailed listing of tyrannical abuses by an individual (the King of England) 
which denied colonists the rule of law (The Declaration of Independence).  While not explicitly 
stating that the rule of law was preferable to the rule of men, the effect of the arguments 
presented in the Declaration of Independence stated a preference for the rule of law. 
 The third American response to the ancient question posed by Aristotle appeared in the 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which was written in response to perceived legislative 
tyranny by several early state legislatures following the practice of the British parliamentary 
model, a response authored by John Adams to embed the institutional practice of Montesquieu’s 
doctrine regarding governmental separation of powers into the state constitution.  Without the 
response being a government of laws, and without that response being wedded to the doctrine of 
Separation of Powers, judicial review would either have not emerged or its form would have 
been vastly different than is the current state of affairs in American life.   
 The Constitutional Convention of 1787, the collection of essays entitled The Federalist, 
the ratifying conventions in the various states, and the ratification of the U.S. Constitution 
combined to provide the fourth American response to Aristotle’s question.  Vesting sovereignty 
in the people, dividing government responsibilities between three branches of government, 
creating a unique federalist form of government, establishing rules by which its legislators and 
head executives would be chosen, and laying out the set of rules under which the nation would 
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be governed, the Constitution declared that American government would be based on the rule of 
law when it declared: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and 
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.  (U.S. 
Constitution, Article VI) 
  
 America’s fifth assertion that the rule of law is preferable to the rule of men was implied 
by President Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address when he declared “that government of the people, by 
the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth” (Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address).  Such 
government can only occur with any lasting success under a written constitution that provides the 
basic rules under which that government can operate.  Lincoln referred to the United States as “a 
new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all [people] are created 
equal” (Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address).  The nation to which Lincoln referred operated under the 
rule of law, not of men, operating first under the Articles of Confederation, and functioning 
subsequently under the U.S. Constitution. 
 This chapter and appendices also uncovered other, similar answers to Aristotle’s question 
that were provided by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison (1803), by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), by the United States First Circuit Court of Appeals 
in United States v. Butler (1936), by the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire in 
Chimento v. Stark (1973) (a case affirmed without opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court), by both 
Judge Sirica’s federal district court ruling and the federal circuit court’s ruling in In re Subpoena 
to Nixon (1973), by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon (1974), and by Watergate 
Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox in the aftermath of the Saturday Night Massacre (October 21, 
1973).  America’s response to Cox’s use of Aristotle’s question also uncovered the Roman 
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response to that same question, a response inscribed in American court house and law school 
architecture, “Fiat justitia, ruat coelum,” interpreted to read “Let Justice be done, though the 
Heavens fall.” (White, p. 5).   
 The discovery of the next thread proved to be somewhat troubling to this writer, 
primarily because of both current and future implications posed by this thread.  Somewhat 
surprising to this writer was the prevalent use of propaganda techniques employed by Justice 
Rehnquist in the majority decision of National League of Cities v. Usery, by Justice O’Connor in 
dissenting opinions in FERC v. Mississippi and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, by Justice O’Connor in the majority opinion in New York v. United States, and by 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Printz v. United States. 
 Initial impressions regarding the judicial use of propaganda techniques were subsequently 
confirmed by a studious investigation by this writer, which consisted of: 1)  applying the 
techniques of propaganda analysis to the judicial opinions in question; and 2)  examining the 
thoughts of other justices authoring opinions in the identified cases.   The results of this study 
required the addition of an appendix entitled “Propaganda Techniques” (See Appendix M).   
 It is perhaps reliance upon propaganda techniques to achieve a pre-determined end rather 
than comprehensive legal analysis that lies at the root of “judicial activism.”  At least one federal 
judge believes judicial activism is far more prevalent among conservative judges.  Speaking at 
Drake University’s public forum on the judiciary and the media, Chief U.S. District Judge Mark 
Bennett declared, “There’s more judicial activism from the conservative judges than any liberal 
judges.  There’s no question about that in my mind” (Dalmer, p. 1B).  Which is somewhat ironic 
since “judicial activism” is “a term favored by right-wing groups to accuse liberal judges of 
making laws rather than applying them” (Dalmer, p. 1B).  Judge Bennett offered examples of 
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propaganda techniques used by conservatives to “insinuate a political agenda,” e.g., their use of 
code words, which are a sophisticated use of the name-calling propaganda technique (Dalmer, p. 
2B).   
 Regarding the use of the term “judicial activism,” it would appear that liberals and 
conservatives mean different things when each uses the term.  The events surrounding the 2010 
elections in Iowa shed some light on one meaning – judicial decisions which take into account 
majority social, religious, and economic values when making a decision.  Decisions reached 
which contravene prevailing social values and mores are the result of activist judges, according 
to most conservative viewpoints.  In 2010 an extensive campaign was mounted by Iowa 
conservatives to oust three state supreme court justices whose names appeared on the ballot to 
determine whether the voters wished to retain or to oust the justices.  These justices were 
targeted by conservatives for their part in a unanimous 7-0 Iowa Supreme Court ruling, Varnum 
v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009), which, in effect, legalized same-gender marriages in 
Iowa through its holding that the Iowa law limiting the civil benefits of marriage to only a man 
and a woman violated the Iowa Constitution’s Bill of Rights.  The justices had simply applied 
the Iowa Constitution to the facts of the case without regard to existing prejudices, much in the 
fashion exemplified by the portraits & statues of justice showing her with a blindfold, weighing 
the mix of facts and the law in the scales of justice in a dispassionate manner without favor or 
disfavor.  For striking down a discriminatory state law that violated the Iowa Constitution, the 
Iowa Supreme Court Justices were accused of judicial activism.  Enough voters disagreed with 
the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision strongly enough to align with the conservative advocacy 
directed at ousting the justices, and the three justices (which included the Chief Justice of the 
Iowa Supreme Court) were ousted by majority vote.   
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 An examination of American history confirms this meaning of judicial activism, meaning 
a judicial decision reached by applying foundational law to the facts of the case that results in a 
decision that doesn’t agree with prevailing beliefs and social mores.  The term, activist judges, 
was applied by racists and conservatives to the Warren Court in the aftermath of its rulings 
regarding segregation in  
courtrooms, jails and prisons, restaurants, hotels, bars, trains and train 
stations, buses, streetcars, elevators, lunch counters, swimming pools, 
beaches, baseball fields, fishing holes, telephone booths, prizefights, pool 
halls, factories, public toilets, hospitals, cemeteries, and virtually all other 
places where blacks and whites might meet.  (Hall, 1992, p. 767) 
 
The Warren Court simply applied the literal meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the facts 
of the various cases at hand without regard to racial prejudice.  For this, the majority justices 
were accused of judicial activism. 
 The other meaning of judicial activism lies in the literal interpretation of the term –  
judges acting to achieve a pre-determined result through unsound judicial practices and through 
dubious argumentative practices instead of employing traditional judicial analysis in the 
objective sense of being blind to existing prejudices and social mores.  In other words, engaging 
in judicial lawmaking.  This is the meaning in which Chief U.S. District Judge Mark Bennett 
used the term.  
 Within the thread of judicial use of propaganda techniques by conservative justices, two 
distinctive strands were uncovered during the investigation of Tenth Amendment case law (See 
discussion in various parts of this chapter under the appropriate case headings).  The first strand 
represented the consistent misuse of dicta from Texas v. White by various justices in majority 
opinions, which included the following:  Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 844 (1976); Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in 
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New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992); and Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997).  The misuse occurred because the dicta was 
lifted out of its original context and used for a purpose that was contradicted by both the 
reasoning and holding of Texas v. White (See 426 U.S. 833, 867-868, n. 8). 
 The second strand uncovered was the use of propaganda techniques to invent an 
interpretation of the Tenth Amendment not supported by either the text or the case law of the 
Amendment.  The created interpretation centered on use of the Tenth Amendment as a restriction 
on a constitutionally delegated power.  Examples of the interpretation as developed by different 
justices occurred in the following opinions:  Justice Rehnquist’s “Tenth as a Declaration of 
Constitutional Policy” argument in the majority opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery, 
426 U.S. 833, 841-845 (1976); Justice O’Connor’s reiteration of Rehnquist’s “Tenth as a 
Declaration of Constitutional Policy” argument in her dissenting opinion in FERC v. Mississippi, 
456 U.S. 752 , 778-779 (1982); Justice O’Connor’s “Spirit of the Tenth Amendment” argument 
in her dissenting opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 
582-585 (1985); Justice O’Connor’s “Federal Structure-Constitutional Framework” argument in 
the majority opinion in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-157 (1992); and Justice 
Scalia’s “Structure of the Constitution” argument in the majority opinion in Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 917-919 (1997). 
 Judicial criticism of these interpretations of the Tenth Amendment came from the 
following justices:  Justice Brennan’s dissenting critique of Rehnquist’s reasoning in National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 858-872 (1976); Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion 
criticism of O’Connor’s lack of judicial reasoning in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761-
762, n. 25, 765, n. 29, 767-768, n. 30; Justice Stevens’ dissenting criticism of O’Connor’s 
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argument in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 211 (1992); and Justice Stevens’ critique 
of Scalia’s structural argument in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 953-961 (1997).  A 
criticism that hit the mark (regarding the opinions relying upon propaganda techniques to 
achieve a view of the Tenth Amendment as limiting the use of a delegated power) was that 
offered by Justice Blackmun, who commented on O’Connor’s use of “rhetorical devices:” 
While these rhetorical devices make for absorbing reading, they 
unfortunately are substituted for useful constitutional analysis.  For while 
Justice O’Connor articulates a view of state sovereignty that is almost 
mystical, she entirely fails to address our central point….  [T]he partial 
dissent has pointed to no constitutionally significant theoretical distinction.  
(456 U.S. 752, 767-768, n. 30) 
 
 Initial questions regarding the Constitution also received an answer during the course of 
this chapter’s investigation.  In America true sovereignty resides in the people.  Given both the 
final text of the preamble to the Constitution and the actions taken at the Constitutional 
Convention, the inescapable conclusion is that the people, not the states, are the “real sovereign 
source of the Constitution” (Rossiter, p. 229; see also Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 78; 
James Madison’s actions and statements at the Constitutional Convention in Farrand, I, pp. 22, 
122-123, 214; revised preamble to the Constitution by the Framers in Farrand, II, pp. 177, 553-
554, 651; Corwin, 1965, p. 89; Wills, 1981/2001, pp. 131-134; Daniel Webster’s arguments in 
McCullough, 17 U.S. 316, 326; William Pinkney’s arguments in McCullough, 17 U.S. 316, 377-
378; Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCullough, 17 U.S. 316, 402-405, 432; In re 
Subpoena to Nixon, 487 F.2d 700, 711). The idea that the people of the United States are the 
ultimate sovereigns flows from the Declaration of Independence as well, according to which: 
That to secure these [inalienable] rights, Governments are instituted among 
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, - That 
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is 
the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new 
Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its 
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powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety 
and Happiness.  (Declaration of Independence) 
 
 The Constitution is therefore not a compact entered into by the states.  The Constitution 
also served as a general plan for American government instead of a detailed, cumbersome legal 
code (17 U.S. 316, 406-409, 413-418).  And because of the nature of the Constitution as a 
general blueprint for government, the Constitution would require interpretation that took note of 
the scope of its general purpose whenever construing situations not specifically mentioned in its 
text (17 U.S. 316, 406-409, 413-416; United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 118-
119, 121; Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258).  Finally, chief 
responsibility for interpreting the Constitution lay with the judiciary, particularly in terms of 
resolving constitutional questions (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-180). 
 An additional thread, complimentary to the thread of disputed sovereignty, was that 
represented by the shifts in how the Tenth Amendment was interpreted by the various Courts 
over time.  Debate focused on the content of the federal government’s powers, with everything 
outside the content of those powers thus reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.  A 
constitutional scholar described both the issue and the ensuing tasks: 
The issue was: to what extent was the state police power, or state 
sovereignty, curbed by specific provisions of the federal Constitution 
limiting state action?  The Court needed to develop a set of standards by 
which the Commerce Clause, the Contract Clause, the Supremacy Clause, 
and the guarantee of republican government in the states could be applied to 
determining the constitutionality of state legislation and common law rules.  
The Court’s changing definitions of interstate commerce, of the obligation 
of contract, and of the reach of the Supremacy Clause all served to define 
the boundaries between state authority and national power.  (Hall, 1992, p. 
640) 
 
One power not mentioned was the Spending Power of Congress, which will be addressed later in 
this summary.  However, the overwhelming number of cases examined in this chapter focused on 
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the intersections of the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment.  Although the reach of the 
Commerce Clause changed, the debate always focused upon the content of “interstate 
commerce.”  From its adoption in December 15, 1791 until June 24, 1976, the Tenth 
Amendment was never construed by any Supreme Court opinion as acting to limit the exercise of 
a constitutionally delegated power.  Instead, the debate for 184 ½ years focused on the content of 
the delegated power.  If a regulated activity fell outside the reach of the delegated federal power, 
it was an activity falling under those powers reserved to the states.  Although a statute could be 
ruled unconstitutional as a violation of the Tenth Amendment, the violation occurred because the 
regulated power fell outside of the constitutionally delegated powers to the federal government. 
 That changed, however, with the Court’s 1976 decision in National League of Cities v. 
Usery.  For the first time, in the absence of both textual support and prior case law, the Court 
ruled that the Tenth Amendment protected “States as States” and declared that a federal law 
enacted under the Commerce Clause represented an unconstitutional interference with essential 
“attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government” (426 U.S. 833, 845).  Although 
reduced by the subsequent Court ruling in FERC v. Mississippi (1982) and overturned by the 
Court’s ruling in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985), the view of the 
Tenth Amendment as limiting federal exercise of a constitutionally delegated power was 
reasserted by subsequent Court rulings in New York v. United States (1992) and Printz v. United 
States (1997).  While that is the current interpretation of the Tenth Amendment, it is somewhat 
troublesome in that such a view was reached primarily through the use of propaganda 
techniques, which were substituted for judicial reasoning that took into account prior case law, 
the content of the asserted power in a judicial sense, and the text of the Amendment.  Whether or 
not any of the dissents offered that challenged the currently prevailing view will serve as the 
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basis for a changed view remains to be seen.  Any action would need to account for both the 
current interpretation and the dissenting interpretation.   
 Finally, the chapter concluded with a special example of the Spending Power of 
Congress, that of Conditional Spending.  South Dakota v. Dole listed five requirements that had 
to be met in order to pass constitutional muster.  To review, these requirements (and their case 
law citations) were: 
• General Welfare Requirement: South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); 
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-641 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 
1, 65 (1936). 
• Unambiguous Conditions Requirement: South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 
(1987); Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
• Relevant Relationship Requirement: South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-208 
(1987); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978); Ivanhoe Irrigation 
District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958). 
• Absence of a Constitutional Bar Requirement: South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 
203, 208 (1987); Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School District, 469 U.S. 256, 
269-270 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 
309, 333, n. 34 (1968). 
• Absence of Financial Coercion Requirement: South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 
211 (1987); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-590 (1937). 
However, as the Court noted in South Dakota v. Dole, in reality there are only four requirements 
since, regarding the requirement that the spending must be for the national welfare, the Court’s 
have generally deferred “to the judgment of Congress” (483 U.S. 203, 207 [summarizing 
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Helvering v. Davis dicta]).  As the Court stated:  “The level of deference to the congressional 
decision is such that the Court has more recently questioned whether ‘general welfare’ is a 
judicially enforceable restriction at all.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976) (per 
curiam)” (483 U.S. 203, 207, n. 2).  As a result, action subsequent to South Dakota v. Dole need 
to take into account four requirements that must be met in order to constitutionally attach 
spending conditions to the receipt of federal funds in order to pass constitutional muster. 
 Penultimately, although the South Dakota Attorney General was not prepared to discuss 
the vital question regarding the relationship of the conditions to the purpose of the funding 
allocations, the Court’s willingness to discuss the Relevant Relationship Requirement should be 
both noted and heeded by future challengers of conditional funding legislation.  The vital 
question here centers on the relationship of the conditions to the purpose of funding allocations.  
Federal aid to education is supportive.  Specifically, Title I focuses on providing extra instruction 
to students who are behind their peers in reading and/or math.  Although some limited funding 
has been made available to students of middle and high school age, the majority of funding has 
targeted students in the elementary grades.  That is the purpose.  The conditions go far beyond a 
remediation purpose, however.  Conditions to be met in order to receive Title I funds now 
include meeting targets for middle and high school student proficiencies in reading, math, and 
science; requiring states to hold public schools accountable for meeting student achievement 
proficiency targets at the elementary, middle school, and high school levels; requiring every state 
to administer the National Assessment of Educational Progress to a sample of students; requiring 
the states to oversee a system of escalating sanctions to schools not deemed to be performing 
well by the federal government; and requiring states to abandon their own system of attendance 
requirements in favor of the federal law creating choice for students in schools not deemed to be 
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performing well by the federal government.  These requirements have no relationship to the 
remedial needs of elementary students in reading and math. 
 The second conditional spending test to be examined centers on the Constitutional Bar 
Requirement.  A constitutional bar might consist of a combination of arguments based on both 
the Guarantee Clause and the Tenth Amendment.  The challenge to NCLB would not be made on 
the basis of either the Guarantee Clause or the Tenth Amendment.  Either used by itself would be 
defeated, in this writer’s opinion, by arguments based on previous successful defenses of 
conditional spending challenges.  Instead the challenge is based on an argument that the 
combination of the two constitutional provisions acts to form a bar that must be passed in order 
for conditional spending to be constitutional.  Arguably the threshold for challenges based on 
violations of a constitutional bar as part of a conditional spending test is lower than the threshold 
for a bar based solely on the Guarantee Clause or the Tenth Amendment that don’t implicate the 
conditional spending arguments. 
 Also, the Court’s discussion of the Guarantee Clause in Baker v. Carr merits 
consideration.  According to the Court, “[T]he mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a 
political right does not mean it presents a political question” (369 U.S. 186, 209).  A state’s 
responsibility for the system of public education constitutes a political responsibility; therefore, it 
does not present a political question.  In the same case, the Court noted analytical tests to be 
applied to detect the presence or absence of a political question (369 U.S. 186, 217; see also the 
summary portion of this paper’s Guarantee Clause chapter).  Application of those tests to the 
present argument presents no presence of a political question.  Furthermore, in questions related 
to education, the Supreme Court has recognized that state efforts to provide a free and public 
system of education to the children of state residents should be “scrutinized under judicial 
   
   
698
principles sensitive to the nature of the State’s efforts and to the rights reserved to the States 
under the Constitution” (411 U.S. 30, 39).  Furthermore, a republican form of government surely 
includes the ability to legislate meaningfully about a topic.  NCLB forecloses some of the most 
meaningful aspects of education from state and local control.  In addition, the Supreme Court has 
recognized the necessity for states and local boards to exert primary responsibility over 
education because their judgments are more informed by knowledge of localized needs.  
According to the Court:  
[T]his case also involves the most persistent and difficult questions of 
educational policy, another area in which this Court’s lack of specialized 
knowledge and experience counsels against premature interference with the 
informed judgments made at the state and local levels.  (411 U.S. 30, 42) 
 
Lastly, a republican form of government surely includes meaningful involvement of citizens, 
particularly at the local and state levels.  This, too, has been recognized by the Court when it 
declared: 
The merit of local control was recognized last Term in both the majority and 
dissenting opinions in Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 
451 (1972).  Mr. Justice Steward stated there that “[d]irect control over 
decisions vitally affecting the education of one’s children is a need that is 
strongly felt in our society.”  Id., at 469.  The Chief Justice, in his dissent, 
agreed that “[l]ocal control is not only vital to continued public support of 
the schools, but it is of over-riding importance from an educational 
standpoint as well.”  Id., at 478.  (411 U.S. 30, 49) 
 
 Furthermore, two economic factors should be examined at the time a challenge to an 
existing conditional funding law is considered in order to determine whether valid argument can 
be made under the Financial Coercion Requirement.  First, the economic condition of the state 
should be evaluated and calculations made to determine what percent of the total funds available 
would constitute the loss of federal funds.  This should be compared with the following 
statement made by the Court in South Dakota v. Dole: 
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Our decisions have recognized that in some circumstances the financial 
inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at 
which “pressure turns into compulsion.”  Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 
[301 U.S. 548 (1937)], at 590.  [Since South Dakota would lose only] 5% of 
the funds otherwise obtainable under specified highway grant programs [if it 
wished to maintain its minimum drinking age of 19] the argument as to 
coercion is shown to be more rhetoric than fact.  (483 U.S. 203, 211) 
 
At the state level, the loss of Title I funds used by the state department of education for 
operational costs should be calculated against the state allocation for operating the state’s 
department of education.  When state funding is low, that percentage may implicate the Financial 
Coercion Requirement.  For most schools in Iowa, except in high poverty areas, NCLB funds 
constitute less than 5% of a district’s general fund.  Whether or not the following factors could 
be brought into play requires that a judgment be made:  negative spending authority, budget 
deficits, state funding cuts, low or non-existent allowable growth, etc. 
 The second economic factor to be examined centers on just what federal funds would be 
impacted by a refusal to accept Title I funds under NCLB.  If federal funding for other categories 
are withdrawn as well, e.g., school lunch funds, special education funds, other federal title 
program funds, then a situation would be created whereby the loss of federal funds conditioned 
by a school or state’s refusal to accept Title I funding would constitute financial coercion. 
 Finally, it’s unclear whether an individual school district can refuse to participate in 
NCLB or whether individual districts are bound by a decision at the state level.  That situation 
may also vary from state to state in terms of particular state legislation and constitutional 
language. 
 The following chapter will feature an examination of the Fourteenth Amendment case 
law, focusing primarily upon the issue of education and whether it constitutes a fundamental 
right under the Equal Protection Clause.  Due Process Clause implications will also be briefly 
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Chapter 7 
The Fourteenth Amendment 
Introduction 
 For the purposes of this analysis, the relevant portion of the five sections comprising the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution resides in Section 1 and reads: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.  (Farrand, IV, p. 98) 
 
The second sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Section 1 contains both the “Due Process” 
and the “Equal Protection” clauses, two constitutional clauses that subsequently impacted most 
of the basic individual freedoms guaranteed by our nation’s governing document, the U.S. 
Constitution.  Beginning in the extreme latter part of the nineteenth century and continuing into 
the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court used the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis by 
which various portions of the Bill of Rights came to be applied to the states, thereby serving as a 
limit on the actions of state and local governments against the fundamental rights of 
individuals.92  Prior to this development (which came to be called the “Incorporation Doctrine”), 
the Bill of Rights served only to limit the actions of the federal government (Hall, 1992, p. 426).   
As a result, the Fourteenth Amendment came to have far-reaching effects in guaranteeing the 
multiple fundamental freedoms of American life. 
 The Fourteenth Amendment was one of three constitutional amendments93 specifically 
designed to assist African-Americans realize the promise of America outlined in the Declaration 
of Independence, the world’s first government document proclaiming the idea of universal 
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human rights (see Appendix R).  The declaration of rights portion of our nation’s foundational 
document began with the second sentence and declared: 
We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal, that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that 
among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.  (Declaration of 
Independence) 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment also overturned the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision by 
removing race as a justification for the denial of either basic rights or the protection of the law in 
American society.  Heifetz defined adaptive work as the difficult work required to change 
attitudes and beliefs, a process that took much longer than that required for technical work.  For 
the larger part of American society the most difficult adaptive work involved changing the 
attitudes and beliefs of white Americans towards people on the socio-political margins of society 
– women and people of color (see Appendix R).  Despite the clear language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it would take yet another constitutional amendment and another half-century of 
time  (52 years) before women could vote (see Appendix R).  Having extended the offer of 
statehood in the early days of the American Revolution to the Delaware Nation in return for their 
support, it would take another 146 years and a special act of Congress before tribal members 
received the right to vote, some 56 years following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 
(see Appendix R).  And finally, the adaptive work begun by abolitionists, furthered by Lincoln’s 
Emancipation Proclamation, and continued by the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments took either 145 years (since the Emancipation Proclamation) or 138 years 
(since the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870) before a person of African-American 
heritage could be elected to the nation’s highest political office, that of President of the United 
States of America.   
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 The Fourteenth Amendment arose out of the armed sectional conflict and the Union’s 
attempts to reconstruct what were viewed as rebellious southern states.  Arising as it did out of 
the Reconstruction, the Fourteenth Amendment’s initial success and subsequent failures to 
address racial attitudes mirrored the successes and failures of Reconstruction.  Evaluating the 
Reconstruction from an outsider’s perspective, one British historian wrote: 
Reconstruction, then, failed to save the South from herself, and the afro-
American from the South.  It did have a dramatic success in another 
direction.  The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were to be dead 
letters in Dixie, but they put solid ground beneath the blacks in the North…  
Their existence, and their organization, meant that in parts of America the 
principle of human equality was still acknowledged, if not very willingly or, 
too often socially (de facto segregation in the North would for long be 
nearly as pervasive as de jure segregation in the South), then at least 
politically…  (Brogan, pp. 381-382) 
 
He concluded: 
In that sense, then, Reconstruction was a victory.  But it was a victory too 
long in coming; and, … there are other reasons why, for Americans, a sour 
taste of failure and disappointment will always hang about the epoch.  Not 
until the mid-twentieth century were many of their historians to find any 
good to say of it.  (Brogan, p. 382) 
 
Historical Background 
 Intertwining of the guarantee clause and the fourteenth amendment. 
 The Guarantee Clause of the Constitution played a prominent role in political discussions 
before, during, and after the Civil War.  As a result, the Fourteenth Amendment intertwined with 
the Guarantee Clause since its inception.  Emerging as part of the North’s efforts to “reconstruct” 
the South, the Fourteenth Amendment was conceived as a means of ensuring basic rights for the 
newly freed slaves.  The Civil War, Reconstruction, and the Fourteenth Amendment – all 
depended upon the Guarantee Clause for their constitutional legitimacy. 
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 Federal officials and Congress cited the Guarantee Clause as justification for multiple 
actions taken during the course of the Civil War.  For example, President Lincoln used the 
Guarantee Clause to justify the use of federal troops against southern rebels, an action 
subsequently approved by Congress (Wiecek, p. 171).  Having called Congress into special 
session on the 85th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, Lincoln laid out the 
ideological context of the Union’s war effort for the assembled legislators: 
The Constitution provides, and all the States have accepted the provision, 
that “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
republican form of government.”  But, if a State may lawfully go out of the 
Union, having done so, it may also discard the republican form of 
government; so that to prevent its going out, is an indispensable means, to 
the end, of maintaining the guaranty mentioned; and when an end is lawful 
and obligatory, the indispensable means to it, are also lawful, and 
obligatory.  (Emphasis in original)  (Message to Congress, July 4, 1861, in 
Gienapp, p. 106) 
 
While Lincoln did not formally cite the Guarantee Clause as justification for the imposition of a 
military governorship in Tennessee in March 1862 following the evacuation of rebel forces from 
Nashville, the man he appointed to act as military governor, Andrew Johnson, did.  In the words 
of a historian of the period: 
According to Johnson, in suppressing the rebellion the government was 
fulfilling its guarantee of a republican government to the state, which meant 
restoring the pre-existing state government.  (Belz, p. 72) 
 
Johnson proclaimed to his fellow Tennesseans: 
I have been appointed, in the absence of the regular and established State 
authorities, as Military Governor for the time being, to preserve the public 
property of the State, to give the protection of law actively enforced to her 
citizens, and, as speedily as may be, to restore her government to the same 
condition as before the existing rebellion.  (Belz, p. 72) 
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As the reader will soon see, this vision of reconstruction clashed with the Republican 
congressional vision of reconstructing the South, particularly the plan of reconstruction 
articulated four years later by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. 
 In battling the presidential version of Reconstruction, Congress first used the Guarantee 
Clause to justify its attempts to exert congressional control over Reconstruction through the 
Wade-Davis Bill, which was pocket-vetoed by President Lincoln.  As will be shown later, the 
Wade-Davis Bill marked a transition point for anti-slavery Republicans (Wiecek, pp. 186-186, 
187; Stampp, pp. 39-40; Belz, pp. 201-203, 206-207, 212-213, 221, 224).  Although Congress 
and two Presidents differed over Reconstruction, they were both united on the use of the 
Guarantee Clause to justify the idea of reconstructing the South.  One historian articulated the 
reasoning behind President Lincoln’s and the U.S. Congress’s use of the Guarantee Clause: 
[They] reasoned that the secession governments of the South were set up in 
violation of the Constitution, which [they] saw as depriving them of a 
republican form of government.  Therefore [the Federal government] must 
use all means at its disposal, including the sword, to restore republican 
governments to the seceded states.  (Wiecek, pp. 174-175) 
 
 Following the conclusion of armed hostilities, Congress used the Guarantee Clause to 
justify its activities “for reconstructing the South” (Wiecek, p. 199).  On February 19, 1866, the 
House passed a resolution submitted by Representative John Broomall of Pennsylvania by a 104-
33 vote that stated: 
That whenever the people of any state are thus deprived of all civil 
government [by rebellion], it becomes the duty of Congress, by appropriate 
legislation, to enable them to organize a state government, and in the 
language of the Constitution, to guarantee to such a state a republican form 
of government.  (Globe, 39 Cong., 1 sess., 916 ff. [19 Feb. 1866]; cited in 
Wiecek, p. 39) 
 
Having been created in December of 1866, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction collected 
“volumes of testimony from witnesses residing in the South” and issued its report on April 28, 
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1866 (Stampp, p. 111).94  The report “crushed the Democratic argument” which stated “that the 
guarantee clause [sic] required the federal government to maintain the existing … state 
constitutions as they were in 1860” (Wiecek, p. 201).  According to the report: 
By withdrawing their representatives in Congress, by renouncing the 
privilege of representation, by organizing a separate government, and by 
levying war against the United States, they destroyed their state 
constitutions in respect to the vital principle which connected their 
respective states to the Union and secured their federal relations; and 
nothing of those constitutions was left of which the United States were 
bound to take notice.  (Wiecek, p. 201) 
 
Laying the groundwork for what would later become the Fourteenth Amendment, the report 
concluded that the rebellious states “ought not to participate in the government of the country 
until the civil rights of all their citizens were secured” (Stampp, p. 111).  The report further 
concluded that the rebellious states 
then lacked constituencies qualified to elect Senators and Representatives, 
that the majority of Southerners were still bitterly hostile to the government 
of the United States, and that the South therefore was not entitled to 
representation in Congress.  (Stampp, p. 111) 
 
One historian, who also possessed a law degree and had practiced law, described the report by 
the Joint Committee on Reconstruction and its implications in these terms: 
[T]he report was the high-water mark of Republican development of the 
guarantee clause [sic] in the first session.  The second session of the Thirty-
ninth Congress would concern itself with implementing the theoretical 
consensus embodied in the report.  (Wiecek, p. 203) 
 
 In the next congressional session Congress subsequently used the Guarantee Clause to 
reject the admission of Nebraska into the Union until the state amended its constitution by 
removing the “white-only” qualifications for voting (Wiecek, pp. 203-204; McKitrick, p. 453, n. 
14 and p. 474).  During the debate over the admission of Nebraska as a state, two arguments 
were developed centering on the Guarantee Clause: 
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As J.A.J. Creswell of Maryland explained, it was clear that the Tenth 
Amendment could not override the powers confided to Congress by the 
guarantee clause [sic].  His colleague James F. Wilson of Iowa began to 
develop the argument that the clause empowered Congress to supervise all 
amendments to all state constitutions, even after their admission, but the 
hammer fell in the middle of his speech, and the point was dropped.  
(Wiecek, p. 204) 
 
President Johnson vetoed the congressional act rejecting Nebraska’s admission into the Union 
until the state corrected its constitution, but Congress ”promptly repassed” the Nebraska bill over 
Johnson’s veto (Wiecek, p. 205).   
 President Johnson also cited the Guarantee Clause in each of his proclamations in the 
spring of 1865 that appointed provisional governors for the occupied southern states.  Each 
proclamation also contained the following statement referencing the content of the Guarantee 
Clause: 
Whereas it becomes necessary and proper to carry out and enforce the 
obligations of the United States to the people of    in securing 
them in the enjoyment of a republican form of government.  (Wiecek, p. 
189) 
 
 Also following the report by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Congress used the 
Guarantee Clause to develop what eventually became the Military Reconstruction Act that both 
asserted congressional control over Reconstruction by  dividing “the ten ex-Confederate states 
(Tennessee being the exception) into five military districts” (Wiecek, p. 207).  The Act 
empowered the brigadier general in charge of each district “to enforce the laws” and “to call for 
the election of delegates to constitutional conventions,” elections which required the 
participation of black voters (Wiecek, p. 207).  The Military Reconstruction Act also stipulated 
that the new state constitution “had to accord the ballot to Negroes” (Wiecek, p. 207) and 
required the newly elected legislature under the state’s new constitution to “ratify the Fourteenth 
Amendment” (Wiecek, p. 207).   
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 The multiple examples illustrating the intertwining of the Guarantee Clause and the 
Fourteenth Amendment were not lost upon future Supreme Court Justices articulating their 
decisions, nor were they lost upon the attorneys arguing cases before the Supreme Court.  The 
Court addressed both the Guarantee Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment in the following 
cases: 
• Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875). 
• United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.  542 (1876). 
• Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
• Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
• Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900). 
• Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1953). 
• Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
• Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
As will be further illustrated, the intertwining of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Guarantee 
Clause grew out of the changing Union war aims, was influenced by several major undercurrents 
of American life, and eventually formed the centerpiece of Reconstruction. 
 Union war aims. 
 Preservation of the union as a war aim. 
 The Guarantee Clause was used by President Lincoln and Congress to justify the use of 
armed forces against southern secessionist forces.  Over the course of the Civil War, Union war 
aims transformed from initial attempts to preserve the Union into what eventually emerged as the 
Reconstruction of the South.   As had been the case with justifying the use of federal troops to 
quell a domestic rebellion, the Guarantee Clause provided the constitutional bedrock for 
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Reconstruction.  In turn, Congress crafted the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments 
to the Constitution to fulfill the Union war aims and to form the cornerstones of Reconstruction. 
Understanding this transformational process in its historical context increases both understanding 
of and appreciation for the Fourteenth Amendment as part of the historical movement towards a 
more perfect realization of American ideals that were first set forth in the Declaration of 
Independence.  A noted scholar of the period summarized the process in the following manner: 
As the North progressed toward the framing of war objectives, America was 
inched along from right to left.  It moved from hesitant support of a limited 
war with essentially negative aims toward a total war with positive and 
revolutionary aims.  The character of the war changed from a pragmatic 
struggle for power to a crusade for ideals.  The struggle took on many 
aspects of an ideological war, and in some minds became a holy war, 
fought, financed, and supported by men who could feel themselves 
instruments of divine will.  (Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 70) 
 
 When Lincoln was elected President and took the oath of office, the United States was 
officially a slaveholding republic.  The Republican Party’s published platform pledged Lincoln 
as President “to the protection of the institution of slavery where it existed” (Woodward, 1960, 
1968, p. 70).  In his first presidential address to the nation, Lincoln emphasized the need to 
prevent secession and the resulting disruption of the Union, which was essentially a negative 
aim, that of preventing something from happening.  Lincoln first addressed the fears motivating 
secession. 
Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the Southern States, that 
by the accession of a Republican Administration, their property, and their 
peace, and personal security, are to be endangered.  There has never been 
any reasonable cause for such apprehension.  (First Inaugural Address, 
March 4, 1861, in Gienapp, p. 88) 
 
Observing that his previous speeches provided “ample evidence to the contrary,” Lincoln cited 
his own “published speeches” and quoted from an unidentified speech: 
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I do but quote from one of those speeches when I declare that “I have no 
purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in 
the States where it exists.  I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I 
have no inclination to do so.”  (First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861, in 
Gienapp, p. 88) 
 
Having rendered southern fears groundless, Lincoln proceeded to discuss the idea of the union of 
individual states into a unified country and what that union signified. 
I hold, that in contemplation of universal law, and of the Constitution, the 
Union of these states is perpetual.  Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in 
the fundamental law of all national governments.  It is safe to assert that no 
government proper, ever had a provision in its organic law for its own 
termination.  Continue to execute all the express provisions of our national 
Constitution, and the Union will endure forever…  (First Inaugural Address, 
March 4, 1861, in Gienapp, pp. 90-91) 
 
Having established the idea of a permanent Union, Lincoln directly confronted the actions taken 
by various southern state legislatures regarding secession. 
It follows from these views that no State, upon its own mere motion, can 
lawfully get out of the Union, - that resolves and ordinances to that effect 
are legally void; and that acts of violence, within any State or States, against 
the authority of the United States, are insurrectionary or revolutionary, 
according to circumstances.  (Emphasis in original) (First Inaugural 
Address, March 4, 1861, in Gienapp, p. 91) 
 
Lincoln spelled out the federal government’s course of action, an action that was not only 
consonant with, but also required by, the Constitution. 
I therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution and the laws, the Union 
is unbroken’ and, to the extent of my ability, I shall take care, as the 
Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be 
faithfully executed in all the States….  I trust this will not be regarded as a 
menace, but only as the declared purpose of the Union that it will 
constitutionally defend, and maintain itself.  (Emphasis in original) (First 
Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861, in Gienapp, pp. 91-92) 
 
Some four months later, Congress followed Lincoln’s lead in terms of spelling out the purpose 
for waging an armed conflict.  On July 22, 1861, the House of Representatives enacted a 
resolution containing the following declaration: 
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[T]his war is not waged … [for the] purpose of overthrowing or interfering 
with the … established institutions of those States, but to … maintain … the 
… States unimpaired; and that as soon as these objects are accomplished the 
war ought to cease.  (Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 71) 
 
 The Senate concurred in these war aims by passing a “similar resolution, also adopted by a 
nearly unanimous vote” (Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 71).  Thus initially the Union was fighting a 
war against secession, a war whose purpose was to preserve the Union. 
 Freedom for slaves as a war aim. 
 Unlike the first war aim, the second purpose for fighting was neither deliberately nor 
carefully crafted by either President Lincoln or Congress.  Instead freedom for slaves emerged as 
the war progressed.  As Lincoln himself admitted, the second war aim was forced by events and 
necessities.  The second war aim “first took the shape of thousands of pitiable fugitive slaves 
crowding into the Union lines” (Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 71).  The emergence of the Union’s 
second purpose for waging war against the South was described by a leading historian of the 
period: 
Freedom as a war aim was arrived at by a long succession of piecemeal 
decisions.  There were orders by field commanders, some countermanded, 
some sustained; there were acts of state legislatures; and there was a long 
succession of bits and driblets of emancipation enacted by Congress, which 
did not get around to repealing the Fugitive Slave Act until June of 1864.  
(Woodward, 1960, 1968, pp. 71-72) 
 
 While most of us think of Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation as a single act, it 
actually consisted of two separate proclamations.  Adding to the complexity of the emergence of 
freedom as a war aim, Lincoln’s private and public statements differed.  Privately, meeting with 
his cabinet in a “special session” in September, 1862, Lincoln confided to his cabinet members 
that the time to issue an Emancipation Proclamation had come, that “it was a promise made only 
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to ‘myself and … to my Maker’” (Guelzo, p. 341).  Gideon Welles, Lincoln’s Secretary of the 
Navy, described Lincoln’s comments as 
a vow, a covenant, that if God gave us the victory in the approaching battle 
[at Antietam], he would consider it an indication of the divine will and that 
it was his duty to move forward in the cause of emancipation.  (Guelzo, p. 
341) 
 
In the immediate aftermath of Antietam, in a meeting with his cabinet, Lincoln described the 
battle’s outcome in terms of its relationship to the question of emancipation, stating, “God has 
decided this question in favor of the slaves” (Guelzo, p. 342).  On September 22, 1862, 
immediately following the following the withdrawal of Confederate forces from Antietam Creek 
in Maryland back to Virginia, Lincoln “issued the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation,” 
signing the document in front of his cabinet at a special cabinet meeting (Brogan, p. 340-341).95  
As one historian described Lincoln’s thoughts: 
Foremost was the consideration that slavery had caused the great rebellion.  
It had also poisoned political life for more than thirty years.  The only way 
of making sure that it would never wreak such mischief again was to destroy 
it.  Lincoln no longer had any doubt that it was a legitimate aim of the war 
to remove the cause of the war.  (Brogan, p. 337) 
 
After the House of Representatives “passed a resolution in support of the Proclamation” when 
Congress convened in December, 1862, Lincoln signed the final draft of the Emancipation 
Proclamation on New Year’s Day, January 1, 1863 (Brogan, p. 341). 
 Lincoln’s public statements exhibited a different tenor from his private remarks just cited.  
Perhaps this difference between private and public remarks reflected his awareness of then-
current political realities regarding the views held by many white Americans at the time. 
The “justice and sound judgment” of white supremacy, Lincoln said in his 
1854 Peoria speech, “is not the sole question, if indeed, it is any part of it.”  
Instead Lincoln held that the “universal feeling” among whites that blacks 
were inferior, “whether well or ill-founded, can not be safely disregarded.”  
(Oakes, p. 38) 
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Perhaps the difference between private and public statements reflected Lincoln’s own previous 
publicly-stated views expressed on a single occasion during the Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 
1858, remarks that were characterized by one historian as “the worst words he ever uttered” 
(Oakes, p. 39).  At the fourth debate, Lincoln introduced his remarks by describing an encounter 
he had earlier that same day.  Lincoln began, “While I was at the hotel to-day [sic] an elderly 
gentleman called upon me to know whether I was really in favor of producing a perfect equality 
between the negroes and white people” (Fourth debate, at Charleston, September 18, 1858, in 
Gienapp, p. 57).  Lincoln responded to the query by declaring: 
I will say then that I am not, nor ever have been in favor of bringing about in 
any way the social and political equality of the white and black races, - that I 
am not nor ever have been in favor of making voters or jurors of negroes, 
nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with white people…  
(Fourth debate, at Charleston, September 18, 1858, in Gienapp, p. 57) 
 
Lincoln continued, “[T]here is a physical difference between the white and black races which I 
believe will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and political equality” 
(Fourth debate, at Charleston, September 18, 1858, in Gienapp, p. 57).  Or, perhaps the 
difference between public and private comments stemmed from a conscious decision to test 
public opinion for reactions to a changing policy á la Heifetz’ concept of adaptive work.  
Describing Lincoln’s public comments on the Proclamation, one historian stated: 
When Lincoln finally resorted to the Proclamation, he presented it as a war 
measure, authorized by war powers and justified by military necessity.  
Again and again he repeated that it was a means to an end – the limited 
Lincolnian end of union – and not an end in itself, that union and not 
freedom was the true war aim.  (Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 73) 
 
Previously Lincoln had offered a plan for gradual emancipation and colonization of freed slaves, 
which was described by a historian of the period as follows: 
   
   
714
This was an extremely conservative plan for gradual and voluntary 
emancipation over a period of thirty-seven years, to be completed by 1900, 
to be administered by the slave states themselves, and to be assisted by the 
Federal government with compensation to slaveowners and foreign 
colonization of freedmen.  (Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 72) 
 
As C. Vann Woodward dryly noted, “Support was not forthcoming, and war developments 
underlined the impracticality of the plan” (Woodward, 1960, 1968, pp. 72-73).  One of Lincoln’s 
biographers pointed to the opposition of free blacks to colonization:  “Free blacks in the North 
had opposed colonization for decades; they had no intention of leaving the only country they had 
known…” (Guelzo, p. 346).  Professor Guelzo further noted, “Rather than colonization, what 
Douglass and the Radical Republicans wanted Lincoln to do was to begin recruiting freed blacks 
into the federal armies and turning them back against their former masters” (Guelzo, p. 347).  
Lincoln further thought that both congressional action and a constitutional amendment would be 
required for emancipation to be legally applied throughout the entire nation.  Describing the 
confluence of dimming prospects for his original plan and impending emancipation, one 
historian presented the following analysis: 
He [Lincoln] characterized it [the Emancipation Proclamation] as a war 
necessity, forced by events, ineffectual, inadequate, and of doubtful legality.  
It is plain that his heart was in his plan for gradual emancipation, which he 
repeatedly but unsuccessfully urged upon Congress and proposed as a 
Constitutional amendment.  (Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 72) 
 
 While privately expressing his feelings about emancipation in spiritual terms, as a former 
attorney and legislator, Lincoln knew that religious feelings offered no legal justification for a 
nation’s public policy.  A professor specializing in American politics analyzed the legal 
questions posed by emancipation: 
Under the Constitution the President had no right to meddle with private 
property in such a sweeping fashion except perhaps on the plea of the most 
extreme military necessity.  More than that, an assault – any assault – on 
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property – any property – was fundamentally antipathetic to the American 
tradition, which regarded property as sacred.  (Brogan, p. 340) 
 
It was this notion of slaves as property that Lincoln had attacked in the Lincoln-Douglas Debates 
of 1858, a notion that had been given constitutional approval by the Supreme Court in the Dred 
Scott decision.  Lincoln had begun attacking the Court’s decision after it had been published in 
1857, honing in on the Chief Justice Taney’s claim “that blacks were not citizens because their 
ancestors had been slaves at the time of the Revolution (Oakes, p. 39).  Professor Oakes 
described and summarized Lincoln’s criticism of the Dred Scott decision: 
What about the millions of immigrants who were quickly becoming citizens, 
Lincoln asked.  Their ancestors weren’t even here when the nation was 
founded.  Taney’s bad logic and egregious history led Lincoln to suspect 
something sinister.  By stripping northern blacks of their citizenship, 
Lincoln believed, Taney was laying the groundwork for the nationalization 
of slavery.  Dred Scott already allowed slavery into the territories; one more 
decision and it would be allowed into the northern states as well.  (Oakes, p. 
39) 
 
Lincoln also characterized the Taney Court’s decision as an assault on and a denigration of the 
nation’s Declaration of Independence.  Responding to Douglas’s defense of the Dred Scott 
decision, Lincoln observed: 
In those days [before the Dred Scott decision], our Declaration of 
Independence was held sacred by all, and thought to include all; but now, to 
aid in making the bondage of the negro universal and eternal, it is assailed, 
and sneered at, and construed, and hawked at, and torn, till, if its framers 
could rise from their graves, they could not at all recognize it.  All the 
powers of earth seem rapidly combining against him.  Mammon is after him; 
ambition follows, and philosophy follows, and the Theology of the day is 
fast joining the cry.  (Speech in Springfield, June 26, 1857, in Gienapp, p. 
40) 
 
To further buttress his argument that the Declaration of Independence included all and that the 
Founders looked to an end of slavery, during the 1860 presidential campaign Lincoln cited both 
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the Northwest Ordinance passed by Congress in 1787 and the remarks made by President 
Washington to Lafayette: 
[Washington had] as President of the United States, approved and signed an 
act of Congress, enforcing the prohibition of slavery in the Northwestern 
Territory, which act embodied the policy of the Government upon that 
subject …; and about one year after he penned it, he wrote La Fayette [sic] 
that he considered that prohibition a wise measure, expressing in the same 
connection his hope that we should at some time have a confederacy of free 
states.  (Speech at the Cooper Union, February 27, 1860, in Gienapp, pp. 72-
73) 
 
 Senator Stephen Douglas pounced on Lincoln’s opposition to the Dred Scott decision in 
the first of his debates with Lincoln in Ottawa, articulating the majority opinion of the time: 
We are told by Lincoln that he is utterly opposed to the Dred Scott decision 
and will not submit to it for the reason that he says it deprives the negro of 
the rights and privileges of citizenship….  I ask you, are you in favor of 
conferring upon the negro the rights and privileges of citizenship?  …I am 
opposed to negro citizenship in any and every form….  I am in favor of 
confining citizenship to white men, men of European birth and descent, 
instead of conferring it upon negroes, Indians, and other inferior races.  
(Oakes, p. 39) 
 
In the fifth debate with Douglas in Galesburg, Lincoln “declared that ‘the right of property in a 
slave is not distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution’” (Oakes, p. 40).   In the final 
debate in Alton, Lincoln again denied that such a right existed by declaring, “I do not believe it is 
a constitutional right to hold slaves in a territory of the United States” (Oakes, p. 40).   
Articulating his argument against the notion of slaves as property, Lincoln argued that Senator 
Douglas’s advocacy of popular sovereignty as the determinant of whether or not slavery should 
exist in the territories “was wrong because it assumed that slaves were no different from hogs or 
cotton” (Oakes, p. 40).  In Lincoln’s view, according to one historian’s summary,  
There were limits – moral limits – beyond which the market should never be 
allowed to go, and surely one of them was the buying and selling of human 
beings.  It that’s not wrong, Lincoln said, nothing is wrong.  (Oakes, p. 40) 
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 Near the end of this final debate between Lincoln and Douglas in Alton, Lincoln stated 
that the “real issue” between the two men transcended the argument of whether slavery was right 
or wrong.  According to Lincoln, the real issue was the 
struggle between these two principles, right and wrong, throughout the 
world….  The one is the common right of humanity, and the other the divine 
right of kings.  It is the same principle in whatever shape it develops itself.  
It is the same old serpent that says, “You work and toil and earn bread, and 
I’ll eat it.”  Not matter in what shape it comes, whether from the mouth of a 
king who seeks to bestride the people of his own nation and live by the fruit 
of their labor, or from one race of men as an apology for enslaving another 
race, it is the same tyrannical principle.  (Oakes, p. 40) 
 
Lincoln had previously argued that slavery was wrong because it denied the nation’s promise of 
equality embedded in the Declaration of Independence.  Douglas’s reply was to insist that the 
Founding Fathers “had never intended to include an inferior race of blacks in the Declaration’s 
promises” (Oakes, p. 40).  With his concluding argument in the final debate at Alton, Lincoln 
“went beyond the legacy of the Revolution [by fusing] the inalienable ‘rights of man’ [with] the 
universal rights of labor” (Oakes, p. 40).  According to Professor Oakes, “The result was an 
astonishingly eloquent denunciation of slavery in which social, economic, political, and moral 
arguments were seamlessly interwoven” (Oakes, p. 40). 
 In his subsequent campaign for the presidency, Lincoln sharpened his attack on the 
property right argument used to justify slavery.  Speaking at the Cooper Union in New York, 
Lincoln criticized the Court’s Dred Scott constitutional analysis, stating “that the Court erred in 
its Dred Scott decision, not by illicit opining on the facts, but from an initial misapprehension of 
what the facts were” (Wills, 2008, p. 4).  Lincoln pointed out that, according to the Court, “[T]he 
right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution” (quoted in 
Wills, 2008, p. 40).  According to Lincoln, this was false – slaves were never called property in 
the Constitution: 
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[N]either the word “slave” nor “slavery” is to be found in the Constitution, 
nor the word “property” even, in any connection with … slave, or slavery, 
and that wherever in that instrument the slave is alluded to, he is called a 
“person;” – and wherever his master’s legal right in relation to him is 
alluded to, it is spoken of as “service or labor which may be due,”…  
(Speech at the Cooper Union, February 20, 1860, in Gienapp, pp. 77-78) 
 
According to the explicit language of the Constitution, Lincoln pointed out, slaves “are referred 
to only as ‘persons’ who perform a ‘service or labor’” (Wills, 2008, p. 4).  As Professor Wills 
both summarized and highlighted the import of Lincoln’s analysis of the Court’s opinion, “This 
is hardly a distinct and express statement of property in them” (Wills, 2008, p. 4).  As Lincoln 
had illustrated, the property clause of the Constitution had made no mention of slaves.  Both the 
“three-fifths” clause adding that fraction of the slave population for apportioning representatives 
to Congress and the fugitive slave clause referred to slaves as “persons,” not as property.  As one 
professor of American history paraphrased Lincoln’s analysis: 
The founders had restricted slavery wherever they could and recognized it 
out of necessity where they had to, Lincoln concluded, but they did not raise 
slavery to the level of a constitutionally protected property right.  (Oakes, p. 
40) 
 
 Upon entering office as President, Lincoln affirmed that he would enforce the fugitive 
slave clause of the Constitution as required by his oath to give “support to the whole 
Constitution;” however, he also declared that free blacks who were hunted down as fugitives 
were “entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens” as also provided in the Constitution 
(First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861, in Gienapp, p. 90).   
 The penultimate legal measure to the final Emancipation Proclamation was a legal 
opinion by Attorney General Edward Bates issued on November 29, 1862, which followed 
Lincoln’s earlier legal arguments against the legitimacy of the Dred Scott decision.  Paraphrasing 
Attorney General Bates’ opinion, Professor Oakes wrote, “Not one word of the Constitution … 
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justifies the color barrier to citizenship that Taney had proclaimed in Dred Scott.  Free blacks 
who were born in America were citizens of the United States” (Oakes, p. 39).   Describing the 
historical import of this opinion, Professor Oakes observed: 
During Lincoln’s presidency the Dred Scott citizenship ruling was 
pronounced null and void and within a few years Bates’s reasoning would 
be permanently affixed in the Constitution by the Fourteenth Amendment.  
(Oakes, pp. 39-40) 
 
 So, through a series of stumbling steps taken either in reaction to or in concert with 
unforeseen, but emerging forces and events, freedom became the second war aim for the Union.  
Describing the elevation of “the war to a new plane,” Professor Vann Woodward wrote: 
It was no longer merely a war against something, but a war for something, a 
war for something greatly cherished in American tradition and creed, a war 
for freedom.  What had started as a war for political ends had, by virtue of 
military necessity, undergone a metamorphosis into a higher and finer thing, 
a war for moral ends.  What had commenced as a police action had been 
converted into a crusade.  (Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 73) 
 
 Equality as a war aim. 
 Republican congressional support. 
 The second war aim, freedom for slaves, represented somewhat of a paradox as “[t]he 
great majority of citizens in the North still abhorred any association with abolitionists” 
(Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 73).  Freedom as a war aim somewhat concealed, but did not 
eliminate, a deep and strong undercurrent channeling through the bedrock of white America’s 
conscious and subconscious beliefs, a racial belief in white superiority.  However, what the 
abolitionists stood for represented yet another bedrock belief of American political society, a 
belief that hadn’t yet percolated into the personal belief systems of most Americans at the time, a 
belief that ran counter to notions of white racial supremacy.  A long-time student of American 
history described the conceptual roots of equality: 
   
   
720
It would be preposterous to credit the abolitionists with surreptitiously 
introducing the idea of equality into America.  The nation was born with the 
word on its tongue.  The first of those “self-evident” truths of the 
Declaration was that “all men are created equal.”  Back of that was the 
heritage of natural rights doctrine, and back of that the great body of 
Christian dogma and the teaching that all men are equal in the sight of God.  
(Woodward, 1960, 1968, pp. 75-76) 
 
 The commitment to equality as a war aim was not as firmly made as was the commitment 
to freedom, which had the support of both the executive and legislative branches of government.  
Only the Republicans in Congress supported equality as a war aim.  Vann Woodward described 
the contrasting support of the two war aims: 
There was no Equality Proclamation to match the Emancipation 
Proclamation.  The third war aim never gained from Lincoln even the 
qualified support he gave to abolition.  Without presidential blessing the 
commitment was eventually made, made piecemeal like that to freedom, and 
with full implications not spelled out until after the war – but it was made.   
(Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 75) 
 
Of the three branches of government, then, equality as a war aim enjoyed only the support of the 
Republican-dominated Congress.  Neither President Lincoln nor President Johnson, a Tennessee 
Democrat, supported it.  Nor, short of a constitutional amendment, would the Supreme Court 
uphold the legality of mere laws legislating equality, laws whose constitutionality most certainly 
would have been challenged in the judicial branch of government (See Brogan, pp. 340-341; 
Guelzo, p. 344; James, 1965, p. 106; & Stampp, p. 136).  Chief Justice Taney, author of the Dred 
Scott decision, served on the Court until late 1864.  And later, it would be a conservative 
Supreme Court that would re-define “equality” as it narrowed the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s application to legal questions of equality. 
 Thirteenth amendment. 
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 The idea of equality played a major role in congressional debates surrounding the 
Thirteenth Amendment, the constitutional amendment that abolished slavery.  Ostensibly 
focused on freedom, abolitionists had long associated freedom with equality. 
Antislavery congressmen carried this association of aims into the framing of 
the Thirteenth Amendment.  Debates over the question in the Senate in the 
spring of 1864 and in the House of Representatives in January, 1865, 
contain evidence that the framers [of the Thirteenth Amendment] aimed at 
equality as well as emancipation.  (Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 76) 
 
 Both objectives, freedom and equality, were assumed to be involved in the Thirteenth 
Amendment by both supporters and opponents of the proposed amendment.  One supporter, 
William D. Kelley of Pennsylvania, declared, “The proposed Amendment is designed … to 
accomplish … the abolition of slavery in  the United States, and the political and social elevation 
of Negroes to all the rights of white men” (Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 77).  Precursory to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, supporters of the Thirteenth Amendment “specifically and repeatedly 
mentioned equal protection of the laws … and guarantee against deprivation of life, liberty, and 
property without due process of the law” (Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 77).   
 Given the prevailing notions of white supremacy held by the majority of Americans at the 
time, the idea of equality provided the “main ground of opposition to the amendment” 
(Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 77).  Opponents of the Thirteenth Amendment complained “that the 
amendment would not only free the Negroes but would ‘make them our equals before the law’” 
(Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 77).  As can be seen by examining the following text of the 
Thirteenth Amendment (see Figure 4 below), the broader construction  that would have included 
equality with freedom did not survive the political realities at that time.  
 The political reality confronting the Thirty-eighth Congress that legislated the version of 
the Thirteenth Amendment subsequently sent to the various state legislatures – that political 
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reality consisted of the make-up of Congress and the requirements of Article V of the United 
States Constitution which stipulated: 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, 
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution … which, … shall be valid 
to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the 
legislatures of three fourths of the several States … (Article V, Constitution 
of the United States) 
 
Figure 4:  







While Republicans controlled both chambers of the Thirty-eighth Congress, their House 
membership did not constitute the required two-thirds majority required by Article V. The House 
membership of the Thirty-eighth Congress comprised “eighty-six Republicans, seventy-two 
Democrats, and twenty-four border state Unionists,” which gave Republicans only 47% of the 
total House membership (Keller, p. 195).96  The Senate membership consisted of “thirty 
Republicans, twelve Democrats, and seven border state Unionists,” which gave Republicans a 
61% majority in the Senate (Keller, p. 195).97  On  February 8, 1864, Senator Charles Sumner 
from Massachusetts introduced a joint resolution in the Senate for the abolition of slavery, 
“which included the clause ‘all persons are born equal under the law’” (Keller, p. 196).  
Describing the Senate interplay between the ideals of America’s promise articulated in the 
Declaration of Independence, the political reality of the historical period, and the requirements of 
 
Section 1.  Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, 
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction. 
Section 2.  Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. 
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Article V of the U.S. Constitution, a professor of political science and American history 
observed: 
Concerned that such wording on equality might derail the chances fro 
passage, Lyman Trumbull of Illinois – also a firm protagonist of black rights 
– offered his own phraseology, omitting Sumner’s controversial language 
but adding Congress’s power to enforce the abolition of slavery.  Trumbull’s 
wording was accepted.  Sumner at first held out for his own version, 
although he finally acquiesced.  (Keller, p. 196) 
 
 Civil rights act of 1866. 
 The Thirty-ninth Congress faced a different set of political realities from their 
predecessors.  Republicans were in control of both houses.  Continuing the struggle for equality, 
the Republican Congress next embodied its version of equality in the civil Rights Act of 1866.  
Partly in response to the notorious Black Codes98 enacted by the Johnson restoration 
governments in the South, and partly in response to the “inducement of political gains as well, “ 
the 1866 Civil Rights Act gave sweeping protection to the rights of African-Americans as 
citizens, guaranteeing them “full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for security of 
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens,” regardless of any law to the contrary” 
(Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 77).  Furthermore, the Civil Rights Act removed race as a criterion 
for citizenship (except for American Indians) when  
it declared that “all persons born in the United States and not subject to any 
foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed,” are citizens of the United 
States.  This act removed the doubts about the Negroes’ status which had 
been raised before the war when the Supreme Court, in the Dred Scott case, 
held that Negroes were not citizens…. (Stampp, pp. 135-136) 
 
When President Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Congress “re-passsed” the Act 
over the President’s veto “by the necessary two-thirds majority in each house” (Brogan, p. 364).  
At the same time, Congress was in the midst of considering what came to be known as the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  However, in order to more fully comprehend the full enormity of the 
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constitutional task, both the context of the times and the hurdles overcome by the congressional 
passage and the states’ approval of the Fourteenth Amendment need to be examined. 
 Major undercurrents impacting reconstruction. 
 If one focuses on the issue of slavery in American life, then both the Civil War (and its 
sub-themes of Union war aims and emancipation) and Reconstruction (which gave birth to the 
Fourteenth Amendment) can be viewed as the playing out of the opposing forces captured by 
Lincoln in his image of America as a “House Divided.”  Speaking to the Illinois Republican state 
convention in 1858 to accept their nomination as the party’s candidate to oppose Stephen A. 
Douglas in his reelection bid for the U.S. Senate, Lincoln focused on slavery as a critical issue 
facing America.  Characterizing the efforts to either maintain or to abolish slavery as “agitation,” 
Lincoln declared: 
 In my opinion, it [agitation] will not cease, until a crisis shall have 
been reached and passed. 
 “A house divided against itself cannot stand.” 
 I believe this government cannot endure, permanently half slave and 
half free. 
 I do not expect the Union to be dissolved – I do not expect the house 
to fall – but I do expect it will cease to be divided. 
 It will become all one thing, or all the other. 
 Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, 
and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in course 
of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward, till it shall 
become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new – North as well as 
South.  (Emphasis in original) (Speech to the Republican state convention, 
June 16, 1858, in Gienapp, pp. 43-44) 
 
 As the nation struggled to eliminate slavery, a variety of forces exerted influence.  
Whether sociopolitical or socioeconomic or sociohistorical in nature, these forces exerted a 
fundamental and enduring impact upon people and events.  To more fully understand the 
emergence of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a contextual understanding of American 
society at that time.  And, a contextual understanding of mid-nineteenth century American 
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culture requires an understanding of the fundamental perceptions and forces operating at the 
time.  To facilitate understanding, these fundamental beliefs, perceptions and forces have been 
grouped into three categories: political, psychological, and sociological.  Their separation is not 
meant to suggest that any single factor acted in secluded fashion to the exclusion of others.  It is 
hoped, however, that a separate focus on each will promote an understanding of the complex 
forces at work as well as provide a contextual background that illuminates the events 
surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 Political undercurrents. 
 Although much more attention will be given to the fundamental beliefs, perceptions, and 
forces of the identified psychological and sociological undercurrents, it should be understood 
that all these undercurrents were played out in the political arena.  The political arena featured 
battles between Republicans and Democrats for control of Congress, between a Congress with a 
Republican majority and a Republican President for control of Reconstruction, and between a 
Republican-dominated Congress and a Democratic President over what the post-war program for 
the South would be. 
 Republican-democrat battle for control of congress. 
 Regarding the battle between the two parties for control of Congress, we have already 
discussed the impact of that battle upon the compromise of the wording of the Thirteenth 
Amendment (the Thirty-eighth Congress which had a Republican majority but not control in the 
House and Republican control in the Senate) and the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 (the Thirty-ninth 
Congress which featured Republican control of both the House and Senate).  Voters gave 
Republicans control of both legislative chambers as a result of the severity of the military 
struggle as well as the changing Union war aims that provided almost prophetic status to 
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Republican abolitionists with the emergence of freedom as a purpose for fighting the war.  The 
results of the inter-party battle for control of Congress would significantly impact both the nature 
of Reconstruction and the emergence of the Fourteenth Amendment (See subsequent section, 
“The Battle Between a Republican Congress and a Democratic President Over Reconstruction,” 
commencing at p. 762).  Control of Congress would also play a major role in decisions about 
giving the vote to African-Americans, a topic that will be discussed more fully later in this 
chapter when sociological undercurrents are discussed. 
The battle between a republican congress and a republican president over  
reconstruction. 
 The Wade-Davis Bill of 1864 pitted a Republican Congress against a Republican 
President in a contest to determine which branch of government would exert primary control 
over reconstructing the South.  Lost in the shuffle because of their minority status of being 
outnumbered by Republicans were the Democrats and Unionists.  As mentioned previously, each 
side (Republican Congress & Republican President) cited the Guarantee Clause in the argument 
over control of Reconstruction.  In December 1863 President Lincoln had presented his plan of 
reconstruction by issuing a “Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction” requiring “a 
minimum of ten per cent of the qualified voters of 1860 to take an oath of allegiance” to the 
Union (Wiecek, p. 184; Stampp, p. 39).  According to Lincoln’s proclamation, such a minority 
could subsequently reorganize a state government that would be recognized by the President.  
Lincoln’ plan for reconstruction “offered the prospect … of inaugurating state governments 
while the war still continued” (Belz, p. 210).  At the time the Wade-Davis Bill was being 
discussed, Lincoln’s plan of reconstruction was already underway in Louisiana and Arkansas. 
 The Republican Congress had other ideas about reconstructing the southern states before 
they were once again a legal part of the Union.  In July 1864 Congress enacted into legislation a 
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bill sponsored by Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio and Representative Henry Davis of Maryland, 
which was  entitled “a bill to guaranty certain states a republican form of government” (Wiecek, 
p. 185).  In first introducing the bill in the House, Davis further referenced the Guarantee Clause 
and claimed that only Congress could enforce its provisions.  According to Representative Davis: 
That clause vests in the Congress of the United States a plenary, supreme, 
unlimited political jurisdiction, paramount over courts, subject only to the 
judgment of the people of the United States, embracing within its scope 
every legislative measure necessary and proper to make it effectual; and 
what is necessary and proper the Constitution refers in the first place to our 
judgment, subject to no revision but that of the people.  (Wiecek, p. 185) 
  
In support of the claim for congressional power regarding the Guarantee Clause, which in turn 
asserted congressional control over reconstructing the rebellious states and their illegal 
governments, Representative Davis cited the Supreme Court ruling in Luther v. Borden, in which 
Chief Justice Taney wrote: 
Under this article of the Constitution [the Guarantee Clause as articulated in 
Article I, § 4] it rests with Congress to decide what government is the 
established one in a State.  For as the United States guarantee to each State a 
republican government, Congress must necessarily decide what government 
is established in a State before it can determine whether it is republican or 
not.  (48 U.S. 1, 42 (1849); cited in Belz, pp. 206-207; see previous pp. 119-
124 of this document for discussion of Luther v. Borden) 
 
 The congressional plan for reconstructing the South differed from Lincoln’s plan in 
several respects.  First, the Wade-Davis Bill required “50 per cent of the white male citizens to 
take an ‘ironclad’ loyalty oath before a state might recover its powers” (Brogan, p. 185).  The 
enrollment of eligible white male citizens was to be supervised by a military governor who 
would rule the Confederate state until a state convention was held to “repudiate secession and 
abolish slavery” (Stampp, p. 39).  The 50% requirement effectively changed the timing of when 
reconstruction would occur.  Lincoln’s 10% requirement meant that reconstruction could proceed 
before the South was completely defeated militarily.  Congress’s 50% requirement meant that 
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reconstruction would take place only after the war was completed (Belz, pp. 210, 241).  The two 
plans for reconstructing the South also differed in their approach to the issue of slavery.  The 
Wade-Davis Bill, by requiring a repudiation of former secession legislation as well as state 
action to abolish slavery as a condition of re-admission to the Union, abolished slavery in the 
rebellious states, but not other states.  Lincoln’s plan for reconstruction did not directly address 
the issue of slavery, an issue that he thought required a constitutional amendment.  Also, while 
Lincoln’s previous Emancipation Proclamation freed the slaves in the rebellious states who came 
under Union military control, it did not directly abolish slavery.  In fact, according to one 
historian, “Lincoln’s turning toward military emancipation also raised a question with radical 
implications:  whether the abolition of slavery would be a condition for the return of the rebel 
states to the Union” (Belz, p. 101). 
 Both the presidential and congressional plans for reconstructing the rebellious states to 
ensure southern governments who were loyal to the Union did agree with regard to the procedure 
of appointing a federal military officer “to carry on the civil administration of a state and enforce 
existing state laws, except those relating to slavery, until a loyal government was formed and 
recognized” (Belz, p. 238).  Both plans also agreed on “emancipation as a minimum condition of 
reconstruction” (Belz, p. 239).  Both plans agreed in another area as well, an area that 
represented what one historian termed “an important area of agreement in a negative sense,” as 
both President Lincoln and the Thirty-eighth Congress agreed in denying the vote to African-
Americans (Belz, p. 239).  The issue of suffrage for African-Americans will be more fully 
treated in a subsequent section of this chapter focused on sociological undercurrents of American 
society affecting Reconstruction and the emergence of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Finally, 
while the two plans differed, their areas of agreement showed that “Lincoln and Congress were 
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advancing in the same direction on the central issues of national power and the destruction of 
slavery” (Belz, p. 239).  The differences centered on the question of who would effectively direct 
the national power as well as the question of how best to abolish slavery. 
 Lost in the jurisdictional battle for control of Reconstruction between the two 
Republican-dominated branches of government were the Democrats.  Perhaps their opposition to 
the proposals for reconstructing the rebellious state governments during the Thirty-eighth 
Congress helps explain their loss of seats in the succeeding Thirty-ninth Congress.  First, they 
“advocated the return of the rebel states without conditions” (Belz, p. 208).  Attacking the 
Republican interpretation of the Guarantee Clause, congressional Democrats argued that “the 
standards of what constitute a republican government were set forth in 1789 and [that] the 
federal government cannot impose any new requirements,” e.g., loyalty to the Union, abolishing 
slavery (Wiecek, p. 186).  Issuing a statement on reconstruction in July 1864, congressional 
Democrats “declared that neither the President by proclamation nor Congress by statute ‘can 
alter, add, or diminish the conditions of Union between the States’” (Belz, p. 209).  
Representative James C. Allen, a Democrat from Illinois, argued that both the laws and 
constitutions of southern state states “have always been recognized by the Federal Government 
as republican in form and consonant with the principles of our Constitution” (Belz, p. 209).  
“Congress could not, argued Allen, initiate new governments or directly intervene in the affairs 
of the states, as the [Wade-Davis] reconstruction bill proposed” (Belz, p. 209).  Representative 
Francis Kernan, a New York Democrat, put forth the state rights argument by declaring that the 
“Davis bill” was “at war with the principles upon which the Federal Government rests, and [was] 
subversive of the State governments and the reserved rights of the people of each State to change 
and administer them” (Belz, p. 209).  Representative Aaron Harding, a Democrat from 
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Kentucky, attacked the very notion of reconstruction.  According to Harding, “The very idea of 
reconstruction is an absurd and revolutionary idea, because it admits the dissolution of the 
Union.  There can be no reconstruction of a State government that is still in existence” (Belz, p. 
210).  While both Democrats and Republicans agreed upon the need for republican governments, 
the Democrats  
insisted that the rebel states met this requirement.  Whereas Republicans 
defined republican government in terms of a state’s acceptance of the 
Constitution and the Union and of its hostility toward slavery, Democrats 
defined it as self-government.  (Belz, p. 209) 
 
 The House of Representatives passed the Wade-Davis Bill by a 73-59 vote on May 4, 
1864 (Belz, pp. 212-213).  In the Senate the bill “was referred to the Committee on Territories, 
under Ben Wade” (Belz, p. 213).  Senator Wade reported the bill out of committee “with 
amendments on May 27, but thereafter let the matter rest until the end of June” (Belz, p. 213).  
One of the amendments represented a significant change as it altered the suffrage requirements 
by removing the racial qualification of white voters, thus allowing “Negroes to vote and to 
participate in the reconstruction of loyal governments” (Belz, p. 217).  During the month of June 
while Senator Wade let the Davis legislation rest, the Thirty-eighth Congress dealt with the 
matter of the Thirteenth Amendment to abolish slavery.  Although it passed in the Senate by a 
38-6 margin, House Republicans were unable to “muster the necessary two-thirds majority when 
the amendment came to a vote on June 15,” even though the vote received a 93-65 majority 
(Belz, pp. 215-216).  Following the failure of the Thirteenth Amendment’s passage in Congress, 
“Wade favored eliminating the provision for Negro political equality, because he thought it 
would arouse opposition that would prevent the bill from passing” (Belz, p. 217).  As a result, 
the Senate eliminated the amendment for African-American suffrage by a 5-24 vote (Belz, p. 
217).  Following a scenario of further Senate amendments, passage by the Senate, rejection of 
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the amended bill by the House, the failure to work out differences by a conference committee, 
the Senate with only one day left in the congressional session voted to withdraw it’s previous 
amendments to the Wade-Davis bill by an 18-14 vote, thereby passing the congressional version 
of the Reconstruction Bill (Belz, pp. 219-221). 
 The Wade-Davis Bill went to President Lincoln on the last day of the congressional 
session.  Since Congress had passed the bill at the end of its session, the possibility of a pocket 
veto existed.  According to Article 1, § 7, ¶ 2 of the Constitution:   
If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays 
excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, 
in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their 
adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law. 
 
Before the Wade-Davis Bill, Presidents had only used the pocket veto 19 times (Belz, n. 37, p. 
224).  President Lincoln utilized the pocket veto to kill the Wade-Davis Bill for several reasons.  
First, its requirement that reconstructed southern governments abolish slavery appeared to be 
unconstitutional.  Speaking of the bill’s prohibition of slavery, Lincoln remarked, “That is the 
point on which I doubt the authority of Congress to act” (Belz, p. 227).  The Wade-Davis Bill 
also “contradicted [Lincoln’s] reconstruction policy in Louisiana and Arkansas” (Belz, p. 226).  
Finally, in a Proclamation concerning Reconstruction, July 8, 1864, Lincoln stated another 
reason for pocket-vetoing the Wade-Davis Bill:  Lincoln was “unprepared, by a formal approval 
of this Bill, to be inflexibly committed to any single plan of restoration” (Belz, p. 227). 
 The aftermath of the Wade-Davis Bill’s passage and President Lincoln’s pocket veto of 
the legislation resulted in a political “stalemate” whereby “loyal state governments” had been 
formed in Louisiana, Arkansas, and Tennessee by January 1865 according to the terms of 
Lincoln’s Reconstruction Proclamation, but Congress refused “to seat Senators and 
Representatives from the states that had complied with [Lincoln’s] terms” (Stampp, p. 40).  
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Congressional refusal to seat the Southern legislators, like Lincoln’s pocket veto, was grounded 
in the Constitution.  Article I, § 5, ¶ 1 of the Constitution stated, “Each House shall be the Judge 
of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members….”  “Thus,” according to one 
historian, “at the time of Appomattox, the President and Congress seemed to have reached a 
stalemate” (Stampp, p. 40).  Such was the situation when Lincoln was assassinated in April 
1865.  With the tactical removal of African-American suffrage for political reasons, the Wade-
Davis Bill also “marked the point where antislavery Republicans passed from their old 
contention that republicanism forbade slavery to their new belief that republicanism required that 
the Negro be given the vote” (Wiecek, p. 187).  Such an attitude impacted subsequent events 
surrounding the development of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The battle between a republican congress and a democrat president over  
reconstruction. 
 Finally, the political undercurrents of Reconstruction featured a political battle between 
President Johnson, a Tennessee Democrat, and the Republican-dominated Congress over what 
Reconstruction was going to be.  In effect, it continued the previous jurisdictional battle between 
President Lincoln and Congress, a battle initially won by the President, but which had turned into 
a political stalemate.  However, this second jurisdictional battle between the President and 
Congress differed from the previous battle over the shape of Reconstruction in that, as a result of 
the elections of 1864, Republicans now controlled enough seats in both legislative chambers to 
override any presidential veto.  And although the radical Republicans were not the majority 
within their party, events subsequent to Johnson becoming President moved moderate 
Republicans to align with radical Republicans. 
 Late twenty century and early twenty-first century readers might be unfamiliar with how 
presidential inaugurations and newly-elected congresses operated prior to the ratification of the 
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Twentieth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, known also as the “Lame Duck Amendment,” in 
1933 (Monk, p. 243).   Prior to the adoption of the Twentieth Amendment, the political system 
operated in the following manner because of the following rationale: 
After the Constitution was ratified, the Congress – still acting under the 
Articles of Confederation – had set March 4, 1789, as the date on which the 
new president and members of Congress would be inaugurated.  But that 
created a four-month period between the November elections and the March 
inaugurations in which lame ducks could obstruct the work of Congress, 
without being accountable to voters.  However, Congress could not change 
the inauguration dates by mere statute, because the Constitution guaranteed 
the president and members of Congress a fixed term that could not be 
shortened without a constitutional amendment.  (Monk, p. 243) 
 
From the beginning of the Constitution until the Twentieth Amendment, Congress convened on 
the first Monday in December as stipulated by Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution.  They 
generally adjourned on March 4th and didn’t reconvene until the following December unless the 
President called for a special session of Congress.   
 Following customary procedures that were grounded in both precedent and the 
Constitution, the Thirty-eighth Congress began its second and last session as a legislative body 
on the first Monday of December 1864 in a lame-duck session which treated the elections of 
1864 as of no effect.  The elections of 1864 would not take effect in congressional terms until the 
convening of the first session of the Thirty-ninth Congress on the first Monday of December in 
1865, some thirteen months following the election.  However, Lincoln did not want to wait until 
the Thirty-ninth Congress convened in order to pass the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing 
slavery.  As Lincoln perceived the situation, such a wait might prove fatal in the event the war 
ended, thus terminating “the military authority of the Emancipation Proclamation,” an event that 
would “leave months of political dead time before Congress met, a time in which nearly anything 
could happen” (Guelzo, p. 400).  The Thirteenth Amendment had been passed by the required 
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two-thirds majority in the Senate during the first session of the Thirty-eighth Congress, but had 
failed in the House because of opposition by House Democrats (Guelzo, p. 400).  The elections 
of 1864 had solved the problem of Democratic opposition by replacing them, but the Thirty-
ninth Congress would not meet until another year had passed.   
 In the last annual message he would deliver to Congress, President Lincoln asked 
Congress to reconsider the amendment that would abolish slavery.  He urged reconsideration 
because “an intervening election show[ed] … that the next Congress will pass the measure if this 
does not” (Message to Congress, December 6, 1864, in Gienapp, p. 213).  While admitting that 
the election had not “imposed a duty on members to change their views or their votes,” the 
“voice of the people” had provided “an additional element to be considered” (Message to 
Congress, December 6, 1864, in Gienapp, p. 213).  Pointing to the “great national crisis” and 
stating that “unanimity of action among those seeking a common end [was] desirable,” Lincoln 
tied the abolition of slavery to the common end of the war, which was “the maintenance of the 
Union” (Message to Congress, December 6, 1864, in Gienapp, p. 213).  Lincoln reminded 
congressional legislators that “[t]he most reliable indication of public purpose in this country is 
derived through our popular elections” (Message to Congress, December 6, 1864, in Guelzo, p. 
213).  Lincoln concluded his address to Congress by stating his implacable opposition to slavery, 
linking the abolishment of slavery as an “indispensable condition to ending the war” (Message to 
Congress, December 6, 1864, in Gienapp, p. 215).  According to Lincoln: 
In presenting the abandonment of armed resistance to the national authority 
on the part of the insurgents, as the only indispensable condition to ending 
the war on the part of the government, I retract nothing heretofore said as to 
slavery.  I repeat the declaration made a year ago, that “while I remain in my 
present position I shall not attempt to retract or modify the emancipation 
proclamation, nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the 
terms of that proclamation, or by any of the Acts of Congress.”  If the 
people should, by whatever mode or means, make it an Executive duty to re-
   
   
735
enslave such persons, another, and not I, must be their instrument to perform 
it.  (Message to Congress, December 6, 1864, in Gienapp, p. 215) 
 
 As it turned out, while Congress and Lincoln differed on Reconstruction, they did agree 
on the necessity to abolish slavery through a constitutional amendment.  On January 6, 1865, 
Congress agreed to reconsider the amendment, “and Lincoln now moved his own engines of 
influence into high gear” (Guelzo, p. 401).   Formerly, resistance had come from Northern 
Democrats and border-state hold-outs.  To deal with this, “the secretaries were sent on their usual 
discreet embassies to unsure congressmen, while the more truculent border-staters were brought 
to the White House for personal interviews with the president” (Guelzo, p. 401).  With some, 
Lincoln argued that the abolition of slavery would act to bring the war to a close.  Others held 
out for lucrative appointments, which they received.  The amendment’s passage was also aided 
by “the collapse of Northern Democratic morale after the election,” and a desire to “throw off the 
proslavery odium” as a hope for subsequent “Democratic ascendancy” (Guelzo, p. 401).  The 
result was a narrow victory for the amendment in the House, described as follows:  “A third of 
the House Democrats defected to Lincoln and, when the reconsidered amendment came to a vote 
on January 31, 1865, it sailed through the House with seven votes to spare” (Guelzo, p. 401).  A 
historian quoted a radical Republican’s assessment  of the amendment’s passage and the means 
by which it was achieved: “’The greatest measure of the nineteenth century,’ remarked the canny 
Thaddeus Stevens, ‘was passed by corruption, aided and abetted by the purest man in America’” 
(Guelzo, p. 401). 
 And so, while the executive and legislative branches of government agreed on the need to 
abolish slavery, they still disagreed over the shape of Reconstruction as well as who should 
determine what shape Reconstruction would take.  When the Thirty-eighth Congress adjourned 
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on March 4, 1865, they had not seated any representatives from southern states that had met 
Lincoln’s requirements for readmission to the Union.   
 When Johnson became president upon Lincoln’s assassination, he initially enjoyed the 
support of the dominant Republican party even though it would be over seven more months 
before the Republican-controlled Thirty-ninth Congress would convene in legislative session.  
As one of his first tasks, the new president met with his former Republican colleagues who had 
served with him on the Committee on the Conduct of the War.  From the Republican perspective, 
the meeting was “most satisfactory,” primarily because the Republicans “did most of the talking” 
while “Johnson listened with apparent sympathy” (Stampp, p. 52). Near the end of the meeting, 
Senator Wade concluded, “Johnson, we have faith in you.  By the gods, there will be no trouble 
now in running the government” (Stampp, p. 52).  The Republicans’ perception of the meeting 
and of forthcoming events was summarized by a noted historian of Reconstruction: 
The radicals departed assuming that the governments Lincoln had organized 
in four southern states would be repudiated, that the Cabinet would be 
reorganized, that a few dozen leading rebels would be brought to trial, and 
that either Congress would be called into special session or political 
reconstruction would be delayed until Congress met in regular session the 
following December.  (Stampp, p. 52) 
 
The reality, however, was quite different as Johnson determined to follow Lincoln’s idea that the 
executive branch of government should determine the form and content of Reconstruction.  
Following his meeting with the Committee on the Conduct of the War, President Johnson 
“responded with a series of public statements and executive proclamations that left the radicals 
momentarily stunned” (Stampp, p. 61).  The reality of Johnson’s intentions emerged to present 
something quite different from radical Republican perceptions of Johnson’s position: 
The new President, it now appeared, was as convinced as Lincoln had been 
that reconstruction was the responsibility of the Executive Department and 
not of Congress.  He did not propose to call Congress into special session, or 
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to delay reconstruction until December when Congress would meet in 
regular session.  Rather, he would start and finish it in the seven months 
before Congress assembled and then present Congress with a fait accompli.  
(Stampp, pp. 61-62) 
 
One historian marked the beginning of radical Republican disenchantment with President 
Johnson as commencing at the end of May, 1865, by drawing attention to a specific presidential 
proclamation. 
But the honeymoon between Johnson and the radicals ended when the 
President, on May 29, 1865, issued a proclamation on North Carolina 
reconstruction which excluded Negroes from suffrage.  Profoundly 
disappointed, the radicals did not give up relying on him or start opposing 
the administration, but their disenchantment with him began.  (Belz, p. 306) 
 
 Moreover, Johnson’s perceptions of the nature of Reconstruction conflicted with those of 
radical Republicans, and eventually, showed a lack of understanding of the war’s essential 
purpose.  While Congress talked of reconstructing the South, Johnson’s preferred terminology 
was “restoration” (Brogan, p. 361).  As part of his plan to complete the restoration of the 
southern states to the Union before Congress convened in December, Johnson issued instructions 
to the defeated secessionists to “elect conventions to draw up state constitutions, which would 
next be ratified by the voters” in time for fall elections to select senators and representatives for 
the forthcoming congressional session in December (Brogan, p. 361).  At the same time, Johnson 
started issuing large numbers of pardons to Confederate secessionists.  As one historian 
described the situation, “Soon it was plain that, armed with their pardons, former Confederate 
leaders were re-entering politics in force, and after the autumn elections would completely 
dominate the new Johnson-inspired Southern state governments” (Brogan, p. 361).   
 Hand in hand with his plans for southern restoration, Johnson was issuing statements 
defending the idea of states’ rights, an action taken that illustrated “how little he understood the 
significance of the great struggle that had just occurred” (Brogan, p. 360).  Johnson’s statements 
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flew in the face of in spite of northern opinion that the war had been precipitated by extreme 
views of states’ rights and that the defenders of states’ rights had just been defeated in a bitterly 
long and costly war.  Along with his defense of states’ rights, Johnson attempted to limit a 
congressional power legitimized by the Constitution regarding the seating of Senators and 
Representatives (See previous section regarding the stalemate between President Lincoln and 
Congress).  According to Johnson, Congress could not legislate the reconstruction of the 
secessionist southern states without southern participation in that effort. 
Within very broad limits, he said, the Constitution respected states’ rights.  
Once a rebel state accepted those limits, it had put itself in harmony with the 
law and the nation again and could not be denied re-admission to 
Congress….  [N]or might Congress legislate on matters affecting their 
interests while their Representatives and Senators were absent.  In practice 
this meant that the future of the Southern blacks could not be settled until 
after the white South had regained all its old political rights and privileges.  
(Brogan, p. 360) 
 
 Subsequent to his efforts to change reconstruction to restoration and simultaneous with 
his efforts to exclude congressional involvement in that program, events in the South combined 
to discredit Johnson’s program in the eyes of many northerners during the summer and fall of 
1865.   First, there was a general pattern of violent acts directed  against individual black people 
by southern whites, which was described by one historian specializing in the history of the period 
as follows: 
The whites intensely resented the presence of Negro troops in the South; the 
more brutal whites committed countless acts of violence against the 
freedmen; and men of all classes considered any deviation on the part of 
Negroes from the subservience of slavery days as “insolence.”  (Woodward, 
1960, 1968, p. 75) 
 
Another historian commented on the violence occurring during the summer and fall of 1865 that 
continued through the summer of 1866, culminating in the race riots in Memphis in April 1866 
“when forty-six blacks were killed, and the massacre of 30 July in the same year at New Orleans, 
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when approximately forty people were killed” by observing, “”[T]he struggle between Congress 
and President over the future of the South from the start took place against a background of 
brutal conflict” (Brogan, p. 362).  On Christmas Eve, 1865, southern whites founded the Ku 
Klux Klan in Pulaski, Tennessee (Brogan, p. 362).   
 Second, against this background of violence directed against the newly freed slaves, 
northerners witnessed the recalcitrance of southerners in resisting the full implementation of 
Johnson’s program of restoration.  One form of recalcitrance centered on northern demands for 
southern states to repudiate secession as illegal, to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment, and to 
repudiate the Confederate war debt.  According to a leading historian of the period: 
Several southern conventions still would not agree that secession had been 
illegal; therefore, they merely repealed, rather than repudiated, the 
ordinances of secession and thus yielded nothing in principle.  The Johnson 
legislature in Arkansas voted pensions for Confederate veterans; Mississippi 
refused to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment; South Carolina refused to 
repudiate the Confederate debt.  (Stampp, pp. 76-77) 
 
 Another form of recalcitrance centered on southern efforts to effectually negate Lincoln’s 
Emancipation Proclamation, the ensuing military emancipation of slaves by Union troops, and 
the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery and involuntary servitude through the infamous 
Black Codes, a series of laws that were “framed to control the Negroes and severely restrict their 
civil rights” and which returned the former slaves “to a modified form of involuntary servitude” 
(Stampp, pp. 79, 80; see also previous p. 752 and n. 95 of this document).  As described by one 
historian, the “crucial point about these [Black C]odes was their ultimate purpose” (Stampp, p. 
79).  He continued: 
They were not designed to help the Negro through the admittedly difficult 
transition from the status of slave to that of a responsible freeman.  They 
were not intended to prepare him for a constructive role in the social, 
political, and economic life of the South.  Few believed that such a role was 
possible.  Rather, the purpose of the Black Codes was to keep the Negro, as 
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long as possible, exactly what he was: a propertyless rural laborer under 
strict controls, without political rights, and with inferior legal rights.  
(Stampp, p. 79) 
 
All of the Johnson restoration governments in the South “restricted the suffrage to the whites” 
(Stampp, p. 78).  Education was also withheld from former slaves.  As reported by Carl Schurz, 
“Hundreds of times I heard the old assertion repeated, that ‘learning will spoil the nigger for 
work,’ and that ‘negro education will be the ruin of the South’” (Stampp, p. 78).  Schurz 
gathered these remarks as a result of being sent by President Johnson to tour the South in order to 
observe conditions (Stampp, p. 73).  As articulated by a delegate to the Texas constitutional 
convention, “I concede them [former slaves] nothing but the station of ‘hewers of wood and 
drawers of water,’” referencing the Israelites’ response to the deception perpetrated upon 
Joshua’s forces by the Gibeonites (Stampp, p. 78; for Judaeo-Christian scriptural reference, see 
Joshua 9:3-27 in the Hebrew Scriptures).  While designed “to assure the whites of a perpetual 
supply of cheap labor,” the Black Codes “also reflected their [whites] belief that the Negro had 
the capacity for nothing better” (Stampp, p. 79).  An English historian summarized the situation: 
Slavery was dead, but slavery was what the Africans were meant for, and 
something as near as possible to slavery was what they were going to get.  
The South might have been defeated in war, but her resources for racial 
oppression were by no means exhausted.  (Brogan, p. 362) 
 
 The political ramifications of southern recalcitrance to the changed circumstances 
wrought by their defeat in a bloody civil war centered on two northern concerns:  first, control of 
Congress; and second, domination of the Johnson restoration governments by the politicians who 
had perpetrated treasonous secession which, in turn, had precipitated a costly civil war.  Both 
concerns not only interlocked, but were viewed as aided and abetted by President Johnson.  
Johnson’s extensive pardons of former Confederates meant they continued to dominate the 
newly formed state governments created by Johnson’s program of restoration.  That, plus the 
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massive disenfranchisement of black voters created a frightening prospect, southern domination 
of Congress.  The newly freed slaves would no longer be counted as three-fifths of a person as 
specified by the former Constitution because of the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment 
abolishing that category.  Instead each former slave would be counted as one person, but still 
would not have the vote as a result of the Black Codes’ restriction of the vote to whites only.  As 
a result the Southern delegation in the House of Representatives would increase “by some 
thirteen members, since all of the freedmen instead of three-fifths would have been counted in 
apportionment” (Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 94).  Other ramifications of Johnson’s pardons, of 
Confederate domination of the Johnson restoration governments, and of the newly legislated 
Black Codes followed: 
Without Negro ballots it was probable that all the additional seats, plus all 
the rest of the seats of the eleven states, would be filled by Democrats and 
not Republicans.  These same states would not only swell the opposition 
votes in Congress but the electoral votes in presidential contests. 
(Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 94) 
 
As a result: 
About thirty-seven of the Southern seats in the House would be accounted 
for by Negro population, who had no votes, and likely filled by sworn 
opponents of the party that took credit for Negro freedom.  To ask an 
overwhelmingly Republican Congress – radical or conservative – to approve 
such a plan was to ask water to run uphill. (Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 94) 
 
And although many northern states denied the franchise to black voters, restrictions on African-
Americans were not codified to the extent represented by the Black Codes (See ensuing section 
of this chapter, “Sociological Undercurrents,” for a fuller discussion regarding denial of the vote 
to African-American citizens in northern states).  Moreover, the moral high ground resulting 
from the abolition of southern slavery was still occupied by the North.  Finally, all Republicans, 
both moderate and radical, “were afraid that southern and western agrarians might once more 
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combine in the Democratic party, for this was the alliance that had dominated national politics 
most of the time in prewar years” (Stampp, p. 93).  The increased southern representation and 
possible alliance with western agrarians were unacceptable, particularly for radical Republicans.  
“This, said the radicals bitterly, would be the South’s reward for her treason” (Stampp, p. 93)! 
 As President, Johnson “had acquiesced in the Black Codes without a murmur” (Stampp, 
p. 81).  Because of his views on states’ rights, Johnson “presumably … felt that the states, 
however unwise, were acting within their constitutional rights.  So he said nothing: it was not for 
him to interfere” (Brogan, p. 363).  And so, he didn’t interfere with the southern legislatures’ 
enactment of the Black Codes, nor did he interfere when the Union “military commanders in the 
South nullified the codes” (Brogan, p. 363).  Northern African-Americans held “numerous 
meetings” in response to the southern Black Codes and called “on Congress for protection” 
(Stampp, p. 80).  The Chicago Tribune articulated northern views when it “warned Mississippi 
that the North would convert her ‘into a frog pond’ before permitting slavery to be re-
established” (Stampp, p. 80).  This public opposition in the North perhaps explains why “military 
officers suspended much of the Mississippi code and threw out the entire South Carolina code” 
(Stampp, p. 81). 
 Thus the stage was set for the convening of the first session of Congress, a Congress that 
had actually been elected in November of 1864, but which would not officially meet until the 
first Monday in December that occurred on the 4th of December,1865.  As a result of the 
elections of 1864, the Thirty-ninth Congress “contained four roughly defined political groups” 
(Stampp, p. 83): 
First, there was a small, disorganized, demoralized Democratic minority….  
Second, there was a rather feeble band of conservative Republicans….  
Third, there was a faction of radical Republicans, more numerous than either 
of the first two groups but still a decided minority even in the Republican 
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party.  Among those who could be identified clearly as radicals [was] … 
[Representative] James F. Wilson of Iowa.  Finally, there were the moderate 
Republicans – the largest group in this Congress – who leaned slightly 
toward Johnson but were nevertheless still wavering between the radical and 
conservative camps….  The moderate Republicans held the balance of 
power; whichever group they gravitated toward would ultimately win 
control of Congress.  (Stampp, pp. 83-84) 
 
Over the intervening months, elements of the moderate Republican majority had slowly begun 
moving towards acceptance of the views of the Radical Republicans, views with which they had 
not agreed when Johnson took office following Lincoln’s assassination, but which had gained 
increasing acceptance as the North witnessed the actions of an unrepentant South.  However, 
when the Thirty-ninth Congress first convened, moderate Republicans “were still hopeful that 
conflict between Congress and the President could be avoided” (Stampp, p. 85).  To keep the 
moderate Republicans “within his grasp,” however, Johnson would have had to have exercised 
prudence and flexibility in his approach to reconstruction (Stampp, p. 84).  President Johnson 
also had to hope that “those who controlled his governments in the South would … use some 
discretion” (Stampp, p. 85).  The reality proved quite different. 
Instead, the President’s tactless, uncompromising, and violent behavior, and 
the southern politicians’ indifference to northern public opinion, eventually 
forced the moderates into an alliance with the radicals.  Consequently, by 
the summer of 1866 the radicals, with their new recruits, had control of 
Congress and were finally in a position to assume the direction of 
reconstruction themselves.  (Stampp, pp. 85-86) 
 
 At the same time another important constituency, northern business interests, had moved 
to a position of supporting the radical Republican views on the need to reconstruct the South.  
This “powerful group saw in the return of a disaffected and Democratic South a menace to the 
economic order that had been established during the absence of the seceding states from the 
Union” (Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 96). 
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On nearly every delicate and disturbing economic issue of the day – 
taxation, the National Bank, the national debt, government bonds and their 
funding, railroads and their financing, regulation of corporations, 
government grants and subsidies to business, protective tariff legislation – 
on one and all the business community recognized in the unreconstructed 
South an antagonist of long standing. (Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 96) 
 
Like both moderate and radical Republicans, but for slightly different reasons, northern business 
interests feared an alliance of a more numerous southern representation in Congress with 
traditional northern Democrats. 
In combination with traditional allies in the West and North, the South could 
upset the new order.  Under these circumstances, the Northern business 
community, except for the banking and mercantile interests allied with the 
Democrats, put aside conservative habits and politics and threw its support 
to Radical Reconstruction. (Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 96) 
 
The confluence of economic interests and politics during this period was summarized by another 
leading historian of the era: 
The Republican party had become, in part, the political agency of the 
northern middle classes and of northern business enterprise….  [T]he 
agrarian interests in the South and West, ever suspicious of bankers, 
capitalists, and urban entrepreneurs generally, posed a serious threat to the 
economic groups the Republican party represented and to the legislation 
passed for their benefit.  (Stampp, p. 95) 
 
 While moderate and radical Republicans were divided over the exact program to be used 
in reconstructing the South, they were united in believing that Congress should control that 
program.  Just as the Thirty-eighth Congress had refused to seat those elected by Lincoln’s 
southern reconstruction governments, so the Thirty-ninth Congress also refused to recognize “the 
Southern representatives and senators chosen under the Johnson-sanctioned” restoration 
governments because both “the legality and desirability of those very constitutions was one of 
the key matters at issue” (Brogan, p. 363).  These actions were entirely within the constitutional 
powers of Congress as specified in Article I, § 4, ¶ 3 despite Johnson’s denunciations of 
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congressional action as being unconstitutional (Brogan, pp. 363-364; see also previous 
discussion in this chapter, pp. 761-762).  As described by one historian, “As Congress began to 
take a hand, Johnson’s control over the process of reconstruction came to an end” (Stampp, p. 
81).  Setting its hand on the tiller of the ship of state regarding the content and direction of 
reconstruction, the Thirty-ninth Congress “express[ed] the boiling indignation of the North … 
[by] denounc[ing] the South and set[ting] up a joint committee of the two houses to propose a 
programme [sic] of congressional reconstruction” (Brogan, p. 363).  While not all Republicans, 
let alone white Northerners, shared the radical Republican statement of Charles Sumner that 
“[t]he South … must be reconstructed in accordance with the principles of the Declaration of 
Independence, with government founded upon the consent of the governed,” most did agree with 
Senator Henry Wilson’s rebuttal of the Black Codes as a purpose of reconstruction (Stampp, p. 
88): 
[W]e must see to it that the man made free by the Constitution … is a 
freeman indeed; that he can go where he pleases, work when and for whom 
he pleases; that he can sue and be sued; that he can lease and buy and sell 
and own property, real and personal; that he can go into the schools and 
educate himself and his children; that the rights and guarantees of the … 
common law are his, and that he walks the earth, proud and erect in the 
conscious dignity of a free man.  (Stampp, p. 88) 
 
Out of these initial actions emerged the later, more substantive legislation developed by the Joint 
Committee on Reconstruction of the Thirty-ninth Congress, namely the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
(See previous section of this chapter, pp. 752-753) and the Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
congressional override on April 9, 1865, of Johnson’s veto of the 1866 Civil Rights Act by more 
than the two-thirds majority required in each legislative chamber signaled that Congress would 
determine the nature and shape of Reconstruction, not the President (Brogan, p. 364; Patrick, pp. 
73-74; Stampp, p. 135; Woodward, 1960, 1968, pp. 77-78).   
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 The emergence of the Fourteenth Amendment and its passage will be considered 
following extensive discussion of the psychological, sociological, and economic undercurrents of 
Reconstruction.  As stated previously, understanding of underlying societal forces at works 
illuminates the Fourteenth Amendment’s origins and purpose. 
 Psychological undercurrents. 
 Victor v. vanquished. 
 The substrata constituting the psychological undercurrents of American life in the 
immediate aftermath of the Civil War center on the theme, “Victor v. Vanquished.”  As a result 
of the Civil War, the South suffered damage to its collective psyche: 
For the South had undergone an experience that it could share with no other 
part of America – though it is shared by nearly all the peoples of Europe and 
Asia – the experience of military defeat, occupation, and reconstruction.  
(Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 190) 
 
An English historian described the psychological impact of defeat in the following manner: 
Southern bitterness ran deep.  Defeat was educative to the extent that it 
induced Southerners to become Americans again … and persuaded many of 
them that the section would have to make a serious effort to industrialize…  
It would be long before anyone would accept that the whole secessionist 
adventure might have been morally wrong, socially unwise, politically 
misconceived. (Brogan, pp. 361-362) 
 
An American historian further described southern reaction to the defeat they had suffered at the 
hands of the northern victors. 
[A] large number of Southerners were bitter in defeat; few of them would 
have agreed that what they had done in 1861 was morally wrong, or that the 
right had triumphed….  Schurz found among the southern people ‘an utter 
absence of national feeling.’  Loyalty consisted of ‘submission to necessity,’ 
and submission was advocated as ‘the only means by which they could rid 
themselves of the federal soldiers and obtain once more control of their own 
affairs.’  Certainly Southerners were not conceding any more than they had 
to.  (Stampp, p. 74) 
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Furthermore, the psychological impact endured beyond the generation that had experienced 
defeat. 
Southern women, particularly, remained ferociously loyal to “the cause.”  
Mourning and commemoration were to be major preoccupations for several 
generations to come: soon war-memorials appeared in every important 
Southern town, usually in the form of a statue of a boy in grey, his heroic 
young face staring resolutely northwards.  (Brogan, p. 362) 
 
 The North viewed the outcome of the Civil War in a quite different light.  More than any 
single individual, Abraham Lincoln framed the conflict in terms of a noble crusade for freedom 
that could only be waged by a free government.  Sometimes Lincoln added the idea of divine 
providence.  According to Lincoln, “Let us have faith that right makes might, and in that faith, 
let us, to the end dare to do our duty as we understand it” (Speech at the Cooper Union, February 
27, 1860, in Gienapp, p. 81).  In his inaugural address, Lincoln declared, “Intelligence, 
patriotism, Christianity, and a firm reliance on Him, who has never yet forsaken this favored 
land, are still competent to adjust, in the best way, all our present difficulty” (First Inaugural 
Address, March 4, 1861, in Gienapp, p. 96).  In his message to a special session of Congress, 
Lincoln portrayed the coming conflict as part of the struggle to preserve democracy.   
This is essentially a People’s contest.  On the side of the Union, it is a 
struggle for maintaining in the world, that form, and substance of 
government, whose leading object is, to elevate the condition of men – to lift 
artificial weights from all shoulders – to clear the paths of laudable pursuit 
for all – to afford all, an unfettered start, and a fair chance, in the race of life.  
(Message to Congress, July 4, 1861, in Gienapp, p. 105) 
 
Following the momentous clash between the North and the South at Gettysburg, Lincoln again 
framed the conflict as a struggle to maintain a government dedicated to liberty, but now added 
the idea first expressed in the nation’s founding document. 
 Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this 
continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the 
proposition that all men are created equal. 
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 Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, 
or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure.  (Gettysburg 
Address, November 19, 1863, in Gienapp, p. 184) 
 
Lincoln concluded his remarks at Gettysburg by exhorting the North to not only remember the 
cause for which they were fighting, but also to re-dedicate themselves to that cause.   
It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us – 
that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for 
which they gave the last full measure of devotion – that we here highly 
resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain – that this nation, under 
God, shall have a new birth of freedom – and that government of the people, 
by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth. (Gettysburg 
Address, November 19, 1863, in Gienapp, p. 184) 
 
Finally, according to Lincoln, the South was fighting to maintain slavery, not freedom. 
One eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not distributed 
generally over the Union, but localized in the Southern part of it.  These 
slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful interest.  All knew that this 
interest was, somehow, the cause of the war.  To strengthen, perpetuate, and 
extend this interest was the object for which the insurgents would rend the 
Union, even by war…  (Second Inaugural Address, March 4, 1865, in 
Gienapp, pp. 220-221) 
 
It was not simply a issue of the North being victorious; instead it was a triumph that reflected 
divine intervention on behalf of the northern armies.  The sufferings and defeats of the North 
during the Civil War served as payment for the North’s previous toleration of slavery.  In 
articulating this view, Lincoln began by paraphrasing scripture, “Woe unto the world because of 
offences!  for [sic] it must needs be that offences come; but woe to that man by whom the 
offence cometh!” (Second Inaugural Address, March 4, 1865, in Gienapp, p. 221).  Lincoln next 
identified “American Slavery [as] one of those offences which, in the providence of God, must 
needs come” and the bloody conflict between North and South “as the woe due to those by 
whom the offence came” (Second Inaugural Address, March 4, 1865, in Gienapp, p. 221).  
Lincoln then prayed “that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away” before declaring: 
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Yet, if God wills that it continue, until all the wealth piled by the bond-
man’s two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until 
every drop of blood drawn with the lash, shall be paid by another drawn 
with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said 
“the judgments of the Lord, are true and righteous altogether.” (Second 
Inaugural Address, March 4, 1865, in Gienapp, p. 221) 
 
The lyrics of the Union army’s “major war song,” The Battle Hymn of the Republic, reinforced 
the righteousness of the Northern cause: “As He died to make men holy, let us die to make men 
free!” (Filler, 1977a, p. 366).   
 Hearts and minds, feelings and beliefs. 
 With the ultimate victory of Northern armies over the Southern rebels and defenders of 
slavery, with the triumph of the Union over those who placed the preservation of slavery ahead 
of the preservation of the Union, “right had given might” to Northern arms, at least in the eyes of 
most Northerners.   The outcome also helped contribute to the “American legend of success and 
victory,” which in turn “fostered the tacit conviction that American ideals, values, and principles 
inevitably prevail in the end” (Woodward, 1960, 1968, pp. 188, 189).   
 Although the military conflict had ended, the beliefs, feelings, and attitudes that had 
driven the conflict still remained. And those feelings ran deep on both sides.  While forced to 
submit to the Union’s military triumph, Southern beliefs in white supremacy remained unshaken.  
As described by one historian: 
[Southerners’] submission was to military might, not to right and truth as 
they defined right and truth….  Submit they would to northern power but 
they would retain their ideas of a South governed for and by white men.  
Although willing to admit the demise of slavery and the permanency of the 
Union, they would go no further.  Already the “Lost Cause” was becoming 
ennobled and its heroes enshrined….  Southerners wanted to know what to 
do – how to convince the victor of their loyalty and still keep the South a 
white man’s land.  (Patrick, p. 61) 
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Southerners received encouragement for their attitude of superiority towards the former slaves 
from no less a person than the President of the United States.  Speaking to Congress, President 
Johnson “in effect, demanded that the South remain a ‘white man’s country’” (Stampp, p. 87).  
Specifically, President Johnson observed: 
[I]t must be acknowledged that in the progress of nations negroes have 
shown less capacity for government than any other race of people.  No 
independent government of any form has ever been successful in their 
hands.  On the contrary, wherever they have been left to their own devices 
they have shown a constant tendency to relapse into barbarism.  (Stampp, p. 
87) 
 
Johnson concluded by characterizing the attitudes of radical Republicans towards the newly 
freed African-Americans as a danger to the nation: 
The great difference between the two races in physical, mental, and moral 
characteristics will prevent an amalgamation or fusion of them together in 
one homogeneous mass….  Of all the dangers which our nation has yet 
encountered, none are equal to those which must result from the success of 
the effort now making to Africanize the [southern] half of our country.  
(Stampp, p. 87) 
 
The President’s views were not that different from the views expressed in the “Official charge” 
given to new recruits of the Ku Klux Klan in 1867: 
Our main and fundamental objective is the MAINTENANCE OF THE 
SUPREMACY OF THE WHITE RACE in this Republic.  History and 
Physiology [sic] teach us that we belong to a race which nature has endowed 
with an evident superiority over all other races, and that the Maker, in thus 
elevating us above the common standard of human creation, has intended to 
give us over inferior races a dominion from which no human laws can 
permanently derogate.  (Emphasis in original) (Brogan, p. 356) 
 
In addition to the desire of white southerners to maintain white supremacy in southern political, 
social, and economic life, there was hatred and bitterness of the North mixed in as well, 
exemplified by the statement of one South Carolinian, who declared,  “[The Yankees] left me 
one inestimable privilege, to hate ‘em.  I git [sic] up at half past four in the morning and sit up till 
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twelve at night, to hate ‘em” (Patrick, p. 62).  In response to northern denunciations of the Black 
Codes passed by southern legislatures, newspaper editors in the South “removed the flag, a 
symbol of the Union, from their editorial columns and described the Northerners in bitter words” 
(Patrick, p. 62).   
 The views of the editor of the Chicago Tribune were typical of the northern response to 
the southern Black Codes.   He wrote: 
We tell the white men of Mississippi that the men of the North will convert 
the State of Mississippi into a frog pond before they will allow such laws 
[the Black Codes] to disgrace one foot of soil in which the bones of our 
soldiers sleep and over which the flag of freedom waves.  (Brogan, p. 373; 
Patrick, p. 61) 
 
Radical Republicans constituted perhaps the most outspoken northern voices in their negative 
views of the southern enemy.  Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts “declared that the South 
had been allowed to surrender too soon” while Wendell Phillips, a longtime opponent of slavery 
and an early abolitionist, observed that southerners were still continuing to fight the North.  
According to Phillips, “The rebellion has not ceased, it has only changed its weapons.  Once it 
fought; now it intrigues; once it followed Lee in arms, now it follows President Johnson in guile 
and chicanery” (Patrick, p. 61).   Congressman Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania expressed 
the views of the victorious North when he declared, “We have the right to treat them [the South] 
as we would any other provinces that we might conquer” (Brogan, p. 356).  Stevens further 
remarked that having seceded and having “been given belligerent rights” during the war, the 
former southern states “were now conquered provinces ‘subject to all the liabilities of a 
vanquished foe” (Stampp, p. 86).  Asserting congressional power, Stevens declared that 
“Congress alone had the power to rebuild the southern states” (Stampp, p. 86).  Stevens then 
asserted sole congressional power “to admit them [the seceded southern states] into the Union, if 
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they should be judged fit to resume the privileges which they renounced and sought to destroy” 
(Stampp, p. 86).  Described as the “master of the Republican House majority, and leader of 
Radical Reconstruction,” Congressman Stevens also advocated for the disenfranchisement “of 
Southern whites in great numbers” and pushed “to confiscate great quantities of their land” 
(Woodward, 1960, 1968, pp. 91, 91-92).  Describing his plan, Stevens declared, “It is intended to 
revolutionize their feelings and principles.  This may startle feeble minds and shake weak nerves.  
So do all great improvements” (Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 92).  Responding to critics who 
described his plan as “humiliating [a] defeated foe,” Stevens rejoined: “Why not?  Do not they 
deserve humiliation?  If they do not, who does?  What criminal, what felon deserves it more” 
(Stampp, p. 92)?  An English professor of history described the northern perspective towards the 
South in the aftermath of the Civil War: 
The North had won; but the victory would be hollow if the ex-Confederates 
renewed their system of racial oppression and, on that foundation, once 
more challenged the dearest interests and beliefs of their fellow-citizens.  
(Brogan, p. 358) 
 
He continued by describing northern concerns about the South and the rationale they used to 
justify their views: 
Lincoln  and the rest had surely not died in vain; but it might seem so if 
justice was not done to the former bondsmen.  And should not the South be 
disciplined?  Was it not a just punishment, as well as prudent, to compel her 
to abandon her old ways?  (Brogan, p. 358) 
 
 Congressional reconstruction. 
 Northern views on victory clashed with southern resistance to changed circumstances, 
which ultimately reinforced the position of Radical Republicans and began a series of events that 
became known as Reconstruction.  Reconstruction would hold sway until the aftermath of the 
presidential election of 1876 in which the election’s outcome was decided politically by the 
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House of Representatives.  The resulting Compromise of 1877 officially ended the federal 
government’s efforts to “reconstruct” the South.  In between the convening of the Thirty-ninth 
Congress and the Compromise of 1877, however, a series of earth-shaking events in the social, 
political, and economic life of the nation emerged that exerted a far-reaching influence on our 
national life.  These profound events emerged from and were influenced by the postwar conflict 
between the victorious North and the vanquished South. 
 The Thirty-ninth Congress convened on December 4, 1865, some thirteen months 
following the elections of 1864.  The Speaker of the House, Schuyler Colfax of Indiana,  
pointed to the opposition in some southern legislatures to ratification of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, their reluctance to repudiate wartime debts, and 
their repeal rather than repudiation of secession, the proscription of southern 
Unionists by former Confederates, and the latter’s failure to protect the 
freedmen.  He proclaimed the exclusive right of Congress to judge the 
qualifications and elections of its members.  (Patrick, p. 63) 
 
Prior to the congressional session, a moderate northern newspaper, the New York Times, 
cautioned against admitting congressmen from the southern states to the Thirty-ninth Congress 
because such action “would signify the end of reconstruction” (Patrick, p. 62).  The Times 
“advised northern congressmen to delay, wait, investigate, and determine whether the southern 
state governments were actually loyal” (Patrick, p. 63).  Earlier that fall, the clerk of the House 
of Representatives, Edward McPherson, had “announced his intention to omit calling the names 
of representatives from the former Confederate states at the opening session of the Thirty-Ninth 
[sic] Congress” (Patrick, p. 63).  With the approval of Speaker Colfax, McPherson followed his 
announced policy when the Thirty-ninth Congress convened and did not call the names of 
southern representatives, an action which prevented them from being seated.  The Senate used 
the same tactic to prevent the seating of southern senators (Patrick, pp. 63-64).  Also on the first 
day, Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania  
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moved for the appointment of a joint committee, composed of nine members 
from the House and six from the Senate, to inquire into conditions of the 
states formerly known as the Confederate States of America and to report 
whether those states were entitled to representation in Congress.  (Patrick, p. 
64) 
 
Stevens also declared that “no representative or senator from the states in question [should] be 
seated” until the committee had completed their investigation and delivered its report to 
Congress (Patrick, p. 64).   
 The House approved Stevens’ motion that same day “by a 136-36 vote” with the Senate 
also voting approval on December 4, 1865 (Patrick, p. 64).  Subsequently, six senators and nine 
representatives were appointed to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction (See Table 4).99  
Containing four moderate Republicans, eight radical Republicans, and three Democrats, the Joint 
Committee was chaired by Senator Fessenden who both directed the  Joint Committee’s 
investigation and authored its final report while Representative Stevens served as the chair of the 
“House section of the Committee” (Patrick, p. 65). 
Table 4: 








 Moderate Republicans controlled the Joint Committee on Reconstruction as it began its 
work, “meeting almost daily” from December, 1865 through April, 1866 (Stampp, p. 111).  In 
 Senate   House of Representatives  
William Fessenden – Maine Thaddeus Stevens – Pennsylvania 
J.W. Grimes – Iowa John A. Bingham - Ohio 
Ira Harris – New York Henry T. Blow – Missouri 
J.M. Howard – Michigan George S. Boutwell – Massachusetts 
Reverdy Johnson – Maryland Roscoe Conkling – New York 
G.H. Williams – Oregon Henry Grider – Kentucky  
 Justin S. Morrill – Vermont  
 Andrew J. Rogers – New Jersey 
 Elihu B. Washburne – Illinois  
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conducting its investigation into conditions in the southern states, the Joint Committee called 
numerous witnesses, among whom were “77 Northerners living in the South, 57 Southerners, 
and 8 Negroes” (Patrick, p. 65).  Senator Fessenden wrote the report of the Joint Committee’s 
findings which was released on April 28, 1866 (Stampp, p. 111).  Findings of the Joint 
Committee on Reconstruction included the following: 
White Southerners were mistreating the freedmen by relegating them to a 
servile economic and political status, proscribing members of the white race 
who had been Unionists during the war, and continuing in power state 
governments dedicated to white supremacy and controlled by former 
secessionists and Confederates.  (Patrick, pp. 65-66) 
 
The Joint Committee also determined that the secessionist states were “disorganized 
communities without civil governments” at the end of the war; therefore the rebellious states 
“lacked constituencies qualified to elect Senators and Representatives” (Stampp, p. 111).  
Because the “majority of Southerners were still bitterly hostile to the government of the United 
States,” and “until the civil rights of all their citizens were secured and until the leaders of the 
rebellion had been excluded from public offices,” the Southern states were “not entitled to 
representation in Congress” (Stampp, p. 111).   
 Because northern newspapers had covered the Joint Committee’s hearings and reported 
its findings in great detail, the congressional investigation into southern conditions “profoundly 
influenced public opinion in the North and persuaded an increasing number of Northerners to 
support a more rigorous policy” (Patrick, p. 66).  Through reading their newspapers, a vast 
number of “Northerners concluded that Southerners remained essentially rebellious and anti-
American while voicing sentiments of loyalty, that freedmen were being virtually re-enslaved by 
law and practice” (Patrick, p. 66). 
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 The effects of the hearings conducted by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction and their 
widespread publicity generated by northern newspapers were far-reaching.  Out of the Joint 
Committee’s hearings emerged the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the reauthorization of the 
Freedmen’s Bureau, and the introduction of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Joint Committee’s 
hearings also influenced the outcome of the mid-term elections of 1866 that resulted in even 
greater numbers of Republican legislators being elected to Congress.  One historian described the 
election of 1866 in the following manner: 
On election day the people rejected Johnson’s claim that reconstruction was 
finished and voted to have Congress proceed along whatever line it chose to 
establish loyal governments in ten southern states.  Every governorship in 
the northern states went to the Republicans and they also won more than a 
two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress.  Only in the border states of 
Delaware, Maryland, and Kentucky did the Democrats score victories.  
(Patrick, p. 89) 
 
 In turn, the election of 1866 exerted further impact upon the nation’s political landscape.  
First, the lame-duck second session of the Thirty-ninth Congress enacted legislation on January 
22, 1867, stipulating that “the first session of the Fortieth Congress [resulting from the mid-term 
elections of 1866], and of Congresses in the future, was to begin on March 4, following elections 
of the preceding year” (Patrick, p. 92).  This action eliminated the thirteen-month delay between 
an election and the actual seating of elected legislators, described as “a long period in which the 
executive department could operate with no check from the legislative branch” (Patrick, p. 92).   
 Second, while the hearings of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction indicated to the 
northern public the need for sterner measures by the North to create governments in the South 
that were loyal to the Union, the election of 1866 reflected widespread support for stiffer 
congressional efforts designed to bring the defeated, but recalcitrant, southerners back into line.  
As a result, Congress’s first official Reconstruction act “divided the South into five military 
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districts, each to be governed by a general of the US army” (Brogan, p. 370).  Furthermore, in 
similar fashion to an army of occupation overseeing the conversion of a conquered people to 
democratic processes, the Military Reconstruction Act provided for the following: 
These generals had the duty of enrolling all qualified voters (in effect, all 
adult males, except those classes of ex-Confederates excluded by the terms 
of the Fourteenth Amendment), of calling together constitutional 
conventions which would set up new, acceptable state governments and to 
preside over the first elections under these arrangements.  (Brogan, p. 370) 
 
The provisions of the Military Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867, also included terms under 
which the military regimes would give way to civilian rule: 
Then, when the new governments had ratified the Fourteenth Amendment 
and Congress had approved the new constitutions, the reconstructed states 
would be at last re-admitted to the federal legislature and the military 
regimes could fade away.  (Brogan, p. 370) 
 
One student of constitutional history viewed the Military Reconstruction Act as constituting the 
high water mark of the Guarantee Clause’s influence in American history.  According to 
Professor Wiecek: 
The clause emerged, stood forward for a time in nearly all its inherent power 
… [reflecting the North’s] determination to hold the people of the southern 
states to a strict account as the price of readmission to full rights in the 
Union.  (Wiecek, p. 208) 
 
In his view: 
Reconstruction represented the confluence of two earlier streams of 
interpretation of the guarantee clause.  One was the old antislavery argument 
that slavery and republican government were incompatible....  This stream 
of interpretation was commingled with the second which insisted that the 
essence of republican government was popular control of the machinery of 
government.  (Wiecek, p. 208) 
 
Did the sterner measures, continued military occupation of a conquered province as represented 
by the Military Reconstruction Act, work?  As analyzed by a British historian, the military rule 
was required to overcome the “ferocious” opposition to the changed status of the newly freed 
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slaves that was posed by the former secessionists (Brogan, p. 370).  In his view, “By 1870 the 
process was complete to the Republicans’ satisfaction, and every Southern state was once more 
represented in Congress” (Brogan, p. 370).  Brogan identified another benefit of the carefully 
monitored development of the new state constitutions required by the Military Reconstruction 
Act.  According to his analysis:  
The new state constitutions did effectively overhaul Southern 
government….  Property qualifications for voting and office-holding were 
abolished for ever; [and] the first systems of public education were set up, 
for whites as well as for blacks, that the South had ever known…  (Brogan, 
p. 372) 
 
Because public education in the South emerged from military rule by the victorious North over 
the vanquished southern states, it represents a unique phenomenon whose effects endured well 
beyond the generation who participated in both the Civil War and Reconstruction. 
 Public education. 
 Northern and southern attitudes towards public education differed greatly.  While most 
northern states had systems of public education in place for elementary children by 1860, few, if 
any, southern states made systemic provisions for publicly educating elementary-age students.  
The nineteenth century differences were cogently startling to an outside observer: 
The North had begun to provide free public schooling in the thirties and 
forties.  In this respect, as in so many others, the ante-bellum South had 
undoubtedly been backward…  However, it should also be recorded that the 
state of Mississippi did not introduce public education for any race until 
1919.  (Brogan, p. 372, n. 11) 
 
A native historian described the educational situation as it existed at the beginning of the Civil 
War: 
Perhaps Horace Mann and the public school system had made ante-bellum 
Americans the most generally educated people on earth.  A majority of 
children attended schools in the North; a few states and a number of cities in 
the poorer and more sparsely settled South supported good public 
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educational programs.  The southern elite employed tutors, enrolled their 
children in some 3000 private academies…  (Patrick, p. 234) 
 
 Following the end of the Civil War, “ a marked contrast between northern and southern 
response[s] to peacetime educational needs” was noted (Patrick, p. 235).  Not only did the 
Northerners resume spending “relatively ample funds freely on schools,” they also “financed 
missionary teachers in the South” (Patrick, p. 235).  As a result, “[m]any ‘schoolmarms’ 
descended on the South to educate the children of a race held back by the lash, and to 
demonstrate Christian love to benighted white natives” (Patrick, p. 236).  According to a noted 
historian’s analysis, “The best estimate is a maximum of five thousand Yankee schoolmarms in 
the South” (Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 169).  Not until after the passage of the congressional act 
in 1867 to reconstruct the South, however, did southern states move to address the issue of public 
education.  Required by the Military Reconstruction Act to develop and submit new state 
constitutions for northern approval, a “southern public school system was established” (Patrick, 
p. 237). 
Without exception constitution-makers operating under the aegis of 
Congressional Reconstruction inserted public school provisions in state 
constitutions.  An educated citizenry was an essential ingredient of 
republican government, every child should have educational opportunity, 
and the taxpayer had a duty to provide schools.  These were the noblest 
designs of southern [Reconstruction] regimes….    (Patrick, p. 236) 
 
 As a result of this educational initiative in the South, “[T]he number and percentage of 
white and Negro children enrolled and attending public schools steadily increased.  The 
educational year lengthened to 100 or more days” (Patrick, p. 236).  Of course, some states 
lagged behind others in their implementation of a system of public education; however, once 
implemented, the results were impressive.  While South Carolina’s constitution of 1868 created a 
system of public education, the state’s legislature did not fund it until 1873, a date which is 
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credited for the introduction of “free public schools into the state for the first time” (Zinn, p. 
148).  From an educational perspective the results were impressive: 
Not only were seventy thousand Negro children going to school by 1876 
where none had gone before, but fifty thousand white children were going to 
school where only twenty thousand had attended in 1860.  (Zinn, p. 148) 
 
With the implementation of state-wide systems of public education throughout the South, “the 
rate of illiteracy gradually declined” (Patrick, p. 237).  Literacy rates improved so that “by 1880, 
86 per cent [sic] of white Texans over ten years of age could at least read and write, and 28 per 
cent of Tennessee’s Negroes were literate” (Patrick, p. 237). 
 The accomplishments achieved through establishing a system of public education,  
however, did not lessen the resentment over the fact that it occurred as a result of the defeat of 
the South and the ensuing military occupation by the North.  Public education was widely 
regarded as a Yankee imposition upon the defeated South.  The dominant southern attitude was 
that “free education was ‘imported here by a gang of carpetbaggers,’” according to one southern 
newspaper editor (Woodward, 1951, p. 61).  After the Compromise of 1877 signaled the official 
end of Reconstruction, the actions of southern states constituted, in many respects, a reaction 
against the North.  In one historian’s view, “Public education, bearing in many minds the stigma 
of a Carpetbag measure, was first to suffer” (Woodward, 1951, p. 61).  The governor of Virginia 
publicly declared that public schools were “a luxury … to be paid for like any other luxury, by 
the people who wish[ed] their benefits,” while a Richmond newspaper editor editorialized that 
taxation to support public education “was socialistic” (Woodward, 1951, p. 61).  Nor were such 
negative views confined to Virginia.   
 Surveying the effects of the South’s reaction to Reconstruction in the aftermath of the 
Compromise of 1877, referred to by southerners as the Redemption of the South, Professor C. 
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Vann Woodward observed, “In Texas, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, 
and Florida reaction crippled the schools, and throughout the South public education suffered” 
(Woodward, 1951, p. 61).  As state funding was diverted from public education across the South, 
the “average length of the common school term” was reduced from a 100-day school year to an 
80-day term of schooling (Woodward, 1951, pp. 61-62).  State appropriations for public 
education in Virginia “declined from $483,000 [in 1876, the last year of Reconstruction] to 
$195,000 [in 1878, the second full year following the Compromise of 1877, or the second year of 
Redemption]” (Woodward, 1951, p. 93).  In his report for 1878, the State School Superintendent 
of Virginia “doubted ‘that more than one-half as many schools will be opened’” the following 
year compared with the last school year (Woodward, 1951, p. 93).  An examination of figures 
(compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau and compiled by geographic region of the country) 
comparing state expenditures for public education during Reconstruction compared with state 
support of public education after the Redemption further illustrate the southern reaction to public 
education as a Yankee imposition (See Table 5).100 
Table 5: 





Census figures for the South Central Region show a similar rate of decline in public school 
funding as measured per capita of population, from 81¢ in 1872 to 51¢ in 1877 (Woodward, 
1951, p. 62).   
 
 1871 1880 
South Atlantic Region $ 10.27 $ 6.60 
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 The effects of the retreat from public education in the South were only too predictable.  
Literacy declined while illiteracy increased.  A southern historian of the period cited an editorial 
in the New Orleans Times-Democrat in the August 3, 1890, edition to illustrate the impact: 
Thirteen years after Redemption a Louisiana newspaper complained that 
“there is an illiterate majority to-day [sic], whereas there was none in 1880, 
that this illiteracy prevails not among the negroes alone, but among the 
whites as well.”  These were but the “natural effects of a poor public school 
system…”   (Woodward, 1951, p. 62) 
 
Following the destruction of the public school system in Tennessee by the “Redeemers,” figures 
comparing the population increase to the illiteracy increase provide further illustration of the 
damage: “[W]hile the white population had increased only 13 per cent [sic] during the preceding 
ten years, white illiteracy had increased 50 per cent [sic]” (Woodward, 1951, p. 63).  Combining 
paraphrase with quotation, Woodward used the views expressed by the Galveston Daily News, 
December 9, 1880, to portray the situation in Texas:   
Retrenchment in Texas left the people with “scarcely a decent pretense” of 
an efficient public school system.  “The sons and daughters of the poorer 
classes, except here and there in favored localities, are thus condemned … 
to grow up in ignorance.  (Woodward, 1951, p. 63) 
 
 The impact was long-lasting, even “after the pressure of the farmers’ movement had been felt” 
in 1890 and per capita expenditures for public education began increasing slightly throughout the 
South (Woodward, 1951, p. 62).  It was not “until after 1900” that the average school term across 
the South reached its Reconstruction length of 100 days (Woodward, 1951, p. 62).  Literacy, or 
rather illiteracy, figures portray the cleavage between the ex-Confederate states and the rest of 
the nation regarding support for public education (See Table 6 below).101  Paralleling literacy 
figures is the data regarding compulsory school attendance by the states.  “By 1900 all states 
outside the South, except two, had adopted some kind of compulsory school-attendance law, 
while Kentucky was the only one of the Southern states with such a law” (Woodward, 1951, p. 
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399).  It would not be until 1918 that all states would have enacted compulsory school-
attendance laws in this country (Hofstadter, p. 326).102  Reflecting the lack of value attached to 
public education in the South, 1901 figures indicated that “less than half of the children of school 
age were regularly attending them [schools]” (Woodward, 1951, p. 399).  More specifically: 
The percentage of white children of school age in daily attendance in 
Southern states ranged from 37 in Virginia to 56 in Texas, with only three 
states having more than 50 per cent [sic].  Attendance among Negro children 
ranged from 23 per cent in Texas to 46 per cent in Tennessee, and in no state 
were so many as half of them regularly in school.  (Woodward, 1951, pp. 
399-400) 
 
The southern states with the highest rates of illiteracy in 1900 were North Carolina (19.5%), 
Louisiana (17.3%), Alabama (14.8%), and Tennessee (14.2%) (Woodward, 1951, p. 400). 
Table 6: 






 Perhaps because of slavery, and perhaps because of the lack of a sizeable middle class, 
the movement for public education that developed in the northern states during the 1830s and 
1840s didn’t take hold in the South.  For psychological reasons, public education was not 
supported by southern states following the Compromise of 1877, better known in the South as 
Redemption.  Such attitudes had a significant impact lasting several generations.  The 
intermediate impact, that still enduring at the opening of the twentieth century, was summarized 
by a twentieth-century historian with southern roots: 
The public schools of the South at the opening of the new century were for 
the most part miserably supported, poorly attended, wretchedly taught, and 
 
Southern States (Whites) 12.0 % 
Southern States (Negroes) 50.0 % 
North Atlantic States 1.6 % 
United States 4.6 % 
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wholly inadequate for the education of the people.  Far behind the rest of the 
country in nearly all respects, Southern education suffered from a greater lag 
than any other public institution in the region.  (Woodward, 1951, p. 398) 
 
 Sociological undercurrents – white racism & white supremacy v. equality. 
 The country had been divided on the issue of slavery.  The twenty northern states 
opposed slavery, the four border states had recognized slavery but had ratified the Thirteenth 
Amendment ending slavery, and the eleven southern states had withdrawn from the Union in 
order to preserve the institution of slavery.103  At the same time, however, the country was fairly 
united in supporting white supremacy.  Lincoln, himself, implied as much during his debate with 
Stephen Douglas at Charleston, Illinois, when he denied favoring either social or political 
equality for African-Americans (See previous pp. 741-742 of this document).  Yet, Lincoln 
created some ambivalence on the topic with his references to the Declaration of Independence, 
asserting, as it were, a difference between socio-political rights and natural rights.  At one point, 
Lincoln declared: 
I, as well as Judge Douglas, am in favor of the race to which I belong having 
the [socially] superior position.  I have never said anything to the contrary, 
but I hold that, notwithstanding all of this, there is no reason in the world 
why the negro is not entitled to all the natural rights enumerated in the 
Declaration of Independence, the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness.  I hold that he is as much entitled to these as the white man.  
(Wills, 1992, p. 100) 
 
Earlier, Lincoln had used the founding document to argue that one could not believe in both the 
Declaration of Independence and the prejudice in favor of slavery.  According to Lincoln: 
I think the authors of that notable instrument [the Declaration of 
Independence] intended to include all men, but they did not intend to 
declare all men equal in all respects.  They did not mean to say all were 
equal in color, size, intellect, moral development, or social capacity.  They 
defined, with tolerable distinctness, in what respects they did consider all 
men equal – equal in “certain unalienable rights, among which are life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”  This they said, and this they meant.  
(Emphasis in original) (Wills, 1992, p. 100) 
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 To further illustrate the complications arising from what appear to the Twenty-first 
Century reader to be illogical, if not contradictory, positions, while the North was united 
regarding opposition to slavery, only a small handful of states in the North favored African-
American suffrage.  Unlike Lincoln, most northerners were unable to see a distinction between 
socio-political equality and the equality derived from natural rights. Of the eighteen northern 
states in the Union at the time, only five states permitted “the Northern Negroes” to vote in 1860 
on the eve of the Civil War:  “Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Maine, and Rhode 
Island” (Woodward, 1966, p. 20; also see Wiecek, p. 191; and Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 83).  
Such views created an anomaly.  While northern proponents of reconstructing the South wished 
to require southern states to give the vote to the newly freed slaves, such advocacy for the South 
did not mean that the same should occur in the North.  The hypocrisy of this approach was noted 
by a historian specializing in the Fourteenth Amendment’s formulation and adoption when he 
observed, “Advocacy of Negro suffrage for the South did not necessarily indicate approval of 
such a policy for the North” (James, 1965, p. 15). The situation was even worse regarding the 
foundation of Anglo-Saxon law, the right to be tried by a jury of ones peers as opposed to royal 
or ecclesiastical figureheads: 
By custom or by law Negroes were excluded from jury service throughout 
the North.  Only in Massachusetts, and there not until 1855, were they 
admitted as jurors.  Five Western states prohibited Negro testimony in cases 
where a white man was a party.  (Woodward, 1966, p. 20) 
 
As will be shown, on the issue of suffrage, the political needs of the northern Republicans to 
remain in power would trump the sociological views of white racism wishing to deny black 
people the vote – at least during the heyday of Reconstruction. 
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 While most modern Americans associate the system known as Jim Crow with the 
southern states and with the racial segregation legalized by Plessy v. Ferguson, Jim Crow was 
actually a northern invention before it developed full blossom in the South.   Professor 
Woodward first drew attention to this peculiarity in his seminal work, The Strange Career of Jim 
Crow.  According to Woodward: 
Segregation in complete and fully developed form did grow up 
contemporaneously with slavery but not in its midst.  One of the strangest 
things about the career of Jim Crow was that the system was born in the 
North and reached an advanced age before moving South in force.  
(Woodward, 1966, p. 17) 
 
Woodward discovered that the French observer of early American life, Alexis de Tocqueville, 
had been surprised “at the depth of racial bias he encountered in the North” (Woodward, 1966, p. 
20).  According to Tocqueville: 
The prejudice of race appears to be stronger in the states that have abolished 
slavery than in those where it still exists; and nowhere is it so intolerant as in 
those states where servitude has never been known.  (Woodward, 1966, p. 
20) 
 
Although slavery had been abolished in every northern state by 1830, a system of segregation 
“permeated all aspects of Negro life in the free states by 1860” (Woodward, 1966, p. 18).  
Describing the system of Jim Crow in the North and why it developed as it did, Woodward 
observed: 
[T]he Northern Negro was made painfully and constantly aware that he 
lived in a society dedicated to the doctrine of white supremacy and Negro 
inferiority.  The major political parties … vied with each other in their 
devotion to this doctrine….  Their constituencies firmly believed that the 
Negroes were incapable of being assimilated politically, socially, or 
physically into white society.  They made sure in numerous ways that the 
Negro understood his ‘place’ and that he was severely confined to it.  
(Woodward, 1966, p. 18) 
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While Horace Greeley had advised young whites to “Go west,” such encouragement was not 
advisable for African-Americans, young or old.  According to Professor Woodward’s analysis, 
“[T]he farther west the Negro went in the free states the harsher he found the proscription and 
segregation” (Woodward, 1966, p. 18).  Woodward continued his explanation of this 
phenomenon: 
Indiana, Illinois, and Oregon incorporated in their constitutions provisions 
restricting the admission of Negroes to their borders, and most states carved 
from the old Northwest Territory either barred Negroes in some degree or 
required that they post bond guaranteeing good behavior.  (Woodward, 
1966, pp. 19-20) 
 
A British historian analyzed why African-Americans didn’t flood the North after gaining their 
freedom.  One explanation he offered was racial discrimination.  As he described it: 
In fact one of the reasons why the North saw so few blacks was that they 
were not allowed to compete for good Northern jobs.  They were excluded 
from the rising labour [sic] unions, and so from the factories, except as 
strike-breakers recruited by the factory owners, which of course did not 
increase their popularity.  (Brogan, p. 374) 
 
Throughout the North, “Negroes found themselves systematically separated from whites” 
(Woodward, 1966, p. 18). 
[Northern Negroes] were either excluded from railway cars, omnibuses, 
stagecoaches, and steamboats or assigned to special “Jim Crow” sections; 
they sat, when permitted, in secluded and remote corners of theaters and 
lecture halls; they could not enter most hotels, restaurants, and resorts, 
except as servants; they prayed in “Negro pews” in the white churches, and 
if partaking of the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper, they waited until the 
whites had been served the bread and wine.  (Woodward, 1966, pp. 18-19) 
 
 The results of ballot initiatives in the immediate aftermath of the war to end slavery bears 
out the prejudice of whites towards blacks.   
In 1865 Wisconsin [and] Minnesota defeated proposals to allow the Negroes 
to vote, and the Nebraska constitution of 1866 confined suffrage to whites.  
New Jersey and Ohio in 1867 and Michigan and Pennsylvania in 1868 
turned down proposals for Negro suffrage.  (Woodward, 1960, 1968, p. 91) 
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The hypocrisy of these defeats was noted by an Iowa Republican following the rejection of 
election measures and after failed attempts at state conventions to extend the ballot to African-
Americans in Iowa.  As described by a historian specializing in the Fourteenth Amendment: 
[I]n 1865 the Iowa election largely turned on the issue of the black vote for 
that state as the voters overwhelmingly repudiated extending the vote to 
blacks.  As late as 1867 the lieutenant governor asked the Republican state 
convention, “How can you insist that loyal negroes shall vote in South 
Carolina, when you refuse to allow colored soldiers of your own Iowa 
colored regiment to vote here?”  (James, 1984, p. 231) 
 
Also in the fall of 1865, Connecticut voters rejected “the issue of Negro suffrage” (James, 1965, 
p. 16).  To summarize, in the fall of the year following the conclusion of the Civil War, ballot 
initiatives to extend the franchise to black Americans failed in Connecticut, Iowa, Minnesota, 
and Wisconsin.  Two years later white voters in New Jersey and Ohio refused to let free blacks 
vote in their states, and one year after this failure, white citizens voted to deny suffrage for 
African-Americans in Michigan and Pennsylvania.  After five years of bloody conflict, and after 
three more years of arguments about reconstructing the South, there still remained only five 
states in which black people could vote, all of which were situated in New England where only 
6% of “Northern Negroes lived,” a figure meaning that 94% of “Northern Negroes” remained 
disenfranchised by white voters (Woodward, 1966, p. 20).  This situation was not lost on astute 
contemporary observers of the American electorate: 
[Regarding the issue of Negro suffrage] Secretary McCulloch flatly 
informed [Senator Charles] Sumner [of Massachusetts] that, in his opinion, 
if the Republican party went into an election on the suffrage issue, the 
opposition would win in three-fourths of the Northern states.  (James, 1965, 
p. 15) 
 
 Emergence of the fourteenth amendment. 
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 With the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, the three-fifths compromise in the 
Constitution would be nullified.  That paragraph would now read: 
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several 
States which may be included within this Union, according to their 
respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole 
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of 
Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.  
(U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 2, ¶ 3) 
 
While the Thirteenth Amendment was not officially adopted by the states until later in 1865, its 
successful adoption was not doubted.  However, its adoption would mean that once the defeated 
southern states were readmitted to the Union, the increased number of citizens (each of the 
former slaves now counted as one person instead of three-fifths of a person) would increase the 
number of southern Representatives in the House.  Estimates revealed that “the South would be 
entitled to at least fifteen new representatives” (James, 1965, p. 22).  Republican fears of what 
would then ensue were articulated by Senator Grimes of Iowa on September 14, 1865: 
We all know that the Democratic party desire and intend to coalesce with 
the returned rebels from the South.  By that means, if they can succeed in 
distracting the supporters of the Government and secure a few Northern 
States, they hope to obtain control of the government, and then will follow 
the assumption of the rebel debt, the restoration of slavery under a less 
odious name, and the return of leaders of the rebellion to power.  (James, 
1965, p. 26) 
 
The practicality of how the increased representation from southern states was spelled out by the 
Chicago Tribune on August 5, 1865, and provided just cause for the alarm articulated by Senator 
Grimes.  Professor James paraphrased the Chicago Tribune’s forecast: 
Without [black] votes…, ex-rebels would immediately gain control of the 
government.  The increased Southern delegation would need only twenty-
nine cooperating Northern votes to dominate the House.  Just where most of 
those needed votes were to be found the Tribune pointed out precisely:  nine 
or ten in New York, five or six in Pennsylvania, at least three in New Jersey, 
three in Ohio, three in Illinois, and one in Wisconsin.  (James, 1965, p. 22) 
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A reading of the Fourteenth Amendment as ratified by the states shows that these fears were 
eventually addressed by the text of that amendment (See Appendix S).  However, prior to the 
development of the Fourteenth Amendment, Republicans pinned their hopes on suffrage for 
African-American adult males.   
Of all the movements influencing the Fourteenth Amendment …, that for 
Negro suffrage was the most outstanding….  The cry for a changed basis of 
representation was, in reality, subsidiary to this, and was meant by Radicals 
to secure in another way what Negro suffrage might accomplish for them: 
removal of the danger of Democratic dominance as a consequence of 
Southern restoration.  The danger of possible repudiation of the national 
obligations, and assumption of the rebel debt, was invariable presented to 
show the need for Negro suffrage or a new basis of representation.  
Sentiment for disqualification of ex-Confederates, though a natural growth, 
well suited such purposes.  (James, 1965, p. 33) 
 
However, these hopes were dashed by northern voters in the state elections of 1865 when the 
question of African-American suffrage was soundly rejected in several states (James, 1965, pp. 
33, 185, 189).  Dealing with the political reality of the time, Republicans eventually adjusted 
during the opening months of the first session of the Thirty-ninth Congress in December, 1865.  
As described by Professor James, “The movement to guarantee civil rights, sponsored originally 
by the more conservative Republicans, received emphasis from Radicals only when state 
elections indicated that suffrage would not serve as a party platform” (James, 1965, p. 33).  
Divided on the question of voting rights for black citizens, Republicans in the Thirty-ninth 
Congress united to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866 over the veto of President Johnson and 
approved the Fourteenth Amendment that was subsequently submitted to the states for 
ratification and eventual adoption. 
 The Fourteenth Amendment first originated in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction 
and formed a part of that committee’s plan for reconstructing the rebellious southern states.  The 
Guarantee Clause provided the justification for the Reconstruction program that eventually 
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emerged, of which the Fourteenth Amendment formed an integral part.  Articulated in a 
resolution proposed by Representative John Broomall of Pennsylvania that was subsequently 
adopted, the resolution stated: 
That whenever the people of any state are thus deprived of all civil 
government [by rebellion] [sic], it becomes the duty of Congress, by 
appropriate legislation, to enable them to organize a state government, and 
in the language of the Constitution, to guarantee to such state a republican 
form of government.  (Wiecek, p. 199) 
 
  What eventually became the Fourteenth Amendment was first developed by an Indiana 
reformer, Robert Dale Owen, who acted “as a kind of liaison between certain congressmen and 
several reform groups” (James, 1965, p. 56).  Having previously shown his proposal to Governor 
Morton of Indiana and several other friends, Owen then visited Representative Thaddeus Stevens 
of Pennsylvania and read it to him “aloud” (James, 1965, p. 100).  Owens then suggested that it 
be shown individually to members of the Reconstruction Committee before it was officially 
introduced to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, a proposal to which Stevens agreed.  
Following this, Congressman Stevens subsequently introduced Owen’s proposed amendment to 
the Joint Committee on April 21, 1866 (James, 1965, p. 103).  Owen’s proposal read: 
 Section 1.  No discrimination shall be made by any State, nor by the 
United States, as to the civil rights of persons, because of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude. 
 Section 2.  From and after the fourth day of July, eighteen hundred 
and seventy-six, no discrimination shall be made in any State nor by the 
United States, as to the enjoyment, by classes of persons, of the right of 
suffrage, because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
 Section 3.  Until the fourth day of July, eighteen hundred and 
seventy-six, no class of persons, as to the right of any of whom to suffrage, 
discrimination shall be made by any State, because of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude, shall be included in the basis of 
representation. 
 Section 4.  Debts incurred in aid of insurrection, or of war against the 
Union, and claims of compensation for loss of involuntary service or labor, 
shall not be paid by any State nor by the United States. 
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 Section 5.  Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article.  (James, 1965, p. 100) 
 
 Representative John Bingham of Ohio then moved to amend the first section of Owen’s 
proposal by adding the phrase “… nor shall any state deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws, nor take private property for public use without just 
compensation” (James, 1965, p. 103).  With three members absent, Bingham’s amendment failed 
5-7 (James, 1965, p. 103).  Following further discussion and votes on other amendments to 
Owen’s proposal, Representative Bingham proposed  to insert the following proposal in the fifth 
section: 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any 
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.  (James, 
1965, p. 104) 
 
Adopted 10-2 by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Bingham later explained the origin of 
his amendment – his reading of Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Barron v. Baltimore (James, 
1965, p. 104).  Some five years later, the Representative from Ohio explained: 
I had read – and that is what induced me to attempt to impose by 
constitutional amendments new limitations upon the power of the States – 
the great decision of Marshall in Barron vs. the Mayor and City Council of 
Baltimore, wherein the chief justice [sic] said, in obedience to his official 
oath and the constitution [sic] as it then was: “The amendments contain no 
expression indicating an intention to apply them to the State governments.  
This court [sic] cannot so apply them.”  (James, 1965, p. 104) 
 
Professor James provided additional information into Representative Bingham’s thinking: 
On further examination of Marshall’s opinion in the Barron case, Bingham 
said that he had particularly noticed the following reference to the first eight 
amendments:  “Had the framers of these amendments intended them to be 
limitations on the powers of the State governments, they would have 
imitated the framers of the original constitution and have expressed that 
intention.”  “Acting upon this suggestion,” continued Bingham, “I did 
imitate the framers of the original Constitution.  As they had said ‘no State 
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shall…, imitating their example and imitating it to the letter, I prepared the 
provision of the first section of the fourteenth amendment [sic] as it stands 
in the constitution [sic].”  (James, 1965, p. 105) 
 
This is how the matter stood on Saturday, April 21, 1866, when the Joint Committee on 
Reconstruction adjourned (James, 1965, p. 107). 
 Following more discussion and more changes to Owen’s original proposal, the Joint 
Committee voted on Saturday, April 28, 1866, “to report the amendment” to both houses of 
Congress on Monday, April 30th (James, 1965, p. 115).  A copy of the proposed amendment was 
released to the press, “which appeared in the leading newspapers the next day (Sunday, April 
29)” (James, 1965, p. 115).  What appeared follows: 
 Section 1.  No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
 Section 2.  Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States which may be included within this Union according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, 
excluding Indians not taxed.  But whenever in any State the elective 
franchise shall be denied to any portion of its male citizens not less than 
twenty-one years of age, or in any way abridged, except for participation in 
rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation in such State shall be 
reduced in the proportion which the number of male citizens shall bear to 
the whole number of such male citizens not less than twenty-one years of 
age. 
 Section 3.  Until the 4th day of July, in the year 1870, all persons 
who voluntarily adhered to the late insurrection, giving it aid and comfort, 
shall be excluded from the right to vote for Representatives in Congress and 
for electors for President and Vice-President of the United States. 
 Section 4.  Neither the united States nor any State shall assume or 
pay any debt or obligation already incurred, or which may hereafter be 
incurred, in aid of insurrection or of war against the United States, or any 
claim for compensation for the loss of involuntary service or labor. 
 Section 5.  The Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate 
legislation the provisions of this article.  (James, 1965, pp. 115-116) 
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After much debate and analysis, the House of Representatives voted 128-37 on May 9, 1866, to 
approve the amendment submitted on April 30th to the full legislative chamber by the Joint 
Committee on Reconstruction (James, 1965, p. 131).   Reporting the event in his diary, Lester 
Ward declared, “The most important political event of the week is the passage by the House of 
Representatives of the Constitutional Amendment offered by the Reconstruction Committee” 
(James, 1965, p. 131).   
 Senator Howard of Michigan introduced the proposed amendment on Wednesday, May 
23, 1866.  In introducing the proposal from the Joint Committee, Howard reviewed the extensive 
hearings conducted by the Joint Committee prior to beginning work on the amendment, 
characterizing the work as an “attempt to arrive at the facts by hearing and digesting an 
enormous amount of testimony” (James, 1965, p. 135).  Professor James paraphrased Senator 
Howard’s description of the Joint Committee’s findings: 
The evidence, said Howard, indicated the necessity of a constitutional 
amendment to restore peace, to invigorate the laws, and to give security 
against the recurrence of evil times from which the nation was only then 
emerging.  The proposal before the Senate had been framed to achieve these 
ends.  (James, 1965, p. 136) 
 
Following Senator Howard’s presentation, numerous amendments were offered, but no action 
was reported.  Senate Republicans subsequently began meeting in caucus to discuss changes to 
the House proposal.  At the fourth caucus on Monday afternoon of May 28th, “the five 
Republican senators on the Joint Committee were appointed to put into writing the views of the 
caucus” (James, 1965, p. 141).  On the following morning, Senator Fessenden presented the 
committee’s work to the caucus.  Professor James reported, “In less than an hour, it was adopted 
with only minor alterations” (James, 1965, p. 141).   
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 That same day, May 29, 1866, Senator Howard reported to the full Senate the changes 
made to the House proposal by the Republican caucus.  Debate raged for several days.  On May 
30th, Senator James Doolittle of Wisconsin, a Republican who had not attended the caucus 
meetings of the Senate Republicans, proposed the addition of the phrase “excluding Indians not 
taxed” to the section dealing with the apportionment of Representatives for each state (James, 
1965, p. 143).  Professor James described the ensuing discussion: 
On the meaning and merits of this phrase, Howard, Trumbull, and Johnson 
entered into a long legal discussion.  Western senators were especially 
interested in the possible practical effects of any such language on the 
Indians within their boundaries or in the territories.  Apostles of racial 
equality for the black man were sometimes not so sure about the red.  Race 
relations had a long history in the United States, and to question inferiority 
of either non-white race was still a new idea to most people.  (James, 1965, 
p. 143) 
 
On Friday, June 8, 1866, the Senate voted on the version developed in the Senate Republican 
caucus as amended by Senator Doolittle’s proposed insertion.  This version became the 
Fourteenth Amendment (See Appendix S for specific language).  With five senators not voting, 
the proposed amendment passed by the two-thirds margin required.  The final tally was 33-11 
(James, 1965, p. 149).  If one considers that twenty-two senators from the eleven seceded 
southern states did not participate, the victory is all the more remarkable, particularly given the 
mid-twentieth century legal applications made according to the terms of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Voting on the Senate’s version, the House of Representatives voted 
overwhelmingly to approve, 120-32 (James, 1965, p. 151). 
 Within a year of being submitted to the state legislatures for ratification, twenty of the 
twenty-one Union states had ratified, the single exemption being California which refused to take 
any action (See Appendix T).  All four border states rejected the Fourteenth Amendment along 
with ten of the eleven seceded southern states – Tennessee, being the exception, ratified the 
   
   
776
Amendment slightly more than a month after both the Senate and House votes approved it (See 
Appendix T).  The Fourteenth Amendment was officially declared to be ratified by Secretary of 
State William H. Seward on July 21, 1868 (James, 1984, p. 298).  
  The impact of the Fourteenth Amendment upon the 1866 elections “proved the strength 
of Radicals in 1866” (James, 1965, p. 178).  The overwhelming popularity of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the North as reflected in both the 1866 election results and the successful 
ratification campaign, in conjunction with the overwhelming rejection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by the seceded Southern states, combined to force a tougher federal policy towards 
the South.  Professor James summarized the events: 
After provisional governments of the Southern states established under 
executive authority [by President Johnson] had rejected the Fourteenth 
Amendment, though they had recently approved the Thirteenth, they were 
replaced by governments under military control established by authority of 
congressional statutes.  These governments, which were not privileged to 
participate in ordinary federal legislation, finally succumbed to pressure and 
ratified the proposed amendment to the most fundamental law of the land.  
(James, 1965, p. 192) 
 
 What eventually became the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
initially urged by William Goodell, described as “an amazingly prolific author, pamphleteer, and 
editor” (Wiecek, p. 160).   Goodell, however, connected the equal protection of the laws to 
the Guarantee Clause.  Arguing in 1845 that the bills of rights in the various state constitutions 
and the Declaration of Independence “make the very pith and essence of a republican 
government to consist in the protection and security of those rights” (Wiecek, p. 161).  As a 
result, he viewed the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution as “a positive command to the states 
to protect the freedoms and civil liberties of their people” (Wiecek, p. 161).  Originally a part of 
the Free Soil movement, in 1847 Goodell declared the Southern system of slavery to be “illegal 
and unconstitutional, and that the federal government [was] bound to secure its abolition by the 
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guaranty [sic], to every state in this Union, of a republican form of government” (Wiecek, p. 
162).  Rejected by the Free Soil movement regarding the abolition of slavery, Goodell and his 
group formed the “Liberty Party Abolitionists” (Wiecek, p. 162).  Changing their name in 1860 
to the Free Constitutionalists, “[t]heir 1860 platform strikingly anticipated the later Radical 
Republicans’ citizenship/due process/equal protection/ privileges-and-immunities approach 
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment” (Wiecek, p. 163).  Dr. Wiecek, then Associate 
Professor of History at the University of Missouri, continued: 
Citing the guarantee clause as a means of asserting federal supremacy over 
the states, they [the Free Constitutionalists] argued that a republican form of 
government implies something more than merely representative 
government; it requires that “at least all the members of the republic shall 
enjoy the protection of the laws,” so that the federal government is obliged 
to see to it that each state extends to all its citizens, including the enslaved 
blacks, the protection of law.  (Wiecek, pp. 163-164) 
 
Commenting on the situation presented by the Free Constitutionalists, Professor Wiecek 
observed, “[T]he theorists who placed their chief hopes on the guarantee clause as a way of 
destroying slavery in the states were complete failures” (Wiecek, pp. 164-165).  Continuing, he 
noted the irony presented by Goodell and the Free Constitutionalists, the Civil War, and 
Reconstruction: 
Yet after slavery was destroyed by other means – under the war powers of 
the commander in chief and by constitutional amendment – the Goodell 
sect’s arguments were repeated and echoed by the Republicans they 
excoriated in the fifties as the constitutional justification for Radical 
Reconstruction.  (Wiecek, p. 165) 
 
Case Law of the Fourteenth Amendment 
The equal protection clause: Foundational & regarding education as a fundamental 
right. 
 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 
 Facts & procedural history. 
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 The nomenclature, Civil Rights Cases, actually refers to five singular cases that were 
grouped by the 1883 Supreme Court because of their common subject matter, that being the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875, which was titled “An Act to protect all citizens in their civil and legal rights” 
(p. 4).  The major thrust of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was to outlaw racial discrimination by 
owners/operators of public conveyances and accommodations throughout the country, or as the 
attorneys and both the majority and dissenting opinions of the Court referred to them, “inns, 
public conveyances, and theatres” (pp. 9-10).  Section one of the 1875 Civil Rights Act 
articulated what was to be achieved by the act: 
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled 
to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, 
facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, 
theatres, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the 
conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to 
citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of 
servitude.  (p. 9) 
 
Section two of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 specified the penalties for anyone violating the act, 
penalties that included indemnifying the person denied the equal protection of the law as well as 
paying an additional fine or serving time in jail.  According to Section two: 
That any person who shall violate the foregoing section by denying to any 
citizen, except for reasons by law applicable to citizens of every race and 
color, and regardless of any previous condition of servitude, the full 
enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or 
privileges in said section enumerated, or by aiding or inciting such denial, 
shall for every such offence [sic] forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred 
dollars to the person aggrieved thereby, to be recovered in an action of debt, 
with full costs; and shall also, for every such offence [sic], be deemed guilty 
of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not less than 
fiver hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, or shall be imprisoned not 
less than thirty days nor more than one year.  (p. 9) 
 
 Of the five cases, two dealt with denial of access to theaters (by Ryan in San Francisco 
and by Singleton in New York City), two dealt with denial of accommodations (by Stanley in 
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Kansas and by Nichols in Missouri), and one sought to recover damages under Section two of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 for being denied use of the ladies car on a train (by officials of the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad Company in Tennessee).  Four of the lawsuits were brought 
by federal officials against the racist defendants while in the fifth lawsuit, the victims brought 
action against the railroad to recover damages under the law for being denied the equal 
protection of the law by railway company officials.   
 Because of the variance in locations whereby public officials violated the provisions of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 by denying individuals the equal protection of the law, the five 
individual cases reached the Supreme Court through differing federal circuit courts for somewhat 
different reasons.  Two of the cases gained a hearing before the Court by means of a Writ of 
Error while three of the lawsuits arrived before the Court as a result of a Certificate of Division 
because the circuit justices could not reach agreement on the constitutionality of the matter 
before the circuit bench.  Regarding the subject matter of denial of public theater 
accommodations, United States v. Ryan reached the Court on a Writ of Error to the Circuit Court 
for the District of California while United States v. Singleton appeared before the Court on a 
Certificate of Division from the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York.  Regarding 
the subject matter of denial of lodging accommodations, United States v. Stanley arrived before 
the Court on a Certificate of Division from the Circuit Court for the District of Kansas while 
United States v. Nichols reached the Court on a Certificate of Division from the Circuit Court for 
the Western District of Missouri.  Finally, Robinson & Wife v. Memphis and Charleston 
Railroad Company arrived before the Court by means of a Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for 
the Western District of Tennessee.  All five cases were uniform in that both plaintiffs and 
   
   
780
defendants agreed that denial of use of public transportation, of lodging accommodations, and of 
theater access occurred by reason of race. 
 Legal questions. 
 First, do the first and second sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 fall within the 
constitutional protections of the Thirteenth Amendment?  Second, are the first and second 
sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 constitutionally authorized by the Fourteenth 
Amendment?  Third, are the equal accommodations in inns, public conveyances and places of 
public amusement “rights that are constitutionally demandable” (p. 4)? 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 The legal reasoning of defendants in the Civil Rights Cases was not presented in the 
official report of the case.  According to the Court’s report, no attorneys appeared before the 
Court to represent four of the five defendants, and no briefs were filed by attorneys for the 
defendants in four of the five individual cases grouped together under the heading of Civil Rights 
Cases.  An attorney did appear before the Court on behalf of the defendants in error, the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad Company; however, his legal arguments were not presented in 
the official record of the Court. 
 It may be assumed that the four unrepresented defendants relied upon: a) the social and 
political realities of the period in which the events occurred; and/or b) the arguments presented 
by defense attorneys for the railroad; and/or c) the discussions recorded by the various circuit 
courts forwarded to the High Court as a result of the two forms of writs issued.  Although not 
officially reported by the Court, defendants’ legal arguments may be deduced from the majority 
Court’s ruling which acted to exonerate all of the defendants in the five separate cases.  Owing to 
this situation, detailed discussion of the defendants’ legal reasoning will be reserved for the 
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section in which the Court’s rationale is presented for the majority opinion.  Briefly, however, it 
can safely be stated that defendants argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was unconstitutional 
as it overstepped the provisions of both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
 The legal reasoning of plaintiffs in the Civil Rights Cases was presented by the Solicitor 
General of the United States and by an attorney representing Mr. and Mrs. Robinson.  The 
Solicitor General reviewed seventeen previous decisions of the Court bearing upon the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Those decisions ruled that the Thirteenth Amendment 
prohibited all forms of involuntary personal servitude.  The Thirteenth Amendment viewed in 
conjunction with both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were to be interpreted “as 
advancing constitutional rights previously existing” (Emphasis in original) (p. 6).   The restraints 
of the Fourteenth Amendment upon state actions to deny due process and equal protection of the 
laws to individuals included all state executive, legislative, and judicial agencies.  Therefore the 
Fourteenth Amendment justified congressional action designed to punish violations of the rights 
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Solicitor General concluded by identifying the 
“right of locomotion” as a basic “element of personal liberty” first protected by English common 
law and subsequently by American case law arising after the adoption of the Constitution (p. 6).  
The Solicitor General next tied denial of that right to the system of slavery existing in America 
prior to the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.  According to the Solicitor General: 
Restraint upon the right of locomotion was a well-known feature of the 
slavery abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment.  A first requisite of the 
right to appropriate the use of another man was to become the master of his 
natural power of motion, and, by a mayhem therein of the common law to 
require the whole community to be on the alert to restrain that power.  (pp. 
6-7) 
 
All of the cases in the Civil Rights Cases interfered unlawfully with the right to locomotion.  In 
doing so, they were not acting as private individuals but were acting in an arena “devoted to a 
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public use” (p. 6).  Acting in such a field of public interest made it a “State interest” (p. 6).  As 
such, the activities were prohibited by both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
 Legal counsel for the Robinsons cited the Court’s own case law in support of the 
following principle: “Where the Constitution guarantees a right, Congress is empowered to pass 
the legislation appropriate to give effect to that right” (p. 7).  The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was 
passed to give effect to the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and as such “was 
within the principles just announced” (p. 8).  Finally, the attorney for Mr. and Mrs. Robinson 
cited the following from Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, regarding the public good and its 
intersection with private property whereby it becomes a public or state interest: 
Under the powers inherent in every sovereignty, a government may regulate 
the conduct of its citizens toward each other, and, when necessary for the 
public good, the manner in which each shall use his own property. 
 
It has, in the exercise of these powers, been customary in England from time 
immemorial, and in this country from its first colonization, to regulate 
ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, 
etc. 
 
When the owner of property devotes it to a use in which the public has an 
interest, he in effect grants to the public an interest in such use, and must, to 
the extent of that interest, submit to be controlled by the public, for the 
common good, as long as he maintains the use.  (p. 8) 
 
According to the existing precedents contained within the Court’s case law, none of the 
defendants were acting in a private capacity since the nature of their business made it a public, 
i.e., state, interest and thus bound by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution. 
 Holding & disposition. 
 Justice Bradley delivered the Court’s majority opinion.  Focusing on the constitutionality 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the Court majority held that neither the Thirteenth Amendment 
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or the Fourteenth Amendment provided constitutional authorization for the congressional 
enactment of the first and second sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875.  Since the amended 
Constitution provided no authority for congressional action, sections one and two of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875 were declared to be unconstitutional by the Court majority.  As a result the 
indictments of all defendants involved in the five consolidated cases comprising the Civil Rights 
Cases were voided. 
 Court’s rationale. 
 Justice Bradley’s majority opinion first addressed the Fourteenth Amendment claims 
supporting the Civil Rights Act of 1875 and acknowledged that the  
views and arguments of distinguished Senators, advanced whilst the law was 
under consideration, claiming authority to pass it by virtue of that 
amendment, are the principal arguments adduced in favor of the power [to 
pass the 1875 Civil Rights Act].  (p. 10) 
 
The Court’s majority did not, however, address the views and arguments of congressional 
legislators who first legislated what subsequently became the Fourteenth Amendment.  Ignoring 
the intentions of legislators who developed the Fourteenth Amendment and further dismissing 
the thoughts of legislators who enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the Court’s majority 
opinion observed, “But the responsibility of an independent judgment is now thrown upon this 
court; and we are bound to exercise it according to the best lights we have” (p. 10).  Neither did 
the Court majority address the case law presented by the U.S. Solicitor General, some seventeen 
(17) U.S. Supreme Court cases.  Nor did the Court address the points of law presented by the 
Solicitor General regarding the Court’s case law.  In addition, neither did the Court address the 
case law, firmly anchored in the English common law, regarding the elemental right of 
locomotion for free people.  Nor did the Court address the case law precedents put forth by the 
attorney for the Robinsons, most notably the Court’s exposition of the legal proposition in Prigg 
   
   
784
v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that Congress may enact legislation “for the protection of 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution” (p. 29).   Neither, finally, did the Court majority address 
the issue raised by the Solicitor General regarding the public nature of private businesses 
engaged in transportation, lodging, and amusement.  Had the Court addressed any of the legal 
items just cited or followed its own procedures in addressing the legislative intent of 
constitutional enactments and amendments as well as judicial precedents, the Court would have 
been forced to a different conclusion from what it, in actuality, did reach.   
 Noting that the Court majority ignored its own procedures and precedents, the question is 
raised, “How then did the Court proceed?”  By using blinders that allowed it to ignore the afore-
mentioned procedures, precedents, and points of law raised by attorneys appearing before the 
highest bench in the land, the Court majority devised a narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in such a way that the opinion “largely mandated the withdrawal of the federal 
government from civil rights enforcement,” an action that “would not be reversed until after 
World War II” (Hall, 1992, p. 149).  One legal scholar summarized the full impact of the Court 
majority’s decision in the Civil Rights Cases: 
[T]he Civil Rights Cases fashioned a Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence 
considerably less protective of individual rights than many of its framers had 
envisioned.  The extent to which the Court’s narrow reading of Fourteenth 
Amendment protections helped usher in and foster the era of extensive 
segregation in southern and other states is open to debate.  (Hall, 1992, p. 
149) 
 
A noted historian specializing in the period of American history during which the Civil Rights 
Cases was situated offered a less sanguine judgment about the subsequent impact of that decision 
upon the resulting development of segregation as bolstered by Jim Crow laws.  Noting that the 
North and the South were never “very far apart on race policy,” and commenting on the political 
process of reconciliation between the two sections as a “cumulative weakening of resistance to 
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racism” on the part of northerners, C. Vann Woodward, Professor of History at Yale University, 
drew attention to the increased articles in the northern press centered on “white supremacy” and 
noted its significance for the rights of black people: 
Such expressions [of white supremacy] doubtless did much to add to the 
reconciliation of North and South, but they did so at the expense of the 
Negro.  Just as the Negro gained his emancipation and new rights through a 
falling out between white men, he now stood to lose his rights through the 
reconciliation of white men.  (Woodward, 1966, p. 70) 
 
Professor Woodward then discussed the nexus of such events to the Court by specifically 
referencing the Civil Rights Cases as a major point situated on a continuum beginning with the 
Slaughter House Cases (1873) and culminating in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896): 
The cumulative weakening of resistance to racism was expressed also in a 
succession of decisions by the United States Supreme Court between 1873 
and 1898 that require no review here.  In the Slaughter House Cases of 
1873…, the court drastically curtailed the privileges and immunities 
recognized as being under federal protection.  It continued the trend in its 
decision on the Civil Rights Cases of 1883 by virtually nullifying the 
restrictive parts of the Civil Rights Act.  (Woodward, 1966, pp. 70-71) 
 
Specifically describing the Court’s holding in the Civil Rights Cases, Vann Woodward 
commented: 
[T]he court held that the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress power to 
restrain states but not individuals from acts of racial discrimination and 
segregation.  The court, like the [northern] liberals, was engaged in a bit of 
reconciliation – reconciliation between federal and state jurisdiction, as well 
as between North and South, reconciliation also achieved at the Negro’s 
expense.  (Woodward, 1966, p. 71) 
 
 In the Civil Rights Cases the narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
fashioned by first quoting the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, after which Justice 
Bradley’s majority opinion opined: 
It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited.  Individual 
invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment….  
It nullifies and makes void all State legislation, and State action of every 
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kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States…   (p. 11) 
 
Justice Bradley’s majority opinion then proceeded to mischaracterize the Civil Rights Act of 
1875 as a type of municipal code in the following manner: 
It [the Fourteenth Amendment] does not invest Congress with power to 
legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of State legislation; but 
to provide modes of relief against legislation, or State action, of the kind 
referred to.  It does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law 
for the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against 
the operation of state laws…  (p. 11) 
 
Furthermore, according to the Court majority, until such state laws were enacted, which are 
“adverse to the rights of citizens,” congressional action cannot “be called into activity” (p. 13).   
And once again, the Court majority took advantage of the opportunity to mischaracterize the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875 as a type of municipal code that is not authorized by the Constitution: 
Such legislation [that arising from the authority of the Fourteenth 
Amendment] cannot properly cover the whole domain of rights appertaining 
to life, liberty and property, defining them and providing for their 
vindication.  That would be to establish a code of municipal law regulative 
of all private rights between man and man in society.  It would be to make 
Congress take the place of the State legislatures and to supersede them.  (p. 
13) 
 
What if the Court should allow such legislation as the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to remain part of 
the body of the nation’s laws?  Using the slippery slope propaganda technique to create a straw 
man (See Appendix M), Justice Bradley’s majority opinion addressed just such a possibility: 
If this legislation [the Civil Rights Act of 1875] for enforcing the 
prohibitions of the amendment [the Fourteenth Amendment], it is difficult to 
wee where it is to stop.  Why may not Congress with equal show of 
authority enact a code of laws for the enforcement and vindication of all 
rights of life, liberty, and property?  (p. 14) 
 
And, having created the straw man, the Court majority then struck him down with yet another 
constitutional argument based on the Tenth Amendment.  In the process, the Court majority 
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created a false premise in discussing the theoretical assumption upon which they claimed the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875 was based.  According to the Justice Bradley’s majority opinion: 
The truth is, that the implication of a power to legislate in this manner is 
based upon the assumption that if the States are forbidden to legislate or act 
in a particular way on a particular subject, and power is conferred upon 
Congress to enforce the prohibition, this gives Congress power to legislate 
generally upon that subject…  The assumption is certainly unsound.  It is 
repugnant to the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, which declares that 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people.  
(pp. 14-15) 
 
 Forced to deal with the fact that the Court had recently declared section four of the 1875 
Civil Rights Act to be constitutional (a case heard by the Court of which Bradley was a member, 
but a case heard before Justice Bradley played the leading, and deciding, role in the infamous 
Compromise of 1877104), Justice Bradley’s majority opinion spent the next five pages of the 
opinion attempting to differentiate between “corrective legislation” (acceptable to the Court) and 
laws that “regulate” (not acceptable unless covering a subject specifically mentioned in Article I, 
Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, whereupon Congress has “direct and plenary powers of 
legislation over the whole subject”).105  In the process, Justice Bradley’s majority opinion drew 
an incorrect analogy between the Civil Rights Act of 1875 and contract law, a maneuver that was 
pointed out in Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion discussed in the next section of this case. 
 Regarding the Thirteenth Amendment, Justice Bradley’s majority opinion sought to 
create two classes of rights by interpreting Congressional intent in passing the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 enacted subsequent to the Thirteenth Amendment, but prior to the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  According to Justice Bradley and the Court majority: 
Congress did not assume, under the authority given by the Thirteenth 
Amendment, to adjust what may be called the social rights of men and races 
in the community; but only to declare and vindicate those fundamental 
rights which appertain to the essence of citizenship, and the enjoyment or 
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deprivation of which constitutes the essential distinction between freedom 
and slavery.  (p. 22) 
 
Referencing its previous distinction between corrective and regulatory legislation at the federal 
level, the Court’s majority opinion proceeded to use that distinction to differentiate the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.  According to the majority opinion, “The amendments 
are different, and the powers of Congress under them are different” (p. 23).  Justice Bradley 
explained the Court majority’s reasoning: 
Under the Thirteenth Amendment, the legislation … may be direct and 
primary, operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by State 
legislation or not; under the Fourteenth, as we have already shown, it must 
necessarily be, and can only be, corrective in its character, addressed to 
counteract and afford relief against State regulations or proceedings.  (p. 23) 
 
Having separated what had not been separate in the minds of the framers of the two 
constitutional amendments, Justice Bradley’s majority opinion stated what it viewed as the 
critical question: 
The only question under the present head, therefore, is, whether the refusal 
to any persons of the accommodations of an inn, or a public conveyance, or 
a place of public amusement, by an individual, and without any sanction or 
support from any State law or regulation, does inflict upon such persons any 
manner of servitude, or form of slavery, as those terms are understood in 
this country?  (p. 23) 
 
One page later, the Court’s majority opinion rephrased the question to emphasize its distinction 
between the actions of individuals and those of the State:   
Can the act of a mere individual, the owner of the inn, the public 
conveyance or place of amusement, refusing the accommodation, be justly 
regarded as imposing any badge of slavery or servitude upon the applicant, 
or only as inflicting an ordinary civil injury, properly cognizable by the laws 
of the State, and presumably subject to redress by those [state] laws until the 
contrary appears?  (p. 24) 
 
Having crafted the question that it wanted to answer, the Court’s majority answered by declaring 
that “such an act of refusal has nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servitude” (p. 24).  
   
   
789
Furthermore, if any rights have been violated by such refusal, the injured party’s “redress is to be 
sought under the laws of the State” (p. 24).  In a fashion similar to that of a parent whose 
patience has been tried by repeated, troublesome queries from a child, a parent whose good 
intentions have been tried beyond measure, Justice Bradley’s Court majority opinion 
remonstrated: 
It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to 
every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the 
guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab 
or car, or admit to his concert or theatre, or deal with in other matters of 
intercourse or business.  (pp. 24-25) 
 
Resentful of what it incorrectly viewed as an attempt to continue receiving special favor and 
status, the Court’s majority opinion continued in the exasperated vein of telling an older child to 
grow up and take responsibility for ones own life: 
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent 
legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there 
must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank 
of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when 
his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by 
which other men’s rights are protected.  (p. 25) 
 
Having found, after its own manner and fashion, that neither the Thirteenth nor the Fourteenth 
Amendments provided authority for congressional enactment of sections one and two of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875, Justice Bradley’s majority Court opinion declared them to be 
“unconstitutional and void” (p. 26).  As a result the lower court judgments were ordered to be 
rendered “accordingly” (p. 26). 
 Dissenting opinion. 
 Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote a vigorous dissent that presaged twentieth century 
legal developments both prior and subsequent to Brown v Board of Education (See Appendix O 
for developments prior to Brown).  Comparing the majority and dissenting opinions in Gestalt 
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terminology, figure for the Court majority consisted of current attitudes of most whites towards 
black people while figure for Justice Harlan consisted of the law applied in a race-blind manner 
without regard to the existing racial views of the majority of the dominant white population.  
While the Court majority ignored established legal principles governing the constitutionality of 
congressional action, Justice Harlan’s dissent fully addressed the issues of intent, both with 
regards to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and with regards to congressional intent in 
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1875.  While the Court majority ignored existing case law 
relating to judicial determinations of the constitutionality of legislation, particularly that 
emanating from Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Justice Harlan fully addressed such 
case law.  While the Court majority ignored the existing case law pertaining to the state interest 
attached to the public use of private property, Justice Harlan’s dissent directed full attention to 
the issue.  While the Court majority ignored the common law emanating from the English 
experience and confirmed in American case law regarding locomotion as an elemental right, 
Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion did not ignore such precedential development. While the 
Court majority ignored existing legal precedents bearing on legal points raised by attorneys, 
particularly as they pertained to the subject matters of citizenship and rights, Justice Harlan’s 
dissenting opinion firmly grounded itself in the existing case law.  Finally, Justice Harlan’s 
dissent offered cogent criticism of the majority Court’s reasoning.   
 Such is a qualitative and analytical comparison of the two opinions.  A quantitative 
comparison would note that the opinion by the Court majority occupied only seventeen (17) 
pages of inventive legal reasoning that gave short shrift to normal Court procedures and 
reasoning, not to mention ignoring huge chunks of case law pertaining to the matter under 
judicial consideration, while Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion, which gave full attention to 
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established Court procedures and reasoning, which directly addressed existing case law, and 
which would require more space by virtue of addressing the legal issues involved and by virtue 
of following established procedures ignored by the Court majority, Justice Harlan’s dissenting 
opinion required thirty-seven (37) pages. 
 Describing the majority opinion as proceeding upon “artificial grounds,” Justice Harlan 
began his dissent by summarizing the results of the Court’s majority opinion and then put into 
quotation marks a summary of the approach not used by the Court majority. 
I cannot resist the conclusion that the substance and spirit of the recent 
amendments of the Constitution have been sacrificed by a subtle and 
ingenious verbal criticism.  “It is not the words of the law but the internal 
sense of it that makes the law: the letter of the law is the body; the sense and 
reason of the law is the soul.  (p. 26) 
 
Fleshing out his point, Justice Harlan continued: 
Constitutional provisions, adopted in the interest of liberty, and for the 
purpose of securing, through national legislation, if need be, rights inhering 
in a state of freedom, and belonging to American citizenship, have been so 
construed as to defeat the ends the people desired to accomplish … and 
which they supposed they had accomplished by changes in their 
fundamental law.  (p. 26) 
 
In order to defeat the intent of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, Justice Harlan 
pointed out, the Court majority had “departed from the familiar rule requiring, in the 
interpretation of constitutional provisions, that full effect be given to the intent with which they 
were adopted” (p. 26).  Justice Harlan would come back to that point in the later part of his 
dissenting opinion. 
 Nor was that the only omission by the Court majority.  The next omission was where he 
and the Court majority parted company.  Justice Harlan began that discussion by noting that both 
he and the other justices were agreed upon one thing, namely, the intent of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1875.  According to Justice Harlan: 
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There seems to be no substantial difference between my brethren and myself 
as to the purpose of Congress; for, they say that the essence of the law is … 
that colored citizens, whether formerly slaves or not, and citizens of other 
races, shall have the same accommodations and privileges in all inns, public 
conveyances, and places of amusement as are enjoyed by white persons; and 
vice versa.  (Emphasis in original) (p. 27) 
 
Observing that the Court majority had adjudged “erroneously that Congress is without power, 
under either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment, to establish such regulations, and that the 
first and second sections of the statute are, in all their parts, unconstitutional and void,” Justice 
Harlan proceeded to cite the Court’s own procedures established in its own precedential case law 
for arriving at judicial determinations of the constitutionality of congressional enactments.  
Citing Fletcher v. Peck and Sinking Fund Cases, Justice Harlan quoted legal principles bearing 
on determining constitutionality that such a determination should never be made except “in a 
clear case” where the “opposition between the Constitution and the law should be such that the 
judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other” (p. 27).  
Through ignoring its own procedures, Harlan implied, the Court majority thus traveled down an 
improper path and arrived at an erroneous decision. 
 Perhaps the irony was lost on the Court majority, but the modern-day reader can’t help 
but note its presence in Justice Harlan’s next treatment, a two-part treatment that again 
confronted that which had been ignored by the Court majority.  The subject matter of the first 
part, Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (1842), was the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, a law 
that had been passed to enforce Article IV, § 2, of the Constitution.  Article IV, § 2 states: 
No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, 
escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, 
be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim 
of the party to whom such service or labor may be due. 
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Upholding the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, the Court articulated the 
following basic legal principles: 
That a clause of the Constitution conferring a right should not be so 
construed as to make it shadowy, or unsubstantial … when another 
construction equally accordant with the words and the sense in which they 
were used, would enforce and protect the right granted. 
 
That Congress is not restricted to legislation for the execution of its 
expressly granted powers; but, for the protection of rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution, may employ such means, not prohibited, as are necessary and 
proper, or such as are appropriate to attain the ends proposed. 
 
The fundamental principle, applicable to all cases of this sort, would seem to 
be that when the end is required the means are given.  (pp. 28-29) 
 
And, finally, the Court in Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, concluded: 
It would be a strange anomaly and forced construction to suppose that the 
national government meant to rely for the due fulfillment [sic] of its own 
proper duties, and the rights which it intended to secure, upon State 
legislation, and not upon that of the Union.  (p. 29) 
 
The preceding legal principles, forming the bedrock of constitutional interpretation, were 
followed by the Court in upholding the constitutionality of the 1793 Fugitive Slave Law.   
 The second part of Justice Harlan’s two-part treatment of Prigg v. Commonwealth of  
Pennsylvania focused on the successor to the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, the Fugitive Slave 
Law of 1850 whose constitutionality came before the Court in Ableman v. Booth (1859) 
immediately prior to the outbreak of the Civil War.  Justice Harlan drew attention to the fact that 
this act went far beyond its predecessor in enforcing the rights of the slave owner.  Just how the 
new law went beyond the former law was first summarized and then explained by Justice Harlan.  
According to Justice Harlan, “They [the provisions of the 1850 act] placed at the disposal of the 
master seeking to recover his fugitive slave, substantially the whole power of the nation” (p. 30).  
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Justice Harlan substantiated his summary by noting just how the entire power of the nation was 
used to help the slave owner by the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850: 
It invested commissioners, appointed under the act, with power to summon 
the posse comitatus for the enforcement of its provisions, and commanded 
all good citizens to assist in its prompt and efficient execution whenever 
their services were required as part of the posse comitatus.  (p. 30) 
 
As Justice Harlan noted, the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 rested “solely 
upon the implied power of Congress to enforce the master’s rights” (p. 30).   
 The irony, surely noted by the thoughtful reader, lies in the Court’s disparate treatments 
regarding the two fugitive slave laws on the one hand and the 1875 Civil Rights Act on the other 
hand.  In upholding the rights of the slave master, the Court followed fully its own legal 
principles as articulated in case law regarding constitutional interpretation.  In disallowing the 
rights of the newly freed slaves, the Court ignored its own legal principles governing 
constitutional interpretation.  Had the Court used the same procedures in the Civil Rights Cases 
as it used in the two fugitive slave law cases, the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 
would have been affirmed.  Alternatively, had the Court used the same procedures in the two 
fugitive slave law cases as it used in the Civil Rights Cases, the two fugitive slave laws would 
have been voided and declared to be unconstitutional. 
 In examining the Thirteenth Amendment as a justification or not for the Civil Rights Act 
of 1875, Justice Harlan addressed what the Court majority did not, namely the case law 
regarding the public character of and ensuing State interest in privately owned “public 
conveyances, inns and places of public amusement” (p. 37).  In so doing, he also addressed the 
foundational finding of the English common law regarding the power of locomotion as a 
fundamental right that was subsequently affirmed by American case law.   
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 Regarding fundamental rights in general, Justice Harlan pointed out that “the Thirteenth 
Amendment alone obliterated the race line, so far as all rights fundamental in a state of freedom 
are concerned” (p. 40).  After examining the American case law regarding the legal status of 
“public conveyances on land and water” through a review of seven cases, Justice Harlan 
summarized:  “The sum of the adjudged cases is that a railroad corporation [or shipping 
company] is a governmental agency, created primarily for public purposes, and subject to be 
controlled for the public benefit” (p. 39).  Connecting the body of case law to the subject matter 
before the Court, Justice Harlan opined: 
Such being the relations these corporations hold to the public, it would seem 
that the right of a colored person to use an improved public highway, upon 
the terms accorded to freemen of other races, is as fundamental, in the state 
of freedom established in this country, as are any of the rights which my 
brethren concede to be so far fundamental as to be deemed the essence of 
civil freedom.  (p. 39) 
 
 Justice Harlan then connected the findings of American case law and his conclusion 
regarding that case law to the English common law regarding the subject matter by quoting the 
finding on the subject of the noted English expert on jurisprudence, William Blackstone:  
“’Personal liberty consists,’ says Blackstone, ‘in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, 
or removing one’s person to whatever places one’s own inclination may direct, without restraint, 
unless by due course of law’” (p. 39).  Applying this to the intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 
Justice Harlan asked “of what value the right of locomotion” was if it were to continue to be 
hindered by the very discriminations that “Congress intended … to remove” (p. 39)?  Harlan 
then connected this discrimination to the institution of slavery that had been abolished by the 
Thirteenth Amendment: 
[Such discrimination cannot] be sustained, except upon the assumption that 
there is, in this land of universal liberty, a class which may still be 
discriminated against, even in respect of rights of a character so necessary 
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and supreme, that, deprived of their enjoyment in common with others, a 
freeman is not only branded as one inferior and infected, but, in the 
competitions of life, is robbed of some of the most essential means of 
existence; and all this solely because they belong to a particular race which 
the nation has liberated.  (pp. 39-40) 
 
Inns being essential for travel, Justice Harlan noted that “the same general observations which 
have been made as to railroads are applicable to inns” and then cited case law to substantiate his 
point.   
 Places of public amusement were not necessarily connected to the right of locomotion; 
however, Justice Harlan noted, “The authority to establish and maintain them comes from the 
public.  The colored race is a part of that public” (p. 41).  Justice Harlan then cited two U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions affirming government interest in private property when it is used for a 
public purpose.  Particularly focusing upon the Court’s ruling in Munn v. Illinois, Harlan noted 
the Court’s reliance upon English jurisprudence when it quoted Lord Chief Justice Hale’s 
remarks, “to the effect that when private property is ‘affected with a public interest it ceases to be 
juris privati only’” (p. 42).  Justice Harlan continued by citing the Court’s own remarks in Munn 
v. Illinois that followed the statement by the Lord Chief Justice: 
Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner 
to make it of public consequence and affect the community at large.  When, 
therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an 
interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must 
submit to be controlled by the public for the common good…  (p. 42) 
 
 At this point, Justice Harlan attacked the claim by the Court majority that Congress was 
attempting by way of the 1875 Civil Rights Act to create a municipal code by legislating in areas 
reserved to the State.  Not so, Harlan declared, “Congress has not, in these matters, entered the 
domain of State control and supervision” (p. 42).  He then explained both “why not” as well as 
what the Civil Rights Act actually did: 
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It does not, as I have said, assume to prescribe the general conditions and 
limitations under which inns, public conveyances, and places of public 
amusement, shall be conducted or managed.  It simply declares, in effect, 
that since the nation has established universal freedom in the country, for all 
time, there shall be no discrimination, based merely upon race or color, in 
respect of the accommodations and advantages of public conveyances, inns, 
and places of public amusement.  (pp. 42-43) 
 
Such discrimination constituted “a badge of servitude” which Congress legitimately sought to 
“prevent under its power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment” (p. 
43).  On Thirteenth Amendment grounds alone, Justice Harlan, declared, the Civil Rights Act of 
1875 “is not, in my judgment, repugnant to the Constitution” (p. 43). 
 Turning his attention to the Fourteenth Amendment, where the Court majority saw 
remedy for discrimination against black citizens in the states, Justice Harlan saw just the 
opposite.  Noting the passage in several southern states of the notorious Black Codes following 
the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment, Justice Harlan pointed out that the intent of such 
legislation was an attempt “to keep the colored race in a condition, practically, of servitude” (p. 
43).  Harlan further cited the public announcements by the southern states that 
whatever might the rights which persons of that race had, as freemen, under 
the guarantees of the national Constitution, they could not become citizens 
of a State, with the privileges belonging to citizens, except by the consent of 
such State; consequently, that their civil rights, as citizens of the State, 
depended entirely upon State legislation.  (p. 43) 
 
The actions of the southern states against its black citizens following the adoption of the 
Thirteenth Amendment constituted the primary reason for proposing the Fourteenth Amendment 
for adoption.  Justice Harlan next cited the Court’s own language from a recent case whereby the 
Court  
declared that the one pervading purpose found in all the recent amendments, 
lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them would have 
been suggested – was “the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm 
establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made 
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freemen and citizen from the oppression of those who had formerly 
exercised unlimited dominion over him.”  (p. 44) 
 
 Following this line of reasoning, Justice Harlan directly confronted the Court majority’s 
incorrect analogy between its position and the constitutional clause by which a State was 
prohibited from passing any laws that impaired the obligation of contracts. Justice Harlan 
conducted a brief tutorial for the Court majority in order to show the Court majority why its 
analogy was not correct because the contract clause did not equal the fifth section of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s “scope and effect” (p. 45).  First, Justice Harlan noted the 
constitutional clause regarding contracts: 
No express power is given Congress to enforce, by primary direct 
legislation, the prohibition upon State laws impairing the obligation of 
contracts.  Authority is [instead], conferred to enact all necessary and proper 
laws for carrying into execution the enumerated powers of Congress and all 
other powers vested by the constitution in the government of the United 
States…  (p. 45) 
 
Of course, Harlan was referencing Article I, § 8, ¶ 18 of the Constitution, more commonly 
designated the Necessary and Proper Clause, the clause that provides the “textual justification for 
the doctrine of implied powers” (Hall, 1992, p. 424).  As Justice Harlan further noted, Congress 
had no authority at the time to legislate directly upon contracts.  He explained: 
[A] prohibition upon a State is not a power in Congress or in the national 
government.  It is simply a denial of power to the State.  And the only mode 
in which the inhibition upon State laws impairing the obligation of contracts 
can be enforced, is, indirectly, through the courts, in suits where the parties 
raise some question as to the constitutional validity of such laws.  The 
judicial power of the United States extends to such suits for the reason that 
they are suits arising under the Constitution.  (Emphasis in original) (p. 45) 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment presented a quite different situation, however, because of Section 
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, which reads, “That Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article” (p. 44).  Reaching the conclusion of his 
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tutorial, Justice Harlan spelled out for the Court majority the landmark significance of Section 
Five.  According to Harlan, Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment marks an epic milestone 
in American constitutional history, the inauguration of which sets its provisions quite apart from, 
and even above, the specified powers enumerated in Article I, § 8 of the Constitution.  In Justice 
Harlan’s words: 
The Fourteenth Amendment presents the first instance in our history of the 
investiture of Congress with affirmative power, by legislation, to enforce an 
express prohibition upon the States.  It is not said that the judicial power of 
the nation may be exerted for the enforcement of that amendment.  No 
enlargement of the judicial power was required, for it is clear that had the 
fifth section of the Fourteenth Amendment been entirely omitted, the 
judiciary could have stricken down all State laws and nullified all State 
proceedings in hostility to rights and privileges secured or recognized by 
that amendment.  The power given is, in terms, by congressional legislation, 
to enforce the provisions of the amendment.  (Emphasis in original) (pp. 45-
46) 
 
The analogy drawn by the Court majority to justify its interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was factually in error as was the Court majority’s reasoning. 
 Justice Harlan next asked, “What are the privileges and immunities to which, by that 
clause of the Constitution [the first sentence of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment], 
they became entitled” (p. 47)?  Noting that the answer lay in the “adjudged cases” of the 
Supreme Court, Justice Harlan summarized the case law on the subject by stating  
that they are those which are fundamental in citizenship in a free republican 
government, such as are “common to the citizens in the latter States under 
their constitutions and laws by virtue of their being citizens.”  Of that 
provision it has been said, with the approval of this court, that no other one 
in the Constitution has tended so strongly to constitute the citizens of the 
United States one people.  Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; Corfield v. 
Coryell, 4 Wash. C.C. 371; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Slaughter-house 
Cases, 16 id. 36.  (p. 47) 
 
Stopping short of bringing the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution into his legal discussion, but 
further buttressing his legal point, Justice Harlan brought Article IV, Section 2 of the 
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Constitution into play, the portion of the Constitution that declares:  “The Citizens of each State 
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”  Setting the 
stage for a legal assertion grounded in case law and specifically stated in the Constitution: 
I hazard [sic] nothing … in saying that no State can sustain her denial to 
colored citizens of other States, while within her limits, of privileges or 
immunities, fundamental in republican citizenship, upon the ground that she 
accords such privileges and immunities only to her white citizens and 
withholds them from her colored citizens.  (p. 47) 
 
Justice Harlan then drew what should have been the obvious conclusion for the Court majority: 
The colored citizens of other States, within the jurisdiction of that State, 
could claim, in virtue of section 2 of article 4 of the Constitution, every 
privilege and immunity which that State secures to her white citizens.  
…[T]he constitutional guaranty is that the citizens of each State shall be 
entitled to “all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States.”  
(pp. 47-48) 
 
 Further illustrating the paucity of legal reasoning on the part of the Court majority, 
Justice Harlan continued his discussion of the rights granted the former slaves by the Fourteenth 
Amendment by citing specific provisions of the Court’s own case law governing the subject.  
According to Harlan’s reading of the law: 
Citizenship in this country necessarily imports at least equality of civil rights 
among citizens of every race in the same State.  It is fundamental in 
American citizenship that, in respect of such rights, there shall be no 
discrimination by the State, … or by individuals or corporations exercising 
public functions or authority, against any citizen because of his race or 
previous condition of servitude.  (p. 48) 
  
To illustrate that he wasn’t grabbing concepts out of the thin air and grounding them in his own 
prejudices, Justice Harlan particularly drew the following cases and their points to the attention 
of his fellow justices, cases featuring legal principles firmly grounded in  the nation’s case law 
that had been ignored by the Court majority: 
• United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555. 
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[T]he rights of life and personal liberty are natural rights of man, and … “the equality 
of the rights of citizens is a principle of republicanism.” 
 
• Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 334. 
[T]he emphatic language of this court is that “one great purpose of these amendments 
was to raise the colored race from that condition of inferiority and servitude in which 
most of them had previously stood, into perfect equality of civil rights with all other 
persons within the jurisdiction of the States.” 
 
• Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 306. 
[T]he court, alluding to the Fourteenth Amendment, said: “This is one of a series of 
constitutional provisions having a common purpose, namely, securing to a race 
recently emancipated, a race that through many generations had been held in slavery, 
all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy.” 
 
• Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 386. 
[I]t was ruled that this amendment was designed, primarily, “to secure to the colored 
race, thereby invested with the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of citizenship, 




 Having established a legal position solidly grounded in the Constitution and its case law, 
a position fully cognizant of the normal Court procedures to be followed when making 
constitutional determinations of congressional enactments, Justice Harlan devoted the remainder 
of his dissenting opinion to a criticism of the position taken by his fellow justices.  Having earlier 
drawn an ironic analogy between previous Court opinions centered on the constitutionality of the 
two fugitive slave laws and the current Court majority’s maneuverings to avoid following similar 
procedures, Justice Harlan directly criticized the Court majority. 
I insist that the national legislature may, without transcending the limits of 
the Constitution, do for human liberty and the fundamental rights of 
American citizenship, what it did, with the sanction of this court, for the 
protection of slavery and the rights of the masters of fugitive slaves.  (p. 53) 
 
And then Harlan posed the question that was unanswerable for the Court majority, for in order to 
confront it, they would be forced to abandon their current position: 
   
   
802
If fugitive slave laws … were legitimate exercises of an implied power to 
protect and enforce a right recognized by the Constitution, why shall the 
hands of Congress be tied, so that … it may not, by means of direct 
legislation, bring the whole power of this nation to bear upon States … and 
upon such individuals and corporations exercising public functions as 
assume to abridge, impair, or deny rights confessedly secured by the 
supreme law of the land?  (p. 53) 
 
Justice Harlan specifically declared that the position assumed by the Court majority was  
plainly repugnant to [the Fourteenth Amendment’s] fifth section, conferring 
upon Congress power … to enforce not merely the provisions containing 
prohibitions upon the States, but all of the provisions of the amendment, 
including the provisions, express and implied, in the first clause of the first 
section of the article granting citizenship.  (p. 54) 
 
If allowed to prevail, Justice Harlan concluded, the Court majority’s opinion reflected a new “era 
of constitutional law” whereby the “rights of freedom and American citizenship” would receive 
less “efficient protection” than that which the Court “unhesitatingly accorded to slavery and the 
rights of the master” (p. 57).   
 Characterizing the Court majority’s admonishment to the former slaves to stop seeking to 
be “the special favorite of the laws” and to begin assuming “the rank of a mere citizen” as an 
unjust statement, Justice Harlan observed that what the Court majority was denying was exactly 
what they desired to be accomplished by the former slaves.  In Harlan’s words, “The one 
underlying purpose of congressional legislation has been to enable the black race to take the rank 
of mere citizens” (p. 61).  Continuing, Justice Harlan identified the crux of the real problem: 
The difficulty has been to compel a recognition of the legal right of the 
black race to take the rank of citizens, and to secure the enjoyment of 
privileges belonging, under the law, to them as a component part of the 
people for whose welfare and happiness government is ordained.  (p. 61) 
 
Continuing towards the conclusion of his dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan identified what other 
students of democracy came to refer to as the tyranny of the majority. 
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At every step in this direction [that of getting a recognition of the equal 
rights of black people by virtue of being granted citizenship], the nation has 
been confronted with class tyranny, which a contemporary English historian 
says is, of all tyrannies, the most intolerable…  Today, it is the colored race 
which is denied, by corporations and individuals wielding public authority, 
rights fundamental in their freedom and citizenship.  (Emphasis added) (p. 
62) 
 
 Only thirteen years later, Justice Harlan would again dissent against the Court majority’s 
attempts to legalize what he referred to as a “caste” system (Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 
559).  Despite the views of the dominant society, law under the American Constitution 
recognized no class system, or at least, it shouldn’t.  Harlan’s dissent in Plessy applies as well to 
the subject matter in the Civil Rights Cases.  In Plessy, Justice Harlan described a situation 
similar to that of the current case. 
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.  And so 
it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power….  
But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country 
no superior, no dominant, ruling class of citizens.  There is no caste here.  
Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes 
among citizens.  In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the 
law.  The humblest is the peer of the most powerful.   Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) 
 
Justice Harlan’s concluding words in Plessy could just as easily apply to the Civil Rights Cases, 
although more ironically, because the recourse to the States that the 1883 Court recommended 
for redress of any discrimination suffered by black people was in 1896 being denied them: 
It is therefore, to be regretted that this high tribunal, the final expositor of 
the fundamental law of the land, has reached the conclusion that it is 
competent for a State to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their civil 
rights solely upon the basis of race.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 
(1896) 
 
Both high courts, regrettably, with the single exception of Justice John Marshall Harlan, 
confirmed the opposite of what most American students learn in school in either civics or 
American government classes.  The two high courts also confirmed, again regrettably, what Plato 
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had successfully refuted more than two thousand years ago when taunted by Thrasymachus in 
The Republic, namely, the assertion by Thrasymachus that justice was nothing more than the 
advantage of the stronger party (Cornford, pp. 18, 21, 25).  It is especially regrettable for those 
who believe in the rule of law within a democratic republic under a Constitution that affirms 
equality under the law.  A noted modern-day professor of law at one of the nation’s leading law 
schools made an assessment of Justice Harlan’s dissents in the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy v. 
Ferguson and their implication for the Fourteenth Amendment.  Although most of what follows 
focuses on Harlan’s dissent in Plessy, much of it also applies to Harlan’s dissent in the Civil 
Rights Cases, particularly since what he had warned against in that case came to pass as subject 
matter in Plessy.  According to Professor Akhil Reed Amar: 
As Harlan saw it, any law whose preamble explicitly proclaimed blacks to 
be second-class citizens would plainly violate the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and the emerging system of racial apartheid known as Jim Crow broadcast 
precisely this unconstitutional message by its very operation.  In purpose, in 
effect, and in social meaning, Jim Crow stretched its tentacles out to keep 
blacks down.  Its whole point was to privilege whites and degrade blacks, in 
direct defiance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of equal 
citizenship.  (Amar, p. 383) 
 
Professor Amar concluded by noting the similarity of the system of Jim Crow with the Black 
Codes passed by southern states in the aftermath of the Thirteenth Amendment and the 
conclusion of the Civil War, after which he noted Justice Harlan’s legacy for posterity: 
Though Jim Crow slyly claimed to provide formal, symmetric equality 
(“separate but equal”), in reality it delivered substantive inequality that 
made its regime practically indistinguishable from the postwar Southern 
Black Codes – the very set of laws that the amendment had undeniably 
aimed to abolish.  Though Justice Harlan saw all this in 1896, his brethren 
did not.  Not until the middle of the twentieth century would Court 
majorities embrace Harlan’s vision, quietly at first and then with increasing 
confidence and emphasis.  (Amar, p. 383) 
 
 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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 Case summary. 
 Although some twenty-six Supreme Court decisions and the historical backgrounds of 
both the Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments have since been presented, some readers will recall 
that Brown v. Board of Education was the last case discussed in the chapter focused on the 
Guarantee Clause (See p. 250+ of this document).  In that discussion, material was presented 
documenting the work of Charles Hamilton Houston and the NAACP in confronting the 
American system of apartheid ensconced in higher education, a campaign that eventually made 
its way into the field of public education.  The successful campaign orchestrated by Charles 
Hamilton Houston served as judicial precedents referenced by the Court in its Brown decision.   
 As some will also recall, Brown actually consisted of four cases that had been grouped 
together because each bore on the same legal question, “Does segregation of children in public 
schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’ factors 
may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities” (p. 
493)?  Actually there were five court cases centered on the same legal question, but because of a 
difference in lower court responses to the legal question applying the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to public education in various states, four of the cases came to be 
grouped together for a consolidated legal opinion.  The fifth case required a separate High Court 
opinion because the lower court had actually ruled in favor of the plaintiffs challenging the 
system of segregated public education in the District of Columbia.  While the legal question was 
basically similar, it differed in that it did not rely on the Equal Protection Clause, but instead 
upon an unjustifiable denial of due process of law under the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee.  The 
five cases are presented in Table 7. The procedural history of the four combined cases will be 
treated first followed by the consolidated opinion that will forever be known as Brown v. Board 
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of Education, or more simply, Brown.  Finally, the background, procedural history, and a 
discussion of the Court’s ruling in Bolling v. Sharpe will be presented. 
Table 7: 







 In the original legal challenge to segregated public education in Topeka, Kansas,  (Brown 
v. Board of Education) that later came to bear the name of the consolidated opinion, elementary 
children in Topeka filed action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas “to enjoin 
enforcement of a Kansas statute which permits, but does not require, cities of more than 15,000 
population to maintain separate school facilities for Negro and white students” (p. 486, n. 1).  
The District Court, consisting of a three-judge panel, ruled that “segregation in public education 
has a detrimental effect upon Negro children,” but it “denied relief on the ground that the Negro 
and white schools were substantially equal with respect to buildings, transportation, curricula, 
and educational qualifications of teachers” (p. 486, n. 1).  The U.S. Supreme Court granted the 
request for appeal. 
 Plaintiffs in the South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliott, were elementary and high school 
students in Clarendon County.  They filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
of South Carolina seeking an injunction to stop enforcement of sections in the state’s constitution 
and statutes that required “the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools” (p. 486, n. 
 
Lower Court Denied Equal Protection Challenge – 14th Amendment 
Brown v. Topeka Board of Education 
Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al. 
Davis et al. v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia 
Gebhart et al. v. Belton et al. 
Lower Court Affirmed Due Process Challenge – 5th Amendment 
Bolling et al. v. Sharpe et al. 
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1).  “The three-judge District Court” denied the relief requested by the plaintiffs, but “found that 
the Negro schools were inferior to the white schools and ordered the defendants to begin 
immediately to equalize the facilities” (p. 486, n. 1).  The District Court “ordered the defendants 
to begin immediately to equalize the facilities,” but denied admission to the white schools for the 
plaintiffs during the process of the equalization program (p. 486, n. 1).  The U.S. Supreme Court 
vacated the decision and remanded for hearing on the progress of the equalization program.  
Following that hearing which found progress in the states equalization program, the Supreme 
Court granted plaintiff’s request for appeal. 
 Plaintiffs in the Virginia case, Davis v. County School Board, were high school students 
in Prince Edward County.  Filing suit in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 
they sought an injunction to stop enforcement of the state constitutional and statutory code 
provisions requiring “the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools” (p. 487, n. 1).  In 
Davis v. County School Board, a three-judge panel denied the injunction, but “found the Negro 
school inferior in physical plant, curricula, and transportation” (p. 487, n. 1).  Similar to the 
South Carolina case, the District Court ordered the defendants to provide the plaintiffs an equal 
program while denying them admission to white schools while the equalization program was 
being undertaken.  The U.S. Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs’ request for appeal. 
 The ruling in the Delaware case, Gebhart v. Belton, contained an interesting statement 
that “segregation itself results in an inferior education for Negro children” (p. 488, n. 1).  The 
case was filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery on behalf of elementary and high school 
students living in New Castle County.  Like the suits in South Carolina and Virginia, plaintiffs 
sought an injunction stop the constitutional and statutory requirements that required segregation 
in the state’s public schools.  Unlike the federal courts in Virginia and South Carolina, however, 
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the “Chancellor gave judgment for the plaintiffs and ordered their immediate admission to 
schools previously attended only by white children” because of the enumerated conditions of 
inferiority in the Negro schools (p. 487, n. 1).  Upon appeal the Supreme Court of Delaware 
affirmed the Chancellor’s ruling, but suggested that “the defendants might be able to obtain a 
modification of the decree after equalization of the Negro and white schools had been 
accomplished” (p. 488, n. 1).  The defendants appealed only the “immediate admission of the 
Negro plaintiffs to the white schools” to the U.S. Supreme Court who agreed to review the case. 
 The case emanating from Kansas was a challenge to a state statute that permitted, but did 
not require segregation in the state’s public schools.  On the other hand, state statutes in South 
Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware required the segregation of black and white students in public 
schools in their states.  This raises at least two questions: 1)  how did the various states address 
the issue of apartheid in public education; and 2) how pervasive was the system de jure 
segregation in the United States at the time of the ruling in Brown v. Board of Education?  Table 
8 below provides comparative groupings107 of data that will address the two questions arising 
from an inquiry into the system of segregated schools in public education. 
 In addition to being a decision bearing on four cases combined into one ruling because 
they shared a common legal question, Brown actually consisted of two separate rulings, the first 
on the merits and the second on the relief.  They are sometimes referred to as Brown I, 347 U.S. 
483 (1954) and Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).  The two decisions resulted from Chief Justice 
Warren’s proposal to the Court justices to separate the two decisions in order to reduce the 
monumental questions involved to manageable scope (Hall, 1999, pp. 34-35).  Brown I also 
consisted of an original argument on December 9, 1952 followed by a re-argument on December 
8, 1953 (For information about the attorneys arguing for the preservation of segregated public 
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education, see Appendix W; for information about the attorneys arguing against segregated 
schools in public education, see Appendix X).  Brown II resulted after hearing re-argument 
regarding the questions of who should be responsible for ensuring that the relief is provided and 
at what pace it should occur.  Brown I held that separate but equal had no place in public 
education while Brown II ordered that school desegregation should proceed with “all deliberate 
speed” (349 U.S. 294). 
Table 8: 
States With Laws Providing For Schools To Be 










 In its unanimous 9-0 ruling the Supreme Court noted that in “each of the cases other than 
the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-
called ‘separate but equal’ doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537” (p. 488).  The Court also noted plaintiffs’ contention, “that segregated public schools are 
not ‘equal’ and cannot be made ‘equal,’ and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection 
of the laws” (p. 488).  Turning to the subject of education, the Court declared: 
 
States Whose Laws REQUIRED Public School Segregation 
Based On Race – Grouped By Geographic Region 
 Border States   The Deep South  
Delaware Oklahoma Alabama Mississippi 
Kentucky Virginia Arkansas North Carolina 
Maryland West Virginia Florida South Carolina 
Missouri Georgia Tennessee 
 Louisiana Texas 
States Whose Laws PERMITTED, BUT DIDN’T REQUIRE 
Public School Segregation Based On Race 
 Arizona Kansas New Mexico Wyoming 
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Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments.  Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the 
importance of education to our democratic society.  It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the 
armed forces.  It is the very foundation of good citizenship.  (p. 493) 
   
Having pointed to the value of education in preparing young people to exercise the fundamental 
responsibilities of citizenship when they became adults, the Court continued its reasoning by 
drawing attention to the value of education as a preparation for future life’s work: 
Today, it [education] is a principal instrument in awakening the child to 
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in 
helping him to adjust normally to his environment.  In these days, it is 
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is 
denied the opportunity of an education.  Such an opportunity, where the 
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to 
all on equal terms.  (p. 493) 
 
Coming to the heart of the matter, the Court noted: 
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in 
public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities 
and other “tangible” factors may be equal, deprive the children of the 
minority group of equal educational opportunities?  We believe that it does.  
(p. 493) 
 
The Court explained its reasoning in terms of the psychological damage caused by segregation. 
To separate them from others of similar age and qualification solely because 
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the 
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to 
be undone.  The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities 
was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which 
nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs…  (p. 494) 
 
Commenting that the “extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson” was 
unknown, the Court stated that the findings of psychological damage were “amply supported by 
modern authority” and declared, “Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is 
rejected” (pp. 494-495).  Continuing, the Court announced its conclusion: 
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We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of “separate 
but equal” has no place.  Separate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal.  Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated 
for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation 
complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  (p. 495) 
 
Before closing, Chief Justice Warren repeated, “We have now announced that such segregation 
is a denial of the equal protection of the laws” (p. 495).   
 The roots of Bolling v. Sharpe can be traced to congressional authorization of a system of 
segregated public schools in Washington, D.C., the schools having been “segregated since Civil 
War days under laws passed by Congress (Huston, p. 1).  This situation flowed from the fact that 
the District of Columbia resides solely under federal jurisdiction.  Owing to this unique 
circumstance, a legal challenge to segregated public schools in the nation’s capitol had to be 
based on “the Fifth Amendment since the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to Congress” 
(Alexander & Alexander, p. 410).   
 Bolling v. Sharpe represented the culmination of a series of challenges mounted by a 
parent group in Washington, D.C.  In 1847 Gardner Bishop, a barber and the father of a fourteen-
year-old daughter, provided leadership for a group of parents concerned about the poor quality of 
junior high school education being offered their children.  Organized as the “Consolidated Parent 
Group,” they mounted a campaign to end segregation in Washington, D.C.’s public schools 
(McNeil, p. 188).  Charles Hamilton Houston provided legal counsel for the group as they 
mounted successive challenges in the U.S. District Court for Washington, D.C. (McNeil, p. 189).  
When  Houston became ill, his place was taken by a colleague and law professor from Howard 
University, James Nabrit, Jr. (National Park Service, Bolling v. Sharpe, ¶ 2).   
 Besides differing from the four cases consolidated in the Brown decision by reason of 
basing the case on the Fifth Amendment instead of the Fourteenth Amendment for reasons 
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already given, Nabrit had not presented “evidence that schools the plaintiffs attended were 
inferior to the facilities for white students” as he “felt the sole issue was that of segregation 
itself” (National Park Service, Bolling v. Sharpe, ¶ 2).  As a result, Nabrit argued that 
“segregation deprive[d] them [“minors of the Negro race”] of due process of law under the Fifth 
Amendment” (Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498).  After the case had been dismissed by the 
District Court for the District of Columbia on the basis of Carr v. Corning (a case which held 
that segregated public schools in the District of Columbia were constitutional) and an appeal had 
been made to the Court of Appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court “granted a writ of certiorari before 
judgment in the Court of Appeals because of the importance of the constitutional question 
presented” (347 U.S. 497, 498). 
 As he had in the cases consolidated under Brown v. Board of Education, Chief Justice 
Earl Warren delivered the Court’s opinion in Bolling v. Sharpe.  Noting that while the Fifth 
Amendment did “not contain an equal protection clause” similar to the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the unanimous Court observed that “the concepts of equal protection and due process, both 
stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive” (347 U.S. 497, 499).  
Furthermore, the Court continued, “discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of 
due process,” a recognition acknowledged by three previous cases which were cited (347 U.S. 
497, 499).  The Court announced a finding integral to its ruling: “Segregation in public education 
is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective” (347 U.S. 497, 500).  
Accordingly, segregation in public education “imposes on Negro children of the District of 
Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due 
Process Clause” (347 U.S. 497, 500).  Announcing the holding of the unanimous Supreme Court, 
Chief Justice Earl Warren declared, “We hold that racial segregation in the public schools of the 
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District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to 
the Constitution” (347 U.S. 497, 500).   
 Significance for the fourteenth amendment. 
 The Brown decision overturned the doctrine of “Separate but Equal” emanating from the 
Plessy decision, but did not overturn Plessy itself.  Brown focused solely on the applicability of 
Plessy to the field of public education.  The Fourteenth Amendment arguments articulated by 
Justice John Marshall Harlan in both the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy v. Ferguson finally bore 
fruit following their application to the campaign orchestrated by Charles Hamilton Houston with 
assistance from Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP attacking Plessy’s doctrine of “Separate but 
Equal” in higher education.   
 The Brown decision marked a major turning point in our nation’s history. For the first 
time, state-sponsored racial segregation in more than one state was deemed to be contrary to the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to our nation’s Constitution.  The intent 
of the original framers of that amendment had finally been broadly realized, although it had 
taken almost a full century for their efforts to finally bear fruit on a national scale.  Although the 
Fourteenth Amendment had overturned the Taney Court’s Dred Scott decision, its active 
enforcement had been thwarted by the Court in the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy v. Ferguson 
until the Warren Court overturned Plessy v. Ferguson in the field of public education and began 
the process of restoring the Fourteenth Amendment to its original purpose.  One expert on 
constitutional law denoted the era begun by the Court’s decision in Brown as a Second 
Reconstruction: 
Four score years after the Founding, a new generation arose to transform 
what their fathers had brought forth on the continent.  In what can only be 
described as a constitutional revolution, the nation ended slavery, made 
every person born under the flag an equal citizen, guaranteed a host of civil 
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rights to all Americans, and extended equal political rights to black men.  
Hard as it was to get America to make these promises, getting her to keep 
them would prove harder still.  Full compliance would not occur until a 
Second Reconstruction in the late twentieth century.  (Amar, 2005, p. 351) 
 
 Following the Brown II decision, the federal judiciary “was faced with southern school 
boards and state governments that were typically committed to the philosophy of ‘massive 
resistance’ to desegregation” (Hall, 1992, p. 703).  One historian looking on events in American 
from across the ocean described the aftermath: 
[T]he process of dismantling segregation could not be plain sailing.  For one 
thing, to attack it in the schools was to attack it everywhere.  The structure 
of white supremacy tottered.  The Deep South rose in wrath and came 
together in fear.  It resolved to evade or defeat this decision as it had so 
many others, and in carrying out this resolution it had, to start with, 
considerable success.  Brown v. Board of Education turned out to be only 
the first blow in a new battle in the long, long war.  (Brogan, p. 647) 
 
As part of the massive campaign of southern resistance to desegregating public schools, two 
states amended their state’s constitutional provisions governing public education. South Carolina 
“repealed” the mandatory provision from its state constitution “directing the establishment of a 
system of public schools,” while Mississippi amended its state constitution to make “its 
constitutional provision discretionary with the state legislature” (San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 112, n. 69 [Marshall, J., dissenting]).   
 Nothing quite matched what happened in Virginia, however.  Describing what happened 
in Prince Edward County, the Supreme Court observed, “Efforts to desegregate Prince Edward 
County’s schools met with resistance” (Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward 
County, 377 U.S. 218, 221).  In 1956, Virginia amended its state constitution “to authorize the 
General Assembly … to appropriate funds to assist students to go to public or to nonsectarian 
private schools” (377 U.S. 218, 221).  The state legislature also enacted legislation that closed 
public schools that were integrated.  The Court provided the following description: 
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The General Assembly met in special session and enacted legislation to 
close any public schools where white and colored children were enrolled 
together, to cut off state funds to such schools, to pay tuition grants to 
children in nonsectarian private schools, and to extend state retirement 
benefits to teachers in newly created private schools.  (377 U.S. 218, 221) 
 
Following the actions taken in special session by Virginia’s General Assembly, the Supervisors 
of Prince Edward County adopted a resolution declaring “that they would not operate public 
schools ‘wherein white and colored children are taught together’” (377 U.S. 218, 222).  Also, the 
County School Board of Prince Edward County, acting “pursuant to state law, closed its public 
schools and provided tuition grants and tax credits to private schools attended only by white 
children” (Hall, 1992, p. 350).   
 Three years later, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia ruled that the state’s 
“legislation closing mixed schools and cutting off state funds” to integrated public schools 
violated Virginia’s constitution (377 U.S. 218, 221).  The U.S. Supreme Court described the 
Virginia state legislature’s response to the state high court’s ruling: 
In April 1959 the General Assembly abandoned “massive resistance” to 
desegregation and turned instead to what was called a “freedom of choice” 
program.  The Assembly repealed the rest of the 1956 legislation, as well as 
a tuition grant law of January 1959, and enacted a new tuition grant 
program.  At the same time the Assembly repealed Virginia’s compulsory 
attendance laws and instead made school attendance a matter of local 
opinion.  (377 U.S. 218, 221-222) 
 
Prince Edward County, however, did not end its campaign of resistance to integrating its public 
schools.  Pursuant to its resolution of 1956 declaring opposition to the operation of integrated 
schools, “the Supervisors of Prince Edward County refused to levy any school taxes for the 
1959-1960 school year” (377 U.S. 218, 222).  The U.S. Supreme Court described the resulting 
consequences: 
As a result, the county’s public schools [which had been closed in 1956] did 
not reopen in the fall of 1959 and have remained closed ever since, although 
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the public schools of every other county in Virginia have continued to 
operate under laws governing the State’s public school system and to draw 
funds provided by the State for that purpose.  (377 U.S. 218, 222-223) 
 
The Court also described additional actions taken in Prince Edward County: 
A private group, the Prince Edward School Foundation, was formed to 
operate private schools for while children in Prince Edward County and, 
having built its own school plant, has been in operation ever since the 
closing of the public schools [in 1956].  An offer to set up private schools 
for colored children in the county was rejected, the Negroes of Prince 
Edward preferring to continue the legal battle for desegregated public 
schools…  (377 U.S. 218, 223) 
 
 In 1961 Allen, Griffin, and other parents of black children in Prince Edward County 
“filed a supplemental complaint” in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia that sought an order enjoining officials in Prince Edward County “from refusing to 
operate an efficient system of public free schools in Prince Edward County” (377 U.S. 218, 224).  
In addition, the parents sought an injunction prohibiting the “payment of public funds to help 
support private schools which excluded students on account of race” (377 U.S. 218, 224).  The 
federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found that “the end result of every 
action taken by that body [Board of Supervisors] [sic] was designed to preserve separation of the 
races in the schools of Prince Edward County” (377 U.S. 218, 224).  As a result, the District 
Court 
enjoined the county from paying tuition grants or giving tax credits so long 
as public schools remained closed.  Allen v. County School Board of Prince 
Edward County, 198 F. Supp. 497, 503 (D.C.E.D. Va. 1961).  At this time 
the District Court did not pass on whether the public schools of the county 
could be closed but abstained pending determination by the Virginia courts 
of whether the constitution and laws of Virginia required the public schools 
to be kept open.  (377 U.S. 218, 224) 
 
 Griffin and other parents had also initiated a mandamus proceeding in state court seeking 
an order to require that the Prince Edward County Board of Supervisors resume levying taxes for 
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public education.  In Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward County, 203 Va. 321 
(1962), the Virginia High Court “held that the State Constitution and statutes did not impose 
upon the County Board of Supervisors any mandatory duty to levy taxes and appropriate money 
to support free public schools” (377 U.S. 218, 224, n. 9).  At about the same time, but previous to 
the Virginia Supreme Court’s ruling in Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward County, 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia completed its ruling in Allen 
v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 207 F. Supp. 349, 355 (D.C.E.D. Va. 1962) in 
which the U.S. District Court 
held that “the public schools of Prince Edward County may not be closed to 
avoid the effect of the law of the land as interpreted by the Supreme Court, 
while the Commonwealth of Virginia permits other public schools to remain 
open at the expense of the taxpayers.”  (377 U.S. 218, 224) 
 
 Immediately after the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia issued its 
final ruling (described immediately preceding), the Board of Supervisors for Prince Edward 
County and the County School Board of Prince Edward County filed a “declaratory judgment 
suit … in a Virginia Circuit Court” and at the same time “asked the Federal District Court to 
abstain from further proceedings until the suit in the state courts had run its course” (377 U.S. 
218, 225).  The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia refused the request from 
Prince Edward County officials and instead “repeated its order that Prince Edward’s public 
schools might not be closed to avoid desegregation while the other public schools in Virginia 
remained open” (377 U.S. 218, 225).  Upon appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit (with one judge dissenting) [Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward County, 
322 F. 2d 332 (C.A. 4th Cir. 1963)] reversed the U.S. District Court’s decision, holding that the 
lower federal court should have waited until the state courts had made a determination of the 
issues.  The U.S. Supreme Court “granted certiorari” while at the same time, 
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the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia had held that the Virginia 
Constitution did not compel the State to reopen public schools in Prince 
Edward County.  County School Board of Prince Edward County v. Griffin, 
204 Va. 650, 133 S.E. 2d 565 (1963).  (377 U.S. 218, 225, n. 10) 
 
In Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), some ten 
years following the Brown I decision, the U.S. Supreme Court authorized “the district court … to 
enjoin further use of grants and credits,” stipulated “that the court could superintend the board’s 
taxing and appropriation powers,” and empowered the district court to “order the public schools 
reopened,” if necessary (Hall, 1992, p. 351).  The preceding holdings were based upon the 
following basic finding: 
[T]he record in the present case could not be clearer that Prince Edward’s 
public schools were closed and private schools operated in their place with 
state and county assistance, for one reason, and one reason only: to ensure, 
through measures taken by the county and the State, that white and colored 
children in Prince Edward County would not, under any circumstances, go 
to the same school.  Whatever nonracial grounds might support a State’s 
allowing a county to abandon public schools, the object must be a 
constitutional one, and grounds of race and opposition to desegregation do 
not qualify as constitutional.  (377 U.S. 218, 231) 
 
In a note appended to the last sentence of the preceding quotation, the Court recalled an earlier 
pronouncement: “’But it should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional 
principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them.’ Brown v. 
Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)” (377 U.S. 218, 231, n. 12).   
 Recounting the legal struggles centered on Brown and its aftermath, while illuminating, 
do not address the extreme human costs underlying such struggles.  Black students in Prince 
Edward County who should have entered first grade when the public schools were closed (prior 
to the beginning of the 1956-1957 school year with entry into private white schools in the county 
being denied anyone who was not white), such students should normally have been ready to 
enter high school as ninth-graders in the 1964-1965 school year following the U.S. Supreme 
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Court’s decision announced on May 25, 1964, in Griffin v. County School Board of Prince 
Edward County.  Instead, most such students were denied their elementary and junior high 
school education because of extreme racial prejudice exercised against them by the racist white 
adult voters and officials of Prince Edward County, aided and abetted by racist white adults 
controlling the Virginia legislature who organized a campaign of massive state resistance to a 
U.S. Supreme Court decision.  While many of the white racists perhaps professed belief in 
Christianity, they certainly did not practice its foundational precepts.  This would be neither the 
first, nor the last, time such a conflict would be enacted between professed beliefs and actual 
actions. 
 In terms of its impact upon segregated school districts, “Brown was remarkably 
ineffectual.  By 1964, a decade after the first decision less than 2 percent of formerly segregated 
school districts had experienced any desegregation” (Hall, 1992, p. 95).  This same writer went 
on to note, however, that  
Brown was a potent catalyst for ambitious social change, both in Congress, 
where the aspirations of Brown helped prompt the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, among others, and in the federal courts 
themselves…  (Hall, 1992, p. 95) 
 
Some, however, would argue that the most powerful result flowing from the Brown decision and 
the accompanying campaign of southern resistance to implementing the law of the land was the 
Civil Rights Movement, a movement whose success in touching the nation’s conscience through 
exposure of the brutal inhumanity and lawlessness of southern resistance was more directly 
responsible for congressional action than was Brown. 
 Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971). 
 Facts & procedural history. 
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 Beginning as a class action suit filed in Superior Court, Los Angeles County, “by 
elementary and high school pupils and parents” who were “concerned with financing of 
California public school systems,” the case reached the Supreme Court of California on appeal 
following the lower court’s dismissal of the lawsuit and the Court of Appeal’s ruling upholding 
the lower court’s ruling (p. 1241, 1266).  The Superior Court, Los Angeles County, had 
dismissed the case, citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in McInnis (a case challenging the 
Illinois system of public school financing) when it sustained “defendants’ demurrers” (p. 1263).  
Seeking both “declaratory and injunctive relief” (p. 1244) from the California Supreme Court, 
the plaintiffs sought the following: 
(1)  a declaration that the present financing system is unconstitutional;  (2)  
an order directing defendants to reallocate school funds in order to remedy 
this invalidity; and  (3)  an adjudication that the trial court retain jurisdiction 
of the action so that it may restructure the system if defendants and the state 
Legislature fail to act with in a reasonable time.  (p. 1245) 
 
Defendants in Serrano v. Priest included “ the Treasurer, the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, and the Controller of the State of California, as well as the Tax Collector and 
Treasurer, and the Superintendent of Schools of the County of Los Angeles” (p. 1244). 
 Legal question. 
 For our purposes, the main legal question was, “Does the ‘California public school 
financing system, with its substantial dependence on local property taxes and resultant wide 
disparities in school revenue, violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment’” 
(p. 1244)?  A secondary question centered on the applicability of the nation’s High Court’s 
affirmation of McInnis to the subject matter of Serrano v. Priest. 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
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 Legal counsel for the defendants argued that California’s financing scheme did not 
discriminate on the basis of wealth by pointing to two components of that scheme: “[T]hrough 
basic aid, the state distributes school funds equally to all pupils; through equalization aid, it 
distributes funds in a manner beneficial to the poor districts” (Emphasis in original) (p. 1250).  
Defense attorneys also argued that “the wealth of a school district does not necessarily reflect the 
wealth of the families who live there” (p. 1252).  Defense counsel also attacked the notion that 
classification by wealth violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  
“[C]lassification by wealth is constitutional so long as the wealth is that of the district, not the 
individual” (p. 1252).  Finally, according to defense attorneys, “[A]ny unequal treatment is only 
de facto, not de jure.  Since the United States Supreme Court has not held de facto school 
segregation on the basis of race to be unconstitutional, …de facto classifications on the basis of 
wealth are presumptively valid” (p. 1253).  Finally, defendants’ legal counsel asserted that  
the applicability of the equal protection clause to school financing ha[d] 
already been resolved adversely to plaintiffs’ claims by the Supreme Court’s 
summary affirmance in McInnis v. Shapiro, supra, 293 F.Supp. 327, affd. 
Mem. Sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie (1969) 394 U.S. 44, 90 S.Ct. 812, 25 L. 
Ed.2d. 37.  (p. 1263) 
 
 Attorneys for plaintiffs argued that California’s system for financing public education 
causes “substantial disparities in the quality and extent of availability of educational 
opportunities” (p. 1244).  As a result, plaintiff attorneys continued, the “educational 
opportunities made available to … plaintiff children are substantially inferior to the educational 
opportunities made available to children attending public schools in many other districts of the 
State…” (p. 1244).  Therefore, plaintiffs’ legal counsel concluded, “The financing scheme thus 
fails to meet the requirements of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and the California Constitution…” (p. 1244). 
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 Holding & disposition. 
 Announcing the major finding of the California Supreme Court, Justice Sullivan 
declared, “We have determined that this funding scheme invidiously discriminates against the 
poor because it makes the quality of a child’s education a function of the wealth of his parents 
and neighbors” (p. 1244).  Continuing, Justice Sullivan announced the state high court’s 6-1 
ruling in terms of the intersection of education with the Equal Protection Clause which required 
the application of strict scrutiny: 
Recognizing as we must that the right to an education in our public schools 
is a fundamental interest which cannot be conditioned on wealth, we can 
discern no compelling state purpose necessitating the present method of 
financing.  We have concluded, therefore, that such a system cannot 
withstand constitutional challenge and must fall before the equal protection 
clause.  (p. 1244) 
 
Reversing the judgment of the lower court, the California Supreme Court “remanded” the case 
“to the trial court with directions to overrule the demurrers and to allow defendants a reasonable 
time within which to answer” (p. 1266). 
 Court’s rationale. 
 In addressing the legal issues under dispute in Serrano v. Priest, the California Supreme 
Court conducted a four-part examination.  The subject matter contained in each of the four parts 
included the following: 
• California’s system of financing public school education; 
• plaintiff’s argument that the school financing system violated the California State 
Constitution; 
• the intersection of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and the 
subject matter of California’s public school financing system. 
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• the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to public school financing systems in 
light of the McInnis decision. 
In tracing the California High Court’s response to each subject area listed previously, the reader 
will be able to follow the rationale used by the California Supreme Court in reaching its decision. 
 Noting that local property taxes constituted “by far the major source of school revenue,” 
the California High Court observed that the “amount of revenue which a district can raise in this 
manner thus depends largely on its tax base – i.e., the assessed valuation of real property within 
its borders” (p. 1246).  Observing that tax bases varied “widely throughout the state,” the State 
Supreme Court further noted that California distributed about half of the state’s educational 
funds (not to be confused with the funds raised within each district by its property tax levy) on a 
“uniform per pupil basis to all districts, irrespective of a district’s wealth” (pp. 1247, 1248).  
According to the California Supreme Court, this “basic aid … actually widens the gap between 
rich and poor districts” because poor districts get that amount as part of equalizing funds while 
wealthy districts too rich to qualify for the equalizing funds still receive the basic uniform grant 
(p. 1248).  Table 9 below illustrates the variability of funding available for educational purposes 
across the state which the State Supreme Court used as provided by the state’s legislative analyst 
(p. 1247, n. 9).  Citing multiple sources, the California Supreme Court noted that California’s 
situation wasn’t that different from other states.  “Similar spending disparities have been noted 
throughout the country, particularly when suburban communities and urban ghettos are 
compared” (p. 1247, n. 9).  Noting the difference in funds available to children in “Baldwin 
Park” and “Beverly Hills,” the court characterized the variance as an “economic chasm” (p. 
1248).  
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Table 9: 
California Public School Districts: Range of 1969-1970  










 Satisfied that it had adequately “outlined the basic framework of California school 
financing,” the court next addressed the constitutionality of that system under Article IX, Section 
5 of the California Constitution which stated:  “The Legislature shall provide for a system of 
common schools by which a free school shall be kept up and supported in each district at least six 
months in every year” (Emphasis in original) (p. 1248).  Rejecting the argument that California’s 
system of financing schools violated the California Constitution, the Court pointed out that it had 
previously defined “system” as implying “a ‘unity of purpose, as well as an entirety of 
operation’” (p. 1248).  Continuing its elucidation, the California Supreme Court explained: 
[W]e have never interpreted the constitutional provision to require equal 
school spending; we have ruled only that the educational system must be 
uniform in terms of the prescribed course of study and educational 
progression from grade to grade.  (p. 1249) 
 
 The Supreme Court of California next moved to the next issue, that involving the major 
question of the case, as to whether or not the “California public school financing scheme violates 
 
Assessed Valuations Per Pupil 
 Elementary High School 
Low $        103 $   11,959 
Median $   19,600 $   41,300 
High $ 952,156 $ 349,093 
Per Pupil Expenditures 
 Elementary High School Unified 
Low $    407 $      722 $    622 
Median $    672 $      898 $    766 
High $ 2,586 $   1,767 $ 2,414 
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the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution” (p. 
1249).  In doing so, the California Supreme Court addressed the following issues in order as 
listed below: 
• the tests required “for measuring legislative classifications against the equal 
protection clause” (p. 1249); 
• the issue of “wealth as a suspect classification” (p. 1250); 
• the claim of “education as a fundamental interest” (p. 1255); and 
• the question of whether or not the current financing system is “necessary to 
accomplish a compelling state interest” (p. 1259). 
 The California High Court distinguished between a rational basis test and the strict 
scrutiny test as used by the U.S. Supreme Court in “measuring legislative classifications against 
the equal protection clause” (p. 1249).  Explaining the rational basis test, the California Supreme 
Court observed: 
In the area of economic regulation, the high court has exercised restraint, 
investing legislation with a presumption of constitutionality and requiring 
merely that distinctions drawn by a challenged statute bear some rational 
relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose.  (p. 1249) 
 
However, cases that either entail “suspect classifications” or involve “fundamental interests” 
require use of a more “active and critical analysis” that subjects “the classification to strict 
scrutiny” (p. 1249).  The California Court explained: 
Under the strict standard applied in such cases, the state bears the burden of 
establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law 
but that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its 
purpose.  (Emphasis in original) (p. 1249) 
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 Next the Supreme Court of California moved to the question of whether wealth 
constitutes a suspect classification that would require use of the strict scrutiny standard.  
Drawing upon the record of the nation’s High Court, the California justices noted: 
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has demonstrated a marked 
antipathy toward legislative classifications which discriminate on the basis 
of certain “suspect” personal characteristics.  One factor which has 
repeatedly come under the close scrutiny of the high court is wealth.  “Lines 
drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race [citation], are 
traditionally disfavored.”  (Harper v. Virginia State Bd. Of Elections (1966) 
383 U.S. 663, 668…)  (p. 1250) 
 
Connecting the issue of wealth to the legal issue at hand, the state court observed: 
Plaintiffs contend that the school financing system classifies on the basis of 
wealth.  We find this proposition irrefutable.  As we have already discussed, 
over half of all education revenue is raised locally by levying taxes on real 
property in the individual school districts.  (p. 1250) 
 
The California Supreme Court also pointed out that “as a practical matter districts with small tax 
bases simply cannot levy taxes at a rate sufficient to produce the revenue that more affluent 
districts reap with minimal tax efforts” (p. 1250).  The State Supreme Court of California 
concluded: “Thus, affluent districts can have their cake and eat it too: they can provide a high 
quality education for their children while paying lower taxes.  Poor districts, by contrast, have no 
cake at all” (pp. 1251-1252).  And, the state high court further observed, 
The commercial and industrial property which augments a district’s tax base 
is distributed unevenly throughout the state.  To allot more educational 
dollars to the children of one district than to those of another merely because 
of the fortuitous presence of such property is to make the quality of a child’s 
education dependent upon the location of private commercial and industrial 
establishments.  Surely, this is to rely on the most irrelevant of factors as the 
basis for educational financing.  (pp. 1252-1253) 
 
Having shown that wealth is a suspect classification that would require the use of the strict 
scrutiny test to determine applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, 
the state court subsequently moved to connect California’s system of financing public education 
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to wealth as a suspect classification.  According to the California Supreme Court, “In sum, we 
are of the view that the school financing system discriminates on the basis of the wealth of a 
district and its residents” (p. 1255). 
 The Supreme Court of California next addressed the question of whether or not education 
could be identified as a “fundamental interest” (p. 1255).  The state high court first began by 
scrutinizing “the indispensable role which education plays in the modern industrial state” (p. 
1255).  The California Supreme Court continued: 
This role, we believe, has two significant aspects: first, education is a major 
determinant of an individual’s chances for economic and social success in 
our competitive society; second, education is a unique influence on a child’s 
development as a citizen and his participation in political and community 
life.  (pp. 1255-1256) 
 
The court summarized the importance of education by observing that “education is the lifeline of 
both the individual and society” (p. 1256).  Before citing both U.S. Supreme Court and 
California Supreme Court cases in which the “fundamental importance of education [was] 
recognized,” the California High Court noted that the cases were “not of precedential value 
because they do not consider education in the context of wealth discrimination” (p. 1256, n. 23).  
However, the court continued, “Our quotation of these cases is not intended to suggest that they 
control the legal result which we reach here, but simply that they eloquently express the crucial 
importance of education” (Emphasis in original) (p. 1256, n. 23). 
 After citing specific descriptions of education’s importance from Brown v. Board of 
Education, the California Supreme Court turned attention to its own case law, focusing on 
descriptions that emphasized the “twin themes of the importance of education to the individual 
and to society” (p. 1257).  The Supreme Court of California next noted that it was  
illuminating to compare in importance the right to an education with the 
rights of defendants in criminal cases and the right to vote – two 
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‘fundamental interests’ which the Supreme Court has already protected 
against discrimination based on wealth.  (p. 1257) 
 
“The analogy between education and voting is much more direct,” the state court observed, 
because “both are crucial to participation in, and the functioning of, a democracy” (p. 1258).  
Concluding its examination of education as a fundamental interest, the California Supreme Court 
declared, “We are convinced that the distinctive and priceless function of education in our 
society warrants, indeed compels, our treating it as a ‘fundamental interest’” (p. 1258). 
 Having reached a finding that the California system of financing public education was 
based on wealth, which is a suspect classification, and having identified education as a 
fundamental interest, and having thus reached the point where the “’strict scrutiny’ equal 
protection standard” was required to ascertain whether or not the state had a compelling interest 
in creating a system of financing public education based on wealth that involved a subject matter 
of fundamental interest, i.e., education, the Supreme Court of California next addressed the 
required question (p. 1259).  Following a three-page examination of the question regarding the 
issue of compelling interest for the state government, the court announced its finding. 
We find that such a financing system as presently constituted is not 
necessary to the attainment of any compelling state interest.  Since it does 
not withstand the requisite “strict scrutiny,” it denies to the plaintiffs and 
others similarly situated the equal protection of the laws.  If the allegations 
of the complaint are sustained, the financial system must fall and the statutes 
comprising it must be found unconstitutional.  (p. 1263) 
 
 Moving to the final question, the California Supreme Court addressed the claim that the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s affirmation of the decision reached by the “three-judge federal district 
court” in McInnis v. Shapiro in 1969  prevented the “applicability of the equal protection clause 
to school financing” (p. 1263).  The McInnis case had challenged the Illinois system of financing 
public education.  However, according to the California Supreme Court, the contentions of 
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plaintiffs in the two cases were “significantly different” (p. 1264).  In Serrano, the plaintiffs 
contended that “discrimination on the basis of wealth is an inherently suspect classification 
which may be justified only on the basis of a compelling state interest” (p. 1264).  In McInnis, 
plaintiffs contended that “educational needs” is “the proper standard for measuring school 
financing against the equal protection clause” (p. 1265).  According to the California court, 
“[T]he nonjusticiability of the ‘educational needs’ standard was the basis for the McInnis 
holding” (p. 1265).  The California court explained:  “The district court found this a ‘nebulous 
concept’ – so nebulous as to render the issue nonjusticiable for lack of ‘discoverable and 
manageable standards’” (p. 1265).  The California court concluded its examination of McInnis 
by the following finding: “In this context, a Supreme Court affirmance can hardly be considered 
dispositive of the significant and complex constitutional questions presented here” (p. 1265). 
 Reaching its final finding that would govern its holding that the California system of 
financing public school education was unconstitutional because of conflict with the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the California Supreme Court declared: 
[W]e are satisfied that plaintiff children have alleged facts showing that the 
public school financing system denies them equal protection of the laws 
because it produces substantial disparities among school districts in the 
amount of revenue available for education.  (p. 1265) 
 
 Concurring/dissenting opinions. 
 Justice McComb dissented, but offered no separate opinion, stating that he agreed with 
Justice Dunn’s opinion in “the Court of Appeal in Serrano v. Priest, 10 Cal.App.3d 1110, 89 
Cal.Rptr. 345” (p. 1266). 
 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 Facts & procedural history. 
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 The original plaintiffs in the case, who became the appellees upon the original 
defendants’ appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court being granted a hearing, Demetrio Rodriguez and 
other Mexican-American parents residing in the Edgewood Independent School District, filed a 
class action lawsuit “on behalf of schoolchildren throughout the State who are members of 
minority groups or who are poor and reside in school districts having a low property tax base” (p. 
5).  Plaintiffs’ suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.  
Their suit argued 
that the Texas system’s reliance on local property taxation favors the more 
affluent and violates equal protection requirements because of substantial 
interdistrict disparities in per-pupil expenditures resulting primarily from 
differences in the value of assessable property among the districts.  (p. 1) 
 
 Defendants named in the initial legal action, some of whom became the appellants upon 
appealing to have their legal issues heard by the U.S. Supreme Court following the initial case, 
were originally the “seven school districts in the San Antonio metropolitan area” as well as “the 
State Board of Education, the Commissioner of Education, the State Attorney General, and the 
Bexar County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees” (p. 5, n. 2; p. 5).  One needs a scorecard to keep 
track of the San Antonio School District throughout the entire legal process of this case.  
Originally named a defendant in the case, it and the other named school districts were dismissed 
from the case by the District Court as a result of “a pretrial conference” (p. 5, n. 2).  Following 
their dismissal from the original case by the “three-judge court … impaneled” to try the case, the 
San Antonio School District joined the Mexican-American “plaintiffs’ challenge to the State’s 
school finance system (Emphasis added) (p. 6; p. 5, n. 2).  Upon the appeal by the State of Texas 
to be heard by the U.S. Supreme Court, the San Antonio School District “filed an amicus curiae 
brief in support of” the original plaintiffs of the case (Emphasis in original) (p. 5, n. 2).  
Although dismissed as a defendant in the original case, the original name given to the case, 
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Rodriguez et al. v. San Antonio Independent School District et al. remained.  The names were 
reversed following the defendants’ legal defeat at the federal district court level and ensuing 
appeal that was granted by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 Originally filed during “the summer of 1968” in the federal district court serving the 
federal jurisdictional district of western Texas by the plaintiff parents, a “three-judge court was 
impaneled in January 1969” to try the case (p. 6).  The U.S. District Court, Western District of 
Texas, then delayed the trial for two years in order to “permit extensive pretrial discovery and to 
allow completion of a pending Texas legislative investigation concerning the need for reform of 
its public school finance system” (p. 6, n. 4).  Following the issuance of the report, Public School 
Finance Problems in Texas, prepared by the Texas Research League, the Texas “legislature 
failed to act in its 1971 Regular Session,” a failure that was characterized by the Justice Marshall 
as follows:  “The strong vested interest of property-rich districts in the existing property tax 
scheme poses a substantial barrier to self-initiated legislative reform in educational financing” (p. 
71, n. 2, Marshall, J. , dissenting).  According to Justice Marshall’s reading of the evidentiary 
record, “It was only after the legislature failed to act … that the District Court, apparently 
recognizing the lack of hope for self-initiated legislative reform, rendered its decision” (p. 71, n. 
2, Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 In December 1971, the three-judge panel for the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Texas issued its decision “in a per curiam opinion [a decision rendered by 
the whole court instead of by a single judge]109 holding the Texas school finance system 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” (p. 6).   
The District Court, finding that wealth is a “suspect” classification and that 
education is a “fundamental” right, concluded that the system could be 
upheld only upon a showing, which appellants [the State of Texas] failed to 
make, that there was a compelling state interest for the system.  The court 
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also concluded that appellants [the State of Texas] failed even to 
demonstrate a reasonable or rational basis for the State’s system.  (pp. 1-2) 
 
Upon appeal by the State of Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court “noted probable jurisdiction to 
consider the far-reaching constitutional questions presented” (p. 6). 
 Legal question. 
 The Court addressed three primary legal questions.  First, does the Texas system of 
financing public school education “operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class” in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (p. 28)?  Second, does the 
Texas school finance scheme “interfere with the exercise of a ‘fundamental’ right,” namely 
education, and thus “require the application of the strict standard of judicial review” (p. 29)?  
Third, does the Texas system of school finance “bear some rational relationship to legitimate 
state purposes” that have been “articulated” by the state (pp. 40, 17)? 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 Attorneys for the appellees/original plaintiffs in the case asserted that the Texas school 
finance system relied primarily upon local property taxes which operated to the detriment “of 
poor families residing in school districts having a low property tax base” while “favor[ing] the 
more affluent” (p. 1).  Operating in this fashion, the school finance system creates “substantial 
interdistrict disparities in per-pupil expenditures” which results in poorer quality educational 
opportunities for students in property-poor districts (p. 1).  The Texas school finance system thus 
creates discrimination based on wealth in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Furthermore, because such discrimination impairs students’ abilities to 
enjoy the fundamental right of education, the judicial standard used to measure the Texas school 
finance system against the Equal Protection Clause should be the judicial standard of strict 
scrutiny. 
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 Attorneys for the appellants/original defendants in the case conceded “the existence of 
major disparities in spendable funds” for Texas school districts to use in educating students 
residing within their boundaries (p. 64).  However, they continued, 
the disparities do not invidiously discriminate against children and families 
in districts such as Edgewood, because the Texas scheme is designed “to 
provide an adequate education for all, with local autonomy to go beyond 
that as individual school districts desire and are able….  It leaves to the 
people of each district the choice whether to go beyond the minimum and, if 
so, by how much.”  (p. 64) 
 
The Texas school finance system does not discriminate on the basis of wealth, but instead has 
created “the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program” in order “to help offset disparities in 
local spending” ability (p. 9).  The use of the strict scrutiny judicial standard is therefore not 
warranted.  Furthermore, if subjected to the “strict judicial scrutiny” standard, “the Texas 
financing system and its counterpart in virtually every other State will not pass muster” (pp. 16, 
17).  
 Holding & disposition. 
 By the slimmest of margins, the Court issued a 5-4 decision for the appellant State of 
Texas and “reversed” the decision of the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Texas (p. 2).  Justices Powell, Burger, Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist constituted the slim 
majority while Justices Brennan, White, Douglas, and Marshall dissented in written opinions.  
Holdings announced by the Court included the following: 
• “The Texas system does not disadvantage any suspect class” (p. 2).  The Texas school 
finance system does not discriminate based on wealth. 
• “Nor does the Texas school-financing system impermissibly interfere with the 
exercise of a ‘fundamental’ right or liberty” (p. 2).  While important, education “is 
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not within the limited category of rights recognized by this Court as guaranteed by the 
Constitution” (p. 2). 
• “This is not a proper case in which to examine a State’s laws under standards of strict 
judicial scrutiny” (p. 2). 
• “The Texas system” of school finance, while “concededly imperfect, … bears a 
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose” (p. 2). 
 Court’s rationale. 
 Before arguments in the case were heard before the national bar of justice in Washington, 
D.C., the justices received briefs of amici curiae arguing for the Court to reverse the federal 
district court’s decision in Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District from thirty (30) 
states, or from 60% of the states in the union, more formally called The United States of 
America.  Almost all of the briefs were submitted from the State Attorney General’s office in the 
various states.  The states, listed alphabetically, are shown below in Table 10 as listed in a note 
of the Court’s opinion (pp. 3-4).   
Table 10 
States Submitting Briefs to the Supreme Court Urging Reversal 







States filing briefs of amici curiae urging the Supreme Court to affirm the lower court’s ruling 
were fewer in number:  one from the Governor of Minnesota (p. 4, note).  Interestingly, while the 
 
Alabama Iowa Missouri South Carolina 
Arizona Kansas Nebraska South Dakota 
California Kentucky New Hampshire Tennessee 
Colorado Louisiana New Jersey Utah 
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 Mississippi Oregon 
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attorney general’s office for California filed a brief urging reversal, the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction of California and the Controller of California both submitted briefs urging affirmation 
of the lower court’s ruling.  Briefs urging affirmation of the lower court ruling were also 
submitted by the San Antonio Independent School District as well as from an attorney 
representing John Serrano, Jr. et al (pp. 4-5, note).  When you include the State of Texas, 
appellant in the legal action before the nation’s highest court, thirty-one states felt their state’s 
system for financing public education was jeopardized by the federal district court’s ruling in 
Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District. 
 Writing for the slender majority of five justices, Justice Powell delivered the 5-4 decision 
of the Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.  Beginning with 
an examination of the historical development of the Texas system of school finance in order to 
establish “the framework for our analysis,” Justice Powell described the tasks to be addressed by 
the opinion: 
We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financing public 
education operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges 
upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the 
Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny.  (p. 17) 
 
He continued: 
If so, the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.  If not, the 
Texas scheme must still be examined to determine whether it rationally 
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and therefore does not 
constitute an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  (p. 17) 
 
Next, while nominally addressing the legal questions posed previously, Justice Powell actually 
began critiquing the District Court’s analysis and findings in the case.  First summarizing the 
lower court’s steps and analysis, Justice Powell concluded by announcing, “Indeed, for the 
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several reasons that follow, we find neither the suspect-classification nor the fundamental-
interest analysis persuasive” (p. 18).  He spent the rest of the opinion explaining that assertion. 
 In Justice Powell’s view, in confronting the issue of wealth as a suspect classification 
with regards to state school finance schemes, the District Court for the Western District of Texas 
“relied on decisions dealing with the rights of indigents to equal treatment in the criminal trial 
and appellate processes, and on cases disapproving wealth restrictions on the right to vote,” and 
“regarded those precedents as controlling” (p. 18).  Justice Powell referenced the following 
decisions in which “school-financing laws in other States” were “struck down” (p. 18):   
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971); Van Dusartz v. 
Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (Minn. 1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. 
Super. 223, 287 A. 2d 187 (1972); Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 
N.W. 2d 457 (1972, rehearing granted, Jan. 1973. 
 
Powell characterized the process these courts used in reaching their findings of wealth being a 
suspect classification in school finance schemes as “a simplistic process of analysis” that 
“largely ignore[d] the hard threshold questions” that need to be considered prior to a 
determination that “a State’s laws and the justifications for the classifications they [the State’s 
laws] create are [to be] subjected to strict judicial scrutiny” (p. 19).  The threshold questions 
were necessary, in Justice Powell’s view, because precedents from two other subject matters, i.e., 
rights of criminals (to legal counsel, etc.) and the right to vote (polling taxes & filing fees to vote 
in primary elections), that shared “distinguishing characteristics” were being applied to a third 
subject matter, public school financing systems (p. 20).  The different subject matters of criminal 
rights and the right to vote shared these characteristics, according to Powell’s opinion:   
The individuals, or groups of individuals, who constituted the class 
discriminated against … shared two distinguishing characteristics:  because 
of their impecunity they were completely unable to pay for some desired 
benefit, and as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a 
meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit.  (p. 20) 
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 Continuing to proceed with a narrow interpretation, Powell articulated the majority 
opinion’s view that the two critical threshold questions included asking “whether it makes a 
difference … that the class of disadvantaged ‘poor’ cannot be identified or defined in customary 
equal protection terms” as well as inquiring “whether the relative – rather than absolute – nature 
of the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence” (p. 19).  Later, Justice Powell 
explained what he meant by a “relative – rather than absolute” deprivation.   
The argument here is not that the children in districts having relatively low 
assessable property values are receiving no public education; rather, it is that 
they are receiving a poorer quality education than that available to children 
in districts having more assessable wealth.  (p. 23) 
 
Powell then noted that “a sufficient answer to appellees’ argument is that, at least where wealth 
is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal 
advantages” (p. 24). 
 Continuing to focus on the term “poor” as applied to individuals, instead of the term 
“poverty” as applied to school districts and their residents who are poor as defined by relative 
status in terms of assessed valuations for property taxes, Justice Powell observed that the Federal 
District Court for the Western District of Texas made “no definitive description of the classifying 
facts or delineation of the disfavored class” (p. 19).  However, Powell’s study “of the District 
Court’s opinion and of appellees’ complaint, briefs, and contentions at oral argument” revealed 
“at least three ways in which the discrimination” could be described (p. 19).  According to 
Justice Powell: 
The Texas system of school financing might be regarded as discriminating 
(1) against “poor” persons whose incomes fall below some identifiable level 
of poverty or who might be characterized as functionally “indigent,” or (2)  
against those who are relatively poorer than others, or (3) against all those 
who, irrespective of their personal incomes, happen to reside in relatively 
poorer school districts.  (pp. 19-20) 
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Powell then proceeded to eliminate the first two categories, first by citing a Connecticut study of 
school districts which “concluded that ‘[i]t is clearly incorrect … to contend that the ‘poor’ live 
in ‘poor’ districts;” and second, by observing that “there is no basis on the record in this case for 
assuming that the poorest people – defined by reference to any level of absolute impecunity – are 
concentrated in the poorest districts” (p. 23).  Powell never directly confronted, however, the 
third category that he had discovered from an examination of the legal record, that regarding the 
category of people who “happen to reside in relatively poorer school districts” (p. 20).  Instead, 
he disingenuously focused on that claim being not based on any absolute deprivation, but instead 
characterized the deprivation as being a relative one in comparison to the higher quality 
education received by children residing in affluent districts in terms of assessed valuation for 
property tax purposes.  
 In the manner illustrated by the preceding material, Justice Powell reached the point 
where he could announce an initial determination reached by the narrow majority of the Court’s 
finding regarding the first legal question: “Does the Texas system of financing public school 
education “operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class” in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (p. 28)?  According to Powell: 
For these two reasons – the absence of any evidence that the financing 
system discriminates against any definable category of “poor” people or that 
it results in the absolute deprivation of education – the disadvantaged class 
is not susceptible of identification in traditional terms.  (p. 25) 
 
Since, according to the slim Court majority, the disadvantaged class was not traditionally 
identifiable, it must mean that the Court was being asked to apply the strict scrutiny standard to 
something novel.  As described by Justice Powell: 
[A]ppelles’ suit asks this Court to extend its most exacting scrutiny to 
review a system that allegedly discriminates against a large, diverse, and 
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amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts 
that happen to have less taxable wealth than other districts.  (p. 28) 
 
He continued to distance the subject matter of the case from his view of traditional norms: 
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of 
the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such 
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, 
or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command 
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.  (p. 28) 
 
Powell then announced the Court’s initial finding in answer to the first legal question referenced 
previously:  “We thus conclude that the Texas system does not operate to the peculiar 
disadvantage of any suspect class” (p. 28). 
 The slender Court majority next focused on the question of whether education was a 
“’fundamental’ right,” a right with which interference in receiving would require “the application 
of the strict standard of judicial review” (p. 29).  The Court began by citing Brown’s views on 
the importance of education “in the context of racial discrimination” (p. 29).  After identifying 
the theme of Brown’s view on the “importance of education to our democratic society” as 
“expressing an abiding respect for the vital role of education in a free society,” and after noting 
multiple decisions of the Court which contained a similar view, Justice Powell framed his view 
of the issue:  “But the importance of a service performed by the State does not determine 
whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal 
Protection Clause” (p. 30).  Powell then followed up by citing remarks by a fellow justice (who 
was voting with him in the current case), Justice Stewart, in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 
642: 
The Court today does not “pick out particular human activities, characterize 
them as ‘fundamental,” and give them added protection ….”  To the 
contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it must, an established 
constitutional right, and gives to that right no less protection than the 
Constitution itself demands.  (Emphasis in original) (p. 31) 
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After citing further cases articulating a similar view as expressed by Justice Stewart in Shapiro, 
Justice Powell summarized the “lesson of these cases in addressing the question now before the 
Court…” (p. 33).  According to Powell’s summary: 
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights 
in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.  Thus, the key to 
discovering whether  education is “fundamental” is not to be found in 
comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to 
subsistence or housing.  (p. 33) 
 
“Rather, the answer,” Justice Powell concluded, “lies in assessing whether there is a right to 
education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution” (pp. 33-34).   Immediately 
finding the answer he sought, Justice Powell declared: “Education, of course, is not among the 
rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.  Nor do we find any basis for 
saying it is implicitly so protected” (p. 35).  Addressing the connection between education and 
the “individual’s right to speak and to vote,” Powell observed that the Court had “never 
presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most 
effective speech or the most informed electoral choice” (p. 36).  While effective speech and an 
educated citizenry able to make effective election decisions were “desirable goals of a system of 
freedom of expression and of a representative form of government,” such goals “are not values to 
be implemented by judicial intrusion into otherwise legitimate state activities” (p. 36).  Instead, 
these goals should “be pursued by a people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from 
governmental interference” (p. 36).  But, the narrow Court majority continued: 
Even if it were conceded that … education is a constitutionally protected 
prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication 
that the present levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide an 
education that falls short.  (pp. 36-37) 
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Announcing the Court majority’s answer to the second legal question regarding whether 
education was a fundamental right whose exercise fell under the protection of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Justice Powell issued 
an indirect answer:  “We have carefully considered each of the arguments supportive of the 
District Court’s finding that education is a fundamental right or liberty and have found those 
arguments unpersuasive” (p. 37).   
 Having previously found that the Texas school finance system does not discriminate on 
the basis of wealth, and having also found that education is not a fundamental right whose 
exercise would be protected by the Equal Protection Clause should it have been found to be a 
fundamental right, the Court next ruled on the question regarding the proper judicial standard to 
be employed in examining the complaints against the system of public school finance in Texas.  
According to Justice Powell’s opinion for the 5-4 majority in San Antonia Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez: 
[T]his is not a case in which the challenged state action must be subjected to 
the searching judicial scrutiny reserved for laws that create suspect 
classifications or impinge upon constitutionally protected rights….  A 
century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause 
affirmatively supports the application of the traditional standard of review, 
which requires only that the State’s system be shown to bear some rational 
relationship to legitimate state purposes.  (p. 40) 
 
 During the course of the Court’s examination of the state’s rational basis for the Texas 
system for financing public education, the Court addressed several topics, one of which included 
the important role played by states in serving as laboratories of experimentation to “try novel 
social and economic experiments” in the scheme of federalism characterized previously by 
Justice Brandeis in “New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting)” (p. 50).  Justice Powell also referred numerous times to the benefits of local control 
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and the proper role of the judiciary in a constitutional democracy.  Given the nature of these 
topics, the discerning reader could easily ascertain the Court majority’s destined finding.  
Nevertheless, a brief tracing of the footsteps taken in reaching the obvious conclusion might be 
helpful.   
 Regarding the limits of the judiciary, Justice Powell first pointed out that what the Court 
was being asked to do lay outside it’s traditional area of expertise: 
We are asked to condemn the State’s judgment in conferring on political 
subdivisions the power to tax local property to supply revenues for local 
interests.  In so doing, appellees would have the Court intrude in an area in 
which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures.  (p. 40) 
 
Continuing in the same vein while at the same time connecting expertise with the theme of local 
control, Justice Powell again observed: 
Thus, we stand on familiar ground when we continue to acknowledge that 
the Justices of this Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with 
local problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to 
the raising and disposition of public revenues.  Yet, we are urged to direct 
the States either to alter drastically the present system or to throw out the 
property tax altogether in favor of some other form of taxation.  (Emphasis 
added) (p. 41) 
 
Maintaining a steady course, Justice Powell subsequently augmented the connection he’d made 
between the judicial lack of expertise in certain areas requiring that deference be given to 
legislatures as well as the notion that respect be accorded the notion of local control.  In Justice 
Powell’s view: 
In addition to matters of fiscal policy, this case also involves the most 
persistent and difficult questions of educational policy, another area in 
which this Court’s lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels 
against premature interference with the informed judgments made at the 
state and local levels.  (p. 42) 
 
 Continuing the same vein of argument, Justice Powell next connected the Court’s lack of 
expertise in areas deferred to legislatures and the notion of local control to a third thematic area, 
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that of experimentation by the states in order to find solutions to complex issues.  Tentatively at 
first, Powell pointed out that “[t]he very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a 
statewide public school system suggests that ‘there will be more than one constitutionally 
permissible method of solving them’” (p. 42).  Communicated somewhat stronger the next time 
regarding the need for experimentation, Justice Powell continued connecting this thread to those 
centered on judicial deference: 
The ultimate wisdom as to … problems of education is not likely to be 
divined for all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate the 
issues.  In such circumstances, the judiciary is well advised to refrain from 
imposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could 
circumscribe or handicap the continued research and experimentation so 
vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems….  (Emphasis 
added) (p. 43) 
 
Justice Powell would return to the need for states to serve as laboratories of experimentation in 
his examination of the rational basis of the Texas scheme for financing public education and 
explicitly reference Justice Brandeis comments in that discussion.  Finally, as will be shown, 
Powell would include a major reference to states as laboratories again in announcing the Court’s 
finding on the last remaining legal question centered on a rational basis for the Texas school 
financing system. 
 The five-justice majority disagreed with the District Court’s finding “that the State had 
failed even ‘to establish a reasonable basis’ for a system that results in different levels of per-
pupil expenditure” (p. 47).  For evidence in support of its assertion, Justice Powell, writing for 
himself and the four justices aligned with him, offered evidence in two parts.  The first part 
centered on the similarity between the Texas school finance scheme and that found in other 
states.  As Justice Powell opined, “In its reliance on state as well as local resources, the Texas 
system is comparable to the systems employed in virtually every other State” (pp. 47-48).  
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Justice Powell would return to this theme again in the penultimate sentence immediately prior to 
his announcement of the five-justice majority’s holding as to the rational basis for the Texas 
system of financing public education.  As Justice Powell observed: 
One also must remember that the system here challenged is not peculiar to 
Texas or to any other State.  In its essential characteristics, the Texas plan 
for financing public education reflects what many educators for a half 
century have thought was an enlightened approach to a problem for which 
there is no perfect solution.  (p. 55) 
 
In other words, to declare that the Texas scheme of financing education had no rational basis 
related to a legitimate state objective would be tantamount to invalidating school finance 
schemes in every other state.   
 The second evidentiary part of the Court majority’s assertion that the Texas system rested 
on a rational basis resided in its scheme’s implementation of the “foundation grant” theory as 
developed by “two New York educational reformers in the 1920’s, George D. Strayer and Robert 
M. Haig’ (p. 48).  Justice Powell cited from the forward to Strayer and Haig’s 1923 work, The 
Financing of Education in the State of New York, written by Professor Coleman to emphasize 
that the Strayer-Haig thesis rested upon accommodating the competing forces described by the 
following: 
The history of education since the industrial revolution shows a continual 
struggle between two forces: the desire by members of society to have 
educational opportunity for all children, and the desire of each family to 
provide the best education it can afford for its own children.  (p. 49) 
 
Powell immediately followed the preceding quotation with this assertion: “The Texas system of 
school finance is responsive to these two forces” (p. 49).  Buttressing the connection between 
local control as articulated by the Strayer-Haig thesis and the Texas school finance scheme, 
Justice Powell inserted comments by two current justices (Stewart and Rehnquist, both of whom 
were in the five-justice majority of the current decision) centering on the importance of local 
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control that were made in a Court decision rendered just the previous term.  Since local control 
contributed to pluralism, Justice Powell then addressed the connection between pluralism and 
experimentation as first articulated by Justice Brandeis.  According to Justice Powell: 
Pluralism also affords some opportunity for experimentation, innovation, 
and a healthy competition for educational excellence.  An analogy to the 
nation-State relationship in our federal system seems uniquely appropriate.  
Mr. Justice Brandeis identified as one of the peculiar strengths of our form 
of government each State’s freedom to “serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments.”  No area of social concern stands to 
profit more from a multiplicity of viewpoints and from a diversity of 
approaches than does public education.  (p. 50) 
 
Somewhat ironically, Justice Powell noted that local control lay at the heart of the appellees’ 
(original plaintiffs) legal challenge to the Texas scheme of financing public education.  In Justice 
Powell’s view: 
Appellees do not question the propriety of Texas’ dedication to local control 
of education.  To the contrary, they attack the school-financing system 
precisely because, in their view, it does not provide the same level of local 
control and fiscal flexibility in all districts.  Appellees suggest that local 
control could be preserved and promoted under other financing systems that 
resulted in more equality in educational expenditures.  (Emphasis added) (p. 
50) 
 
Addressing the issue of inequities found between school districts in Texas immediately prior to 
rendering a decision about the third legal question of the case, Powell stated: 
In sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school financing results in 
unequal expenditures between children who happen to reside  in different 
districts, we cannot say that such disparities are the product of a system that 
is so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory.  (pp. 54-55) 
 
Unifying previous threads of reasoning regarding local control, states as laboratories of 
experimentation, and judicial deference to legislatures in areas residing outside of judicial 
expertise, Justice Powell presented the five-justice majority’s finding regarding the third legal 
question, the rational basis test for the Texas school finance scheme: 
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We are unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of wisdom superior to that 
of legislators, scholars, and educational authorities in 50 States, especially 
where the alternatives proposed are only recently conceived and nowhere 
yet tested.  The constitutional standard under the Equal Protection Clause is 
whether the challenged state action rationally furthers a legitimate purpose 
or interest.  McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973).  We hold that 
the Texas plan abundantly satisfies this standard.  (Emphasis added) (p. 55) 
 
 Concurring/dissenting opinions. 
 Justice Stewart offered a concurring opinion in which he further buttressed the slender 
Court majority’s unwillingness to venture into uncharted waters on judicial grounds.  Admitting 
the validity of the parents’ complaints, he closed the door on judicial relief as the means of 
addressing those complaints.  According to Justice Stewart: 
The method of financing public schools in Texas, as in almost every other 
State, has resulted in a system of public education that can fairly be 
described as chaotic and unjust.  It does not follow, however, and I cannot 
find, that this system violates the Constitution of the United States.  (p. 59) 
 
Offering his view that the Equal Protection Clause conferred “no substantive rights and created 
no substantive liberties,” and that the proper function, therefore, of the Equal Protection Clause 
“is simply to measure the validity of classifications created by state laws,” Justice Stewart 
further offered his explanation of what that meant (Emphasis in original) (p. 59): 
There is hardly a law on the books that does not affect some people 
differently from others.  But the basic concern of the Equal Protect ion 
Clause is with state legislation whose purpose or effect is to create discrete 
and  objectively identifiable classes.  And with respect to such legislation, it 
has long been settled that the Equal Protection Clause is offended only by 
laws that are invidiously discriminatory – only by classifications that are 
wholly arbitrary or capricious.  (p. 60) 
 
 Three “vigorous” dissenting opinions were filed by the four justices not agreeing with the 
reasoning of their fellow justices who composed the five-member majority (Hall, 1992, p. 754).  
One was filed by Justice William Brennan, another was filed by Justice Byron White, who was 
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joined by Justice Brennan and Justice William O. Douglas, and the third dissent, the longest of 
the three, was filed by Justice Thurgood Marshall, who was joined by Justice Douglas. 
 While Justice Brennan joined Justice White’s dissent, he also offered a separate dissent in 
which he stated that education was a fundamental right.  Justice Brennan disagreed totally “with 
the Court’s rather distressing assertion that a right may be deemed ‘fundamental’ for the 
purposes of equal protection analysis only if it is ‘explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the 
Constitution’” (p. 62).  Referencing his agreement with Justice Marshall’s reasoning regarding 
fundamental rights, Justice Brennan explained his own position: 
Here [in this case], there can be no doubt that education is inextricably 
linked to the right to participate in the electoral process and to the rights of 
free speech and association guaranteed by the First Amendment…  This 
being so, any classification affecting education must be subjected to strict 
judicial scrutiny…  (p. 63) 
 
 Reaching his conclusion, Justice Brennan observed:  “[S]ince even the State concedes that the 
statutory scheme now before us cannot pass constitutional muster under this stricter standard of 
review, I can only conclude that the Texas school-financing scheme is constitutionally invalid” 
(p. 63). 
 Justice White, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, employed the rational basis 
scrutiny to the same subject matter as the five-member majority; however, he came to a 
completely opposite result.  Agreeing with the three-judge panel of the Federal District Court for 
the Western District of Texas, Justices White, Douglas, and Brennan found no rational basis for 
the Texas scheme of public school finance.  Unlike the justices in the slim majority, Justice 
White didn’t find credible the assertion by the State of Texas that “the Texas scheme is designed 
‘to provide an adequate education for all, with local autonomy to go beyond that as individual 
school districts desire and are able’” (p. 64).   Referencing the comparisons made between 
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Alamo Heights (a property-rich district in the San Antonio metropolitan area) and Edgewood (a 
property-poor district whose parents initiated the legal action under discussion), Justice White 
pointed out the following for his brethren in the majority: 
The difficulty with the Texas system, however, is that it provides a 
meaningful option to Alamo Heights and like school districts but almost 
none to Edgewood and those other districts with a low per-pupil real estate 
tax base.  In these latter districts, no matter how desirous parents are of 
supporting their schools with greater revenues, it is impossible to do so 
through the use of the real estate property tax.  In these districts, the Texas 
system utterly fails to extend a realistic choice to parents…  (pp. 64-65) 
 
In other words, the stated purpose of the financing scheme in Texas is to provide local control 
and offer districts a choice of spending more than the minimum amount provided.  However, as 
Justices White, Douglass, and Brennan point out in Justice White’s dissenting opinion, property-
poor districts do not have the choice to spend more if they so desire.  The classification scheme 
put in place by a heavy reliance on property taxes does not therefore relate to the state objective, 
that “of maximizing local initiative” (p. 67).  In Justice White’s words: 
If the State aims at maximizing local initiative and local choice, by 
permitting school districts to resort to the real property tax if they choose to 
do so, it utterly fails in achieving its purpose in districts with property tax 
bases so low that there is littlie if any opportunity for interested parents, rich 
or poor, to augment school district revenues.  (Emphasis added) (p. 68) 
 
Characterizing the equal protection analysis conducted by the five-member majority as “no more 
than an empty gesture” because it didn’t require “the State to show that the means chosen to 
effectuate [its] goal are rationally related to its achievement,” Justice White concluded:  “In my 
view, the parents and children in Edgewood, and in like districts, suffer from an invidious 
discrimination violative of the Equal Protection Clause” (p. 68).   
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 Nor did Justices White, Douglas, and Brennan have any “difficulty in identifying the 
class that is subject to the alleged discrimination and that is entitled to the benefits of the Equal 
Protection Clause” (p. 69).  Justice White explained: 
I need go no farther than the parents and children in the Edgewood district, 
… who assert that they are entitled to the same choice as Alamo Heights to 
augment local expenditures for schools but are denied that choice by state 
law.  This group constitutes a class sufficiently definite to invoke the 
protection of the Constitution.  (p. 69) 
 
Drawing an analogy to a class defined similarly by the Court, Justice White declared: “They [the 
parents and children of Edgewood] are as entitled to the protection of the Equal Protection 
Clause as were the voters in allegedly underrepresented counties in the reapportionment cases” 
(p. 69). 
 In his dissent, Justice Marshall identified multiple instances of flawed reasoning and 
avoidance of legal analysis on the part of the five-member majority opinion authored by Justice 
Powell.  Justice Marshall declared his view of the five-member majority’s decision in the second 
sentence of his dissenting opinion.  In Marshall’s view, the decision marked “an abrupt departure 
from the mainstream of recent state and federal court decisions concerning the 
unconstitutionality of state educational financing schemes dependent upon taxable local wealth” 
(p. 70).  Justice Marshall continued: 
More unfortunately, though, the majority’s holding can only be seen as a 
retreat from our historic commitment to equality of educational opportunity 
and as unsupportable acquiescence in a system which deprives children in 
their earliest years of the chance to reach their full potential as citizens.  (pp. 
69-70) 
 
Using an analogy that could have drawn upon the gambler’s shell game in which attention is 
diverted from the real object, Marshall implied the Court majority had substituted rhetoric in 
place of needed legal analysis.  According to Marshall, instead of “closely examining the 
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seriousness of these disparities and the invidiousness of the Texas financing scheme,” the Court 
majority instead chose to elaborate upon “the efforts Texas has purportedly made to close the 
gaps between its districts in terms of levels of district wealth and resulting educational funding” 
(p. 72).  In effect, the Court had created a smoke screen in order to shade the real issue, 
according to Justice Marshall: 
Yet, … the issue in this case is not whether Texas is doing its best to 
ameliorate the worst features of a discriminatory scheme but, rather, 
whether the scheme itself is in fact unconstitutionally discriminatory in the 
face of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the 
laws.  (p. 72) 
 
 Justice Marshall ridiculed the assertion by the State of Texas that “there is no denial of 
equal educational opportunity to any Texas schoolchildren as a result of the widely varying per-
pupil spending power provided districts under the current financing scheme” (p. 83).  According 
to Justice Marshall, “It is an inescapable fact that if one district has more funds available per 
pupil than another district, the former will have greater choice in educational planning than will 
the latter” (pp. 83-84).  Referencing a Supreme Court case with which he was familiar from his 
practice as an attorney with the NAACP, Justice Marshall quoted: 
That a child forced to attend an underfunded school with poorer physical 
facilities, less experienced teachers, larger classes, and a narrower range of 
courses than a school with substantially more funds – and thus with greater 
choice in educational planning – may nevertheless excel is to the credit of 
the child, not the State, cf. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 
349 (1938).  (p. 84) 
 
Justice Marshall took issue with the Court majority’s acceptance of a minimum level of 
education that the State of Texas argued was supplied by their school finance scheme.  Again, 
the Court majority missed the point.  In Justice Marshall’s view: 
But this Court has never suggested that because some “adequate” level of 
benefits is provided to all, discrimination in the provision of services is 
therefore constitutionally excusable.  The Equal Protection Clause is not 
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addressed to the minimal sufficiency but rather to the unjustifiable 
inequalities of state action.  It mandates nothing less than that “all persons 
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”  F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. 
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).  (p. 89) 
 
In Justice Marshall’s view, sufficient evidence substantiated the wide disparities in educational 
funding that occurred as a result of the state’s finance scheme, which should have raised red 
flags for the justices.   
Here, appellees have made a substantial showing of wide variations in 
educational funding and the resulting educational opportunity afforded to 
the school children of Texas.  This discrimination is, in large measure, 
attributable to significant disparities in the taxable wealth of local Texas 
school districts.  This is a sufficient showing to raise a substantial question 
of discriminatory state action in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  
(p. 90) 
 
Marshall ridiculed the Court majority’s use of the rational basis standard to judge the school 
finance scheme as an avoidance of “the telling task of searching for a substantial state interest 
which the Texas financing scheme, with its variations in taxable district property wealth, is 
necessary to further” (p. 98).  By testing “the Texas scheme” against a “lenient standard of 
rationality” that has “traditionally [been] applied to discriminatory state action in the context of 
economic and commercial matters,” the five-member majority promoted the “emasculation of 
the Equal Protection Clause in the context of this case” (p. 98).   
 In the context of proposing how the Court could proceed in adjudicating equal protection 
claims, Justice Marshall found fault with the Court’s “rigidified approach to equal protection 
analysis,” an approach that wasn’t borne out by an examination of existing case law (p. 98).   
The Court apparently seeks to establish today that equal protection cases fall 
into one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of 
review – strict scrutiny or mere rationality.  But this Court’s decisions in the 
field of equal protection defy such easy categorization.  A principled reading 
of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of 
standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal 
Protection Clause.  (p. 98) 
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Justice Marshall continued his explanation by describing the type of equal protection analysis to 
which he was referring: 
I find in fact that many of the Court’s recent decisions embody the very sort 
of reasoned approach to equal protection analysis for which I previously 
argued – that is, an approach in which “concentration [is] placed upon the 
character of the classification in question, the relative importance to 
individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits 
that they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the 
classification.”  (p. 99) 
 
Justice Marshall proceeded to discuss the case law of rights receiving strict scrutiny protection 
that were not mentioned in the Constitution, including the “right to procreate,” the “right to vote 
in state elections,” and the “right to an appeal from a criminal conviction” (p. 100).  While 
agreeing with the Court majority “that the process of determining which interests are 
fundamental is a difficult one,” Justice Marshall stated that it was not “insurmountable” (p. 102).  
Marshall countered both the view that the process of determining fundamental rights would 
“necessarily degenerate into an unprincipled, subjective ‘picking-and-choosing’ between various 
interests as well as the view that the Court would be involved “in creating ‘substantive 
constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws’” by simply stating 
he didn’t agree with such views.  To counter those views, he offered a specific process distilled 
from the Court’s own case law.  Basically, Justice Marshall drew attention to the fact that the 
exercise of constitutionally guaranteed rights often either depended upon or were connected 
significantly to other factors, some of which were fundamental to the exercise of that right while 
others were not.  Fundamental rights needed to be connected to a constitutionally guaranteed 
right.  The critical process was an examination of the nexus between a constitutional right and a 
possibly fundamental right.  The stronger the connection, the more fundamental a right could 
become along with a corresponding adjustment of the type of judicial scrutiny to be applied to 
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alleged infringements of that nonconstitutional interest.  According to Justice Marshall’s 
description: 
Although not all fundamental interests are constitutionally guaranteed, the 
determination of which interests are fundamental should be firmly rooted in  
the text of the Constitution.  The task in every case should be to determine 
the extent to which constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on 
interests not mentioned in the Constitution.  As the nexus between the 
specific constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws 
closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the 
degree of judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a 
discriminatory basis must be adjusted accordingly.  (pp. 102-103) 
 
Justice Marshall then proceeded to discuss specific cases wherein the Court applied higher 
standards of judicial scrutiny to state laws instead of adhering to “highly tolerant standards of 
traditional review” (p. 104).  Summarizing his review, Justice Marshall observed: 
In summary, it seems to me inescapably clear that this Court has 
consistently adjusted the care with which it will review state discrimination 
in light of the constitutional significance of the interests affected and the 
invidiousness of the particular classification.  (p. 109) 
 
Continuing, Justice Marshall summarized the difference between his interpretation and that of 
the five-member Court majority: 
The majority suggests, however, that a variable standard of review would 
give this Court the appearance of a “super-legislature.”  I cannot agree.  
Such an approach seems to me a part of the guarantees of our Constitution 
and of the historic experiences with oppression of and discrimination against 
discrete, powerless minorities which underlie that document.  (p. 109) 
 
 Justice Marshall then moved to an examination of the importance of education relative to 
other endeavors as well as the nexus between education and various constitutional rights in 
illustration of the analytical process he had proposed.  Near the end of this analysis, Justice 
Marshall criticized the Court majority for “seek[ing] refuge in the fact that the Court has ‘never 
presumed to … guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed 
electoral choice” (Emphasis in original) (p. 115).  “This,” criticized Justice Marshall, “serves 
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only to blur what is in fact at stake” (p. 115).  Marshall continued, “[T]he issue is neither 
provision of the most effective speech nor of the most informed vote.  Appellees do not now seek 
the best education Texas might provide” (Emphasis in original) (pp. 115-116).  Justice Marshall 
turned the focus upon what the appellees were seeking: 
They do seek, however, an end to state discrimination resulting from the 
unequal distribution of taxable district property wealth that directly impairs 
the ability of some districts to provide the same educational opportunity 
that other districts can provide with the same or even substantially less tax 
effort.  (p. 116) 
 
Having identified the location whereby the Court majority went off the track of proper legal 
analysis, and having focused attention upon the appellee complaint in terms of alleged state 
discrimination that possibly impaired a fundamental right, Justice Marshall stated both the issue 
and the question facing the Court that had been ignored by the Court majority. 
The issue is, in other words, one of discrimination that affects the quality of 
the education which Texas has chosen to provide its children; and, the 
precise question here is what importance should attach to education for 
purposes of equal protection analysis of that discrimination.  (Emphasis 
added) (p. 116) 
 
Referencing the Court’s decision in Brown, Justice Marshall concluded his discussion of 
education and constitutional issues as follows: 
As this Court held in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S., at 493, the 
opportunity of education, “where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a 
right which must be made available to all on equal terms.”  The factors just 
considered, including the relationship between education and the social and 
political interests enshrined within the Constitution, compel us to recognize 
the fundamentality of education and to scrutinize with appropriate care the 
bases for state discrimination affecting equality of educational opportunity 
in Texas’ school districts…  (p. 116) 
 
Several pages later, Justice Marshall concluded his dissent with a simple declaration: “I would 
therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court” (p. 133). 
 Aftermath of the case. 
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 For the decade following the Court’s decision in San Antonio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez, Texas tried “equalization” reforms of its school finance system in order to reduce 
the inequities flowing from its scheme; however, they failed (Hall, 1992, p. 754).  Since federal 
routes through the court system for a redress of grievances had been closed, in 1984 Rodriguez 
and other parents, with assistance from the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education 
Fund, filed suit in state court “on behalf of the Edgewood district” (Hall, 1992, p. 754).  The 
legal papers alleged “that Texas school finance policy violated the Texas constitution (Hall, 
1992, p. 754). 
 The case reached the Texas Supreme Court where the justices, in a unanimous vote in 
October 1989, found “for the petitioners in Edgewood v. Kirby (1989)” (Hall, 1992, p. 754).  
According to an historical account, the Texas Supreme Court 
declared that the legislature had failed “to establish and make suitable 
provision for … an efficient system of public free schools” throughout the 
state, as mandated by Article VII of the Texas constitution.  Existent 
inequality among the districts … affronted the constitutional vision of 
efficiency.  (Hall, 1992, p. 754) 
 
Describing the Texas high court’s order, the account also situated Texas in the context of other 
states experiencing legal challenges to their system of financing public education: 
The court ordered the legislature to redesign its school finance system by 1 
May 1990, so that districts would have access to relatively equal revenues 
per pupil when making equal tax efforts.  With this decision, Texas became 
the tenth state to have its state supreme court declare a school finance law in 
violation of the state constitution.  (Hall, 1992, p. 754) 
 
 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 Facts & procedural history. 
 In September 1988, a class action lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Texas “on behalf of school-age  children of Mexican origin … who could not 
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establish that they had been legally admitted into the United States” (p. 206).  Plyler, the 
Superintendent of the Tyler Independent School District, along with board members of the same 
school district were listed as defendants.  Upon the suit being filed, “the State of Texas 
intervened as a party-defendant” (p. 206).  Under Texas law, the plaintiff children were excluded 
from attending any of the public schools in the Tyler ISD because of their undocumented status.  
Besides providing for the exclusion from public educational services in school districts across 
Texas, the state law also prohibited districts from receiving any state funds for the education of 
undocumented children.  The class action lawsuit aimed to stop both practices, whose purpose 
was to exclude the children of illegal aliens from being educated in the public schools. 
 The District Court for the Eastern District of Texas issued a preliminary injunction 
“enjoining defendants from denying a free education to members of the plaintiff class” after 
determining that such a class (undocumented children of school age whose parents were 
Mexican) existed within the school district boundaries (p. 206).  Three months later the district 
court “conducted an extensive hearing on plaintiff’s motion for permanent injunctive relief” (p. 
206).  Making “extensive findings of fact,” the federal District Court for the Eastern District of 
Texas “held that illegal aliens were entitled to the protection of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment” and granted a permanent injunction against implementation and 
enforcement of the Texas statute complained of in the legal action (p. 208).  Following appeal 
being granted, the “Fifth Circuit Court upheld the District Court’s injunction” (p. 208). 
 While Plyler v. Doe was in the appeal process, more suits were filed in 1978 and 1979 
“in the United States District Courts for the Southern, Western, and Northern Districts of Texas” 
(p. 209).  All of the suits challenged the constitutionality of the Texas statute directed against 
school-age children of undocumented status.  All of the lawsuits “named the State of Texas and 
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the Texas Education Agency as defendants, along with local officials” (p. 209).  A federal 
“Judicial Panel … consolidated the claims against the state officials into a single action to be 
heard in the District Court for the Southern District of Texas” (p. 209).  Designated In re Alien 
Children Education Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, the Federal Court for the Southern District of 
Texas held that the Texas statute “violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment;” the court further ruled that “the absolute deprivation of education should trigger 
strict judicial scrutiny, particularly when the absolute deprivation is the result of complete 
inability to pay [tuition] for the desired benefit” (p. 209).  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
“summarily affirmed the decision of the Southern District” (p. 210). 
 Upon notification to the parties of “probable jurisdiction,” the U.S. Supreme Court 
consolidated both Plyler v. Doe and In re Alien Children Litigation “for briefing and argument” 
(p. 210). 
 Legal question. 
 May the State of Texas “deny to undocumented school-age children the free public 
education that it provides to children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted 
aliens” without violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (p. 205)?  In 
addressing this question, the Court would break it into two component parts: 1) Are illegal aliens 
entitled to the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment; and 2) Does the 
state law refusing reimbursement to school districts for the education of illegal aliens violate the 
Equal Protection Clause? 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 Attorneys for the State of Texas argued that “persons who have entered the United States 
illegally are not ‘within the jurisdiction’ of a State even if they are present within a State’s 
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boundaries and subject to its laws” (p. 211).  As a result, undocumented aliens “have no right to 
the equal protection of Texas law” (p. 210).  Attorneys for Texas also offered the following 
justifications for the law excluding illegal immigrants from public education:  1) “the State may 
seek to protect itself from an influx of illegal immigrants” (p. 228); 2) “undocumented children 
are appropriately singled out for exclusion because of the special burdens they impose on the 
State’s ability to provide high-quality public education” (p. 229); and finally, 3): 
undocumented children are appropriately singled out because their unlawful 
presence within the United States renders them less likely than other 
children to remain within the boundaries of the State, and to put their 
education to productive social or political use within the State.  (pp. 2229-
230). 
 
 Attorneys for the representatives of school-age undocumented children argued that the 
“Fourteenth Amendment provides that ‘[n]o State shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws” (Emphasis in original) (p. 210).  The phrase “within its jurisdiction” 
refers “to all within the boundaries of a State” (p. 212).  Since Texas provides a system of free 
public education, it cannot legally exclude school-age, undocumented children residing within 
the state’s boundaries.  The Fourteenth Amendment controls the issue because children are being 
unlawfully deprived of a fundamentally important right that will harm them the rest of their lives. 
 Holding & disposition. 
 The Court held as follows: 
A Texas statute which withholds from local school districts any state funds 
for the education of children who were not “legally admitted” into the 
United States, and which authorizes local school districts to deny enrollment 
to such children, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  (p. 202) 
 
 Court’s rationale. 
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 Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, delivered 
the Court’s 5-4 decision.  Unlike the majority opinion in San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez, the Court examined the thoughts and statements of the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in helping the Court reach a constitutional determination regarding a 
state classification scheme.  And, the Court did utilize the type of scrutiny procedures suggested 
by Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion in the San Antonio case.  In the period intervening 
between San Antonio and the current case, Justices Blackmun and Powell may have re-thought 
Justice Marshall’s remarks regarding the type of equal protection judicial scrutiny to be applied 
to state classification schemes as they voted this time to critically analyze such a scheme.  Also, 
the Court utilized abundant case law in making its determination.  Finally, the Court did not use 
any smoke screens of state actions to address inequity or rationalize a rational basis by noting the 
existence of such a practice in every other state in order to avoid hard, critical legal analysis. 
 The application of case law to the question regarding access to the Equal Protection 
Clause by illegal aliens proved more than sufficient to nullify state arguments regarding their 
ineligibility.  That, and the examination of congressional debate surrounding the development of 
the Fourteenth Amendment were sufficient for the Court to observe: 
To permit a State to employ the phrase “within its jurisdiction” in order to 
identify subclasses of persons whom it would define as beyond its 
jurisdiction, thereby relieving itself of the obligation to assure that its laws 
are designed and applied equally to those persons, would undermine the 
principal purpose for which the Equal Protection Clause was incorporated in 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Equal Protection Clause was intended to 
work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-
based legislation.  (Emphasis added) (p. 213) 
 
Pointing out the obvious, the Court noted: 
Use of the phrase “within its jurisdiction” thus does not detract from, but 
rather confirms, the understanding that the protection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment extends to anyone, citizen or stranger, who is subject to the 
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laws of a State, and reaches into every corner of a State’s territory.  That a 
person’s initial entry into a State, or into the United States, was unlawful, 
and that he may for that reason be expelled, cannot negate the simple fact of 
his presence within the State’s territorial perimeter.  (Emphasis in original) 
(p. 215) 
 
Presenting its holding regarding the first question, the Court announced:   
And until he leaves the jurisdiction – either voluntarily, or involuntarily in 
accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the United States – he is 
entitled to the equal protection of the laws that a State may choose to 
establish.  (p. 215) 
 
 The second question, the Court acknowledged, posed greater difficulty as it involved a 
determination of whether the Texas statute denying public education to children who couldn’t 
“demonstrate that their presence within the United States is lawful” or couldn’t bear “the burden 
of tuition” in lieu of such demonstration (pp. 215-216).  Following the process articulated by 
Justice Marshall in his San Antonio dissent, Justice Brennan observed that the rational basis 
scrutiny was too “deferential a standard” to apply “to every classification” (p. 216).  The Court 
articulated the first step, examining the Constitution:   
In determining whether a class-based denial of a particular right is deserving 
of strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, we look to the 
Constitution to see if the right infringed has its source, explicitly or 
implicitly, therein.  But we have also recognized the fundamentality of 
participation in state “elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the 
jurisdiction,” … even though “the right to vote, per se, is not a 
constitutionally protected right.”  (p. 217, n. 15) 
 
 For the second step, the Court turned “to a consideration of the standard appropriate for 
the evaluation of §21.031,” the Texas statute in question (p. 218).  Examining the nature of the 
problem the law was supposed to address, the Court noted that 
[s]heer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws barring entry into this 
country, coupled with the failure to establish an effective bar to the 
employment of undocumented aliens, has resulted in the creation of a 
substantial “shadow population” of illegal migrants – numbering in the 
millions – within our borders.  (p. 218) 
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 Noting that the plaintiff children were members of the underclass described, the Court observed 
that “the children who are plaintiffs in these cases ‘can affect neither their parents’ conduct nor 
their own status’” (p. 220).  Weighing this circumstance and the effect of the state law against 
the concept of justice, the Court found something lacking as it observed, “[L]egislation directing 
the onus of a parent’s misconduct against his children does not comport with fundamental 
conceptions of justice” (p. 220).  The Court was unable to find a rational basis for the Texas law: 
Of course, undocumented status is not irrelevant to any proper legislative 
goal….  But §21.031 is directed against children, and imposes its 
discriminatory burden on the basis of a legal characteristic over which 
children can have little control.  It is thus difficult to conceive of a rational 
justification for penalizing these children for their presence within the 
United States.  Yet that appears to be precisely the effect of §21.031.  (p. 
220) 
 
 The Court then moved to an examination of the status of education, again using the 
process suggested by Justice Marshall in his San Antonio dissent.  Noting that on the one hand, 
education is not a “’right’ granted to individuals by the Constitution,” nor on the other hand “is it 
merely some governmental ‘benefit indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare 
legislation,” the Court began determining its benefit to society in order to place it on a scale 
between an explicit constitutional right and a mere benefit.  The Court noted accordingly, “Both 
the importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its 
deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction” (p. 221).  While perhaps not a 
fundamental right, “[E]ducation has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society” 
(p. 221).  Furthermore, the Court declared,  
[the] denial of education to some isolated group of children poses an affront 
to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of 
governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on 
the basis of individual merit.  (pp. 221-222) 
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Weighing the loss of an activity against the cost to individuals and society in order to determine 
the level of judicial scrutiny required in evaluating state legislation against the Equal Protection 
Clause, again following the pathway suggested previously by Justice Marshall, the Court 
reasoned as follows: 
The inestimable toll of that deprivation on the social, economic, intellectual, 
and psychological well-being of the individual, and the obstacle it poses to 
individual achievement, make it most difficult to reconcile the cost or the 
principle of a status-based denial of basic education with the framework of 
equality embodied in the Equal Protection Clause.  (p. 222) 
 
At this point, the Court cited in their entirety the Brown decisions observations regarding 
education.  Following this, the Court stated it was ready to “determine the proper level of 
deference to be afforded §21.031” (p. 223).  In fact, the Court had already been engaged in that 
process through its adoption of the procedures recommended by Justice Marshall in his 
dissenting opinion in San Antonio v. Rodriguez.  What the Court actually did at this point was 
announce that it would “appropriately take into account its [the discriminations of the Texas law] 
costs to the Nation and to the innocent children who are its victims” (p. 224).  Observing that 
“more is involved in these cases” than questions requiring only a rational basis, after noting that 
a strict scrutiny analysis (requiring that a compelling state interest be shown as justification for 
the law) wasn’t necessary because education was not “a fundamental right,” the Court began the 
process of determining the level of scrutiny to be applied to the Texas law (p. 223).  What 
emerged was a heightened form of scrutiny to determine whether the legislation’s ends aligned 
with the articulated purposes. 
 Regarding the state’s argument that the law was designed to protect the state “from an 
influx of illegal immigrants,” the Court observed that the primary motivation for illegal entry 
into this country was “the availability of employment” (p. 228).  Evaluating the state’s argument, 
   
   
863
the Court declared: “[W]e think it clear that ‘[c]harging tuition to undocumented children 
constitutes a ludicrously ineffectual attempt to stem the tide of illegal immigration,’ at least when 
compared with the alternative of prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens” (pp. 228-229). 
 Regarding the state’s argument that the burden of educating undocumented children 
would damage the state’s ability “to provide high-quality public education,” the Court pointed 
out that “the record in no way supports the claim that exclusion of undocumented children is 
likely to improve the overall quality of education in the State” (p. 229).  This observation also 
aligned with the findings of the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. 
 Finally, the Court addressed the state’s argument that the classification scheme was 
appropriate “because their [undocumented children] unlawful presence within the United States 
renders them less likely than other children to remain” in Texas, thus eliminating the possibility 
they would “put their education to productive social or political use with the State” (pp. 229-
230).  Questioning whether such an interest by Texas was legitimate, the Court pointed out that 
Texas “has no assurance that any child, citizen or not, will employ the education provided by the 
State within the confines of the State’s borders” (p. 230).  Pointing to the costs of the law, the 
Court questioned what in fact the state hoped to achieve. 
It is difficult to understand precisely what the State hopes to achieve by 
promoting the creation and perpetuation of a sub-class of illiterates within 
our boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, 
welfare, and crime.  (p. 230) 
 
Whatever the interests of the State of Texas were in enacting §21.031, those purposes were 
“wholly insubstantial in light of the costs involved to these children, the State, and the Nation” 
(p. 231). 
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 Announcing its holding in the context of a heightened judicial scrutiny that flowed from 
the suggestions offered by Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion in San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez, the Court ruled: 
If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public 
education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that 
denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state 
interest.  No such showing was made here.  Accordingly, the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals in each of these cases is Affirmed.  (Emphasis in 
original) (p. 230) 
 
 Concurring/dissenting opinions. 
 Concurring opinions were filed separately by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell.  
A single dissenting opinion was written by Chief Justice Burger, which was joined by Justices 
White, Rehnquist, and O’Connor.  They shed no new light on the subject, nor do they break new 
ground. 
 The due process clause. 
 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
 Facts & procedural history. 
 The city of Baltimore diverted streams of water flowing into the city harbor from “their 
accustomed and natural course,” the effect of which was to render useless the wharf (because of 
the ensuing shallowness of the harbor in which the wharf was located) owned by John Barron 
upon which he based his economic livelihood.  He sued for damages and the loss of 
uncompensated property (the economic value of his wharf that had been rendered useless by the 
city’s action).  The “Baltimore county court” found “against the defendants, and a verdict for 
four thousand five hundred dollars was rendered for the plaintiff” (p. 244).  The City of 
Baltimore appealed to the “court of appeals for the western shore of the state of Maryland,” 
which reversed the lower court’s ruling “and did not remand the case to that court for a further 
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trial” (pp. 243, 244).  Whereupon Barron filed for “a writ of error” to the U.S. Supreme Court (p. 
244). 
 Legal question. 
 Does the Fifth Amendment act to restrain states and their political subdivisions from 
taking private property “for public use without just compensation” (p. 243)? 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 Arguing that “the right and profit of wharfage, and use of the water at the wharf for the 
objects of navigation, was a vested interest” that had been “interfered with … and taken away … 
for public use” by the City of Baltimore, the attorney for John Barron argued that the Fifth 
Amendment required the city to reimburse Barron for his economic loss (p. 245).  Citing the 
appropriate text of the Fifth Amendment, “private property shall not be taken for public use 
without just compensation,” Barron’s attorney argued that the Fifth Amendment  
declares principles which regulate the legislation of the states, for the 
protection of the people in each and all the states regarded as citizens of the 
United States, or as inhabitants subject to the laws of the union.  (p. 246) 
 
 Roger B. Taney was currently serving as the Attorney General of the United States.  He 
also appeared to be representing the City of Baltimore as well.  According to the following note, 
the attorneys for the City of Baltimore did not make argument before Chief Justice Marshall’s 
Court:  “The counsel for the defendants in error [sic] Mr. Taney and Mr. Scott, were stopped by 
the court” (p. 247, asterisked note). 
 Holding & disposition. 
 The U. S. Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment acted only to restrain the federal 
government from infringing personal liberties, not the state governments.  Being applicable only 
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to the federal government and not the individual state governments, the Court had “no 
jurisdiction of the cause” and thus dismissed the case (p. 249). 
 Court’s rationale. 
 Chief Justice Marshall announced the unanimous 7-0 verdict of the Court.  He began by 
observing, “The constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for 
themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of the individual states” (p. 
247).  The Chief Justice continued: 
The people of the United States framed such a government for the United 
States…  The powers they conferred on this government were to be 
exercised by itself; and the limitations on power, if expressed in general 
terms, are naturally, and, we think, necessarily applicable to the government 
created by the instrument.  (p. 247) 
 
Chief Justice then drew the obvious conclusion from the previous propositions, framing his 
deduction in a manner that included the fact of state constitutions: 
If these propositions be correct, the fifth amendment must be understood as 
restraining the power of the general government, not as applicable to the 
states.  In their several constitutions they have imposed such restrictions on 
their respective governments as their own wisdom suggested; such as they 
deemed most proper for themselves.  (p. 247) 
 
 After beginning the Court’s review by focusing upon the text of the Constitution, 
particularly Article I, § 9 &  § 10, the Chief Justice concluded: 
Had congress [sic] engaged in the extraordinary occupation of improving 
the constitutions of the several states by affording the people additional 
protection from the exercise of power by their own governments in matters 
which concerned themselves alone, they would have declared this purpose 
in plain and intelligible language.  (p. 249) 
 
Continuing the Court’s analysis of the Constitution, Chief Justice Marshall next noted that most 
of the state conventions called to ratify the newly proposed Constitution recommended that 
amendments be adopted “to guard against [an] abuse of power” and to provide “security against 
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the apprehended encroachments of the general government – not against those of the local 
governments” (p. 249).  Observing that Congress subsequently proposed such amendments 
which were duly “adopted by the states,” Chief Justice Marshall concluded: 
These amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to apply 
them to the state governments.  This court cannot so apply them.  We are of 
opinion that the provision in the fifth amendment … declaring that private 
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, is 
intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the government 
of the Untied States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the states.  (p. 
249) 
 
Therefore, Chief Justice Marshall continued, “[T]here is no repugnancy between the several acts 
… of Maryland,… and the constitution [sic] of the United States.  This court, therefore, has no 
jurisdiction of the cause; and it is dismissed” (p. 249). 
 The significance of Barron v. Baltimore lies in the fact that it’s ruling regarding the 
inapplicability of the Bill of Rights as a restraint on state power held sway well into the 
Twentieth Century, even after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.  This was particularly 
so regarding the Fifth Amendment’s clauses pertaining to the rights of accused persons.  Since 
these rights are numerous, and since the Fifth Amendment contains many clauses, the full text of 
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution follows: 
No persons shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual 
service in time of War or public danger, nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
 
 In Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), the Court rejected argument that 
attempted to apply “the Fifth Amendment requirement of grand jury indictment in … capital 
cases” by way of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Hall, 1992, p. 418).  
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Justice Harlan’s dissent in Hurtado v. California would subsequently be used for legal argument 
in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), unfortunately, in vain.  The legal issue in Palko 
involved double jeopardy.  In his dissenting opinion in Hurtado, Justice John Marshall Harlan 
declared “that whatever would be a violation of the original Bill of Rights if done by the federal 
government was equally unlawful under the Fourteenth Amendment if done by the states” (Hall, 
1992, p. 618).  The thread of Justice Harlan’s dissent would again find resonance with Justice 
Hugo Black, who articulated the argument first presented by Harlan.  In Adamson v. California, 
332 U.S. 46 (1947), a case involving an asserted right against self-incrimination based on the 
Fifth Amendment, Justice Black’s dissenting opinion declared  
that the due process clause should be read to guarantee that “no state could 
deprive its citizens of the privileges and protections of the Bill of Rights” 
and therefore argued that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates “the full 
protection of the Fifth Amendment’s provision against compelling evidence 
from an accused to convict him of a crime.” (Hall, 1992, p. 9) 
 
 The Court has never fully adopted the approach first articulated by Justice Harlan nor its 
more recent iteration by Justice Black.  The Court “has, however, incorporated many of the 
individual components of the Bill of Rights under a doctrine called ‘selective incorporation’” 
(Hall, 1992, p. 9).  The rationale for selective incorporation was most clearly articulated by 
Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, a case which will be subsequently examined.  While the 
Fifth Amendment rights of the accused were quite slow in being applied, if at all, as restrictions 
on state action, property rights, the subject matter of the last clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
fared much better.  In fact, this Fifth Amendment clause was the first to be incorporated by 
reason of the Fourteenth Amendment as a restriction on state activity in Chicago, Burlington and 
Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), a 7-1 Court decision that was authored by 
Justice Harlan. 
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 Concurring/dissenting opinions. 
 Being a unanimous decision by Justices Johnson, Duvall, Story, Thompson, M’Lean, 
Baldwin, and Chief Justice John Marshall, the question of dissenting opinions was rendered 
moot.  During the period in question, it was not customary to offer separate concurring opinions. 
 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
 Facts & procedural history. 
 Palko was indicted for murder in the first degree in state court in Fairfield County, 
Connecticut, but the jury convicted Palko of murder in the second degree whereupon he was 
sentenced to life imprisonment.  Connecticut law, with the presiding judge’s permission, permits 
“appeals in criminal cases to be taken by the state” to the Supreme Court of Appeals (p. 320).  
Upon such appeal by the State of Connecticut, “the Supreme Court of Errors reversed the 
judgment and ordered a new trial” as a result of its findings (p. 321): 
It found that there had been error of law to the prejudice of the state (1) in 
excluding testimony as to a confession by defendant; (2) in excluding 
testimony upon cross-examination of defendant to impeach his credibility, 
and (3) in the instructions to the jury as to the difference between first and 
second degree murder.  (p. 321) 
 
 Upon retrial, and prior to the jury being impaneled, Palko  objected to the court that he 
was being placed “twice in jeopardy for the same offense,” which was in violation “of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States” (p. 321).  The court overruled 
his objection and the new trial continued with the jury returning a verdict in the second trial of 
“murder in the first degree” (p. 321).  As punishment, the court sentenced Palko to the death 
penalty.  Upon appeal, the “Supreme Court of Errors affirmed the judgment of conviction” (p. 
322).  Whereupon, Palko appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court which agreed to hear his case. 
 Legal question. 
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 Is the prohibition of double jeopardy by the Federal Government in the Fifth Amendment 
made “applicable against state action by force of the Fourteenth Amendment” (p. 319)?  “Is 
double jeopardy … a denial of due process forbidden to the states” by the Fourteenth 
Amendment (p. 323)? 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 Palko’s attorneys argued that “whatever is forbidden by the Fifth Amendment is 
forbidden by the Fourteenth also” (p. 322).  The Court further summarized the arguments 
presented by the two attorneys arguing on Palko’s behalf: 
To retry a defendant, though under one indictment and only one, subjects 
him, it is said, to double jeopardy in violation of the Fifth Amendment, if the 
prosecution is one on behalf of the United States.  From this the 
consequence is said to follow that there is a denial of life or liberty without 
due process of law, if the prosecution is one on behalf of the people of a 
State.  (p. 322) 
 
The Court’s opinion provided additional information regarding the arguments made by Palko’s 
attorneys, this one being most similar to the argument made by Justice Harlan in his dissenting 
opinion in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884): 
We have said that in appellant’s view the Fourteenth Amendment is to be 
taken as embodying the prohibitions of the Fifth.  His thesis is even broader.  
Whatever would be a violation of the original bill of rights (Amendments I 
to VIII) if done by the federal government is now equally unlawful by force 
of the Fourteenth Amendment if done by a state.  (p. 323) 
 
 Neither the materials reported by the Court nor the Court’s opinion revealed any 
information about the arguments presented by the two attorneys representing the State of 
Connecticut.  However, some of their arguments may be deduced from a reading of the Court’s 
opinion.  One would also imagine that Connecticut’s attorneys would have cited the Court’s 
ruling in Hurtado v. California whereby the Court held “that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment could not logically encompass the specific procedural guarantees of the 
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Fifth Amendment,” particularly since it was a case cited by the Court in its ruling (Hall, 1992, p. 
418; p. 323).  
 Holding & disposition. 
 Regarding the first question, the Court held that the “Fourteenth Amendment does not 
guarantee against state action all that would be a violation of the original bill of rights … if done 
by the Federal Government” (p. 320).  Regarding the second question, the Court’s answered in 
the following manner: 
The conviction of the defendant upon the retrial ordered upon the appeal by 
the State in this case was not in derogation of any privileges or immunities 
that belonged to him as a citizen of the United States.  (p. 320) 
 
 Court’s rationale. 
 Justice Cardozo wrote the Court’s 8-1 decision.  It must have been one of Cardozo’s last 
opinions because he didn’t participate in further cases beginning December 10, 1937, “on 
account of illness,” which was just four days after the decision in Palko was announced (302 
U.S. III).  Regarding the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment applied the first eight 
amendments of the Bill of Rights against the state governments and officials, Justice Cardozo 
stated, “There is no such general rule” (p. 323).  Regarding the Fifth Amendment, Justice 
Cardozo observed the Court’s holding in Hurtado v. California and Gaines v. Washington that 
the grand jury requirement could be replaced by the state in the form of “informations at the 
instance of a public officer” (p. 323).  Regarding the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against self-
incrimination, Justice Cardozo pointed to the holdings in Twining v. New Jersey, Snyder v. 
Massachusetts, and Brown v. Mississippi whereby the Court held “that in prosecutions by a state, 
the exemption will fail if the state elects to end it” (p. 324).  Regarding both the Sixth and 
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Seventh Amendments’ requirements for jury trial, Justice Cardozo pointed to multiple rulings 
which held “trial by jury may be modified by a state or abolished altogether” (p. 324).   
 However, as Justice Cardozo pointed out, there have been portions of the Bill of Rights 
that have been applied against the state governments by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause, particularly with reference to the First Amendment’s guarantees.  Justice 
Cardozo explained, citing specific provisions of the Bill of Rights and the corresponding cases 
whereby the Court had applied them as a restriction against the states: 
On the other hand, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
may make it unlawful for a state to abridge by its statutes the freedom of 
speech which the First Amendment safeguards against encroachment by the 
Congress, … or the like freedom of the press, … or the free exercise of 
religion, … or the right of peaceable assembly, without which speech would 
be unduly trammeled, … or the [Sixth Amendment’s] right of one accused 
of crime to the benefit of counsel…  (p. 324) 
 
 According to Justice Cardozo’s reasoning, the previously mentioned portions of the Bill 
of Rights, or “immunities … have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and 
thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states” (pp. 324-325).  In 
other words, the individual rights which both the federal and state governments have to respect 
are fundamental to American notions of justice and liberty.  Justice Cardozo articulated the 
“rationalizing principle” whereby certain rights were held to be inviolate and protected from 
infringement by any type of government, be it state or federal: these certain rights are “of the 
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty,” with each such protected right representing a 
“principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental” (p. 325).  By contrast, while having value, “the right to trial by jury and the 
immunity from prosecution except as the result of an indictment … are not of the very essence of 
a scheme of ordered liberty” (p. 325).  Justice Cardozo continued:  “What is true of jury trials 
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and indictments is true also … of the immunity from compulsory self-incrimination….  This too 
might be lost, and justice still be done” (p. 325).   
 Having described rights that had been recognized as being inviolable by any level of 
American government, having articulated the organizing principle whereby the Court determined 
which rights were inviolable by any government and those rights that were protected only against 
infringement by the federal government, and having illustrated the rights protected only from 
federal infringement, Justice Cardozo further explained the Court’s reasoning used to 
differentiate which rights were absorbed by the Fourteenth Amendment and those rights which 
were not absorbed.  
The exclusion of these immunities and privileges [i.e., trial by jury, 
indictment by a grand jury, etc.] from the privileges and immunities 
protected against the action of the states has not been arbitrary or casual.  It 
has been dictated by a study and appreciation of the meaning, the essential 
implications, of liberty itself.  (p. 326) 
 
Justice Cardozo expounded further with reference to the process of “absorption” and its true 
source: 
We reach a different plane of social and moral values when we pass to the 
privileges and immunities that have been taken over from the earlier articles 
of the federal bill of rights and brought within the Fourteenth Amendment 
by a process of absorption.  These in their origin were effective against the 
federal government alone.  If the Fourteenth Amendment has absorbed 
them, the process of absorption has had it source in the belief that neither 
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.  (p. 326) 
 
 Having laid out the “dividing line” and its “unifying principle,” Justice Cardozo moved to 
the question of “on which side of the line the case made out by the appellant [Palko] has 
appropriate location” (p. 328).  Justice Cardozo asked: 
Is that kind of double jeopardy to which the statute has subjected him 
[Palko] a hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it?  
Does it violate those “fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie 
at the base of all our civil and political institutions”? [sic]  (p. 328) 
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Answering, “no,” Justice Cardozo further explained: 
The state is not attempting to wear the accused out by a multitude of cases 
with accumulated trials.  It asks no more than this, that the case against him 
shall go on until there shall be a trial free from the corrosion of substantial 
legal error….  There is no seismic innovation.  The edifice of justice stands, 
its symmetry, to many, greater than before.  (p. 328) 
 
Prior to pronouncing that the judgment of the lower court was affirmed, Justice Cardozo 
announced the Court’s holding, “The conviction of appellant [Palko] is not in derogation of any 
privileges or immunities that belong to him as a citizen of the United States” (p. 328). 
 As noted by one legal scholar, Palko constituted a watershed event regarding the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause: 
Palko represents the beginning of a struggle to find a test for applying the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a limit on state 
power….  Cardozo’s opinion was a precursor of the “incorporation debate” 
that became so evident later in Adamson v. California (1947).  His rationale 
for upholding the Connecticut law developed into the “fundamental 
fairness” test later championed by Justice Felix Frankfurter, while the theory 
he rejected became known as the incorporation doctrine favored by Justice 
Hugo Black.  (Hall, 1992, p. 618) 
 
Continuing, the legal scholar described the resolution reached by the Court post-Palko: 
A variation of the incorporation doctrine won out, as many of the 
protections of the Bill of Rights eventually were applied directly to the 
states.  In 1969 Palko was overruled by Benton v. Maryland, and double 
jeopardy became one of those provisions of the Bill of Rights selectively 
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.  (Hall, 1992, p. 618) 
 
 Concurring/dissenting opinions. 
 Justice Butler dissented from the eight-member majority, but offered no opinion nor 
explanation as to his reasons for dissenting. 
The application of other restrictions on state action under the fourteenth 
amendment. 
 
 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
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 Case summary. 
 The subject matter involved gender-based discrimination against male employees by the 
State of Connecticut’s “statutory retirement benefit plan,”  an action prohibited ultimately by the 
Fourteenth Amendment and more immediately by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
which was passed under the authority of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment (p. 445).  Although 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not originally include “the States as employers,” it 
was amended to do so by the 1972 Amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (p. 
445).   
 The legal issue involved a conflict between the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments.  
The legal question posed by the case as articulated by the High Court: Does “the shield of 
sovereign immunity [offered] the State by the Eleventh Amendment” protect the State against 
the congressional power of enacting laws and awards “against the State as a means of enforcing 
the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment” (p. 448)? 
 Procedurally the initial action began in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Connecticut, was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and ended up 
before the U.S. Supreme Court.  The initial action was filed by “[p]resent and retired male 
employees of the State of Connecticut” and alleged  
that certain provisions of the State’s statutory retirement benefit plan 
discriminated against them because of their sex, in violation of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which, as amended, extends coverage to the 
States as employers.  (p. 445) 
 
Defendants named by the lawsuit included Bitzer, “the Chairman of the State Employees’ 
Retirement Commission,” as well as both “the Treasurer and the Comptroller of the State of 
Connecticut” (p. 449, n. 4).  The District Court “held that the Connecticut State Employees 
Retirement Act violated Title VII’s prohibition against sex-based employment discrimination” 
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and “entered prospective injunctive relief in petitioners’ favor against respondent state officials” 
(p. 449).  In its review of the facts of the case, the Supreme Court also noted the following: 
Petitioners had also alleged that the retirement plan was contrary to the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but n view of its 
ruling under Title VII the District Court found no reason to address the 
constitutional claim.  390 F. Supp., at 290.  (p. 449, n. 3) 
 
Regarding the remaining allegations of the state employees, the District Court did not grant the 
petitioners’ claim for “an award of retroactive retirement benefits as compensation for losses 
caused by the State’s discrimination, as well as ‘a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs’” 
(pp. 449-450).  The District Court reasoned that  
both [claims by petitioners] would constitute recovery of money damages 
from the State’s treasury, and were therefore precluded by the Eleventh 
Amendment and by this court’s [the U.S. Supreme Court] decision in 
Edelman v. Jordan, [415 U.S. 651 (1974)].  (p. 450) 
 
 The appeal of the District Court’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit was not made by the State of Connecticut, but instead by the original plaintiffs in the 
case.  The state employees contended “that Congress does possess the constitutional power under 
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to authorize their Title VII damages action against the State” 
(p. 451).  In its ruling the Court of Appeals affirmed part of the District Court’s ruling and 
reversed part of the same court’s holding regarding damages and attorneys’ fees.  Since the 
appeal centered only on those aspects (damages and attorneys’ fees) of the case and not upon the 
District Court’s ruling regarding the finding of discrimination on the part of the State nor the 
ensuing injunction against Connecticut officials – those constituted ground in the appeal process, 
not figure in Gestalt terminology – the Court of Appeals addressed only the issue of damages, 
i.e., backpay, and attorneys’ fees.  The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court’s finding 
regarding damages, but disagreed regarding attorney fees.  Reasoning that attorneys’ fees “would 
   
   
877
have only an ‘ancillary effect’ on the state treasury of the kind permitted under Edelman,” the 
Court of Appeals remanded the issue of attorneys’ fees to the District Court (p. 451).   
 The state employees filed an appeal of the Circuit Court’s ruling regarding the issue of 
backpay, i.e., “an award of retroactive retirement benefits as compensation for losses caused by 
the State’s discrimination” (pp. 449-450).  Whereupon the Connecticut state officials cross-filed, 
accepting the Court of Appeals affirmation that damages were precluded by the Eleventh 
Amendment,  but arguing “that under Edelman the Eleventh Amendment bars any award of 
attorneys’ fees here because it would be paid out of the state treasury” (p. 451).  The petition of 
the state officials was designated “No. 75-283, Bitzer, Chairman, State Employees’ Retirement 
Commission, et al. v. Matthews et al. (p. 445, asterisked note).   
 Justice Rehnquist delivered the unanimous Court ruling in Fitzpatrick v. Butler.  The 9-0 
Court opinion began the process of distinguishing the Edelman decision from the current case.  
According to Justice Rehnquist: 
In Edelman this Court held that monetary relief awarded by the District 
Court to welfare plaintiffs, by reason of wrongful denial of benefits … 
violated the Eleventh Amendment.  Such an award was found to be 
indistinguishable from a monetary award against the State itself…” (p. 451). 
 
Providing addition elaboration, Justice Rehnquist explained, “We concluded that none of the 
statutes relied upon by plaintiffs in Edelman contained any authorization by Congress to join a 
State as a defendant” (p. 452).  The Court further noted: 
All parties in the instant litigation agree … that the suit for retroactive 
benefits … is in fact indistinguishable from that sought … in Edelman, since 
what is sought here is a damages award payable to a private party from the 
state treasury.  (p. 452) 
 
“Our analysis begins where Edelman ended, for in this Title VII case, the ‘threshold fact of 
congressional authorization’ … to sue the State as employer is clearly present,” announced 
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Justice Rehnquist (p. 452).  Continuing, he pointed out the nature of the legal question involved 
in the current case:  “[H]ere, however, the Eleventh Amendment defense is asserted in the 
context of legislation passed pursuant to Congress’ authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment” (p. 453).  Justice Rehnquist next engaged in a judicial lecture focused on the intent 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to limit state sovereignty. 
As ratified by the States after the Civil War, that Amendment quite clearly 
contemplates limitations on their authority….  The substantive provisions 
are by express terms directed at the States.  Impressed upon them by these 
provisions are duties with respect to their treatment of private individuals.  
Standing behind the imperatives is Congress’ power to “enforce” them “by 
appropriate legislation.”  (p. 453) 
 
Citing Ex parte Virginia, Justice Rehnquist noted that the Court in that case “examined at length” 
the “impact of the Fourteenth Amendment upon the relationship between the Federal 
Government and the States” and scrutinized as well “the reach of congressional power under § 
5” (p. 453).  Finding the discussion in that case pertinent to the current legal discussion, Justice 
Rehnquist quoted several observations from Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880): 
The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States, 
and they are to a degree restrictions of State power.  It is these which 
Congress is empowered to enforce, and to enforce against State action, … 
whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.  (p. 454) 
 
Justice Rehnquist then cited a specific example of the Fourteenth Amendment’s impact upon 
state action from Ex parte Virginia: 
It is said the selection of jurors for her courts and the administration of her 
laws belong to each State; that they are her rights.  This is true in the 
general.  But in exercising her rights, a State cannot disregard the limitations 
which the Federal Constitution has applied to her power.  (p. 454) 
 
Justice Rehnquist’s next selection from Ex parte Virginia focused on the importance of § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment for interpreting that Amendment’s reach: 
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Were it not for the fifth section of that amendment, there might be room for 
argument that the first section is only declaratory of the moral duty of the 
State….  But the Constitution now expressly gives authority for 
congressional interference and compulsion in the cases embraced within the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  It is but a limited authority, true, extending only to 
a single class of cases; but within its limits it is complete.  Id., at 346-348.  
(p. 455) 
 
 Based upon its examination, the Court moved to announce a basic finding that would 
control its holdings in the case. 
It is true that none of these previous cases presented the question of the 
relationship between the Eleventh Amendment and the enforcement power 
granted to Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  But we think 
that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which 
it embodies, see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, (1890), are necessarily 
limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
(p. 456) 
 
Justice Rehnquist continued to explain the Court’s basic finding in terms of its difference from 
other activities covered by the Eleventh Amendment. 
We think that Congress may, in determining what is “appropriate 
legislation” for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials which 
are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.  (p. 456) 
 
Thus, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment to allow the state employees to recover 
attorney fees, and at the same time the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision to 
prohibit the state employees from being awarded backpay for losses suffered by the State of 
Connecticut’s discriminatory action. 
 Significance for the fourteenth amendment. 
 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer’s significance for the Fourteenth Amendment is two-fold.  First, it 
demonstrates that in subject matters involving discrimination covered by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, that Amendment overrides any Eleventh Amendment concerns.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment provides a limitation upon state activity, period.  Second, the case serves as a 
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reminder that the Amendment’s power lies in its restrictions upon state, not upon federal, activity 
in the federal scheme of balancing power between the states and the national government. 
 Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982). 
 Case summary. 
 Brown v. Hartlage involved the application of the First Amendment to state legislation 
via the Fourteenth Amendment.  The subject matter featured a collision between an election for 
the position of Jefferson County Commissioner involving an incumbent and a challenger, 
Kentucky legislation regarding speech during an election campaign, and speech uttered by 
Brown as a candidate for Hartlage’s position during the course of the campaign. 
 Regarding the facts of the case, § 121.055 of the Corrupt Practices Act enacted in 1982 to 
form a portion of the Kentucky State Code, specified the following: 
No candidate for nomination or election to any state, county, city or district 
office … shall promise, agree or make a contract with any person to vote for 
or support any particular individual, thing, or measure, in consideration for 
the vote … of that person in any election…  (p. 49) 
 
The act further specified that any judicially determined violations of the Corrupt Practices Act by 
a successful candidate would result in “the nomination or election of the contestee [being] 
declared void” (p. 49, n. 4, as continued on p. 50).  During the course of the campaign for the 
position of Jefferson County Commissioner from District C, Carl Brown as a challenger to the 
incumbent Earl Hartlage, “charged his opponent with complicity in a form of fiscal abuse,” that 
of leading “a surprise move to … more than double the salaries of the county commissioners” (p. 
47)!  Brown and a fellow candidate for Jefferson County Commissioner representing District B, 
Bill Creech, “pledged the tax payers [of Jefferson County] some relief” by declaring that “one of 
our first official acts as county commissioners will be to lower our salary to a more realistic 
level…” (p. 48).  After the televised news conference ended, “Brown and Creech learned that 
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their commitment to lower their salaries arguably violated the Kentucky Corrupt Practices Act” 
(p. 48).  Four days after the press conference, both candidates “issued a joint statement retracting 
their earlier pledge” in which they stated: 
We have discovered that there are Kentucky court decisions and Attorney 
General opinions which indicate that our pledge to reduce our salaries if 
elected may be illegal….  [W]e do hereby formally rescind our pledge to 
reduce the County Commissioners’ salary if elected and instead pledge to 
seek corrective legislation in the next session of the General Assembly, to 
correct this silly provision of State Law.  (pp. 48-49) 
 
 The results of the election triggered the procedural events of Brown v. Hartlage.  In the 
ensuing election, “Brown defeated Hartlage by 10,151 votes.  Creech was defeated” (p. 49).  
Immediately Earl Hartlage filed a lawsuit “in the Jefferson Circuit Court,” Hartlage v. Brown, 
charging that “Brown had violated the Corrupt Practices Act and seeking to have the election 
declared void and the office of Jefferson County Commissioner, ‘C’ District, vacated by Brown” 
(p. 49).  The “trial court found that … Brown’s promise violated the Act,” but further 
concluded that in light of Brown’s retraction, the defeat of his running mate, 
who had joined in the pledge, and the presumption that the will of the people 
had been revealed through the election process, Brown had been “fairly 
elected.”  (p. 50) 
 
The Jefferson Circuit Court, the initial trial court of the action, “declined to order a new election” 
as a result of its reasoning of the case. 
 Upon appeal by Hartlage, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the lower state court’s 
decision.  The Kentucky Court of Appeals, while agreeing “that Brown’s statement was 
proscribed” by the Kentucky Corrupt Practices Act, “also held, however, that the trial court had 
erred in failing to order a new election” and “was mistaken in believing that it possessed the 
discretionary authority to balance the gravity of the violation against the disenfranchisement of 
the electorate that would result from declaring the election void” (pp. 50, 51).  Regarding 
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Brown’s claim that the Kentucky law violated his speech rights as guaranteed by the First 
Amendment which were subsequently applied as a restraint on state action against freedom of 
speech by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Kentucky Court of Appeals “concluded that 
Brown’s ‘statement was not constitutionally protected’” by virtue of the following reasoning: 
To hold that promises to serve at reduced compensation in violation of the 
Corrupt Practices Act are immune from regulation in view of the provisions 
of the United States Constitution is to open the door to arguments that other 
statements in violation of the Corrupt Practices Act are protected because 
they involve speech and self-expression.  (p. 51) 
 
Finding “that the State’s interest in the fairness and integrity of its elections was compelling, and 
that the State could insist that elections be conducted free of corruption and bribery,” the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals voided the election results, thereby reversing the initial decision of 
the trial court (pp. 51-52).   
 Upon appeal by Brown, the “Supreme Court of Kentucky denied review, whereupon 
Brown appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which “granted the petition for certiorari” (p. 52). 
 Justice Brennan delivered the Court’s decision, a unanimous 9-0 ruling, in Brown v. 
Hartlage.  The first sentence of the opinion acknowledged “that the States have a legitimate 
interest in preserving the integrity of their electoral processes” (p. 52).  However: 
When a State seeks to restrict directly the offer of ideas by a candidate to the 
voters, the First Amendment surely requires that the restriction be 
demonstrably supported by not only a legitimate state interest, but a 
compelling one,,,   (pp. 53-54) 
 
Noting that a candidate’s promise to confer some ultimate benefit on the voter … does not lie 
beyond the pale of First Amendment protection” (pp. 58-59), Justice Brennan pointed to a 
bedrock principle of the First Amendment: 
[T]he State ban runs directly contrary to the fundamental premises 
underlying the First Amendment as the guardian of our democracy.  That 
Amendment embodies our trust in the free exchange of ideas as the means 
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by which the people are to choose between good ideas and bad, and between 
candidates for political office.  (p. 60) 
 
Justice Brennan particularly highlighted a statement made by Justice Brandeis.  According to 
Justice Brennan, “The preferred First Amendment remedy of ‘more speech, not enforced 
silence,’ Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), thus has 
special force” (p. 61).  Announcing its holding, the unanimous Court declared: 
Because we conclude that § 121.055 has been applied in this use to limit 
speech in violation of the First Amendment, we reverse the judgment of the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals and remand for proceedings not inconsistent 
with this opinion.  (p. 62) 
  
 Significance for the fourteenth amendment. 
 Brown v. Hartlage reaffirmed the incorporation doctrine whereby restrictions on 
infringements of basic constitutional rights (the Bill of Rights having prohibited such action by 
the federal government) were applied to state government activity through the agency of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  In this case, the First Amendment was applied to negate state 
legislation violating the speech guarantee of that Amendment by use of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Once again, this case illustrates the use of the Fourteenth Amendment to restrain 
state action against the rights of individuals.  It also illustrates the intertwining of the Fourteenth 
Amendment with the idea of republican government contained in Article IV, § 4 of the U.S. 
Constitution. 
Summary of Salient Points 
 The Guarantee Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment are joined hip-and-thigh.  Many 
(including this writer) do not understand that basic fact until they become familiar with the 
historical underpinnings of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Guarantee Clause was invoked by 
President Lincoln as the basis for the federal government’s involvement in the Civil War.  The 
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Guarantee Clause provided the constitutional grounding for the congressional reconstruction of 
the South, out of which emerged the constitutional amendments collectively known as the 
Reconstruction Amendments.  One legal scholar provided a description of both their context and 
their impact: 
Four score years after the Founding, a new generation arose to transform 
what their fathers had brought forth on the continent.  In what can only be 
described as a constitutional revolution, the nation ended slavery, made 
every person born under the flag an equal citizen, guaranteed a host of civil 
rights to all Americans, and extended equal political rights to black men.  
(Amar, 2005, p. 351) 
 
Finally, it should be recognized that the Guarantee Clause was specifically invoked on the floor 
of Congress to justify the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment.   
 Two developments conjoined to support the trio of amendments, of which the Fourteenth 
constituted the centerpiece of subsequent case law emerging from all three amendments.  First, 
historical development subsequent to the framing and ratification of the Constitution had 
revealed that state governments were just as likely as the federal government to violate critical 
individual rights that form the critically necessary background of a republican form of 
government.  Second, it was recognized that something of constitutional significance was needed 
to guarantee the basic rights of the newly freed slaves in the southern states.  Hence, the 
Fourteenth Amendment arose out of the northern effort to “reconstruct” the South on a more 
republican basis in the aftermath of the Civil War.  Despite the inherent promise, the reality of its 
implementation would require adaptive work before being implemented.  Continuing his 
discussion of the “constitutional revolution” wrought by passage of the Reconstruction 
Amendments, Professor Akhil Reed Amar noted: 
Hard as it was to get America to make these promises, getting her to keep 
them would prove harder still.  Full compliance would not occur until a 
Second Reconstruction in the late twentieth century.  For women, too, the 
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First Reconstruction would taste bittersweet, as daughters of the republic 
won promises of civil rights but not the key political right to vote.  (Amar, 
2005, p. 351) 
 
 Understanding the historical background of the Fourteenth Amendment as growing out of 
the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution also helps the modern-day reader of Supreme Court 
decisions understand why both the Guarantee Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment were 
jointly used as constitutional underpinnings of legal argument in the newly emerging 
jurisprudence of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Without understanding the historical connection 
between the Guarantee Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, the conjunction of both in early 
Fourteenth Amendment case law appears to be only an odd coincidence that makes sense since 
both are focused on basic human rights, without which a republican form of government is 
impossible. 
 While the Guarantee Clause has been deemed nonjusticiable, primarily because of the 
lack of discernable standards by which a Court can make a determination of what constitutes a 
republican form of government and what does not, the Fourteenth Amendment has compiled a 
remarkable body of jurisprudence.  Being a part of the three Civil War Amendments, the 
Fourteenth Amendment shares an important clause with them, the first of any constitutional 
amendments to contain such a clause.  § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads, “The Congress 
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article” (U.S. 
Constitution, Amendment XIV).  The inclusion of that clause has been of critical importance in 
overriding the late-twentieth-century/early-twenty-first century developments of Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence initiated by the Rehnquist Court which implausibly have ruled that 
sovereign immunity enjoys full constitutional status capable of being overridden by only a few 
select constitutional provisions, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment being one of those (See 
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subsequent chapter, particularly the discussions of Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida and 
Alden v. Maine, as well as that chapter’s summary). 
 From the perspective of legal history, the Fourteenth Amendment has been used to 
restrict the activities of state and local governments.  It has never served as a bulwark to impede, 
inhibit, or restrict any federal government activities.  No act of Congress has been struck down 
on the grounds that it violates provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Instead, the Fourteenth 
Amendment has centered on the preservation of individual liberties against incursion by state 
and local governments.  As a result, state laws have been struck down, local government actions 
have been prohibited, and the activities of state and local government officials have been 
restrained judicially by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Focused on preserving individual liberties 
deemed to be fundamental in nature, the Fourteenth Amendment has been used to hold certain 
basic liberties contained in the Bill of Rights as being inviolable of incursion by state and local 
governments.  The Fourteenth Amendment provided the basis for striking down the Plessy 
doctrine of “Separate, But Equal” in the field of public education beginning with the Court’s 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954).  As a result state laws segregating students 
because of race in public education were struck down.  And even though the Court’s opinion in 
Brown talked about the importance of education, eventually education was not deemed by the 
Court to represent a fundamental right. 
 Before continuing the discussion of Brown’s influence, it is important to keep in mind the 
various levels of judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that have been fashioned by the Court to evaluate the constitutionality of 
governmental classifications that impinge on human rights.  At the time the California Supreme 
Court ruled in Serrano v. Priest, two levels of judicial scrutiny existed – the rational basis test 
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and the strict scrutiny test.  Both were described by that court.  The tests conform to a hierarchy 
with fundamental, constitutionally protected rights at the top.  Explaining the rational basis test, 
the California Supreme Court observed: 
In the area of economic regulation, the high court has exercised restraint, 
investing legislation with a presumption of constitutionality and requiring 
merely that distinctions drawn by a challenged statute bear some rational 
relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose.  (487 P.2d 1241, 
1249) 
 
Thus, with regard to most legislation, the Court begins with the assumption that the law is 
constitutional and seeks only to determine whether the law rationally connects to a legitimate 
government purpose with its classification scheme.  The resulting classification schemes do not 
connect to “suspect classifications,” nor do they involve “fundamental interests” protected by the 
Constitution (487 P.2d 1241, 1249).   The involvement of “suspect classifications” and/or 
“fundamental interests” require a higher level of judicial analysis, that of “strict scrutiny” (487 
P.2d 1241, 1249).  As explained by the California Supreme Court: 
Under the strict standard applied in such cases, the state bears the burden of 
establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law 
but that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its 
purpose.  (Emphasis in original) (487 P.2d 1241, 1249) 
 
An intermediate form of judicial scrutiny emerged using principles urged by Justice Thurgood 
Marshall in his dissenting opinion in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 
(1973).  We first encountered the standard of heightened scrutiny in Plyler v. Doe (1982) 
wherein Justice Brennan applied the method of constitutional analysis articulated by Justice 
Marshall.  Heightened scrutiny “requires that governmental action be ‘substantially’ related to an 
‘important governmental interest’” (Hall, 1992, p. 435).  Heightened scrutiny would be used to 
evaluate the “denial of a particular right” that is not a constitutional right (either “explicitly or 
implicitly”), but which is related to the exercise of a fundamental right (457 U.S. 202, 217, n. 
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15).  The denial of education (not a fundamental right protected by the Constitution, but a right 
necessary for the exercise of constitutionally-protected rights) to undocumented students in its 
public schools by the Texas legislature provided an example whereby heightened scrutiny was 
used to invalidate the Texas law.  
 The Court’s dicta in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) regarding the importance of 
education became one of the most cited provisions of the Court’s Brown opinion in subsequent 
court decisions in which education featured in the subject matter.  Cited by state supreme courts, 
lower federal courts, and by the Supreme Court itself, the dicta in the original Brown decision 
merits a second look.  In discussing education, the Brown Court declared: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments.  Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the 
importance of education to our democratic society.  It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the 
armed forces.  It is the very foundation of good citizenship.  (347 U.S. 483, 
493) 
 
While later courts would emphasize the importance of education as a preparation for assuming 
the adult responsibilities of citizenship, they would also discuss education’s vital role in 
preparing individuals for the life of work as a foundation for later success in life.  According to 
the Brown Court: 
Today, it [education] is a principal instrument in awakening the child to 
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in 
helping him to adjust normally to his environment.  In these days, it is 
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is 
denied the opportunity of an education.  Such an opportunity, where the 
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to 
all on equal terms.  (347 U.S. 483, 493) 
 
 The Warren Court’s views regarding the importance of education served as the 
foundation upon which the Supreme Court of California would declare that education was indeed 
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a fundamental right which would require that a compelling state purpose would be needed to 
justify any classification scheme involving education.  In Serrano v. Priest (1971), the California 
Supreme Court struck down a public school financing scheme on the grounds that it resulted in a 
school classification scheme “conditioned on wealth” (487 P.2d 1241, 1244).  According to the 
Supreme Court of California’s ruling, “[T]he right to an education in our public schools is a 
fundamental interest which cannot be conditioned on wealth” (487 P.2d 1241, 1244).  Drawing 
upon the model provided by the Brown decision, the California Supreme Court explained why 
education constituted a fundamental right: 
This [the indispensable role played by education in modern society] role, we 
believe, has two significant aspects: first, education is a major determinant 
of an individual’s chances for economic and social success in our 
competitive society; second, education is a unique influence on a child’s 
development as a citizen and his participation in political and community 
life.  (487 P.2d 1241, 1255-1256) 
 
The California High Court also identified the particular nexus between education and a specific 
duty of citizenship.  According to the California Supreme Court: 
The analogy between education and voting is much more direct:  both are 
crucial to participation in, and the functioning of, a democracy.  Voting has 
been regarded as a fundamental right because it is “preservative of other 
basic civil and political rights…,” (Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 533, 
562, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1381, 12 L.Ed. 2d 506; see Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) 
118 U.S. 356, 370, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220.).  (487 P.2d 1241, 1258) 
 
Nor was the California Supreme Court the only court viewing education as a fundamental right.  
School-finance systems in Minnesota, New Jersey, and Michigan were also struck down because 
the quality of a fundamental right, i.e., education, was conditioned upon wealth. 
 Of the cases examined, the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas 
became the next court to rule that education was a fundamental right.  In San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. 280 (1971), the federal district court 
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invalidated the Texas school financing scheme as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  According to the Supreme Court’s summary of that decision, “The 
District Court [found] that wealth is a ‘suspect’ classification and that education is a 
‘fundamental’ right” (411 U.S. 1).   
 The view of education as a fundamental right was specifically overturned by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in its narrow 5-4 ruling in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 
(1973).  Although education was important and played a “vital role” in “our democratic society,” 
according to the Court’s 5-4 majority, “the importance of a service performed by the State does 
not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the 
Equal Protection Clause” (411 U.S. 1, 30).  “Education, of course,” the Court declared, “is not 
among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.  Nor do we find any 
basis for saying it is implicitly so protected” (411 U.S. 1, 35).  Four of the justices hearing the 
case argued, however, did believe that education constituted a fundamental right – Justices 
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Douglas.  Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion articulated his 
vision of an intermediate level of scrutiny to be applied to rights vitally connected to the exercise 
of constitutionally-protected rights, but which were not in themselves explicitly-protected rights.  
The subsequent implementation of Justice Marshall’s vision resulted in the addition of 
heightened scrutiny situated above rational basis scrutiny and below strict scrutiny. 
 Heightened scrutiny was used by the Court in Plyler v. Doe (1982), yet another 5-4 
decision by the Court.  Describing the role and importance of education, Justice Brennan’s 
discussion implicitly recognized the inadequacy of having only two standards of judicial 
scrutiny, both of which were inappropriate in confronting education.  According to Justice 
Brennan’s majority opinion: 
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Public education is not a “right” granted to individuals by the Constitution.  
San Antonio Independent School Dist. V. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).  
But neither is it merely some governmental “benefit” indistinguishable from 
other forms of social welfare legislation.  Both the importance of education 
in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its 
deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction.  (457 U.S. 202, 
221) 
 
   While perhaps not a fundamental right in the sense that public education is not mentioned in 
the Constitution, “[E]ducation has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society” 
(457 U.S. 202, 221).  So, while not a fundamental right enjoying constitutional status, education 
plays a fundamental role in today’s society, a status that,  when examined judicially, requires the 
use of the heightened scrutiny standard under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 However, it should be remembered, no federal legislation has been challenged on the 
basis of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Centered on preserving basic constitutional rights from 
being violated by state and local governments, the Fourteenth Amendment has acted to abolish 
state legislation by reason of their unconstitutionality.  Given this perspective, it is difficult for 
this writer to envision any application of the Fourteenth Amendment by state or local officials in 
efforts to legally challenge portions of the No Child Left Behind Act.   
 Instead of the Fourteenth Amendment being used by one of the states or its agencies to 
challenge assertions of federal control, the reverse might well hold true, particularly if combined 
with the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution as was discussed in the summary of the chapter 
centering on the Guarantee Clause.  Given the importance of education in today’s world, given 
the role that education plays in equipping young people to become economically engaged and to 
exercise their citizenship responsibilities, and given the disparate performances of individual 
state systems of public education, Congress could assert primary control over education in this 
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country using both the Guarantee Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment to justify its assertion.  
The argument used by Congress would be that an educated citizenry is essential for the 
maintenance and perpetuation of a republican form of government. The Fourteenth Amendment 
portion of the argument would be that the existence of separate state systems of public education 
deny the equal protection of the laws through their uneven performances in terms of student 
achievement, not to mention the existence of achievement gaps of student groups based upon 
both racial/ethnic background and socioeconomic status. 
 Such an action might prove difficult to challenge.  According to the case law, which runs 
from Luther v. Borden to the modern-day, Congress is the main determiner of what constitutes a 
republican form of government.  Also, congressional determinations regarding a republican form 
of government do not present a justiciable cause of action for the courts, according to an 
impressive array of the case law centering on the Guarantee Clause.   
 Of course, such a policy course would violate the use of federalism as a public policy 
approach.  Such a policy approach on the part of the federal government would also require that 
much adaptive work occur to overcome long traditions of state control of public education which 
generally incorporate features of local control through publicly elected boards of education in 
each of the school districts.  However, if utilized as an approach to the issue of children’s well-
being in this country that also addressed the components of systems thinking articulated by 
Senge, it would not violate systems thinking per se.  The “teamwork” component of systems 
thinking would present a significant obstacle to overcome.  As a result, a policy approach 
whereby Congress used both the Guarantee Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment to assert 
primary control over public education would most definitely run counter to adaptive work and 
the use of federalism as a public policy approach; it would most likely violate the concept of 
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systems thinking as well.  Most important, however, in any discussion regarding the assertion of 
federal control over education, is the attitude of the public.  Because of great public support for 
local control of public education, and because of the deep vein of distrust of centralized authority 
in America (except in emergencies and catastrophes, both natural, militarily, and economically), 
outright control of public education by the federal government remains unlikely as public 
attitudes now stand.  
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Chapter 8 
The Eleventh Amendment 
Introduction 
 The Eleventh Amendment constitutes a point of ignorance and irrelevancy for most 
Americans who are more familiar with the Bill of Rights (Amendments 1-10) and the Civil War 
Amendments (Amendments 13, 14, & 15), a view typified by the following comment of a legal 
scholar, who stated, “Between the Tenth Amendment and the Reconstruction Amendments, of 
course, came the intervening Eleventh and Twelfth Amendments” (Amar, 1998, p. 124 n).  The 
Eleventh Amendment was specifically proposed and adopted for the purpose of overturning a 
Supreme Court decision that, as will be shown later, went against the understanding of some (but 
not all) of the Constitution’s Framers as well as most of the Federalists at the constitutional 
ratification conventions in the various states (see Monk, p. 199; Levy, pp. 57-59; see also the 
“Historical Background” section of this chapter).  Confusion arose because of different 
understandings and perspectives regarding the question of whether or not a state could be sued in 
court, especially by citizens of other states.  As one scholar of constitutional law noted, nothing 
that was said at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia provided an answer (Levy, p. 56).  
However, the text of Article III, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution clearly extended federal judicial 
power to “controversies … between a state and citizens of another state.”  However, judged in 
terms of the context provided by the ratification controversy by the state conventions, Article III, 
§ 2 didn’t really mean what it said.  
The reason is that after opponents of the Constitution condemned the clause 
because it derogated from state sovereignty, advocates of ratification 
explained that it meant only cases in which a state had given consent or had 
initiated the suit as a plaintiff.  (Levy, p. 56) 
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 The Eleventh Amendment officially installed a concept that came to the American 
colonies by way of English common law (See subsequent “Historical Background” section of 
this chapter).  After being adopted, the Amendment received rough treatment at the hands of the 
Supreme Court.  According to one historical account, “Marshall’s Court rejected Eleventh 
Amendment arguments in ten of eleven cases raising them.  The Court under Chief Justice Roger 
Taney (1836-1864) did so in five of five” (Hall, 1992, p. 382).  Subsequently, the Eleventh 
Amendment lay relatively dormant until the latter part of the twentieth century when it became 
the basis for several Supreme Court decisions (see subsequent “Case Law” section of this 
chapter).   
Historical Background 
 The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, based on the concept 
of sovereign immunity, reads as follows: 
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any 
Foreign State. 
 
 Sovereign immunity – The english experience. 
 The principle of sovereign immunity came to the American colonies through its 
development in early English common law, which declared “that the king was immune from suit 
by his subjects” (Hall, 1992, p. 806).  When brought to America, the principle was closely 
associated with the maxim, “The King can do no wrong” (Hall, 1992, p. 288).  However, as will 
be shown, the maxim had a different interpretation when first originated.  Both interpretations 
(the original 13th century explanation and the later 18th century explication) provided opposite 
answers to the question originally posed by Aristotle regarding whether it was better to be ruled 
by law or by men (See n. # 67).   
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 As first developed, the maxim flowed from the application of natural law concepts to 
political rule by Aristotle, Cicero, and subsequent medieval thinkers.  After an extended period, 
during which time classical political thought lay dormant, a twelfth-century Englishman, John of 
Salisbury, who had studied under Peter Abelard in Paris, became one of the first medieval 
thinkers to “take up political theory in any extended way” (Audi, p. 454; see also Corwin, 1965, 
p. 17).  According to John of Salisbury, a ruler who answered Aristotle’s question by declaring a 
preference for the rule of men was a “tyrant” because he was “one who oppresses the people by 
rulership based upon force” (Corwin, 1965, pp. 18-19).  On the other hand, a ruler who preferred 
the rule of law as the answer to Aristotle’s question deserved the title of “prince” because he was 
“one who rules in accordance with the laws” (Corwin, 1965, p. 19).  As John of Salisbury 
explained, the ruler “may not lawfully have any will of his own apart from that which the law or 
equity enjoins, or the calculation of the common interest requires” (Corwin, 1965, p. 19).  As 
summarized by Professor Corwin, John of Salisbury concluded that the linguistic roots of Latin 
proved his point, “Indeed the very title rex is derived from doing right, that is, acting in 
accordance with law (recte)” (Emphasis in original) (Corwin, 1965, p. 19).  Furthermore, 
according to John, if a ruler chose to substitute his own rule for the rule of law, “legitimate 
resistance to him can include his assassination” (Audi, p. 454).  After summarizing natural law’s 
connection with positive (human) law, Corwin compared classical and medieval thoughts about 
natural law: 
[C]lassical antiquity erected the conception of a law of nature discoverable 
by human reason when uninfluenced by passion and forming the ultimate 
source and explanation of the excellence of positive law….  [W]hereas the 
classical conception of natural law was that it conferred its chief benefits by 
entering into the more deliberate acts of human authority, the medieval 
conception was that it checked and delimited authority from without….  In 
ancient theory jus naturale was a terminus ad quem – a goal toward which 
actual law inevitably tended; in medieval theory it was a terminus a quo – a 
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standard from which human authority was always straying.  (Emphasis in 
original) (Corwin, 1965, pp. 22, 22-23, p. 23, n. 64) 
 
 John of Salisbury’s line of political thought was continued by Henry de Bracton, a judge 
of the King’s Bench during the reign of Henry III, who was considered to be “the greatest of 
English medieval jurists” (Willson, p. 148; see also Corwin, 1965, p. 27).  In providing his and 
England’s answer to Aristotle’s question, Bracton united natural law, English common law, and 
the idea of a higher law.  According to Bracton: 
The King himself ought not to be subject to man, but subject to God and to 
the law, for the law makes the King.  Let the King then attribute to the law 
what the law attributes to him, namely, dominion and power, for there is no 
King where the will and not the law has dominion.  (Corwin, 1965, p. 27) 
 
And, as described by Professor Corwin, Bracton offered a religious paraphrase of John of 
Salisbury’s theoretical observations about politics.  According to Professor Corwin: 
The King’s power, he writes, is the power of justice, not of injustice.  So 
long as he does justice, the King is the vicar of God; but when he turns aside 
to injustice, he is the minister of the devil.  Indeed, he is called King (rex) 
from ruling well (regendo), not from reigning (regnando).  (Emphasis in 
original) (Corwin, 1965, p. 27) 
 
During Bracton’s life, the maxim offered by royalists was that “the pleasure of the prince has the 
force of law” (Corwin, 1965, p. 28).  Not so, according to Bracton.  Only “that which has been 
rightly defined with the counsel of his magistrates, the King himself authorizing it, and 
deliberation and discussion having been had upon it” has the force of law (Corwin, 1965, p. 28).  
Regarding the maxim offered earlier as justification for sovereign immunity, Professor Corwin 
pointed out its original meaning, a meaning just the opposite of its literal interpretation.  Corwin 
wrote: 
The origin of the maxim that “the King can do no wrong” has been assigned 
by some authorities to the minority of Henry III; but if the saying existed in 
Bracton’s day, it meant nearly the opposite of what it does today.  “If the 
King, or anybody else, said that the King ‘could not’ do something, that 
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meant, not that the act would not, if done, be attributed to the king, but that 
the king was no more allowed to do it, than a subject was allowed to commit 
a trespass or a felony.”  Ehrlich, Proceeding Against the Crown (6 Oxford 
Studies in Leg. And Soc. Hist. 1921) 127.  (Corwin, 1965, p. 29, n. 82) 
 
So, originally the maxim indicated a preference for the rule of law, while the literal interpretation 
subsequently used indicated a preference for the rule of men with a corresponding focus upon 
accomplishing the will of the ruler without regard to the law.  It would be several centuries 
before the principle regarding the separation of powers would be articulated by Montesquieu, a 
few hundred years before separation of powers would be combined with judicial review to form 
an institutional check on abuses of sovereignty in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, and 
also centuries before institutional checks upon governmental abuse of power would be 
implemented in the U.S. Constitution. 
 The rationale for the literal interpretation of the maxim regarding sovereign immunity 
“was that since law emanated from the sovereign, he could not be held accountable in courts of 
his own creation” (Hall, 1992, p. 806).  The doctrine of sovereign immunity for the king and his 
agents was transferred in the United States to both state and federal governments.  Or, at least, 
that’s what some of the Framers thought.  That the Framers had discussed the idea of sovereign 
immunity regarding the issue of taxation was plainly stated by Alexander Hamilton in The 
Federalist (No. 81, p. 456).110  However, the Anti-Federalists had not participated in the 
Constitutional Convention and argued that Article III, § 2 of the Constitution abrogated a state’s 
sovereign immunity by extending the federal judicial power to include “Controversies … 
between a State and Citizens of another State” (U.S. Constitution, Article III, § 2). 
Sovereign immunity and the american political experience prior to the constitution. 
 
 The issue of sovereign immunity for the state governments was particularly immediate 
because of the huge debts most states had contracted, both during and after the Revolutionary 
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War.  After assuming his duties as the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton had 
estimated that the combined debts of the states totaled between $21 and $25 million (PAH, 6: 
119; see also previous discussion in “Historical Background” section of Chapter Six of this 
paper).  The nightmare envisioned by the states was a horde of creditors filing suits against the 
state governments to collect on unpaid debts contracted for a variety of expenses. 
 Anti-Federalists also feared that the Constitution would eliminate state judicial systems 
by consolidating the state courts and absorbing them into the federal court system (Hall, 1992, p. 
144).  Immediately following the Constitutional Convention, George Mason, a constitutional 
delegate from Virginia who had refused to sign the Constitution, published a list of his objections 
in the October 4, 1787 Pennsylvania Packet that included his fear that “the federal judiciary 
would destroy and absorb the state judiciaries” (Bowen, p. 268).  Anti-Federalist fears of 
absorption of state judiciaries was part of an overall fear regarding “consolidation” of the states 
into an “empire” as described by one historian: 
This new Constitution was patterned after the English system surely.  Under 
it the United States would no longer be a confederation of free sovereign 
states but a consolidation, an empire.  The very word consolidation was an 
offense against “first principles,” against the principles of the Revolution 
that Americans had fought for.  The spirit of ’75 – had it then vanished with 
victory?  (Emphasis in original) (Bowen, p. 268) 
 
Anti-Federalist fears of federal “consolidation” were also articulated by Patrick Henry, who 
asked rhetorically: 
Whither is the spirit of America gone?  Whither is the genius of America 
fled?  …We drew the spirit of liberty from our British ancestors.  But now, 
Sir, the American spirit, assisted by the ropes and chains of consolidation, is 
about to convert this country into a powerful and mighty empire….  There 
will be no checks, no real balances, in this government.  What can avail your 
specious, imaginary balances, your rope-dancing, chain-rattling, ridiculous 
ideal checks and contrivances?  (Emphasis added) (Bowen, pp. 297-298) 
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 Writing to rebut the Anti-Federalists’ claim regarding sovereign immunity in The 
Federalist, Alexander Hamilton, as Publius, had written: 
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an 
individual without its consent.  This is the general sense and the general 
practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of 
sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union.  
(Emphasis in original) (No. 81, p. 455) 
 
Three sentences later, Hamilton flatly stated “that there is no color to pretend that the State 
governments would, by the adoption of [the Constitution], be divested of” their sovereign 
immunity (No. 81, p. 456).   
 Sovereign immunity and the state ratifying conventions for the constitution. 
 Hamilton’s view of sovereign immunity was echoed by James Madison during the 
Virginia convention to ratify the proposed Constitution. The Virginia state ratifying convention 
served as a key battleground over the debate regarding sovereign immunity as well as other 
issues on which the Federalists and Anti-Federalists differed.  When the Virginians began their 
convention in early June, eight of their sister states had already ratified the newly proposed 
Constitution (see Appendix U).  Today, since we know the outcome, the contemporary person 
often glosses over or is ignorant of the critical nature of the original event.  At least one historian 
has cautioned:  
At several points in this study, I have urged that the person in search of the 
past must affect an innocence of the future.  Our knowledge of how events 
ultimately worked out too easily gives us a false perspective on how they 
came to be.  (Fredriksen, p. 202) 
 
However, because we know that the Constitution was duly ratified by the states, we tend to 
ignore and forget what a close thing the event actually was as well as being aware of what the 
critical issues were (see Appendix U for the state ratification votes for Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Virginia, and New York).  This is particularly true of the Virginia convention in 
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which the opposing forces were so evenly matched.  Besides being one of the larger states, 
Virginians had played a critical role in the Constitutional Convention.  However, Anti-
Federalists were also strong in Virginia.  When the state ratifying convention began, the delegate 
totals for each side were practically even (Rossiter, p. 291).  It was also a convention that pitted 
Constitutional Framers against one another.  George Mason had refused to sign the Constitution 
and served as a leading Anti-Federalist (Bowen, pp. 261, 268; Rossiter, pp. 250, 291).  Historians 
regarded the Virginia ratification convention as one of the best of the state conventions as well as 
one of the most critical for the outcome of the Constitution.  According to one source: 
In no convention were the opponents of the Constitution able to meet the 
friends on such equal terms…  The debates, which lasted the better part of 
four weeks, were the most searching, exciting, and well-reported of any 
convention.  By the time of the decisive vote…, neither the wildly slashing 
[Patrick] Henry nor the neatly parrying [James] Madison, who rose to 
heights as lofty as those he had reached in Philadelphia, could deny that 
every potential defect and every real merit of the Constitution had been 
candidly exposed.  (Rossiter, p. 291) 
 
Another historian described the Virginia ratifying convention in the following manner: 
This was to be the ablest of all the ratification conventions and the best 
prepared, a gathering studded with stars, with names and faces known 
throughout the state and well beyond – well-speaking gentlemen on both 
sides, well-dressed, wellborn.  More than a fourth were military men….  
They had fought the British, they had fought the Indians, and in political 
conviction they were ranged on both sides.  (Bowen, pp. 294-295) 
 
The outcome would be critical, for as one commentator noted, “A nine-state Union without 
Virginia, however, would be no union at all” (Rossiter, p. 291).  Actually, Virginia was one of 
four states, “[a]ny one of [which] – Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia – was 
in a physical and political position to wreck the whole scheme by holding out” (Rossiter, p. 279). 
 As previously mentioned, sovereign immunity was one of the critical issues discussed in 
the Virginia ratifying convention, and it was at the Virginia convention where the idea received 
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its most thorough discussion.  In answer to the charge that under Article III, § 2 of the 
Constitution, Virginia would “be brought before the bar of [federal] justice to be arraigned like a 
culprit, or private offender,” Madison’s reply echoed that provided previously by Hamilton in 
The Federalist: “It is not in the power of individuals to call any state into court.  The only 
operation it can have, is that, if a state should wish to bring a suit against a citizen, it must be 
brought before the federal court” (Levy, p. 57).  Patrick Henry responded to Madison and heaped 
ridicule upon the argument “that the state may be plaintiff only,” which was a clear “perversion 
of the text’s language” (Levy, p. 57).  To this, John Marshall responded by clearly stating “the 
fundamental Federalist position on the clause” (Levy, p. 57).  Marshall declared: 
I hope that no gentleman will think that a state will be called at the bar of the 
federal court….  It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should 
be dragged before a court.  The intent is, to enable states to recover claims 
of individuals in other states.  I contend this construction is warranted by the 
words.  (Levy, pp. 57-58) 
 
 By a relatively narrow vote the Federalist interpretation, as presented by Hamilton, 
Madison, and Marshall, prevailed in Virginia’s state ratifying convention, and the Constitution 
was duly ratified.  However, by the time discussion came to an end and a vote was taken in 
Virginia, New Hampshire had ratified four days previously, thus making Virginia the tenth state 
to ratify the Constitution.  More importantly, Virginia was the third of the four large states to 
ratify the Constitution (see Appendix U for constitutional ratification dates by Pennsylvania, 
Massachusetts, Virginia, & New York).  Perhaps one of the reasons the Federalists prevailed in 
Virginia was their agreement to submit a proposal to Congress that the grant of judicial power in 
Article III, § 2 be rewritten so that it omitted suits “between a State and citizens of another State” 
(Mathis, 1968, p. 214, n. 26). 
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 In New York, the concept of sovereign immunity did not occupy center stage. Instead 
New York’s debate was dominated by two dismal prospects brilliantly framed by Alexander 
Hamilton: first, the spectre of staying outside the newly formed Union with only Rhode Island 
and North Carolina for company; and second, the unwelcome possibility that the City of New 
York, accompanied by southern New York counties, would secede from the state in order to join 
the Union (Rossiter, pp. 293-294).  Thus, the looming specter of isolation played a large role in 
New York’s ratification of the Constitution.  However, sovereign immunity did receive some 
attention in New York as it formed the basis of a proposed amendment to the Constitution 
forwarded to Congress by the New York constitutional ratification convention.  According to a 
federal appellate judge who also served as an adjunct professor of law at both Rutgers University 
Law School and Seton Hall University Law School: 
The understanding of the convention on state sovereign immunity can best 
be gleaned from the text of a proposed amendment that it submitted to the 
First Congress: “that nothing in the Constitution now under consideration 
contained, is to be construed to authorize any suit to be brought against any 
state, in any manner whatever.”  (Gibbons, p. 1912) 
 
As Judge Gibbons observed, “Such an amendment would have constitutionalized a rule of state 
sovereign immunity” (Gibbons, p. 1912).  The judge for the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit continued: 
That the New York ratifying convention deemed this amendment necessary 
to accomplish that result [a constitutional rule regarding state sovereign 
immunity] suggests that despite anything Hamilton said in The Federalist 
No. 81, the delegates understood that, under section 2 of article III, states 
were in some instances subject to suit.  (Gibbons, p. 1912). 
 
 The last two states to ratify the Constitution, North Carolina and Rhode Island, did not 
hold state ratifying conventions for the Constitution until after Congress had submitted what 
became the Bill of Rights to the state legislatures for ratification as constitutional amendments 
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one through ten.  Even then, each state’s convention proposed to Congress that an additional 
amendment be added regarding sovereign immunity.  North Carolina adopted Virginia’s 
approach in suggesting that Article III, § 2 be rewritten so that it omitted suits “between a State 
and citizens of another State” (Mathis, 1968, p. 214, n. 26).  Rhode Island, the last state to ratify 
the Constitution (See Appendix U for comparative dates) followed New York’s example by 
proposing that Congress submit an additional amendment to the states for their approval whereby 
all lawsuits by individuals against any of the states would be constitutionally prohibited (Mathis, 
1968, p. 214, n. 26).  Congress, however, would take no further action until convinced to do so 
by subsequent events. 
Chisholm v. georgia: Summary of the primary catalyst for the eleventh amendment. 
 
 The troubling question of sovereign immunity arose once again in Chisholm v. Georgia, 
2 U.S. 419 (1793), a case brought by Alexander Chisholm, a citizen of Charleston, South 
Carolina serving as executor for a merchant, Robert Farquhar (also from Charleston, South 
Carolina), who had supplied clothing to Georgia’s colonial forces during the Revolutionary War 
(Mathis, 1968, pp. 217-218; Hall, 1992, p. 144).111  The lawsuit was to recover the value of the 
clothing supplied by the merchant to Georgia’s troops as authorized by the Executive Council of 
Georgia, but for which payment had not been made by the state.112  First filed in the United 
States Circuit Court for the District of Georgia after the Georgia legislature had rejected 
Chisholm’s claim on behalf of Farquhar, Farquhar’s Executor v. Georgia was decided during 
“the October 1791 term of the Circuit Court” (Mathis, 1968, p. 218).  Although the original 
amount of the sale had been listed as “£63,605, South Carolina currency,” the lawsuit was for 
“£100,000 sterling (principal, interest, and damages)” (Jacobs, p. 47).  Georgia’s response was to 
assert sovereign immunity and to plead the following: “the state of Georgia cannot be drawn or 
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compelled to answer against the will of the said State before any Justices of any Court of Law or 
Equity whatsoever” (Jacobs, p. 47).  The two judges who heard the case, James Iredell (Justice of 
the U.S. Supreme Court on circuit) and Nathaniel Pendleton (Judge of the U.S. District Court for 
Georgia) agreed with Georgia’s assertion and ruled that “Georgia could not be sued by a citizen 
of South Carolina in the Circuit Court” (Mathis, 1968, p. 218).   
 Chisholm, however, refused to let the matter end so unsatisfactorily.  Rather than 
appealing the lower court’s decision by filing for a writ of error,  Chisholm instead filed “an 
original suit in the Supreme Court” (Jacobs, p. 47, n. 31).  Although papers had been served to 
the Governor and Attorney General of Georgia, the state refused to appear, having instructed 
attorneys to deliver “a written remonstrance and protestation on behalf of the state, against the 
exercise of jurisdiction in the cause” because of sovereign immunity (2 U.S. 419).  The attorneys 
were also instructed that they were not to take “any part in arguing the question” before the 
Court (2 U.S. 419).  Edmund Randolph, the U.S. Attorney General who had represented Virginia 
at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, argued the case for Chisholm. 
 The case was heard by four Justices, Patterson not having been yet selected to fill the seat 
left vacant by Justice Johnson’s resignation (2 U.S. 419, 479, n. b).  One of the Justices, John 
Jay, had helped author The Federalist, having written only three articles because of illness (Hall, 
1992, p. 446).  Another Justice, James Wilson, had represented Pennsylvania at the 
Constitutional Convention “where he played a part second only to James Madison’s” role (Hall, 
1992, p. 933).  A third Justice, William Cushing, had served as the vice president of the 
Massachusetts convention that “narrowly ratified the document [the U.S. Constitution] in 
February 1788” (Hall, 1992, p. 213).  Because of his strong support of the Constitution and 
because of his demonstrated legal expertise, Cushing had also been the “first associate justice 
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that George Washington appointed” to the Supreme Court (Hall, 1992, p. 213).  Cushing had 
also previously served in the state convention “that drafted the Massachusetts Constitution of 
1780,” the same constitution that answered Aristotle’s ancient query with the declaration that, in 
Massachusetts at least, the citizens would be governed by “a government of laws and not of 
men” (Hall, 1992, p. 213; Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Article XXX).  The fourth 
Justice, James Iredell, had been selected by Washington to serve on the Court because of his 
“eloquent and energetic efforts in behalf of the ratification of the Constitution” in North Carolina 
as well as his prior legal experience (Hall, 1992, p. 440). 
 With all of the Justices sitting on the Court possessing such staunch Federalist 
credentials, the deck should have appeared to have been stacked against Chisholm’s efforts to 
sue the State of Georgia for an unpaid bill.  Such, however, proved not to be the case.  Perhaps 
part of the reason lies in the fact that while the issue may have been discussed at the 
Constitutional Convention, no definitive answer was reached.  Such, at least, was part of the 
answer provided by one constitutional historian.  First, he laid out the issue: 
Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) … involved the question whether a state could 
be sued in the Supreme Court by a citizen of another state without its 
consent.  Nothing said at the Philadelphia Convention answers that question, 
but the text of the Constitution seems to extend the judicial power of the 
United States to “controversies … between a state and citizens of another 
state.”  (Levy, p. 56) 
 
Next, he presented the problem and its political solution: 
But that provision of Article III, understood in the context of the ratification 
controversy, seems not to mean what it says.  The reason is that after 
opponents of the Constitution condemned the clause because it derogated 
from state sovereignty, advocates of ratification explained that it meant only 
cases in which a state had given consent or had initiated the suit as plaintiff.  
(Levy, p. 56) 
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 But perhaps the outcome of the case resulted primarily from the difference between 
making a political argument and making a legal decision based upon the law and on the 
Constitution.  Of the five Justices, only Iredell sided with Georgia’s claim for sovereign 
immunity, basing his decision on the English common law inherited by the new nation.  The four 
remaining Justices, basing their decision on the Constitution and the ensuing Judiciary Act, held 
that “[a] state may be sued, in the supreme court [sic], by an individual citizen of another state” 
(2 U.S. 419).  Justice Cushing asked two penetrating questions that went straight to the heart of 
the matter.  First, in discussing Article III, § 2 of the Constitution by which the judicial power of 
the United States was extended “to Controversies between two or more States” as well as those 
“between a State and Citizens of another State,” Justice Cushing both commented and 
questioned: 
The case (Chisholm v. Georgia), then, seems clearly to fall within the letter 
of the constitution.  It may be suggested, that it could not be intended to 
subject a state to be a defendant, because it would affect the sovereignty of 
states.  If that be the case, what shall we do with the immediate preceding 
clause – “controversies between two or more states,” where a state must of 
necessity be defendant?  If it was not the intent, in the very next clause also, 
that a state might be made defendant, why was it so expressed, as naturally 
to lead to and comprehend that idea?  Why was not an exception made, if 
one was intended?  (2 U.S. 419, 467) 
 
Justice Cushing grounded his next question in the purpose of republican government: 
Further, if a state is entitled to justice in the federal court, against a citizen of 
another state, why not such citizen against the state, when the same 
language equally comprehends both?  The rights of individuals and the 
justice due to them, are as dear and precious as those of states.  Indeed, the 
latter are founded upon the former; and the great end and object of them 
must be, to secure and support the rights of individuals, or else, vain is 
government.  (2 U.S. 419, 468 
 
In similar fashion, Justice Wilson situated the issue in the foundations of justice through use of a 
comparative homily that employed imagery grounded in a Greek myth: 
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A state, like a merchant, makes a contract.  A dishonest state, like a 
dishonest merchant, willfully refuses to discharge it: the latter is amenable 
to a court of justice: upon general principles of right, shall the former, when 
summoned to answer the fair demands of its creditor, be permitted, Proteus-
like, to assume a new appearance, and to insult him and justice, by declaring 
I am a sovereign state?  Surely not.  (Emphasis in original) (2 U.S. 419, 456) 
 
Using rhetorical questions in the midst of his argument, Justice Blair summarized the legal 
position reached by four of the five Justices on the Court: 
[T]he constitution … gives to the supreme court original jurisdiction … in 
the case where a state shall be a party; but is not a state a party as well in the 
condition of defendant, as in that of a plaintiff?  And is the whole force of 
that expression satisfied, by confining its meaning to the case of a plaintiff-
state?  It seems to me, that if this court should refuse to hold jurisdiction of a 
case where a state is defendant, it would renounce part of the authority 
conferred, and consequently, part of the duty imposed on it by the 
constitution; because, it would be a refusal to take cognizance of a case, 
where a state is a party.  (Emphasis in original) (2 U.S. 419, 451) 
 
 The legal reasoning used by the three majority Justices provides additional features of 
interest to twenty-first century readers for a number of reasons.  First, the Court issued seriatim 
opinions, thereby following the English tradition wherein “appellate courts announced case 
outcomes through the separate opinions of each participating judge,” a practice used from the 
Court’s beginnings until ended by Chief Justice John Marshall in 1801, at which time the Court 
adopted the current practice of issuing a single majority opinion as part of Marshall’s attempt to 
make the Court a “coequal” branch of the federal government (Hall, 1992, p. 780).113  Second, 
the opinions contained discussions about a number of interesting historical topics.  Chief Justice 
Jay’s opinion provided a legal description of the American Revolution.  Jay’s opinion also 
discussed the origin of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which he then used to point out the 
difference in views of sovereignty between European countries and the United States.  Chief 
Justice Jay also commented on the demands made by the concept of republican government upon 
justice.  Justice Wilson’s opinion corrected Justice Iredell’s discussion regarding England’s 
  
contribution to the doctrine of sovereign immunity by providing information about earlier Saxon 
treatment of the doctrine that was omitted by Justice Iredell.  Justice Wilson also interpreted the 
meaning of the most common pe
 
According to Justice Wilson, “Causes, and not parties to causes, are weighed by justice, in her 
equal scales: on the former solely, her attention is fixed: to the latter, she is, as she is painted, 
blind” (2 U.S. 419, 466).   
 In his own review of the Engl
Justice Wilson corrected an omission by Justice Iredell in the latter Justice’s discussion of 
sovereign immunity.  Iredell had focused upon the English developments of sovereign immunity 
 
 
rsonification of justice in his opinion (See Figure 5: Justice).
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subsequent to the Norman invasion.  Wilson observed that the practice of Saxon rulers prior to 
1066, as well as the Norman rulers in England following their triumph under William at 
Hastings, was quite different from that discussed by Justice Iredell.  According to Justice Wilson: 
Under the Saxon government, a very different doctrine was held to be 
orthodox.  Under that government, as we are informed by the Mirror of 
Justice, a book said by Sir Edward Coke, to have been written, in part, at 
least, before the conquest; under that government, it was ordained, that the 
King’s court should be open to all plaintiffs, by which, without delay, they 
should have remedial writs, as well against the King or against the Queen, as 
against any other of the people.  The law continued to be the same, for some 
centuries after the conquest.  Until the time of Edward I., the King might 
have been sued as a common person.  (2 U.S. 419, 459) 
 
Justice Wilson also pointed out that despite the doctrine of sovereign immunity current in 
England, the King could be sued.  Wilson observed: 
True it is, that now, in England, the King must be sued in his courts, by 
petition; but even now, the difference is only in the form, not in the thing.  
The judgments or decrees of those courts will substantially be the same 
upon a precatory as upon a mandatory process.  (2 U.S. 419, 459) 
 
 Chief Justice Jay’s opinion contained several features of interest.  First, the Chief Justice 
and co-author of The Federalist provided a legal description of the Revolutionary War in order 
to examine “the political situation we were in, prior to the revolution, and to the political rights 
which emerged from the revolution” (2 U.S. 419, 470).  The Chief Justice began by describing 
the legal position of the colonies prior to the Revolution: 
All of the country, now possessed by the United States, was then a part of 
the dominions appertaining to the crown of Great Britain.  Every acre of 
land in this country was then held, mediately or immediately, by grants from 
that crown.  All the people of this country were then subjects of the King of 
Great Britain, and owed allegiance to him; and all the civil authority then 
existing … flowed from the head of the British Empire.  (2 U.S. 419, 470) 
 
Next, the Chief Justice examined the changed legal standing of the United States following the 
beginning of the American Revolution: 
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The revolution, or rather the Declaration of Independence, found the people 
already united for general purposes, and at the same time, providing for their 
more domestic concerns, by state conventions…  From the crown of Great 
Britain, the sovereignty of their country passed to the people of it; … and 
thirteen sovereignties were considered as emerged from the principles of the 
revolution …; the people, nevertheless, continued to consider themselves, in 
a national point of view, as one people; … (2 U.S. 419, 470) 
 
Chief Justice Jay next proceeded to describe the situation under the Articles of Confederation 
and the newly approved Constitution: 
[A]fterwards, in the hurry of the war, and in the warmth of mutual 
confidence, they made a confederation of the states, the basis of general 
government.  Experience disappointed the expectations they had formed 
from it; and then the people, in their collective and national capacity, 
established the present constitution.  It is remarkable, that in establishing it, 
the people exercised their own rights, and their own proper sovereignty, and 
conscious of the plenitude of it, they declared with becoming dignity, “We, 
the people of the United States, do ordain and establish this constitution.”  
Here we see the people acting as sovereigns of the whole country; and in the 
language of sovereignty, establishing a constitution by which it was their 
will, that the state governments, should be bound, and to which the state 
constitutions should be made to conform.  (2 U.S. 419, 470-471) 
 
 While the legal (as opposed to the usual political, social, or economic history) description 
of the emergence of the United States of America provided interest by itself, the Chief Justice 
used it as a springboard to launch into a discussion of the differences in sovereignty between the 
U.S. and the European countries, which, in turn, had implications for the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity in American jurisprudence.  Chief Justice Jay began by describing sovereignty as it 
developed in Europe. 
[T]he sovereignties in Europe, and particularly in England, exist on feudal 
principles.  That system considers the prince as the sovereign, and the 
people as his subjects; it regards his person as the object of allegiance, and 
excludes the idea of his being on an equal footing with a subject, either in a 
court of justice or elsewhere.  (2 U.S. 419, 471) 
 
Jay continued his discussion of sovereignty as developed from feudal principles by describing 
the natural evolution of the doctrine of sovereign immunity: 
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That system contemplates him as being the fountain of honor and authority; 
and from his grace and grant, derives all franchises, immunities and 
privileges; it is easy to perceive, that such a sovereign could not be 
amendable to a court of justice, or subjected to judicial control and actual 
constraint.  It was of necessity, therefore, that suability became incompatible 
with such sovereignty….  The same feudal ideas run through all their 
jurisprudence, and constantly remind us of the distinction between the 
prince and the subject.  (2 U.S. 419, 471) 
 
At this point, the Chief Justice counterposed American sovereignty: 
No such ideas obtain here; at the revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the 
people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are 
sovereigns without subjects … and have none to govern but themselves; the 
citizens of America are equal as fellow-citizens, and as joint-tenants in the 
sovereignty.  (2 U.S. 419, 471-472) 
 
Chief Justice Jay continued by discussing the difference in governance effected by the two 
different views of sovereignty. 
Sovereignty is the right to govern.  In Europe, the sovereignty is generally 
ascribed to the prince; here it rests with the people; there, the sovereign 
actually administers the government; here, never in a single instance; our 
governors are the agents of the people, and at most stand in the same 
relation to their sovereign, in which regents in Europe stand to their 
sovereigns.  (2 U.S. 419, 472) 
 
The Chief Justice next posed the question regarding “whether suability [was] compatible with 
state sovereignty” (2 U.S. 419, 472).  Proceeding to answer the inquiry he posed by asking yet 
another question, the nation’s first Chief Justice continued: 
Suability by whom?  Not a subject, for in this country there are none; not an 
inferior, for all the citizens being, as to civil rights, perfectly equal, there is 
not, in that respect, one citizen inferior to another.  It is agreed, that one free 
citizen may sue another; the obvious dictates of justice, and the purposes of 
society demanding it.  (2 U.S. 419, 472) 
 
Jay next dismissed the notion of state sovereignty interfering with a lawsuit against it in much 
the same fashion as previously done by Justice Cushing by observing that it was permissible for 
one state to sue another state.  The Chief Justice continued: 
   
   
913
The only remnant of objection, therefore, that remains is, that the state is not 
bound to appear and answer as a defendant, at the suit of an individual; but 
why it is unreasonable that she should be so bound, is hard to conjecture:  
that rule is said to be a bad one, which does not work both ways; the citizens 
of Georgia are content with a right of suing citizens of other states; but are 
not content that citizens of other states should have a right to sue them.  (2 
U.S. 419, 473) 
 
Such an objection as made by Georgia was repugnant to the idea of republican government.  
According to C.J. Jay, “[T]rue republican government requires, that free and equal citizens 
should have free and equal justice” (2 U.S. 419, 476).  Jay concluded, “The exception contended 
for, would contradict and do violence to the great and leading principles of a free and equal 
national government, one of the great objects of which is, to ensure justice to all” (2 U.S. 419, 
477).  The idea that the Constitution meant what it said, that the federal judiciary had jurisdiction 
in controversies between states and in controversies between a state and citizens of another state, 
such an idea was both “honest” and “useful” because it both taught and appreciated  
the value of our free republican national government, which places all our 
citizens on an equal footing, and enables each and every of them to obtain 
justice, without any danger of being overborne by the weight and number of 
their opponents; and because it brings into action and enforces this great and 
glorious principle, that the people are the sovereign of this country, and 
consequently, that fellow-citizens and joint-sovereigns cannot be degraded, 
by appearing with each other, in their own courts, to have their controversies 
determined.  (2 U.S. 419, 479) 
 
By tying together the legal description of the Revolution, a notion of a differing sovereignty 
springing from a constitutional republic, and the requirements of republican government, the 
Chief Justice found no room for a doctrine of sovereign immunity.  The Chief Justice’s opinion 
was directly in line with those answers provided to Aristotle’s ancient query that preferred a 
government of laws.  Sovereign immunity, whether applying to a government or an individual 
official, was founded on the special privilege of a ruler who was thought to be above the people, 
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not, as with the case of republican government, a servant of the people and thus accountable to 
them. 
 The Court ordered “that unless the said state shall either … appear, or show cause to the 
contrary in this court, by the first day of next term, judgment by default shall be entered against 
the said state” (2 U.S. 479).  At the following term of the Court, on August 5, 1793, Alexander 
Dallas and Jared Ingersoll appeared before the Court on Georgia’s behalf “to contend that 
judgment by default should not be entered against the State” and requested that the case be 
continued to the next term for argument to which the Court agreed (Mathis, 1968, pp. 222-223).  
Approximately one year after the original decision in Chisholm, on February 14, 1794, the Court 
“directed that judgment be entered for the plaintiff [Chisholm], and a writ of enquiry [sic] for 
damages was awarded against Georgia” (Mathis, 1968, p. 223).  At the following term, on 
August 5, 1794, “the Court provided that a jury was to be summoned at the next term to inquire 
what damages the plaintiff should be awarded” (Mathis, 1968, p. 223).  Professor Mathis 
summarized the closing events of the case: 
However, the writ of enquiry for damages was apparently never sued out or 
executed, probably because Georgia made a settlement of the claims on 
December 9, 1794.  The settlement was made with Peter Trezevant, husband 
of Elizabeth Farquhar.  In return for a release of all the Farquhar claims, 
Trezevant accepted from Georgia eight certificates for the sum of slightly 
more than £7,586.115  (Mathis, 1968, p. 223) 
 
 State and congressional responses to chisholm v. georgia. 
 As might be imagined, the Court’s decision was greeted with hostility by most of the 
state governments and their officials.  Georgia’s reaction was extreme.  There the House of 
Representatives passed a bill “ordering the hanging of any federal official entering Georgia to 
enforce Chisholm,” such action having been made a felony in Georgia (Hall, 1992, p. 831; see 
also Fletcher, p. 1058; Levy, p. 58; Mathis, 1968, p. 226, n. 72; Warren, p. 101).  The action by 
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Georgia’s House also denied any offender the benefit of the clergy before he was to be hanged 
(Fletcher, p. 1058; Levy, p. 58; Mathis, 1968, p. 226, n. 72; Warren, p. 101).  Cooler heads 
prevailed in the Georgia Senate, however, which prevented the bill from becoming law, perhaps 
owing to the possibility of a constitutional amendment and perhaps because of Governor 
Telfair’s advocacy of such an approach (Jacobs, pp. 55-57).  
 The actions of the Virginia legislature were more measured and calculated as part of a 
campaign designed to combat the Court’s Chisholm decision.  First, both chambers of the 
Virginia legislature passed a resolution, which declared Virginia’s opposition to the outcome of 
Chisholm v. Georgia and that also resurrected the Anti-Federalist “consolidation” argument 
against the Constitution.  The resolution declared that the Court’s decision was “incompatible 
with and dangerous to the sovereignty of the individual states, as the same tends to a general 
consolidation of these confederated republics” (Jacobs, p. 59).  The second Virginia legislative 
resolution “instructed the state’s senators and requested its representatives to unite with those of 
other states in obtaining clarifying amendments to the Constitution” (Jacobs, p. 59).   
 On February 19, 1793, just one day after the Court announced its decision, the House of 
Representatives offered the first of a series of resolutions that eventually became the Eleventh 
Amendment to the Constitution (Levy, p. 59).116  As reported, the resolution’s content followed 
the recommendation offered by the New York and Rhode Island constitutional ratification 
conventions that would have “constitutionalized a rule of state sovereign immunity” (Gibbons, p. 
1912; Mathis, 1968, p. 214, n. 26).  On February 20, 1793, two days after the Court’s decision in 
Chisholm v. Georgia, an unnamed senator offered the following motion: 
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, two-thirds of both Houses concurring, That 
the following article be proposed to the Legislatures of the several States, as 
an amendment to the Constitution of the United States; which, when ratified 
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by three-fourths of the said Legislatures, shall be valid as part of the said 
Constitution, viz: 
 
 “The Judicial power of the United States shall not extend to any suits 
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State.” 
(Emphasis in original) (Annals of Congress, 3, pp. 651-652) 
 
This proposal differed from that offered in the House in that it no longer offered a generalized 
sovereign immunity for states, but instead was particularized to focus only on suits against a state 
coming from citizens outside of the state, whether American or foreign.  No mention was made 
either of any action being taken on the motion or if the motion was even seconded by another 
senator.117  However, five days later, on February 25th, it was recorded that “[t]he Senate 
resumed the consideration of the motion, made the 20th instant, respecting an additional article 
of amendment to the Constitution of the United States” (Annals of Congress, 3, p. 656).  After 
rejecting a motion “to postpone the consideration thereof to the next session of Congress,” the 
Senate further debated the matter without recording any of the remarks made by the senators and 
then postponed “the further consideration thereof” without mentioning the length of 
postponement or the date at which it would be further considered (Annals of Congress, 3, p. 
656).  On March 2, 1793, the Second Congress adjourned with no action on the proposal for a 
constitutional amendment regarding sovereign immunity having been taken by either the House 
or the Senate. 
 Some eleven months later, on Thursday, January 2, 1794, the Senate (still meeting behind 
closed doors, but keeping a public record of its proceedings as part of the Third Congress; see 
previous n. 93) offered the following motion and then postponed “further consideration” until 
January 13th: 
Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, two-thirds of both Houses concurring, That 
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the following article be proposed to the Legislatures of the several States, as 
an amendment to the Constitution of the United States; which, when ratified 
by three-fourths of the said Legislatures, shall be valid as part of the said 
Constitution, to wit: 
 
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any 
foreign State.”  (Emphasis in original) (Annals of Congress, 4, p. 25) 
 
The only difference between this proposal and the one offered the previous February in the 
Senate was the addition of the words “be construed to.”  On Monday, January 13, 1794, the 
Senate delayed consideration of the constitutional amendment until the following day (Annals of 
Congress, 4, p. 29).  On Tuesday, January 14, 1794, the Senate discussed the proposed 
amendment relating to sovereign immunity.  The following alteration to the amendment (with the 
changed portions being in boldface print) was proposed by Senator Gallatin of Pennsylvania: 
The Judicial power of the United States, except in cases arising under 
treaties made under the authority of the United States, shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States, by citizens of another State, or by citizens 
or subjects of any foreign State.  (Emphasis added) (Annals of Congress, 4, 
p. 30; see also Gibbons, pp. 1932-1933) 
 
As can be seen, the bold-faced provision would have ensured that the federal courts could be 
used to assure compliance with treaties, a provision near and dear to the hearts of western 
Pennsylvanians because of the “pending negotiations with Great Britain concerning evacuation 
of the northwestern posts” and because of western Pennsylvania’s “vulnerability to Indian 
attacks” (Gibbons, p. 1933).  Gallatin’s motion was defeated, however, by an unreported vote 
total.  Another change to the constitutional amendment was offered by an unnamed senator (the 
changed portion being identified by boldface print): 
The Judicial Power of the United States extends to all cases in law and 
equity in which one of the United States is a party; but no suit shall be 
prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, 
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or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State, where the cause of action 
shall have arisen before the ratification of this amendment. (Emphasis 
added) (Annals of Congress, 4, p. 30) 
 
As can be seen, this change would have alleviated the worries and concerns about the states’ 
Revolutionary War debts as well as suits by Loyalists and Tories (or their executors, as citizens) 
to recover property confiscated by the various states during the Revolution.  It would also have 
placed state governments and their officials under the rule of law instead of carving out a special 
exemption for them under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  This intention was frustrated as 
the proposed change was also defeated, again by an unrecorded vote total (Annals of Congress, 
4, p. 30).  The constitutional amendment as originally presented on the Senate floor on January 2, 
1794, was then voted on and passed by a 23-2 vote (Annals of Congress, 4, p. 30).  The only 
negative votes were those cast by Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania and John Rutherfurd of New 
Jersey (Annals of Congress, 4, p. 31).  No discussion regarding any of the motions, either for or 
against, was recorded.   
 Although the Senate approved the proposed Eleventh Amendment on January 14th, the 
House didn’t begin its consideration of the proposed amendment until Tuesday, March 4, 1794, 
when it moved into a “Committee of the Whole House” to consider “the resolution sent from the 
Senate, ‘proposing an article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States, respecting 
the Judicial power;’” (Annals of Congress, 4, p. 476).  Making no changes to the Senate’s 
proposal, the House emerged from meeting as a committee of the whole, resumed official 
operation as the House of Representatives in regular session, and offered the following change to 
the official Senate version (the House change printed in boldface): 
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any 
foreign State, Where such State shall have previously made provision in 
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their own Courts, whereby such suit may be prosecuted to effect. 
(Emphasis added) (Annals of Congress, 4, p. 476) 
 
The proposed change was defeated 77-8 (Annals of Congress, 4, p. 476).  The official Senate 
version was then voted on by the House and approved 81-9 (Annals of Congress, 4, p. 477).  The 
opposing votes came from the following Representatives:  John Beatty, New Jersey; Elias 
Boudinot, New Jersey; Thomas Fitzsimmons, Pennsylvania; Thomas Scott, Pennsylvania; 
George Hancock, Virginia; William Hindman, Maryland; Andrew Pickens, South Carolina; Silas 
Talbot, New York; and Artemas Ward, Massachusetts (Annals of Congress, 4, p. 478).  Of the 9 
votes opposing the Eleventh Amendment, six had voted in favor of the previously rejected House 
change to the Senate-approved version of the Eleventh Amendment:  Beatty, Boudinot, Scott, 
Hindman, Pickens, and Talbot (Annals of Congress, 4, p. 476).  As can be surmised from the 
votes against the Amendment in Congress, opposition to the Eleventh Amendment was 
particularly strong in Pennsylvania and in New Jersey.  Neither of their state legislatures 
approved the Eleventh Amendment when it was submitted to them by Congress (Jacobs, p. 67; 
see also Appendix V).  At the time, Pennsylvania was the only state that permitted lawsuits 
against the state by individuals in the state court system (Jacobs, p. 67, n. 99). 
 Officially approved by Congress on March 4, 1794, the date of the House’s passage of 
the Senate-approved version, the proposed Eleventh Amendment was sent to each of the fifteen 
state legislatures where it was approved by the required three-fourths of the state legislatures on 
February 7, 1795 (Hall, 1992, p. 250).  However, this was not known until later because of the 
“erratic” certification of action by the state legislatures and officials (Jacobs, p. 67) (See 
Appendix V).  Although twelve state legislatures had ratified the Eleventh Amendment by 
February 1795, only eight states had communicated the result to President Washington, who had 
forwarded such communication to Congress after he had received it (Jacobs, p. 67; see also 
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Annals of Congress, 4, pp. 847, 1253, 1275 for acknowledgment by the Senate and House for 
receiving letters forwarded by President Washington from Georgia and Delaware regarding their 
approval of the Eleventh Amendment).  Such was the situation still existing in January 1796 
(Jacobs, p. 67; also, see Appendix V).   
 Confusion also occurred regarding who was responsible for determining the official date 
as to when the three-fourths ratification requirement was met.  As a result, two dates came to 
exist for when the Eleventh Amendment was determined to become effective.  Initially, the date 
given was January 8, 1798, the date when the President formally declared the Amendment to be 
a part of the Constitution during the presidential message to Congress by President John Adams 
(Hall, 1992, p. 250).  However, it was later “recognized that the president has no role in the 
process of amendment, so 1795 is gaining recognition as its effective date” (Hall, 1992, pp. 250-
251).  February 7, 1795, was the date on which the North Carolina legislature, the twelfth state to 
do so, ratified the Eleventh Amendment (see Appendix V). 
 The procedure by which President Adams became involved in certifying the actions of 
the ratifying states provided another feature of interest to the whole affair.  On January 31, 
Senator Tazewell, on behalf of the “committee on the subject of amendments to the Constitution 
of the United States” reported the committee’s findings regarding state actions taken to proposed 
amendments, beginning with the first twelve authorized by Congress (Annals of Congress, 6, p. 
1537).  With regards to the “amendment respecting the suability of States,” Tazewell reported 
that the following states had “ratified” the amendment “as appears by authentic documents 
returned to Congress” through President Washington: “New York, Massachusetts, Vermont, 
New Hampshire, Georgia, Delaware, Rhode Island, and North Carolina” (Annals of Congress, 6, 
p. 1537).  The Senate committee report also stated that the committee had “strong reasons to 
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believe that other States have ratified this latter amendment, and that the evidences of the fact 
have not been as yet returned to the proper Departments of the Government” (Annals of 
Congress, 6, p. 1537).  The report concluded by stating that the required three-fourths rule had 
not been made in order for the proposed amendment to become part of the Constitution.  The 
Senate Proceedings next presented the following without reporting any discussion or informing 
the public that the Senate had taken positive action regarding it: 
Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, 
That the President be requested to adopt some speedy and effectual means 
of obtaining information from the States of Connecticut, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and South 
Carolina, whether they have ratified the amendment proposed by Congress 
to the Constitution concerning the suability of States; if they have, to obtain 
the proper evidence thereof. 
 
Ordered, That the Secretary desire the concurrence of the House of 
Representatives in this resolution.  (Emphasis in original) (Annals of 
Congress, 6, p. 1537) 
 
That the Senate had indeed taken positive action on January 31, 1797, can be surmised from two 
facts reported elsewhere in the Annals on February 1 and on February 25, 1797.   First, on 
February 1, 1797, the House reported that they had received a resolution from the Senate 
regarding the suability of States, which they copied into their minutes, a copy identical to the 
copy presented above (Annals of Congress, 6, 2057).  After discussing and rejecting the 
possibility of dealing with the Senate’s proposal in a “Committee of the Whole,” the House 
agreed to refer the matter “to a select committee” composed of five House members (Annals of 
Congress, 6, 2057).  On February 15, Representative Harper reported to the House the 
Committee’s initial findings, which reported nothing regarding the proposed Eleventh 
Amendment.  Instead Harper reported that the committee had been unable to find any record that 
the first ten amendments to the Constitution had been properly ratified by the required three-
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fourths of the state legislatures.  The committee asked that the House request the President to 
investigate the situation and report to them his findings (Annals of Congress, 6, p. 2163).  Six 
days later, on February 21, 1797, Representative Harper presented another report from the 
committee regarding the “amendments [sic] proposed to the Constitution respecting the suability 
of States,” which was accompanied by the recommendation “that the President be requested to 
inquire what States had agreed to the said amendment” (Annals of Congress, 6, p. 2223).  The 
House decided to refer the matter “to a Committee of the Whole” on the following day (Annals 
of Congress, 6, p. 2223).  On the following day, February 22nd, the House “resolved itself into a 
Committee of the Whole” to discuss the committee’s report and the Senate resolution (Annals of 
Congress, 6, p. 2248).  However, because of the extreme noise emanating from without by 
cannon fire, beating drums, and the playing of fifes in “commemoration of the President’s birth 
day [sic],” the House decided to move out of the Committee of the Whole and consider the 
matter at another time as “the report was important” (Annals of Congress, 6, 2248).  Two days 
later, on February 24th, the House moved “into a Committee of the Whole” to discuss both the 
committee’s report on the initial twelve amendments proposed by Congress in 1789 as well as 
the Senate resolution (Annals of Congress, 6, p. 2281).  The question regarding the amendments 
contained in the Bill of Rights turned on the question of whether eleven ratifying states 
constituted the required three-fourths of the fourteen states who had been members of the Union 
in 1789, the question turning on the additional question of whether or not a state was divisible 
(eleven was mathematically more than three-fourths of fourteen, but this implied that a state 
could be divided since three-fourths of fourteen did not present an even number.  This, in turn, 
raised the possibility that twelve states would be required to ratify the Bill of Rights).  After 
lengthy discussion, the House rejected the resolution proposed by the Committee regarding the 
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Bill of Rights and approved the Senate resolution regarding the proposed Eleventh Amendment’s 
status (Annals of Congress, 6, p. 2284).  The following day, February 25, 1797, the Senate 
reported receipt of a “message from the House of Representatives” informing the Senate that the 
House had passed “the resolution sent from the Senate for concurrence, for obtaining information 
relative to the amendment concerning the suability of States” (Annals of Congress, 6, p. 1559). 
 Of course, as the nation’s Vice President, Adams had presided over the Senate and thus 
had been present when news of the various states’ actions regarding the Eleventh Amendment 
had been forwarded to both the Senate and House by President Washington during the time 
period commencing November 21, 1794, with Washington’s forwarding of New York’s 
communication and ending January 29, 1796, with Washington’s forwarding of communications 
received from Rhode Island and North Carolina.  Adams’ involvement as President, however,  
began with the 1797 resolution of Congress.    Instead of appearing before Congress in person, 
President Adams first sent the following message to Congress, dated December 30, 1797, that 
was received and officially noted separately by the Senate and by the House on January 1, 1798: 
Gentlemen of the Senate, and  
 Gentlemen of the House of Representatives: 
 
In compliance with the desire of the two Houses of Congress, expressed in 
their resolution of the 2d of March, 1797, that some speedy and effectual 
means might be adopted of obtaining information from the States of 
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, 
Tennessee, and South Carolina, whether they have ratified the amendment 
proposed by Congress to the Constitution, concerning the suability of States, 
and, if they have, to obtain proper evidences; measures have been taken, and 
information and evidences obtained, the particulars of which will appear in 
the report from the Secretary of State, made by my direction, on the 28thth 
day of this month, and now presented to the two Houses for their 
consideration. (Emphasis in original) (Annals of Congress, 7, pp. 481, 784-
785) 
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The March 2nd date used by President Adams may refer to the date of adjournment by the 
Fourth Congress and possible date of transmission of the congressional request for information 
from the President regarding ratification of the Eleventh Amendment by the various states.  It 
does not, however, refer to either the initial date of action by the Senate (January 31, 1797) or the 
concurring date of action by the House (February 25, 1797); see preceding discussion).   On 
January 8, 1798, President Adams sent the following message to each congressional chamber: 
Gentlemen of the Senate, and 
 Gentlemen of the House of Representatives: 
 
I have now an opportunity of transmitting to Congress a report of the 
Secretary of State, with a copy of an Act of the Legislature of the State of 
Kentucky, consenting to the ratification of the amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States, proposed by Congress in their resolution 
of the second day of December, 1793, relative to the suability of States.  
This amendment having been adopted by three-fourths of the several States, 
may now be declared to be a part of the Constitution of the United States. 
(Emphasis in original) (Annals of Congress, 7, pp. 483, 809; Richardson, I, 
p. 260) 
 
Illustrative again of the haphazardness of the Eleventh Amendment’s ratification process, 
President Adams recorded the wrong date for the resolution of Congress approving the 
submission of the Eleventh Amendment to the state legislatures.  Instead of the March 4, 1793 
date on which the House approved the Senate’s version of the Amendment, President Adams 
listed the date of December 2, 1793, the date on which the Third Congress commenced its 
deliberations.  However, no Senate action regarding the Eleventh Amendment was recorded on 
that date, such action not occurring until January 2, 1794 (Annals of Congress, 4, pp. 10, 25).  
The positive actions taken to approve the Eleventh Amendment by state legislatures in 
Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina were never directly communicated to 
Congress, having gotten lost in the shuffle and lumped together with the general statement, 
offered without supporting evidence by President Adams: “This amendment having been 
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adopted by three-fourths of the several States, may now be declared to be a part of the 
Constitution of the United States” (Annals of Congress, 7, pp. 483, 809).  Also lost in the shuffle 
was the refusal to ratify by New Jersey and Pennsylvania as well as the failure to act by the 
legislature of Tennessee (see Appendix V, n. 9 & n. 23). 
 Lawsuits serving as secondary catalysts for the eleventh amendment. 
 The question begging discussion in the critical arena surrounding the Eleventh 
Amendment is, “What exactly was the situation in American jurisprudence regarding lawsuits 
against the states during the period under consideration?”  A subsidiary question would be, 
“What role, if any, did such lawsuits play in the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment?”  
Lawsuits by individuals against other individuals challenging state actions as well as legal 
actions against the states themselves fell into three broad categories.  First were claims for 
payment against the state, of which Chisholm provided an example.  Other examples included 
Vanstophorst v. Maryland (1791), Oswald v. New York (1793), and Cutting v. South Carolina 
(1796) (For case information, see Appendix Y).  It should be noted that none of the suits 
suggested “a picture of general fiscal irresponsibility on the part of the defendant [states]” as the 
lawsuits were arguments about payments for services and were not about “public securities, 
paper, or loan certificates issued by a state” (Jacobs, p. 70).  Furthermore, it should be 
remembered, Hamilton’s plan for the federal government to assume responsibility for the states’ 
war debts had already been enacted by Congress (see preceding pp. 291-295 of this paper). 
 Next, but potentially both more embarrassing and troubling, were the lawsuits that 
subjected the state’s disposition of public lands to judicial scrutiny.  These suits accumulated 
additional names as they made their way through the judicial system.  Grayson v. Virginia 
(1792), a.k.a. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, a.k.a. Indiana Company v. Virginia provided one 
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example, while Moultrie v. Georgia (1797), a.k.a. Huger v. Georgia, provided yet another 
example (for case information, see Appendix Y).  Such suits resurrected the Anti-Federalist 
arguments made against the newly proposed Constitution in the state ratifying conventions, one 
of the most articulate of which had been George Mason’s remarks before the Virginia ratifying 
convention, when he stated: 
Let gentlemen look at the westward.  Claims respecting those lands, every 
liquidated account, or other claim against this state, will be tried before the 
federal court.  Is not this disgraceful?  Is this state to be brought to the bar of 
justice like a delinquent individual?  (Gibbons, p. 1904) 
 
Closely linked with the western lands issue in Anti-Federalist arguments was the fear of 
absorption of the state courts by the federal judiciary, the term used being consolidation.  
Immediately following the Chisholm decision, a Philadelphia newspaper wrote: 
It must excite serious ideas in those who have from the beginning been 
inclined to suspect that the absorption of the State governments has long 
been a matter determined on by certain influential characters in this country 
who are aiming gradually at monarchy.  (Mathis, 1968, p. 224) 
 
The newspaper article, printed in the nation’s capital, continued: 
Federal jurisprudence has aimed a blow at the sovereignty of the individual 
States, and the late decision of the Supreme tribunal of the Union has placed 
the ridgepole on the wide-extended fabrick [sic] of consolidation.  The 
representatives of the free citizens of the independent States will, no doubt, 
cherish the spirit of investigation and remonstrate on this subject with 
wisdom and firmness.  (Mathis, 1968, p. 224) 
 
As one legal scholar who focused on the Eleventh Amendment noted, “Judicial inquiry into state 
policies respecting the disposition of public lands promised to open a Pandora’s box” (Jacobs, p. 
70). 
 The third category of lawsuits, even more explosive than the conjunction of western lands 
and absorption because it touched nerves still raw from the Revolution against Great Britain, 
involved challenges to actions against Tory estates that had been authorized by the state 
   
   
927
legislatures.  These included Rutgers v. Waddington (1784), Vassal v. Massachusetts (1793), 
Ware v. Hylton (1796), and another suit that began as a two-party suit between individuals, 
Brailsford v. Spalding (1792), but evolved into a suit involving the state, Georgia v. Brailford 
(1794) (For case information, see Appendix Y).  The raw wounds of war and the spectre of 
Loyalist vengeance in the form of lawsuits were partially responsible for the outburst of anti-
judicial sentiment following the Court’s Chisholm decision.  One newspaper discussed the 
“numerous prosecutions that will immediately issue from the various claims of refugees, Tories, 
etc., that will introduce such a series of litigations as will throw every State in the Union into the 
greatest confusion (Warren, p. 99, n. 1).  Another newspaper article concluded: 
Nothing remains but to give the key of our treasury to the agents of the 
refugees, Tories and men who were inimical to our Revolution, to distribute 
the hard money now deposited in that office to persons of this description.  
(Warren, p. 99, n. 1) 
 
As one legal historian described the situation, “[I]n Congress, as well as in the state legislatures, 
there was strong opposition to recognition of any liability to reimburse British creditors or to 
make restitution for the seizure of Loyalist property” (Jacobs, p. 70).  As he further observed: 
In fact, this was the transcendent political issue of 1794 and 1795, when the 
Eleventh Amendment was under active consideration, as provisions of the 
Jay Treaty clarifying the rights of Loyalists came under attack in Congress 
and throughout the country.  (Jacobs, pp. 70-71) 
 
 For a variety of reasons and in somewhat confused fashion, a portion of the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity became embedded in the Constitution of the United States, thus weakening 
in some degree the country’s response to Aristotle’s ancient question.  Sovereign immunity 
tainted the nation’s response in favor of a government of laws by inserting a critical portion that 
favored a government of men who could not be held accountable before the law for their actions 
(see previous discussion regarding the doctrine of sovereign immunity). 
   
   
928
Case Law of the Eleventh Amendment 
 The eleventh amendment prior to 1960. 
 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 Facts & procedural history. 
 Following the Civil War, the State of Louisiana adopted a new constitution in 1868.  In 
January, 1874, Louisiana issued bonds, several of which Hans purchased.  The payments on the 
bonds by Louisiana to Hans were to commence in January, 1880.  The same year the bonds were 
issued, 1874, Louisiana amended its constitution to read: 
The issue of consolidated bonds, authorized by the general assembly of the 
State at its regular session in the year 1874, is hereby declared to create a 
valid contract between the State and each and every holder of said bonds, 
which the State shall by no means and in nowise impair….  To secure such 
levy, collection and payment the judicial power shall be exercised when 
necessary.  The tax required for the payment of the principal and interest of 
said bonds shall be assessed and collected each and every year until said 
bonds shall be paid, principal and interest…  (p. 2) 
 
Instead of using the taxes collected to make payments on the bonds, however, Louisiana 
“unlawfully and wrongfully diverted the money so collected, and appropriated the same to 
payment of the general expenses of the State” (p. 3).  To legalize this maneuver, the State of 
Louisiana had again amended its constitution in 1879, the year prior to the first bond payments 
coming due, to read that the first payments due in 1880 were “remitted” and that the “taxes 
collected to meet said coupons are hereby transferred to defray the expenses of the state 
government” (p. 2). 
 Hans commenced legal action in the U.S. Circuit Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana to force the State of Louisiana to pay the value of the bonds he held.  Hans argued that 
the amended constitution of 1879 violated the contract Louisiana had formed with the purchasers 
of the state’s bonds; Hans further argued that the state’s action violated Article I, § 10 of the U.S. 
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Constitution regarding the prohibition against states enacting laws “impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts” (Article I, § 10).  After being served a citation, Louisiana’s Attorney General “filed 
an exception” on behalf of the state (p. 3).  The grounds for Louisiana’s exception to the legal 
action filed by Hans were “that this court [the federal Circuit Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana] is without jurisdiction ratione personae” (Emphasis in original) (p. 3).  Louisiana’s 
Attorney General further stated, “Plaintiff cannot sue the state without its permission; the 
constitution and laws do not give this honorable court jurisdiction of a suit against the state, and 
its jurisdiction is respectfully declined” (p. 3).   
 The U.S. Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana sustained the exception and 
dismissed the lawsuit filed by Hans.  Whereupon Hans filed an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court 
which, in turn, issued a “writ of error” to hear the case (p. 4). 
 Legal question. 
 As articulated by the Court: 
The question is presented, whether a State can be sued in a Circuit Court of 
the United States by one of its own citizens upon a suggestion that the case 
is one that arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States.  (p. 9) 
 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 Arguing from the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment, Hans’ legal counsel contended 
that suits against states were prohibited only when they were filed by citizens of another state or 
by citizens of a foreign nation.  Attorneys for Hans further argued that the current case fell within 
the description of the nation’s judicial power as articulated in Article III, § 2 of the U.S. 
Constitution.  Regarding the claim by Louisiana that “because of its sovereignty it is excepted 
from the operation of this general grant of judicial power,” Hans’ attorneys declared, “There is 
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no warrant for the proposition either in the history of the constitution or in its judicial 
interpretation” (p. 4).   
 Focusing on the original issue of the bonds and the State of Louisiana’s Constitution of 
1874, Hans’ legal counsel argued that the bonds constituted a contract between the State of 
Louisiana and Hans, and that any interference with such contract was prohibited by Article I, § 
10 of the U.S. Constitution.  Furthermore, Hans’ attorneys pointed out, both the original 
legislation creating the bonds and the State’s Constitution of 1874 formal enshrinement of the 
bonds as a contract contained language giving Louisiana’s permission for a lawsuit through 
inclusion of the provision for judicial enforcement of the collection of taxes and payment of the 
bonds’ principal and interest.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Louisiana’s previous ruling in 
another case whereby the State High Court held that Louisiana’s consent to suit by “the 
constitutional amendment of 1874” had been “repealed by the Constitution of 1879” constituted 
an error that needed to be corrected by the U.S. Supreme Court (p. 7). 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana assumed, that, although the Constitution of 
the United States prohibited the State from passing any law impairing the 
validity of a contract, the State by the adoption of a constitution could avoid 
that prohibition.  The court overlooked the numerous decisions of this court 
[the U.S. Supreme Court] declaring that provision of the Constitution to be 
directed as well against impairing the obligation of a contract by 
constitutional amendment as by legislative authority; that in the meaning of 
the prohibition a constitution is a law.  (p. 8) 
 
Beyond reporting the State of Louisiana’s argument to the lower federal court regarding 
immunity from suit by reason of its sovereignty as recognized by the Eleventh Amendment, the 
Court’s report of the case did not detail argument made by the defendant State of Louisiana. 
 Holding & disposition. 
 The Court affirmed the ruling of the lower court, holding that a “State cannot, without its 
consent, be sued in a Circuit Court of the United States by one of its own citizens, upon a 
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suggestion that the case is one that arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States” 
(p. 1). 
 Court’s rationale. 
 All nine justices concurred in the verdict of the case.  One justice, however, did not 
concur with the reasoning employed by the other eight justices.  Justice Bradley, the same justice 
who authored the notorious opinion in the Civil Rights Cases narrowing the scope of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, being also the same justice who cast the deciding vote for Hayes in the 
1876 presidential election by which means the South escaped from the constraints of 
Reconstruction in its treatment of black people and its commitment to public education, authored 
and delivered the Court’s opinion in Hans v. Louisiana, an opinion that expanded the Eleventh 
Amendment, thus freeing “most other southern states from legal accountability” (Hall, 1992, p. 
82).   
 The fact that the text of the Eleventh Amendment didn’t specifically mention the 
situation of Hans, that of being a citizen of the state being sued, was an obstacle to be overcome 
by the Court.  It was overcome by means not agreeable to the sole justice who agreed with the 
outcome, but did not agree with the arguments chosen by Bradley to get there.  Justice Bradley 
arrived at the Court’s chosen destination by means of denigrating the Court’s decision in 
Chisholm v. Georgia, a case argued and decided well before he was born.  Justice Bradley 
arrived at the end sought by the Court by means of treating remarks made in The Federalist and 
remarks made at the Virginia ratifying convention as more authoritative than the actual text of 
the Eleventh Amendment.  Justice Bradley arrived at the Court’s verdict by elevating the views 
of a dissenting justice in Chisholm v. Georgia over the expressed judicial views of a greater 
jurist, Chief Justice John Marshall. 
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 Simultaneously denigrating the verdict in Chisholm v. Georgia and elevating the views of 
Justice Iredell’s dissenting opinion in that case served Justice Bradley’s purpose of building a 
circumstantial case grounded in an ancient concept, that of sovereign immunity, although it has 
been shown previously in this chapter how that concept grew to its present form, a form having 
more in common with the needs of despotic rule than democratic rule in a constitutional republic, 
through a distortion of the original meaning.  Justice Bradley began building his circumstantial 
case by recounting the case law of the Eleventh Amendment, a case law built upon a literal 
reading of the Eleventh Amendment.  Then, after briefly referring to Chisholm v. Georgia as the 
case which precipitated the Eleventh Amendment, Justice Bradley emphasized the emotional 
reaction to that decision, stating that it  
created such a shock of surprise throughout the country that, at the first 
meeting of Congress thereafter, the Eleventh Amendment to the 
Constitution was almost unanimously proposed, and was in due course 
adopted by the legislatures of the States.  (p. 11) 
 
Justice Bradley also called attention to the immediate effect of the Eleventh Amendment, 
pointing out that that the “amendment … actually reversed the decision of the Supreme Court [in 
Chisholm v. Georgia]” (p. 11).  Ignoring the fact that the Court’s decision in Chisholm v. 
Georgia was based on the Constitution as it read PRIOR to the adoption of the Eleventh 
Amendment, Bradley opined that the fault of the previous justices in Chisholm v. Georgia lay in 
the fact that they “were more swayed by a close observance of the letter of the Constitution, 
without regard to former experience and usage” (p. 12).   All, perhaps, except Justice Iredell.  
Upon Justice Iredell’s dissenting opinion, then, fixed Justice Bradley, who proceeded to elevate 
Iredell above his fellow justices in Chisholm. 
 Bradley next highlighted remarks made by Alexander Hamilton in number 81 of The 
Federalist whereby Hamilton addressed the argument against ratification of the new Constitution 
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on the grounds of citizens that the Constitution would permit lawsuits by citizens of one state 
against the government of another state.  In other words, the portion of The Federalist in which 
Hamilton countered the argument against the Constitution’s ratification by presenting the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity.  The target of the argument against ratification was Article III, § 
2 addressing the federal judicial authority, a target once again hit upon in the Virginia convention 
to ratify the Constitution by Anti-Federalists.  James Madison and John Marshall countered the 
arguments of Patrick Henry and George Mason by restating the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
in common language. 
 Observing that the idea of the “suability of a State without its consent was a thing 
unknown to the law” after postulating that “the cognizance of suits and actions unknown to the 
law, and forbidden by the law was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the 
judicial power of the United States,” Justice Bradley once again discussed the case law of the 
Eleventh Amendment, not mentioning, of course, that the case law he discussed had been built 
by a close reading of the text of the Eleventh Amendment.  The case law discussion as conducted 
by Bradley helped the Court focus attention upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity, not upon a 
close reading of the text of the Eleventh Amendment and most definitely not upon an application 
of a literal reading of the Constitution as amended to the facts of the case at hand.   
 While as a private citizen engaged in legal practice, Marshall offered views in favor of 
sovereign immunity at the Virginia ratifying convention, when called to rule upon the subject as 
a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Marshall’s views changed.  In Cohen v. Virginia, Chief 
Justice Marshall’s opinion included an observation regarding a writ of error issued by the 
Supreme Court involving “a State [as] a defendant in error” (p. 19).  His remarks included a 
close reading of the language of the Eleventh Amendment and the observation that the Court’s 
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jurisdiction “was governed by the general grant of judicial power [in Article III], as extending ‘to 
all cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, without respect to parties’” 
outside of the two exceptions contained in the Eleventh Amendment when a suit was 
commenced against a state by “’a citizen of another State’ or ‘of any foreign state’” (p. 20).  
Bradley countered this embarrassing fact raised by attorneys for Hans by arguing the following: 
It must be conceded that the last observation of the Chief Justice does favor 
the argument of the plaintiff.  But the observation was unnecessary to the 
decision, and in that sense extra judicial, and though made by one who 
seldom used words without due reflection, ought not to outweigh the 
important considerations referred to which lead to a different conclusion.  
(p. 20) 
 
Justice Bradley began to conclude his arguments by noting that “the State cannot be compelled 
by suit to perform its contracts,” that “the obligations of a State rest for their performance upon 
its honor and good faith, and cannot be made the subjects of judicial cognizance unless the State 
consents to be sued” (p. 20).  Bradley concluded that the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
required legislative judgment, “not the courts” (p. 21).  According to Bradley: 
But to deprive the legislature of the power of judging what the honor and 
safety of the State may require, even at the expense of a temporary failure to 
discharge the public debts, would be attended with greater evils than such 
failure can cause.  (p. 21) 
 
With the decision in Hans, the Court re-cast the Eleventh Amendment as prohibiting any 
lawsuits against the states by citizens anywhere, whether they reside in a differing state, in a 
foreign country, or in the same state.  Hans represents the triumph of the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity for the state governments.  Subsequent legal cases would carve out exceptions to that 
idea, particularly when state sovereignty collided with the plenary powers of Congress as 
enumerated in Article I, § 8 of the Constitution and in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 Concurring/dissenting opinions. 
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 Justice John Marshall Harlan concurred with the Court’s holding, but not with any of its 
reasoning.  Justice Harlan took particular exception to Justice Bradley’s characterization of the 
Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, rightly noting that “the decision in that case was based 
upon a sound interpretation of the Constitution as that instrument then was [prior to the adoption 
of the Eleventh Amendment]” (p. 21).  In addition, there were other things said in the opinion 
with which Justice John Marshall Harlan did not agree – “But I cannot give my assent to many 
things said in the opinion” –  however, he provided no additional clarification (p. 21). 
 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 Facts & procedural history. 
 This case began with Minnesota’s attempts to reign in the power of the railroads and their 
unfair practices in setting rates, a problem that had long been targeted by the Grange, by 
Populists, and by their successors, the Progressives.  Each of these political movements enjoyed 
strong support in Minnesota.  In fact, Minnesotans played key roles in both the Grange and the 
Populist movements.  Oliver Hudson Kelley, one of the original founders of the Grange as a 
fraternal order for southern farmers and originally from Minnesota, returned to Minnesota to help 
organize farmers into granges, a movement which became an agricultural force in the Midwest in 
organizing resistance to what was deemed to be unfair business practices by the railroads.  
Another Minnesotan, Ignatius Donnelly, authored the preamble of the 1892 Populist party’s 
Omaha platform, a document which reads: 
We meet in the midst of a nation brought to the verge of moral, political, 
and material ruin.  Corruption dominates the ballot-box, the legislatures, the 
Congress, and even touches the ermine of the bench…  The newspapers are 
largely subsidized or muzzled; public opinion silenced; business prostrated; 
our homes covered with mortgages; labour [sic] impoverished; and the land 
concentrating in the hands of the capitalists….  The fruits of the toil of 
millions are boldly stolen to build up colossal fortunes for a few, 
unprecedented in the history of mankind; and the possessors of these, in 
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turn, despise the republic and endanger liberty.  From the same prolific 
womb of governmental injustice we breed the two great classes – tramps 
and millionaires.  (Brogan, p. 439) 
 
Four years later, the Populists had captured the Democratic Party at their convention in Chicago 
(Beard, Beard, & Beard, p. 315).  A decade later their spirit reigned supreme in the legislature of 
the State of Minnesota. 
 In order to combat what was perceived by the public as dictatorial powers exercised by 
the railroads in setting their rates for a public function, that of transporting people and goods, the 
Minnesota legislature enacted legislation creating a railroad and warehouse commission whose 
purpose was to set the rates railroads could charge for transporting freight between the various 
railroad stations in Minnesota.  The commission issued its first order regarding rates in 
September, 1906, an order with which the railroad companies complied even though the new 
rates “materially reduced [the rates] then existing” (p. 127).   
 At the same time the Minnesota legislature passed legislation setting penalties for 
disobedience to the rates set by the state commission.  Both individuals working for the railroads 
as well as the railroads themselves could be charged for any violations of the state commission’s 
provisions.  Individuals “shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine 
of not less than twenty-five hundred dollars, nor more than five thousand dollars for the first 
offense” (p. 127).  Individuals foolhardy enough to commit a second violation were to be fined 
“not less than five thousand dollars nor more than ten thousand dollars for each subsequent 
offense” (p. 127).  Corporations were subjected to the same schedule of penalties, which were 
“to be recovered in a civil action” as opposed to criminal action taken against individuals (p. 
127). 
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 Having used the state commission to set rates for the hauling of freight in Minnesota, in 
April, 1907, the legislature of the State of Minnesota next passed a statute setting a “maximum 
passenger rate to be charged by railroads in Minnesota,” a rate which dropped the rate from three 
cents to two cents per mile (p. 127).  The same act also provided the following penalties for 
violating the act setting the maximum passenger rates. 
Any railroad company, or any officer, agent or representative thereof, who 
shall violate any provision of this act shall be guilty of a felony and, upon 
conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand 
(5,000) dollars, or by imprisonment in the State prison for a period not 
exceeding five (5) years, or both such fine and imprisonment.  (p. 128) 
 
Again, the railroad companies and their employees complied with the requirements of the new 
law regarding passenger rates. 
 Subsequently the Minnesota legislature enacted legislation covering rates for freight 
items not included in the initial order of the state commission.  In addition the new legislation 
divided these commodities into seven classes and established maximum rates for each 
commodity classification.   
 The railroad companies did not comply with the provisions of this later act.  Instead, one 
day before the act was scheduled to take effect, “nine suites in equity were commenced in the 
Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota, Third Division” (p. 129).  Each 
suit was “brought by stockholders of the particular railroad mentioned in the bill [setting the new 
rates for the various commodity classifications]” (p. 129).  Each lawsuit named the following as 
defendants: the railroad of which the complainants were stockholders, “the members of the 
Railroad and Warehouse Commission, and the Attorney General of the State, Edward T. Young, 
and individual defendants representing the shippers of freight upon the railroad” (p. 129).   
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 The purpose of each lawsuit was to obtain an injunction preventing the railroad company 
from complying with the requirements of any of the afore-mentioned acts of the Minnesota 
legislature and any orders issued by the Railroad and Warehouse Commission.  Basing their 
claims upon the Fourteenth Amendment, each suit alleged that the reduced “tariffs and charges” 
were  
unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory, in that they each … would … deprive 
complainants [the shareholders] and the railway company of their property 
without due process of law, and deprive them and it of the equal protection 
of the laws, contrary to and in violation of the Constitution of the United 
States and the amendments thereof.  (p. 130) 
 
Each of the suits also stated that the penalties “prescribed” for violations of any of the 
Commission’s orders and the legislative acts were  
so drastic that no owner or operator of a railway property could invoke the 
jurisdiction of any court to test the validity thereof, except at the risk of 
confiscation of its property, and the imprisonment for long terms in jails and 
penitentiaries of its officers, agents and employés [sic].  (p. 131) 
 
Due to the “drastic” or Draconian nature of the penalties prescribed for violation of any of the 
orders and state laws, the attorneys for the shareholders contended in each of the nine suits, 
“each of them [the acts and orders] was … unconstitutional” because each “denied to the 
defendant railway company and its stockholders … the equal protection of the laws, and 
deprived it and them [the shareholders] of their property without due process of law” (p. 131). 
 The U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Minnesota issued a temporary restraining order, 
“which only restrained the railway company from publishing the rates as provided [for in the 
latest act that had not been complied with] … and from reducing its tariffs to the figures set forth 
[in the latest act]” (p. 132).  The Circuit Court refused to issue an injunction against the previous 
orders of the Commission and acts of the Minnesota legislature as the railway companies had 
already complied with their provisions.  The U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Minnesota also 
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issued an injunction restraining “Edward T. Young, Attorney General, from taking any steps 
against the railroads to enforce the remedies or penalties specified in the act” (p. 132). 
 Appearing before the federal court, Attorney General Young requested the court to 
dismiss the action against him since “the court had no jurisdiction over him as Attorney General” 
because, Minnesota having not consented to any suit against itself, the legal action filed by the 
shareholders was “contrary to the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States” 
(p. 132). 
 Following “a hearing of all parties and taking proofs in regard to the issues raised,” the 
U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Minnesota issued another injunction “against the railway 
company, restraining it, pending the final hearing of the cause, from putting into effect the 
tariffs, rates, or charges set forth in the act” (p. 132).  
The court also enjoined the defendant Young, as Attorney General of the 
State of Minnesota, pending the final hearing of the cause, from taking or 
instituting any action or proceeding to enforce the penalties and remedies 
specified in the act above mentioned, or to compel obedience to that act, or 
compliance therewith, or any part thereof.  (p. 132) 
 
Immediately on the following day, Attorney General Young filed action in Minnesota state court 
to have a writ of mandamus “issued and served upon the Northern Pacific Railway Company, 
commanding the company” to comply with the latest act (pp. 133-134).  Whereupon the U.S. 
Circuit Court for the District of Minnesota “ordered Mr. Young to show cause why he should not 
be punished … for … contempt for … violating the temporary injunction issued by that court” 
(p. 134).  Appearing before the federal court, the Minnesota Attorney General repeated his 
earlier arguments based on the Eleventh Amendment, following which the U.S. Circuit Court for 
the District of Minnesota judged him to be in contempt and ordered the U.S. Marshall for the 
District of Minnesota, Third Division, to be taken into federal custody until the Minnesota 
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Attorney General “dismiss the mandamus proceedings brought by him … in the Circuit Court of 
the State” and until he paid a fine of $100 (p. 126). 
 Following this sequence of events,  
[a]n original application was made to this court [the U.S. Supreme Court] 
for leave to file a petition for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari in behalf 
of Edward T. Young, petitioner, as Attorney General of the State of 
Minnesota.  (Emphasis in original) (p. 127) 
 
Whereupon the U.S. Supreme Court issued an order to the federal marshal detaining the 
Minnesota Attorney General “to show cause why such petition [for writs of habeas corpus and 
certiorari] should not be granted” (Emphasis in original) (p. 126).  The U.S. Marshal for the 
District of Minnesota, Third Division  
justified his detention of the petitioner [the Minnesota Attorney General] by 
virtue of an order of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of 
Minnesota, which adjudge the petitioner guilty of contempt of that court and 
directed … that he should stand committed to the custody of the marshal 
until that order was obeyed.  (p. 126) 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court then issued a writ of certiorari to review the case and make a final 
disposition regarding the issue(s) under dispute.  
 Legal questions. 
 Are there federal questions involved which would give the federal Circuit Court for the 
District of Minnesota jurisdiction of the case?  Do the penalties contained within the orders of 
the Minnesota Railroad and Warehouse Commission and within the acts of the legislature for the 
State of Minnesota violate the due process and equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment?  Does the injunction issued by the federal Circuit Court for the District of 
Minnesota against the Minnesota Attorney General constitute a suit against the State of 
Minnesota in violation of the provisions of the Eleventh Amendment? 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
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 Edward T. Young, Attorney General for the State of Minnesota, along with the Attorney 
General for the State of Missouri and four other attorneys presented arguments before the Court 
based upon the Eleventh Amendment.  They first argued that the state orders and laws regulating 
railroad rates “did not present a question involving the construction of the Constitution of the 
United States,” but instead involved “a question of fact only” (p. 135)  The Court’s report 
summarizing their main contentions follows: 
The Circuit Court exceeded its power and authority in making its order that 
the petitioner be enjoined as Attorney General from taking appropriate legal 
proceedings to compel the railway companies to comply with the act of 
April 18, 1907.  (p. 136) 
 
They continued: 
The suit in the Circuit Court against the Attorney General was in effect a 
suit against the State of Minnesota.  The immunity of a State from suit, as 
provided by the Eleventh Amendment, is not dependent upon any pecuniary 
interest, as contended by respondents.  (p. 138) 
 
 Ten attorneys represented the shareholders who originally initiated the first legal 
proceedings of the case.  One wonders who paid their fees.  These attorneys proceeded to argue 
the case on Fourteenth Amendment grounds.  According to the Court’s summary: 
The case involves a Federal question sufficient to sustain jurisdiction upon 
that ground alone.  The penalty provisions of the law attacked are violative 
of the Fourteenth Amendment….  The rates fixed are confiscatory and the 
legislation is therefore unconstitutional and void under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  (p. 140) 
 
Regarding the State of Minnesota’s Eleventh Amendment arguments, attorneys for the 
shareholders [and the railroads?] argued that “the Eleventh Amendment should not be given a 
construction which would tend to impair the full efficacy of the protecting clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment” (p. 141).  After pointing to the critical role played by courts of equity, 
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most particularly “the Circuit Courts of the United States,” in offering protection against 
unconstitutional laws, the team of attorneys concluded (p. 141): 
If it shall be held that a state statute may be so adroitly framed that the 
Eleventh Amendment will bar any suit in the Federal courts of equity 
jurisdiction, then no corporation nor individual will dare assume the risk of 
the savage punishments which may be inflicted under such acts, and 
legislation which flagrantly violates the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment will be made operative for all practical purposes.  (pp. 141-142) 
 
 Holding & disposition. 
 In Ex parte Young, the Court held “that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction in the case 
before it, because it involved the decision of Federal questions arising under the Constitution of 
the United States” (p. 145).  The Court further held  
that the provisions of the acts relating to the enforcement of the rates … by 
imposing such enormous fines and possible imprisonment as a result of an 
unsuccessful effort to test the validity of the laws themselves are 
unconstitutional on their face…  (p. 148) 
 
Note that the Court’s holding did not directly reference either the Due Process Clause or the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  While the text of the actual decision 
didn’t reference the two clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the syllabus of the case did in 
presenting the jurisdictional holding of the case.  According to the syllabus, the portion of the 
Court’s report immediately preceding the discussion of Ex parte Young: 
Whether a state statute is unconstitutional because the penalties for its 
violation are so enormous that persons affected thereby are prevented from 
resorting to the courts for the purpose of determining the validity of the 
statute and are thereby denied the equal protection of the law and their 
property rendered liable to be taken without due process of law, is a Federal 
question and gives the Circuit Court jurisdiction.  (p. 124). 
 
Regarding the Eleventh Amendment question, the Court held as follows: 
The attempt of a state officer to enforce an unconstitutional statute is a 
proceeding without authority of, and does not affect, the State in its 
sovereign or governmental capacity, and is an illegal act and the officer is 
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stripped of his official character and is subjected in his person to the 
consequences of his individual conduct.  The State has no power to impart 
to its officer immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the 
United States.  (p. 124) 
 
 Court’s rationale. 
 In Ex parte Young, Justice Peckham delivered the 8-1 decision of the Court, a bench that 
included the notable jurist, Oliver Wendell Holmes, who was serving his fifth term on the Court; 
the bench also included the notable dissenter, Justice John Marshall Harlan.  Quickly moving to 
the issue of whether or not a federal question was involved, the Court noted and discussed the 
presence of multiple federal questions centered on the intersection between Minnesota’s 
legislation and the clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Following its review of the issue 
regarding the presence of federal questions, the Court announced its first holding whereby “the 
Circuit Court had jurisdiction in the case before it” (p. 145). 
 The Court next moved to the contentions regarding the constitutionality of the State of 
Minnesota’s orders via a state commission and Minnesota’s legislative acts.  Beginning with a 
review of case law regarding extreme penalties and their effect upon making legislation 
“conclusive” in terms of not being challengeable in practical terms, the Court noted points of law 
and then reached its holding that the Minnesota acts were “unconstitutional” because of the 
“provisions of the acts relating to the enforcement of the rates, either for freight or passengers” 
(p. 148).  Next moving to the question regarding the rates, the Court pointed to the Circuit 
Court’s initial finding that the rates fixed by order and statute “were not sufficient to be 
compensatory, and were in fact confiscatory, and the act was therefore unconstitutional,” or at 
least enough unconstitutional to justify an injunction pending a “final hearing” (pp. 149, 132).   
 The Court finally addressed the competing constitutional claims of the Eleventh and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  However, it did not do so in a direct manner.  Instead, having found 
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the state acts unconstitutional by virtue of their violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Court reframed the issue in the following terms: 
We have, therefore, upon this record the case of an unconstitutional act of 
the state legislature and an intention by the Attorney General of the State to 
endeavor to enforce its provisions, to the injury of the company, in 
compelling it, at great expense, to defend legal proceedings of a complicated 
and unusual character…  (p. 149) 
 
Having found that the federal courts had jurisdiction by virtue of federal questions being 
involved, having subsequently investigated the federal questions and found state laws to be 
unconstitutional as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court could duck the Eleventh 
Amendment issue through the stratagem of ruling that state employees are stripped of state 
sovereignty when they try to enforce unconstitutional laws, thus rendering the Eleventh 
Amendment claim moot. 
 At the time the Court’s decision in Ex parte Young was most unpopular.  Previously, the 
same Court with the same justice authoring the Court’s opinion had invalidated New York’s 
regulation of the hours of labor in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  Now, in Ex parte 
Young the Court had once again “sided with the monied interests against the public” (Hall, 1992, 
p. 949).  However, both Justice Harlan and Justice Holmes had dissented in the Lochner 
decision, swimming upstream against the corporate interests who viewed such regulation as an 
unwarranted intrusion by the government into the marketplace, a hallowed place where ideas of 
social Darwinism and laissez-faire economics ran rampant. 
 Concurring/dissenting opinions. 
 Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented, arguing that the Court’s decision would 
“practically obliterate the Eleventh Amendment and place the States, in vital particulars, as 
absolutely under the control of the subordinate Federal courts, as if they were capable of being 
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directly sued” (p. 204).   Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes saw it differently.  “’[T]he Union would 
be imperiled’ if the Supreme Court could not declare unconstitutional the laws of the several 
states.  The power to enjoin state officers from violating federal law seems a necessary adjunct to 
that ability” (Hall, 1992, p. 949).   
 The eleventh amendment since 1960. 
 Parden v. Terminal Railroad Company, 377 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 Case summary. 
 Officially designated Parden et al. v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks 
Department et al., the facts of the case involved a collision between a state-owned-and-operated 
railroad engaged in interstate commerce, workers for that state-owned-and-operated railway, and 
the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.  Workers, all of them citizens of the State of Alabama who 
had been injured as employees of the Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks 
Department, filed suit in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Alabama.  The 
injured workers sought damages for their injuries under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.  
The State of Alabama, appearing as the defendant in the case, “moved to dismiss the action on 
the ground that the Railway was an agency of the State and the State had not waived its 
sovereign immunity from suit” as provided by the Eleventh Amendment (p. 185).  The Federal 
District Court for the Southern District of Alabama granted the state’s motion for dismissal on 
Eleventh Amendment grounds.  Upon appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s ruling.  Upon further appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court “granted 
certiorari” to review the case and make a final disposition of the legal issues involved in the 
dispute (p. 185).   
 The legal question before the Court was stated by Justice Brennan: 
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The question in this case is whether a State that owns and operates a railroad 
in interstate commerce may successfully plead sovereign immunity in a 
federal-court suit brought against the railroad by its employee under the 
Federal Employers’ Liability Act.  (p. 184) 
 
Two additional questions arose from consideration of the question just presented.  According to 
Justice Brennan: 
Here, for the first time in this Court, a State’s claim of immunity against suit 
by an individual meets a suit brought upon a cause of action expressly 
created by Congress.  Two questions are thus presented:  (1) Did Congress 
in enacting the FELA intend to subject a State to suit in these 
circumstances?  (2) Did it have the power to do so, as against the State’s 
claim of immunity?  (p. 187) 
 
 As may be surmised from the foregoing account, Justice Brennan, described by one legal 
source as “Warren’s theoretician and technician” who framed “the judicial arguments to carry 
out Warren’s strategy” as the two justices served as each other’s “closest confidant[s] and chief 
all[ies],” authored and announced the Court’s 5-4 decision by which the Supreme Court reversed 
the decisions of the federal district and circuit courts (Hall, 1992, p. 914).  In addition to Justice 
Brennan, the other majority justices were Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Clark, and 
Goldberg.  Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Douglas, 
Harlan [Justice John Marshall Harlan’s grandson, a more conservative jurist than his grandfather, 
possibly arising from his affinity for the wealthy and powerful as evidenced by his extensive 
corporate attorney experience prior to joining the Court], and Stewart. 
 Beginning with the declaration, “We think that Congress, in making the FELA applicable 
to ‘every’ common carrier by railroad in interstate commerce, meant what it said,” the Court next 
commenced a review of the Court’s case law by noting, “That congressional statutes regulating 
railroads in interstate commerce apply to such railroads whether they are state owned or privately 
owned is hardly a novel proposition; it has twice been clearly affirmed by this Court” (pp. 187, 
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187-188).  Justice Brennan also pointed out that “the precise question presented by the instant 
case” had all been addressed by lower courts which each “held that the FELA did authorize suit 
against a publicly owned railroad despite a claim of sovereign immunity” (p. 189). 
 Addressing the conflict between the Eleventh Amendment and congressional action 
based upon the Constitution’s grant of plenary power to regulate commerce, the Court began: 
Respondents [the State of Alabama] contend that Congress is without 
power, in view of the immunity doctrine, thus to subject a State to suit.  We 
disagree.  Congress enacted FELA in the exercise of its constitutional power 
to regulate commerce…  While a State’s immunity from suit by a citizen 
without its consent has been said to be rooted in “the inherent nature of 
sovereignty,” … the States surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when 
they granted Congress the power to regulate commerce.  (pp. 190-191) 
 
To drive the point home, Justice Brennan cited specifically from the Court’s “ruling in United 
States v. California … [that] a State’s operation of a railroad in interstate commerce” 
must be in subordination to the power to regulate interstate commerce, 
which has been granted specifically to the national government.  The 
sovereign power of the states is necessarily diminished to the extent of the 
grants of power to the federal government in the Constitution…. [T]here 
[sic] is no such limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce…  
(p. 191) 
 
Explaining that the Court’s “[r]ecognition of the congressional power to render a State suable 
under the FELA” shouldn’t be construed to mean “that the immunity doctrine, as embodied in 
the Eleventh Amendment … is here being overridden,” the Court continued: 
It remains the law that a State may not be sued by an individual without its 
consent.  Our conclusion is simply that Alabama, when it began operation of 
an interstate railroad approximately 20 years after enactment of the FELA, 
necessarily consented to such suit as was authorized by that Act.  By 
adopting and ratifying the Commerce Clause, the States empowered 
Congress to create such a right of action against interstate railroads; by 
enacting the FELA in the exercise of this power, Congress conditioned the 
right to operate a railroad in interstate commerce upon amenability to suit in 
federal court as provided by the Act…  (p. 192) 
 
Couching the Court’s holding in terms of “this Nation’s federalism,” the Court further explained: 
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A State’s immunity from suit by an individual without its consent has been 
fully recognized by the Eleventh Amendment and by subsequent decisions 
of this Court.  But when a State leaves the sphere that is exclusively its own 
and enters into activities subject to congressional regulation, it subjects itself 
to that regulation as fully as if it were a private person or corporation.  (p. 
196) 
 
 Justice White’s dissenting opinion disagreed with the Court’s interpretation of the impact 
of state ratification of the U.S. Constitution, that apparently the significance of a specific grant of 
power to the federal government did not necessarily withdraw such specified activity from a 
state’s sovereignty which eliminated the possibility of the state submitting an Eleventh 
Amendment defense.  The dissenting opinion did not view the grant of power by the states to the 
federal government to operate automatically as a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity 
from legal action.  In fact, the dissenting opinion downplayed the fact that Congress was 
exercising plenary authority over an activity that had been withdrawn by the states themselves 
from their own sphere of influence.  Instead, the dissenting opinion attempted to maintain the 
focus on the Eleventh Amendment’s requirement of intentional waiver of immunity as opposed 
to the real issue, the conflict between the Eleventh Amendment and Congress’ plenary authority 
to legislate in those areas designated for federal activity by Article I, § 8 of the Constitution.  
According to the dissenting opinion: 
If the automatic consequence of stat operation of a railroad in interstate 
commerce is to be waiver of sovereign immunity, Congress’ failure to bring 
home to the State the precise nature of its option makes impossible the 
“intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege” 
which must be shown before constitutional rights may be taken to have been 
waived.  (p. 200) 
 
 Significance for the eleventh amendment. 
 The significance of this case resides in the Court’s holding that states cannot use the 
Eleventh Amendment to shield itself from congressional exercise of its plenary authority to 
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regulate commerce as specifically granted by the states to Congress in Article I, § 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution, that the grants of power to Congress by the states in Article I, § 8 necessarily 
diminished state sovereignty in those areas.  The issue regarding the intersection of Article I, § 8 
and the Eleventh Amendment would be revisited, most particularly in Pennsylvania v. Union 
Gas Company, 491 U.D. 1 (1989) and in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 
(1996). 
 Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985). 
 Case Summary. 
 The facts of the case involve the congressional act entitled Aid to Families With 
Dependent Children (AFDC), the Director of the Michigan Department of Social Services 
(Mansour), “recipients of benefits under the federal” AFDC program, and a congressional 
amendment to the AFDC Act while the dispute was being litigated (p. 64).  AFDC was described 
by Justice Brennan as a “matching benefits program by which “[s]tates pay up to 50 percent of 
their benefit payments, the Federal Government pays the remainder” (p. 77, n. 3) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting).  Certain AFDC recipients filed two separate class action suits in the federal District 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan naming Mansour, Director of the Michigan 
Department of Social Services, as the defendant.  The combined complaint of the two class 
action suits 
claimed that respondent’s [Mansour’s] policies of prohibiting the deduction 
of child care costs and requiring the inclusion of step-parents’ income for 
purposes of calculating earned income, thereby determining eligibility for 
and the amount of AFDC benefits, violated applicable federal law.  (p. 64) 
 
In actuality, one class action suit focused upon the claim regarding the deduction of child care 
costs while the other class action suit targeted the claim regarding step-parents’ income.  In the 
class action suit focused upon step-parents’ income, the District Court “issued a preliminary 
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injunction preventing respondent [Mansour, the Director of the Michigan Department of Social 
Services] from enforcing its automatic inclusion policy” (p. 66). 
 While the two class-action disputes regarding calculations for eligibility and payments 
under AFDC were being legally debated before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan, Congress amended the AFDC Act “to expressly require States to deduct child care 
expenses and to include stepparents’ income” (p. 64).  Following congressional amendment of 
the Aid to Families of Dependant Children Act, Mansour brought the policies of the Michigan 
Department of Social Services “into compliance” with the amended act” (p. 66).  Subsequent to 
the congressional action’s stipulations regarding the requirement that step-parents’ income be 
included in the calculations of earned income, both “parties thereafter stipulated that the District 
Court should terminate its preliminary injunction as of the effective date of the amendment” (p. 
66).  As a result of the foregoing actions, 
the District Court held that the changes in federal law rendered moot the 
claims for prospective relief, that the remaining claims for declaratory and 
“notice relief” related solely to past violations of federal law, and that such 
retrospective relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.  (p. 64) 
 
Upon “a consolidated appeal” to the next federal judicial level, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (p. 
64).   
 Before proceeding further, it is important to understand the various forms of relief sought 
by the plaintiffs and denied by the federal courts.  “Prospective relief” refers to halting the 
alleged violations committed by the Michigan Department of Social Services under Mansour’s 
direction.  As we saw in Ex parte Young, this took the form of an injunction being issued by the 
federal court barring further violations of federal law by a state official.  In the current case, 
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Green v. Mansour, the state director’s compliance with the AFDC Act as amended rendered 
moot the claim for “prospective relief.”   
 The two other forms of relief, declaratory relief and notice relief, involved in the legal 
dispute are more complicated and rely for their definition upon previous case law.  Since 
understanding these two forms of relief is critical to a full understanding of the federal court 
decisions and to an even fuller understanding of their place in the long chain of Eleventh 
Amendment litigation, time and space will be devoted to the explanation of and implications 
flowing from “declaratory relief” and “notice relief.” 
 Declaratory relief is the issuance by a federal court of “a declaratory judgment that state 
officials violated federal law in the past when there is no ongoing violation of federal law” (p. 
67).  Prior to 1934, declaratory relief was not traditionally available.  As explained by one legal 
expert: 
The traditional, restrictive view of the judicial process limited courts to 
active relief [as opposed to “passive relief that merely defines legal relations 
through declaratory judgments”].  Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court, in 
Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Association (1928), implied that a special 
barrier to declaratory relief lay in the Constitution’s limiting the federal 
judicial power [in Article III, § 2, cl. 1] to [current] cases and controversies.  
(Hall, 1992, p. 223) 
 
The situation changed, however, in 1934 with the passage by Congress of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act.  As explained by Justice Rehnquist in Green v. Mansour:   
The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. §2201, permits a federal 
court to declare the rights of a party whether or not further relief is or could 
be sought, and we have held that under this Act declaratory relief may be 
available even though an injunction is not.  Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 
452, 462 (1974).  But we have also held that the declaratory judgment 
statute “is an enabling Act, which confers a discretion of the courts rather 
than an absolute right upon the litigant.”  Public Service Comm’n v. Wycoff 
Co., 344 U.S. 237 241 (1952) 
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 Turning to “notice relief,” the discussion will be somewhat lengthier due to the fact of its 
complicated judicial application. At the time of the opinion in Green v. Mansour, Justice 
Rehnquist stated in that opinion that the federal Circuit Courts were in substantial disagreement 
regarding the applicability of notice relief to legal disputes involving state violations of federal 
law.  Actually, there was in fact substantial agreement among the Circuit Courts, 4-1, regarding 
the allowance of “notice relief” (p. 68).  The disagreement actually was between the Rehnquist 
slim Court majority in Green v. Mansour, joined by the federal Court of Appeal for the Second 
Circuit, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the federal Courts of Appeal for the Fourth, 
Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits as well as the four dissenting Justices in Green v. Mansour.  
In this case, Rehnquist disapproved of the arguments for notice relief; however, in a previous 
decision, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979), Rehnquist had approved of the same arguments 
for notice relief, a situation that will be treated more fully in the paragraphs devoted to dissenting 
opinions in Green v. Mansour.  However, Rehnquist’s opinion in Quern v. Jordan as cited by 
Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion in Green v. Mansour explain what is meant by “notice 
relief.”  As explained by Rehnquist in Green v. Mansour, the case of Quern v. Jordan involved 
the improper denial of benefits by the State of Illinois to citizens who were eligible for those 
benefits under the federal Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled (AABD) Act, an act designed as a 
“federal-state program” to be administered by the individual states.  In Justice Rehnquist’s 
words: 
The notice approved by the Court of Appeals [in Quern v. Jordan (1979)] 
simply apprises plaintiff class members of the existence of whatever 
administrative procedures may already be available under state law by 
which they may receive a determination of eligibility for past benefits…. 
[sic] The mere sending of that notice does not trigger the state 
administrative machinery.  Whether a recipient of notice decides to take 
advantage of those available state procedures is left completely to the 
discretion of that particular class member; the federal court plays no role in 
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that decision.  And whether or not the class member will receive retroactive 
benefits rests entirely with the State, its agencies, courts, and legislature, not 
with the federal court.  Id. [Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979)], at 347-
348.  (pp. 75-76) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
 
Further explanation of the legal concept, “notice relief,” was further provided by Justice Brennan 
in an explanation which included citations by both the Supreme Court and by the federal Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  As explained by Justice Brennan in a footnote to his 
dissenting opinion in Green v. Mansour: 
… the notice approved in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S., at 349, “inform[ed] 
[sic] class members that their federal suit [was] [sic] at an end, that the 
federal court [could] [sic] provide them with no further relief, and that there 
[were] [sic] existing state administrative procedures which they may wish to 
pursue.”  The class members were “’given no more … [sic] than what they 
would have gathered by sitting in the courtroom.’”  Ibid., quoting Jordan v. 
Trainor, 563 F. 2d 873, 877-878 (CA7 1977).  And, of course, what class 
members would have gathered by sitting in the courtroom was the 
substantive outcome of the litigation – a declaration that Illinois officials 
had violated federal law.  (p. 75, n. 1) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
 
 To return to the legal procedures of the case at hand, Green v. Mansour, as discussed 
previously, the federal District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan had held in both class-
action suits that questions of state violation of AFDC had been rendered moot because state 
officials were complying with the amended act.  The District Court also held that petitions “for 
declaratory and notice relief related solely to past violations of federal law,” a fact the District 
Court interpreted as representing “retrospective relief” and were therefore “barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment” as originally argued by the State of Michigan (p. 67).   
 Upon “consolidated appeal” to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, that court 
affirmed the decision of the lower federal court, agreeing with all aspects of that court’s decision.  
Further explanation was provided by the Supreme Court’s description of the legal proceedings: 
It agreed that the changes in federal law rendered moot the claims for 
prospective relief.  Id. [742 F. 2d 277 (1984)], at 281-283.  It also agreed 
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that because the sought-after notice and declaratory relief was retrospective 
in nature, the relief was barred by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).  
742 F. 2d, at 286-288.  It reasoned that when there is no prospective relief to 
which notice can be ancillary, even [relief notice] approved in Quern v. 
Jordan … cannot escape the Eleventh Amendment bar.  742 F. 2d, at 287-
288.  Declaratory relief is similarly barred under such circumstances, it 
explained, because such relief could relate solely to past violations of 
federal law…  (p. 67) 
 
According to the Court’s opinion, the Court  
granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Circuits over whether federal 
courts may order the giving of notice of the sort approved in Quern v. 
Jordan [relief notice], supra, or issue a declaratory judgment that state 
officials violated federal law in the past when there is no ongoing violation 
of federal law.  (p. 67) 
 
 Justice Rehnquist announced the narrow 5-4 decision of the Court in Green v. Mansour 
which affirmed the original ruling of the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan as 
well as the affirmation of that decision by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.  He was 
joined by Chief Justice Burger and by Justices O’Connor, Powell, and White.  Justices Brennan, 
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented.  As provided by the Court’s record: 
Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 74.  Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which Brennan and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 79.  Blackmun, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined, 
post, p. 81.  (p. 65) 
 
 After presenting the facts and procedural history of the case, Justice Rehnquist attempted 
to explain why notice relief – which had been provided under circumstances quite similar to 
those in Quern v. Jordan, a case whose opinion had been authored by Rehnquist – was not 
available to petitioners in Green v. Mansour.  Of course, the reader doesn’t really find that out 
(the similarity of Quern v. Jordan and Green v. Mansour) until reading Justice Brennan’s dissent 
as Rehnquist doesn’t reveal that fact in his own opinion.  In fact, instead of admitting the 
similarity, an admission that would have required a different holding by the Court regarding the 
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request for relief notice, Rehnquist attempted to put blame on the petitioners, claiming that 
“petitioners misconceive our Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and our decision in Quern” (p. 
69).  At best, Rehnquist’s tactic was ill-conceived; at worst, it was unethical and dishonest.  
Rehnquist attempted, unconvincingly in light of Justice Brennan’s remarks which were joined by 
the other dissenting justices…, Rehnquist attempted…, Rehnquist attempted…, Rehnquist 
attempted to differentiate the two cases on the basis that it was not “ancillary to the grant of some 
other appropriate relief that can be noticed,” e.g., an injunction prohibiting further violation of 
the federal law in question (p. 71).  On this basis, both notice relief and declaratory relief were 
both prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment.  However, as Justice Brennan pointed out in his 
dissent, Rehnquist’s use of “ancillary” to distinguish between Quern v. Jordan and Green v. 
Mansour utilized faulty logic: 
It is not enough to distinguish the cases [by observing] that the notice relief 
in Quern was “ancillary” to a prospective injunction because the 
“prospective” injunction had been moot for three years before the Court of 
Appeals fashioned the notice relief and for five years before this Court 
approved it – Congress abolished the federal program at issue in Quern in 
1974 [which was five years before it reached the Court].  (p. 76, n. 2) 
 
More specifically, Justice Brennan noted that the argument against notice and declarative relief 
posed by the State of Michigan was “identical in all significant respects” to the argument posed 
by the State of Illinois in Quern v. Jordan, an argument that had been rejected by Justice 
Rehnquist in writing the Court’s opinion in Quern v. Jordan [this was quoted previously in this 
paper’s discussion about notice relief].  Having previously rejected the argument that the 
Eleventh Amendment prohibited both notice and declarative relief, and having subsequently held 
that both types of relief were appropriate in Quern, Justice Brennan noted the inconsistency of 
Rehnquist’s position by declaring, “In the present case, the Court turns around and accepts the 
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argument made by the State of Illinois in Quern with respect to Green’s request for declaratory 
relief” (p. 76).  Justice Brennan then noted: 
The Court fails to explain adequately why declaratory relief should be 
analyzed differently than notice relief was in Quern, since use of the 
declaratory judgment in the State’s courts is also left completely to the 
discretion of individual notice recipients and the award of retroactive 
benefits “rests entirely with the State, its agencies, courts, and legislature, 
not with the federal court.”  Quern, supra, at 348.  (p. 76) 
 
To demonstrate the similarity of requests between the plaintiffs in Green and the plaintiffs in 
Quern, Justice Brennan described Green’s request: 
Green asked the District Court to order that notices be sent out to other 
AFDC recipients advising them of the outcome of the litigation, i.e., of the 
declaratory judgment and telling them that state administrative proceedings 
might be available to them to obtain retroactive benefits.  (p. 75, n. 1) 
 
Justice Brennan’s arguments regarding the Rehnquist-led decisions are convincing.  They lend 
credence to an observation about Justice Rehnquist by several legal authorities.  The observation 
as reported by one legal scholar:  “Such apparent inconsistencies promoted the view that 
Rehnquist was unprincipled and result oriented and that he was using his position on the Court to 
achieve the goals of his own conservative political agenda” (Hall, 1992, p. 716). 
 Previously, Justice Brennan had identified what he believed to be the root cause of the 
Court’s inconsistent Eleventh Amendment decisions, a reason rooted in the absence of text in the 
Eleventh Amendment supportive of previous decisions which prevented the development of a 
foundational rationale for the Court’s holdings.  As articulated by Justice Brennan: 
… I explained at length my view that the Court’s Eleventh Amendment 
doctrine “lacks a textual anchor [in the Constitution] [sic], a firm historical 
foundation, or a clear rationale.”  Today’s decision demonstrates that the 
absence of a stable analytical structure underlying the Court’s Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence produces inconsistent decisions.  (p. 74) 
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The foregoing summarized and somewhat understated the extent of the analysis Justice Brennan 
formulated in his dissenting opinion in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 
(1985) in the Court’s term immediately preceding the term in which Green v. Mansour was 
decided.  Justice Brennan provided a fuller summarization of that dissent than what was just 
previously cited.  According to Justice Brennan’s introduction of that dissenting analysis: 
As I demonstrated in Atascadero, supra, the Court’s constitutional doctrine 
of the sovereign immunity of States rests on a mistaken historical premise.  
Because I treated the subject exhaustively in that case, I will only restate my 
conclusions here.  (Emphasis added) (p. 78) 
 
Justice Brennan continued: 
Recent scholarship indicates that the Framers never intended to 
constitutionalized the doctrine of state sovereign immunity; consequently 
the Eleventh Amendment was not an effort to reestablish, after Chisholm v. 
Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), a limitation on federal judicial power contained 
in Article III.  (p. 78) 
 
Moving to the heart of the matter, the textual content of the Eleventh Amendment, Justice 
Brennan continued to explain his analysis of the Eleventh Amendment. 
Nor, given the limited terms and context in which the Eleventh Amendment 
was drafted, could the Amendment’s narrow and technical language be 
understood to have instituted a broad new limitation on the federal judicial 
power in cases “arising under” federal law whenever an individual attempts 
to sue a State.  (p. 78) 
 
Tying the historical record and the language of the Constitution to the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment, an exercise in which one could only hope the full Court would have engaged had 
not a narrow majority already fixed on a predetermined end, the preservation of the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity (which itself had been based on a misinterpretation of language), Justice 
Brennan explained: 
Rather, as the historical records and the language of the Constitution reveal, 
the Amendment was intended simply to remove federal-court jurisdiction 
over suits against a State where the basis for jurisdiction was that the 
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plaintiff was a citizen of another State or an alien – suits which result in the 
abrogation of the state law of sovereign immunity in state-law causes of 
action.  (Emphasis in original) (p. 78) 
 
Because the Court ignored the text of the Eleventh Amendment as well as the historical context 
surrounding the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, because the Court sought to implement 
what it presumed to be the underlying principle of the Eleventh Amendment, i.e., sovereign 
immunity, the Court’s opinions would lack consistency as well as a basic analytical 
underpinning.  Following the discussion in which he illustrated the Rehnquist majority’s 
inconsistent holdings, Justice Brennan proceeded to examine the Court’s rationale: 
By way of explication [the explanation for its inconsistent record, 
particularly its attempts to explain the reasons for interpreting similar legal 
situations differently in two opinions], the Court retreats to the position that 
federal courts may grant relief prospectively, that is, against ongoing and 
future violations of federal law, but not retroactively, that is, against past 
violations of federal law.  (p. 77) 
 
Justice Brennan continued by explaining a balancing test that the Court had constructed: 
 Basically what the Court is doing, as it admits in this case, is balancing the 
Eleventh Amendment and the Supremacy Clause.  Ante, at 68.  If relief is 
sought against continuing violations, the Court finds that the Supremacy 
Clause outweighs the Eleventh Amendment; but if relief is requested against 
past violations, the Court determines that the Eleventh Amendment 
outweighs the Supremacy Clause.  (p. 77) 
 
And then, Justice Brennan pointed to the lack of constitutional underpinning for the Court’s 
construction: 
The Court cites not constitutional authority for this balancing test and has 
not offered, and I suspect cannot offer, a satisfactory analytical foundation 
for it.  Furthermore, I strenuously disagree with the Court’s suggestion that 
the balance it has struck sufficiently protects the supremacy of federal law.  
(Emphasis added) (p. 77) 
 
 Justice Brennan noted the effect of the Court’s narrow-majority opinion: 
From this day forward, at least with regard to welfare programs, States may 
refuse to follow federal law with impunity, secure in the knowledge that all 
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they need do to immunize themselves from accountability in federal courts 
is to conform their policies to federal law on the eve of judgment…  (p. 77) 
 
Justice Brennan continued by noting the impact on individuals of the state’s noncompliance 
efforts that resulted in the states saving money at the expense of needy & qualifying individuals: 
During the period of noncompliance, States save money by not paying 
benefits according to the criteria established by federal law, while needy 
individuals designated by Congress as the beneficiaries of welfare programs 
are cheated of their federal rights.  (pp. 77-78) 
 
Justice Brennan concluded by noting the reward for noncompliance by the states for violating 
federal law that was sanctioned by the Court in Green v. Mansour as well as by drawing 
attention to the incongruity between the Supremacy Clause and the Court’s Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence: 
Once again, the Court’s doctrine “require[s] [sic] the federal courts to 
protect States that violate federal law from the legal consequences of their 
conduct.”  … Surely the Supremacy Clause requires a different result.  The 
foregoing reveals the fundamental incoherence of the Court’s Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence.  (p. 78) 
 
 Significance for the eleventh amendment. 
 The Court’s inconsistency regarding the Eleventh Amendment, particularly as shown by 
its holdings in Quern and Green v. Mansour, indicate a struggle to address the constitutional 
issues, particularly when the Court appears to have a pre-determined end in sight.  That pre-
determined end, as will be shown, provides one of the consistencies of Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence.  The other consistency lies in the conception of what Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence would be were that jurisprudence anchored in the text of both the Eleventh 
Amendment and its application to the text and case law of the Constitution as articulated by 
Justice Brennan.  Both will appear in ensuing cases. 
 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company, 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
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 Case summary. 
 The facts and procedural history of the case are long and complicated.  Events originally 
began in 1900, some eighty-eight (88) years before the full culmination of those beginnings 
came to reside in argument before the U.S. Supreme Court.  The facts involve two private 
companies, coal tar wastes produced by an unnamed coal gasification plant (that began operation 
around 1900), the dismantlement of the coal gasification plant in 1950, the acquisition of the coal 
gasification plant property by the Union Gas Company (either before or after the dismantling of 
the plant; the Court record did not indicate when), subsequent easements acquired by the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, large-scale flood-control actions by the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania in 1980 centered on Brodhead Creek, the unanticipated discovery of coal tar 
deposits originally placed in close proximity to Brodhead Creek by the original coal gasification 
company, the ensuing contamination of the creek by the uncovered coal tar deposits, successful 
cleanup efforts by the State and the Federal Government working together cooperatively, a 
congressional act entitled the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980, or its acronym, CERCLA, congressional amendment of CERCLA during 
the course of legal proceedings by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 
(SARA), and, finally, the federal Environmental Protection Agency. 
 The epicenter of all of these facts was situated in portions of Brodhead Creek located 
near Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania.  The community of Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, sits 
approximately four miles west of the Delaware Water Gap, which is on the west bank of the 
Delaware River, a waterway that serves as the boundary between western New Jersey and 
eastern Pennsylvania.  Located near the Kittatinny Mountains of New Jersey, the Pocono 
Mountains of Pennsylvania, and the Delaware State Forest, Stroudsburg is also situated in the 
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midst of several ski areas as well.  In addition, Stroudsburg is located in what has been officially 
designated as the Chesapeake Bay Watershed Area.  The events transpiring on Brodhead Creek 
resulted in its being designated “the Nation’s first emergency Superfund site” by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (p. 6). 
 The first legal action was initiated by the United States.  Having reimbursed the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania “for cleanup costs of $720,000” as provided by the 
congressional acts, the federal government “sued Union Gas” under the provisions of CERCLA 
(p. 6).  The United States claimed “that Union Gas was liable for such costs because the 
company and its predecessors had deposited coal tar into the ground near Brodhead Creek” (p. 
6).  Whereupon Union Gas Company  
filed a third-party complaint against Pennsylvania, asserting that the 
Commonwealth was responsible for at least a portion of the costs because it 
was an “owner or operator” of the hazardous-waste site, … and because its 
flood-control efforts had negligently caused or contributed to the release of 
the coal tar into the creek.  (p. 6) 
 
Regarding the third-party complaint, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania claimed that “its 
Eleventh Amendment immunity barred the suit” (p. 6).   Agreeing with the Commonwealth’s 
assertion of immunity, the “District Court dismissed the complaint” (p. 6).  Subsequently a 
“divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed” the lower federal court’s 
dismissal of the third-party complaint on Eleventh Amendment grounds in United States v. 
Union Gas Co., 792 F. 2d 372 (1986) (p. 6).   
 The legal situation became more complicated upon the Union Gas Company’s appeal to 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  As recounted by Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in which he 
reviewed the legal events beginning with the appeal by the Union Gas Company and afterwards 
announced the ruling of the Court in Part I of the opinion: 
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While Union Gas’ petition for certiorari was pending, Congress amended 
CERCLA by passing SARA.  We granted certiorari, vacated the Court of 
Appeals’ opinion, and remanded for reconsideration in light of these 
amendments…  On remand, the Court of Appeals held that the language of 
CERCLA, as amended, clearly rendered States liable for monetary damages 
and that Congress had the power to do so when legislating pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause.  United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F. 2d 1343 (1986).  
We granted certiorari, 485 U.S. 958 (1988), and now affirm.  (p. 6) 
 
 The preceding quotation ended Part I of the Court’s opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union 
Gas Co.  Part II of the opinion focused on confronting the legal question, “whether CERCLA, as 
amended by SARA, clearly expresses an intent to hold States liable in damages for conduct 
described in the statute” (p. 7).  Buttressing the focus of the legal question, Justice Brennan cited 
Hans v. Louisiana and described the Court’s holding in that case before deriving an additional 
point from a more recent case: 
[T]his Court held that the principle of sovereign immunity reflected in the 
Eleventh Amendment rendered the States immune from suits for monetary 
damages in federal court even where jurisdiction was premised on the 
presence of a federal question.  Congress may override this immunity when 
it acts pursuant to the power granted it under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but it must make its intent to do so “unmistakably clear.”  See 
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).  (p. 7) 
 
During the course of the Court’s consideration of the legal question addressed in Part II, Justice 
Brennan directly rebutted seven points of Justice White’s arguments expressed in the dissenting 
opinion he authored which had been joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and 
O’Connor.  Regarding the legal question addressed by Part II of the opinion, the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania asserted “that CERCLA merely makes clear that States may be liable to the 
United States, not that they may be liable to private entities such as Union Gas” (p. 11).  Finding 
that “Congress intended to permit suits brought by private citizens against the States,” the Court 
announce its holding regarding the first legal question:  “We thus hold that the language of 
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CERCLA as amended by SARA clearly evinces an intent to hold States liable in damages in 
federal court” (pp. 12, 13). 
 The answer to the first legal question given above created a second legal question, a 
constitutional question that provided the focus for Part III of the Court’s opinion: Does “the 
Commerce Clause grant Congress the power to enact such a statute” as CERCLA, a statute 
which “clearly permits suits for money damages against States in federal court” (p. 13)?  The 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania argued “that the principle of sovereign immunity found in the 
Eleventh Amendment precludes such congressional authority” (pp. 13-14).  Justice Brennan 
announced the Court’s response, “We do not agree” (p. 14).  Beginning the Court’s explanation 
of the reasoning used to reach a position of disagreement with the Commonwealth’s argument 
regarding Eleventh Amendment immunity for the states from suit, Justice Brennan cited the 
Court’s ruling in Parden, highlighting the importance of that case as the beginning of “a trail 
unmistakably leading to the conclusion that Congress may permit suits against the States for 
money damages” (p. 14): 
The trail begins with Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks Dept., 
377 U.S. 184 (1964).  There, in responding to a state-owned railway’s 
argument that Congress had no authority to subject the railway to suit, we 
concluded that “the States surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when 
they granted Congress the power to regulate commerce,” id., at 191, and that 
“[b]y [sic] empowering congress to regulate commerce, … the States 
necessarily surrendered any portion of their sovereignty that would stand in 
the way of such regulation,” id., at 192.  (p. 14) 
 
 After examining more of the Court’s case law that marked the “path” he had indicated 
previously, Justice Brennan moved to case law of the federal circuit courts of appeal.  Citing 
decisions from the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 7th, and 9th circuits, Justice Brennan pronounced: 
It is no accident, therefore, that every Court of Appeals to have reached this 
issue [congressional abrogation of “States’ immunity when acting pursuant 
to the Commerce Clause”] has concluded that Congress has the authority to 
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abrogate States’ immunity from suit when legislating pursuant to the plenary 
powers granted it by the Constitution.  (p. 15) 
 
In continuing to address the legal question regarding the conflicting arguments posed by the 
Eleventh Amendment and the plenary grant of power to Congress contained in the Commerce 
Clause, Justice Brennan effectively countered points offered by Justice Scalia in his mixed 
opinion, doing so by drawing attention to the argumentative tricks and techniques employed by 
Scalia, as well as the faulty reasoning engaged in by the partly concurring, partly dissenting 
justice.  Justice Brennan concluded his critical analysis of Scalia’s reasoning with an 
announcement of the Court’s initial finding regarding the constitutional question: 
When one recalls … Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 
480, 495 (1983), Justice Scalia’s conception of Hans’ holding looks 
particularly exaggerated.  Our prior cases thus indicate that Congress has the 
authority to override States’ immunity when legislating pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause.  This conclusion is confirmed by a consideration of the 
special nature of the power conferred by that Clause.  (p. 19) 
 
 Considering the “special nature” of the Commerce Clause during examination of the 
constitutional question posed by the intersection of the Eleventh Amendment and the Commerce 
Clause, Justice Brennan called attention to the fact that “the Commerce Clause withholds power 
from the States at the same time as it confers it on Congress” (p. 19).  Continuing the Court’s 
consideration of the grant of power to Congress contained in the Commerce Clause, Justice 
Brennan reasoned: 
[B]ecause the congressional power thus conferred would be incomplete 
without the authority to render States liable in damages, it must be that, to 
the extent that the States gave Congress the authority to regulate commerce, 
they also relinquished their immunity where Congress found it necessary, in 
exercising this authority, to render them liable.  (pp. 20-21) 
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Connecting the Commerce Clause to environmental regulation, Justice Brennan noted, “Hence, 
the Commerce Clause as interpreted in Philadelphia v. New Jersey ensures that we often must 
look to the Federal Government for environmental solutions” (p. 21) because the 
general problem of environmental harm is often not susceptible of a local 
solution.  See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (recognizing 
authority of federal courts to create federal “common law” of nuisance to 
apply to interstate water pollution, displacing state nuisance laws).  (p. 20). 
 
 The final argument posed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania asserted “that the 
federal judicial power as set forth in Article III does not extend to any suits for damages brought 
by private citizens against unconsenting States” (Emphasis in original) (p. 22).  Responding to 
the inverse of the Commonwealth’s argument, the Court observed, “We have never held, 
however that Article III does not permit such suits where the States have consented to them” (p. 
22).  The Court responded in a manner which subtly indicated the irrelevancy of Article III to the 
discussion as framed by the Court, “Pennsylvania’s argument thus is answered by our conclusion 
that, in approving the commerce power, the States consented to suits against them based on 
congressionally created causes of action” (p. 22). 
 Having concluded analysis of the constitutional question in Part III, and having answered 
the question posed in Part II, the Court announced its final holding and disposition of the case in 
Part IV.  According to the Court: 
We hold that CERCLA renders States liable in money damages in federal 
court, and that Congress has the authority to render them so liable when 
legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause.  Given our ruling in favor of 
Union Gas, we need not reach its argument that Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 
1 (1890), should be overruled.  We affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  (p. 23) 
 
 Regarding concurring and dissenting opinions, these being in addition to the “official” 
opinion of the Court’s majority, individual justices discovered in the latter part of the Twentieth 
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Century what it took the American public longer to realize, a realization that emerged only in the 
Twenty-first Century with the development of social media, e.g., Facebook.  That realization 
consists of a misapprehension that anyone who offers an opinion, regardless of their expertise or 
training (or in the Court’s case, regardless of two hundred years of tradition, custom, and practice 
dictating otherwise as instituted by Chief Justice John Marshall), is an “expert” by virtue of 
being published on a website, although in the case of multiple opinions by the multiple justices, 
even greater expert status than that accruing to a member of the Court flows from authoring ones 
own opinion so as to be “officially recognized” by being included in the official volume of the 
reports of the Supreme Court, the United States Reports.  The opinions offered in Pennsylvania 
v. Union Gas Co. are multiple and complicated.  Some concur, some dissent, while yet others 
“join as to Parts II, III, and IV, concurring in part and dissenting in part” (p. 29).  For the record, 
as described by the Court’s report of the case: 
Brennan, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion 
of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, in which Marshall, Blackmun, 
Stevens, and Scalia, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in 
which Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined.  Stevens, J., filed a 
concurring opinion, post, p. 23.  Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, in Parts II, III, and IV of which Rehnquist, C.J., 
and O’Connor and Kennedy, JJ., joined, post, p. 29.  White, J., filed an 
opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in Part I of 
which Rehnquist, C.J., and O’Connor and Kennedy, JJ., joined, post, p. 45.  
O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 57.  (pp. 3-4) 
 
The proliferation of dissenting and concurring opinions became more noticeable under the 
leadership exercised by Chief Justice Rehnquist.  One legal scholar remarked, “[N]owadays, 
dissents express disagreements over matters once considered too inconsequential to merit a 
separate opinion, and, in Justice Lewis Fr. Powell’s words, they are not ‘a model of temperate 
discourse’” (Hall, 1992, p. 609). 
 Significance for the eleventh amendment. 
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 The significance of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. lies in directly confronting the issue 
not squarely faced by the Court in its previous decision in Parden v. Terminal Railroad 
Company, the question of congressional authority abrogating state immunity from suit under the 
Eleventh Amendment when acting pursuant to its plenary authority granted by Article I, § 8 of 
the Constitution “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes.”   The implication of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. regarding the 
other grants of plenary power to Congress contained in Article I, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution at 
this point is unknown; however, it would be most difficult to defend state immunity from suits 
filed in federal courts in any of the grant areas, should Congress so choose.  
 The immediately preceding conjectures flowed from the Court’s holding in Pennsylvania 
v. Union Gas Co., from a reading of the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment, and from a 
textual reading of the Constitution’s Article I sections and its Article III sections.  However, as 
will be subsequently shown, the slim Court majority’s ruling in Seminole Tribe v. Florida 
deviated once again from textual considerations.  Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion in 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas explained how the nation came to have two Eleventh Amendments, a 
point that should be kept in mind in proceeding to examine subsequent Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence.  As stated by Justice Stevens: 
It is important to emphasize the distinction between our two Eleventh 
Amendments.  There is first the correct and literal interpretation of the plain 
language of the Eleventh Amendment that is fully explained in Justice 
Brennan’s dissenting opinion in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 
U.S. 234, 247 (1985).  In addition, there is the defense of sovereign 
immunity that the Court has added to the text of the Amendment in cases 
like Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).  (p. 23) 
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After characterizing the second version of the Eleventh Amendment as a “judicially created 
doctrine of state immunity,” Justice Stevens referred again to Justice Brennan’s dissenting 
opinion in Atascadero (p. 24): 
Because Justice Brennan’s opinion in Atascadero and the works of 
numerous scholars118 have exhaustively and conclusively refuted the 
contention that the Eleventh Amendment embodies a general grant of 
sovereign immunity to the States, further explication on this point is 
unnecessary.  (p. 24) 
 
Justice Stevens then directly addressed the proper linkage between the Eleventh Amendment and 
the Article III clauses referencing judicial power, a linkage based on the plain text of each 
section of the Constitution: 
Suffice it to say that the Eleventh Amendment carefully mirrors the 
language of the citizen-state and alien-state diversity clauses of Article III 
and only provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend” to these cases.  There is absolutely noting in the text of 
the Amendment that in any way affects the other grants of “judicial Power” 
contained in Article III.  Plainer language is seldom, if ever, found in 
constitutional law.  (p. 24) 
 
Besides keeping in mind Justice Stevens’ point regarding the fact of two Eleventh Amendments, 
one textual and one created by the judiciary, the reader will also need to keep in mind Justice 
Stevens’ analysis of the Eleventh Amendment-Article III connection when reading subsequent 
majority reports of which Rehnquist is a member. 
 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 Facts & procedural history. 
 The facts of the case involved a tribal government (the Seminole Tribe of Florida), a state 
government (Florida) as headed by its governor (Lawton Chiles), a congressional act (the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act), Article I, § 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution (the Commerce Clause), and the 
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution.  The ultimate purpose of the act was to provide a 
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vehicle for the regulation of gaming activities in Indian country as conducted by the various 
Indian tribes (whose sovereign status as “dependent domestic nations” lay somewhere between 
the state and federal governments, the tribes possessing “a status higher than that of states”) 
(Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17; Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 
272 F. 2d. 131) (See Appendix R for a fuller discussion of the status of Indian tribes and their 
citizens).   
 Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act pursuant to its authority under the 
Commerce Clause, more particularly under the portion of the Commerce Clause empowering 
Congress “To regulate Commerce … with the Indian Tribes” (U.S. Constitution, § 8, cl. 3).  
Throughout our nation’s history and jurisprudence, that power has been held to reign supreme, 
subject only to the limitations on federal power contained in the “Bill of Rights” (Cohen, p. 91).  
The Marshall Court had originally held that the federal government held sole jurisdiction over 
Indian Affairs119 when the Court declared in Worcester v. Georgia that “[t]he whole intercourse 
between the United States and this nation [the Cherokee Nation], is, by our Constitution and 
laws, vested in the government of the United States” (31 U.S. 515, 561).  More specifically, the 
federal power over Indian Affairs rested primarily in the hands of Congress.  According to Chief 
Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court in Worcester v. Georgia (1832): 
That instrument [the Constitution of the United States] confers on congress 
the powers of war and peace; of making treaties, and of regulating 
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the 
Indian tribes.  These powers comprehend all that is required for the 
regulation of our intercourse with the Indians.  They are not limited by any 
restrictions on their free actions; the shackles imposed on this power, in the 
confederation, are discarded.  (31 U.S. 515, 559) 
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Felix Cohen, the great authority on federal Indian law, in discussing the “frequent” references “to 
the so-called ‘plenary’ power of Congress over the Indians,” made the following observations 
and concluded as follows: 
[I]t is clear that the powers mentioned by Chief Justice Marshall proved to 
be so extensive that in fact the Federal Government’s powers over Indian 
affairs are as wide as state powers over non-Indians, and therefore one is 
practically justified in characterizing such federal power as “plenary.”  This 
does not mean, however, that congressional power over Indians is not 
subject to express limitations upon congressional power, such as the Bill of 
Rights.  (Cohen, p. 90) 
 
 With regard to gaming on tribal land, Congress carved out an exception to the country’s 
national history of policy regarding Indian Affairs and granted the state governments authority to 
work with the Indian tribes located within their borders in order to establish and regulate tribally-
owned gaming activities on tribal land.  According to the Court’s description, the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act allowed 
an Indian tribe to conduct certain gaming activities only in conformance 
with a valid compact between the tribe and the State in which the gaming 
activities are located.  25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C).  Under the Act, States 
have a duty to negotiate in good faith with a tribe toward the formation of a 
compact, § 2710(d)(3)(A), and a tribe may sue a State in federal court in 
order to compel performance of that duty, § 2710(d)(7).  (p. 44) 
 
 Upon Florida’s refusal “to enter into any negotiation for inclusion of [certain gaming 
activities] [sic] in a tribal-state compact” in violation of the “requirement of good faith 
negotiation” contained in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, the Seminole Tribe of Florida filed 
suit in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Florida as specified by the Act (p. 
52).  Governor Chiles and the State of Florida responded by “arguing that the suit violated the 
State’s sovereign immunity from suit in federal court” and asked the court to dismiss the suit on 
those grounds.  Having their motion to dismiss the suit on Eleventh Amendment grounds, 
Governor Chiles and the State of Florida “took an interlocutory appeal of that decision” since the 
   
   
971
“collateral order doctrine allows immediate appellate review of order denying claim of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity” (p. 52).  Upon reviewing the decision of the Federal District Court for  
the Southern District of Florida, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower 
court’s ruling, “holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred petitioner’s suit against 
respondents [the State of Florida]” (p. 52).  The Supreme Court, having granted certiorari to the 
Seminole Tribe of Florida to review the Eleventh Circuit Court’s ruling, provided details of that 
court’s ruling: 
The court [the Eleventh Circuit Court] agreed with the District Court that 
Congress … intended to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity, and also 
agreed that the Act had been passed pursuant to Congress’ power under the 
Indian Commerce Clause…  The court disagreed with the District Court, 
however, that the Indian Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to 
abrogate a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit, and concluded 
therefore that it had no jurisdiction over petitioner’s suit against Florida.  
(pp. 52-53) 
 
Continuing to describe the Eleventh Circuit Court’s ruling, the Supreme Court provided further 
details about that court’s additional holding. 
The court further held that Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), does not 
permit an Indian tribe to force good-faith negotiations by suing the 
Governor of a State.  Finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the 
Eleventh Circuit remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss 
petitioner’s suit.  (p. 53) 
 
 In the meantime, two additional events occurred prior to the Supreme Court’s review of 
the Eleventh Circuit Court’s ruling.  First, following the Southern Florida District Court’s denial 
of its motion to dismiss and in close proximity to its appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court, the 
State of Florida filed a “summary judgment motion” with the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida claiming “that Florida had fulfilled its obligation under the Act to 
negotiate in good faith” (p. 53, n. 6).  Upon investigation and analysis, the Southern Florida 
District Court approved the State of Florida’s motion; whereupon the Seminole Tribe filed an 
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appeal with the Eleventh Circuit Court who “stayed its review of that decision pending the 
disposition of this case [the original suit filed in federal district court by the Seminole Tribe of 
Florida]” (p. 53, n. 6). 
 Second, the following event occurred at the Eleventh Circuit Court.  As described by the 
U.S. Supreme Court: 
Following its conclusion that petitioner’s suit should be dismissed, the Court 
of Appeals went on to consider how § 2710(d)(7) would operate in the wake 
of its decision.  The court decided that those provisions of § 2710(d)(7) that 
were problematic could be severed from the rest of the section, and read the 
surviving provisions of § 2710(d)(7) to provide an Indian tribe with 
immediate recourse to the Secretary of the Interior from the dismissal of a 
suit against a State.  (p. 53, n. 4) 
 
 Legal questions. 
 The first legal question, as posed by the Court:  “Does the Eleventh Amendment prevent 
Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes against States for prospective injunctive relief to 
enforce legislation enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause” (p. 53)?  This question 
gave rise to two subsidiary questions: “first, whether Congress has ‘unequivocally expresse[d] 
[sic] its intent to abrogate the immunity,’ Green v. Mansour ... ; and second, whether Congress 
has acted ‘pursuant to a valid exercise of power,’ ibid” (p. 55).  The second legal question, again 
as posed by the Court: “Does the doctrine of Ex parte Young permit suits against a State’s 
Governor for prospective injunctive relief to enforce the good-faith bargaining requirement of 
the Act” (p. 53)? 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 Regarding the authority posed by the Indian Commerce Clause, attorneys for the 
Seminole Tribe argued that “[t]here [sic] is no principled basis for finding that congressional 
power under the Indian Commerce Clause is less than that conferred by the Interstate Commerce 
   
   
973
Clause” (p. 60).  Attorneys for the Seminole Tribe reminded the Court that “the Union Gas 
plurality found the power to abrogate from the ‘plenary’ character of the grant of authority over 
interstate commerce,” and since there is no textual differentiation, in terms of the power granted, 
between congressional power to regulate commerce “among the States” and to regulate 
commerce “with the Indian tribes,” the power of Congress regarding the Indian tribes, 
particularly to eliminate state immunity from suit, is as complete as that noted by the Court in its 
Union Gas decision (p. 60; U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 8, cl. 3).  The Seminole Tribe’s 
attorneys further contended that  
the Indian Commerce Clause vests the Federal Government with “the duty 
of protect[ing]” [sic] the tribes from “local ill feeling” and “the people of the 
States,” United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-384 (1886), … [and] 
that the abrogation power [the power to remove state immunity from 
lawsuit] is necessary “to protect the tribes from state action denying 
federally guaranteed rights.”  (p. 60) 
 
 Attorneys for the State of Florida argued that the Indian Commerce Clause was dissimilar 
to the Interstate Commerce Clause.  According to the Court’s description of that argument: 
They [attorneys for the State of Florida] note that we have recognized that 
“the Interstate Commerce and Indian Commerce Clauses have very different 
applications,” Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 
(1989), and from that they argue that the two provisions are “wholly 
dissimilar.”  Brief for Respondents 21.   (pp. 60-61) 
 
The Court continued its explanation of the State of Florida’s arguments that the Indian 
Commerce Clause differed from the Interstate Commerce Clause: 
Respondents [the State of Florida’s attorneys] contend that the Interstate 
Commerce Clause grants the power of abrogation only because Congress’ 
authority to regulate interstate commerce would be “incomplete” without 
that “necessary” power.  Id., at 23, citing Union Gas, supra, at 19-20.  The 
Indian Commerce Clause is distinguishable, respondents contend, because it 
gives Congress complete authority over the Indian tribes.  Therefore, the 
abrogation power is not “necessary” to Congress’ exercise of its power 
under the Indian Commerce Clause.  (p. 61) 
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Interestingly, the State of Florida’s attorneys presented an argument against the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act based on Tenth Amendment Grounds, an argument that was noted by the Court 
as follows: 
Respondents also contend that the Act mandates state regulation of Indian 
gaming and therefore violates the Tenth Amendment by allowing federal 
officials to avoid political accountability for those actions for which they are 
in fact responsible.  See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).  
This argument was not considered below by either the Eleventh Circuit or 
the District Court, and is not fairly within the question presented.  Therefore 
we do not consider it here.  See this Court’s Rule 14.1; Yee v. Escondido, 
503 U.S. 519 (1992).  (p. 61, n. 10) 
 
 Regarding arguments centering on the application of Ex parte Young, the Court 
mentioned one argument presented by the Seminole Tribe (p. 73), but did not discuss any of the 
arguments presented by the State of Florida.  Because of the unsound and illogical legal 
reasoning employed by the Court in presenting its opinion, this writer is reluctant to attempt any 
efforts aimed at deducing from the Court’s opinion such arguments that might have been 
presented by the State of Florida. 
 Holding & disposition. 
 The Court affirmed the Circuit Court’s opinion and held “that the Indian Commerce 
Clause fid not grant Congress the power to abrogate the States’ eleventh Amendment immunity” 
(p. 44).  The Court also affirmed the Circuit Court’s ruling “that Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 
does not permit an Indian tribe to force good-faith negotiations by suing a State’s Governor” (p. 
44). 
 Court’s rationale. 
 Previously in this paper, mention was made of a fault line regarding issues of sovereignty 
that was situated first, in American politics, and subsequently, in American jurisprudence.  Made 
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in reference to the historical background and the case law regarding the Tenth Amendment to the 
Constitution, some of those remarks follow: 
Clashes involving the Tenth Amendment reveal a primordial fault line in 
American politics with local and state rights located on one side and 
national government supremacy situated on the other….   Finally, political 
clashes along America’s fault line presaged the legal clashes contained in 
the case law of the Tenth Amendment….  These political clashes provide 
the historical context required to more fully understand the ensuing legal 
battles over government sovereignty in the United States.  (Janson, 2011, pp. 
268-269) 
 
At the time the remarks were written, little did this writer suspect that the “primordial fault line 
in American politics” would reveal itself in Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence; yet that is 
precisely what Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida clarified for this writer, that the same fault 
line identified in Tenth Amendment issues also served as a fractal subterranean demarcation line 
of Eleventh Amendment disputes.   
 One can trace its judicial development, beginning first with the Court’s decision in Hans 
v. Louisiana, the initial identifying thread of argument being a focus, or lack thereof, on textual 
support of the Constitution for ones legal position.  The Hans Court referenced what it thought 
was the mistake of the Court in the Chisholm decision, that of being “swayed by a close 
observance of the letter of the Constitution” (134 U.S. 1, 12).  The Hans Court was not to be 
bound by seeking a textual reason for incorporating the common law doctrine of sovereign 
immunity into the nation’s jurisprudence.  In the Court’s view: 
It is not necessary that we should enter upon an examination of the reason or 
expediency of the rule which exempts a sovereign State from prosecution in 
a court of justice at the suit of individuals….  It is enough for us to declare 
its existence.  (134 U.S. 1, 21) 
 
The textually-based thread of argument next appeared in Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinions in 
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon (a case not briefed, but whose remarks were cited in 
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subsequent Court opinions) and in Green v. Mansour as well as his plurality opinion in 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.  The Eleventh Amendment’s textual thread revealing the fault 
line in American political life and jurisprudence picked up a complementary thread of argument, 
the existence of two Eleventh Amendments, in Justice Stevens concurring opinion in 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.  That complimentary thread was based, in part, on Justice 
Brennan’s Atascadero and Green v. Mansour dissenting opinions, dissents which had added yet 
more supporting argumentative threads of complementary color to the original textual argument.   
 Before discussing any additional argumentative threads revealing the fault line, we 
should remember the two initial threads already identified: first, the argumentative thread 
centering on textual support for the Court’s constitutional interpretations of the Eleventh 
Amendment; second, the existence of two separate Eleventh Amendments in American 
jurisprudence.  The additional complimentary threads revealed by the Court’s justices consisted 
of the following individual strands:  
• the Court’s decision in Hans involved an incorporation of the common law doctrine, 
sovereign immunity; 
• the Court’s misunderstanding of the historical common law experience in America, 
originally being the “body of judge-made law that was administered in the royal 
courts of England” with the corresponding amended understanding by Americans that 
any common law adopted in America was amenable to legislative amendment (Hall, 
1992, p. 170); 
• the Court’s decision in Hans, along with subsequent interpretations resting on Hans, 
misrepresented the actual historical experiences with both common law and with the 
Eleventh Amendment, which, in turn, did not provide for a full understanding of the 
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actual implications of Hans as a decision grounded in common law and thus 
amenable to legislative revision; and finally, 
• the recognition that the original intent by the framers of the Constitution and the 
Eleventh Amendment (as determined by expert research on the part of multiple 
professional historians and legal scholars as published in peer-reviewed journals of 
impeccable quality) did not support the Court’s original decision in Hans, thus 
rendering that opinion groundless as a precedent for current or future Court rulings in 
terms of textual, legal, analytical, and historical support.   
 In the current case, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, all of the preceding 
argumentative threads were picked up and woven by Justice Stevens’ and by Justice Souter’s two 
dissenting opinions into a model of constitutional interpretation that was textually-based and 
which grounded itself in the historical record and upon original intent as expressed in both 
debate and written communications.  Furthermore, Justice Souter’s dissent, while basing itself on 
Brennan’s and Stevens’ previous opinions, extended and updated their arguments.  Finally, 
Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion incorporated a final complementary strand into the 
discussion, a recognition based on the understanding of America’s unique contribution to 
sovereignty, a contribution hithertofore unrecognized in the Court’s Eleventh Amendment’s 
jurisprudence.  According to Justice Souter, the ratification of the Constitution “affected … 
sovereignty in a way different from any previous political event in America or anywhere else” 
(p. 150).  As articulated by Justice Souter: 
For the adoption of the Constitution made them members of a novel federal 
system that sought to balance the States’ exercise of some sovereign 
prerogatives delegated from their own people with the principle of a limited 
but centralizing federal supremacy.  (p. 150) 
 
Justice Souter continued: 
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As a matter of political theory, this federal arrangement of dual delegated 
sovereign powers truly was a more revolutionary turn than the late war [the 
American Revolution] had been.  See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Federalism 
was our Nation’s own discovery.  The Framers split the atom of 
sovereignty”). 
 
Justice Souter next pointed to the underpinning foundation of this remarkable achievement: 
The American development of divided sovereign powers, which “shatter[ed] 
… [sic] the categories of government that had dominated Western thinking 
for centuries,” id., at 385, was made possible only by a recognition that the 
ultimate sovereignty rests in the people themselves….  [T]he Federalists 
could succeed only by emphasizing that the supreme power “’resides in the 
PEOPLE, as the fountain of government’”…  The People possessing this 
plenary bundle of specific powers were free to parcel them out to different 
governments and different branches of the same government as they saw fit.  
(Emphasis in the original) (pp. 151-152) 
 
Tying that development into the Rehnquist Court’s Eleventh Amendment holding, Justice Souter 
pointed out the inconsistency of the two developments: 
[T]he Court’s position runs afoul of the general theory of sovereignty that 
gave shape to the Framers’ enterprise.  An enquiry [sic] into the 
development of that concept demonstrates that American political thought 
had so revolutionized the concept of sovereignty itself that calling for the 
immunity of a State as against the jurisdiction of the national courts would 
have been sheer illogic.  (pp. 149-150) 
 
Continuing, Justice Souter noted: 
Given this metamorphosis of the idea of sovereignty in the years leading up 
to 1789, the question whether the old immunity doctrine might have been 
received as something suitable for the new world of federal-question 
jurisdiction is a crucial one.  See, e.g., Amar, supra, at 1436 (“By thus 
relocating true sovereignty in the People themselves … Americans 
domesticated government power and decisively repudiated British notions 
of ‘sovereign’ governmental omnipotence” (footnote omitted)).  (p. 153 & p. 
153, n. 48) 
 
In other words, the novel American concept of sovereignty as resting in the people made absurd 
any claims of sovereign immunity, particularly outside the limited text of the Eleventh 
Amendment.   
   
   
979
 So there it is, the primordial fault line in American political and judicial life, originally 
thought by this writer to reveal itself primarily in Tenth Amendment issues – a fault line that has 
now demonstrated its full presence in Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.  Logically, this makes 
sense and could have been intuited previously by a more thoughtful individual, particularly given 
that both the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments have seen a primary focus on federal-state 
questions.  On the one side of the fault line in Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence stands a 
textual analysis rooted in historical development and original understanding of the Framers while 
on the other side stands a common law doctrine of sovereign immunity that is both inapplicable 
to America’s unique political and judicial contributions to political philosophy and to any 
concept of constitutional inviolability, not to being misunderstood by both the Hans and 
Rehnquist Courts in terms of its common law grounding.   
 As a result of the discovery regarding this jurisdictional fault line in Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence, subsequent cases in this chapter will be discussed in terms of the 
Eleventh Amendment fault line.  It is this writer’s opinion that ultimately the constitutional 
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment and its application to American life will come to rest 
on a more solid foundation, a judicial framework consisting of textual and historical support.  
Such a foundation would also include an understanding of original intent as revealed in thought 
and speech, not to mention the application of  an understanding of America’s unique conception 
of sovereignty as residing ultimately in the people, not in any state or national government.  
Currently, a solid constitutional interpretation resides only in the afore-mentioned opinions 
authored by Justices Brennan, Stevens, and Souter.  Currently, what holds judicial sway is an 
interpretation grounded in common law without any tacit understanding of common law’s 
limitations in the American experience.  As a result, focus will center on the two dissenting 
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opinions as they directly address the Court’s faulty reasoning in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida. 
 First of all, this case constituted a lengthy portion of volume 517 of the U.S. Reports – 
one hundred and forty-two (142) pages, to be more precise.  Of the three opinions, Rehnquist’s 
occupied approximately thirty (30) pages while Justice Stevens’ opinion needed twenty-three 
(23) pages.  Justice Souter’s opinion, however, required eighty-six (86) pages.  Together, the two 
dissenting opinions covered one hundred and nine (109) pages.  In this writer’s opinion, such 
length was required because the two dissenting opinions did what the majority opinion should 
have done, but didn’t – conduct a legal inquiry based upon constitutional text  
• which examined the historical record and the original intent of the Framers of the 
nation’s basic document and of the Eleventh Amendment,  
• which recognized the commonality of Chisholm v. Georgia, of Hans v. Louisiana, of 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, and of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., all of which assumed 
that Congress had the power “to create a private federal cause of action against a 
State, or its Governor, for the violation of a federal right” (p. 76), 
• which understood the rationale responsible for the narrow wording of the Eleventh 
Amendment,  
• which understood the Hans decision in terms of its being grounded in an American 
incorporation of an English common law doctrine and therefore amenable to 
congressional amendment, and, finally, 
• which incorporated a full understanding of America’s unique contribution to political 
philosophy and science in “split[ting] the atom of sovereignty” by splitting power 
between two levels of government and by locating the true source of sovereignty in a 
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recognition that sovereignty resides in the people, an acknowledgement that is fully 
incompatible with any doctrine of sovereign immunity for the various parts of 
government to which the people delegated portions of their power (514 U.S. 779, 
838). 
 In explaining the reason for offering his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens described 
Justice Souter’s dissent and characterized the Court’s flawed reasoning as follows: 
As Justice Souter has convincingly demonstrated, the Court’s contrary 
conclusion is profoundly misguided.  Despite the thoroughness of his 
[Justice Souter’s] analysis, supported by sound reason, history, precedent, 
and strikingly uniform scholarly commentary, the shocking character of the 
majority’s affront to a coequal branch of our Government merits additional 
comment.  (Emphasis added) (p. 78) 
 
Justice Stevens pointed out the true meaning of the narrow Court majority’s opinion by which 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. was overruled.  According to Justice Stevens: 
The majority’s opinion does not simply preclude Congress from establishing 
the rather curious statutory scheme under which Indian tribes may seek the 
aid of a federal court to secure a State’s good-faith negotiations over gaming 
regulations.  Rather, it prevents Congress from providing a federal forum for 
a broad range of actions against States, from those sounding in copyright 
and patent law, to those concerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and the 
regulation of our vast economy.  (p. 77) 
 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens convincingly demonstrated the fallacious reasoning 
that lay behind the five-member-majority’s holding that the “Eleventh Amendment restricts the 
judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional 
limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction” (p. 45).  The Rehnquist Court relied heavily upon 
Justice Iredell’s dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia and upon the Court’s opinion in Hans v. 
Louisiana.  The Rehnquist five-member majority misinterpreted those decisions as relying upon 
an assertion put forth by the two states “that Article III did not extend the judicial power to suits 
against unconsenting States” (p. 78).  As Justice Stevens correctly pointed out, “[B]oth of those 
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opinions [Justice Iredell’s dissent in Chisholm and the Court’s opinion in Hans] relied on an 
interpretation of an Act of Congress rather than [upon] a want of congressional power to 
authorized a suit against the State” (p. 78).   As Justice Stevens pointed out to the five-member-
majority headed by Rehnquist: 
In concluding that the federal courts could not entertain Chisholm’s action 
against the State of Georgia, Justice Iredell relied on the text of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, not the State’s assertion that Article III did not extend the 
judicial power to suits against unconsenting States.  Justice Iredell argued 
that, under Article III, federal courts possessed only such jurisdiction as 
Congress had provided, and that the Judiciary Act expressly limited federal-
court jurisdiction to that which could be exercised in accordance with “’the 
principles and usages of law.’”  Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall., at 434 
(quoting § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789).  (pp. 78-79 
 
Justice Stevens further explained Iredell’s dissent as resting on an interpretation of a 
congressional act, the Judiciary Act of 1789, not upon any Article III argument put forth by a 
state.  Resting entirely upon the text of Justice Iredell’s dissent, Justice Stevens pointed out: 
He [Justice Iredell] reasoned that the inclusion of this phrase [“the principles 
and usages of law” referred to immediately preceding as contained in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789] constituted a command to the federal courts to 
construe their jurisdiction in light of the prevailing common law, a 
background legal regime that he believed incorporated the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity.  Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall., at 434-436 (dissenting 
opinion).  (p. 79) 
 
Combining a reading of the plain, explicit text of Article III of the U.S. Constitution with the 
plain, explicit text of Justice Iredell’s dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens concluded: 
The language of Article III certainly gives no indication that such an 
implicit bar [protecting the sovereign immunity of states].  That provision’s 
text specifically provides for federal-court jurisdiction over all cases arising 
under federal law.  Moreover, as I have explained, Justice Iredell’s dissent 
argued that it was the Judiciary Act of 1789, nor Article III, that prevented 
the federal courts from entertaining Chisholm’s diversity action against 
Georgia….  In sum, little more than speculation justifies the [Rehnquist 
Court’s] conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment’s express but partial 
limitation on the scope of Article III reveals that an implicit but more 
general one is already in place.  (p. 83) 
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 Next Justice Stevens addressed the Court’s ruling in Hans v. Louisiana.  First, Justice 
Stevens noted the reliance of Justice Bradley, the author of the Court’s Hans decision, upon 
Justice Iredell’s dissenting opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia and connected both opinions to their 
consideration to the common law doctrine regarding sovereign immunity. 
Justice Bradley’s somewhat cryptic opinion for the Court in Hans relied 
expressly on the reasoning of Justice Iredell’s dissent in Chisholm, which, of 
course, was premised on the view that the doctrine of state sovereign 
immunity was a common-law rule that Congress had directed federal courts 
to respect [in the Judiciary Act of 1789], not a constitutional immunity that 
Congress was powerless to displace.  (Emphasis added) (p. 84) 
 
Next, Justice Stevens noted particularly the reliance of Justice Bradley upon examining 
congressional legislation, in this case the Judiciary Act of 1875, and for that examination to form 
the basis of the Court’s holding in Hans, an opinion similar to Justice Iredell’s dissent in 
Chisholm.  Justice Stevens continued: 
For that reason [congressional direction in the Judiciary Act of 1789 for the 
federal courts to respect the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, as 
interpreted in Chisholm], Justice Bradley explained that the State’s 
immunity from suit by one of its own citizens was based not on a 
constitutional rule but rather on the fact that Congress had not, by 
legislation, attempted to overcome the common-law presumption of 
sovereign immunity.  His analysis so clearly supports the position rejected 
by the majority today that it is worth quoting at length.  (Emphasis added) 
(pp. 84-85) 
 
Justice Stevens then quoted Justice Bradley’s opinion focused upon his examination of the 
Judiciary Act of 1875 to determine congressional intent regarding the common law doctrine of 
sovereign immunity.  Justice Bradley found that Congress “did not intend to invest its courts 
with any new and strange jurisdictions” [such as federal jurisdiction to hear citizen suits against a 
state government] (p. 85, citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S., at 18-19).  And so, as Justice 
Stevens pointed out, the Rehnquist Court concocted a constitutional rule that had no textual basis 
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and enjoyed no precedential support because it relied upon a misinterpretation, intentional or 
otherwise, of two former Supreme Court cases.  As Justice Souter also noted with regards to the 
Court’s distortion of the relationship between Article III and the Eleventh Amendment, it was no 
mistake that the language of the Eleventh Amendment mirrored the language of Article III.  
According to Justice Souter: 
In precisely tracking the language in Article III providing for citizen-state 
diversity jurisdiction, the text of the Amendment does, after all, suggest to 
common sense that only the Diversity Clauses are being addressed.  If the 
Framers had meant the Amendment to bar federal-question suits as well, 
they could not only have made their intentions clearer very easily…  (p. 
111) 
 
Thus, to interpret Article III as containing an implicit bar to Congress regarding its ability to 
address a mistaken common law application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity via the 
Eleventh Amendment distorts both Article III and the Eleventh Amendment. 
 Justice Souter began his dissent by acknowledging the validity of Justice Stevens’ view, 
expressed in his concurring opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., that two Eleventh 
Amendments existed in American jurisprudence.  He used that view to introduce his own 
critique of the majority opinion’s view regarding Article III and the Eleventh Amendment as a 
prohibition on congressional power to abrogate a state’s immunity from suit.  According to 
Justice Souter: 
There [Justice White’s concurring opinion in Union Gas] he explained how 
it has come about that we have two Eleventh Amendments, the one ratified 
in 1795, the other (so-called) invented by the Court nearly  a century later in 
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).  Justice Stevens saw in that second 
Eleventh Amendment no bar to the exercise of congressional authority 
under the Commerce Clause in providing for suits on a federal question by 
individuals against a State, and I can only say that after my own canvass of 
the matter I believe he was entirely correct in that view, for reasons given 
below.  (Emphasis added) (p. 100) 
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Agreeing that the Hans decision incorporated the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
Justice Souter pointed to its reasoning as being contrary to the Founders’ views regarding 
common law and federalism.  According to Justice Souter; 
The error of Hans reasoning is underscored by its clear inconsistency with 
the Founders’ hostility to the implicit reception of common-law doctrine as 
federal law, and with the Founders’ conception of sovereign power as 
divided between the States and the National Government for the sake of 
very practical objectives.  The Court’s answer today … is likewise at odds 
with the Founders’ view that common law, when it was received into the 
new American legal system, was always subject to legislative amendment.  
(Emphasis added) (p. 102) 
 
Regarding the view of the Framers of the Eleventh Amendment, Justice Souter pointed to the 
rejection of Representative Sedgwick’s proposal following the Chisholm decision, a rejection 
that conclusively indicated that the Eleventh Amendment was not adopted to provide a broad 
interpretation of sovereign immunity.  If Sedgwick’s proposal had been adopted, the Eleventh 
Amendment would have had the text to support the Hans decision.  However, the amendment 
proposed by Sedgwick was rejected, and so there is no textual support for the Hans decision, a 
fact first pointed out by Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in Atascadero State hospital v. 
Scanlon.  Sedgwick’s proposed amendment, as he had been directed to offer by the “Legislature 
of [the] Commonwealth [of Massachusetts],” reads as follows from Justice Souter’s quotation of 
that proposal: 
“[N]o state shall be liable to be made a party defendant, in any of the 
judicial courts, established, or which shall be established under the authority 
of the United States, at the suit of any person or persons, whether a citizen 
or citizens, or a foreigner or foreigners, or of any body politic or corporate, 
whether within or without the United States.”  Gazette of the United States 
303 (Feb. 20, 1793).  (p. 111) 
 
As Justice Souter pointed out: 
Congress took no action on Sedgwick’s proposal, however, and the 
Amendment as ultimately adopted two years later could hardly have been 
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meant to limit federal-question jurisdiction, or it would never have left the 
States open to federal-question suits by their own citizens.  (p. 112) 
 
 The Marshall Court was in much closer proximity to the events surrounding both the 
formation and adoption of the Constitution as well as the Eleventh Amendment.  In fact, most 
members of that Court had either witnessed or participated in those developments.  The views of 
the Marshall Court regarding the Eleventh Amendment were an accurate interpretation of the 
Eleventh Amendment, a fact that has been an embarrassment to subsequent Courts whose 
Justices chose to ignore them, e.g., Justices Bradley and Rehnquist.  Two cases particularly 
illustrate the views of the Marshall Court regarding both the purpose and original intent 
envisioned by the framers of the Eleventh Amendment, Cohens v. Virginia (1821) and Osborn v. 
Bank of United States (1824).  Both cases were examined by Justice Souter in his examination of 
the historical record as part of a search for the original intent of the Eleventh Amendment’s 
adoption. 
 As Justice Marshall pointed out in the unanimous decision of Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 
264 (1821) (referenced by Justice Souter in his dissenting opinion as 6 Wheat. 264), the purpose 
of the Eleventh Amendment, according to the framers of that amendment,  
was to bar jurisdiction in suits at common law by Revolutionary War debt 
creditors, not “to strip the government of the means of protecting, by the 
instrumentality of its courts, the constitution and laws from active 
violation.” Id., at 407.  (pp. 112-113) 
 
Justice Souter emphasized the following remarks by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens: 
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, emphasized that the 
Amendment had no effect on federal courts’ jurisdiction grounded on the 
“arising under” provision of Article III and concluded that “a case arising 
under the constitution or laws of the United States, is cognizable in the 
Courts of the Union, whoever may be the parties to that case.”  Id., at 383.  
(p. 112) 
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 A quick examination of Cohens v. Virginia reveals the verbal shenanigans utilized by 
Justices Bradley and Rehnquist in their efforts to avoid the conflict between the Marshall Court’s 
characterization of the Eleventh Amendment and their own views, and to also avoid utilizing a 
basic rule of constitutional interpretation requiring an examination of or search for the original 
intent of those who framed the constitutional provision in question.  The subject matter of 
Cohens v. Virginia was a conflict between state and federal law in which Virginia posed an 
Eleventh Amendment defense that was overridden by the Marshall Court’s view “that the 
Constitution made the Union supreme and that the federal judiciary was the ultimate 
constitutional arbiter” (Hall, 1992, p. 162).  More specifically, the Cohens (Philip and Mendes) 
had been convicted of violating a Virginia statute forbidding the sale of lottery tickets.  The 
Cohens argued they had sold the lottery tickets in Virginia “under the authority of an act of 
Congress for the District of Columbia” (Hall, 1992, p. 162).  Upon appeal by the Cohens to the 
U.S. Supreme Court of their conviction, Virginia “asserted that the Eleventh Amendment 
precluded the Supreme Court from hearing the case and that section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789120 did not apply” (Hall, 1992, p. 162).  In delivering the Court’s opinion, Chief Justice 
Marshall directly confronted the constitutional issues arising under the Eleventh Amendment, 
and at the same time announced the Court’s decision in the case on narrower grounds which 
avoided the issue of Virginia’s noncompliance with a constitutional ruling.  According to a legal 
scholar’s description of Cohens: 
He [Chief Justice Marshall] asserted that the Constitution made the Union 
supreme and that the federal judiciary was the ultimate constitutional arbiter.  
While the states could interpret their own laws, any federal question must 
ultimately be resolved, as section 25 provided, only by the federal courts.  
The Eleventh Amendment did not prevent federal courts from deciding 
properly a legitimate federal question, even where a state was the appellee.  
(Emphasis added) (Hall, 1992, p. 163) 
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The outcome of Cohens v. Virginia, as described:  “Marshall avoided Virginia noncompliance by 
holding that the lottery statute applied only in the District of Columbia,” a holding that decided 
the case on narrower grounds than a ruling on the basis of the constitutional question presented 
(Hall, 1992, p. 163).  However, in order to get to the more narrowly-focused decision, the 
constitutional question had to be addressed, and it was.  So, while technically the holding wasn’t 
based on the collision between the Eleventh Amendment and congressional legislation pursuant 
to a constitutional grant of power, i.e., the Judiciary Act of 1789, the entire case was predicated 
on that conflict.  To opine, as Justice Bradley did in Hans, that the remarks made by Chief 
Justice Marshall in Cohens were “unnecessary to the decision, and in that sense extra judicial” 
ignored the subject matter of Cohens in intellectually dishonest fashion (134 U.S. 1, 20).  The 
remarks also permitted Justice Bradley and the Court to avoid their responsibility to investigate 
the original intent behind the Eleventh Amendment, an intent expressly addressed in Cohens, and 
an intent that would have led to a far different conclusion than that reached by the Court in Hans.   
 As Justice Souter noted, the Marshall Court’s “treatment of the [Eleventh] Amendment in 
Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824), was to the same effect [as the Marshall 
Court’s treatment of that amendment in Cohens v. Virginia]” (p. 113).  Quoting Justice Marshall, 
Justice Souter interpreted the Marshall Court’s ruling in Osborn v. Bank of United States: 
The Amendment there was held there to be no bar to an action against the 
State seeking the return of an unconstitutional tax.  “The eleventh 
amendment of the constitution has exempted a State from the suits of 
citizens of other States, or aliens,” Marshall stated, omitting any reference to 
cases that arise under the Constitution or federal law.  Id., at 847.  (p. 113) 
 
The discerning reader will also note that the Marshall Court based its interpretation of the 
Eleventh Amendment solely upon the text of that amendment, knowing full well the historical 
reasons for that amendment as well as the original intent of those who framed the Eleventh 
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Amendment.  Referencing Justice Brennan’s dissent in Atascadero, Justice Souter noted the 
importance of the Marshall Court’s rulings as a key to understanding the proper judicial 
approach to be taken regarding the Eleventh Amendment.  As Justice Souter pointed out: 
The best explanation for our practice belongs to Chief Justice Marshall: the 
Eleventh Amendment bars only those suits in which the sole basis for 
federal jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship [meaning, a citizen of another 
state or of another country, not a citizen of the state being sued, in 
accordance with the plain language of the amendment].  See Atascadero 
State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S., at 294 (Brennan, J., dissenting)…  (p. 
114) 
 
Justice Souter concluded his review of the Marshall Court’s interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment and the importance of that interpretation for current jurisprudence in its alignment 
with the other critical factors to be accounted for in constitutional interpretation: 
In sum, reading the Eleventh Amendment solely as a limit on citizen-state 
diversity jurisdiction [as stated in the plain text of that amendment] has the 
virtue of coherence with this Court’s practice, with the views of John 
Marshall, with the history of the Amendment’s drafting, and with its allusive 
language.  (p. 114) 
 
 The Rehnquist five-member majority showed defensiveness concerning the dissenting 
opinions’ references to not only the Rehnquist opinion’s lack of textual basis, but the lack of a 
textual basis in the Hans decision upon which Rehnquist was relying.  As Justice Rehnquist 
phrased the response: 
The dissent’s lengthy analysis of the text of the Eleventh Amendment is 
directed at a straw man – we long have recognized that blind reliance upon 
the text of the Eleventh Amendment is “‘to strain the Constitution and the 
law to a construction never imagined or dreamed of.’”  Monaco, supra, at 
326, quoting Hans, supra, at 15.  (p. 69) 
 
The textual requirement for conducting a constitutional analysis hardly constitutes a straw dog, 
as Justice Souter pointed out.  In the quote above, Rehnquist relies upon a former case’s citation 
of a previously improperly decided case as justification for his position, a highly dubious 
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procedure, especially for one so highly placed in our national judiciary.  In other words, an 
erroneous iteration is subsequently reiterated and reiterated, in the mistaken hope that repetitions 
alone will justify the original mistake and direct attention from its mistaken premises.  One can 
only wonder at Rehnquist’s feelings upon having his own words from previous opinions thrown 
back at him as proof against his own argument in Seminole Tribe.  According to Justice Souter: 
The majority chides me that the “lengthy analysis of the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment is directed at a straw man,” ante, at 69.  But plain text is the 
Man of Steel in a confrontation with “background principle[s]” and 
“’postulates which limit and control,’” ante, at 68, 72.   (p. 116, n. 13) 
 
Justice Souter then summarized a portion drawn from a law review article, the law review article 
(embarrassingly for Rehnquist) containing utterances from Rehnquist, both as a Justice and as a 
Chief Justice, which directly refuted his position in Seminole Tribe: 
An argument rooted in the text of a constitutional provision may not be 
guaranteed of carrying the day, but insubstantiality is not its failing.  See, 
e.g., Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 353, 383-384 
(1981) (“For the purposes of legal reasoning, the binding quality of the 
constitutional text is itself incapable of and not in need of further 
demonstration”); cf. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 178 (1987) 
(Rehnquist, C.J.) (“It would be extraordinary to require legislative history to 
confirm the plain meaning of [Federal Rule of Evidence] 104”); Garcia v. 
United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.) ([O]nly the most 
extraordinary showing of contrary intentions from [the legislative history] 
would justify a limitation on the ‘plain meaning’ of the statutory language”).  
(Emphasis in original) (p. 116, n. 13) 
 
Justice Souter neared the conclusion of his refutation of Rehnquist’s misleading (and dishonest, 
but understandable) characterization of reliance upon text for constitutional analysis as a straw 
man: 
This [an “extraordinary showing of contrary intentions” on the part of the 
legislature in order to justify abandoning a reliance on the “plain meaning of 
the language”] is particularly true in construing the jurisdictional provisions 
of Article III, which speak with a clarity not to be found in some of the more 
open-textured provisions of the Constitution.  See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646-647 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., 
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dissenting); Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 399, 424 (1985) (noting 
the “seemingly plain linguistic mandate” of the Eleventh Amendment).  (p. 
116, n. 13) 
 
Somewhat incredulous that the Rehnquist five-member majority seemed to be brazenly flaunting 
its nonreliance on text in making a constitutional analysis, Justice Souter concluded, “That the 
Court thinks otherwise [contrariwise to the wisdom and necessity of reliance upon the plain 
meaning of text] is an indication of just how far it has strayed beyond the boundaries of 
traditional constitutional analysis” (p. 116, n. 13).    
 Justice Souter linked the holding in Union Gas to a recognition of the limited holding in 
Hans, and then showed the illogical grounding of the Rehnquist majority’s holding in Seminole 
Tribe.  First, the linkage between Union Gas and Hans, as described by Justice Souter.  First, he 
noted, “[T]he Hans Court had no occasion to consider whether Congress could abrogate that 
background immunity by statute” (p. 117).  Justice Souter continued: 
Indeed …, this question never came before our Court until Union Gas, and 
any intimations of an answer in prior cases were mere dicta.  In Union Gas 
the Court held that the immunity recognized in Hans had no constitutional 
status and was subject to congressional abrogation.  (p. 117) 
 
Moving to the case at hand, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, a case which reached a holding 
contradictory to Union Gas, Justice Souter observed: 
Today the Court overrules Union Gas and holds just the opposite.  In 
deciding how to choose between these two positions [the positions 
represented by Union Gas and Seminole Tribe], the place to begin is with 
Hans’s holding that a principle of sovereign immunity derived from the 
common law insulates a State from federal-question jurisdiction at the suit 
of its own citizen.  (p. 117) 
 
Regarding the Court’s decision in Hans, linked critical examination and legal scholarship by 
observing, “A critical examination of that case will show that it was wrongly decided, as 
virtually every recent commentator has concluded” (p. 117).  In notes referencing his statement, 
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Justice Souter pointed to multiple law review articles examining the question and noted the 
summary of another legal scholar’s review of the issue:   
As one scholar has observed, the literature is “remarkably consistent in its 
evaluation of the historical evidence and text of the amendment as not 
supporting a broad rule of constitutional immunity for states.”  Jackson, 
supra, [The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign 
Immunity, 98 Yale L.J. 1 (1988)], at 44, n. 179).  (p. 110, n. 8) 
 
Justice Souter’s references to historical and legal scholarship are backed up by Justice Stevens’ 
concurring opinion in Union Gas and by Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion in Atascadero.  As 
noted by Justice Stevens in his separate concurring opinion in Union Gas: 
Because Justice Brennan’s opinion in Atascadero and the works of 
numerous scholars have exhaustively and conclusively refuted the 
contention that the Eleventh Amendment embodies a general grant of 
sovereign immunity to the States, further explication on this point is 
unnecessary.  (491 U.S. 1, 24) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
 
In a note to the above statement, Justice Stevens listed research as published in such 
distinguished legal journals as the Yale Law Journal (two – 1987 & 1988), the Harvard Law 
Review (three – 1976, 1984, & 1989), the Columbia Law Review (1983), and the Stanford Law 
Review (1983) which included noted legal scholars Lawrence Tribe and Akhil Reed Amar, 
among others (491 U.S. 1, 24, n. 1).  So, the research conducted by scholars and the legal 
reasoning employed by Justices Brennan, Stevens, and Souter converged on the assertion that not 
only was Hans wrongly decided, that even being wrongly decided, Hans did not represent any 
generalized constitutional grant of immunity.  Justice Souter concluded by noting that the 
Court’s ruling in Seminole Tribe simply piled error upon error in a manner that greatly distorted 
the Eleventh Amendment through judge-made law “untethered” by constitutional text (p. 117).  
According to Justice Souter: 
It follows that the Court’s further step today of constitutionalizing Hans’s 
rule against abrogation by Congress compounds and immensely magnifies 
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the century-old mistake of Hans itself and takes its place with other historic 
examples of textually untethered elevations of judicially derived rules to the 
status of inviolable constitutional law.  (p. 117) 
 
In Justice Souter’s opinion, as well as Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, not to mention 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and White (all former justices no longer serving actively 
on the Court): 
Because neither text, precedent, nor history supports the majority’s 
abdication of our responsibility to exercise the jurisdiction entrusted to us in 
Article III, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals [in 
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida].  (p. 185) 
 
 Dissenting opinions. 
 The two dissenting opinions, one by Justice Stevens, and one by Justice Souter that was 
joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, were discussed in the previous section. 
 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 Facts & procedural history. 
 The facts center on the Fair Labor Standards Act, originally enacted by Congress in 1938 
to require “employers to pay a minimum wage” (p. 808).  The original FLSA of 1938 contained 
“an exemption for States acting as employers’ (p. 808).  The Fair Labor Standards Act was 
amended in 1966 to remove that exemption “so far as it concerned workers in hospitals, 
institutions, and schools” (p. 808).  Challenged by the State of Maryland, the Court upheld the 
amended FLSA in Maryland v. Wirtz (1968).  The FLSA was again amended by Congress in 
1974 by “extend[ing] [sic] the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to almost all public 
employees employed by the States and by their various political subdivisions” (p. 808, quoting 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S., at 836).   Again challenged, in National League of 
Cities v. Usery (1976) the Court ruled that the 1974 congressional amendments to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act constituted “an unconstitutional infringement of state sovereignty,” and in the 
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process also “overturned Wirtz, dismissing its reasoning as no longer authoritative” (p. 808).  
Approximately nine years later, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985) 
the Court “overruled National League of Cities, … this time taking the position that Congress 
was not barred by the Constitution from binding the States as employers under the Commerce 
Clause” (p. 809).  Thus, the 1974 amendment of the Fair Labor Standards Act became 
constitutional, including the amended act’s provisions providing for redress of grievances in 
either federal district court or through the state court system, the latter under the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution whereby it is declared: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and 
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.  (U.S. 
Constitution, Article VI, cl. 2) 
 
 In 1992, Alden and sixty-six (66) plaintiffs, all of whom at the time were “present or 
former state probation officers,” filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of 
Maine “against their employer, the State of Maine” (Alden v. State, 715 A.2d 172, 173; p. 711).  
The suit by Alden et al “alleged the State had violated the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, … as amended…, and sought compensation and liquidated damages” (p. 711).  
While the federal district court was conducting the case, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 5-4 majority 
decided Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, a decision whereby the Court held that “Congress 
lacks power under Article I to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity from suits commenced or 
prosecuted in the federal courts” (p. 712).  As a result of the Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine dismissed the suit.  Following appeal, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower federal court’s decision in Mills v. 
Maine, 118 F. 3d 37 (CA1, 1997).   
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 Blocked in the federal court system by the Court’s ruling in Seminole Tribe, Alden et al 
“filed the same action in state court” (p. 712).  The Superior Court, Cumberland County, Maine, 
dismissed the suit brought by the State of Maine’s probation officers “on the basis of sovereign 
immunity” (715 A.2d 172, 173).  Upon appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine upheld the 
judgment of the Superior Court, Cumberland County in a 4-2 decision.  The majority of the 
Maine Supreme Court, in Alden v. State, held as follows: 
State sovereign immunity, as reflected in the Eleventh Amendment, 
protected the state from state probation officer’s FLSA cause of action in its 
own courts; although Congress may have intended to subject the states to 
the overtime provisions of the FLSA, it did not have the necessary power, 
pursuant to the Constitution, to accomplish this end.  (715 A.2d 172, 173) 
 
In its opinion, the Maine High Court majority referenced the Court’s Seminole Tribe opinion 
referencing the Eleventh Amendment “as reflecting a more fundamental principle of state 
sovereign immunity,” thus repeating the Seminole Tribe Court’s mistake of not acknowledging 
that such a view is grounded in the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity and therefore 
subject to congressional alteration (Alden v. State of Maine, 715 A.2d 172, 175).  Justice Dana 
authored a dissenting opinion in Alden v. State, which was joined by Justice Rudman.  That 
dissent will be addressed in a subsequent section of this paper’s treatment of Alden v. Maine.   
 Upon appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari, whereupon “[t]he 
United States intervened as a petitioner to defend the statute” (p. 712).  Briefs of amici curiae 
urging the Court to uphold the Maine Supreme Court’s decision in Alden v. State were submitted 
by thirty-seven (37) states, including one submitted from Iowa by Attorney General Tom Miller 
(p. 711, asterisked note).  In addition, the National Conference of State Legislatures submitted a 
brief of amici curiae encouraging the Court to uphold the Maine Supreme Court’s decision.  
Only two briefs of amici curiae were submitted that argued for reversal of the state supreme 
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court’s decision: one by the Association of American Publishers, Inc.; and one by the National 
Association of Police Organizations (p. 711, asterisked note). 
 Legal question. 
 A clear legal question was not presented by the Court’s five-member-majority.  Neither 
the Court’s syllabus of the case nor the majority opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy and 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist as well as Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, hint at a 
legal question.  A legal question may be inferred, however, from the Court’s holding.  As 
inferred, that question could be: Do the “powers delegated to Congress under Article I of the 
United States Constitution … include the power to subject nonconsenting States to private suits 
for damages in state courts” (p. 712)?  The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Souter and 
joined by Justice Stevens, by Justice Ginsburg, and by Justice Breyer, offers the same possibility.  
As inferred from the dissenting opinion’s description of the Court majority’s holding, the 
question could be:  Does the Constitution bar “an individual suit against a State to enforce a 
federal statutory right under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 … when brought in the State’s 
courts over its objection” (p. 760)? 
 Legal reasoning of opposing parties. 
 Legal arguments were not specifically stated in Alden v. Maine.  However, they were 
noted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in its ruling regarding Alden v. State of Maine.  
Since both cases were similar, the arguments as presented by the Maine High Court are pertinent.  
According to the report of the State of Maine case, Alden “contend[ed] that the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity may not be interposed to defend against this federally created cause of 
action [by the FLSA]” (715 A.2d 172, 173).  According to the Maine High Court, “Alden 
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contend[ed] that Congress has abrogated the State’s sovereign immunity by enacting FLSA 
[under the Commerce Clause’s grant of congressional authority]” (715 A.2d 172, 173).   
 The State of Maine’s argument was briefly articulated by the Maine High Court: “The 
State moved for a judgment on the pleadings…, stating as grounds the doctrine of state sovereign 
immunity…” (715 A.2d 172, 173).  Articulated more precisely in the holding of the case by the 
Maine Supreme Court, the State’s argument may be inferred as the following:  “State sovereign 
immunity, as reflected in the Eleventh Amendment, protect[s] the state from [the] state probation 
officer’s FLSA cause of action in its own courts” (715 A.2d 172, 173).  Continuing, the Court’s 
report from which the State of Maine’s argument is inferred, argued:  “[A]lthough Congress may 
have intended to subject the states to the overtime provisions of the FLSA, it did not have the 
necessary power, pursuant to the Constitution, to accomplish this end” (715 A.2d 172, 173). 
 Holding & disposition. 
 In announcing the first holding, the Court’s syllabus required a full page of verbiage to 
explain and justify it’s position.  As distilled from the lengthy explanation offered in the 
shortened syllabus (one page in the syllabus compared to nineteen pages in the opinion): 
The Constitution’s structure and history and this Court’s authoritative 
interpretations make clear that the States’ immunity from suit is a 
fundamental aspect of the sovereignty they enjoyed before the 
Constitution’s ratification and retain today except as altered by the plan of 
the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments….  Since the 
Amendment [the Eleventh] confirmed rather than established sovereign 
immunity as a constitutional principal, it follows that that immunity’s scope 
is demarcated not by the text of the Amendment alone, but by fundamental 
postulates implicit in the constitutional design.  (pp. 706-707) 
 
The syllabus was able to condense the Court majority’s second holding more concisely.  
According to the Court’s syllabus of Alden v. Maine:  “The States’ immunity from private suit in 
their own courts is beyond congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation” (p. 707). 
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 Court’s rationale. 
 As Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, convincingly 
demonstrates, the Court’s rationale simply does not support its holding.  Similar to the decision 
in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the justices split 5-4 in Alden v. Maine.  Similar to its 
approach in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Court did not rely upon the text of the 
Eleventh Amendment for its decision in Alden v. Maine.  In fact, a reliance upon the Eleventh 
Amendment would not have supported the Court majority’s holding because the subject matter 
did not involve the federal court system.  Instead it involved the court system of the State of 
Maine, an arena not addressed by the Eleventh Amendment.  As Justice Souter noted, “[T]he 
state forum renders the Eleventh Amendment beside the point” (p. 760).  Interestingly, this point 
served as a primary reason for the dissenting opinion offered by Justice Dana as joined by Justice 
Rudman, both of whom served on the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine which heard Alden v. 
State of Maine.  As Maine Supreme Court Justice Dana pointed out, “[N]either Seminole Tribe 
nor the Supremacy Clause permits the State to interpose its sovereign immunity as a defense to a 
suit alleging a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act … that is maintained in state court” 
(Alden v. State of Maine, 715 A.2d 172, 176).  He further explained: 
In Seminole Tribe, therefore, the Court determined that Congress had 
exceeded its Article I powers by seeking to expand the jurisdiction of 
Article III courts beyond the limits imposed by the Eleventh Amendment.  
That decision provides little guidance as to the proper resolution of this 
case:  state courts are not Article III courts, and “the Eleventh Amendment 
does not apply in state courts,” Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Ry. Comm’n, 
502 U.S. 197, 205; 112 S.Ct. 560; 116 L.Ed.2d 560 (1991).  (Alden v. State 
of Maine, 715 A.2d 172, 176) 
 
Therefore, Justice Dana of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine continued, instead of relying on 
Seminole Tribe, a “different, and in my opinion better, approach is illustrated by the recent 
decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court in Jacoby v. Arkansas Department of Education, 331 
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Ark. 508, 962 S.W.2d 773 (1998)” (Alden v. State of Maine, 715 A.2d 172, 177).  Maine 
Supreme Court Justice Dana explained, and in doing so, cited decisions in other jurisdictions 
supporting the explanation provided by the Arkansas Supreme Court: 
In Jacoby, the court concluded that neither the Eleventh Amendment nor the 
sovereign immunity provision of the Arkansas Constitution prevents state 
employees from maintaining an FLSA cause of action against the state in 
state court.  See id. At 775-78; see also Ribitzki v. School Bd. Of Highlands 
County, 710 So.2d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the Eleventh 
Amendment does not immunize the state from an FLSA action in state 
court); Bunch, 122 Md.App. 437, 712 A.2d 585, (holding that the 
Supremacy Clause requires state courts to enforce the FLSA against the 
states and that the scope of states’ sovereign immunity from suit in their 
own courts is not coterminous with their Eleventh Amendment immunity). 
(Alden v. State of Maine, 715 A.2d 172, 177-178) 
 
Furthermore, as Maine Supreme Court Justice Dana pointed out in his dissent: 
The Jacoby court [the Supreme Court of Arkansas] determined that the 
Seminole Tribe decision was not conclusive “of state liability in its own 
courts.”  962 S.W.2d at 777.  The court reasoned that pursuant to the 
Supremacy Clause, the FLSA must be treated as much the law of Arkansas 
as laws passed by the Arkansas legislature.  See id. At 775.  (Alden v. State 
of Maine, 715 A.2d 172, 178) 
 
Having removed the relevance of the Court’s Seminole Tribe ruling for the matter before a state 
court, and having introduced the Arkansas High Court’s analysis of FLSA, Justice Dana 
continued: 
The court [the Arkansas Supreme Court] observed that “state employees … 
are clearly entitled to file FLSA claims against state agencies as employers”; 
[sic] that “the FLSA expressly provides that state courts have jurisdiction 
over these claims”; [sic] and that the FLSA is “the law throughout the land, 
and state sovereign immunity cannot impede it.”  Id. at 777.  (Alden v. State 
of Maine, 715 A.2d 172, 178) 
 
 Furthermore, according to Maine Supreme Court Justice Dana, the U.S. Supreme Court 
had already held the FLSA to be a valid law pursuant to the powers granted by the Commerce 
Clause contained in Article I, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution.  As Justice Dana pointed out: 
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The Supreme Court has decided that Congress acted within its Article I 
powers and did not violate the Tenth Amendment when it provided state 
employees with the protections afforded by the FLSA.  See Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555-56…  Pursuant to the 
Supremacy Clause, “[t]his [sic] Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof … shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary 
notwithstanding.”  U.S. Const. art. 6.  (Alden v. State of Maine, 715 A.2d 
172, 178) 
 
Justice Dana, unlike his brethren in the majority of the Maine Supreme Court’s decision in Alden 
v. State, explicitly recognized the common law origins of the doctrine of sovereign immunity and 
its amenability to change by Congress.  As explained by Justice Dana: 
To the extent that Maine’s common law doctrine of sovereign immunity 
conflicts with the provisions of the FLSA which subject the State to liability 
in state court, the Supremacy Clause resolves that conflict in favor of the 
FLSA.  (Alden v. State of Maine, 715 A.2d 172, 178) 
 
 Thus, neither the Eleventh Amendment, at least according to its text, nor Article III of the 
Constitution referencing federal court jurisdiction in the United States, should have applied to 
Alden v. Maine as a State of Maine lawsuit.  And, given the Court’s decision in Garcia which 
held the FLSA to be a valid exercise of its powers pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution, neither should Seminole Tribe have applied to the case filed in the Maine state 
court system.  How, then, did the U.S. Supreme Court reach its decision in Alden v. Maine? 
 The dissents authored previously by Justice Souter and by Justice Stevens in Seminole 
Tribe must either have hit their mark with the five majority justices, or they must have hit their 
mark with the legal scholars and historians around the country, who in turn criticized the five-
member majority for their opinion in Seminole Tribe (or perhaps both explanations contain 
particles of truth), because the majority opinion abandoned its reliability on sovereign immunity 
as a common law doctrine incorporated into the Eleventh Amendment.  Of course, this view of 
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the Eleventh as incorporating the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity had been done 
without officially recognizing it as a common law grounding because such recognition would 
have required the subsequent recognition that common law was amenable to congressional 
change.  In part the Court’s shift from a sole reliance upon the Eleventh Amendment and what 
they conceived to be sovereign immunity in Alden v. Maine was necessitated because, strictly 
speaking, the Eleventh Amendment didn’t come into particular play in Alden v. Maine.   So, 
instead of a discussion grounded in common law without recognition of that fact, and instead of 
a decision strictly grounded in the Eleventh Amendment, the opinion authored by Justice 
Kennedy in Alden v. Maine relied heavily upon Alexander Hamilton’s discussion of sovereign 
immunity, a discussion grounded not in common law, but in natural law.  Of course, natural law 
had provided the foundation for America’s Declaration of Independence and the colonists’ 
discussion of their rights, e.g.:  
We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal, that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that 
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. – That to secure 
these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed…  (American Declaration of 
Independence, July 4, 1776) 
 
America’s separation from England was grounded neither in common law nor in codified law, 
but instead fixed its ground of being upon natural law, upon self-evident truths which could be 
discerned through reason as providing standards and norms for human conduct. 
 Illustrative of the shift in the Court majority’s shift in emphasis, Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion only referenced Hans v. Louisiana seven (7) times, most of those referencing 
Hans’ references to Justice Iredell’s dissenting opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia or referencing the 
Court’s non-reliance upon the text of the Eleventh Amendment as a guide for their decision in 
Hans.  Like a broken record repeating itself, a reiteration of a reiteration of a wrongly-decided 
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iteration, the five-member majority in Alden referenced its own misguided decision in Seminole 
Tribe some ten (10) times in a vain attempt to buttress their holdings in Alden v. Maine.  
Illustrative of the five-member majority’s unannounced reliance upon natural law, the Court’s 
opinion referenced Alexander Hamilton ten (10) times as well.  Significantly, those references 
comprised text citations occupying multiple pages of the majority’s opinion. 
 Justice Souter and the dissenting justices recognized what the five-member majority did 
not acknowledge, that their opinion was grounded incongruously in natural law (the incongruity 
will be discussed later in this section).  Noting that the Court majority’s opinion in Alden was not 
“a mere corollary to its reasoning in Seminole Tribe” by which the Court “substituted the Tenth 
Amendment for the Eleventh as the occasion demand[ed],” Justice Souter observed that the 
Court majority’s “references to a ‘fundamental aspect’ of state sovereignty” did not refer “to a 
prerogative inherited from the Crown, but to a conception necessarily implied by statehood 
itself” (pp. 762, 762-763, 763).  Justice Souter continued: 
The conception is thus not one of common law so much as of natural law, a 
universally applicable proposition discoverable by reason.  This, I take it, is 
the sense in which the Court so emphatically relies on Alexander Hamilton’s 
reference in The Federalist No. 81, p. 548 (J. Cooke ed. 1961, to the States’ 
sovereign immunity from suit as an “inherent” right, see ante, at 716…  (p. 
763) 
 
Given the fact that the majority did not cite any source more frequently than the writings of 
Alexander Hamilton, Justice Souter surmised the Court’s purpose for exhibiting such a reliance:  
I understand the Court to rely on the Hamiltonian formulation with the 
object of suggesting that its [the Court’s] conception of sovereign immunity 
as a “fundamental aspect” of sovereignty was a substantially popular, if not 
the dominant, view in the periods of Revolution and Confederation.  (p. 763)  
 
Justice Souter then concluded that the Court’s purpose in relying so extensively upon Hamilton 
raised the following fundamental question: 
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The Court’s principal rationale for today’s result, then, turns on history: was 
the natural law conception of sovereign immunity as inherent in any notion 
of an independent State widely held in the United States in the period 
preceding the ratification of 1788 (or the adoption of the Tenth Amendment 
in 1791)?  (p. 763) 
 
 Justice Souter and the dissenting justices next recognized what the five-member majority 
did not (at least officially within the majority opinion), that much of Alexander Hamilton’s 
discussion, both in The Federalist and in his own papers, was grounded in natural law.  As will 
be shown, such a reliance upon natural law should have had consequences other than those 
contained within the majority’s opinion in Alden v. Maine.  Justice Souter noted that the majority 
opinion relied extensively upon Alexander Hamilton, particularly his authorship of “The 
Federalist No. 81, where he [Hamilton] described the sovereign immunity of the States in 
language suggesting principles associated with natural law” (p. 773).  In conjunction with this 
observation, Justice Souter cited a lengthy passage from Hamilton’s writing (Federalist No. 81) 
that occupied half of the page in his dissenting opinion.  Following the lengthy citation, Justice 
Souter pointed out: 
Hamilton chose his words carefully, and he acknowledged the possibility 
that at the convention the States might have surrendered sovereign immunity 
in some circumstances, but the thrust of his argument was that sovereign 
immunity was “inherent in the nature of sovereignty.”  (p. 773) 
 
Observing that “the universality of the phenomenon of sovereign immunity, which Hamilton 
claimed …, is a peculiar feature of the natural law conception,” Justice Souter offered the 
following analysis: 
The apparent novelty and uniqueness of Hamilton’s employment of natural 
law terminology to explain the sovereign immunity of the States is worth 
remarking, because it stands in contrast [1] to formulations indicating no 
particular position on the natural-law-versus-common-law origin, [2] to the 
more widespread view that sovereign immunity derived from common law, 
and [3] to the more radical stance that the sovereignty of the people made 
sovereign immunity out of place in the United States.  (p. 774) 
   




 Observantly, Justice Souter pointed to the incongruity between the Court majority’s use 
of Hamilton’s views and the reception those same views received early on in the Supreme Court 
at the time in which the Framers of the Constitution actually lived as contemporaries of 
Hamilton, contemporaries who well understood Hamilton’s thinking: 
Hamilton’s view is also worth noticing because, in marked contrast to its 
prominence in the Court’s opinion today, as well as in Seminole Tribe … 
and in Hans v. Louisiana, … it found no favor in the early Supreme Court, 
see infra, at 781.  (pp. 774-775) 
 
In referring to “the early Supreme Court” (see above), Justice Souter was referencing the views 
expressed by the Supreme Court justices in Chisholm v. Georgia.  Justice Souter noted that 
Hamilton’s natural law discussions regarding sovereign immunity were completely absent in the 
Chisholm decision: 
If the natural law conception of sovereign immunity as an inherent 
characteristic of sovereignty enjoyed by the States had been broadly 
accepted at the time of the founding, one would expect to find it reflected 
somewhere in the five opinions delivered by the Court in Chisholm v. 
Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793).  Yet that view did not appear in any of them.  
(p. 781) 
 
Since the Court majority had also tried to imbue the Tenth Amendment with natural law status in 
its majority opinion, Justice Souter examined Chisholm to see if it contained any such references, 
particularly given the close proximity between the adoption of the Tenth Amendment and the 
Chisholm decision. 
And since a bare two years before Chisholm, the Bill of Rights had been 
added to the original Constitution, if the Tenth Amendment had been 
understood to give federal constitutional status to state sovereign immunity 
so as to endue it with the equivalent of the natural law conception, one 
would be certain to find such a development mentioned somewhere in the 
Chisholm writings.  (p. 781) 
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Announcing the results of his examination of all of the Chisholm opinions aimed at detecting any 
references either to Hamilton’s natural law conception of sovereign immunity or to the Tenth 
Amendment as embodying sovereign immunity, Justice Souter declared: 
In fact, however, not one of the opinions espoused the natural law view, and 
not one of them so much as mentioned the Tenth Amendment.  Not even 
Justice Iredell, who alone among the Justices thought that a State could not 
be sued in federal court, echoed Hamilton or hinted at a constitutionally 
immutable immunity doctrine.  (Emphasis added) (p. 781) 
 
 Perhaps there was evidence that a natural law doctrine of sovereign immunity existed in 
the colonies prior to the Constitution.  Upon examining the colonial charters, Justice Souter 
noted that none of the colonies enjoyed sovereign immunity, “that being a privilege understood 
in English law to be reserved for the Crown alone” (p. 764).  He further stated, “Several colonial 
charters, including those of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Georgia, expressly 
specified that the corporate body established thereunder could sue and be sued” (p. 764).  Justice 
Souter quoted Justice Joseph Story’s observation that “antecedent to the Declaration of 
Independence, none of the colonies were, or pretended to be, sovereign states” (p. 764).   
 What were the views regarding sovereign immunity for the states immediately following 
the Declaration of Independence?  Justice Souter discovered a mix of opinions in the new state 
constitutions commencing with the Revolution. 
Connecticut and Rhode Island adopted their pre-existing charters as 
constitutions, without altering the provisions specifying their suability…  
Other new States understood themselves to be inheritors of the Crown’s 
common law sovereign immunity and so enacted statutes authorizing legal 
remedies against the State parallel to those available in England [e.g.,]… 
petition of right or the monstrands de droit in the Chancery or Exchequer.  
(pp. 769-770) 
 
Virginia, New York, and Pennsylvania adopted the latter versions of English law providing for 
redress against the state on the part of their own citizens (pp. 770-771).  What about the practice 
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of including declarations of inalienable rights in the new state constitutions?  Did such natural 
law declarations contain similar declarations regarding sovereign immunity?  Justice Souter 
announced the results of his examination of state constitutions: 
[D]espite a tendency among the state constitutions to announce and declare 
certain inalienable and natural rights of men and even of the collective 
people of a State…, no State declared that sovereign immunity was one of 
those rights.  To the extent that States were thought to possess immunity, it 
was perceived as a prerogative of the sovereign under common law.  And 
where sovereign immunity was recognized as barring suit, provisions for 
recovery from the State were in order, just as they had been at common law 
in England.  (p. 772) 
 
Perhaps there was widespread agreement regarding sovereign immunity at the state conventions 
called to ratify the new Constitution.  According to Justice Souter’s summary of his examination: 
[A] diversity of views with respect to sovereignty and sovereign immunity 
existed at the several state conventions, and this diversity stands in the way 
of the Court’s assumption that the founding generation understood sovereign 
immunity in the natural law sense as indefeasibly “fundamental” to 
statehood.  (p. 776, n. 16) 
 
As just one example of a founding father, constitutional framer, and Supreme Court Justice who 
expressed views contrary to the assumptions of the Rehnquist Court, Justice Souter cited James 
Wilson’s remarks at the Pennsylvania Convention: 
Upon what principle is it contended that the sovereign power resides in the 
state governments?  The honorable gentleman has said truly, that there can 
be no subordinate sovereignty.  Now, it there cannot, my position is, that the 
sovereignty resides in the people; they have not parted with it; they have 
only dispensed such portions of the power as were conceived necessary for 
the public welfare.  (p. 777) 
 
As another prominent example, this time from a founding father, Revolutionary War general, and 
constitutional framer located south of the later-to-be-named Mason-Dixon Line in a state whose 
name later came to be synonymous with state rights, Justice Souter cited the following: 
At the South Carolina Convention, General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney … 
took the position that the States never enjoyed individual and unfettered 
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sovereignty, because the Declaration of Independence was an act of the 
Union, not of the particular States.  In his view, the Declaration “sufficiently 
confutes the … [sic] doctrine of the individual sovereignty and 
independence of the several states…. [sic]  The separate independence and 
individual sovereignty of the several states were never thought of by the 
enlightened band of patriots who framed this Declaration … as … it was 
intended to impress this maxim on America, that our freedom and 
independence arose from our union, and that without it we could neither be 
free nor independent.”  Ibid.  (p. 777, n. 17) 
 
 Having searched the historical record for evidence supporting the Court’s claims that 
sovereign immunity was widely understood to be a fundamental aspect of statehood at the time 
of the nation’s founding and at the time the Constitution was framed and ratified, a conception 
that was based upon natural law, Justice Souter could find no evidence to support the Court’s 
position.  Having conducted a search that included an examination of colonial charters, of 
colonial thought about the colonies and sovereign immunity, of the state constitutions emerging 
after the Declaration of Independence, of the records of the Constitutional Convention, of the 
debates of the various state conventions called to ratify the Constitution, and having examined 
the remarks of all the Supreme Court justices who participated in Chisholm v. Georgia, Justice 
Souter concluded: 
It is clear enough that the Court has no historical predicate to argue for a 
fundamental or inherent theory of sovereign immunity as a limiting 
authority elsewhere conferred by the Constitution or as imported into the 
Constitution by the Tenth Amendment.  (p. 795) 
 
 What of the idea of sovereign immunity, grounded in natural law, being applicable in the 
sense that the five-member majority in Alden envisioned it?  Can a theory of sovereign immunity 
grounded in natural law be used to block a federal-question suit  in either a state or a federal 
court?  In a word, no!  So, even if they had been able to find historical evidence to support their 
claim (they couldn’t, remember), they still couldn’t have logically used such a claim to block a 
suit grounded in federal law.  Why?  The answer lies in the locus of sovereignty as traditionally 
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conceived prior to the American’s recognition that sovereignty resides in the people.  
Traditionally, sovereignty resided with the sovereign who was regarded as the source of law.  
Sovereign immunity then protected the source of law from being sued, as explained in common 
law terminology.  While the common law and natural law conceptions of sovereign immunity 
have a common subject matter and can be juxtaposed in many conversations, they each possess 
“distinct foundations” (p. 768).  Justice Souter pointed to the natural law foundation of sovereign 
immunity as discussed by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 
U.S. 349 (1907).  According to Justice Holmes: 
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or 
obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no 
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right 
depends.  Kawananakoa, supra, at 353.  (p. 796) 
 
Justice Souter noted that the authorities cited by Justice Holmes in his Kawananakoa opinion 
“stand in the line that today’s Court purports to follow,” one of whom was Hobbes.  Justice 
Souter included one of Justice Holmes’ citations of Hobbes’ discussion of the natural law 
doctrine of sovereign immunity, a portion of which follows: 
The sovereign of a Commonwealth, be it an assembly or one man, is not 
subject to the civil laws.  For having power to make and repeal laws, he 
may, when he pleaseth, free himself from that subjection by repealing those 
laws that trouble him….  Nor is it possible for any person to be bound to 
himself, because he that can bind can release; and therefore he that is bound 
to himself only is not bound.  Leviathan, ch. 26, § 2, p. 130.  (p. 797) 
 
As Justice Souter pointed out: 
“The “jurists who believe in natural law” … would not have faulted him for 
seeing the consequence of their position: if the sovereign is not the source of 
the law to be applied, sovereign immunity has no applicability.  Justice 
Holmes indeed explained that in the case of multiple sovereignties, the 
subordinate sovereign will not be immune where the source of the right of 
action is the sovereign that is dominant.  See Kawananakoa, 205 U.S., at 
353, 354 (District of Columbia not immune to private suit, because private 
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rights there are “created and controlled by Congress and not by a legislature 
of the District”).  (pp. 797-798) 
 
In other words, in Alden v. Maine where the law “proceeds from the national source, whose laws 
authorized by Article I are binding in state courts, sovereign immunity cannot be a defense” (p. 
798).  Since FLSA is a law enacted by Congress, under the natural law doctrine of sovereign 
immunity, only Congress can claim immunity from suit.  The State of Maine, not being the 
source of the law represented by FLSA, can not invoke sovereign immunity.  Thus the natural 
law doctrine of sovereign immunity has no applicability in such a case.  As Justice Souter 
observed: 
After Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority [holding that 
FLSA was a valid utilization of the Article I Commerce Clause power], 
Justice Holmes’s logically impeccable theory yields the clear conclusion 
that even in a system of “fundamental” state sovereignty immunity, a State 
would be subject to suit eo nominee [sic] in its own courts on a federal 
claim.  (p. 798) 
 
Given that the text of the Constitution as amended does not provide justification for the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity articulated by the Rehnquist Court, that Court must find the source and 
ensuing justification for the its use of that doctrine in either common law or in natural law.  
Justice Souter commented on the “trap of Holmes logic” which rendered the five-member 
majority’s judicial position untenable no matter which source they chose for the origin of the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity: 
There is no escape from the trap of Holmes’s logic save recourse to … the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity … of the common law.  But if the Court 
admits that the source of sovereign immunity is the common law, it must 
also admit that the common law doctrine could be changed by Congress 
acting under the Commerce Clause.  It is not fro me to say which way the 
Court should turn; but in either case it is clear that Alden’s suit should go 
forward.  (p. 798) 
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Regarding the Rehnquist Court’s misuse and misunderstanding of both the common law 
(Seminole Tribe) and natural law (Alden v. Maine) doctrines of sovereign immunity, which 
somehow, in some mysterious manner, co-opted the Tenth Amendment for purposes other than 
its plain language indicates, Justice Souter concluded: 
The sequence of the Court’s positions [Seminole Tribe and Alden] prompts a 
suspicion of error, and skepticism is confirmed by scrutiny of the Court’s 
efforts to justify its holding.  There is no evidence that the Tenth 
Amendment constitutionalized a concept of sovereign immunity as inherent 
in the notion of statehood, and not evidence that any concept of inherent 
sovereign immunity was understood historically to apply when the 
sovereign sued was not the font of the law.  (p. 761) 
 
 Regarding the Court’s argument that its decision had a “structural basis in the 
Constitution’s creation of a federal system,” that sovereignty immunity for states “inhere[d] in 
the system of federalism established by the Constitution,” that argument was “demonstrably 
mistaken” according to Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer (pp. 798, 798-799, 799).  
The American founders who framed the U.S. Constitution “split the atom of sovereignty” and 
established “two political capacities, one state and one federal,” thereby creating a government 
based on federalism (“our Nation’s own discovery”) which “owed its existence to the act of the 
whole people who created it” (U.S. Term Limits, Inc., v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838, 839) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Souter noted that the overall plan of “delegated sovereignty 
… between the two component governments of the federal system was clear, and was succinctly 
stated by Chief Justice Marshall” (p. 800).  According to Chief Justice Marshall’s description of 
federalism: 
In America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between the government 
of the Union, and those of the States.  They are each sovereign, with respect 
to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the 
objects committed to the other.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 410 
(1819).  (p. 800) 
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It was precisely the descriptions of federalism by Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Kennedy 
that revealed “the flaw in the Court’s appeal to federalism,” according to Justice Souter (p. 800).  
He continued: 
The State of The State of Maine is not sovereign with respect to the national 
objectives of the FLSA.  It is not the authority that promulgated the FLSA, 
on which the right of action in this case depends.  That authority is the 
United States acting through the Congress, whose legislative power under 
Article I of the Constitution to extend FLSA coverage to state employees 
has already been decided, see Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, supra, and is not contested here.  (p. 800) 
 
Justice Souter continued to apply the scheme of federalism contained in the plain language of the 
U.S. Constitution to the facts of Alden v. Maine.   
Maine has created state courts of general jurisdiction; once it has done so, 
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2, which requires 
state courts to enforce federal law and state-court judges to be bound by it, 
requires the Maine courts to entertain this federal cause of action.  (p. 801) 
 
Justice Souter concluded:  “The Court’s insistence that the federal structure bars Congress from 
making States susceptible to suit in their own courts is, then, plain mistake” (p. 801).  Finally, in 
a note to the statement just cited, Justice Souter turned the Court’s argument for federal structure 
against itself.  Addressing the Rehnquist Court’s expressed concern that without its version of 
sovereign immunity, the federal government would “ultimately … commandeer the entire 
political machinery of the State against its will and at the behest of individuals,” Justice Souter 
drew the Rehnquist Court’s attention to a fundamental principle of America’s scheme of 
government when he aptly pointed out: 
But this is to forget that the doctrine of separation of powers prevails in our 
Republic.  When the state judiciary enforces federal law against state 
officials, as the Supremacy Clause requires it to do, it is not turning against 
the State’s executive any more than we turn against the Federal Executive 
when we apply federal law to the United States: it is simply upholding the 
rule of law.  There is no “commandeering” of the State’s resources where 
   
   
1012
the State is asked to do no more than enforce federal law.  (Emphasis added) 
(p. 801, n. 34) 
 
 Finally, there is the matter of the various stratagems and techniques employed by the 
Rehnquist Court in Alden v. Maine to divert attention away from the critical matters at hand and 
to focus attention elsewhere through the use of various, at best, argumentative tricks, at worst, 
propaganda techniques, much in the same fashion as gamblers operated the proverbial shell game 
in the saloons and gambling halls of America’s nineteenth-century river boats and western 
frontier towns.  Deftly moving and forever shielding the shell which covers the pea, the 
Rehnquist Court has substituted specious rhetoric for sound judicial reasoning and has mounted 
attacks to divert attention from its own lack of textually-based argument and from the absence of 
sound constitutional analysis in its own argument.  Just a few examples should suffice to 
demonstrate the unsoundness of the Rehnquist Court’s approach to jurisprudence.  An astute and 
critical reader will be able to locate more that what is discussed in the material which concludes 
the analysis of Alden v. Maine. 
 First, the Rehnquist Court committed a type of red herring fallacy when it tried to counter 
the dissent’s references to sovereign immunity as deriving from either the common law or from 
natural law (See Appendix M for discussion of various propaganda techniques).  After falsely 
characterizing the argument of sovereign immunity’s origins in either common law or natural 
law as a “false dichotomy” (the false characterization constituting an “unsupported claim”), the 
majority opinion drew the red herring across the trail of argument in a manner that also utilized 
the propaganda technique of suppressed evidence as follows: 
The text and the structure of the Constitution protect various rights and 
principles.  Many of these, such as the right to trial by jury and the 
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, derive from the common 
law.  The common-law lineage of these rights does not mean they are 
defeasible by statute or remain mere common-law rights, however.  They 
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are, rather, constitutional rights, and form the fundamental law of the land.  
(p. 733) 
 
The red herring is the argument that the rights listed, which had their origin in the common law, 
are now constitutional rights in much the same manner that the Court is trying to make sovereign 
immunity a constitutional right.  This argument has no relevance to the issue of sovereign 
immunity being derived either from the common law or the natural law.  The suppressed 
evidence lies in the fact that although the right to trial by jury has a common law origin, its 
constitutional stature derives not from any structure of the Constitution, but from being one of 
the few common-law rights specifically addressed in the Constitution.  Article III, § 2, cl. 3 
specifically states: 
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; 
and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have 
been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be 
at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.  (U.S. 
Constitution, Article III, § 2, cl. 3) 
 
The fact of trial-by-jury’s origin in common law nor from any constitutional structure, but from 
the explicit text of the Constitution.  Likewise, the same holds true for the prohibitions against 
unreasonable searches and seizure.  Although possessing an origin in common law, the explicit 
text of the Constitution, not the document’s structure, provides the grounding for its status as a 
constitutional right.  As stated in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution as part of the Bill of 
Rights adopted subsequent to the Constitution’s ratification: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.  (U.S. Constitution, Amendment IV) 
 
Where one expects to find sound constitutional analysis and judicial reasoning, one instead 
encounters a series of propaganda techniques employed in dizzying fashion in the space of a few 
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sentences.  If by propaganda, one refers to “a message presentation aimed at presenting an 
agenda that fails to paint a complete picture,” the Court’s opinion in Alden v. Maine contains 
propaganda (See Appendix M, SourceWatch).  The agenda is the Court’s efforts to 
constitutionalized the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  The complete picture the Rehnquist 
Court wishes to distract attention from include the lack of a textual basis for its argument, the 
origins of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in either the common law or natural law, the views 
of original intent expressed by those closest to the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, the full 
historical record of American colonists’ and the nation’s Founders’ understanding of sovereign 
immunity, and the basic incompatibility between the doctrine of sovereign immunity and a 
constitutional republic whereby sovereignty rests with the people. 
 Second, the Rehnquist Court utilized a false premise from which it concluded that 
sovereign immunity should have immutable constitutional status.  The false premise consisted of 
the following: 
The generation that designed and adopted our federal system considered 
immunity from private suits central to sovereign dignity….  Although the 
American people had rejected other aspects of English political theory, the 
doctrine that a sovereign could not be sued without its consent was universal 
in the States when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.  (pp. 715-716) 
 
Justice Souter summarized the evidence demonstrating the falseness of the premise upon which 
the Rehnquist Court based its holding.  First, Justice Souter introduced the Court’s claim and 
described the scope of his investigation into the evidence, in this case, the lack of evidence to 
support the Court’s premise, thus demonstrating its falseness: 
There is almost no evidence that the generation of the Framers thought 
sovereign immunity was fundamental in the sense of being unalterable.  
Whether one looks at the period before the framing [of the Constitution], to 
the ratification controversies, or to the early republican era [following the 
framing and ratification of the Constitution], the evidence is the same.  (p. 
764) 
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Next, Justice Souter reviewed the findings of his investigation into the historical evidence: 
Some Framers thought sovereign immunity was an obsolete royal 
prerogative inapplicable in a republic; some thought sovereign immunity 
was a common law power defeasible, like other common law rights, by 
statute; and perhaps a few thought, in keeping with a natural law view 
distinct from the common law conception, that immunity was inherent in a 
sovereign because the body that made a law could not logically be bound by 
it.  (p. 764) 
 
And then, Justice Souter concluded, “Natural law thinking on the part of a doubtful few will not, 
however, support the Court’s position” (p. 764). 
 Third, the Court in a modified ad hominem attack, misrepresented the evidence and made 
a false claim.  According to the Rehnquist Court’s opinion: 
In an apparent attempt to disparage a conclusion with which it disagrees, the 
dissent attributes our reasoning to natural law.  We seek to discover, 
however, only what the Framers and those who ratified the Constitution 
sought to accomplish when they created a federal system.  We appeal to no 
higher authority than the Charter which they wrote and adopted.  (p. 758) 
 
The ad hominem attack has the virtue of also acting as a red herring, drawing attention from the 
fact that the Court, not able to base its position on the text of the Constitution, was discussing 
sovereign immunity either in terms of its common law or its natural law grounding, an activity 
with consequences that would destroy the Court’s position if recognized.  The misrepresentation 
of evidence lies in the second sentence cited above.  The Court was not seeking to discover what 
the Framers thought.  The Rehnquist Court only wished to discover thought which supported its 
position and to disregard all thought countering said position (see previous discussion).  The 
false claim occurs in the final sentence of the above quotation.  No textual basis existed in the 
“Charter” to support the Rehnquist Court’s position; thereby rendering moot the assertion 
regarding an “appeal to no higher authority than the Charter” (p. 758).  Finally, Justice Souter 
countered the Court’s characterization of the dissent’s purpose.  As stated by Justice Souter: 
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The Court says that to call its approach “natural law” is “an apparent attempt 
to disparage,” ante, at 758.  My object, however, is not to call names but to 
show that the majority is wrong, and in doing that it is illuminating to 
explain the conceptual tradition on which today’s majority draws, one that 
can be traced to the Court’s opinion from its origins in Roman sources.  (p. 
767, n. 6) 
 
 Fourth, the Rehnquist Court misconstrued the historical record by making a false 
assertion that, in turn,  was used to make an unsupported claim.  This occurred in the context of 
examining the “historical record” to determine “the founding generation’s intent” regarding 
sovereign immunity (p. 741).  The attorneys for Alden et al. had argued that the Founder’s were 
silent on the subject, and thus provided “no instruction” regarding the matter (p. 741).  The 
Rehnquist Court’s response follows:  
We believe, however, that the Founders’ silence is best explained by the 
simple fact that no one, not even the Constitution’s most ardent opponents, 
suggested the document might strip the States of the immunity.  In light of 
the overriding concern regarding the States’ war-time debts, together with 
the well-known creativity, foresight, and vivid imagination of the 
Constitution’s opponents, the silence is most instructive.  It suggests the 
sovereign’s right to assert immunity from suit in its own courts was a 
principle so well established that no one conceived it would be altered by 
the new Constitution.  (p. 741) 
 
As will be shown by noting Justice Souter’s response, the Rehnquist Court misconstrued the 
historical record by suppressing evidence countering its assertion.  In addition, Justice Souter 
demonstrated the logical fallacy regarding its assertion of an unsupported claim, that being the 
Court’s interpretation of the so-called “silence” of the Founders.  First, Justice Souter countered 
the Court’s misinterpretation of the historical record and its false assertion regarding any thought 
being given to the idea that a States’ immunity could be stripped by drawing the Court’s 
attention to the remarks of James Wilson.  Justice Souter observed, “In fact, a stalwart supporter 
of the Constitution, James Wilson, laid the groundwork for just such a view at the Pennsylvania 
Convention, see infra, at 777-778” (p. 772, n. 12).  As Justice Souter noted: 
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Wilson laid out his view that sovereignty was in fact not located in the 
States at all:  “Upon what principle is it contended that the sovereign power 
resides in the state governments?  The honorable gentleman has said truly, 
that there can be no subordinate sovereignty.  Now, if there cannot, my 
position is, that the sovereignty resides in the people; they have not parted 
with it; they have only dispensed such portions of the power as were 
conceived necessary for the public welfare.”  Id.[2 Elliot’s Debates], at 443.  
(p. 777) 
 
Justice Souter continued to refute the Court’s distorted historical record analysis and the 
resulting false assertion that no one of the Framers had contemplated the absence of state 
immunity from suit.  According to Justice Souter’s analysis of James Wilson’s remarks that were 
made at the Pennsylvania Convention to ratify the Constitution: 
While this statement [the preceding remarks made by Wilson, cited 
immediately preceding] did not specifically address sovereign immunity, it 
expressed the major premise of what would later become Justice Wilson’s 
position in Chisholm:  that because the people, and not the States, are 
sovereign, sovereign immunity has no applicability to the States.  (pp. 777-
778) 
 
Justice Souter next focused attention upon the Court’s unsupported claim regarding the so-called 
silence of the Framer’s regarding sovereign immunity.  Providing a different interpretation to the 
issue of “silence,” Justice Souter observed: 
For the most part, it is true, the surviving records of the ratifying 
conventions do not suggest that much thought was given to the issue of suit 
against States in their own courts.  But this silence does not tell us that the 
Framers’ generation thought the prerogative so well settled as to be an 
inherent right of States, and not a common law creation.  It says only that at 
the conventions, the issue was not on the participants’ minds because the 
nature of sovereignty was not always explicitly addressed.  (p. 772, n. 12) 
 
 Fifth, the Rehnquist Court mischaracterized parts of James Wilson’s remarks so as to 
diminish his importance in the eyes of the unwary reader, the end result being part of an ad 
hominem attack aimed to marginalize and discredit.  First, it should be noted, it would be most 
difficult to identify anyone who played a greater role in the nation’s founding.  James Wilson 
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was a signer of the Declaration of Independence, a member of the Second Continental Congress, 
a delegate to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia which framed the Constitution of the 
United States, a delegate to the Pennsylvania Convention to ratify the Constitution, and finally, a 
Supreme Court justice. These experiences created a select peer group for James Wilson.  While 
his activities thus present an impressive resume, what of the quality of his participation in those 
activities.  At the Constitutional Convention, Wilson “played a part second only to James 
Madison’s” (Hall, 1992, p. 933).  Wilson also served as the leader of the ratification campaign in 
Pennsylvania (Hall, 1992, p. 933).  However, in order to preserve its fabricated jurisprudence, 
the Rehnquist Court could not acknowledge James Wilson without being forced to abandon its 
constructed position.  Hence, its disparagement of Wilson.  According to the Rehnquist Court, 
“Wilson and Pinkney expressed a radical nationalist vision of the constitutional design that not 
only deviated from the views that prevailed at the time, but despite the dissent’s apparent 
embrace of the position, remains startling even today” (p. 725).   In response, Justice Souter 
pointed to the remark that the Court construed as “radical” (p. 725).  Wilson’s remark was made 
at the Pennsylvania Convention to ratify the Constitution and expressed “his hostility to any idea 
of state sovereign immunity” (p. 776).  As described by Justice Souter, “For Wilson, ‘[t]he [sic] 
answer [was] [sic] plain and easy: the government of each state ought to be subordinate to the 
government of the United States” (p. 776).  Next, Justice Souter, in the manner of a professor 
correcting a student’s mistaken reasoning, drew attention to the faulty characterization on the 
part of the Rehnquist Court: 
The Court says this statement of Wilson’s is “startling even today,” ante, at 
725, but it is hard to see what is so startling, then or now, about the 
proposition that, since federal law may bind state governments, the state 
governments are in this sense subordinate to the national.  (p. 776, n. 16) 
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Concluding, Justice Souter noted the incongruity between the Court’s incredulity and the original 
purpose for the Constitutional Convention that resulted in the current Constitution’s inclusion of 
the Supremacy Clause: 
The Court seems to have forgotten that one of the main reasons a 
Constitutional Convention was necessary at all was that under the Articles 
of confederation Congress lacked the effective capacity to bind the States.  
The Court speaks as if the Supremacy Clause did not exist or McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), had never been decided.  (p. 776, n. 16) 
 
At the same time, Justice Souter took the opportunity to call particular attention to the Court’s 
other attempts to discredit Wilson.  As noted by Justice Souter: 
Finally, the Court calls Wilson’s view “a radical nationalist vision of the 
constitutional design,” ibid., apparently in an attempt to discount it.  But 
while Wilson’s view of sovereignty was indeed radical in its deviation from 
older conceptions, this hardly distanced him from the American mainstream, 
and in October 1787, Washington himself called Wilson “as able, candid, & 
honest a member as any in Convention,” 5 Papers of George Washington: 
Confederation Series 379 (W. Abbot & D. Twohig eds. 1997).  (Emphasis 
added) (p. 776-n. 16) 
 
Wilson’s remarks, while radical in terms of their difference from previous political theory, were 
not different from the American mainstream of thought that “split the atom of sovereignty” and 
created a system of federalism that was “unprecedented in form and design” (U.S. Term Limits, 
Inc., v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995), Kennedy, J., concurring).  Wilson’s remarks, instead 
of being heeded by the Court, represented a portion of the historical record that the Rehnquist 
Court either ignored or disparaged because it directly contradicted the Court’s desires. 
 Sixth, the Rehnquist Court, situated near the close of the twentieth century, had the cheek 
to accuse the Justices of the early republic, situated within four years of the Constitution’s 
ratification and within six years of its framing, of failing to fully understand sovereign immunity.  
And just who were the Supreme Court justices the Rehnquist Court was accusing of failure?  
Two (John Jay & James Wilson) served in the Second Continental Congress that authorized the 
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Declaration of Independence.  One (James Wilson) signed the Declaration of Independence. Two 
(John Blair, Jr. & James Wilson) participated in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 in 
Philadelphia.  Three (John Blair, Jr., William Cushing, & James Wilson) played significant roles 
in their state conventions to ratify the Constitution (in Virginia, Massachusetts, & Pennsylvania, 
respectively).  One (John Jay) authored three of the essays contained in the Federalist which 
played an important role in the campaign to ratify the newly framed Constitution.  One (Jay) 
served as the nation’s first Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.  One (William 
Cushing) served as a delegate to the state convention which drafted the Massachusetts 
Constitution of 1780, the country’s first political document that combined the doctrine of 
separation of powers with the doctrine of judicial review to form an institutional check on abuses 
of sovereignty and which declared that the citizens of Massachusetts would be governed by “a 
government of laws, not of men” in answer to Aristotle’s ancient question (Massachusetts 
Constitution of 1780, Art. XXX).   
 To get back to the statement that such men failed to understand sovereign immunity as it 
was understood in their own time – labeling such an act by the Rehnquist Court to be a false 
premise seems to somewhat understate the situation by ignoring either the unmitigated gall or the 
desperate need to legitimize an unsound position that prompted such an utterance by the 
Rehnquist Court in Alden v. Maine.  According to the Rehnquist Court’s majority opinion, “First, 
despite the opinion of Justice Iredell, the majority failed to address either the practice or the 
understanding [of sovereign immunity] that prevailed in the States at the time the Constitution 
was adopted” (Emphasis added) (p. 721).  Rather, as Justices Brennan, Stevens, Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer have noted (not to mention a host of historians and legal scholars who 
have extensively researched and have written authoritative accounts of the historical record in 
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question), the Rehnquist Court distorted the historical record with such a statement – it chose the 
wrong verb to characterize the justices’ decisions in Chisholm.  It was not that the justices 
hearing Chisholm “failed to address the practice or the understanding” regarding sovereign 
immunity, it was that they chose not to, and with good reason, as an unbiased examination of the 
historical record shows (p. 721). 
 Seventh, the Rehnquist Court uniquely combines logical fallacy and an unwarranted 
claim in a futile attempt to support their conclusion in Alden v. Maine.  The unwarranted claim, 
noted by Justice Souter, involved a logical fallacy based upon sovereign immunity and the Tenth 
Amendment.121  First, the logical fallacy, whose first three propositions are presented below, 
followed by the mistaken conclusion which gives rise to the logical fallacy: 
A. States were sovereign entities prior to the Constitution (itself, a questionable assertion 
capable of refutation). 
B. Sovereign entities, by virtue of their sovereignty, enjoy sovereign immunity. 
C. The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution reserved certain sovereign powers to the 
states. 
D. Ergo, the Tenth Amendment reflects a basic understanding that the states have a 
constitutionally-based sovereign immunity from all lawsuits (except those generated 
by the specific powers generated by Amendment XIV, § 5). 
Of course, as has already been shown, Justice Souter demolished the idea that anyone viewed the 
Tenth Amendment in such a fashion.  However, that viewpoint of the Rehnquist Court derived 
from the logical fallacy demonstrated above.  Furthermore, the Rehnquist Court used that logical 
fallacy to make its unwarranted claim, that the Framers understood the Tenth Amendment in 
such a misconstrued fashion.  Following Justice Souter’s examination of the record, most 
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particularly, the views of ALL the justices in Chisholm v. Georgia, including that of Justice 
Iredell who dissented and upon whom the Rehnquist Court placed great reliance, Justice Souter 
concluded that “[n]ot a single Justice suggested that sovereign immunity was an inherent and 
indefeasible right of statehood” and further noted that not even the legal counsel for Georgia or 
Justice Iredell “conceived the possibility that the new Tenth Amendment produced the equivalent 
of such a doctrine” (p. 789).  Although not characterizing the Court’s view as an unwarranted 
claim, in actual fact it was, as Justice Souter demonstrates: 
This dearth of support makes it very implausible for today’s Court to argue 
that a substantial (let alone a dominant) body of thought at the time of the 
framing understood sovereign immunity to be an inherent right of statehood, 
adopted or confirmed by the Tenth Amendment.  (p. 789) 
 
To make matters worse (from the Rehnquist Court’s viewpoint), Justice Souter pointed to two 
early Court cases whereby states “voluntarily subjected themselves to suit in the Supreme Court 
around the time of Chisholm” (p. 789, n. 25) (See Appendix Y for further discussion of these two 
cases named below).  After noting the source of his information (“See Marcus & Wexler, Suits 
Against States: diversity of Opinion in the 1790s, 1993 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 73, 74-78” [p. 789, n. 
25]), Justice Souter continued to demolish the Rehnquist Court’s assertion regarding thought 
about sovereign immunity in the early republic by pointing out the following: 
At the Court’s February Term, 1791, before Chisholm, Maryland entered a 
plea (probably as to the merits in Van Staphorst v. Maryland, see 1993 J. 
Sup. Ct. Hist., at 74, a suit brought by a foreign citizen for debts owed by 
the State, but then settled the suit to avoid the establishment of an adverse 
precedent on immunity, see id., at 75.  In Oswald v. New York, an action that 
commenced before Chisholm but that was continued after it, New York 
initially objected to jurisdiction, see 1993 J. Sup. Ct. Hist., at 77, but the suit 
was tried to a jury in the Supreme Court, and after New York lost, it paid the 
full jury verdict out of the State’s treasury, id., at 78.  (p. 789, n. 25) 
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Of course, if one still needs more evidence beyond that provided by Justice Souter in his 
dissenting opinion as joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, such a reader should feel 
free to consult Appendix Y of this paper. 
 Concurring/dissenting opinions. 
 Justice Souter authored a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justice Stevens, by Justice 
Ginsburg, and by Justice Breyer.  This dissent was discussed somewhat thoroughly in the 
previous section of this case, Alden v. Maine. 
 Summary of Salient Points 
 To overcome the embarrassing fact that no textual basis exists in the U.S. Constitution to 
support the Court’s current position vis á vis the Eleventh Amendment, the Court has needed to 
find some historical evidence to support its position, an act that turned out to be futile.  The 
Rehnquist Court’s search for a historical record significantly misread and distorted the record, 
particularly when compared with the work of both historians and legal scholars.  Besides 
misreading the record, the Rehnquist Court ignored the testimony of those closest to the events, 
e.g., the five Supreme Court justices authoring opinions in Chisholm and the Marshall Court’s 
statements regarding original understandings and intent of the Eleventh Amendment, statements 
uttered in Cohens v. Virginia (1821) and in Osborn v. Bank of United States (1824).  If two 
people’s views should have been given priority (given their participation in the Revolutionary 
War, the Constitutional Convention, and their state’s convention to ratify the Constitution), it 
should have been James Wilson of Pennsylvania and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South 
Carolina. 
 The Rehnquist Court’s attempt in Seminole Tribe to incorporate the common law doctrine 
of sovereign immunity into the Eleventh Amendment was either based on ignorance or upon 
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deceit.  The Rehnquist Court’s subsequent attempt to incorporate the natural law doctrine of 
sovereign immunity ignored the fact that it was a natural law doctrine they were trying to 
incorporate, again, either through ignorance or deceit.  Such a position, it must have been hoped 
by the Court, would allow them to escape the horns of a dilemma – on the one hand, trapped by 
the logic of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes discussion of natural law under which the State of 
Maine was unable to assert a claim of sovereign immunity; on the other hand, trapped by the 
implications of common law being amenable to change by congressional action as represented 
by both the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act.  However, even if 
the five-member majority of the Rehnquist Court could have found historical evidence to support 
their contention (again, it couldn’t without distorting and misconstruing the record it selected 
while ignoring significant portions of the historical record that contradicted its position), the 
Rehnquist Court could not have overcome the philosophic grounding in either the common law 
or natural law, a grounding which rendered their own position groundless and thus without merit. 
 At some future point in time, the Supreme Court will once again apply sound principles 
of constitutional analyses to its Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.  When the Court does 
examine the historical record in an unbiased fashion without having a pre-determined outcome in 
mind, when the Court does ground its interpretation in the text of the Constitution, when the 
Court does realize the incongruity between the concept of sovereign immunity and the original 
American contribution to political thought whereby sovereignty was located in the people of the 
United States, when the Court does demonstrate its understanding of the improper grounding of 
the Hans decision along with subsequent Rehnquist Court decisions as simple illogical 
reiterations of a mistaken iteration, at that point, the Court will need look no further for previous, 
properly construed judicial analyses than the dissenting opinions of Justice Brennan in 
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Atascadero and Green v. Mansour, of Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion in Union Gas and 
dissenting opinion in Seminole Tribe, and of Justice Souter’s dissenting opinions in Seminole 
Tribe and Alden v. Maine.   
 Interestingly, Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer expressed hopes that a 
future Court would find itself abandoning the indefensible positions taken by the Rehnquist 
Court.  Drawing a comparison between the Rehnquist Court and the Lochner Court at the 
beginning of the century in the dissenting opinion of Alden v. Maine, Justice Souter (the author 
of the dissenting opinion which was joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer) observed: 
The resemblance of today’s state sovereign immunity to the Lochner era’s 
industrial due process is striking.  The Court began this century by imputing 
immutable constitutional status to a conception of economic self-reliance 
that was never true to industrial life and grew increasingly fictional with the 
years, and the Court has chosen to close the century by conferring like status 
on a conception of state sovereign immunity that is true neither to history 
nor to the structure of the Constitution.  I expect the Court’s late essay into 
immunity doctrine will prove the equal of its earlier experiment in laissez-
faire, the one being as unrealistic as the other, as indefensible, and probably 
as fleeting.  (527 U.S. 706, 814) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.) 
 
A distinguished professor of law and renowned legal scholar at one of the nation’s most 
prestigious law schools noted that the modern Court’s approach to the Eleventh Amendment was 
most generally represented by the five-member majority in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.  
He observed: 
Four justices have sharply dissented from this approach.  See ibid., 76-100 
(Stevens, J., dissenting), 100-85 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg 
and Breyer, JJ.).  Most legal scholars have tended to side with the dissenters.  
A great deal of this scholarship (including my own) is analyzed and 
synthesized in Justice Souter’s comprehensive dissent.  (Amar, 2005, p. 336, 
n. 31, at p. 598) 
 
Regarding the same Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence discussed in the quotation above, 
Professor Akhil Reed Amar pointed out that the Rehnquist Court stretched the words of the 
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Eleventh Amendment “beyond all recognition” in order to arrive at “fact patterns far beyond the 
amendment’s text” (Amar, 2005, p. 336).  He continued: 
Instead of respecting the Constitution’s general theme of popular 
sovereignty, today’s Court has exalted governmental sovereignty and in fact 
made it harder for twenty-first-century Americans to achieve redress [for 
governmental wrongs] than it ever was in eighteenth-century England.  
Instead of honoring the celebrated common-law maxim that “for every right, 
there should be a remedy,” the modern Court seems intent on insisting that 
for many a right there must be no remedy.  Sovereignty means never having 
to say you’re sorry.  (Emphasis in original) (Amar, 2005, p. 336) 
 
The Court’s fabrication of a constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity has no modern-day 
parallel unless one examines the governments of such totalitarian regimes as Nazi Germany, 
Stalinist Russia, and Maoist China.  Such a comparison reveals how un-American the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity is and how ill-suited it is to the democracy of a constitutional republic 
wherein sovereignty resides in the people.  In his dissenting opinion in Alden v. Maine, joined by 
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, Justice Souter drew attention to the incompatibility 
between a nation whose sovereignty resides in the people and the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity.  Following a discussion of the idea of sovereign immunity as flowing from a notion of 
“royal dignity” as discussed by Blackstone (the noted English authority on the common law), 
Justice Souter noted: 
It would be hard to imagine anything more inimical to the republican 
conception, which rests on the understanding of its citizens precisely that the 
government is not above them, but of them, its actions being governed by 
law just like their own.  (Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 802) (Souter, J., 
dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.) 
 
However, the present ill-suited state of affairs will continue until new justices are appointed to 
the Court who will see the wisdom of basing Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence on a soundly 
solid legal foundation similar to that constructed by the four dissenting justices of Seminole Tribe 
and Alden v. Maine, dissents which, in turn, built upon previous dissents authored by Justice 
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Brennan in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon and Green v. Mansour as well as the majority 
opinion of Justice Brennan and the companion concurring opinion of Justice Stevens in 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company. 
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Chapter 9 
Findings & Conclusions of the Research, 
Recommendations for Further Research, 
And Concluding Thoughts 
Introduction 
 This dissertation is premised on the assumption that a review of the case law relating to 
federalism would yield an answer to the primary research question centered on constitutional 
federalism and the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB).  Components of federalism emerged from 
a review of the literature that centered thinking on four areas of investigation: the Guarantee 
Clause, the Tenth Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Deeper probing in the literature review revealed cases that constituted a major portion of the case 
law for each area of investigation.  These cases were subsequently examined in order to yield 
answers to the primary question. The research framework utilized in examining the case law of 
federalism flowed from the structure of legal analysis.  The particular framework used in this 
study was developed by triangulating the analyses of: 1)  the structure of law review articles; 2) 
the structure of dissertations focused on addressing legal questions; and 3) recommendations by 
law professors.  This was subsequently checked by examining recommendations by legal 
scholars in works about conducting legal research. 
 Secondary questions centered on investigating whether or not NCLB was grounded in 
systems thinking (as articulated by Senge) and in adaptive work (Heifetz).  An additional 
research question centered on federalism as a public policy approach.  Systems thinking as 
articulated by Senge contains the following components: mental model, personal mastery, shared 
vision, and team learning.  Systems thinking attempts to identify all of the components impacting 
a particular system and then address those components exhibiting a negative impact on the 
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system..  Without a systems view, one focuses attention on symptoms rather than identifying and 
addressing underlying problems.  According to Heifetz, adaptive work is the work required “to 
diminish the gap between the values people stand for [leaving no child behind] and the reality 
they face [achievement gaps in student learning]” (Heifetz, 1994, p. 22).  Engaging in adaptive 
work requires identifying the beliefs and values that need to be modified so they no longer 
prevent or inhibit constructive work to diminish gaps between ideals and current realities. 
Federalism as a public policy approach was defined as a federal-state partnership that is forged in 
order to solve a major problem in America in a manner that: 
• involves meaningful input at both the state and the federal levels; 
• promotes citizen involvement at the local level; and that  
• engages in experimental work to determine the most effective means by which a 
complex problem can best be solved. 
 In addition, a qualitative study was conducted that focused on the views of the two state 
leaders of public education in hopes of shedding light on the three research questions.  Dave 
Christensen of Nebraska and Ted Stilwill of Iowa held their positions as public education leaders 
of their respective states during a period of time that reached from before NCLB was conceived 
to its legislative enactment until after it was to have been implemented in their state systems of 
public education.  Their views are to be found in Chapter Two of this study. 
 Finally, this study attempted to provide a full historical context for each of the 
components of constitutional federalism, i.e., the Guarantee Clause, as well as the Tenth, 
Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.  An intentional action borne of 
previous engagement in research and study, the discussion of historical context flows from a 
conviction that one can not fully understand a subject or occurrence without understanding the 
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context in which it occurred or was developed.  In other words, text without context provides a 
poor basis for the full comprehension and understanding required for analysis and application in 
that interesting intersection of legal facts and principles, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, 
the subject matter of life.  Not understanding context forecloses a complete conception of 
possible uses today as well as inhibits a full comprehension of the impact of past developments 
on today’s society.  More importantly, not understanding context forecloses a full understanding 
of why something is not applicable or useful for addressing specific situations and developments 
in the Twenty-first Century.  For example, comprehending the development of the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, combined with a full understanding of America’s unique contribution of 
political theory in creating a federalism wherein sovereignty resides in the people, synergize to 
form the key for future Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.  When one adds to the preceding an 
understanding of America’s continuing answer to a question first posed by Aristotle centuries 
ago, which in turn constitutes an obligation to continue answering Aristotle’s question in a vein 
similar to the past, one fully appreciates the current state of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.  
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence provides only one example illustrating the importance of 
historical context.  Many readers have doubtless discovered more.  It is hoped that the various 
historical contexts provided in this research acted to enhance the reader’s full understanding of 
the components of constitutional federalism and their bearing on current issues. 
Research Questions 
 Four research questions were posed for the purpose of guiding the investigation into 
possible intersections between federalism and the No Child Left Behind Act.  The questions are 
posed separately below.  The answers to the research questions will be provided in the findings 
presented subsequent to the questions. 
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 Primary research question. 
 Do portions of the No Child Left Behind Act that represent federal action violate any of 
the constitutional provisions governing federalism? 
 Secondary research questions. 
 Does NCLB take a systems approach to ensuring that no child gets left behind in 
America when viewed through the lens of Senge’s systems perspective? 
 Given the goal of NCLB and the incongruence between the goal of ensuring that no 
children are left behind and the current reality in America whereby achievement gaps exist 
between classes of students grouped by race and socioeconomic status, does NCLB utilize 
adaptive work as articulated by Heifetz in order to close the gap between America’s current 
reality and the goal of NCLB? 
 Does NCLB represent a public policy approach based upon federalism in which the states 
are viewed as co-partners and as laboratories of experimentation engaged in finding solutions to 
a complex problem? 
Findings and Conclusions Derived From the Research 
 Findings & conclusions related to the primary research question. 
 Finding no. 1. 
 NCLB is an exercise of congressional conditional spending derived from Article I, § 8. 
 Discussion. 
 Of all the cases examined in the Tenth Amendment chapter, NCLB most closely 
resembles the cases examined related to conditional spending whereby Congress conditions the 
state use of federal money on state acceptance of the conditions contained within the federal 
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legislation.  The Court spelled out the tests to be applied to conditional spending legislation for 
determination of constitutionality in South Dakota v. Dole. 
 Conclusion. 
 As such, the best constitutional challenge could be one based on the nature of the 
legislation being challenged.  Examination should be made of Tenth Amendment case law that is 
focused on the conflict between the Tenth Amendment and the Spending Clause of the 
Constitution.  Particular attention should be given to those cases utilizing Tenth Amendment 
arguments centered on the judicially-constructed tests that must be employed for legislation to 
pass constitutional muster. 
 Finding no. 2. 
 NCLB arguably fails one or more of the conditional spending tests articulated in South 
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 Discussion. 
 The Relevant Relationship Requirement presents the most obvious choice of the 
conditional spending tests infringed by NCLB.  The vital question here centers on the 
relationship of the conditions to the purpose of funding allocations.  Federal aid to education is 
supportive.  Specifically, Title I focuses on providing extra instruction to students who are 
behind their peers in reading and/or math.  Although some limited funding has been made 
available to students of middle and high school age, the majority of funding has targeted students 
in the elementary grades.  That is the purpose.  The conditions go far beyond a remediation 
purpose, however.  Conditions to be met in order to receive Title I funds now include meeting 
targets for middle and high school student proficiencies in reading, math, and science; requiring 
states to hold public schools accountable for meeting student achievement proficiency targets at 
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the elementary, middle school, and high school levels; requiring every state to administer the 
National Assessment of Educational Progress to a sample of students; requiring the states to 
oversee a system of escalating sanctions to schools not deemed to be performing well by the 
federal government; and requiring states to abandon their own system of attendance requirements 
in favor of the federal law creating choice for students in schools not deemed to be performing 
well by the federal government.  These requirements have no relationship to the remedial needs 
of elementary students in reading and math.  The line between educational assistance and 
educational control has been crossed by Congress.   
 The second conditional spending test to be examined centers on the Constitutional Bar 
Requirement.  A constitutional bar might consist of a combination of arguments based on both 
the Guarantee Clause and the Tenth Amendment.  The challenge to NCLB would not be made on 
the basis of either the Guarantee Clause or the Tenth Amendment.  Either used by itself would be 
defeated, in this writer’s opinion, by arguments based on previous successful defenses of 
conditional spending challenges.  Instead the challenge is based on an argument that the 
combination of the two constitutional provisions acts to form a bar that must be passed in order 
for conditional spending to be constitutional.  Arguably the threshold for challenges based on 
violations of a constitutional bar as part of conditional spending is lower than the threshold for a 
bar based solely on the Guarantee Clause or the Tenth Amendment that don’t implicate the 
conditional spending arguments.  Such an argument is implied by the Court’s inclusion of a 
constitutional bar requirement as one of the tests for conditional spending.  Neither the 
Guarantee Clause nor the Tenth Amendment, in and of themselves, require inclusion in a list of 
tests to evaluate the constitutional muster of conditional spending.  They each have been, and 
still remain, quite capable of operating on their own.  Inclusion in a separate list of tests for 
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conditional spending implies a lower threshold for their use in evaluating the constitutionality of 
such legislation. 
 Education is not mentioned in the U.S. Constitution.  Education is, however, specifically 
mentioned in all 50 state constitutions (McCoy, pp. 1-11).  Nor has education been designated an 
implied power of the U.S. Constitution.  Education is, however, a specified responsibility for 
state governments as spelled out in state constitutions.  For example, Article IX, Section 1 of the 
State Constitution of Iowa declares, “The educational and school funds and lands shall be under 
the control and management of the general assembly of this state.”  Article IX, Section 3 of the 
State Constitution of Iowa reads, “The general assembly shall encourage, by all suitable means, 
the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.”  And finally, 
Article IX, Section 6 of the State Constitution declares, “The financial agents of the school funds 
shall be the same, that by law, receive and control the state and county revenue for other civil 
purposes, under such regulations as may be provided by law.”  Other state constitutions contain 
similar features.  Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that “education is perhaps 
the most important function of state and local governments” (347 U.S. 483, 493).  No judicial 
opinion by the High Court has countermanded that assertion.  In fact, quite the opposite has 
proven to be the case as numerous court decisions in the past fifty (50) years have cited precisely 
that statement. 
 Being “the most important function of state and local governments,” primary control over 
education is a critical aspect of those governments’ functioning under a republican form of 
government.  State expenditures for education in most, if not all, states constitute a major portion 
of their budgets.  In Iowa, expenditures for education represent more than 60% of the state’s total 
budget in any given year.  Furthermore, the Court’s discussion of the Guarantee Clause in Baker 
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v. Carr merits consideration.  According to the Court, “[T]he mere fact that the suit seeks 
protection of a political right does not mean it presents a political question” (369 U.S. 186, 209).  
A state’s responsibility for the system of public education constitutes a political responsibility; 
therefore, it does not present a political question.  In the same case, the Court noted analytical 
tests to be applied to detect the presence or absence of a political question (369 U.S. 186, 217; 
see also the summary portion of this paper’s Guarantee Clause chapter).  Application of those 
tests to the present argument presents no presence of a political question.  Furthermore, in 
questions related to education, the Supreme Court has recognized that state efforts to provide a 
free and public system of education to the children of state residents should be “scrutinized under 
judicial principles sensitive to the nature of the State’s efforts and to the rights reserved to the 
States under the Constitution” (411 U.S. 30, 39).  Furthermore, a republican form of government 
surely includes the ability to legislate meaningfully about a topic.  NCLB forecloses some of the 
most meaningful aspects of education from state and local control.  In addition, the Supreme 
Court has recognized the necessity for states and local boards to exert primary responsibility over 
education because their judgments are more informed by knowledge of localized needs.  
According to the Court:  
[T]his case also involves the most persistent and difficult questions of 
educational policy, another area in which this Court’s lack of specialized 
knowledge and experience counsels against premature interference with the 
informed judgments made at the state and local levels.  (411 U.S. 30, 42) 
 
Lastly, a republican form of government surely includes meaningful involvement of citizens, 
particularly at the local and state levels.  This, too, has been recognized by the Court when it 
declared: 
The merit of local control was recognized last Term in both the majority and 
dissenting opinions in Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 
451 (1972).  Mr. Justice Steward stated there that “[d]irect control over 
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decisions vitally affecting the education of one’s children is a need that is 
strongly felt in our society.”  Id., at 469.  The Chief Justice, in his dissent, 
agreed that “[l]ocal control is not only vital to continued public support of 
the schools, but it is of over-riding importance from an educational 
standpoint as well.”  Id., at 478.  (411 U.S. 30, 49) 
 
 The preceding form the basis for constructing legal arguments uniting Guarantee Clause 
and Tenth Amendment positions to form an impassible constitutional bar for NCLB under the 
Constitutional Bar Requirement for conditional spending. Neither the Guarantee Clause nor the 
Tenth Amendment act on their own to form a constitutional barrier.  They act jointly.  The 
constitutional barrier created does not act on its own, but does act as a test under the conditional 
spending requirements jurisprudence.  Together, the Guarantee Clause and the Tenth 
Amendment constitute a test that is impassible for NCLB.  An additional constitutional bar 
centers on the conditional spending tests acting jointly. If Congress wishes to assert direct federal 
control over public education in America, it must do so explicitly in a manner that specifies the 
constitutional justifications for its action.  The conditional spending tests act as a constitutional 
bar to de facto control of public education in the absence of de jure control. 
 Finally, consideration may need to be given to the Absence of Financial Coercion 
Requirement as a possible line of argument.  Two economic factors in particular should be 
examined.  The first involves analyzing the current economic condition of the state and of a 
particular school district.  Particular factors at the district level to be analyzed for their impact 
include low, zero, or negative allowable growth in state aid to public schools, state funding cuts 
implemented after the fiscal year has gotten under way, district budget deficits, district’s 
spending authority being negative, and low or negative district solvency ratios.  While most Title 
I budgets constitute less than 5% of a district’s general fund, these factors may raise the Title I 
portion to a higher percentage. At the state level, the loss of Title I funds used by the state 
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department of education for operational costs should be calculated against the state allocation for 
operating the state’s department of education.  When state funding is low, that percentage may 
implicate the Financial Coercion Requirement. 
 The second economic factor to be examined centers on just what federal funds would be 
impacted by a refusal to accept Title I funds under NCLB.  If federal funding for other categories 
are withdrawn as well, e.g., school lunch funds, special education funds, other federal title 
program funds, then a situation would be created whereby the loss of federal funds conditioned 
by a school or state’s refusal to accept Title I funding would constitute financial coercion. 
 Finally, it’s unclear at this point whether an individual school district can refuse Title I 
funds.  Individual school districts could be bound by decisions made at the state level.  This is a 
situation that will probably vary from state to state because of differences in state constitutions 
and state legislation creating, funding, and maintaining the public education system within its 
state borders. 
 Conclusion. 
 Using the amicus curiae brief submitted by attorneys for the National Conference of 
State Legislatures in South Dakota v. Dole as a model, a federalism challenge to NCLB could be 
mounted which argues that the law fails the Relevant Relationship Requirement and the 
Constitutional Bar Requirement needed in order to pass constitutional muster as a valid exercise 
of conditional spending.  Depending upon what federal funding is withheld when a test case is 
conducted and upon what a state or district’s financial condition is, consideration may need to be 
given to utilizing the Absence of Financial Coercion Requirement as well. 
 Finding no. 3. 
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 A strong argument can be made that, within the first two years of its passage, NCLB did 
violate the conditional spending test relating to knowledgeable choice. 
 Discussion. 
 Both state directors of education in Nebraska and Iowa confirmed that no one fully 
understood the requirements and implications of the law, neither the congressional legislators 
who voted for it, nor the educational officers at the state level responsible for its implementation, 
nor the education officials at the federal level, nor the teachers and administrators at the local 
level charged with implementing its requirements.  Having been constructed behind closed 
doors, few legislators had read the 1,000+ pages of the law on which they were voting.  Any 
acceptance by state education officials was not based on a knowledgeable choice, but instead on 
a trust that things would be made clear in the near future and that it would all work out in the 
end.  After all, the goal was a noble one, a fact that made it difficult for dedicated educators to 
oppose. 
 Conclusion. 
 Had a state been prepared, it might have filed for an injunction delaying the 
implementation of the law in their state until the full law’s requirements and consequences could 
be fully communicated and understood.  The argument for the injunction would have been based 
on the knowledgeable choice portion of the conditional spending tests required for legislation to 
pass constitutional muster under a Tenth Amendment conditional spending challenge. 
 Finding no. 4. 
 Historically, the Guarantee Clause has been used by the federal government to justify 
action against the states.  It has never been used to nullify federal action. 
 Discussion. 
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 The argument (the Guarantee Clause should be used to overturn legislation because it 
negatively impacts the state’s republican form of government) is easy to make logically, but 
difficult to construct judicially.  The hurdle lies in a set of clear-cut standards by which to mark 
the moment when a government crosses the line demarcating the difference between a republican 
and a non-republican government.  Also, the historical background presents an added barrier to 
overcome. Only two cases have intimated that the Guarantee Claus would justify judicial 
scrutiny of congressional action, while the historical record, the text, and the location of the 
Guarantee Clause in the Constitution combine to make a convincing argument against such 
scrutiny. 
 Conclusion. 
 The Guarantee Clause holds out remote hope as the basis for a federalism challenge to 
NCLB.  However, it might be used in conjunction with the Tenth Amendment arguments 
centering on the conditional spending tests, which act to preserve federalism.  It could be argued 
that a joint Guarantee Clause-Tenth Amendment challenge (not mounted separately as part of a 
constitutional challenge, but jointly under the particular conditional spending test relating to the 
constitutional bar) will preserve a republican form of government in the state.  In this manner 
you have a legal argument that seeks to preserve both federalism and a republican form of 
government. 
 Finding no. 5. 
 The Fourteenth Amendment acts to restrain state governments, not the Federal 
Government. 
 Discussion. 
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 This finding is easily verified by examining the text of the amendment and by reviewing 
the case law of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Fourteenth Amendment has never been used to 
overturn congressional legislation. Instead, the Fourteenth Amendment has overturned state 
legislation, has restrained state executive action, and has compelled state action to provide the 
equal protection of the laws and due process to individuals. 
 Conclusion. 
 The Fourteenth Amendment offers little possibility for use in either mounting or 
supporting a federalism-based challenge to NCLB. 
 Finding no. 6. 
 The historical record of America’s political and judicial life contains a thread of 
experience representing a continuous answer to Aristotle’s ancient question (“Which is 
preferable in government – the rule of law or the rule of an individual?”), an answer that declares 
the rule of law is not only preferred, but required. 
 Discussion. 
 Beginning in 1776, America’s political answers to Aristotle’s question consisted of the 
following responses:  Tom Paine’s Common Sense, the Declaration of Independence, the 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, the multiple activities contained in the framing, debating 
and approving the U.S. Constitution, Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, and Watergate Special 
Prosecutor Archibald Cox’s actions in the aftermath of the Saturday Night Massacre of October 
21, 1973.  America’s judicial answers to Aristotle’s question, which declared that the rule of law 
would prevail over the rule of individuals, are represented by the following:  Chief Justice 
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison (1803), the U.S. Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), 
the U.S. First Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Butler (1936), the U.S. District Court 
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for the District of New Hampshire in Chimento v. Stark (1973), both Judge Sirica’s federal 
district court ruling and the federal circuit court’s ruling in In re Subpoena to Nixon (1973), and 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon (1974).   America’s response to Watergate 
Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox’s use of Aristotle’s question also uncovered the Roman 
response to that same question, a response inscribed in American court house and law school 
architecture, “Fiat justitia, ruat coelum,” interpreted to read “Let Justice be done, though the 
Heavens fall” (White, p. 5). 
 Conclusion. 
 It is incumbent upon us as citizens to insist that the our nation continue to answer 
Aristotle’s question in the same vein as this paper’s research indicates it has been answered 
previously, that the rule of law is preferred over the rule of individuals unconstrained by the law. 
 Finding no. 7. 
 The concept of sovereign immunity contravenes both America’s original contribution to 
political thought (creating a unique form of federalism wherein sovereignty resides in the people) 
and America’s answer to Aristotle’s question declaring that the rule of law is preferable to the 
rule of individuals. 
 Discussion. 
 In America true sovereignty resides in the people.  Given both the final text of the 
preamble to the Constitution and the actions taken at the Constitutional Convention, the 
inescapable conclusion is that the people, not the states, are the “real sovereign source of the 
Constitution” (Rossiter, p. 229; see also Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 78; James 
Madison’s actions and statements at the Constitutional Convention in Farrand, I, pp. 22, 122-
123, 214; revised preamble to the Constitution by the Framers in Farrand, II, pp. 177, 553-554, 
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651; Corwin, 1965, p. 89; Wills, 1981/2001, pp. 131-134; Daniel Webster’s arguments in 
McCullough, 17 U.S. 316, 326; William Pinkney’s arguments in McCullough, 17 U.S. 316, 377-
378; Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCullough, 17 U.S. 316, 402-405, 432; In re 
Subpoena to Nixon, 487 F.2d 700, 711). The idea that the people of the United States are the 
ultimate sovereigns flows from the Declaration of Independence as well.  It is illogical to apply 
the idea of sovereign immunity to a system of government wherein sovereignty resides in the 
people.  Who would the people be immune from – themselves? 
 The other component of America’s uniquely original contribution to political thought 
resides in the creation of a federal system which divided governing power between two levels of 
government – state and federal.  It was described most recently by Supreme Court Justice Arthur 
Kennedy who metaphorically compared America’s creation of federalism to the success of 
modern physicists in splitting the atom.  First, Justice Kennedy noted the sovereignty of the 
American people by observing, “In my view, however, it is well settled that the whole people of 
the United States asserted their political identity and unity of purpose when they created the 
federal system” (U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838, (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). Justice Kennedy continued: 
Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery.  The Framers split the atom of 
sovereignty.  It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two 
political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion 
by the other.  The resulting Constitution crated a legal system unprecedented 
in form and design, establishing two orders of government, each with its 
own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and 
obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.  (514 U.S. 
779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) 
 
To review, federalism is a unique creation in dividing governing power between two levels of 
government while identifying sovereignty as residing in the people.  The doctrine of sovereign 
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immunity is both disrespectful to America’s genius and inapplicable in such a unique system of 
government. 
 Finally, America’s answer to Aristotle’s question declares that a government of laws is 
preferable to the rule of individuals.  In a political system identifying itself as a government of 
laws, no individual is above the law.  Nor is any government official.  Nor is any division of 
government.  With sovereignty residing in the people, with all people being equal, and with the 
government being a government of laws, no thing or person is above the law.  Hence, the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity is inapplicable in such a unique political system as was created 
by American genius. 
 Conclusion/ 
 The doctrine of sovereign immunity constitutes an antithesis to the thesis posed by 
America’s original contribution to political thought and by America’s answer to Aristotle’s 
ancient question. 
 Finding no. 8. 
 The use of propaganda techniques by conservative justices to reach a predetermined end 
(that of finding ways to limit delegated powers contained in Article I, § 8) in Tenth and Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence marks that jurisprudence as judge-made law (much in the common-
law tradition of England) with no textual basis in the Constitution.  Furthermore, the current 
judicial interpretations of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments ignore accepted judicial 
procedures of constitutional analysis. 
 Discussion. 
 This finding is based on the examination of both Tenth Amendment and Eleventh 
Amendment case law, particularly those cases featuring opinions by Justice/Chief Justice 
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Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice Powell, and Justice O’Connor.  Both amendments could 
conceivably be used  to challenge the effect of NCLB, which amounts to federal control over 
education.  The argument could note that the effect of NCLB runs counter to the recognition by 
the Court that “education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments” 
(Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493).  The argument could point out that federal 
control over education runs counter to the evidence provided by a comparative textual analysis of 
state constitutions and the U.S. Constitution.  Education is explicitly referred to in state 
constitutions whereby the state assumes responsibility for creating, funding, and maintaining a 
system of public education; education is not mentioned once in the U.S. Constitution.  The 
argument could conclude by stating the “structure of the Constitution” concept undergirding 
current Tenth and Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence would prohibit federal control over 
education.  Parts of the argument have a textual grounding in the Constitution while other parts 
do not as they are grounded in judge-made law constructed through dishonest means.  It would 
prove irresistible to a results-oriented attorney to separate the two types of arguments.  As a 
result, in the end, such a legal challenge to NCLB would be dishonest and reflect an answer to 
Aristotle’s ancient question that is unacceptable – that answer being that the rule of men (judge-
made law constructed by devious means) is preferable to the rule of law. 
 Conclusion. 
 Current Tenth and Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, being judge-made law that uses 
faulty techniques of construction, is built on a base of shifting sand (the structure of the 
Constitution as interpreted by whatever a majority of justices may decide).  As such, it provides a 
poor ethical, logical, and legal basis upon which to mount a federalism challenge to NCLB. 
 Findings & conclusions related to the secondary research questions. 
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 Finding no. 1. 
 Poverty exerts a primary force upon education that is negative, that acts as a fundamental 
factor impacting the system of children’s well-being in America, and that stands for the lack of a 
key to unlock the gates barring a young person’s ability to fully benefit from education. 
 Discussion. 
 Research findings, most of which were presented in Chapter Four of this study, 
conclusively demonstrate this finding.  For example, researchers analyzing the difference in 
achievement scores from the First International Mathematics Study discovered that “virtually all 
of the variation in mean test scores can be predicted by the child poverty rate” (Jaeger, p. 122).   
Narrowing in on the topic for greater specificity, researchers uncovered evidence demonstrating 
that approximately 60% of the variation in achievement scores could be “predicted by 
[narrowing in on] the poverty rate among children in single-parent households” (Jaeger, p. 122).  
In another study by the Education Research Center in Ireland, researchers discovered that 
poverty provided a critical link to poor literacy performance.  The report identified “the number 
of children … with serious reading difficulties” to be “between 25 and 30 percent,” a figure that 
correlated to the child poverty rate of 25% (Flynn, p. 7).  The effects of poverty on children’s 
ability to learn were spelled out: 
[O]ne in four children in Ireland lives in families where the household 
income is half of the national average income.  This translates into children 
coming to school hungry, poorly dressed, no books, no money for extras.  Is 
it any wonder there are reading difficulties when this is the daily reality for 
so many children?  Food and clothing, not books, are the priorities here.  
(Flynn, p. 7) 
 
Another researcher, having reviewed existing research studies and after conducting his own 
analysis of SIMS, TIMSS, and NAEP data sets, concluded, “Child poverty is both a huge social 
problem in our country and an obvious generator of educational difficulties” (Biddle, p. 11).  
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Numerous studies confirm the link between socioeconomic status and student achievement.  
Socioeconomic status constitutes a major key to one’s ability to fully benefit from education. 
 Conclusion. 
 Constitutional federalism challenges will not matter in the absence of a systemic 
approach to confront the negative influences of poverty on the system of children’s well-being in 
America. 
 Finding no. 2. 
 NCLB focuses on a symptom (student achievement gaps) and ignores a significant 
underlying cause of those gaps (poverty). 
 Discussion. 
 No Child Left Behind focuses on the event of non-learning which it defines as a score on 
a single exam that falls below an arbitrary criterion.  It then uses these scores to identify 
achievement gaps, which if not narrowed over time, result in sanctions and penalties.  As stated 
previously, much of the score variations in student achievement can be explained by child 
poverty.  However, NCLB does not address the systemic causes of child poverty.  Instead, it 
focuses on the symptoms of child poverty, the event of non-learning heavily influenced by 
poverty.  NCLB’s approach is typical of efforts to apply linear thinking to complex non-linear 
situations by not viewing it holistically.  It focuses attention upon the symptom, not the cause.  
According to Peter Senge: 
[T]he causes of many pressing issues, from urban decay to global ecological 
threat, lay in the very well-intentioned policies designed to alleviate them.  
These problems were “actually systems” that lured policymakers into 
interventions that focused on obvious symptoms, not underlying causes, 
which produced short-term benefit but long-term malaise, and fostered the 
need for still more symptomatic interventions.  (Senge, pp. 14-15) 
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As Senge noted, “[V]ision without systems thinking ends up painting lovely pictures of the 
future with no deep understanding of the forces that must be mastered to move from here to 
there” (Senge, p. 12).  Senge further cautioned, “Without systems thinking, the seed of vision 
falls on harsh soil” (Senge, p. 12). 
 This finding also explains why the issue of dollars spent on education is irrelevant to the 
real issue at hand.  The real issue is the dollars spent lifting families with children out of poverty.  
Only after that does it make sense to discuss the dollars spent on education.  Dollars spent on 
education, while important, still represents only one part of the total system impacting children’s 
well-being, a system greatly impacting student learning. 
 Conclusion. 
 NCLB provides a prime example of Senge’s warning regarding the lack of a systems 
approach to a systemic  problem that results from focusing upon a symptom while ignoring the 
symptom’s cause. 
 Finding no. 3. 
 NCLB ignores the system of children’s well-being in America. 
 Discussion. 
 The approach used by the No Child Left Behind Act, a focus upon achievement gaps, 
ignores the shortcomings of other systems impacting the well-being of children in American 
society.  These include, but are not limited to, poverty, quality child care in families of working 
parents, health care, and universal preschool.  From birth until age eighteen, children and young 
people spend slightly more than 8% of their total life in the classroom (See Appendix G).  Yet 
NCLB places responsibility for the success or failure of children to learn solely on public 
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education and ignores the systems impacting the remaining 92% of children’s lives during the 
formative and emerging periods of their lives.   
 An editorial in the Des Moines Register discussed the problems of quality child care for 
low-income families with working parents.  Discussing the situation of latchkey children who 
leave for school after their parents have reported to work and who arrive home before their 
parents’ work day is completed, the DMR Editorial-page Staff stated: 
The problem is that society feels little responsibility for making sure good 
child care is available or for assisting lower-income families who can’t fit 
the cost of good child care into their budgets.  It is not just those receiving 
welfare or just off welfare who struggle with this.  Why is Iowa so stingy?   
… Instead of treating children as treasures, we treat them as liabilities.  (Des 
Moines Register Editorial-page Staff, p. 4AA) 
 
As pointed out just previously under Finding No. 1 and Finding No. 2, poverty has a huge impact 
upon student learning and negatively affects the system of children’s well-being in America. 
Thus, the system of children’s well-being has a huge impact upon student achievement in this 
country.  
 The failure to systemically address the multiple systems bearing on the well-being of 
American children has several consequences.  First, the success in achieving the goal of NCLB 
will be limited as other systems impacting children’s well-being will not be addressed in any 
major fashion.  Second, and more important, by not recognizing the important role of other 
systems, we will not be making the fundamental changes that need to occur in order for America 
to be recognized as a society that places primary value upon the nation’s children.  Third, we will 
be delaying the start of the adaptive work that needs to occur in order for us to realize the 
promise of America to its children, that no child will be left behind. 
 Conclusion. 
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 Until the system of children’s well-being is fully addressed, gaps in student achievement 
will persist. 
 Finding no. 4. 
 NCLB does not utilize a systems approach: 1) because it treats a symptom, not the cause; 
2) because it ignores the impact of poverty upon learning; 3) because it ignores the system of 
children’s well-being; and 4) because it does not incorporate Senge’s requirements for systems 
thinking in a learning community. 
 Discussion. 
 According to Senge, systems thinking is “a discipline of seeing wholes” and “a 
framework for seeing interrelationships rather than things, for seeing patterns of change rather 
than static ‘snapshots’” (Senge, p. 68).  As stated previously, NCLB treats a symptom, not the 
cause.  Besides not acknowledging the impact of poverty upon learning, NCLB ignores the 
whole system of children’s well-being.  NCLB focuses upon a series of snapshots in the forms of 
annual tests and ignores the systems or processes that greatly impact the content of the individual 
snapshots.  As discussed in Chapter Four of this study, NCLB has serious flaws when analyzed 
according to the disciplines comprising Senge’s view of systems thinking – mental models, 
personal mastery, shared vision, team learning, and systemic thinking. All of Senge’s disciplines 
reveal problems with NCLB from a systems perspective, particularly the discipline centered 
upon the learning community concept which is critical for the success of public policy in terms 
of creating ownership.  Also, neither of the state directors of public education in their states 
(Doug Christensen, Nebraska; Ted Stilwill, Iowa) viewed NCLB as embodying a systems 
approach to improving public education.   
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 More particularly, NCLB lacks a systems perspective in terms of viewing education as 
interacting with and dependent upon other systems impacting children and families, particularly 
regarding the negative force exerted by poverty.  The shortcomings of those systems and their 
effect upon education are ignored by NCLB.  
 Conclusion. 
 Revisions of NCLB should represent part of a comprehensive effort to address the 
problems of poverty, to focus upon improving the system of children’s well-being in America, 
and to create a learning community focused upon a systems approach to children’s well-being, a 
system of which education is only one part. 
 Finding no. 5. 
 NCLB does not represent a public policy approach based upon federalism. 
 Discussion. 
 The prescriptive approach of the No Child Left Behind Act runs counter to Iowa’s and 
other states’ educational practice of local control.  Rather than reflecting policy and leaving the 
implementation details to the local level, NCLB is highly prescriptive in detailing what each 
state will do.  As such, it utilizes a top-down, my-way-or-the-highway approach that has little to 
do with using federalism to foster a cooperative effort.  Doug Christensen, Nebraska’s 
Commissioner of Education, pointed to local control as the primary reason education worked as 
well as it did in the rural midwestern and northeastern states.  Ted Stilwill, Director of the Iowa 
Department of Education when NCLB was inaugurated, also noted that local control was integral 
to implementing change in Iowa’s public schools.  According to Stilwill: 
And in Iowa, we have excellent evidence that in fact pride is more effective 
in change, and school districts in Iowa do well because they are invested in 
their kids, and they care about what happens to them, and they feel good 
about what happens to them.  (Stilwill, p. 6) 
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 The prescriptive, top-down approach focused on compliance instead of a partnership 
between knowledgeable professionals produced some sense of frustration at the state level as 
well.  According to Doug Christensen: 
That, to me, just speaks volumes about the incapacity of this law to generate 
leadership, because it’s “Follow the letter of the law.”  We fill out 
workbooks, for gosh sakes.  I mean, we had to fill out an AYP workbook.  
Makes you feel like a child.  Makes you feel like, “Well, why don’t they just 
fill it out and then we’ll sign it,” instead of going through this charade of us 
filling it out and letting them sign it.  I don’t think they grasp the notion that 
you can’t generate leadership and discretion and decision-making at a local 
policy level from afar.  (Christensen, p. 3) 
 
The top-down approach, prescriptive approach was responsible, in both Christensen’s and 
Stilwill’s eyes, for a one-size-fits all viewpoint that created weak points in the law.  NCLB did 
not recognize critical differences between the different educational systems in place across the 
country; nor did NCLB recognize critical differences in different groups of learners within each 
public educational system.  Federalism as a public policy approach would have avoided that 
because of the input made by the state and local partners.  The lack of a federalism centered on 
partnerships with the states also resulted in creating animosity towards the federal government, 
particularly with it’s draconian approach, e.g., the system will only improve through top-down 
action imposed from outside the system, and through the imposition of sanctions and penalties 
for failure to achieve the legislation’s purpose.  In 2004, Arne Duncan, Chicago Public Schools 
Superintendent, criticized NCLB as follows: 
It infuriates me when bureaucrats in Washington make laws and set rules 
that make no sense and, in the end, harm kids.  The way this law is being 
implemented creates disincentives and discourages those who are trying to 
do the right thing.  It is wrong morally and intellectually, and it harms public 
education.  (Banchero & Little, p. 9) 
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Of course, this criticism was uttered by Duncan before newly-elected President Barack Obama 
tapped him to be his Secretary of Education in the aftermath of the 2008 elections.  The lack of a 
federalism centered on partnerships that promoted collaborative work at all levels also ignored 
the possibilities discussed by Senge concerning systems thinking: 
[Systems thinking is] concerned with a shift of mind from seeing parts to 
seeing wholes, from seeing people as helpless reactors to seeing them as 
active participants in shaping their reality, from reacting to the present to 
creating the future.  (Senge, p. 69) 
 
 By not utilizing federalism as a public policy approach, NCLB lost an opportunity to 
forge systems thinking and adaptive work into the efforts to develop solutions for the problem of 
children getting left behind in America.  Instead, NCLB currently represents a short-sighted and 
ill-conceived attempt to apply a technical fix to a larger systemic problem, the well-being of 
children in America.  Although not noted by the Congress and presidential administration 
responsible for NCLB, a blueprint already existed that weaved together the constitutional and 
public policy threads of federalism for the purpose of addressing severe problems and for 
securing the general welfare of American society.  Two Supreme Court justices described the 
blueprint of federalism whereby states served as laboratories of experimentation for the purpose 
of trying to find solutions to complex problems.  The first was Justice Brandeis in 1932: 
There must be power in the states and the nation to remold, through 
experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing 
social and economic needs.  …To stay experimentation in things social and 
economic is a grave responsibility.  Denial of the right to experiment may be 
fraught with serious consequences to the nation.  It is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.  (New State Ice v. 
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311) 
 
The second was Justice O’Connor in 1982: 
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Courts and commentators frequently have recognized that the 50 States 
serve as laboratories for the development of new social, economic, and 
political ideas.  This state innovation is no judicial myth.  When Wyoming 
became a State in 1890, it was the only State permitting women to vote.  
That novel idea did not bear national fruit for another 30 years.  Wisconsin 
pioneered unemployment insurance, while Massachusetts initiated minimum 
wage laws for women and minors.  After decades of academic debate, state 
experimentation finally provided an opportunity to observe no-fault 
automobile insurance in operation.  Even in the field of environmental 
protection, an area subject to heavy federal regulation, the States have 
supplemented national standards with innovative and far-reaching statutes.  
(FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-789) 
 
 And such was the approach ignored by NCLB in creating a worthy goal, but in failing to 
utilize federalism as a public policy approach for efforts attempting to find solutions to the 
problem whereby children are being left behind.  The public policy approach of federalism 
would be enhanced if yoked to systems thinking and adaptive work, as has been shown.  But that 
hasn’t yet been done.  As a result American public education is left holding the bag for a society 
that fails to address the larger systemic issues of children’s well-being, the system exerting the 
greatest impact on student learning in school.  National efforts to change the view that student 
achievement gaps are largely a structural failure of the nation remain absent.  Without a public 
policy of federalism linking systems thinking and adaptive work, we continue on a course that 
continues to camouflage the systemic issues of children’s well-being in America.  In the words 
of one analyst, “The most prosperous nation on earth is failing many children” (Jaeger, p. 126). 
 Conclusion. 
 A public policy approach based upon federalism represents the best opportunity to create 
a learning community focused upon a systems approach to children’s well-being that will engage 
in the adaptive work needed for successful implementation. 
 Finding no. 6. 
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 America is one of the least effective countries of the world’s largest industrialized nations 
in confronting the issue of poverty. 
 Discussion. 
 Comparative analyses, all of which were presented in Chapter Four of this study, between 
American and other countries’ efforts to address poverty support this finding.  Whether the 
research refers to child poverty rates, or to single parent poverty rates, or to parental subsidies for 
parents of children aged birth to three-years-of-age, or to success in lifting families out of 
poverty, or to young mothers in the work force, or to universal free preschool education for 
children, or to subsidized childcare, the United States consistently is at the bottom end of the 
comparative spectrum.  Comparative economic data within our own country add to this 
deplorable illustration.  During the period 1989 to 1999, the number of millionaire households 
increased by 200% while by 1998, “only 40 of 100 poor children received assistance …, the 
lowest since the 1970s” (Bounds, p. B1; Mathis, 1999, p. 8A).  Data illustrating changes in 
family income in the United States over the course of a decade revealed that while the lowest 
income decile showed a -14.8% decline, the highest decile income groups experience a +16.5% 
increase.  Characterizing the differing situations between the richest and poorest segments of 
American society, an economist observed, “By the close of the 1990s the United States had 
become more unequal than at any other time since the dawn of the New Deal – indeed, it was the 
most unequal society in the advanced democratic world” (Boshara, p. 91).  To illustrate his point, 
Boshara presented the following data: 
The top 20 percent of households earned 56 percent of the nation’s income 
and commanded an astonishing 83 percent of the nation’s wealth.  Even 
more striking, the top one percent earned about 17 percent of national 
income and owned 38 percent of national wealth….  In contrast, the bottom 
40 percent of Americans earned just 10 percent of the nation’s income and 
owned less than one percent of the nation’s wealth.  (Boshara, pp. 91-92) 
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Another researcher pointed to the cause of increased child poverty and the increasing inequitable 
distribution of wealth in the nation: 
For one thing, recent shifts in the industrial culture, political climate, and tax 
laws of our nation have generated a massive upward redistribution of 
income and wealth – away from poor and middle-class Americans and into 
the hands of the super rich.  (Biddle, p. 11) 
 
 More recent data about income inequalities in America suggest the situation has 
worsened for lower income groups and the families therein.  In 2007, figures for the top 1% of 
the wealthiest income group indicated a disturbing comparison with similar figures for 1928, the 
year before the Great Depression commenced.  According to Robert Reich, former U.S. 
Secretary of Labor and currently a professor of public policy at the University of California, 
Berkeley, “surging inequality” in America was responsible for both the Great Depression 
(viewed as beginning with the stock market crash in 1929) and the Great Recession of 2008: 
[I]n 1928 the richest 1 percent of Americans received 23.9 percent of the 
nation’s total income.  After that, the share going to the richest 1 percent 
steadily declined.  New Deal reforms, followed by World War II, the GI Bill 
and the Great Society expanded the circle of prosperity.  By the late 1970s 
the top 1 percent raked in only 8 to 9 percent of America’s total annual 
income.  But after that, inequality began to widen again, and income 
reconcentrated at the top.  By 2007 the richest 1 percent were back to where 
they were in 1928 – with 23.5 percent of the total.  (Reich, p. 13) 
 
Jeff Madrick, senior fellow at the Roosevelt Institute and the Schwartz Center for Economic 
Policy Analysis, confirmed Reich’s figures for the top 1% and related that to a decreased share to 
total income for the bottom.  Madrick articulated his economic analysis:  
[T]he top 1 percent of families made 23.5% of all income in 2007, including 
capital gains, compared with less than 10 percent in the early 1970s.  It 
hadn’t risen nearly to that level since 1928….  In sum, the top fifth of 
families increased their share of total income from 41.1 percent in 1973 to 
47.3 percent in 2007.  The bottom 80 percent lost share.  (Madrick, p. 21) 
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Dean Baker, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, stated that “rising 
inequality is at the center of the current economic crisis [of 2008+]” (Baker, p. 17).  He attributed 
the cause to government policy.  According to Baker: 
The first Great Depression was not just the result of mistaken policy during 
the initial banking crisis; it was caused by ten years of inadequate policy 
response…  And since that increase in inequality [the Great Recession of 
2008+] was not a natural process but the result of conscious policy, it can be 
reversed….  [U]nions have long been a major force in reducing inequality.  
Whatever can be done to protect the right to organize and allow workers the 
option of joining unions will help to reduce inequality.  It is not difficult to 
develop policies to reduce the inequality that has given us a crisis-prone 
economy.  The problem is getting the political will.  (Baker, p. 16; p. 17) 
 
Currently, then, we’re seeing an increase in poverty as a result of public policy without a public 
policy designed to systemically address the increasing poverty, a course that puts increasing 
numbers of American families and children at risk and insures that increasing numbers of 
children will get left behind in spite of the public school systems efforts to educate them. 
 In comparing the American performance against other industrialized nations that provide 
structural supports for families in poverty, Dr. Angela Taylor concluded, “Perhaps it’s not that 
the French, Germans, and Japanese expect more from their nations’ children but rather that they 
expect more for them” (Emphasis in original) (Taylor, p. 12).  Dr. Taylor’s conclusion 
corroborated the findings of other research studies.  For example, after examining date 
comparing a number of the world’s major economic powers, a researcher at the University of 
Michigan concluded, “Of all industrialized nations, the United States and South Africa accept the 
least public responsibility for young children” (Emphasis in original) (Lubeck, p. 471).  
Explaining the situation, Dr. Lubeck observed: 
Despite the fact that government plays an increasingly prominent role in 
people’s lives, the ideology of private responsibility remains firmly etched 
in the American consciousness.  Child bearing and rearing are perceived to 
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be a parental/family responsibility, and it is primarily parents who finance 
child care and early education for their children.  (Lubeck, p. 472) 
 
Continuing to explain her findings to the annual meeting of the American Educational Research 
Association, Dr. Lubeck concluded: 
The inability to provide well for children, to afford child care or decent 
housing or needed health care, has thus signaled individual rather than 
structural failure.  Although recent efforts to increase public responsibility 
for young children in the United States have shown some success, the 
ideology of individualism and private responsibility continues to hamper the 




 Much adaptive work will be required in order to re-focus the nation’s efforts to more 
constructively address the problem of poverty. 
 Finding no. 7. 
 NCLB ignores the adaptive work needed to effectively address the issue of poverty as 
part of an effort focused on improving the system of children’s well-being in America. 
 Discussion. 
 NCLB ignores the system of children’s well-being in America and does not fully address 
the issue of poverty.  Nor is NCLB a part of any such policy effort to address the issue of poverty 
and the system of children’s well-being.  As a result, NCLB does not see the need for any 
adaptive work to be done with regards to either poverty or the system of children’s well-being in 
America.  Because it does not see the need for adaptive work to address these problems, NCLB 
does not engage in the adaptive work required for public and policy support of such initiatives. 
 NCLB does, however, reflect to some degree adaptive work on the part of private 
interests at the expense of the public good.  According to Doug Christensen, Nebraska’s 
Commissioner of Education in the years when NCLB was enacted and implemented: 
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[NCLB’s intent] is not about improving public education.  This is about 
embarrassing public education, so that we can have a conversation about 
choice and vouchers and charter schools.  Because if it was about improving 
public education, we wouldn’t do it this way.  Nobody would.  (Janson, 
2003, pp. 5-6) 
 
Ted Stilwill, Director of Iowa’s Department of Public Instruction during the same time as his 
counterpart in Nebraska, also observed that some of the legislators’ votes in favor of NCLB 
occurred because the individuals were “not terribly strong advocates of public schools” (Janson, 
2003, p. 7).  These legislators, according to Stilwill, “viewed public education as monopolistic 
and as part of the problem, not part of the solution” (Janson, 2003, p. 7).  At the very least, the 
public interest was ignored in favor of private interests on the part of some legislators. 
 America’s declaration of war on poverty occurred some forty years ago.  It’s first 
campaign ended in the 1980s with its abandonment.  The gap between the vision of no children 
being left behind in America and the current realities of poverty and lack of public policy support 
for the system of children’s well-being remains large.  Public education needs to be addressed as 
part of a larger, more comprehensively systemic effort aimed at children’s well-being that 
recognizes the nature of the adaptive challenge facing us. 
 Conclusion. 
 Policy makers at the state and national level, graduate schools in education and public 
policy, think tanks and institutes, along with concerned citizens engaged in working to address 
issues related to children’s well-being in the absence of a systemic public policy approach 
designed to improve children’s well-being, and the news media need to focus primary attention 
on the multiple facets of children’s well-being in America in order to illustrate the gap between 
American reality and American ideals. 
 Finding no. 8. 
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 NCLB does not represent a research-based approach to increasing student achievement. 
 Discussion. 
 Ironically, while NCLB requires educators to utilize research-based instructional 
practices, NCLB’s basis lacks a research base for improved teaching and learning in American 
education.  First, it ignores the research regarding motivation.  Second, it gets assessment wrong.  
Third, it ignores the research about how children learn.   
 Extrinsic motivational procedures and external standards, both featured prominently in 
NCLB, negatively effect learning, at least according to research conducted by Maehr & Stallings 
(1972), Deci, Spiegel, Ryan, Koestner, & Kaufmann (1982), Grolnick & Ryan (1987), Ames & 
Archer (1988), Elliott & Dweck (1988), Flink, Boggiano, & Barrett (1990), Utman (1997), 
Mueller & Dweck (1998), and Amrein & Berliner (2002).  This research built on the initial work 
of Deci and Ryan at the University of Rochester who had postulated a need for autonomy or self-
determination as a descriptor of intrinsic motivation.  They contrasted intrinsic motivation 
(individuals focus on learning and mastering task skills) with extrinsic motivation (individuals 
are pressured by external forces and feel compelled to focus on demonstrating ability and worth).   
 According to Deci and Ryan, intrinsically motivated persons are willing to try and stretch 
their abilities beyond their present capabilities.  Furthermore, intrinsically motivated individuals 
derive pleasure from attempting to meet such a challenge.  Deci and Ryan believed that intrinsic 
motivation fostered creativity, spontaneity, and flexibility in problem solving.  According to 
Deci and Ryan, compulsion to achieve by external forces promotes increased feelings of pressure 
in individuals and fosters low levels of creative, spontaneous, and flexible behavior.  Extrinsic 
motivation also acts to undermine any intrinsic motivation that individuals possess prior to the 
onset of extrinsic motivation as a prime factor in behavior.   
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 Finally, both directors of state public educational systems in Iowa and Nebraska declared 
that NCLB missed the boat on motivation through its emphasis on negative reinforcement.  As 
both Stilwill and Christensen noted, shaming and sanctions have a poor track record in their 
states regarding systemic change (Stilwill, p. 6; Christensen, p. 2).  Being grounded in operant 
conditioning, NCLB’s approach also runs counter to B.F. Skinner’s research, who noted the 
ineffectiveness of punishment.  According to Skinner, punishment was less effective than 
positive reinforcement in changing behavior because it: 
• caused the individual to “avoid being punished” rather than to focus on changing the 
behavior; 
• caused “slower and less learned responses;” 
• trained an individual about “what not to do,” but didn’t train them regarding “what to 
do;” and 
• caused a person to “associate the punishment with the punisher” and not the behavior 
to be abolished or modified (Benson, pp. 80-81) 
 NCLB also got assessment wrong with its reliance upon summative assessment, or 
testing, as Doug Christensen, Commissioner of Education in Nebraska, described it.  According 
to Dr. Christensen: 
I believe that assessment is a very valuable piece of learning how to teach 
and teach well and improving teaching, but this (NCLB) is not about 
assessment – it’s about testing.  And testing becomes a compliance 
document.  It’s the ultimate compliance document.  (Christensen, p. 21) 
 
And then, Dr. Christensen’s discussion of testing (summative assessment) addressed motivation 
issues and the lack of a partnership approach by NCLB: 
And, you know, if you want people to rise to high levels, you have to make 
a decision whether or not you’re going to be accountable or to be held 
accountable.  And being held accountable makes you a junior partner; it 
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makes you a lesser person in the hierarchy; it makes you a person who can’t 
be given free choice, free will, as opposed to being accountable.  
(Christensen, p. 21) 
 
With its emphasis on summative assessment (which has no research base for improved student 
learning), NCLB ignored the research base regarding the use of formative assessment by 
classroom teachers to improve both teaching and learning.  That research base includes the 
reporting of Fuchs & Fuchs (1986), Atkin & Black (1997), Neill (1997), Stigler & Hiebert 
(1997), Wineburg (1997), Black & Wiliam (1998), Black, Harrison, Lee, Marshall, & Wiliam 
(2004), and others.   
 The mental model of NCLB also serves to direct attention away from the research about 
how students learn.  Grounded in philosophical realism as most of its provisions are (one, 
education should provide students with “basic and essential knowledge,” most notably in 
reading, math, and science; two, knowledge exists and can be measured; three, students need to 
measure up to objective standards; four, the use of tests to evaluate student performance), NCLB 
runs counter to the research about how children actually learn (Ozmon & Craver, pp. 69, 71-73, 
79, 81-82).  The extensive research conducted by Vygotsky (1962), Piaget (1954 & 1962), 
Goodman (1986), Clay & Cazden (1990), and Clay (1991) revealed that knowledge was 
constructed and developed by learners through their interactions with the world around them.  
NCLB, on the other hand, views learning as a quantifiable set of facts and abilities that can be 
taught, learned, mastered, and assessed by a single exam given once a year.  For NCLB, a single 
score obtained at a specific date in time defines learning and determines success or failure, both 
for each student and her/his own public school.  Again, NCLB’s stance towards learning is not 
built on research about how children learn. 
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 Finally, Dr. Christensen identified a possible violation of yet another research base 
pertaining to the importance of teaching to improved student achievement.  While NCLB 
requires research-based professional development and requires highly qualified teachers as 
defined by their licensure, NCLB does not value teachers.  Such a view would run counter to the 
research base created by Ferguson (1991), Hedges, Laine, & Greenwald (1994), Greenwald, 
Hedges, & Laine (1996), and Darling-Hammond (1998).  According to Dr. Christensen, the 
people who actually make a difference in determining whether or not students learn – teachers – 
are placed by NCLB “clear down at the bottom” (Christensen, p. 2).  Dr. Christensen continued 
by addressing the view towards teachers and administrators, motivation, and the top-down 
approach which doesn’t value partnering with the states’ public education systems or local 
educators: 
[C]lassroom teachers now are the last people that have anything to say about 
what happens under No Child Left Behind.  In fact, they’re not trusted to 
have anything to say about it.  Superintendents and principals are trusted 
equally as little, and it’s no respect for the local system of education at all – 
very little respect for the state system of education and respect only for a 
particularly slanted view of education at the federal level.  (Christensen, p. 
2) 
 
 In conclusion, NCLB’s approach is not based upon research about motivation, 
assessment, learning, and possibly teaching.  Nor does its emphasis on standards have a 
demonstrated research base.  As two researchers noted, “A focus on standards and accountability 
that ignores the processes of teaching and learning in classrooms will not provide the direction 
that teachers need in their quest to improve” (Stigler & Hiebert, pp. 19-20).  Also, Atkin & 
Black’s work in England and Wales offers more evidence regarding the lack of a research base 
indicating that standards will improve education. 
There is no strong evidence from the TIMSS data that the existence or 
absence of nationally prescribed standards leads to improved [student] 
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performance….  On this point, the one of us with close experience of the 
imposition of a national curriculum in England and Wales sees little 
evidence that this approach has yielded improvement and much evidence 
that it has damaged the status and morale of those on whom improvement 
most depends, the teachers.  (Atkin & Black, p. 26) 
 
Finally, it should be kept in mind that there may exist other research bases violated by NCLB of 
which this writer is unaware. 
 Conclusion. 
 Revisions of NCLB should focus upon creating an educational growth model for federal 
financial assistance to education as part of a collaborative state-federal approach that builds upon 
research-based educational practices and provides for state-level experimentation to best meet 
the localized needs of its students. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
 Drawn primarily from the findings and conclusions related to the secondary research 
questions, the following questions are provided in hopes of stimulating interest in further study 
of issues bearing on the system of children’s well-being. 
 Recommendation no. 1 for future research. 
 One of this study’s findings centered on the need to address the system of children’s 
well-being in America. 
• What would be the component parts of a system of children’s well-being in America? 
• What are the public policy considerations involved in initially formulating, further 
developing, and implementing a systemic approach to ensuring the well-being of all 
children in America? 
 Recommendation no. 2 for future research. 
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 Research indicates other major industrialized nations do a much better job of lifting 
families out of poverty than does the United States. 
• What public policies are used to lift families out of poverty? 
• What do specific programs look like? 
• How do these findings regarding other nation’s public policies inform our own 
policies? 
• Which could be implemented as technical fixes, and which would require adaptive 
work? 
 Recommendation no. 3 for future research. 
 It has been suggested by several economists that economic inequality in America has 
played a significant role in impacting current poverty which, in turn, impacts the well-being of 
children.  Economic inequality plays a greater role in the absence of a systemic public policy 
approach designed to ensure the well-being of all children.  These observations prompt the 
following questions: 
• What structural and public policy defects exist in American society that have worked 
to create a system of economic inequality unequaled in America since the year 
preceding the Great Depression? 
• What are the arguments for and against economic inequality in America? 
• What are the values and beliefs undergirding both positions? 
• What adaptive work, if any, needs to occur to promote and implement policies 
designed to promote greater economic equality in America?  If adaptive work is 
ascertained to be required, of what should it consist? 
 Recommendation no. 4 for future research. 
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 At least one researcher has identified an ideology of individualism as a block to viewing 
socioeconomic inequality as a threat to the well-being of all children in America.  Since the well-
being of all children in society is not deemed to be a serious societal problem, it does not receive 
serious, sustained, and widespread discussion.  Traditional American mistrust of government has 
also been mentioned as a block to viewing socioeconomic inequality as a major problem in 
American society.   
• In what adaptive work do policymakers need to engage as they confront the ideology 
of individualism and suspicion of government acting to block a systemic policy 
approach designed to ensure the well-being of all children in America? 
• Who should assume primary responsibility for engaging in such adaptive work? 
• What would the overall campaign of adaptive work look like? 
 Recommendation no. 5 for further research. 
 Research indicates other countries are more effectively addressing issues of poverty than 
is the United States.  Assuming poverty to be a key component of children’s well-being, a study 
of those nations adjudged to be more effective in addressing poverty could possibly shed light on 
how other countries view the system of children’s well-being. 
• How do other industrialized nations address the well-being of children within their 
own societies? 
• What implications do these efforts have for the development and implementation of 
similar approaches in the United States? 
• What beliefs and values held by mainstream Americans would work to: 
• block the implementation of similar policies in this country? 
• assist in the implementation of similar policies in the United States? 
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The reader may have developed additional questions bases upon the findings and conclusions 
reached by this study.  It is hoped that this study serves to stimulate additional research regarding 
any of the topics addressed in this investigation of the intersections between a congressional 
exercise in conditional spending and systems thinking, adaptive work, and constitutional 
federalism.  
Concluding Observations 
 As matters now stand, NCLB does not link together federalism, systems thinking, and 
adaptive work in a strategically planned effort to ensure that no child gets left behind in America.  
Public discussion thus far has centered on compliance with and opposition to the congressional 
No Child Left Behind Act.  According to the analysis of NCLB presented in chapters two 
through four thus far, America appears to be stuck on a short-sighted and ill-conceived attempt to 
apply a technical fix to the problem of achievement gaps in public schools without recognizing 
the larger systemic problem, the well-being of children in America.  By ignoring the larger 
systemic issue America will not recognize the nature of the adaptive work that needs to be done 
nor will our country harness that recognition to systems thinking and federalism.  If we are truly 
serious about ensuring that no children in America get left behind, we need to unite systems 
thinking, adaptive work, and federalism, particularly federalism as a public policy approach.  
One size does not fit all.  Nor is everyone agreed upon educational approaches.  States as 
laboratories work well in seeking solutions in the absence of consensus and fit with American 
pragmatism.  Finally, unless the problem of poverty is addressed as part of a systemic approach 
to the system of children’s well-being, constitutional federalism as examined in chapters five 
through eight of this study becomes irrelevant to the real issue at hand. 
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States and State-imposed Student Achievement Standards,  
2002-2003 
 State Standards State Standards 
 To Be Implemented By Individual Districts  But Districts Can Use Their Own 
 
Alaska Montana Nebraska 
Arizona Nevada 
Arkansas New Hampshire 
Alabama New Jersey 
California New Mexico 
Colorado New York  
Connecticut North Carolina  
Delaware North Dakota 
Florida Ohio 
Georgia Oklahoma           No State Standards; 
Hawaii Oregon     Standards To Be Developed 
Idaho Pennsylvania  By Each Individual District  
Illinois Rhode Island 
Indiana South Carolina Iowa 











Totals Re: No Local Control at the District Level v. Local Control at the District Level 
 
 48 2 
 
SOURCES: 
Polly Feis, Deputy Commissioner, Nebraska Department of Education,  
Lincoln, NE.  Personal communication on January 21, 2005. 
Tom Deeter, Program Evaluator, Iowa Department of Education, Des  
Moines, IA.  Personal Communication on January 31, 2005. 
Hebel, S. (2001, February 9).  Universities push to influence state tests 
for high-school students.  The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
pp. A23-A24. 
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States and Student Assessments, 1999-2000 
 
 
 Assessments But High School       Planning No State Assessment 
  Not Exit Exams   Exit Exams  HS Exit Exams    No HS Exit Exam  
 
 Arkansas Alabama Alaska Iowa 
 Colorado Florida Arizona 
 Connecticut Georgia California 
 Delaware Hawaii Illinois 
 Idaho Indiana Maine 
 Kansas Louisiana Massachusetts 
 Kentucky Maryland Oklahoma 
 Michigan Minnesota Oregon 
 Missouri Mississippi Utah 
 Montana New Mexico 
 Nebraska Nevada 
 New Hampshire New Jersey 
 North Dakota New York 
 Pennsylvania North Carolina 
 Rhode Island Ohio 
 South Dakota South Carolina 
 Vermont Tennessee 
 Washington Texas 




















Hebel, S. (2001, February 9).  Universities push to influence state 
tests for high-school students.  The Chronicle of Higher 
Education, pp. A23-A24. 
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States and Student Assessments, 2002-2003 
 
 State Assessments But High School No State-Required Assessment 
    No HS Exit Exams   Exit Exams   No HS Exit Exam  
 
 Alaska Alabama Iowa 
 Arizona California 
 Arkansas Connecticut 
 Colorado Florida 
 Delaware Georgia 
 Hawaii Indiana 
 Idaho Louisiana 
 Illinois Maryland 
 Kansas Massachusetts 
 Kentucky Minnesota 
 Maine Mississippi 
 Michigan New Mexico 
 Missouri Nevada 
 Montana New Jersey 
 Nebraska New York 
 New Hampshire North Carolina 
 North Dakota Ohio 
 Oklahoma South Carolina 
 Oregon Tennessee 
 Pennsylvania Texas 
 Rhode Island Virginia 




 West Virginia 
 Wisconsin 
 Wyoming 











Council of Chief State School Officers (2003, Fall).  State student assessment 
programs annual survey: Summary Report: Data on 2001-2002 
statewide student assessment programs.  Washington, DC:  Council of 
Chief State School Officers. 
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Appendix D 
Organizational Patterns of 
Selected Law Review Articles 
 
 
Merritt, D.J. (1988, January).  The guarantee clause and state autonomy: Federalism for a 
third century.  Columbia Law Review, 88 (1), 1-78. 
 
Statement of Problem & organization of article (three paragraphs) – no heading.  The third 
paragraph focused on discussing the organization of the article into the various parts and 
briefly described what each part would focus upon.   
 
Part I focused on review of strong federal system and Supreme Court's unsuccessful attempts to 
protect that system.  Part II examined the content and history of the Guarantee Clause and 
demonstrates how it will be a shield for state autonomy.  Part III applied this proposal to a 
variety of federal actions to demonstrate how it would work.  Part IV put forth arguments 
showing how this should be justiciable and thus enforceable in the courts. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Values of Federalism. 
B. The Supreme Court and Federalism. 
II. AN ALTERNATIVE FEDERALISM PRINCIPLE:  THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE. 
A. Text of the Guarantee Clause. 
B. History of the Guarantee Clause. 
III. APPLICATIONS OF THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE. 
A. The Franchise. 
B. The Structure and Mechanics of State Government. 
C. Qualifications for State Office. 
D. Wages of State Employees. 
E. Regulation of Private Activity. 
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The introduction included the following:  Statement of the problem; Statement of what he 
proposed to do in the article; and  Organization of the article into its component parts.  This 
had no heading and was composed of the following portions: 
• Statement of Problem [3 paragraphs]. 
• Statement of Purpose [1 paragraph]. 
• Section I Focus [2 paragraphs]. 
• Section II Focus [1 paragraph]. 
• Section III Focus [1 one-page paragraph] 
• Summarization of problem and solution. 
 
Section I focused on Federalist ideas of sovereignty and dual-agency governance structures.  
Section II focused on addressed the problem of sovereign immunity and constitutional 
violations.  Section III focused on how his solution addressed the problem addressed in the 
introduction. 
 
I. THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE. 
A. The Revolutionary Debate. 
1. British Ideas. 
2. The American Response. 
a. The Corporate Analogy. 
b. The State Constitution Experience. 
B. The Federalist Constitution. 
1. Creating Central Authority. 
2. Limiting State Governments. 
3. Dividing Power Horizontally:  Bicameralism and Separation of Powers. 
4. Dividing Power Vertically:  Federalism. 
a. Federalism and the Empire. 
b. Federalism and the Confederation. 
c. Federalism and the Constitution. 
C. The Civil War Debate. 
1. The Unitary People. 
2. Confederate Vestiges, Union Responses. 
3. The Role of the States. 
II. SOVERIGN IMMUNITY AND THE FEDERALIST CONSTITUTION. 
A. Chisholm v. Georgia. 
B. The Eleventh Amendment. 
1. The Inadequacy of Current Doctrine. 
2. The Advantages of Neo-Federalism. 
C. The Remedial Imperative of Government Liability. 
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III. A NEO-FEDERALIST VIEW OF FEDERALISM. 
A. The Riddle of The Federalist. 
B. Military Checks and Balances. 
C. Political Checks and Balances. 
D. Legal Checks and Balances. 
1. Historical Examples. 
a. Fourth Amendment. 
b. Habeas Corpus. 
c. State Legislative Power and Federal Judicial Supremacy: A Neo-Federalist 
Synthesis. 
2. A Neo-Federalist Future: Converse – 1983. 




Kaden, L.B. (1979).  Politics, money and state sovereignty: The judicial role.  Columbia Law 
Review 79, 847 – 897. 
 
 
The introduction had no heading, consisted of five paragraphs, and had the following 
components: 
 
• historical development and context of the problem (4 paragraphs). 
• statement of the problem (.75 paragraph). 
• outline of the article (.25 paragraph). 
 
I. STATE SOVEREIGNTY – ITS NATURE AND IMPORTANCE. 
A. The Constitutional Concept of Sovereignty. 
B. The Importance of State Sovereignty. 
1. Improved Governmental Processes. 
2. Individual Liberty. 
II. THE DECLINE OF STATES' INFLUENCE UPON THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 
A. The Historical Background. 
1. The Structural Elements. 
2. Political Forces. 
3. The Scope of Federal Government Activity. 
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B. The Contemporary Scene. 
1. The Structural Elements. 
2. The Political Forces. 
3. The Expansion of the Federal Government. 
4. Summary. 
III. FEDERAL INTRUSIONS UPON STATE INTERESTS – SOME EXAMPLES. 
A. Direct Commands to the States. 
B. Federal Grants. 
1. The Development of Grant Programs. 
2. The Present System. 
3. Grants With Strings Attached. 
4. Evaluating the Conditions. 
IV. JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY. 
A. The Traditional Judicial Response. 
B. The Supreme Court's Renewed Interest in State Sovereignty. 
C. Standards for Judicial Review. 
1. Direct Commands to the States. 




Powell, H.J. (1993, April).  The oldest question of constitutional law.  Virginia Law Review, 
79 (3), 633–689. 
 
 
The introduction had a heading and consisted of six paragraphs (approximately three pages, 
including citations).  The first five paragraphs discussed the historical context of differing 
interpretations of federalism.  The final paragraph stated the problem and the author's focus 
– a discussion of Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in New York v. United States [New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)] in the context of a "historical search for a 
principled law of federalism" (op. cit. 635).   The concluding paragraph of the introductory 
section also described the particular focus of each section as described below: 
 
Part I: a summarization of Justice O'Connor's opinion in New York. 
Part II: a discussion of O'Connor's development of a theory of federalism 
and its culmination in the New York decision. 
Part III: author's consideration of O'Connor's claim that her concept of 
federalism has a historical basis. 
Part IV: the author's argument that, although New York lacks a firm basis in 
the federalist debates of the 18th century constitutional period, 
O'Connor's federalist position can be defended on other grounds. 
 
The outline of Powell's article, shown below, illustrates how he shaped his arguments. 
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 INTRODUCTION. 
I. THE NEW YORK DECISION. 
II. O'CONNOR'S FEDERALISM. 
III. HISTORICAL ANSWERS TO THE OLDEST QUESTION 
A. The New Constitution and the Question of Federalism. 
B. The Historical Search for a Law of Federalism. 
1. The Nationalistic Rejection of a Law of Federalism. 
2. The Textual Enumeration of Federal Powers. 
3. States' Immunities as Constitutional Rights. 
4. Historical Precedent for the Autonomy of Process Principle. 
IV. A PRUDENTIAL JUSTIFICATION FOR NEW YORK V. UNITED STATES. 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
   








Dayton, J. (1991).  Constitutional analysis of school funding systems.  Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomington. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
Problem Statement.  [2.50 pages] 
Research Question. [0.50 pages] 
Procedures. [1.50 pages] 
Limitations of the Study. [0.25 pages] 
II. A CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT CASE LAW INFLUENCING SCHOOL  
 FUNDING LITIGATION 1971-91. 
Introduction. 
Serrano v. Priest. 
San Antonio v. Rodriguez. 
[32 additional cases] 
Case Law Chronology Summary 








Separation of Powers. 
Jurisdictional Issues Summary. 
Judicial Review of Factual Issues 
Linking Expenditures to Educational Quality. 
Disparities in Assessed Valuation. 
Disparities in Per Pupil Expenditures. 
Evidence of Harm to Children. 
Factual Issues Summary. 
Judicial Review of Legal Issues 
Equal Protection Challenges. 
Whether Education Is a Fundamental Right. 
Suspect Class. 
Level of Scrutiny. 
State Justification. 
Education Article Challenges 
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Constitutional Interpretation. 
Identifying the State Duty. 
Determining Whether the Constitutional Duty Is Met. 
Legal Issues Summary 




Political Solution v. Judicial Solution. 
Impact of the State's Fiscal Situation. 
Analytical Framework Summary 
Applying the Analytical Framework to a Pending Case (Lake Central v. State of Indiana). 




Glossary of Legal Terms. 
Lyman, W.G. (1995).  An investigation into the constitutionality of federal assistance for mass 




A. Problem Statement/Purpose/Questions. [2.25 pages] 
B. Scope. [1.50 pages] 
C. Organization [1.25 pages] 
II. A HISTORY OF FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN TRANSPORTATION. 
A. Introduction. 
B. Federal Policy. 
C. Water Transportation. 
D. Railroads. 
E. Air Transportation. 
F. Roads. 
III. A HISTORY OF MASS TRANSPORTATION. 
A. Up to 1958. 
B. Since 1958. 
C. Results of Federal Aid. 
D. Conclusion. 
IV. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND  
 GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSES. 
A. Introduction. 
B. Presidents. 
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C. Jurists. 
D. Alexander Hamilton. 
E. Conclusion. 
V. CASE HISTORIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE 
 GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE. 
A. Introduction. 
B. Interstate Commerce Clause. 
C. General Welfare Clause. 
D. Conclusion. 
VI. ANALYSIS / CONCLUSIONS. 
A. Introduction. 
B. Interstate Commerce Clause. 
1. The Negative Doctrines. 
2. The Positive Doctrines. 
C. General Welfare Clause. 
D. Conclusions. 
Colwell, W.B. (1996).  The constitutionality of the Illinois Waiver of Educational Mandates 
Act:  Legislative use of the joint resolution.  Unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
Federal and State Deregulation of Education. 
Governmental Response:  State of Illinois. 
Statement of the Problem. 
Purpose and Significance of the Study. 
Research Question. 
Organization of Study. 
Limitations of the Study. 
Summary. 
II. REVIEW OF LEGISLATION. 
Historical Analysis of Deregulation of Educational Mandates in Illinois 
Summary 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS: THE LEGISLATIVE VETO.  
Legislative Veto: An Introduction 
The Administrative Procedures Act 
Case Law 
Summary 
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS: OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES.  
Separation of Powers 
Legislative Denial: Use of Statute or Resolution 
   





V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION. 
Constitutional or Unconstitutional? Application of Legal Principles to Public Law 89-3 
Comparison of Public Law 89-3's Legislative Provisions: Waiver versus Modification 
Separation of Powers 
Legislative Act? Joint Resolution 60 
Equal Protection and Special Legislation 
Legislative Veto 
Summary 
VI. CONCLUSIONS, AMENDMENTS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER  




Policy Implications of Public Act 89-3 
Recommendations for Further Study 
Skuly, R.J. (1998).  The constitutionality of the noncurricular religious use of Ohio schools.  
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Kent State University,  
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY.  
Problem 





2. REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT, FEDERAL LAW 
DEALING WITH THE NONCURRICULAR RELIGIOUS USE OF SCHOOLS, AND THE  
 OHIO CONSTITUTION. 
The First Amendment 
Creation of a Bill of Rights 
A Wall of Separation 
Application of the First Amendment to the States 
Establishment and Free Exercise 
Establishment and Free Speech – the Equal Access Act 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
The Ohio Constitution and Law Dealing with the Noncurricular Religious Use of Schools 
State Laws and the Religious Use of Schools 
Summary 
3. ANALYSIS OF CASES DEALING WITH THE NONCURRICULAR RELIGIOUS USE  
   
   
1106
 OF SCHOOLS.    
Cases in Which Churches Have Requested the Use of School Facilities for Religious 
Services 
Cases in Which Community Groups Have Requested the Use of School Facilities to Hold 
Programs or Activities with Religious Content 
Cases in Which Community Groups Have Requested the Use of School Facilities to Hold 
School Baccalaureate Programs 
Cases in Which Student Groups Have Requested the Use of School Facilities for Religious 
Meetings or Club Activities. 
Cases in Which Citizens Brought Suit Because of Approved Noncurricular Use, or Bans on 
Use, of School Facilities. 
Cases Involving the Use of Public Facilities Other than Schools for Religious Purposes 
Cases Involving the Use of Schools for Speech Which Might be Considered Controversial 
Summary 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. 
Common Grounds for Challenges to the Noncurricular Religious Use of Schools 
Establishment Clause Violations 
Free Exercise Clause Violations 
Free Speech Clause Violations 
Policy Considerations for Regulating Facilities Use by the Public 








   





Doug Christensen, Commissioner of Public Education for Nebraska;  
Ted Stilwill, Director of the Iowa Department of Education 
 
 
1. So, from where you sit today, is No Child Left Behind a good law? 
 
 
2. What have been your conversations with federal legislators re: NCLB? 
 
• Why did they vote for it? 
• Do they intend to drastically revise it? 
 
 
3. What is the impact of NCLB upon federalism? 
      "    "   "       "      "       "         "     your job? 
 
 
4. In what ways does this law either align or conflict with your beliefs and values? 
 
 




6. Some believe NCLB is an attempt to undermine public education by setting impossibly high 








8. If not challenged or changed, how do you see this playing out?  What will education look like 
in 10-20 years? 
 
 




   




Time Spent In School As a Percent of a Young Person’s Life 
From Birth Until High School Graduation and Selected Portions of the Iowa 
Administrative Code, School Rules of Iowa 
 
Percent of Time Receiving Instruction 
This figure is based on Iowa requirements and the following calculations.  Total hours 
from birth until age five: 365 days x 24 hours x 5 years = 43,800 hours.  Total hours beginning 
with kindergarten through the senior year of high school, from age five until age eighteen: 365 
days x 24 hours x 13 years = 113, 880 hours.  The total hours of life from birth until age 18 = 
157, 680 hours.  Iowa requires a school calendar of 180 days of instruction and an instructional 
schedule of 5.5 hours per day in class: 180 days x 5.5 hours x 13 years = 12,870 hours.  Percent 
of time receiving minimal instruction of a young person’s life from birth until high school 
graduation equals 12,870 hours divided by 157,680 total hours which equals 8.16 percent 
(12,870 / 157,680 = .081621 = 8.16%).  Such a figure represents perfect attendance as well as 
perfect weather with no weather cancellations, no days lost for parent-teacher conferences, no 
days lost for family emergencies, no partial days lost for participation in co-and extra-curricular 
activities, and no days lost for state tournament participation.  The figure has been rounded to 
8.2% for clarity and ease of discussion. 
Of course, if instructional time represents 8.2% of a young person’s life, non-
instructional time equals 91.8% of a young person’s life from birth until high school graduation. 
Percent of Time Receiving Instruction in Core Academic Areas 
The core academic areas include English/language arts, mathematics, science, and social 
studies.  Generally, from grades 7-12, students will generally average 45 minutes per day in each 
of the core areas whether they follow an eight-period day or an A-B block schedule.  Assuming a 
   
   
1109
best-case scenario of a student taking a core curriculum each year from seventh through twelfth 
grade, total time spent in core classes per day equals .75 hrs. x 4 =  3 hours per day.  Although 
the core areas vary from kindergarten through sixth grade (English/LA & math dominating the 
early grades with science and social studies receiving greater emphasis in the upper elementary 
grades), let’s assume an average of 45 minutes per day for instructional time in each of the core 
areas.  Let’s also assume full-day, every day kindergarten as well.  Thus total time spent in core 
classes per day from kindergarten through sixth grade equals 3 hours per day as well.  Total core 
academic instruction time from kindergarten through twelfth grade would equal 3 hrs/day x 180 
days/school year x 13 years =  7,020 total hours of core academic instruction.  Percent of time 
receiving core academic instruction of a young person’s life from birth until high school 
graduation equals 7,020 hours divided by 157,680 total hours which equals 4.45 percent (7,020 / 
157,680 = .04452 = 4.45%). 
Of course, NCLB emphasizes English/language arts, mathematics, and science while 
ignoring social studies.  This would make the 4.45% (percent of a young person’s life receiving 
core academic instruction) even lower, but for argument’s sake, let’s assume that 4.45% is a 
roughly accurate figure.  Perhaps it can be assumed that homework makes up the difference.  
NCLB thus emphasizes 4.45% of a young person’s life as the major system while ignoring the 
95+% of an individual’s life spent outside of the core academic areas.   
Chapter 12, Iowa Administrative Code, School Rules of Iowa 
§ 281 – 12.1(7)  Minimum school calendar …  Each board shall adopt a school calendar that 
identifies specific days for student instruction, staff development and in-service time, and 
time for parent-teacher conferences.  The length of the school calendar does not dictate 
the length of contract or days of employment for instructional and noninstructional staff.  
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The school calendar may be operated anytime during the school year of July 1 to June 30 
as defined by Iowa Code section 279.10.  A minimum of 180 days of the school 
calendar… shall be used for student instruction… (Exception: A school or school district 
may, by board policy, excuse graduating seniors up to five days of instruction after 
school or school district requirements for graduation have been met.) 
§ 281 – 12.1(8)  Day of school.  A day of school is a day during which the school or school 
district is in session and students are under the guidance and instruction of the 
instructional professional staff.  School shall be considered in session during parent-
teacher conferences as well as during activities such as field trips if students are engaged 
in programs or activities under the guidance and direction of instructional professional 
staff. 
§ 281 – 12.1(9)  Minimum school day.  A school day shall consist of a minimum of 5 1/2 hours 
of instructional time for all grades 1 through 12.  The minimum hours shall be exclusive 
of the lunch period.  Passing time between classes as well as time spent on parent-teacher 
conferences may be counted as part of the 5 1/2-hour requirement. 
§ 281 – 12.5(3)  Elementary program, grades 1 – 6.  The following areas shall be taught in 
grades one through six:  English-language arts, social studies, mathematics, science, 
health, human growth and development, physical education, traffic safety, music, and 
visual art. 
§ 281 – 12.5(4)  Junior high program, grades 7 and 8.  The following shall be taught in grades 7 
and 8:  English-language arts, social studies, mathematics, science, health, human growth 
and development, physical education, music, visual art, family and consumer education, 
career education, and technology education.  Instruction in the following areas shall 
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include the contributions and perspectives of persons with disabilities, both men and 
women, and persons from diverse racial and ethnic groups, and shall be designed to 
eliminate career and employment stereotypes. 
§ 281 – 12.5(5)  High school program, grades 9 – 12.  In grades 9 through 12 a unit is a course 
or equivalent related components or partial units taught throughout the academic year as 
defined in subrule 12.5(18).  The following shall be offered and taught as the minimum 
program:  English-language arts, six units; social studies, five units; mathematics, six 
units as specified in 12.5(5)”c”; science, five units; health, one unit; physical education, 
one unit; fine arts, three units; foreign language, four units; and vocation education, 12 
units as specified in 12.5(5)”i.” 
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Educational Attainment of Metropolitan Areas For the Age Population 25 Years and Over 
As Measured By Possession of a Bachelor’s Degree or Better According to the United 
States Census 2000 Summary File 
 
 
 Rank  Metropolitan Area  Percent of Population w/BA+ 
 
 1. Iowa City, IA 47.6 % 
 2. Corvallis, OR 47.4% 
 3. Lawrence, KS 42.7 % 
 4. Columbia, MO 41.7 % 
 5. Madison, WI 40.6 % 
 6. Charlottesville, VA 40.1 % 
 7. Santa Fe, NM 39.9 % 
 8. Bloomington, IN 39.6 % 
 9. Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 39.5 % 
 10. Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 38.9 % 
 11. Gainesville, FL 38.7 % 
 12. Champaign-Urbana, IL 38.0 % 
 13. San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA 37.3 % 
 14. Burlington, VT 37.2 % 
 15. Washington DC-Baltimore-Alexandria 37.1 % 
 16. College Station, TX 37.0 % 
 17. Tallahassee, FL 36.7 % 
 17. Austin, TX 36.7 % 
 19. State College, TX 36.3 % 
 20. Bloomington-Normal, IL 36.2 % 
 21. Boulder, Denver, Greeley, CO 35.5 % 
 22. Rochester, MN 34.7 % 
 23. Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, MA 34.4 % 
 24. Athens, GA 34.1 % 







Data Set Obtained from: 
Beth Henning, Census Specialist, Reference Desk,  
State Library of Iowa; 
who dynamically generated the table from the 2000 Census data 
provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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Appendix J 




 The initial incident (Madison’s threat to raise constitutional objections if a shorter term 
for the bank to be located in Philadelphia was not agreed to), as viewed by historians, is 
somewhat controversial.  Representative William L. Smith reported it in his publication, The 
Politicks and Views of a Certain Party Displayed (1792), p. 17.  Madison denied it in “Notes on 
William Loughton Smith’s Politicks and Views,” (4 November 1792), PJM, 14, pp. 399-400.  
Boyd, the editor of Jefferson’s papers, opined that the “constitutional issue was raised belatedly” 
as “primarily a weapon of defense” since there were “grounds for supposing that southern – 
especially Virginia – opposition to a national bank chartered for twenty years rested on the 
suspicion that this was another means of keeping the government in Philadelphia” (PTJ, 19, p. 
281).  Several of Madison’s contemporaries were of the same opinion.  Representative Fisher 
Ames of Massachusetts stated that the “great point of difficulty was, the effect of the bank law to 
make the future removal of the government from Philadelphia less likely” and was what 
motivated both Madison and Jefferson to oppose the bank bill (PTJ, 19, p. 281; see also Bowling, 
p. 235; Elkins & McKitrick, 798, n. 50; McDonald, p. 202).  Representative Benjamin Bourne of 
Rhode Island observed that Madison had opposed the bank “both on the ground of 
inconstitutionality [sic] and inexpedience.  But I am persuaded we would not have heard 
anything of either, did not the Gentleman from the Southward view the measure, as adverse to 
the removal of Congress, ten years hence” (McDonald, 1979, pp. 201-202; see also Bowling, p. 
235).  Even a foreign observer was able to discern a connection between the capital’s location 
and the bank bill.  Théophile Cazenove, serving as a representative of multiple Amsterdam firms, 
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wrote in a letter to the firms the following analysis:  “As those who desire that the seat of 
government be on the Potomac are united against the Bank, so the opposite party are united in its 
favor” (PTJ, 19, p. 281).   
 How did Madison’s principal biographers, who were examined for this paper, treat 
Madison’s opposition to the bank bill?  Garry Wills omitted the entire incident from his 
biography of Madison.  Ralph Ketcham omitted any discussion regarding a connection between 
the bank bill and the capital’s location.  Ketcham also ignored the negative congressional 
reaction to Madison’s raising of constitutional objections to the bank bill as well as any reference 
to Madison’s politicking with the Pennsylvania delegation.  Lance Banning spent most of one 
page (a long paragraph) presenting Hamilton’s bank proposal and then moved immediately into a 
three-page presentation of Madison’s objections to the bill as presented in a full-day speech to 
the House (Banning, pp. 325-328).  Banning omitted all reference to the negative response 
Madison’s constitutional objections encountered in the House.  Regarding the connection that 
Madison’s contemporaries made between opposition to the bank bill and the future removal of 
the capital to the Potomac, Banning stated, “A minority of modern analysts concur with Ames 
and other critics in attributing the framer’s stand to southern fears that the creation of the bank 
would impede the transfer of the government from Philadelphia to the Potomac” (Banning, p. 
329).  Mentioning Smith’s assertion, Banning dismissed it by noting Madison’s assertion that 
“this charge was ‘false’” (Banning, p. 329).  Banning then immediately launched into a four-
page defense of Madison against the “minority of modern analysts” previously mentioned by 
stating, “Led by his biographers, the friendly critics have advanced a different explanation [for 
Madison’s position]” (Banning, p. 329).  Under this alternative explanation, Hamilton’s 
economic proposals “favored the Northeast, benefited the financial interests, and created a 
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corrupted corps of treasury supporters in the Congress” (Banning, p. 329).  According to 
Banning’s interpretation of the incident by Madison’s benevolent critics, “Madison could not 
abide  … a construction of the Constitution that would free the predators from constitutional 
constraints” (Banning, p. 329).  Four pages later, Banning concluded: 
With the signing of the bank bill, he [Madison] decided to arouse a 
popular resistance to a scheme that he was coming to perceive as a 
concerted effort to subvert the people’s Constitution and to undermine 
the liberty that he had meant that Constitution to preserve.  (Banning, p. 
333) 
 
 One wonders what Smith would have to gain by falsifying what happened between 
Madison and the Pennsylvania delegation.  Such wondering would not find a plausible answer.  
If one asks whether or not the incident was isolated and unsupported by other credible evidence, 
the question to both would be, “No.”  On the contrary, multiple contemporaries drew a 
connection between Madison’s raising of constitutional objections and the question of the 
capital’s future location.  Furthermore, if one asks what Madison would have to gain by denying 
what happened, the answer would be the credibility of his constitutional objections.  If one asked 
whether this represented an isolated incident in which Madison raised (by declamation or 
precipitated through his actions) constitutional issues to achieve political ends, the answer again 
would be, “No, it happened on multiple occasions.”  And one would then list the bank bill, Jay’s 
Treaty (see Appendix K), the Kentucky & Virginia Resolutions (see section of the same title in 
the historical background of the Tenth Amendment), and Marbury’s appointment (See n. # 36).  
If one asked whether Madison engaged in falsifying evidence or in later modification of his 
writings to improve his public image, the answer would be, “Yes.”  According to one of his 
principal biographers, “Julian Boyd, the editor of Jefferson’s papers, caught him in an egregious 
falsification” regarding criticism he had made of Lafayette in a letter to Jefferson by which he 
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“deleted original passages” and “faked Jefferson’s handwriting” (Wills, 2002, p. 162).  Professor 
Wills also described how Madison tried to minimize his own role in the Virginia Resolutions by 
getting Jefferson to remove Madison’s “defense of them from the curriculum of the University of 
Virginia” (Wills, 2002, pp. 162-163).  According to Wills, Madison had “even wanted The 
Federalist removed too, since John Taylor of Caroline had made that book part of the dispute 
over secession” (Wills, 2002, p. 163).  Finally, when his record of the proceedings of the 
Constitutional Convention were opened up publicly, Wills states that Madison “tried to place it 
in a context that would take the edges off the inevitable reversals and contradictions of [his] 
life…” (Wills, 2002, p. 163).   
 In the final analysis, I find it too difficult to refute the analysis offered by what Banning 
referred to as a “minority of modern analysts” (Banning, p. 329).  I simply don’t think they went 
far enough by placing that one incident in the fuller context of other incidents in which Madison 
appeared to play politics with the Constitution in order to achieve ends he personally wanted.  
But I would also agree that Madison had political objections to measures he opposed, 
particularly Hamilton’s economic proposals.  I’m not convinced, however, that they were 
legitimately constitutional issues.  In the end, they were not judged to be viable in a 
constitutional sense.  However, historians will continue to debate the issue. 
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Appendix K 
A Second Constitutional Issue in Washington’s Administration: Jay’s Treaty 
 
 Two constitutional issues were raised during President Washington’s tenure in office; 
James Madison initiated both.  The first involved legislation establishing the First Bank of the 
United States as discussed previously with the constitutional issue centering on the Tenth 
Amendment as it intersected with the Necessary and Proper Clause.  The second issue included 
new claims put forth by Madison regarding constitutional treaty-making, a dispute in which Jay’s 
Treaty served as the precipitating agent. 
 The treaty resulted from a decision in 1794 “to send John Jay to London as a special 
envoy to negotiate a general settlement of outstanding differences” between the British and 
American governments, some of which had arisen out of Britain’s conflict with France (Elkins & 
McKitrick, p. 388; for details of the treaty, its negotiation, its reception in the United States, the 
American context, and its ratification, see Elkins & McKitrick, pp. 388-449).  To say that James 
Madison did not like the treaty would be to misstate his true feelings.  One of his principal 
biographers more aptly described Madison’s reaction.  “Madison exploded indignantly when … 
he learned the terms of the treaty, that the Senate had ratified it, and that the President had … 
signed it” (Ketcham, p. 357).  Two other historians described Madison’s reaction by placing it in 
the context of his life’s work: “Madison, so much of whose effort ever since 1789 had been 
devoted to protecting the American republic from the corruptions of British commerce, and who 
could now see his entire projected system being wrecked by the treaty, was irreconcilable” 
(Elkins & McKitrick, p. 442).  Part of Madison’s reaction stemmed from a “strain of 
anglophobia” that ran “as deep as ever” through his belief system (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 
269).122  In Madison’s thinking, Great Britain represented the antithesis of republican virtue as it 
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was “the home of monarchy and aristocracy, of corruption, … of ‘fashion and superfluity,’ and 
of manufacturing, which of all occupations produce[d] ‘the most servile dependence of one class 
… on another’” (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 269).  Reflecting his “agrarian bias,” Madison believed 
that “self-sufficient farmers” best provided the “social and economic foundations necessary for 
republican government” (Ketcham, pp. 313 & 328).  According to Madison: 
The class of citizens who provide at once their own food and their own 
raiment, may be viewed as the most truly independent and happy.  They are 
more: they are the best basis of public liberty, and the strongest bulwark of 
public safety.  (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 269) 
 
Furthermore, according to Madison, yeoman farmers “are exempt from the ‘distresses and vice 
of overgrown cities’” (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 269).  In contrast, manufacturing and industry, 
located for the most part in cities, produced “the most servile dependence of one class … on 
another” (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 269). 
 As the acknowledged legislative leader of the emerging opposition party to the 
Federalists, Madison provided the ideological support for a movement in the House of 
Representatives to defeat the treaty.  The cost for Madison, however, was a further abandonment 
of earlier principles and of a constitutional procedure he had helped develop.  Edward Livingston 
of New York began the assault in the House by introducing a motion that requested President 
Washington “to furnish papers related to the negotiation of Jay’s Treaty” (Ketcham, p. 361).  
Madison then asserted “the right of the House both to request executive papers, and by passing 
or rejecting legislation to carry out the treaty, to pass upon the treaty’s validity” (Ketcham, p. 
361).  Ironically, Jay’s Treaty had been negotiated and ratified according to the constitutional 
requirements that Madison himself had helped establish.  Furthermore, it was a legal process that 
Madison had defended when he wrote Federalist Numbers 62 and 63 discussing the Senate.  As 
Madison stated, the Senate was the proper body of Congress to be involved with foreign affairs 
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because of its members’ longer tenure of office and staggered terms which gave it the ability to 
have an institutional memory that made it more capable of a stable policy and thereby help the 
country be more trustworthy to other nations.  “Without a select and stable member of the 
government, the esteem of foreign powers will … be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable 
policy” (Federalist No. 63, p. 350).  According to Madison, the House of Representatives was 
not a suitable body to be involved in foreign affairs because its greater numbers and shorter 
tenure in office did not allow it to develop a “due sense of national character” (Federalist No. 63, 
p. 350).  Madison had written, “Yet, however requisite a sense of national character may be, it is 
evident that it can never be sufficiently possessed by a numerous and changeable body” 
(Federalist No. 63, p. 351).   
 Now, however, Madison claimed the House had the ability to nullify a treaty after the 
Senate had ratified it.  According to one of his biographers, Madison exceeded his own authority 
and tried “to tear down what he had built up” (Wills, 2002, p. 40).  Madison’s position “was 
more than ‘loose construction’ of the Constitution.  It amounted to reversal of its plain sense” 
(Wills, 2002, p. 42).  Such was also the opinion of a fellow legislator from New York who had 
opposed the Constitution as an Antifederalist.  Speaking to the House, 
John Williams said he himself had opposed the treaty-making power of the 
President and Senate at his state ratifying convention, but had never doubted 
that the Constitution gave it to them, nor understood that the House of 
Representatives had been given the power to interfere in treaties.  (Elkins & 
McKitrick, p. 445) 
 
Livingston’s resolution passed the House, 62-37, “and on March 25 the call for papers was 
conveyed to the President” (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 445).   
 One historian characterized what followed as President Washington “read[ing] Madison a 
lesson on constitutionalism” (Wills, 2002, p. 42).  In a message to the House, Washington 
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declined to comply with the resolution because the Constitution had given “the power of making 
Treaties [to] the President with the advice and consent of the Senate” (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 
445).  Washington reminded the House that he had been a member of the Constitutional 
Convention and could thus report that the clear understanding of the Convention that when 
treaties were “ratified by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate”, and were thus 
published, “they become obligatory” (Elkins & McKitrick, p. 445).  And then, Washington 
administered the master stroke.  As President of the Constitutional Convention, Washington had 
been entrusted with keeping the official journal of its proceedings.  He quoted a citation that 
“showed that the convention had specifically voted against the idea that ordinary legislation 
[involving the House] could reach to treaty-making (both Madison and Washington had voted 
with the majority against that claim)” (Wills, 2002, p. 42).   
 The House subsequently dropped its demand and appropriated funds to implement Jay’s 
Treaty.  Madison did not attribute the failed attempt to defeat the treaty to any failure within 
himself.  Instead, Madison blamed “[t]he banks, the British merchants, [and] the insurance 
companies” as well as “the exertions and influence of Aristocracy, Anglicism, & mercantilism” 
(Ketcham, p. 365; Elkins & McKitrick, p. 446).  In addition to the failure of his attempt to raise a 
constitutional objection that would defeat the treaty, Madison suffered a personal loss as well, 
the loss of his friendship with George Washington.  Washington “washed his hands of his friend 
after the treaty affair” (Leibiger, p. 209).  In his view, Madison had “brought the Constitution to 
the brink of a precipice” and had endangered the “peace, happiness and prosperity of the 
Country” for motives that he suspected were “bad” (Leibiger, p. 209).  The consequences were 
described by one of Madison’s biographers: 
Washington would never rely on him again, never consult him never invite 
him to a private meeting in the executive mansion where Madison had been 
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the trusted confidant, never receive him at Mount Vernon, where he had 
spent so many days and nights, regularly stopping off on trips to and from 
his home in Orange County.  (Wills, 2002, p. 43) 
 
Washington “had concluded, after a long sad experience, that Madison was duplicitous and 
dishonorable” (Wills, 2002, p. 43). 
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Appendix L 
Discussions of Judicial Review 
By the Framers During the Constitutional Convention In 1787 
 
 For the most part, the Framers did not discuss the issue of judicial review during their 
consideration of the jurisdiction of the federal courts.  Instead they discussed the concept during 
repeated discussions about an idea originally presented during the early stages of the Convention, 
a proposal for a council of revision that amounted to an executive veto of legislation.  During the 
conversations about a veto power, various leading men of the Convention repeatedly asserted 
that “the federal judiciary would declare null and void laws that were inconsistent with the 
constitution” (Farrand, 1913, p. 157).  Thus it was assumed that the power of judicial review 
existed and was often used as a reason to defeat the idea of a council of revision that would join 
together the executive and judicial branches of government to examine legislative acts. 
 The idea of a council of revision was the brainchild of James Madison as the author of 
the Virginia Plan, a plan described as “the basic framework for the document that became the 
Constitution of the United States” (Ketcham, p. 188).  Prior to the actual beginning of the 
Convention, the Virginia delegation “agreed that Madison’s plan … should be presented to the 
convention by Randolph as its basic working document” (Ketcham, p. 194).  On May 29, 1787, 
Edmund Randolph presented the Virginia Plan, consisting of “fifteen resolutions, which for the 
next two weeks were the foundation of the debates, and in fact formed the essential frame of 
government finally offered to the people of the states” (Ketcham, p. 196).  The eighth resolution 
of the plan dealt with the council of revision and read: 
Resd. that the Executive and a convenient number of the National Judiciary, 
ought to compose a council of revision with authority to examine every act 
of the National Legislature before it shall operate, & every act of a particular 
Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be final; and that the dissent of 
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the said Council shall amount to a rejection, unless the Act of the National 
Legislature be again passed, or that of a particular Legislature be again 
negatived by   of the members of each branch.  (Farrand, I, p. 21) 
 
It can be surmised from Madison’s use of British examples in defending his proposed council of 
revision before the Convention’s members that Madison had gotten the idea for such a council 
from examples provided by the British government.  For example, on July 21st, Madison spoke 
about the British practice of letting judges be in the legislature and in “Executive Councils” in 
defending his proposal to mix the executive and judicial branches (Farrand, II, p. 77).  Madison 
also mentioned the British practice of submitting “to their (the judges) previous examination all 
laws of a certain description” (Farrand, II, p. 77).  Other Framers also made reference to the 
British example when discussing the council of revision (Farrand, II, pp. 73 & 75).  What 
actually emerged at the end of the Convention was not the proposed council of revision, but 
rather a specific provision for a presidential veto that could be overridden by a 2/3 majority in 
each legislative chamber as well as an unspecified understanding of judicial review being used to 
void laws judged to be unconstitutional. 
 To document the Framers unspecified understanding of constitutional review as a check 
against unconstitutional legislation, one must examine the records of the debates that occurred 
during the course of the Constitutional Convention.  The following Framers spoke in favor of 
judicial review, indicating by their remarks that such a power not only existed, but also made 
unnecessary a council of revision: 
• Governeuer Morris, delegate from Pennsylvania. 
• Rufus King, delegate from Massachusetts. 
• Elbridge Gerry, delegate from Massachusetts. 
• Luther Martin, delegate from Maryland. 
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• Hugh Williamson, delegate from North Carolina. 
• Caleb Strong, delegate from Massachusetts. 
Their arguments weighed heavily in the votes against the proposed council of revision.  In 
addition, the following acknowledged the existence of judicial review as a check against 
unconstitutional legislation, but also favored the creation of a council of revision as proposed by 
the Virginia Plan: 
• James Madison, delegate from Virginia. 
• George Mason, delegate from Virginia. 
• James Wilson, delegate from Pennsylvania. 
John Dickinson, delegate from Delaware, waffled on the subject of judicial review during the 
Convention, speaking for it on June 4th and opposing it on August 15th although he admitted 
that he was “at a loss what expedient to substitute” for judicial review (Farrand, I, p. 110; 
Farrand, II, p. 299).  However, after the Convention, he wrote clearly in favor of judicial review 
as an accomplished fact.  Writing as “Fabius” in a 1788 letter advocating approval of the 
Constitution, Dickinson wrote: 
In the senate the sovereignties of the several states will be equally 
represented; in the house of representatives the people of the whole union 
will be equally represented; and in the president and the federal independent 
judges, so much concerned in the execution of the laws and in the 
determination of their constitutionality, the sovereignties of the several 
states and the people of the whole union may be considered as conjointly 
represented.  (Beard, 1912, p. 20) 
 
 Of the fifty-five delegates to the Convention, only two spoke in opposition to a judicial 
check against the legislature – Gunning Bedford, Jr., from Delaware and John Mercer, delegate 
from Maryland.  Bedford “was opposed to every check on the Legislative, even the Council of 
Revision first proposed” (Farrand, I, p. 100).  According to Madison’s notes, Mercer 
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“disapproved of the Doctrine that the Judges as expositors of the Constitution should have 
authority to declare a law void.  He thought laws ought to be well and cautiously made, and then 
to be uncontroulable [sic]” (Farrand, II, p. 298).  Mercer’s position is somewhat complicated 
because he favored judicial review of the laws if done in conjunction with the executive branch, 
even though done as separate departments (Farrand, II, p. 298). 
 Numerous speeches in a variety of contexts were delivered in favor of judicial review or 
in acknowledgement of its existence under the new Constitution.  In the discussion about the 
council of revision on Monday, June 4, 1787, Elbridge Gerry spoke against including the 
judiciary in an executive “Council of Revision” because  
they (the judges) will have a sufficient check agst. encroachments on their 
own department by their exposition of the laws, which involved a power of 
deciding on their Constitutionality.  In some States, the Judges had 
<actually> [sic] set aside laws as being agst. the Constitution.  (Farrand, I, p. 
97) 
 
Gerry then made a motion to suspend the council of revision in order to provide for a sole 
presidential veto, subject to being overridden by an unspecified percent of the legislature.  Rufus 
King seconded the motion by his fellow delegate from Massachusetts, “observing that the Judges 
ought to be able to expound the law as it should come before them, free from the bias of having 
participated in its formation” (Farrand, I, p. 98).  James Wilson of Pennsylvania then spoke, 
saying that he didn’t think either the council of revision or the proposed executive veto went “far 
enough” (Farrand, I, p. 98).  If the branches were to be “distinct & independent,” then each of the 
“Executive & Judiciary” branches should have “an absolute negative” on unconstitutional 
legislation (Farrand, I, p. 98).  The Convention, after voting down (10-0) a motion to give the 
president an absolute veto that wasn’t subject to being overridden by a subsequent vote of the 
legislature, then approved (8-2) “Mr. Gerry’s motion which gave the Executive alone without the 
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Judiciary the revisionary controul on the laws <unless overruled by 2/3 of each branch> [sic]” 
(Farrand, I, pp. 103 & 104).  However, the idea of a council of revision continued to be discussed 
in subsequent sessions of the Convention, and the concept of judicial review continued to be 
used in rebuttal of such a council. 
 On July 17th the Convention discussed the idea of giving Congress the power to 
“negative all laws passed by the several States” that they deem to be violations of the 
Constitution.  While Madison spoke in favor, Governeuer Morris opposed it, saying, “A law that 
ought to be negatived will be set aside in the Judiciary departmt. and if that security should fail; 
may be repealed by a Nationl. law” (Farrand, II, pp. 27 & 28).  The proposal to empower 
Congress to nullify unconstitutional state laws was then rejected, 7-3 (Farrand, II, p. 28).    
 On July 21st, James Wilson of Pennsylvania made an attempt to resurrect the council of 
revision which was supported by Madison (Farrand, II, pp. 73 & 74).  Caleb  Strong of 
Massachusetts spoke in opposition, being against any proposal to join together the executive and 
judicial functions of government.  According to Strong (as recorded by Madison), 
[T]he power of making ought to be kept distinct from that of expounding the 
laws.  No maxim was better established.  The judges in exercising the 
function of expositors might be influenced by the part they had taken, in 
framing the laws.  (Farrand, II, p. 75) 
 
Luther Martin of Maryland also weighed in against Wilson’s attempt to give new life to the 
previously rejected council of revision, describing the idea of combining judicial and executive 
functions “as a dangerous innovation” (Farrand, II, p. 76).  He continued: 
[A]s to the Constitutionality of laws, that point will come before the Judges 
in their proper official character.  In this character they have a negative on 
the laws.  Join them with the Executive in the Revision and they will have a 
double negative.  It is necessary that the Supreme Judiciary should have the 
confidence of the people.  This will soon be lost, if they are employed in the 
task of remonstrating agst. popular measures of the Legislature.  (Farrand, 
II, pp. 76-77) 
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George Mason spoke in favor of both Wilson’s motion and judicial review, believing that both 
were necessary.  Judicial review would invalidate unconstitutional laws while the council of 
revision would take care of bad laws that might be constitutional, but still “oppressive” and 
“unjust” (Farrand, II, p. 78).  According to Mason: 
[I]n this capacity [judicial review] they could impede in one case only, the 
operation of laws.  They could declare an unconstitutional law void.  But 
with regard to every law however unjust oppressive or pernicious, which did 
not come plainly under this description, they would be under the necessity 
as Judges to give it a free course.  He wished the further use to be made of 
the Judges, of giving aid in preventing every improper law.  (Farrand, II, p. 
78) 
 
 On August 15th, Madison proposed that all acts of Congress be submitted “to the 
Executive and Supreme Judiciary Departments” before they became law, which was seconded by 
Wilson (Farrand, II, p. 298).  At this point, Mercer made his comments against judicial review 
being separate, but in support of the motion that submitted the question to both executive and 
judicial departments (Farrand, II, p. 298).  After Gerry reminded the Convention that the motion 
was “the same thing with what has been already negatived,” the Framers voted the motion down, 
8-3 (Farrand, II, p. 298). 
 On August 22nd the Convention debated a proposal to insert into the Constitution a 
prohibition against passing ex post facto laws.  Hugh Williamson of North Carolina couched his 
support for the proposal in terms of the help it provided judges in reviewing subsequent 
legislation.  According to Madison’s notes, Williamson observed, “Such a prohibitory clause is 
in the Constitution of N. Carolina, and tho it has been violated, it has done good there & may do 
good here, because the Judges can take hold of it” (Farrand, II, p. 376).  The proposal was 
adopted by a 7-3 vote with North Carolina’s delegation being divided and thus unable to cast its 
vote (Farrand, II, p. 376).   
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 Madison spoke about judicial review on two separate occasions before the Convention, 
both times illustrating his understanding that the judiciary possessed the power of judicial 
review.  The first occasion took place on July 23rd when the Convention discussed whether to 
submit the proposed Constitution to the state legislatures for approval or to popular assemblies 
chosen by the people in each state.  Madison opposed sending it to the state legislatures because 
that would make the “system founded on the Legislatures only” a “league or treaty” whereas a 
system “founded on the people” would truly be “a Constitution” (Farrand, II, p. 93).  The 
difference between the two systems held importance for the concept of judicial review.  
According to Madison: 
A law violating a treaty ratified by a preexisting law, might be respected by 
the Judges as a law, though an unwise or perfidious one.  A law violating a 
constitution established by the people themselves, would be considered by 
the Judges as null & void.  (Farrand, II, p. 93) 
 
The motion to submit the Constitution to the state legislatures for approval was defeated by a 7-3 
vote (Farrand, II, p. 93).  The subsequent motion to submit the plan to “assemblies chosen by the 
people” was adopted on a 9-1 vote with only Delaware in opposition (Farrand, II, pp. 93-94). 
 The second occasion marking Madison’s recognition of judicial review occurred on 
August 27th when the Convention was discussing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
contained in Article XI, § 3.  Doctor Johnson of Connecticut proposed an amendment which 
specifically extended jurisdiction to cases “arising Under the Constitution” (Farrand, II, p. 430).  
Madison raised a question of language, wondering whether or not the jurisdiction “ought not to 
be limited to cases of a Judiciary Nature” as the Court should only be involved in adjudicating 
actual cases in terms “of expounding the Constitution” (Farrand, II, p. 430).  The Framers 
approved the motion “nem: con: it being generally supposed that the jurisdiction given was 
constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature” (Farrand, II, p. 430).   
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 The record of the Framers’ debates in the Constitutional Convention, much of it in 
Madison’s own hand, clearly indicates both Madison’s awareness and acceptance of judicial 
review as a check upon unconstitutional legislation.  The record of the debates provides 
additional credibility to Hamilton’s observations about judicial review in The Federalist.  It also 
raises the question of how Madison could later support and advocate attempts by the states to 
serve as the judgmental body regarding the constitutionality of congressional legislation as he 
did in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. 
 
   











Appeal to Fear: When an individual warns member of her audience that disaster will result 
if they do not follow a particular course of action, she is using the fear 
appeal.  By playing on the audience’s deep-seated fears, practitioners of 
this technique hope to redirect attention away from the merits of a 
particular proposal and towards steps that can be taken to reduce the fear. 
 
 In contemporary politics, the fear-appeal continues to be widespread.  
When a politician agitates the public’s fear of immigration, or crime, and 
proposes that voting for her will reduce the threat, she is using this 
technique.  When confronted with persuasive messages that capitalize on 
our fear, we should ask ourselves the following questions: 
 
• Is the speaker exaggerating the fear or threat in order to obtain my 
support? 
• How legitimate is the fear that the speaker is provoking? 
• Will performing the recommended action actually reduce the 
supposed threat?  (PropagandaCritic) 
 
False Dichotomy: Also called “false dilemma.  If someone is saying, “Either this OR that,” 
or is presenting only two alternatives, it is always a good idea to consider 
they are using this technique.  Ask yourself, “Are these really the only two 
alternatives, or is something being overlooked?”  (SantaRosa) 
 
False Premise: A false premise is a premise that is untrue or distorted.  Logic is the 
process of drawing a conclusion from one or more premises (or 
propositions, assumptions, suggestions, ideas).  Since the premise is not 
correct or not fully correct, the conclusion drawn may be in error.  To 
repeat, a false premise is an erroneous proposition on which a statement or 
conclusion is drawn.  (UToledo; Reference) 
 
Hasty Generalization:  This fallacy involves taking exceptional cases and generalizing from 
them to a conclusion about ordinary, non-exceptional cases.  The fallacy is 
the assumption that what is true for the exceptional is true for all.   
 
 
Propaganda:  a specific type of message presentation, aimed at serving an 
agenda.  Even if the message conveys true information, it fails to 
paint a complete picture.  (SourceWatch) 
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 An organization that bars all private use of office computers, because one 
pervert used it to access child pornography, has fallen into this trap.  
(GreatDebate) 
 
Logical Fallacy: In order to understand what a fallacy is, one must understand what an 
argument is.  Very briefly, an argument consists of one or more premises 
and one conclusion.  A logical fallacy is, very generally, an error in 
reasoning.  (SourceWatch) 
 
Name Calling: Name Calling is a form of ad hominem attack that draws a vague 
equivalence between a concept and a person, group or idea.  By linking 
the person or idea being attacked to a negative symbol, the propagandist 
hopes that the audience will reject the person or the idea on the basis of 
the symbol, instead of looking at the available evidence.  (SourceWatch) 
 
 An ad hominem argument (Latin, literally “argument against the man [or 
person]) is a fallacy that involves replying to an argument or assertion by 
attempting to discredit the person offering the argument or assertion and 
not addressing their proposition.  Properly, it consists of saying that an 
argument is wrong because of something about the individual or 
organization is in error rather than about the argument itself.  
(SourceWatch) 
 
 A more subtle form of name-calling involves words or phrases that are 
selected because they possess a negative emotional charge.  Fiscal 
conservatives making budget cuts can be referred to as either “stingy” or 
“thrifty.”  Both words refer to the same behavior, but they have very 
different connotations.  Other examples include: 
 





 The Institute for Propaganda Analysis first identified the name-calling 
technique in 1938.  (PropagandaCritic) 
 
Red Herring: In the past, to prolong a foxhunt, a herring would be dragged across the 
path so the dogs would lose the trace of the fox.  An advocate who tries to 
distract the audience from an issue by introducing something irrelevant to 
the line of reasoning is said to be relying on a red herring.  Example: 
“I am against banning smoking in restaurants – cars 
cause far more air pollution in urban areas.” 
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The auto pollution issue is an attempt to divert attention from the 
restaurant smoking ban.  That auto pollution is a bigger problem does not 
solve the problem of smoking in enclosed places.  (GreatDebate) 
 
Slippery Slope: Basically an argument for the likelihood of one even leading to another, 
invoking the “slippery slope” means arguing that one action will initiate a 
chain of events that will lead to an undesirable event.  The fallacy is about 
the inevitability of the one event leading to the undesirable outcome.  
(Wikpedia, Reference) 
Using the slippery slope argument, the proposer posits the following 
inferential scheme: 
 
If A occurs 
then the chances increase that B will occur. 
 
The argument takes on one of various semantical forms: 
 
• In one form, the proposer suggests that by making a move in a 
particular direction, we start down a “slippery slope”.  Having 
started down the metaphorical slope, it appears likely that we will 
continue in the same direction, which the arguer sees as a negative 
direction; hence the “sliding downwards” metaphor. 
 
• Another form appears more static, arguing that admitting or 
permitting A leads to admitting or permitting B, by following a 
long chain of logical relationships.  The long series of intermediate 
events serving to connect A to B are an example of the “camel’s 
nose” argument:  once a camel has managed to place its nose 
within a tent, the rest of the camel will inevitably follow.  This 
approach may also relate to the Conjunction Fallacy:  with a long 
string of steps leading to an undesirable conclusion, the chance of 
ALL the steps actually occurring is actually less than the chance of 
any one individual step occurring alone. 
 
Arguers also often link the Slippery Slope Fallacy to the Straw Man 
Fallacy in order to attack an idea or proposition: 
 
1. A has occurred (or will or might occur; therefore 
2. B will inevitably happen.  (Slippery Slope) 
3. B is wrong; therefore 
4. A is wrong.  (Straw Man) 
 
The “slippery slope” form of argument is often used to provide evaluative 
judgments on social change: once an exception is made to some rule, 
nothing will hold back further, more egregious exceptions to that rule.  
Contemporary examples include: 
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• If women are allowed to abort their unborn children, then soon no 
life will be held sacred. 
• If we forbid partial-birth abortion, soon all abortion will become 
illegal. 
• If we allow gay marriage, the family as a strong institution 
supporting a civil society will disappear. 
• If we allow gun registration, then gun confiscation will follow. 
 
The slippery slope claim requires independent justification to connect the 
inevitability of B to an occurrence of A.  (Reference) 
 
The best way to counter the Slippery Slope Fallacy is to point out that 
there is a logical point at which a line can be drawn which will prevent the 
slide down the slope.  (GreatDebate) 
 
Straw Man Fallacy: A type of Red Herring Fallacy, the Straw Man Fallacy is one of the 
best-named fallacies because it is memorable and because it illustrates the 
nature of the fallacy.  Imagine a fight in which one of the combatants sets 
up a man of straw, attacks it, then proclaims victory.  All the while, the 
real opponent stands by untouched. 
 
 The Straw Man is a type of Red Herring because the arguer is attempting 
to refute an opponent’s position, but instead attacks a position – the “straw 
man” – not held by his opponent.  In a Straw Man argument, the arguer 
argues to a conclusion that denies the “straw man” he has set up, but 
misses the real target.  The argument used against the straw man is usually 
a perfectly good argument; however, in not arguing against the real 
position the Straw Man fallacy is committed.  So, the fallacy is not simply 
the argument, but the entire situation of the argument occurring in such a 
context. 
 
 As the “straw man” metaphor suggests, the counterfeit position attacked in 
a Straw Man argument is typically weaker than the opponent’s actual 
position, just as a straw man is easier to defeat than a flesh-and-blood one.  
Of course, this is no accident, but is part of what makes the fallacy 
tempting to commit. 
 
 A common straw man is an extreme man.  Extreme positions are more 
difficult to defend because the make fewer allowances for exceptions, or 
counter-examples.  Consider the statement form, “all P are Q” and “No P 
are Q.”  Both are extremes, especially when compared with “many P are 
Q,” “some P are Q,” some P are not Q,” and “many P are not Q.”  The 
extremes are easiest to refute, since all it takes is a single counter-example 
to refute a universal proposition.  (FallacyFiles) 
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Suppressed Evidence:  Also called “Lie By Omission” and “Half-Truths.”  This technique is 
quite subtle.  It has the advantage that you can’t get caught in a lie, 
because everything that you say is true.  You just fail to mention all of 
those bothersome little facts that do not support your point of view.  
Should a critic point out one of those annoying undesired facts, you can at 
least feign innocent ignorance, or claim that the fact is really just an 
unimportant, trivial detail, not worth mentioning.  (Orange-papers) 
 
Unsupported Claim:  A claim that is not supported by facts or other evidence.  Senator Joseph 
McCarthy provided one of the more infamous examples during the 1950s.  
He would state, “I have in my hand a list of 205 Communists working in 
the State Department,” as he waved a piece of paper that had no names on 
it.  He never revealed that list of names, or any other list of names of 
Communists.  (Orange-papers) 
 
Unwarranted Extrapolation:  Recognized as a logical fallacy, an unwarranted extrapolation is 
the tendency to make huge predictions about the future on the basis of a 
few small facts. 
 
 As Stuart Chase pointed out, “It is easy to see the persuasiveness in this 
type of argument.  By pushing one’s case to the limit, one forces the 
opposition into a weaker position.  The whole future is lined up against 
him.  Driven to the defensive, he finds it hard to disprove something 
which has not yet happened. 
 
 This logical sleight of hand often provides the basis for an effective fear-
appeal.  Consider the following contemporary example:  “If Congress 
passes legislation limiting the availability of automatic weapons, America 
will slide down a slippery slope which will ultimately result in the banning 
of all guns, the destruction of the Constitution, and a totalitarian police 
state.”  (SourceWatch, PropagandaCritic) 
 
 When someone tries to convince you that a particular action will lead to 
disaster (or nirvana), ask yourself if there is enough data to support the 
speaker’s (or writer’s) predictions, whether you can think of other ways 
that things might turn out, and if there are, why the speaker is painting 




Note: Since the intent is to provide information about the various propaganda techniques, I did 
not utilize a formal style incorporating quotation marks, ellipsis points, and standard 
citations.  The descriptions are basically word-for-word, but in some I paraphrased and 
blended together material from more than one source while in others I eliminated some 
wordy portions or redundant material.  I credited sources at the end of paragraphs or 
sections using the term immediately following the www portion of the web address, 
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which I capitalized while maintaining the run-together form of the terms.  In this manner 
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Appendix N 
A Government of Laws Or of Men? 
The Answer Provided By the Actions of Archibald Cox 
 
 The reader previously encountered Archibald Cox as Solicitor General in connection with 
his argument before the Court in the apportionment case, Baker v. Carr (1962) (See discussion 
of the case in Chapter Five of this paper).  Archibald Cox, of course, is the individual who later 
earned national status as an exemplar of integrity through his duties as the Special Watergate 
Prosecutor.  It would be his belief (as well as that of others) in an ages-old answer to an equally 
ancient question (the answer being that government should be the rule of law and not of men), 
which would precipitate a series of events leading to the infamous Saturday Night Massacre, to 
subsequent impeachment proceedings, and finally to Nixon’s resignation from the office of 
President of the United States (For information about the “ancient question,” as well as answers 
provided by others that were uncovered in the course of this investigation, see the following 
notes in this paper:  n. # 46, n. # 67). 
 Following disturbing disclosures about Watergate (the criminal break-in of National 
Democratic Headquarters in Washington D.C. on June 17, 1972, by Republican operatives 
during Richard Nixon’s presidential re-election campaign) that resulted in the resignations of 
Richard Kleindienst as Attorney General, H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman as presidential 
advisors, and John Dean as Nixon’s special counsel, President Nixon nominated his then 
secretary of defense, Elliot Richardson, to be the new attorney general.  In the meeting where 
Nixon offered the position to Richardson, President Nixon raised the idea of appointing a special 
prosecutor (Gormley, p. 247).  According to Richardson, “The president made clear that 
Richardson ‘could decide whether to appoint, and if so whom’” (Gormley, p. 248).  After his 
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first seven choices for the special prosecutor position turned him down, Richardson turned to his 
former law professor at Harvard, “Archie” Cox (Gormley, pp. 233-234).  During hearings before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee in May of 1973, Richardson testified that “he’d give 
independence” to the special prosecutor, and Cox testified that “he’d exercise it [independence]” 
(Gormley, p. 243).  A key exchange occurred between Cox and Senator Byrd during the hearing, 
which was described by a professor of law: 
Cox had promised the committee to pursue the trail of any crime, 
regardless of its scope or implications.  Senator Byrd had pressed, “even 
if that trail should lead, heaven forbid, to the Oval Office of the White 
House itself?”  “Wherever that trail may lead,” Cox had assured the 
senator.  (Gormley, p. 243) 
 
 Occurring concurrently with the news broken by the Washington Post “that former White 
House chief of staff H.R. Haldeman had allegedly instructed the CIA to block the Watergate 
investigation, at the urging of the president himself,” the contrast between the news in the Post 
and the responses at the Senate Judiciary Committee reassured senators as Richardson was 
confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee and the full Senate with the understanding that 
Cox would be appointed as a special prosecutor to investigate Watergate.  Following his 
confirmation, Attorney General Richardson issued a directive “to all Justice Department 
personnel when Cox was appointed” by him to be the Special Watergate Prosecutor (Gormley, p. 
297).  The directive “vested Cox with ‘full authority for investigating and prosecuting’ not only 
the Watergate case but all ‘allegations involving the President, members of the White House 
staff, or Presidential appointees’” (Gormley, p. 297). 
 Having learned of the possible existence of taped presidential conversations, Cox met 
with White House attorneys on June 6, 1973 and requested notes and memos regarding a meeting 
between President Nixon and Henry Petersen, the assistant attorney general in charge of the 
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Criminal Division of the Justice Department, as well as a tape recording of a meeting between 
President Nixon and John Dean, White House Counsel (Gormley, pp. 274-275).  In addition Cox 
requested the “White House logs that listed all calls and visits between key White House aides 
and President Nixon between June 1972 and May 1973” (p. 275).  The latter item was all that 
Cox received. 
 On July 16, 1973, Alexander Butterfield testified before the Senate Watergate 
Committee, chaired by Senator Sam Erwin of North Carolina, “about the elaborate taping system 
installed in the White House by President Nixon” (Gormley, p. 284).  Two days later, on July 
18th, Cox requested eight tapes from the President’s counsel for a grand jury proceeding 
“investigating the unauthorized entry into the Democratic National Committee Headquarters and 
related offenses” (In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1, 3, n. 1; see also Gormley, p. 286).  
On July 23, the same day Nixon refused Cox’s request, Cox issued a subpoena to President 
Nixon for nine tapes (Gormley, p. 289).  Nixon wrote to Judge Sirica at the federal district court 
house on July 25 and declined to provide the subpoenaed tapes.  The following day Cox met with 
the grand jury, “read the White House letter and explained why these nine tapes … were crucial 
to his investigation” (Gormley, p. 292).  On July 26 the federal grand jury voted unanimously “to 
seek an order from Judge Sirica directing the president of the United States to ‘show cause why 
there should not be full and prompt compliance’” (Gormley, pp. 292-293).  Subsequently Judge 
Sirica issued a “grand jury subpoena duces tecum” that ordered President Nixon “to provide the 
documents or respond to Cox’s Rule to Show Cause” (360 F. Supp. 1, 3, n. 1; Gormley, p. 293).  
On August 7, “the day of the deadline set by Judge Sirica,” Nixon’s attorneys filed a “response 
to Cox’s Rule to Show Cause, refusing to turn over any documents or tapes” (Gormley, p. 300).  
   
   
1140
As a result, on August 22 both sides presented arguments to Judge Sirica in U.S. District Court, 
District of Columbia, “on the question of producing nine White House tapes” (Gormley, p. 300). 
 On August 30 Judge Sirica announced his ruling in the case In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 
F. Supp. 1 (1973).   Sirica’s opinion read: 
Ordered that respondent, President Richard M. Nixon, or any subordinate 
officer … with custody or control of the documents or objects listed in the 
grand jury subpoena duces tecum of July 23, 1973, … is hereby commanded 
to produce forthwith for the Court’s examination in camera, the subpoenaed 
documents or objects which have not heretofore been produced to the grand 
jury.  (360 F. Supp. 1, 3) 
 
After quoting from Chief Justice Marshall’s ruling in United States v. Burr, Judge Sirica noted 
that Marshall had “concluded that, contrary to the English practice regarding the King, the laws 
of evidence do not excuse anyone because of the office he holds” (360 F. Supp. 1, 10).  
Continuing that line of thought, Sirica declared: 
In all candor, the Court fails to perceive any reason for suspending the 
power of courts to get evidence and rule on questions of privilege in 
criminal matters simply because it is the President of the United States who 
holds the evidence.  (360 F. Supp. 1, 10) 
 
According to the Court’s summary, Judge Sirica noted that “in camera inspection of the tape 
recordings … was required to balance the forcible showing of necessity by the grand jury against 
the need for protection of presidential deliberations” (360 F. Supp. 1).  As stated by Sirica, “The 
Court is simply unable to decide the question of privilege without inspecting the tapes” (360 F. 
Supp. 1,  14).  Continuing, Judge Sirica further noted, “[T]here is every reason to suppose an in 
camera examination will materially aid the Court in its decision” (360 F. Supp. 1, 14).  In 
conclusion, Judge Sirica observed: 
The Court has attempted to walk the middle ground between a failure to 
decide the question of privilege at one extreme, and a wholesale delivery of 
tapes to the grand jury at the other.  The one would be a breach of duty; the 
other an inexcusable course of conduct.  (360 F. Supp. 1, 14) 
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 Nixon appealed, and on September 12th the tapes issue was argued before the Circuit 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  This court issued a preliminary decision that 
ordered “the White House and the special prosecutor to work out their differences” by September 
20 or face a subsequent “binding decision” (Gormley, p. 308).  As this order didn’t prove to be 
successful, the circuit court issued a 5-2 ruling on October 12 that “swept aside the president’s 
claim of executive privilege” and ruled that “the tapes were necessary to the grand jury’s 
investigation” (Gormley, p. 313).  Noting that the “Constitution [made] no mention of special 
presidential immunities,” and that such constitutional “silence cannot be ascribed to oversight,” 
the Circuit Court answered, as it were, Aristotle’s ancient question with the following: 
[T]he President … does not embody the nation’s sovereignty.  He is not 
above the law’s commands:  “With all its defects, delays and 
inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free 
government except that the Executive be under the law…”  Sovereignty 
remains at all times with the people, and they do not forfeit through 
elections the right to have the law construed against and applied to every 
citizen.  (487 F.2d 700, 711) 
 
Nixon had claimed that the President, “rather than the courts, ha[d] final authority to decide 
whether [the claim to executive privilege] applies in the circumstances” (487 F.2d 700, 713).  
Responding to Nixon’s claim for absolute executive privilege, the Circuit Court began by 
quoting from the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953):   
“The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate 
for the claim of privilege;” “judicial control over the evidence in a case 
cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers.”  (487 F.2d 700, 
714) 
 
Moving forward in time to the preceding court term, the Circuit Court noted its ruling in 
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788, 793 (1971), in which the 
Circuit Court had stated, “Any claim to executive absolutism cannot override the duty of the 
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court to assure that an official has not exceeded his charter or flouted the legislative will” (487 
F.2d 700, 714).  Stating that they would “adhere to the Seaborg decision,” the Circuit Court 
continued by connecting Seaborg and Reynolds to the case most often cited as an affirmation of 
judicial review:  “To do otherwise would be effectively to ignore the clear words of Marbury v. 
Madison, that ‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law is’” (487 F.2d 700, 714).  After noting that “it [was] the courts that determine the validity 
of the assertion and the scope of the privilege,” the Court concluded that such was required by 
the “separation of powers doctrine” (487 F.2d 700, 714-715).  The Circuit Court continued, “To 
leave the proper scope and application of Executive privilege to the President’s sole discretion 
would represent a mixing, rather than a separation, of Executive and Judicial functions” (487 
F.2d 700, 715).  Nixon’s attorneys had until Friday, October 19, to file an appeal with the U.S. 
Supreme Court.   
 No appeal was filed.  Instead, the White House announced “on the late-evening news 
programs” that “the President will not give up the tapes and [would] not appeal to the Supreme 
Court” (Drew, p. 46).  According to the press release, Nixon declared, “I have felt it necessary to 
direct him [Cox], as an employee of the Executive Branch, to make no further attempts by 
judicial process to obtain tapes, notes or memoranda of Presidential conversations” (White, pp. 
263-264).  The press release continued:  “Under the Constitution, it is the duty of the President to 
see that the laws of this nation are faithfully executed.  My actions today are in accordance with 
that duty, and in that spirit of accommodation” (White, p. 264).    One historian evaluated the 
President’s reply in the following manner: 
The statement was, in its own terms, a masterpiece of political art – it 
floated on a rhetoric of conciliation, compromise and earnest good will.  
What it left out, flatly, was the fact that the President was not complying 
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with the order the Court of Appeals had issued the previous Friday.  
(Emphasis in original) (White, p. 264) 
 
Cox, having obtained a copy of the White House statement in a phone call to “the Los Angeles 
Times Washington Bureau,” issued his own statement in which he “nailed the deceit” of the 
White House statement (Gormley, p. 343; White, p. 264).  The Special Watergate Prosecutor’s 
statement read: 
In my judgment the President is refusing to comply with the Court 
decrees….  The instructions are in violation of the promises which the 
Attorney General made to the Senate when his nomination was confirmed.  
For me to comply to those instructions would violate my solemn pledge to 
the Senate and the country to invoke judicial process to challenge 
exaggerated claims of executive privilege.  I shall not violate my promise.  
(White, p. 264) 
 
The following Saturday, October 20, 1973, Cox held a news conference and reiterated that he 
would not obey  the order issued by the President because “to obey the order would be a 
violation of [my] duties” (Drew, p. 46).   
 That evening, Nixon ordered Attorney General Elliot Richardson to fire Special 
Watergate Prosecutor Archibald Cox.  Such an order violated the guidelines worked out by the 
Department of Justice which read: “The Attorney General will not countermand or interfere with 
the Special Prosecutor’s decisions or actions;” and “The Special Prosecutor will not be removed 
from his duties except for extraordinary improprieties” (Drew, p. 49).  Richardson refused 
Nixon’s order and submitted his resignation.  Nixon then ordered the next individual in the chain 
of command at the Department of Justice, Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus, to fire 
Cox.  Ruckelshaus refused as well and submitted his resignation.  Nixon then ordered the third-
in-command at the Justice Department, the newly appointed Solicitor General Robert Bork, to 
fire Cox, which Bork proceeded to do (Drew, pp. 51-53; Gormley, pp. 356-358).  As one 
journalist described it, “An enigmatic President has summarily fired three men – men who had 
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built up some public trust” (Drew, p. 52).  The press referred to the multiple events of Saturday, 
October 20, as “The Saturday Night Massacre” (Gormley, p. 361).   
 Archibald Cox’s last official act as Special Watergate Prosecutor was to issue a one-
sentence statement for the public, a statement recalling Aristotle’s ancient question, the answers 
to which threaded their way through the nation’s legal and political history:  “Whether ours shall 
continue to be a government of laws and not of men is now for Congress and ultimately the 
American people” (Gormley, p. 358; see also Drew, p. 53). 
 The American public’s response was immediate and overwhelming, so much so that it 
was portrayed by the Nixon people as an erupting “’firestorm’ of public opinion,” a protest later 
described as “so intense and dramatic that no single participant in the Watergate affair could 
have ever predicted its fury” (Gormley, p. 361).  One journalist wrote: 
“Firestorm.”  I had always thought of the word in connection with the 
firestorm of Dresden, in the Second World War – a word of terrifying 
connotations, like “holocaust.”  A word one would use with care.  Reporters 
believe that the word was first used in connection with last weekend by 
[Nixon press secretary] Ron Ziegler.  (Drew, p. 66) 
 
According to historian Theodore White, “[T]he explosion of public sentiment after the Saturday 
night firing of Archibald Cox was as fierce and instantaneous as the day Pearl Harbor had been 
attacked, or the day John F. Kennedy had been assassinated” (Gormley, p. 362).  Over “450,000 
Mailgrams and telegrams,” an amount that was “nearly quadruple the previous record,” were 
sent to the Capitol and the White House criticizing Nixon’s actions against the Watergate Special 
Prosecutor in the days following the Saturday Night Massacre (Gormley, p. 362).  Describing the 
unprecedented outpouring of public criticism of White House actions, one Congressman 
observed that “[I]t was ‘as if a dam had broken’” (White, p. 268).  According to a television 
news reporter: 
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The events of that weekend caused something to snap in the country.  Some 
fragile membrane of patience and tolerance broke and Washington was 
deluged with telegrams of outrage and demands for impeachment.  It was in 
reaction to that “firestorm,” as White House aides called it, that the hitherto 
reluctant House Judiciary Committee began to crank up the complicated 
machinery for impeachment proceedings.  (Rather & Gates, p. 311) 
 
During the week following the events of October 20, “House members introduced twenty-two 
separate bills calling for the impeachment of the president or investigation into impeachment 
proceedings” (Gormley, p. 380).  Joining together in a petition, the deans of seventeen law 
schools (which included Stanford, Yale, Columbia, and Harvard) requested “that Congress 
‘consider the necessity’ of impeachment now” (White, pp. 268-269).  The House Judiciary 
Committee began preparing for impeachment proceedings “for the first time in 105 years,” and 
on October 30, “the House Judiciary Committee granted sweeping subpoena power to Chairman 
Peter Rodino, who pledged to proceed ‘full steam ahead’” (Gormley, pp. 380; 380, n. 21).  
Summarizing the thinking that precipitated the firestorm of public opinion, one historian wrote: 
The White House had defied the courts.  If the law did not bind the 
President to obedience in this instance, what laws could prevent him from 
other abuses of power, public or secret?  The question was now not one of 
burglary, break-in, cover-up, but of power itself – and the White House had 
been caught in a total misreading of the American mind.  (White, pp. 269-
270) 
 
In response to the overwhelming public and political criticism, the White House did an about-
face and capitulated. 
Within three days, Charles Alan Wright, the President’s Constitutionalist, 
stood before Judge Sirica to capitulate, to announce that the President would 
yield the tapes demanded.  “This President does not defy the law,” said 
Wright, though his client three days before had done exactly that.  (White, p. 
270) 
 
 In another note, Ralph Nader and others filed a law suit against Robert Bork because of 
his role in firing Cox.123  Cox was not involved in the suit and “disavowed any connection with 
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it” (Gormley, p. 383).  On November 14, 1973 the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia ruled in Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (1973), that Bork’s action in firing Cox as 
Special Watergate Prosecutor “was in clear violation of an existing Justice Department 
regulation having the force of law and was therefore illegal” (Gormley, p. 383).  The regulation 
to which District Court Judge Gesell referred was the agreement reached by Richardson and 
Cox, an agreement that Attorney General Richardson had published in the Federal Register on 
June 4, 1973 that gave the agreement the force of law (366 F. Supp. 104, 107, n. 4).  The ruling 
did not have the effect of reinstating Cox, and he “refused to seek any remedy in connection with 
[the] ruling” because Cox thought that “Ralph Nader was just distracting attention from the real 
issue” (Gormley, p. 383).  According to Archibald Cox, the real issue resided in the answer that 
America would provide to the question first posed by Aristotle more than 2,000 years previous to 
the events of 1973.  In Cox’s view: 
The issue wasn’t one of whether Cox ha[d] a job or not.  What happened to 
Cox was of no importance.  The issue was whether the president of the 
United States was going to be subject to the law as declared by the courts of 
the land.  (Gormley, p. 383) 
 
 America’s answer to the question posed by Aristotle contained several strands:  the 
efforts of investigative journalists operating under the assumption of a free press; the integrity 
possessed by both an Attorney General and a deputy Attorney General that required them to take 
a conscientious stand based upon principle and honesty in opposing unprincipled, self-serving 
orders issued by their supervisor; the actions of a Special Watergate Prosecutor who viewed his 
job as an integral part of the American answer to Aristotle’s ancient question; an American 
public who rose in indignation at an American president’s attempts to place himself above the 
law; as well as the efforts provided by the two other branches of government provided by the 
Framers, who had embedded the doctrine of the Separation of Powers in the Constitution.  
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Although separate activities, the individual strands wove together around the core response of 
America’s answer, an answer that one commentator tied in with a previous answer given 
previously by another civilization, that represented by the Republic of Rome.  The commentator 
drew attention to two separate federal government actions that occurred on the same day in July 
of 1974.   On the morning of July 24th, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its ruling in United States 
v. Nixon, an opinion that “reined in extravagant assertions of President Richard Nixon’s lawyers, 
who claimed presidential power to be unlimited, especially as to foreign and defense matters, and 
defined solely by a president’s own judgment” and which proclaimed “that no one is above the 
law” (Hall, 1992, p. 593).  During the evening hours of that same day, July 24, 1974, Chairman 
Peter Rodino called to order the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives so that 
official impeachment proceedings could begin.  The commentator continued by noting that the 
members of the House Judiciary Committee would, over the course of the “next six days,”  
act to define power – theirs, the people’s and the President’s – in rolling, 
vivid and brilliant debate for all the world to see and hear.  “Fiat justitia, 
ruat coelum,” the Roman lawmakers had said.  “Let Justice be done, though 
the heavens fall.”  Justice, at every level of American power, was now under 
way:  in two weeks a President would fall.  (Emphasis in original) (White, p. 
5) 
 
Perhaps it is appropriate to conclude with the answer (as well as the reasoning) provided by 
Aristotle to the question he posed in the fourth century B.C.E.124 so that the reader may compare 
the various responses offered.  According to Aristotle: 
To invest the law then with authority is, it seems, to invest God and 
intelligence only; to invest a man is to introduce a beast, as desire is 
something bestial and even the best of men in authority are liable to be 
corrupted by anger.  We may conclude then that the law is intelligence 
without passion and is therefore preferable to any individual.  (Emphasis in 
translation) (Aristotle, Book III, ch. xvi; Welldon, p. 154) 
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As can be seen from the illustration on the preceding page, District of Columbia v. 
John R. Thompson Co. was the only case cited by the Court in Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States.  However, that 1953 Court ruling represented the tip of an 
iceberg of prior case law, much of it within the decade preceding 1953. 
 
The two cases cited by the Court in its District of Columbia ruling constituted a 
strategic point in that both cases, Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan and Railway 
Mail Assn. v. Corsi, affirmed state supreme court decisions upholding state-
enacted civil rights legislation in the respective states of Michigan and New York.  
The Court’s Bob-Lo decision contained a plethora of recently decided cases in 
addition to one late nineteenth-century case, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, whose decision 
had lain dormant for better than half a century.  Finally, while the District of 
Columbia ruling cited two cases upholding state supreme court decisions that 
validated state laws prohibiting segregation in public accommodations and travel, 
the referenced Bob-Lo decision cited a case where the U.S. Supreme Court 
overturned a state supreme court decision validating a state law requiring 
segregation in public accommodations and travel.   
 
The cases listed on the previous page will be briefly annotated for the 
purpose of providing contextual information in order to deepen both an 
understanding of and appreciation for the careful work involved in building 




District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., Inc., 346 U.S. 100 (1953). 
 
Justice William O. Douglas wrote and delivered the Court’s opinion whereby the Court held 
Congress had delegated law-making powers to the District of Columbia that included the police 
power to adopt laws prohibiting racial discrimination.  The District of Columbia had enacted two 
laws, one in 1872 and the other in 1873, that made “it a crime to discriminate against a person on 
account of race or color or to refuse service to him on that ground” (p. 101). 
 
The Thompson Company, owner of several restaurants, was prosecuted in a criminal proceeding 
“for refusal to serve certain members of the Negro race at one of its restaurants in the District of 
Columbia solely on account of the race and color of those persons” (p. 100).  Upon conviction, 
the company appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, who 
overturned the conviction.  On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Circuit Court’s 
ruling, thus affirming the criminal court’s conviction of the restaurant company. 
 
The particular citation referred to by the Court in its Heart of Atlanta Motel ruling follows: 
 
And certainly so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned there is no 
doubt that legislation which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in 
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the use of facilities serving a public function is within the police power of 
the states.  See Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93-94; Bob-Lo 
Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28, 34.  (p. 109) 
 
Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945). 
 
Thurgood Marshall and members of his legal team filed a brief of amicus curiae for the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).  The New York Civil Rights 
Law prohibited “any ‘labor organization’” from denying “any person membership by reason of 
his race, color or creed” (p. 88).  The Railway Mail Association, “an organization of regular and 
substitute postal clerks, limit[ed] its membership to persons of the Caucasian race and native 
American Indians” (p. 88).  Officers of one of the Railway Mail Association’s “branch 
associations raised the question of [the Associations denial of membership based on race] with 
the … State of New York” (p. 91).  Believing that New York’s Civil Rights Law would be 
enforced against it, the Railway Mail Association filed suit in state court seeking “an injunction 
restraining enforcement against it” (p. 91).  The lower state court granted the injunction, but the 
Appellate Division reversed the lower state court’s ruling.  On appeal to the New York [Supreme 
Court], the Appellate Division’s ruling was affirmed.  The New York Supreme Court’s ruling 
was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 
The Railway Mail Association argued that the New York Civil Rights Law “offend[ed] the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an interference with its right of selection to 
membership and abridgment of its property rights and liberty of contract” (p. 93).  The Court 
responded: 
 
A judicial determination that such legislation violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment would be a distortion of the policy manifested in that 
amendment, which was adopted to prevent state legislation designed to 
perpetuate discrimination on the basis of race or color.  We see no 
constitutional basis for the contention that a state cannot protect workers 
from exclusion solely on the basis of race, color, or creed…  (pp. 93-94) 
 
The Court unanimously upheld the New York State Supreme Court’s ruling.  In a separate 
concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter characterized the Association’s claim as being “devoid of 
constitutional substance,” and remarked: 
 
[A] state may choose to put its authority behind one of the cherished aims of 
American feeling by forbidding indulgence in racial or religious prejudice to 
another’s hurt.  To use the Fourteenth Amendment as a sword against such 
State power would stultify that Amendment.  (p. 98) 
 
Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948). 
 
Thurgood Marshall and his legal team filed a brief of amicus curiae for the NAACP.  The 
Michigan Civil Rights Act stated: 
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All persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to full and 
equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, hotels, 
restaurants, eating houses, barber shops, billiard parlors, stores, public 
conveyances on land and water, theatres, motion picture houses, public 
educational institutions, in elevators, on escalators, in all methods of air 
transportation and all other places of public accommodation, amusement, 
and recreation…  (p. 32) 
 
The Michigan Civil Rights Act, in similar fashion to the New York Civil Rights Act, was passed 
in the wake of the Court’s decision in the Civil Rights Cases wherein the Court had ruled that the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not protect the public accommodations requirements of the U.S. 
Civil Rights Act of 1875.  Since the public accommodations requirements of the 1875 Act had 
no constitutional justification, they constituted “an impermissible attempt … to create a … code 
regulating the private conduct of individuals in the area of racial discrimination” (Hall, 1992, p. 
149).  Michigan was one of “many states” to have passed such state civil rights legislation at the 
time (p. 33).  According to the Court, “Seventeen other states have similar, and in many 
instances substantially identical, legislation.  The statutory citations are given in Morgan v. 
Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 382, n. 24” (p. 33, n. 10).125 
 
The term, Bob-Lo, was a “corruption” of Bois Blanc Island, a “part of the Province of Ontario, 
Canada,” that was located “just above the mouth of the Detroit River, some fifteen miles from 
Michigan’s metropolis upstream” (p. 29).  Bob-Lo was thought of as Detroit’s “Coney Island” 
(p. 29).  Besides owning “almost all of Bois Blanc in fee,” which it operated “as a place of 
diverse amusements,” the Bob-Lo Excursion Company owned and operated “two steamships for 
transporting its patrons of the island’s attractions from Detroit to Bois Blanc and return” (p. 29). 
 
Sarah Elizabeth Ray, an employee of the Detroit Ordnance District and also part of a class being 
“conducted at the Commerce High School under the auspices of the ordnance district,” planned 
to take part in a class “excursion to Bois Blanc” (p. 30).  According to the facts set forth by the 
Court, “All [thirteen girls] were white except Miss Ray” (p. 30).  After the girls had purchased 
their tickets and boarded the boat, Miss Ray was “escorted,” over her objections, from the boat 
“because she was colored” (p. 31). 
 
Upon a complaint filed by Miss Ray, “criminal prosecution followed … for violation of the 
Michigan civil rights act in the discrimination practiced against Miss Ray” (p. 31).  The Bob-Lo 
Excursion Company was found “guilty as charged” by the Recorder’s Court for Detroit and 
“sentenced … to pay a fine of $25” (p. 31).  Upon appeal the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed 
the lower court’s ruling, which was then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision, 7-2, with Chief 
Justice Hughes and Justice Jackson dissenting.  The Court stated: 
 
It is difficult to imagine what national interest or policy … could reasonable 
be found to be adversely affected by applying Michigan’s statute to these 
facts or to outweigh her interest in doing so.  Certainly there is no national 
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interest which overrides the interest of Michigan to forbid the type of 
discrimination practiced here.  (p. 40) 
 
Interestingly, the prior case law was not cited in the majority opinion, but instead in Justice 
Douglas’s concurring opinion.  Those cases will be each treated separately in the following 
material in the order in which they were cited in the concurrence of Justice Douglas.  The case 
citation will also include the pages of the ruling to which Douglas specifically referred when he 
so specified. 
 
Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946). 
 
Thurgood Marshall argued the case on behalf of the appellant, Ms. Morgan.  The 7-1 Court held 
that a Virginia law requiring segregation of passengers on interstate motor buses was 
unconstitutional because “separation of races in interstate transportation” interfered with 
interstate commerce (p. 386).  The Court’s decision overturned the ruling by the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia, which had previously upheld the validity of the Virginia statute.  Both 
the historical context and significance of Morgan v. Virginia were noted by one of America’s 
eminent historians, C. Vann Woodward, in his noted work, The Strange Career of Jim Crow: 
 
 Because of its historic interest as one of the earliest areas in which the Jim 
Crow lawmakers entered, and because the Jim Crow car became the very 
symbol of the system, segregated transportation deserves special notice.  
The Supreme Court followed a course it took in other fields by first 
sharpening its insistence on equality of accommodations in allegedly 
‘separate but equal’ [sic] facilities, and then eventually ruled out segregation 
itself….  Not until 1946 did the Court, in Morgan v. Virginia, throw out a 
state law requiring segregation of a carrier crossing state lines.  (Woodward, 
1966, p. 140) 
 
Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Larabee Flour Mills Co., 211 U.S. 612, 619, 623-624 (1909) 
 
Drawing upon previous Court incorporation of common law in support of state attempts to 
prohibit unequal treatment, Justice Douglas cited this case in support of the following statement:  
“The common-law duty of carriers was to provide equal service to all, a duty which the Court 
has held a State may require of interstate carriers in the absence of a conflicting federal law” 
(333 U.S. 28, 41). 
 
Although the principle cited by Douglas emerged from a context not involving racial 
discrimination, the principle applied to discrimination regardless of what provided the basis for 
prejudicial action.  Larabee Flour Mills had obtained a Kansas Supreme Court ruling directing 
the Missouri Pacific Railway Company to provide the mill with the same rail service it was 
providing to other companies situated along its lines.  The railroad obtained a writ of error from 
the U.S. Supreme Court; however, the Court affirmed the ruling of the Kansas Supreme Court. 
 
Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945). 
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Although already discussed as one of the two cases cited by the Court in District of Columbia v. 
John R. Thompson Co., Justice Douglas also cited the same case in his concurring opinion for 
Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan.  The reader will recall that Thurgood Marshall submitted a 
brief for amici curia on behalf of the NAACP.  Justice Douglas cited the Corsi decision in 
support of the following legal principle:  “[T]he police power of a State under our constitutional 
system is adequate for the protection of the civil rights of its citizens against discrimination by 
reason of race or color” (333 U.S. 28, 41). 
 
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). 
 
Justice Douglas cited this case in support of his statement that Congress wouldn’t pass a law 
conflicting with Michigan’s Civil Rights Act because Congress had no power “to create different 
classes of citizenship according to color so as to grant freedom of movement … to certain classes 
only” (333 U.S. 28, 42).  Interestingly, Justice Douglas had offered a separate concurring opinion 
in Edwards v. California, a Court decision that struck down “a California statute, popularly 
known as the ‘Okie Law,’” which had “prohibited a person from bringing any nonresident 
indigent person into California” (Hall, 1992, p. 245). 
 
In its ruling, the Court indicated “that it would not accept stereotypical judgments about the poor 
as justification for laws discriminating against them” (Hall, 1992, p. 245).  Edwards had been 
charged with violating the California statute when he was apprehended by authorities 
transporting his wife’s unemployed brother, Duncan, from Texas to the Edwards’ home in 
California.  California, characterizing Duncan as a pauper, cited the following passage from a 
prior Court ruling in support of its contention that “the limitation upon State power to interfere 
with the interstate transportation of persons [was] subject to an exception in the case of 
‘paupers’” (p. 176): 
 
In City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102, at 143, it was said that it is “as 
competent and as necessary for a State to provide precautionary measures 
against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts, 
as it is to guard against the physical pestilence, which may arise from 
unsound and infectious articles imported, …”  (p. 176) 
 
In response to California’s assertion that Duncan was a “pauper” within the meaning of the 
Court’s decision in City of New York v. Miln, the Court responded: 
 
But assuming that the term is applicable to him [Duncan], we do not 
consider ourselves bound by the language referred to.  City of New York v. 
Miln was decided in 1837.  Whatever may have been the notion then 
prevailing, we do not think that it will now be seriously contended that 
because a person is without employment and without funds he constitutes a 
“moral pestilence.  Poverty and immorality are not synonymous.  (p. 177) 
 
Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 94 (1941). 
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This was an action protesting the lack of equality under the existing “Separate But Equal” 
principle upheld by the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson.  Arthur W. Mitchell, a member of the U.S. 
House of Representatives, had purchased a first-class ticket in a “Pullman sleeping car” for a 
journey by rail from Chicago, Illinois to Hot Springs, Arkansas on April 20, 1937 (p. 89).  The 
Court recounted the facts: 
 
Shortly after leaving Memphis and crossing the Mississippi River into 
Arkansas, the train conductor … compelled [Mitchell] over his protest and 
finally under threat of arrest to move into the car provided for colored 
passengers.  This was in purported compliance with an Arkansas statute 
requiring segregation of colored from white persons by the use of cars or 
partitioned sections providing “equal, but separate and sufficient 
accommodations” for both races.  (p. 89) 
 
Besides losing his air-conditioned sleeping compartment, the Honorable Representative Mitchell 
also lost access to “the train’s only dining-car and only observation-parlor car” (p. 90).  The 
coach to which the congressman was removed “was ‘an old combination affair,’ not air-
conditioned, … [and] without wash basins, soap, towels or running water [and flush toilets] 
except in the women’s section” (p. 90).  The car was described as being “filthy and foul 
smelling” (pp. 90-91).   
 
Congressman Mitchell filed a complaint with the Interstate Commerce Commission who, after 
conducting an investigation and hearing, dismissed the complaint.  Five of the Commissions 
members dissented from the decision (See p. 92).  Upon review as provided by the Interstate 
Commerce Act, the U.S. District Court for Northern Illinois upheld the Interstate Commerce 
Commission’s decision, which was then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court (See pp. 81, 93).  In 
a 9-0 decision, the Court reversed the decision made by the Commission and upheld by the lower 
court because “the discrimination shown was palpably unjust and forbidden by the Act” (p. 97).   
 
This legal action presented a number of interesting points.  First, the U.S. Justice Department 
sided with Congressman Mitchell against a federal administrative bureaucracy, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, with the nation’s Solicitor General arguing before the Court “that the 
Commission erroneously supposed that the Arkansas Separate Coach Law applied to an 
interstate passenger” (pp. 88, 92). 
 
The second point of interest arose from the collision between interstate commerce and “the 
separate coach laws of the several States,” which were enacted in the aftermath of the Plessy 
decision as part of “the Jim Crow code of discrimination and segregation” (p. 81; Woodward, p. 
116).  With the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act, Congress had taken aim at “the evil of 
discrimination” (p. 94).  Furthermore, according to the Court, there was “no basis for the 
contention that Congress intended to exempt any discriminatory action or practice of interstate 
carriers affecting interstate commerce which it had authority to reach” (p. 94).  Drawing attention 
specifically to the Act, the Court summarized and quoted the following: 
 
Paragraph 1 of § 3 of the Act says explicitly that it shall be unlawful for any 
common carrier subject to the Act “to subject any particular person … to 
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any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect 
whatsoever.”  49 U.S.C. 3.  (p. 95) 
 
Continuing, the Court further noted: 
 
From the inception of its administration the Interstate Commerce 
Commission has recognized the applicability of this provision to 
discrimination against colored passengers because of their race and the duty 
of carriers to provide equality of treatment with respect to transportation 
facilities.  (p. 95) 
 
The third point of interest provided by the case was the number and identity of states whose 
attorneys general submitted briefs “as amicus curia” urging the Court to affirm the decision of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission as upheld by the federal District Court.126  The list 
illustrated states where both state and public support for discriminatory actions ranked among the 
highest in the nation.  However, it was not an exclusive listing of states where racial prejudice 
was to be found. 
 
Justice Douglas cited Mitchell v. United States in his concurring opinion, Bob-Lo Excursion Co. 
v. Michigan, in support of the following proposition: 
 
If a sister State undertook to bar Negroes from passage on public carriers, 
that law would not only contravene the federal rule [barring such 
discrimination] but also invade a “fundamental individual right which is 
guaranteed against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Mitchell v. 
United States, supra, p. 94.  (333 U.S. 28, 42) 
 
It should be noted that although the Court discussed the intersection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the “state action” posed by the Arkansas statute requiring racial discrimination, 
the Court’s decision was based on the violation of the Interstate Commerce Act’s provisions by 
the railroad, a violation that was initially sustained by both the Interstate Commerce Commission 
and a federal district court (p. 94). 
 
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
 
Charles Hamilton Houston, the architect of the NAACP strategy for overcoming the legal 
“Separate But Equal” doctrine as judicially established by Plessy v. Ferguson, argued this case 
for “Lloyd L. Gaines, an African-American resident” of Missouri, who had been denied 
“admission to Missouri’s all-white law school” (Hall, 1992, p. 556).127  The official report of the 
Court’s opinion, while including the legal arguments by attorneys for Missouri, did not include 
the legal arguments advanced by Mr. Houston and his associates (pp. 338-342).  One can surmise 
from the opening of the Court’s 6-2 opinion, which was delivered by Chief Justice Hughes, that 
the “refusal [to admit Gaines on racial grounds] constituted a denial by the State of the equal 
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution,” 
was an argument presented by Houston (p. 342).128  The Court was requested to issue a writ of 
mandamus “to compel the curators of the University to admit [Gaines]” (p. 342). 
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At the original state court trial in Missouri, university officials admitted “that [Gaines’] ‘work 
and credits at the Lincoln University would qualify him for admission to the School of Law of 
the University of Missouri if he were found otherwise eligible’” (p. 343).  According to the 
Court’s summarization of the facts of the case: 
 
He [Gaines] was refused admission upon the ground that it was “contrary to 
the constitution, laws and public policy of the State to admit a negro as a 
student in the University of Missouri.”  It appears that there are schools of 
law in connection with the state universities of four adjacent States, Kansas, 
Nebraska, Iowa and Illinois, where nonresident negroes are admitted.  (p. 
343) 
 
For the Court, the critical legal question was “whether the provision for the legal education in 
other States of negroes resident in Missouri is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement 
of equal protection” (p. 348).  The Court sharpened the focus of the question on the next page of 
its opinion, stating, “The basic consideration is … what opportunities Missouri itself furnishes to 
white students and denies to negroes solely upon the ground of color” (p. 349).  Immediately 
prior to examining the facts in light of the legal question, the Court took note of the “duty of the 
State,” which, according to the Court, was a “duty when it provides such [legal] training to 
furnish it to the residents of the State upon the basis of an equality of right” (p. 349).  The Court 
summarized its view of the facts as applied to the legal question: 
 
The white resident is afforded legal education within the State; the negro 
resident having the same qualifications is refused it there and must go 
outside the State to obtain it.  That is a denial of the equality of legal right to 
the enjoyment of the privilege which the State has set up, and the provision 
for the payment of tuition fees in another State does not remove the 
discrimination.  (pp. 349-350) 
 
It was in conjunction with these arguments that the Court cited Yick Wo v. Hopkins.  And it was a 
phrase in the following elaboration of Yick Wo [in boldface], which, in turn, was cited by Justice 
Douglas in his separate concurring opinion in Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan where he 
stated, “Nothing short of at least ‘equality of legal right’ in obtaining transportation can satisfy 
the Equal Protection Clause” (333 U.S. 28, 42).  The Yick Wo citation and its elaboration by the 
Court in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada follows: 
 
The equal protection of the laws is “a pledge of the protection of equal 
laws.”  Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369.  Manifestly, the obligation 
of the State to give the protection of equal laws can be performed only 
where its laws operate, that is, within its own jurisdiction.  It is there that the 
equality of legal right must be maintained.  That obligation is imposed by 
the Constitution upon the States…  (Emphasis added) (p. 350) 
 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins was one of two cases cited by Chief Justice Hughes in consideration of the 
equal protection arguments before the Court.  The other case, University of Maryland v. Murray, 
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169 Md. 478, involved a similar legal matter, admission by “a black Marylander … and graduate 
of Amherst College” to the “law school of the University of Maryland” (McNeil, p. 138).  That 
case had been argued previously by Charles Hamilton Houston, but unlike the state courts in 
Missouri, the lower state court in Maryland “directed the university to admit Murray – in 
accordance with his constitutional right” McNeil, p. 139).  Six months later, “the Maryland Court 
of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s writ of mandamus” compelling Donald Murray’s 
admission to and attendance at the University of Maryland Law School (p. 139).129 
 
In its Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada decision reversing the ruling of the Missouri Supreme 
Court that had affirmed the lower state court’s decision upholding the action of the University of 
Missouri in denying Mr. Gaines admission to its law school, the U.S. Supreme Court announced: 
 
[T]he court denied the federal right which petitioner set up and the question 
as to the correctness of that decision is before us.  We are of the opinion that 
the ruling was error, and that petitioner was entitled to be admitted to the 
law school of the State University in the absence of other and proper 
provision for his legal training within the State.  (p. 352) 
 
A legal historian summarized both the significance and the immediate aftermath of Missouri ex 
re. Gaines v. Canada: 
 
The Gaines case thus became a pivotal event in the NAACP’s campaign to 
overturn the separate but equal standard.  While the Court did not repudiate 
segregation, the case signaled a new urgency in evaluating the standard.  As 
for Lloyd Gaines, he never enrolled in law school.  Shortly after the Court 
rendered its opinion, he disappeared, never to be heard from again.  (Hall, 
1992, p. 557) 
 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 
Since the relationship between Yick Wo v. Hopkins, Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, and 
Justice Douglas’ concurring opinion in Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan has already been 
explained on the previous page, this section will focus on providing a short synopsis of the case 
so the reader can fully ascertain its significance in relation to the issue of equal rights. 
 
First of all, the ruling actually involved two separate cases with almost identical factual and 
procedural histories, which, being nearly identical, were combined on appeal to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  Second, the historical context included Chinese laundries in San Francisco, anti-
immigration feelings by white Californians, and racist hostility to Chinese people.  Third, the 
procedural progress of the case included a trial before “the Police Judges Court, No. 2, of the city 
and county of San Francisco, conviction, imprisonment, application “for a writ of habeas corpus 
to the Supreme Court of California” for one party and to the “Circuit Court of the United States 
for the District of California” for the other party, denial of the applications, and appeals for a writ 
of error to the Supreme Court (pp. 356-357).130 
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In 1880 the City of San Francisco passed an ordinance requiring all people operating laundries 
“within the corporate limits of the city and county of San Francisco” to obtain “the consent of the 
board of supervisors” in order to legally operate a laundry (p. 357).  Operating a laundry without 
such permission was made a misdemeanor with a conviction resulting in a “fine of not more than 
one thousand dollars, or … imprisonment in the county jail not more than six months, or by both 
such fine and imprisonment” (p. 357). 
 
Facts that were “admitted on the record” by both parties included the following:  of the 
approximately 320 laundries, “about 240 were owned and conducted by subjects of China”; and, 
more than 200 applications by the two plaintiffs and their “countrymen … for permission to 
continue their [laundry] business” were denied by the board of supervisors while “all the 
petitions of those who were not Chinese, with one exception … were granted” (p. 359).  Also, 
the Court cited the third article of the treaty between the United States and China, which 
contained the following stipulation: 
 
If Chinese laborers, or Chinese of any other class … meet with ill treatment 
at the hands of any other persons, the Government of the United States will 
exert all its powers to devise measures for their protection, and to secure to 
them the same rights, privileges, immunities and exemptions as may be 
enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation, and to which 
they are entitled by treaty.  (pp. 368-369) 
 
The Court, previous to citing the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, declared: 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the 
protection of citizens….  These provisions are universal in their application, 
to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any 
differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the 
laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.  (Emphasis added) (p. 369) 
 
The Court noted that San Francisco’s laundry ordinances didn’t “prescribe” any “rule and 
conditions for the regulation of the use of property for laundry purposes to which all similarly 
situated [could] conform” (p. 368).  Instead, all decisions depend upon “the mere will and 
pleasure” of the supervisors (p. 368).  Applying these facts to the American theory and principles 
of government, the Court observed: 
 
When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of 
government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review 
the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do 
not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and 
arbitrary power.  (pp. 369-370) 
 
The Court continued its lesson in American Civics with a lengthy sentence that continued a line 
of thought running from Aristotle to the Massachusetts Bill of Rights authored by John Adams to 
Chief Justice Marshall’s use of it in Marbury v. Madison (See n. # 67): 
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But the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, 
considered as individual possessions, are secured by those maxims of 
constitutional law which are the monuments … securing to men the 
blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the 
famous language of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the government of the 
commonwealth “may be a government of laws and not of men.”  (p. 370) 
 
The Court noted the need to look beyond the literalness of a law and examine its effects: 
 
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it 
is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an 
unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations 
between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial 
of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.  (pp. 373-
374) 
 
Noting the fact of discrimination against Chinese launderers, the Court declared “that no reason 
for it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which 
in the eye of the law is not justified” (p. 374).  The Court concluded: 
 
The discrimination is, therefore, illegal, and the public administration which 
enforces it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws and a violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.  The imprisonment of the 
petitioners is, therefore, illegal, and they must be discharged.  (p. 374) 
 
The contrast between this ruling and the ruling by the Plessy Court is enough to make a grown 
person weep, both for the people who suffered as a result of Plessy and for the betrayal of the 
“American vision for a more perfect society” (Preceding manuscript, p. 31).  A legal scholar 
observed, “Although the Yick Wo decision was potentially sweeping, it did not achieve instant 
recognition.  After 1886 the Supreme Court’s composition changed, and the Court did not build 
upon this precedent until the mid-twentieth century” (Hall, 1992, p. 949). 
 
   




Exchange Between the Supreme Court Justices and  
Roger Tellinghuisen, Attorney General For South Dakota, During Oral Argument of South 
Dakota v. Dole 
 
Tellinghuisen: I think that it could be suggested that Congress under its commerce clause powers 
could impose a regulation upon the states which it otherwise could not do in the 
face of the Twenty-First Amendment [sic]. 
 
The Court: I thought you were arguing that these conditions on receipt of Federal money 
were invalid in themselves. 
 
Tellinghuisen: I am arguing --   
 
The Court: Wholly aside from the Twenty-First Amendment.  Don’t you argue that? 
 
Tellinghuisen: No, I don’t.  I suggest in our brief that the conditions are invalid outside the 
context of the Twenty-First Amendment from the standpoint that they are 
coercive. 
 
The Court: Well, do you disavow the argument then submitted by the National Conference of 
State Legislatures in their amicus brief to the effect that there has to be a 
substantial relationship between the condition imposed on a grant and the 
spending of Federal money? 
 
Tellinghuisen: Your Honor, I am not in a position to suggest to this Court that I disagree with 
that proposition. 
 
The Court: Well, you certainly are.  You can say it is right or it is wrong. 
 
The Court: You just did a while ago. 
 
Tellinghuisen: What I am suggesting is that I am not prepared to address that issue in light of the 
fact that we have the Twenty-First Amendment.  I think it would be --   
 
The Court: What if you lose on that, and this Court is having to grapple with it?  Is that an 
argument you make or is it not? 
 
Tellinghuisen: It is from the standpoint that Congress’s power under the commerce clause is not 
without limitations, as this Court has noted, for instance, in Lawrence County v. 
Lead-Deadwood School District [sic].  And we would submit to the Court that the 
Tenth Amendment would operate as a bar upon Congress to impose these types of 
conditions which in effect are coercive upon the states, and that are being used – 
is being attached for a purpose not related to --   
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The Court: That is the same argument. 
 
The Court: Well, the argument made in that amicus brief is not one of coercion at all.  That is 
not the thrust of it. 
 
Tellinghuisen: The argument that is made in the amicus brief is not that the purpose for which 
the condition is attached is not proper, and I guess I would just have to maintain 
that I am not prepared to argue that particular fine point at this time because we 
are not dealing outside the scope of the Twenty-First Amendment. 
 
The Court: (Inaudible) suggest then, Mr. Attorney General, that the Tenth Amendment at 
least is not as much of an inhibitor on Federal regulation as would be the Twenty-
First? 
 
Tellinghuisen: I think that would certainly be in keeping with this Court’s prior decisions. 
 
The Court: And that is your position? 
 
Tellinghuisen: It may not be a position that I would like to advocate, but it is certainly one that I 
recognize. 
 
The Court: It sounds like if you lost on the Twenty-First then you would a fortiori lose on the 
Tenth. 
 
Tellinghuisen: Well, I guess I can sum it up, Your Honor, by just suggesting that if we lose on 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
   I. Congress may spend for “the general Welfare,” independent of its specific delegated 
regulatory powers.  In exercising its spending power, Congress may also establish conditions 
relating to its expenditure of funds; but to be valid as conditions, the requirements or prohibitions 
must relate directly to the grant itself.  The court of appeals erred in determining that the NMDA 
was a valid spending condition imposed by Congress. 
 The court of appeals improperly concluded that the NMDA did not constitute “coercion” 
of the States.  The Court ignored both the legislative history, which plainly demonstrates that the 
NMDA is a coercive measure, and the practical dependence of the States on federal highway 
funds.  In any event, the “coercion/inducement” test is not helpful in determining whether a 
requirement attached to a grant is valid as a condition under the Spending Clause, or is a 
regulatory enactment that must be supported by the powers specifically delegated to Congress.  
The coercion/inducement test stems from Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), 
whose holding upon close analysis, fails to support it.  Since Steward, the Court has recognized 
on numerous occasions that there is no constitutionally significant difference between coercing 
action by withholding a benefit and inducing action by granting a benefit.  Either may operate as 
a coercive measure destructive of fundamental rights. 
 A more pertinent inquiry is whether the condition relates directly to the purpose of the 
expenditure to which it is attached, or is, rather, legislation directed to another, distinct federal 
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purpose.  In the latter case, the condition cannot be a valid exercise of the spending power, 
although it may be valid pursuant to one of Congress’ expressly delegated regulatory powers 
(Emphasis in original). 
 The NMDA bears no direct relationship to the grant of federal funds for the construction 
and improvement of highways.  The amendment does not specify the purpose for which the 
funds may be spent, does not relate to the highways which are the object of the expenditure, and 
does not even relate to users of the highway.  Instead, its effect is to legislate in an extraneous 
area by limiting the States’ discretion to control the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages 
within their borders.  That is the effect that Congress intended, as appears clearly from the 
legislative history.  Under these circumstances, the NMDA is not a valid exercise of the spending 
power; and it must be examined to determine whether it is within the scope of Congress’ 
delegated regulatory powers (Emphasis in original). 
   II. Congress has not power under the Constitution to enact a national minimum drinking age.  
The State’s right to “regulate the sale or use of liquor within its borders” lies with the “core § 2 
powers” vested in the States by the Twenty-first Amendment.  Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. 
Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 713 (1984).  That Amendment “directly qualifies the federal commerce 
power” (324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, No. 84-2022, slip op. 10 (U.S. January 13, 1987)), the only 
possible source of authority for regulation by Congress of the local sale and consumption of 
alcoholic beverages.  There is no place for a “balancing” test in the area of “the State’s central 
power under the Twenty-first Amendment” to “regulat[e] the times, places, and manner under 
which liquor may be imported and sold” (Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. at 716).  The history of 
the Twenty-first Amendment, particularly the elimination of proposed § 3 because it would have 
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given Congress effective control over local liquor sales, demonstrates beyond doubt that 
Congress has no power to impose a national minimum drinking age. 
 Even if the Twenty-first Amendment did not preclude enactment of a national minimum 
drinking age, Congress has no power to compel the States to adopt laws to achieve that objective.  
This Court has never “sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate and 
enforce laws and regulations” (FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761-762 (1982)), but rather 
has expressed doubt on this point (id. At 762, n.26).  The constitutional division of powers 
between the national government and the States precludes Congress from mandating state 
legislation. 
 Accordingly, the National Minimum Drinking Age Amendment cannot be sustained, 
either as an exercise of Congress’ broad spending power or under the regulatory powers 
delegated to it by the Constitution. 
 
B. The Validity Of “Conditions” On A Grant Depends Upon 
Whether They Are Specifications As To The Use Of The 
Grant Or An Attempted Regulation. 
 
 Rather than the illusory inquiry whether a condition on spending is coercive, the proper 
inquiry is whether the requirement imposed by Congress is a condition at all, or whether it is in 
fact a regulation.  Butler may have approved the “expenditure of public moneys for public 
purposes” (297 U.S. at 66), without regard to limitations implicit in the direct grants of 
legislative power, but it did not approve conditions on the expenditure of public moneys that 
serve regulatory purposes unrelated to the object of the expenditure.  Thus, not every spending 
condition related to the national interest is valid as a lawful exercise of the spending power.  The 
condition must relate to the purpose of the expenditure, not to some other national purpose that 
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serves the “general Welfare.”  Otherwise, it is not a spending condition at all.  It is simply 
regulation, and, as such, valid only if supportable as an exercise of a delegated power other than 
the spending power. 
 An example illustrates this point.  Suppose that Congress, in the interest of the “general 
Welfare” in enhanced science education, determines to provide grants to the States to build 
schools.  Congress may attach to those grants the requirement that those schools contain science 
laboratories.  Congress may not, however, require that all other state schools have science 
laboratories because that requirement does not relate to the proper expenditure of the federal 
funds.  It does relate to the national interest in science education; but because it does not relate to 
the purpose of the grant, it is regulation, not an exercise of the spending power.  It may be valid 
as regulation, or it may not be; but it is not a lawful exercise of power under the Spending 
Clause.  Although Congress has the power to spend for the general welfare, it has the power to 
legislate only for delegated purposes (Emphasis in original).  The distinction is crucial if any 
semblance of a federal government of limited powers is to be preserved. 
 The appropriate inquiry, then, is whether the spending requirement or prohibition is a 
condition on a grant or whether it is regulation.  The difference turns on whether the requirement 
specifies in some way how the money should be spent, so that Congress’ intent in making the 
grant will be effectuated.  Congress has no power under the Spending Clause to impose 
requirements on a grant that go beyond specifying how the money should be spent.  A 
requirement that is not such a specification is not a condition, but a regulation, which is valid 
only if it falls within one of Congress’ delegated regulatory powers. 
 The will of the people as embodied in the Constitution grants to Congress only specific 
delegated powers.  All powers not so delegated are expressly reserved to the States and to their 
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people.  Federal regulation, even though disguised as a spending condition, that exceeds 
Congress’ delegated regulatory powers, threatens “the separate and independent existence” of the 
States.  Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869). 
 All of this is not to say that the Court must invalidate a purported condition on a grant 
that is found to be a regulation.  As a regulation, the condition would be valid if it fell within one 
of Congress’ delegated regulatory powers.32  A test that inquires whether the federal requirement 
is a condition at all, i.e., a specification as to the use of grant funds, rather than a regulation, need 
not call into question any decision of this Court.33  It will merely ensure that the decision in this 
case and others in the future will reflect the constitutionally imposed limits on Congress’ 
authority. 
C. The National Minimum Drinking Age Amendment Is Not 
A Condition On the Expenditure of Federal funds, But An 
Attempted Regulation. 
 
 At issue in this case is the requirement that States enact a minimum drinking age as a 
condition on the grant of highway funds.  Its validity thus depends on whether the adoption of a 
minimum drinking age is a necessary and proper condition to effectuate Congress’ purpose in 
providing funds to the States for highway construction, not to effectuate some other national 
purpose, no matter how laudable. 
                                                 
32
 It is well settled that legislation invalidly enacted under one of Congress’ powers will be 
upheld if valid under another.  See Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948); 
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. at 61. 
33
 Thus, in the earliest spending condition cases, Butler and Steward, the “condition” could 
have been sustained as regulation under the Commerce Clause.  Much of the confusion in the 
early spending and taxing cases no doubt resulted from what is now seen as an overly narrow 
view of the commerce power.  Compare Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), with 
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).  Thus, we do not urge, as the Solicitor General 
characterizes petitioner’s argument (Op. Cert. 10), that “any condition attached to a 
legislative grant of funds would be unconstitutional unless it were independently supported 
by some clause of the Constitution other than the Spending Clause.”  We argue simply that 
requirements that are not “spending” conditions must be independently supported. 
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 There is no dispute that Congress, pursuant to its spending power, may grant funds to the 
States to build and maintain highways.  Nor is there any dispute that Congress may impose 
specifications necessary to effectuate its intent in spending for those highways, by dictating, for 
example, that the highway shall be built in a certain location, or according to a certain 
construction design, or that it shall have special lanes designated for use by high occupancy 
vehicles, or shall not be used by vehicles over a certain weight.  Such conditions, which relate 
either to the construction of the highway or to its use, may be necessary to accomplish the 
purpose of the grant itself.  They are lawful specifications on the use of the federal funds 
provided; and they are valid for the same reasons that Congress may spend money for health care 
and specify that none of that money may be spent on abortions (see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 
297 (1980)), or spend money on local public works projects and specify that a percentage of the 
funds must be allocated to minority contractors (see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)).  
As the purchaser of a highway, Congress is entitled to specify, just like any other purchaser, 
precisely the kind of highway that it wants.  What Congress may not do pursuant to its spending 
power is to impose requirements on a grant that go beyond specifying how the money should be 
spent.  Those requirements are not conditions at all; they are regulation.  In the name of the 
general welfare, Congress may spend for anything that it wishes; but it cannot buy compliance 
with unrelated legislation that is not otherwise within its delegated regulatory powers. 
 That, however, is precisely what Congress attempted to do when it added the NMDA to 
the Surface Transportation Assistance Act.  The purpose of Title I of that Act was to provide 
funds to complete, and to resurface, restore, rehabilitate, and reconstruct the Interstate System, 
and to fund system-related projects.  See H.R. Rep. No. 555, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 2-3 (1982), 
reprinted in  4 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3639, 3640-41 (1982).  The purpose of the NMDA, 
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as identified by the court below and set out clearly in the legislative history, was to prevent 
teenage highway deaths attributable to drunk driving, particularly when teenagers drive across 
state lines to drink.  Preventing teenage highway deaths is obviously an important goal; South 
Dakota and other States are themselves pursuing it by various means (see n. 11, supra).  A 
national minimum drinking age of twenty-one may aid in effectuating this goal.  But a national 
minimum drinking age is not related to Congress’ intent in expending funds for the construction 
and maintenance of national highways. 
 The NMDA does not specify anything concerning the nature of the highways for which 
Congress wishes to spend federal funds.39  Instead, the amendment uses the States’ need for 
federal highway dollars to accomplish an unrelated regulatory purpose.  The court below upheld 
the amendment on the ground that it furthered an important national purpose, the elimination of 
drunk driving by young adults.  On that theory, the condition would have been equally related to 
any other federal expenditure, such as the hypothetical grant of funds to the States for science 
education. 
                                                 
39
 It cannot reasonably be argued that Congress wished to spend its funds on a “safe” highway, 
defined to be a highway free of drunk drivers.  The NMDA was attached not to the grant of 
safety funds, but to general highway construction funds.  See, e.g., S8206 (remarks of Sen. 
Danforth); see also H5395 (remarks of Rep. Howard); H5398 (remarks of Rep. Florio).  
Moreover, the condition was imposed after the grants for the highways were made and the 
States took advantage of the unrestricted federal aid to build highways, the use of which 
Congress now seeks to control.  The condition is also at once so overbroad and 
underinclusive that it plainly does not accomplish even the goal of safe highways.  The 
NMDA requires the States to prohibit the purchase of alcohol by all persons younger than 21, 
whether or not they ever drive; and it does nothing about the drivers older than 21, who 
account for 84% of the accidents (see n. 15, supra).  It is apparent that the goal of uniformity, 
in which Senator Danforth, a sponsor of the bill, stated that Congress was “more interested 
than the precise age” (S8219), would have been served as well by requiring all States to 
lower the drinking age to 18, while the problem of youthful drivers would have been better 
served by raising the driving age. 
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 Moreover, unlike true spending conditions, which merely specify the permissible uses of 
federal funds, the congressional purpose of establishing a uniform minimum drinking age cannot 
be accomplished unless all the States take the grants and comply with the condition.  The 
decision by even a single State to forgo the federal funds in order to avoid compliance would 
thwart the regulatory end.  The dependence on uniformity is the hallmark of regulation, not grant 
conditions.40  The court of appeals held that withholding highway funds pending the adoption of 
a minimum drinking age is “reasonably related to Congress’s interest in achieving a nationally 
uniform minimum drinking age.”  Pet. App. A13.  This tautology, however, has no bearing on 
the issue whether the condition is reasonably related to the grant to which it is attached.  The 
court of appeals’ syllogism – that Congress could have concluded that drinking and driving by 
young adults was a problem of national proportions; that a uniform minimum drinking age would 
lessen that problem; and that the grant condition was therefore reasonably related to solution of 
the national problem – is a fine description of support for the exercise of the regulatory power.  It 
has nothing to do with the exercise of the spending power.   
 The error of the court of appeals’ analysis is patent.  If the courts uphold grant conditions 
that are not specifications for the grant itself, but are simply, in some way, “in the general 
welfare,” Congress assumes license to regulate for the general welfare, i.e., without regard to the 
limitations inherent in the grant of specific delegated regulatory powers.  As we discuss below, 
the NNMDA is not within those powers. 
 
                                                 
40
 Ironically, in the absence of uniformity, a State that does comply might suffer increased 
teenage deaths due to drunk driving.  If two adjacent States set the drinking age below 21, 
and one raises the drinking age because it cannot afford to forgo the federal highway funds, it 
might for the first time see its youths create “blood borders” by drinking in the adjacent 
State, whereas it previously kept them close to home. 
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Appendix R 
The Concept of Universal Rights:   
Its Historical Development and Implementation 
 
Overview 
 The Declaration of Independence, passed and signed by the Second Continental Congress 
on July 4, 1776, can be viewed as the world’s first political document adopted by either a 
national or an international governmental body which declared universal rights for all men, 
regardless of birth or circumstance.  The second paragraph of the U.S. Declaration of 
Independence states: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that 
among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.  That to secure 
these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed…  (Declaration of Independence) 
 
 It would be incorrect to view Magna Carta as a political document guaranteeing 
individual liberties to all men.  In Magna Carta, King John granted certain rights to the English 
aristocracy.  Magna Carta’s importance lies in the fact that it was the first political document to 
place a ruling monarch under the rule of law and to act as a check on royal power on June 15, 
1215, the date on which King John agreed to the terms of Magna Carta (Willson, pp. 108-109).   
Magna Carta was solidified by the Declaration of Rights enacted by Parliament on December 16, 
1689, following the Glorious Revolution that deposed the Catholic King James.  The terms of the 
English Declaration of Rights were described as “a reaffirmation of those ‘true, ancient and 
indubitable rights of the people of this realm’” (Friedrich & Blitzer, p. 145).  Those rights 
included: 
(1) making or suspending any law without the consent of Parliament is 
illegal, (2) levying money without consent of Parliament is illegal, (3) the 
maintenance of a standing army without the consent of Parliament is illegal, 
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(4) it is lawful to petition the sovereign, (5) it is lawful for citizens to keep 
arms, (6) elections of members of Parliament must be free, (7) there must be 
freedom of debate in Parliament, (8) excessive bail should never be 
demanded, (9 juries should be empaneled in every trial, and (10) Parliament 
should meet frequently.  (Friedrich & Blitzer, p. 145) 
 
The English Declaration of Rights continued the trend begun by Magna Carta which reflected the 
idea that governments should be subjected to the rule of law, in this case the monarchy.   
 The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, enacted by the revolutionary 
National Assembly in France following the fall of the Bastille on July 14, 1789, can be viewed as 
the world’s second political document adopted by a governmental body that declared universal 
rights for all men.  The National Assembly had been created by the withdrawal of the Third 
Estate from the previous Estates General on June 17, 1789.  Upon their withdrawal, the Third 
Estate renamed themselves and whoever would join them “the National Assembly.”  These 
actions amounted “to a constitutional revolution, for now the elected deputies of ‘the nation’ 
displaced the old estates in which nobles and clergy dominated” (Censer & Hunt, p. 50).  The 
actions taken by the Third Estate received the sanction of King Louis XVI on June 27 when he 
ordered the members of the First and Second Estates (clergy & nobles) “to join the deputies of 
the Third Estate for deliberations in common” (Censer & Hunt, p. 51).  Subsequently the 
National Assembly voted to approve the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen on 
August 26, 1789.  This action had been delayed for a week because of “clerical reluctance to 
concede total freedom of thought and worship” (Doyle, p. 118).  The first and second articles of 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen declared: 
1. Men are born and remain free and equal in rights.  Social distinctions 
may be based only on common utility. 
2. The purpose of all political association is the preservation of the natural 
and imprescriptible rights of man.  These rights are liberty, property, 
security, and resistance to oppression.  (Censer & Hunt, p. 46) 
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 Just who was considered to be a man depended upon the sociopolitical norms of 
particular political societies.  In revolutionary America, “men” were deemed to be white males 
who owned property.  In revolutionary France, “men” were initially interpreted to be white 
Catholic males “who passed a test of wealth” (Censer & Hunt, p. 55).  However, in December 
1789 the National Assembly determined “that the Declaration applied to Protestants” as well 
(Censer & Hunt, p. 55).  In September 1791 the National Assembly included Jews in the 
definition of “citizens if they were willing to renounce their special tax and legal exemptions” 
(Censer & Hunt, p. 55).  Thus, during this period in French history, “about two-thirds of adult 
French men met the property requirement for voting under the new system” (Censer & Hunt, p. 
56).  Note that in both revolutionary America and revolutionary France, women were not deemed 
equal enough to vote. 
Full Citizenship and Voting Rights for Women 
 The right to vote for women came over a century later in both America and France.  The 
delay in the United States occurred partly because the development of organized political 
activism for women’s suffrage didn’t appear on the scene until 1848 when Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton and Lucretia Mott called for a conference to meet in Seneca Falls, New York, to address 
the issue of women’s rights following the refusal of a world anti-slavery convention in London 
to let Mott speak even though she was officially a delegate to the conference (Modern History 
Sourcebook: Seneca Falls: The Declaration of Sentiments, 1848).   Modeling their Declaration of 
Sentiments on the U.S. Declaration of Independence, the document approved by the Seneca Falls 
Conference declared: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are created 
equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; 
that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure 
these rights governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the 
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consent of the governed.  (Stanton, p. 70; see also Beard, Beard & Beard, p. 
210) 
 
Illustrative of the adaptive work needed to change values, beliefs, and attitudes about women 
being recognized as full citizens and the length of time required for adaptive work to have an 
impact upon society, the delay in the United States also occurred in spite of the passage and 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in the aftermath of the Civil War in 1868.  Section I of 
the Fourteenth Amendment clearly stated: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States… 
 
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment muddied the waters somewhat regarding gender.  While 
it didn’t define citizenship in terms of the voter’s gender, it did provide a penalty only when an 
eligible male was denied the right to vote.  According to Section 2: 
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for 
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in 
Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of 
the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such 
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in 
any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the 
basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the 
number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male 
citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
 
 It took only seven years from the time the Fourteenth Amendment was officially adopted 
in 1868 until a case reached the U.S. Supreme Court on the issue of women’s voting rights.  
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875) reached the U.S. Supreme Court by basing its argument 
for women’s suffrage on the Fourteenth Amendment (See previous pp. 131-136 of this 
document).  Ms. Minor, a resident of Missouri, was denied the right to register to vote by 
Happersett, the voter registrar, because “she was not a ‘male citizen of the United States,’ but a 
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woman” (88 U.S. 162, 163-164).  The Court denied Minor’s claim that Happersett’s action 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment by holding that citizenship didn’t include the right of 
suffrage.  While such reasoning wouldn’t have prevailed in ancient Athens (B.C.E.) where 
citizenship entitled one to both speak and vote on public issues, it prevailed two millennia later 
in nineteenth-century America (C.E.).  While Athens restricted citizenship to “freeborn males,” 
the issue being confronted was citizenship and what it meant (Stone, 1988, p. 10).  According to 
the ancient Greeks: 
Every citizen had the right to vote and speak in the assembly where the laws 
were enacted, and to sit in the jury courts where those laws were applied and 
interpreted.  These were the basic characteristics of Greek politics – the 
administration of its cities – long before Aristotle described them in the 
fourth century B.C. [sic]. (Emphasis in original) (Stone, 1988, p. 11) 
 
In addressing the issue of citizenship, however, the nineteenth-century U.S. Supreme Court 
elected to discard several centuries of political discourse flowing from Greek thought and chose 
to re-define citizenship.  According to the Court’s restricted definition in Minor v. Happersett, 
citizenship merely conveyed “the idea of membership of a nation, and nothing more” (88 U.S. 
162, 166).  Reasoning that citizenship and suffrage were separate entities, the Court ruled that 
“the fourteenth amendment [sic] did not affect the citizenship of women any more than it did of 
men” (88 U.S. 162, 170). 
 As a result, American women were not accorded the right to vote until 1920 when the 
Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution was approved (Monk, p. 238).  That same year 
Icelandic women were accorded full suffrage (See Appendix R1). Thus the country that created 
the world’s first parliament in 930 C.E. and the nation that created the first governmental 
declaration of universal rights for all men in 1776 C.E. recognized women as citizens with voting 
rights in the same year (Davis, p. 19).  In so doing, they became the 16th and 17th nations 
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worldwide to recognize the legal voting rights of women, which was approximately three 
decades after New Zealand became the world’s first nation to officially recognize the right of 
women to vote (See Appendix R1).  At the time the Nineteenth Amendment was passed, 16 
states and one territory of the U.S. had already enacted legislation giving women in their states 
full suffrage, 11 states granted presidential suffrage, two states allowed women to vote in 
primary elections, and 19 states completely denied women the right to vote in any election (See 
Appendix R1).  Prior to the Nineteenth Amendment being officially approved by Congress on 
June 4, 1919, to be submitted for ratification to the states and its subsequent approval by the 36th 
state for official ratification on August 18, 1920, “[a]mendments giving women the right to vote 
were introduced in Congress one after another for more than 40 years before this one [the 
Nineteenth] was finally passed” (Peltason, pp. 798r-798s). The  Nineteenth Amendment stated 
simply and clearly that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.”   
 French women were not recognized as voting citizens until 1944 when the provisional 
government headed by De Gaulle recognized the right of women to vote following the liberation 
of Paris from Nazi occupation (Censer & Hunt, p. 55; Hackett et al, p. 404l).  A modern-day 
commentator noted the long delay in French women being accorded the vote in spite of their 
“active participation in the French Revolution, the French Republic of 1848, [and the 1871 Paris 
Commune]” (Eraslan, p. 1).  Contrasting women’s suffrage in France with that achieved in the 
United States, Eraslan pointed out “that women’s suffrage could only be achieved in France 
thanks to a wartime decree by General Charles de Gaulle, not by the initiative of the legislators 
of the parliamentary republic” (Eraslan, pp. 1-2).  Moreover, “[A]mong the major European 
countries France was on of the last to grant women the vote” (Eraslan, p. 2).  Citing a source that 
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focused on the 1848 Revolution in France, Eraslan noted an oppositional irony in men’s 
attitudes: 
Ironically, leftist politicians were concerned that women could vote for 
conservatives whereas the Roman Catholic Church were opposing universal 
suffrage as its leaders feared that voting would emancipate women and 
cause the breakup of the family.  (Eraslan, p. 1) 
 
 French women went to the polls for the first time in October, 1945, to elect the National 
Assembly that would write the new French constitution for the Fourth Republic, an event that 
finally fulfilled expectations created by the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen 
(Hackett et al, p. 404l).  The promise of the French Revolution, “Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité,” and 
the possibility of its extension into the political lives of women had been cut short by a 
combination of the cultural revolutionary phase of the Reign of Terror’s effort to exert total 
control and force conformity to a revolutionary standard of behavior and by the rise of Napoleon 
to power as part of a conservative response to the Revolution.  The deputies of the National 
Convention under Robespierre’s influence began to crack down on “women’s political clubs, in 
particular the society of Revolutionary Republican Women.  The deputies associated women’s 
participation in the public sphere with political disorder and social upheaval” (Censer & Hunt, p. 
101).  One of the leading deputies of the National Convention, Jean-Baptiste Amar, “proposed an 
official decree on 30 October 1793 forbidding women to join together in political clubs” (Censer 
& Hunt, p. 82).  To justify such action, Amar posed what he viewed to be the critical issue and 
then articulated his own answer about women’s capabilities: 
Should women exercise political rights and get mixed up in the affairs of 
government?  Governing is ruling public affairs by laws whose making 
demands extended knowledge, an application and devotion without limit, a 
severe impassiveness and abnegation of self; governing is ceaselessly 
directing and rectifying the action of constituted authorities.  Are women 
capable of these required attentions and qualities?  We can respond in 
general no….  (Censer & Hunt, pp. 82-83) 
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In the view of two historians: 
The closing of women’s clubs marked an important turning point in the 
Revolution.  From then on the … political organizations came increasingly 
under the thumb of the Committee of Public Safety and the Jacobins in the 
Convention.  (Censer & Hunt, p. 101)   
 
 Napoleon’s views of the place of women in society did not differ from the sentiments of 
the revolutionary deputies of the National Convention.  According to two professors specializing 
in French history, Napoleon:  
effectively ended the French Revolution and set France on a new course.  
Step by step he created an authoritarian state: military officers, engineers, 
and scientists took most of the honors; the police maintained order through 
censorship, harassment, and house arrest; and a paternalistic legal code 
buttressed the authority of fathers over children, husbands over wives, and 
employers over workers.  (Censer & Hunt, p. 144) 
 
The “paternalistic legal code” referred to in the just-quoted passage was better known as the 
Napoleonic Code and took legal effect in 1804 (Censer & Hunt, p. 144; Cleary, p. 604).  
Although the new law code “guaranteed religious liberty and established a uniform system of 
law that ensured equal treatment for all adult males,” it also curtailed women’s rights by making 
women subject either to their fathers or to their husbands (Censer & Hunt, p. 147).  As discussed 
by a leading French jurist of the time:  
There have been many discussions on the equality and superiority of the 
sexes.  Nothing is more useless than such disputes….  Women need 
protection because they are weaker; men are free because they are stronger.  
(Censer & Hunt, p. 147) 
 
Professors Censer and Hunt summarized the Napoleonic Code framer’s attitude towards women:  
“[T]hey used women’s supposed innate weakness as justification for limiting the participation of 
women in public life and for legally protecting their separate, domestic roles to help reaffirm 
their wifely and motherly virtues” (Censer & Hunt, p. 147).  According to Censer & Hunt’s 
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comparative analysis of women’s rights under the French monarchy, the French Revolution, and 
the Napoleonic Code:   
The Civil Code took the male revolutionary ambivalence about women’s 
political participation a step further, modifying even those few revolutionary 
laws that had been favorable to women, and in some instances denying 
rights women had under the monarchy.  (Censer & Hunt, p. 147) 
 
The values and beliefs of the framers of the Napoleonic Code were more attuned to the views of 
Enlightenment writers, particularly Rousseau, “who insisted that natural law and reason 
demonstrated that men inherently possessed the right to political participation whereas women 
did not.  Nature and reason justified the exclusion of women from the republic” (Censer & Hunt, 
p. 185).  The impact of the conservative Napoleonic reaction on the original ideals of the French 
Revolution was long-lasting as it spanned a century-and-a-half of time.  “Not until 1965 did 
French wives gain legal status equal to that of their husbands” (Censer & Hunt, p. 147).131 
Citizenship and Voting Rights for American Indians 
 Introduction. 
 American Indians received U.S. citizenship and voting rights through a tangled, 
complicated, piecemeal process involving a combination of U.S. Supreme Court rulings and 
congressional legislation.  It was tangled and complicated because of the different views 
regarding the status of the Indian tribes and of tribal members that flowed from their treaty status 
and because of the constantly shifting political status of individual tribes vis-à-vis the United 
States.  Citizenship and, by extension, voting rights for tribal members, were inextricably 
intertwined with the political status of tribes and the respective sovereignty of tribal 
governments.  As part of a nonlinear circular process the political status of tribes, in turn, was 
impacted by congressional legislation and by Court rulings regarding the legitimacy of 
congressional action.  Finally, the assumptions, beliefs, and values of the dominant Europeans 
   
   
1181
and Euro-Americans added yet another ingredient to the social, economic, and political mix of 
impacting factors.  Treaties, Supreme Court rulings, and congressional action, out of which 
eventually flowed citizenship and voting rights for tribal members, were all grounded in a 
worldview that took for granted the following assumptions:  white superiority and nonwhite 
inferiority regarding the worth and ability of individuals, the superiority of western civilization 
and the corresponding inferiority of all other civilizations, and, finally, the superiority of 
agricultural-based societies compared with the inferiority of hunter/gatherer-based societies.  
Each of these factors will be discussed subsequently in order to trace the twisting, turning route 
whereby tribal members of the various Indian nations, situated in what eventually became the 
United States, eventually received U.S. citizenship and the right to vote. 
 Treaties as foreign relations. 
 From the beginnings of contacts between Europeans and the Indian tribes located 
between the Atlantic seaboard and the Mississippi River, from the Gulf of Mexico to the Great 
Lakes-St. Lawrence River region, the tribes were treated as foreign nations.  The various 
European governments negotiated treaties with the tribal governments and treated the tribes as 
nations to be dealt with as a part of their foreign policy.  As a result many tribes located east of 
the Mississippi possessed treaties with multiple European governments that had been negotiated 
during the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries.   For example the Meskwaki currently possess treaties 
and agreements (both written and oral) that the tribe negotiated with the French, the English, the 
Spanish, and the American governments (Cole, pp. 16-19; Eby, p, 40; Edmunds & Peyser, pp. 
202-204; Jung, pp. 13, 15, 18; Wanatee, p. 78; Waseskuk, pp. 56-57).   
 As the Europeans treated the Indian tribes, so did the fledgling American government.  
America’s first treaty as a newborn nation was not a treaty with a European nation.  America’s 
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first treaty following its Declaration of Independence and its birth as the newly formed United 
States of America was the treaty it negotiated with the Delaware, an Indian nation.  The treaty, 
signed at Fort Pitt on September 17, 1778, contained provisions permitting American troops to 
pass through Delaware territory “to attack the British posts on the Great Lakes” as well as a 
provision encouraging Delaware warriors to enlist in the Continental Army (Debo, pp. 86-87).  
The most interesting provision of the treaty promoting an alliance between the Delaware Nation 
and the United States for current students of American government, however, was the article 
tendering the possibility of statehood to the “Delaware Nation” with the resulting guarantee of 
having “a representative in Congress” (Debo, p. 87).   The idea of statehood and representation 
in Congress implied the right to vote; however, the treaty provision remained stillborn as the 
Delaware preferred to maintain their own sovereignty.  Never again did the United States make 
such an offer to the Delaware or to any of the other indigenous nations inhabiting the continent.  
In fact, the next treaty between the United States and the Delaware proved more typical of 
subsequent treaties between the various tribes and the newly emerged country.  According to the 
Treaty of Fort McIntosh, signed on January 21, 1785, the Delaware “were allotted a reservation 
of land and ceded to the United States other lands formerly claimed by them” (Prucha, 1984, 
1986, p. 34).    
 The two treaties between the U.S. and the Delaware Nation occurred when the United 
States was operating under the Articles of Confederation.  Thus, either Congress as a whole 
performed both legislative and executive functions regarding “peace and war,” “sending and 
receiving ambassadors,” and “entering into treaties and alliances,” or the appointed Committee 
of the States performed executive and legislative functions while congress was in recess (Article 
IX, Articles of Confederation).  This changed with the adoption of the Constitution which 
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separated executive and legislative functions.  Soon after the current Constitution was ratified by 
the necessary states, the question arose of how to handle treaties with the Indian tribes.  Should 
treaties with the Indian nations be ratified by the Senate as required by Article II, § 2, ¶ 2 of the 
Constitution, or was formal ratification not necessary since the negotiating and signing process 
could be considered sufficient for treaties between the United States and the various tribes?    
 President Washington submitted the first Indian treaties under the Constitution to the 
Senate on May 25, 1789, whereupon the Senate, “for the first time, entered upon executive 
business” (Gales, p. 40).  The Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United 
States of America provided more detailed information than did Gales’ The Debates and 
Proceedings in the Congress of the United States.  According to the Senate’s Journal of its 
executive proceedings, “General Knox brought the following message from the President, which 
he delivered into the hands of the Vice-President, and withdrew” (Senate of the United States, p. 
3; hereafter cited as Sen. Exec. J.).  The papers delivered by Knox as Secretary of War contained 
a brief introductory message from President Washington and a more detailed report by Secretary 
Knox.  The treaties submitted by the President via Secretary Knox to the Senate for its 
“consideration and advice” had been negotiated and signed at Fort Harmar on January 9, 1789 by 
“the United States and several nations of Indians” (Sen. Exec. J., p. 3).  One of the two treaties 
had been negotiated with the Iroquois, referred to as “the Six Nations, the Mohawks excepted,” 
while the other treaty was with “the Sachems and Warriors of the Wyandot, Delaware, Ottawa, 
Chippawa [sic], Pattiwatima [sic], and Sac nations” (Sen. Exec. J., p. 5).   
 In his report to the Senate, Secretary Knox observed that the treaty with the Six Nations 
had reserved “six miles square round the Fort at Oswego” to the Iroquois (Sen. Exec. J., p. 5).  
Knox pointed out that the reserved land was currently located “within the territory of the State of 
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New York” (Sen. Exec. J., p. 5).  In order to conform to the requirements of the Constitution, 
Knox suggested that “if this explanation should be made, and the Senate of the United States 
should concur in their approbation of the said treaties, it might be proper that the same should be 
ratified and published” (Sen. Exec. J., p. 5).  In other words, according to Knox’s thinking, 
without treaty status, the authority of the federal government to treat with the Indian tribes 
regarding state lands could be called into question.  The Senate tabled “the message from the 
President, with the papers accompanying the same … for consideration” (Sen. Exec. J., p. 5).   
 The Senate next took up consideration of the “President’s message of the 25th ult.” On 
Friday, June 12th after moving into executive session (Gales, p. 47).  After  reading the materials 
submitted previously, the Senate referred the matter “to a committee, consisting of Messrs. Few, 
Read, and Henry” (Gales, p. 47).  It would be slightly more than two months before the Senate 
considered the matter of the two Indian treaties.  According to a scholar who analyzed the 
process: 
The circumstances in which this decision [of how treaties with Indian tribes 
should be handled] was reached reveal how both the President and the 
Senate were feeling their way carefully and thoughtfully in the 
determination of the technique of treaty-making.  (Hayden, p. 12) 
 
 Finally, on Wednesday, August 26, 1879, the Senate moved into executive session in 
order “to consider the report of a committee, appointed June the 10th, on Indian treaties made at 
Fort Harmar” (Sen. Exec. J., p. 24).  The committee of Senators Few, Read, and Henry reported 
that since the treaties had been made in accord with the “powers and instructions … given to the 
said Governor by the late Congress,” they recommended that the treaties “be accepted; and that 
the President of the United States be advised to execute and enjoin an observance of the same,” 
whereupon the Senate “[o]rdered, That the consideration thereof be postponed” (Sen. Exec. J., p. 
24).  At this point it appeared as if the Senate felt it more important “to determine whether the 
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treaties referred to it were in accord with the instructions under which they were negotiated” 
rather than consider the question of whether formal ratification would be required (Hayden, p. 
13).  The Senate would not meet again in executive session until Tuesday, September 8th. 
 On September 8, 1789, the Senate approved part of the committee’s recommendation, 
adopting a resolution advising the President “to execute and enjoin an observance of the treaty” 
with “the Wyandot, Delaware, Ottawa, Chippewa, Pattawattima [sic], and Sac nations” (Sen. 
Exec. J., p. 25).  No mention was made of either ratification by the Senate or the Treaty with the 
Six Nations.  The Senate also reported that “an attested copy of the proceedings was laid before 
the President of the United States. (Sen. Exec. J., p. 25). 
 Shortly thereafter, the President having received a copy of the Senate’s resolution 
regarding one of the two treaties negotiated and signed at Fort Harmar, Secretary of War Knox 
delivered a second message to the Senate from President Washington.  In his message of 
September 17, 1789,  President Washington first observed that it was  
the general understanding and practice of nations, as a check on the mistakes 
and indiscretions of Ministers or Commissioners, not to consider any treaty 
… as final and conclusive, until ratified by the … government from whom 
they derive their powers.  (Sen. Exec. J., pp. 26-27) 
 
After noting that the United States had decided to follow this practice regarding “treaties with 
European nations,”132 the President expressed his own opinion by stating, “I am inclined to think 
it would be adviseable [sic] to observe it in the conduct of our treaties with the Indians” (Sen. 
Exec. J., p. 27).  Observing that even though the Indian nations did not have to submit a treaty 
negotiated by them to any of their own government bodies for ratification, Washington thought It 
“both prudent and reasonable” that such a treaty “not be binding on the nation [the U.S.] until 
approved and ratified by the government” (Sen. Exec. J., p. 27).    Instead of creating different 
classifications of treaties according to how the government treated them after they had been 
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negotiated, President Washington thought that the “national proceedings [regarding treaties 
should] become uniform, and be directed by fixed and stable principles” (Sen. Exec. J., p. 27).  
Washington then observed that the Senate’s action regarding the Fort Harmar treaties raised two 
questions: 
1st, Whether those treaties were to be considered as perfected, and 
consequently as obligatory, without being ratified?  If not, then 2dly, 
Whether both, or either, and which of them, ought to be ratified?  On these 
questions I request your opinion and advice.  (Sen. Exec. J., p. 27) 
 
The questions were critical (as will be shown through examination of the Marshall Court’s ruling 
in the Cherokee cases) because of two factors: first, the ability to negotiate a treaty with another 
power was recognized as an act of sovereignty; and second, the United States would later claim 
judicial legitimacy to its land holdings in North America by asserting that the United States was 
the sole and legitimate successor to all of Great Britain’s practices and accomplishments 
(including negotiating treaties with the various tribes) regarding the various Indian nations. 
 Realizing that a precedent under the newly adopted Constitution was being established, 
the Senate appointed yet another special three-person committee (Senators Carroll, King, and 
Read) to investigate the issues involved and to recommend which course of action should be 
taken with Indian treaties (Sen. Exec. J., p. 27).   
 In its report to the Senate on the following day (Friday, September 18), the committee 
drew a distinction between treaties with Indians and treaties with European nations.  The 
committee concluded that the solemnities of formal treaty ratification were not necessary with 
Indian treaties (Sen. Exec. J., pp. 27-28).  The Senate then postponed action on the committee’s 
report (Sen. Exec. J., p. 28).   
 Taking up the matter again on the following Tuesday, September 22, 1789, the Senate, 
after debating the committee report, rejected the committee’s recommendation and approved a 
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resolution ratifying only the Fort Harmar treaty negotiated with the Wyandot, Delaware, Ottawa, 
Chippewa, Potawatomi, and Sac “nations” (Sen. Exec. J., p. 28).   The Senate postponed action 
on the Fort Harmar treaty negotiated with the Iroquois  “until next session of Senate” because the 
treaty could “be construed to prejudice the claims of the States of Massachusetts and New York” 
(Sen. Exec. J., p. 28).  Despite two committee reports recommending the contrary position, 
through a “process of give and take” between the congressional and executive branches of 
government over the course of a four-month period, the full Senate agreed with President 
Washington that treaties with the Indian nations should be accorded the same treatment as 
treaties with other nations of the world in accordance with the Constitution’s provisions as 
outlined in Article II, § 2, ¶ 2 (Hayden, p. 16). 
 Status of tribal governments In the framework of american government. 
 The legal question regarding the status of Indian tribes and their members – were they 
foreigners as members of independent & sovereign nations, or were they conquered peoples, the 
tribes having no recognized governmental status with tribal members viewed as   citizens of the 
states in which they resided – was initially answered in two Supreme Court rulings (Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia) that are collectively known as the Cherokee Cases.    
 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
 The earliest judicial answer occurred in somewhat ambivalent form in Cherokee Nation 
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).  The case was precipitated by the discovery of gold on Cherokee 
land in Georgia and the ensuing illegal occupation of Cherokee land by gold-seeking whites in 
violation of numerous treaties between the Cherokee and the United States.  Georgia 
subsequently passed “a series of savage laws against the Cherokees” (Debo, p. 121).  The state 
laws enacted by Georgia against the Cherokee included the following: 
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forbidding their judicial officials to hold court or their council to meet 
except to ratify land cessions, forbidding them to mine their own gold, 
authorizing a survey of their land and its disposal by lottery to Georgians, 
and creating the Georgia Guard to enforce state law in their country.  
Legislation against the missionaries [to the Cherokees] required white men 
living among the Indians to swear allegiance to the state under pain of four 
years’ imprisonment for noncompliance.  (Debo, p. 121) 
 
As documented by Debo, President Jackson played a duplicitous role in the affair.  “In 
communications to the Georgia officials, the President encouraged their anti-Cherokee policy; to 
the Indians he argued that he was powerless to prevent the operation of state law” (Debo, p. 121).  
The actions of the Georgia Guard paralleled that of Nazi thugs some 100 years later under 
Hitler’s Third Reich.  Debo described the Georgia Guard and its activities:  “The Georgia Guard 
was composed of ruffians, who terrorized the Cherokees – putting them in chains, tying them to 
trees and whipping them, throwing them into filthy jails” (Debo, p. 121). 
 The Cherokees obtained the services of William Wirt, formerly the U.S. Attorney 
General, and filed suit against Georgia in the U.S. Supreme Court seeking an injunction to halt 
Georgia’s encroachment on Cherokee land and to prevent the operation of Georgia’s laws on 
tribal members and tribal government.  As described by an eminent scholar of Indian affairs: 
Wirt contended that the Cherokees were a sovereign nation, not subject to 
Georgia’s territorial jurisdiction, and that the laws of Georgia were null and 
void because they were repugnant to treaties between the United States and 
the Cherokees, to the intercourse law of 1802, and to the Constitution by 
impairing contracts arising from the treaties and by assuming powers in 
Indian affairs that belonged exclusively to the federal government.  (Prucha, 
1984, 1986, p. 75) 
 
Addressing the issues raised before the Court in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Justices Thompson 
and Story opined that “Indian tribes were foreign nations” (Janson, 1978, p. 29).  Acknowledging 
the treaty relationship between the Cherokees and the United States, Justice Thompson (with the 
concurrence of Justice Story; see 30 U.S. 1, 80) observed that the weaker party of the treaty 
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placed “itself under the protection of a more powerful one, without stripping itself of the right of 
government and sovereignty” (30 U.S. 1, 53).  Justice Thompson continued: 
Tributory and feudatory states do not thereby cease to be sovereign and 
independent states, so long as self-government, and sovereign and 
independent authority is left in the administration of the state.  Testing the 
character and condition of the Cherokee Indians by these rules, it is not 
perceived how it is possible to escape the conclusion, that they form a 
sovereign state.  They have always been dealt with as such by the 
government of the United States; both before and since the adoption of the 
present constitution.  (30 U.S. 1, 53) 
 
 Chief Justice Marshall and the two remaining justices constituting the Court’s majority 
ruled that the Cherokee were not a foreign state nor were they a state of the United States nor 
were tribal members considered to be citizens of the United States (Janson, 1978, p. 30).  While 
admitting that the Cherokee Nation had “been uniformly treated as a State from the settlement of 
our country,” and while acknowledging that the Cherokees’ attorneys had been successful in 
arguing that Cherokees were members of  “a distinct political society capable of managing its 
own affairs and governing itself,” Chief Justice Marshall framed the critical question:  “Do the 
Cherokees constitute a foreign state in the sense of the Constitution” (Emphasis added) (30 U.S. 
1, 16)?  The question was crucial because if the Cherokee Nation was adjudged to be a foreign 
state, its law suit against the State of Georgia could be allowed under Article III, § 2 of the 
Constitution which “describes the extent of judicial power” of the United States (30 U.S. 1, 15).  
Article III, § 2, ¶ 1 of the U.S. Constitution reads:  
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under 
this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their authority; … to controversies … between a State, 
or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects.  (U.S. 
Constitution) 
   
Thus, if not a foreign state, the Cherokee Nation’s motion for an injunction against the State of 
Georgia to stop the operation of state law on Cherokee land would have to be dismissed.  
   
   
1190
 Searching for an answer to whether or not the Cherokee Nation was a foreign state in a 
constitutional sense, Chief Justice Marshall turned to Article I, § 8, ¶ 3, which gave Congress the 
power “to ‘regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian tribes’” (30 U.S. 1, 18).  According to the Chief Justice: 
In this clause they are as clearly contradistinguished by a name appropriate 
to themselves from foreign nations as from the several States composing the 
Union.  They are designated by a distinct appellation; and as this appellation 
can be applied to neither of the others, neither can the appellation 
distinguishing either of the others be in fair construction applied to them.  
(30 U.S. 1, 18) 
 
Chief Justice Marshall noted: 
The objects to which the power of regulating commerce might be directed, 
are divided into three distinct classes – foreign nations, the several States, 
and Indian tribes.  When forming this article, the convention considered 
them as entirely distinct.  (30 U.S. 1, 18) 
 
In an attempt to reconcile the conflicting issues of the separate sovereignty of the tribes 
recognized by the U.S. government with the issue of the distinctly separate categories of foreign 
nations, states, and Indian tribes enumerated in Article I, § 8, ¶ 3 of the Constitution, Marshall 
began by framing the apparent contradictions: 
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and 
heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy until that right shall 
be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government, yet it may well 
be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged 
boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated 
foreign nations.  (30 U.S. 1, 17). 
 
If not a part of any of the states of the Union, and if not a foreign nation in the constitutional 
sense of the term, what, then, was the status of the Cherokee Nation specifically and of the 
various Indian nations generally?  Chief Justice Marshall concluded: 
They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent 
nations.  They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of 
their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of 
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possession ceases….  They and their country are considered by foreign 
nations, as well as by ourselves, as being so completely under the 
sovereignty and dominion of the United States, that any attempt to acquire 
their lands, or to form a political connection with them, would be considered 
by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility.  (Emphasis 
added) (30 U.S. 1, 17-18) 
 
The Chief Justice then applied the majority’s finding to the legal issue at hand: 
[A]fter mature deliberation, the majority is of the opinion that an Indian 
tribe or nation within the United States is not a foreign state in the sense of 
the Constitution, and cannot maintain an action in the courts of the United 
States.  (30 U.S. 1, 20) 
 
The original issue triggering the lawsuit by the Cherokee Nation, could state laws operate to the 
disadvantage of tribal members’ rights and of the tribe itself, remained unanswered by Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia.  Two subsidiary questions, what rights did tribal members possess, and what 
exactly was the status of a domestic dependant nation, also remained unanswered.  These 
questions would be addressed a year later in Worcester v. Georgia as a result of two 
missionaries, working with tribal members and living within the Cherokee Nation, confronting 
the repressive Georgia statutes. 
 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 350 (1832). 
 The legal facts of Worcester v. Georgia began when Samuel Worcester and Elizur Butler, 
two American Board missionaries to the Cherokees, were indicted by a Gwinnett County grand 
jury in Georgia for “residing with the limits of the Cherokee Nation without a license” and for 
having failed to take “the oath to support and defend the constitution and laws of the State of 
Georgia” (31 U.S. 350, 359).  Worcester & Butler were subsequently arraigned, tried, found 
guilty, and sentenced by the Superior Court of the County of Gwinnett “for residing in the 
Cherokee Nation without license” (31 U.S. 350, 361).  The sentence of “hard labor” was to be 
served in the Georgia penitentiary for a “term of four years” (31 U.S. 350, 361).  Following the 
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arrest, conviction, and sentencing of its two missionaries, the “American Board of 
Commissioners for Foreign Missions … hired William Wirt and John Sergeant to bring the 
Cherokee cause against Georgia to the Supreme Court” (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 76).  Upon 
application by Wirt, formerly the nation’s Attorney General, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a 
Writ of Error and ordered Georgia officials to appear before the Court “to show cause, if any 
there be, why judgment rendered against [the defendants] … should not be corrected, and why 
speedy justice should not be done to the parties in that behalf” (31 U.S. 350, 362).   
 Debo characterized the situation and summarized the outcome of the case:  “This time 
there was no question of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, and in the Worcester v. Georgia 
decision in February, 1832, the Cherokees won a complete victory” (Debo, p. 121).  According 
to Prucha, “Marshall’s decision in the case of Worcester v. Georgia, delivered on March 3, 1832, 
was a forthright vindication of the Cherokee position, for he declared unconstitutional the 
extension of state law over Cherokee lands” (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 76).  Despite the confusion 
over the actual date of the opinion (February for Debo, March for Prucha), the Court addressed 
the issues in Worcester v. Georgia that had been avoided in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.133  The 
legal questions arising from the state-tribal conflict included:  1) What is the legal status of 
Indian tribes as domestic dependent nations; 2) can state laws govern tribes and their members; 
3) who exercises political sovereignty over tribal members; and 4) what is the political status of 
tribal members? 
 Chief Justice Marshall delivered the Court’s opinion.  According to the Court, the law of 
nations, the Constitution of the United States, the treaties made between the Cherokee nation of 
Indians and the United States, and the multiple acts of Congress each served to recognize the 
political sovereignty of the Indian nations.  In addressing the law of nations, Chief Justice 
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Marshall articulated the legal viewpoint of the European discovery of North America, a 
viewpoint seldom found in the histories presented in elementary, secondary, and postsecondary 
history textbooks or courses of study.  The Chief Justice began with the first contacts between 
the inhabitants of America and Europe: 
America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a 
distinct people, divided into separate nations, independent of each other, and 
of the rest of the world, having institutions of their own, and governing 
themselves by their own laws.  (31 U.S. 350, 368) 
 
Marshall illustrated the absurdity of Georgia’s jurisdictional claims by citing the reverse 
argument of tribal claims to sovereignty over the European nations. 
It is difficult to comprehend the proposition, that the inhabitants of either 
quarter of the globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over the 
inhabitants of the other, or over the lands they occupied; or that the 
discovery of either, by the other, should give the discoverer rights in the 
country discovered, which annulled the pre-existing right of its ancient 
possessors.  (31 U.S. 350, 368) 
 
Continuing his discussion of the law of nations, Chief Justice Marshall referenced the doctrine of 
discovery as a compact among the various European governments which “gave to the nation 
making the discovery, as its inevitable consequence, the sole right of acquiring the soil and of 
making settlements on it” (31 U.S. 350, 369).  Marshall spelled out the political aspects of the 
doctrine of discovery: 
It regulated the right given by discovery among the European discoverers; 
but could not affect the rights of those already in possession, either as 
aboriginal occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a discovery made before 
the memory of man.  It gave the exclusive right to purchase, but did not 
found that right on a denial of the right of the possessor to sell. (31 U.S. 350, 
369) 
 
Since the “United States succeeded to all the claims of Great Britain, both territorial and 
political” following the American Revolution, Chief Justice Marshall noted the compliance of 
the crown’s charters to the various American colonies with the law of discovery:  “[T]hese grants 
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asserted a title against Europeans only, and were considered as blank paper, so far as the rights of 
the natives were concerned” (31 U.S. 350, 370).  Continuing to connect the law of nations with 
the British colonization of North America, the Chief Justice described the political situation at 
the beginning of British settlement of North America: 
This soil was occupied by numerous and warlike nations, equally willing 
and able to defend their possessions.  The extravagant and absurd idea, that 
the feeble settlements made on the sea-coast, or the companies under whom 
they were made, acquired legitimate poser by them to govern the people, or 
occupy the lands from sea to sea, did not enter the mind of any man.  (31 
U.S. 350, 369) 
 
Although “power, war, [and] conquest give rights, which, after possession, are conceded by the 
world; and which can never be controverted by those on whom they descend,” the power of 
making war “conferred by these charters on the colonies” was for defensive purposes only (31 
U.S. 350, 369; 31 U.S. 350, 370).  Citing specific royal charters, Chief Justice Marshall 
continued: 
The charter to Connecticut concludes a general power to make defensive 
war with these terms: “and upon just causes to invade and destroy the 
natives or other enemies of the said colony.”  The same power, in the same 
words, is conferred on the government of Rhode Island.  This power to repel 
invasion, and, upon just cause, to invade and destroy the natives, authorizes 
offensive as well as defensive war, but only “on just cause.”  The very terms 
imply the existence of a country to be invaded, and of an enemy who has 
given just cause of war.  (31 U.S. 350, 370) 
 
Marshall concluded his discussion of the law of nations and the British example by noting the 
difference between curtailing a tribal government’s foreign relations and noninterference with 
the internal affairs of the tribe: 
Certain it is, that our history furnishes no example, from the first settlement 
of our country, of any attempt on the part of the crown, to interfere with the 
internal affairs of the Indians, further than to keep out the agents of foreign 
powers…  The king purchased their lands, when they were willing to sell, at 
a price they were willing to take, but never coerced a surrender of them.  He 
also purchased their alliance and dependence by subsidies, but never 
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intruded into the interior of their affairs nor interfered with their self-
government, so far as respected themselves only.  (31 U.S. 350, 371) 
 
 In moving to his discussion of treaties as evidence of tribal sovereignty, Chief Justice 
Marshall first summarized the British example. 
Such was the policy of Great Britain towards the Indian nations inhabiting 
the territory from which she excluded all other Europeans; such her claims, 
and such her practical exposition of the charters she had granted; she 
considered them as nations capable of maintaining the relations of peace and 
war; of governing themselves, under her protection; and she made treaties 
with them, the obligation of which she acknowledged.  (31 U.S. 350, 372) 
 
Observing that the Cherokees had sided with the British during the American Revolution, 
Marshall noted that the first treaty between the Cherokees and the United States had been 
concluded in 1785.   To counter possible claims that the Cherokee held an inferior bargaining 
position, the Chief Justice posed the following question: “[D]id the Cherokees come to the seat 
of the American government to solicit peace; or, did the American commissioners go to them to 
obtain it” (31 U.S. 350, 374)?  In answer, Marshall noted that “[t]he treaty was made at 
Hopewell, not at New York” (31 U.S. 350, 374).  After discussing the various articles of the 
Treaty of Hopewell, Chief Justice Marshall concluded, “The only inference to be drawn from 
them is, that the United States considered the Cherokees as a nation” (31 U.S. 350, 375).  
Marshall next focused on the succeeding Treaty of Holston between the Cherokees and the U.S. 
that was negotiated in 1791.  After discussing specific articles of that treaty, Chief Justice 
Marshall summarized the Treaty of Holston: 
This treaty, thus explicitly recognizing the national character of the 
Cherokees, and their right of self-government; thus guarantying their lands; 
assuming the duty of protection, and, of course, pledging the faith of the 
Untied States for that protection; has been frequently renewed, and is now in 
full force.  (31 U.S. 350, 377) 
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Marshall concluded his summary of the Treaty of Holston by noting treaty provisions 
specifically pertinent to the facts of Worcester v. Georgia: 
To the general pledge of protection have been added several specific 
pledges, deemed valuable by the Indians.  Some of these restrain the citizens 
of the United States from encroachments on the Cherokee country, and 
provide for the punishment of intruders. (31 U.S. 350, 377) 
 
 Chief Justice Marshall transitioned to the various acts of Congress as recognition of tribal 
sovereignty in a manner and context that implied it flowed from a combination of the law of 
nations concepts inherited from Britain as well as the need to enforce treaty stipulations. 
From the commencement of our government, congress has passed acts to 
regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians, which treat them as nations, 
respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection 
which treaties stipulate.  (31 U.S. 350, 377) 
 
Continuing, the Chief Justice next argued that both treaties and congressional action, with the 
implied support of the law of nations, acted to separate tribal lands and the tribes from the 
various states. 
The treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the Indian territory as 
completely separated from that of the states; and provide that all intercourse 
with them shall be carried on exclusively by the government of the Union.  
(31 U.S. 350, 378) 
 
 Chief Justice Marshall next played the constitutional trump card when he noted “the 
adoption of our existing constitution” (31 U.S. 350, 379).  He continued: 
That instrument confers on congress the powers of war and peace; of 
making treaties, and of regulating commerce with foreign nations, and 
among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.  These powers 
comprehend all that is required for the regulation of our intercourse with the 
Indians.  (31 U.S. 350, 379) 
 
 Having completed his discussion of the law of nations, of treaties, of congressional 
action, and of constitutional requirements in separate fashion, Marshall then proceeded to 
summarize the impact of the law of nations upon the political status of Indian tribes. 
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The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent, 
political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the 
undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single 
exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from 
intercourse with any other European potentate…  (31 U.S. 350, 379) 
 
The Chief Justice then noted the nexus between treaties and the Constitution in terms of their 
impact upon the political status of Indian tribes. 
The constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be 
made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the 
previous treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently, admits their 
rank among those powers who are capable of making treaties.  The words 
“treaty” and “nation,” are words of our own language…  We have applied 
them to Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations of the earth; 
they are applied to all in the same sense.  (31 U.S. 350, 379) 
 
Chief Justice Marshall concluded his summary by confronting the notion that treaties with the 
tribes that placed them under the protection of European governments, or later of the United 
States, acted in a way to abolish tribal sovereignty.  According to Marshall: 
[T]he settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not 
surrender its independence – its right to self-government – by associating 
with a stronger, and taking its protection.  A weak state, in order to provide 
for its safety, may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, 
without stripping itself of the right of government, and ceasing to be a state.  
(31 U.S. 350, 380) 
 
 Having brought the law of nations and specific historical examples, the status and 
specific provisions of treaties, the various acts of Congress, and the Constitution to bear on the 
facts and legal issues of the case, Chief Justice Marshall delivered the Court’s conclusions. 
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own 
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia 
can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, 
but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with 
treaties, and with the acts of congress.  (31 U.S. 350, 380) 
 
The Chief Justice continued: 
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The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our 
constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States.  The 
act of the state of Georgia, under which the plaintiff in error was prosecuted, 
is, consequently void, and the judgment a nullity.  (31 U.S. 350, 380) 
 
Worcester’s conviction was “reversed and annulled” because the Georgia court’s judgment was 
based on a law that was “void, as being repugnant to the constitution, treaties and laws of the 
United States” (31 U.S. 350, 381).  On March 5, 1832, the Supreme Court “issued a special 
mandate to the Georgia court ordering it to reverse its decision and to release Worcester and 
Butler” (Burke, p. 524).  The aftermath of the Court’s ruling and order to release the two 
imprisoned missionaries, Samuel Worcester and Elizur Butler, added a bizarre, disturbing, and 
complex footnote to our nation’s history.134 
 According to the two Cherokee cases, tribes occupied a unique position in American 
government.  They were not a part of either the federal or the individual state governments. 
Instead each individual tribe was a domestic dependant nation.  Tribal members were not citizens 
of either the United States or of the individual states in which their tribal lands were located; 
instead they were citizens of their tribes.  Legally, the various Indian nations and their members 
were subject to their tribal governments, to the treaties negotiated between their tribe and the 
United States, and to the federal legislation enacted as a result of both treaties and the law of 
nations.  State laws possessed no legal status regarding the Indian nations and their tribal 
members. As ruled by the Supreme Court, “The whole intercourse between the United States and 
this nation [the Cherokee Nation], is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of 
the United States” (31 U.S. 350, 380).  The Indian nations still possessed their original powers of 
self-government except with respect to foreign relations in terms of trade and alliances.  As the 
Supreme Court had observed in Worcester v. Georgia: 
   
   
1199
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent, 
political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the 
undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single 
exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from 
intercourse with any other European potentate…  (31 U.S. 350, 379) 
  
 Euro-american cultural imperialism. 
 Even as the Cherokee Cases were wending their way through the legal system, efforts 
were underway by the Jackson administration to remove the Cherokee and other tribes to Indian 
Territory west of the Mississippi River.  Following both the Cherokee Cases and the removal of 
the Five Civilized Tribes from lands east of the Mississippi, additional efforts would be made to 
reduce tribal sovereignty through legislation and treaties, which would trigger additional Court 
cases.  The efforts to reduce tribal sovereignty were grounded in what one scholar termed 
“cultural imperialism,” which in turn was grounded in a view of white superiority that took for 
granted the superiority of western civilization (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 233).  Also taken for 
granted was the superiority of agricultural-based societies over hunter-gatherers.   
 Caldwell v. The State of Alabama, 1 Stew. & P. 327 (Ala., 1832).135 
 These views of cultural and racial supremacy, or of cultural imperialism when 
transformed into action, found clear expression in a relatively obscure legal opinion that was 
written during the same time period as the Cherokee cases and was authored by the Chief Justice 
of the Alabama Supreme Court in Caldwell v. The State of Alabama, 1 Stew. & P. 327 (Ala., 
1832), a case that was included in a collection documenting “The Case of the American Indian 
Against the Federal Government of the United States” (Deloria, 1971, cover page).  Addressing 
what he described as a “high pretension of savage sovereignty,” Alabama Chief Justice 
Lipscomb began his analysis: 
If a people are found in the possession of a territory, in the practice of the 
arts of civilization; employed in the cultivation of the soil, and with an 
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organized government, no matter what may be its form they form an 
independent community; their rights should be respected, and their 
territorial limits not encroached on.  (1 Stew. & P. 327, 332) 
 
Referring to what the Alabama Chief Justice termed an unwritten “code of national law, by 
which political societies should be tried,” Lipscomb declared: 
Savage tribes without a written language, or established form of 
government, and wholly ignorant of the customs and usages of civil society, 
are not capable of appreciating the principles of this code; and, (not yielding 
obedience to its canons) have never been looked on as parties to this 
compact of nations.  (1 Stew. & P. 327, 333) 
 
First asking a rhetorical question focused on his previous assertion about the unwritten code of 
law governing the civilized nations of the world, the Alabama Chief Justice then proceeded to 
frame his lengthy answer to that question.  First, the question: 
Were the natives of this vast continent, at the period of the advent of the 
First Europeans, in the possession and enjoyment of those attributes of 
sovereignty, to entitle them to take rank in the family of independent 
governments?  (1 Stew. & P. 327, 333) 
 
The state chief justice began his answer: 
They were composed of numerous tribes, subsisting by fishing and hunting, 
without any uniform or established system of government,,,,  The fairest 
quarter of the globe is roamed over by the Wildman, who has no permanent 
abiding place, but moves from camp to camp, as the pursuit of game may 
lead him.  He knows not the value of any of the comforts of civilized life…  
In what way is he to be treated with?  As well might a treaty, on terms of 
equality, be attempted with the beast of the same forest that he inhabits.  (1 
Stew. & P. 327, 333-334) 
 
Employing the propaganda technique of “false dichotomy” (See Appendix M), the Alabama 
Chief Justice next presented what he deemed to be the two choices confronting the European 
colonists, after which he couched the European’s choice in terms of the primacy of agricultural 
societies.136 
The civilized nations of Europe, had either to adjust among themselves, a 
fair, an equitable mode of acquisition according to their own canons of 
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morality and national law, or to leave this fair continent in the rude and 
savage state in which they found it.  They reasoned, and reasoned correctly, 
that the right of the agriculturists was paramount to that of the hunter tribes.  
(1 Stew. & P. 327, 335) 
 
In support of the state high court’s endorsement of agricultural superiority over hunters and 
gatherers, the Alabama Chief Justice quoted the Swiss jurist Vattel’s writings on the law of 
nations, writings which were grounded in a Euro-centric viewpoint and which “applied a theory 
of natural law to international relations” (Emmerich de Vattel, 2009, ¶ 1). 
[T]he cultivation of the soil is not only to be recommended by government, 
on account of the extraordinary advantages that flow from it, but from its 
being an obligation imposed by nature on mankind; the whole earth is 
appointed for the nourishment of its inhabitants, but it would be incapable of 
doing it, was it uncultivated.  (1 Stew. & P. 327, 335-336) 
 
The chief jurist of Alabama continued to quote Vattel’s arguments for dispossessing the original 
inhabitants of North America as justification for Alabama’s judicial position: 
We have already observed, in establishing the obligation to cultivate the 
earth, that those nations can not exclusively appropriate to themselves more 
land than they have occasion for, and which they are unable to settle and 
cultivate.  (1 Stew. & P. 327, 336) 
 
In an earlier incarnation of the “Lebensraum” principle that would be appropriated and misused 
by Hitler some centuries later to justify Nazi imperialism against its eastern European 
neighbors,137 Alabama Chief Justice Lipscomb quoted Vattel’s view on the European 
dispossession of the various tribal inhabitants already living on the land when the Europeans 
arrived: 
Their removing their habitations through those immense regions, can not be 
taken for a true and legal possession; and the people of Europe, too closely 
pent up, finding land in which these nations are in no particular want, and of 
which they make no actual and constant use, may lawfully possess it and 
establish colonies there.  (1 Stew. & P. 327, 336) 
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In a separate opinion Alabama Supreme Court Justice Taylor articulated an “ends justify the 
means” argument for dispossessing the tribal inhabitants from their lands.  Before asking what he 
had determined were the two critical questions, the Alabama justice painted a before-and-after 
scenario of the European’s impact upon North America: 
But when we contemplate the change which has been wrought in this one 
savage wilderness, by the arts, the industry, and the superior knowledge of 
the new population; when we visit our thronged cities, smiling fields, and 
happy habitations; when we contemplate our numerous bays and harbors, 
once the resort only of the wild fowl and the inhabitants of the deep; now 
studded with ships and vessels of all sizes and nations, pouring upon these 
lands the rich and extensive commerce of a whole world; when, instead of a 
roving tribe of hunters, we behold a powerful nation of agriculturists, as free 
in every desirable liberty, as their savage predecessors; when our happy 
political institutions and the religion of the Bible, have displaced their 
barbarous laws, and wretched superstitions; …  (1 Stew. & P. 327, 445)  
 
Alabama Supreme Court Justice Taylor then provided the dénouement to his argument: 
… can we wish these effects of civilization, religion, and the arts, to 
disappear, and the dark forests and roaming Indian again to possess the 
land?  Are we not compelled to admit that the superintending providence of 
the Being who first formed the earth, is to be seen in this mighty change?  (1 
Stew. & P. 327, 445) 
 
 The cherokee example. 
 The widespread views of whites towards Indians articulated by the Alabama Supreme 
Court raise an interesting question.  When all is said and done, what reception would an 
indigenous nation receive if it met the expectations articulated by Alabama Supreme Court 
Justice Taylor and his fellow justices?  If a tribe and its members transformed themselves from a 
hunter-gatherer society to one based on agriculture, if it developed its own alphabet system and a 
system of writing the tribal language that was accompanied by widespread literacy among tribal 
members, if it encouraged the development of a formal educational system for its young people, 
if it adopted a republican form of government based on a written constitution – if, in short, the 
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tribal society adopted Euro-American political-economic forms while maintaining its own 
unique cultural identity – would such developments be welcomed and meet with the approval of 
the dominant American society?  The Cherokee example provides an answer.   
 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Cherokee Nation “had begun to ask for 
schools” (Debo, p. 113).  A noted student of the history of the various Five Civilized Tribes 
described the response: 
The Moravian Brethren came in 1801, and the Presbyterians opened a 
school a little later.  Spectacular progress began when the American Board 
of Commissioners for Foreign Missions began its work there in 1817.  Then 
the educational work of the missionaries was simplified when just at this 
time the Cherokee genius Sequoyah reduced the language to writing.  
(Debo, p. 113) 
 
Having never come under the influence of missionaries nor having any extensive contact with 
either British or Americans, Sequoyah neither spoke nor wrote any English.  However, “[H]e 
knew that the white man had a system of conveying messages by making marks on paper.  He 
said, ‘I thought that would be like catching a wild animal and taming it’” (Debo, p. 113).  
Continuing her narrative, Debo described Sequoyah’s work and its impact on the Cherokee: 
Working for years, finishing in Arkansas in 1821, he isolated eighty-six 
Cherokee syllables and assigned a character to each one.  Thus the Indian 
simply memorized the characters; then he could read or write anything in 
the language.  Almost immediately the whole tribe became literate, and the 
Western and Eastern divisions began to communicate with each other in 
writing.  (Debo, p. 113) 
 
Beginning in 1828, the Cherokee Nation began publishing a tribal newspaper “with columns in 
English and Cherokee,” using a printing press whose type had been made in Boston, the home of 
the American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions (Debo, p. 114).  Over a twenty-year 
period, the Cherokee Nation worked to develop a republican form of government based on both a 
written constitution and legal code.  Debo described the process: 
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In 1808 the Cherokees had begun to formulate a legal code – necessarily 
written in English.  Then step by step they developed a responsible 
government to take the place of the haphazard rise of chiefs.  In 1828 they 
elected delegates to a constitutional convention, which created a government 
with a principal chief, a bicameral council, and a system of courts with 
orderly procedures and jury trial; and they participated freely in the election 
that followed.  (Debo, p. 114) 
 
Another historian, speaking of the southern tribes generally and of the Cherokee specifically, 
summarized the economic & political transformations of tribal society: 
These Indian nations, persuaded by federal officials and aided by federal 
funds, had abandoned hunting for farming.  The change attached them to 
their lands, created in them a sense of property, and made the wild lands 
west of the Mississippi seem uninviting.  This economic change had its 
political counterpart.  In 1827 the Cherokees adopted a constitution modeled 
after that of the United States, and declared themselves an independent 
nation with an absolute right to soil and sovereignty within their boundaries.  
By these two acts, the Cherokees reasserted their autonomy with respect to 
Georgia and their independence from the United States.  (Burke, p. 503) 
 
The previously described transformational activities of the Cherokee Nation immediately 
preceded the State of Georgia’s seizure of Cherokee lands, the Indian Removal Act, the two 
Cherokee cases, Georgia’s defiance of the Court ruling in Worcester with the initial 
encouragement of President Jackson, and the Cherokee Nation’s subsequent removal to the 
Indian Territory west of the Mississippi. 
 Federal reduction of tribal sovereignty. 
 Overview. 
 Before proceeding further, it would be wise to keep some basic points in mind.  While the 
Cherokee cases answered basic questions about tribal status and sovereignty, a focus on this 
single point would obscure the varied and differing threads constructing the evolving tapestry we 
now call American Indian policy.  Describing the policy towards the various indigenous nations 
inhabiting the continental United States as a “complex matter,” one historian explained: 
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There were too many factors involved, too many different viewpoints 
towards the Indians, too many hindrances in carrying out an established 
policy to permit easy generalizations.  American Indian policy grew bit by 
bit.  Principles were worked out from time to time as experience deepened 
and as circumstances changed.  Prucha, 1962, p. vii) 
 
If one focuses upon the federal government, all three branches (judicial, legislative, and 
executive) were involved in formulating and implementing American Indian policy, but not 
always in a coordinated, functional manner.  “…Indian policy did not spring full-blown from 
some statesman’s brow, but rather was a slow growth, developing under the press of 
circumstances and the pressures of diverse groups” (Prucha, 1962, p. vii).  As a result, sometimes 
treaties dominated, at other times congressional legislation, at yet other times presidential policy, 
while at other times Court rulings dominated the field.  And yet, while needing to be aware of the 
complexities of Indian-white relations as they evolved over the years, it is also important to keep 
in mind a basic understanding, keeping cognizant that policy towards the Indian nations 
developed “as the federal government sought solutions to the problems caused by the presence of 
the Indians” (Prucha, 1962, p. 1).  To further explain: 
These problems the new nation inherited from Great Britain when it 
acquired its independence; they grew out of the given fact that the Indians 
were here when the white man arrived and that their presence on the land 
formed an obstacle to the westward advance of the white settlers.  (Prucha, 
1962, p. 1) 
 
So, while the policy responses were complex, the origin of the need to develop policy responses 
was quite simple.138 
 At the same time, the various tribes did not constitute a single homogenous entity, but 
instead represented multiple, differing cultures and languages.  Further complicating 
consideration of U.S. policy towards the Indian nations (out of which eventually emerged 
citizenship), individual tribes were situated at differing points along a time-line continuum 
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regarding their interactions with Europeans and with the United States.  The specific year of each 
tribe’s initial interactions with nonIndians and of the tribe’s first official actions with a nonIndian 
government varied according to tribal locations which, in turn, helped determine when the tide of 
white encroachment reached it.  For some tribes contact with nonIndians occurred prior to the 
birth of the United States as a nation while for others tribal contact of a governmental nature with 
Euro-Americans happened afterwards.  For the Narragansett, Mohegan, Wampanoag, and Pequot 
this occurred before the dawning of the eighteenth century while for the Lakota, Cheyenne, 
Arapaho, and Apache it did not occur until the mid-nineteenth century.  At the time the 
Stockbridge were being assimilated, the Choctaw and Shawnee were being removed to locations 
west of the Mississippi.  While the Meskwaki were returning from the Indian Territory and 
purchasing land in Iowa for their tribe, the Lakota were wiping out Lieutenant Grattan’s military 
unit following his troops’ firing on a peaceful village.  As can be seen, official and unofficial 
relations in terms of trade, treaties, wars, legislation, and court cases varied across time and 
space for individual tribes. 
 In somewhat of a contrast to the preceding complexity, after the various tribes inhabiting 
the original thirteen colonies had been subjugated and no longer posed a military threat, the 
majority of Americans viewed the various tribes and tribal members, not as Cherokees or 
Iroquois, but as subhuman members of an inferior civilization.  The prevalence of a worldview 
grounded in white superiority and nonwhite inferiority, overlaid with a veneer of assumptions 
regarding the superiority of western civilization and of agricultural-based societies, reinforced 
notions that the untamed members of tribes living on homelands west of the Mississippi beyond 
the immediate reach of American civilization would need to be educated to civilization.  The 
foregoing cultural imperialism encouraged encroachment on Indian lands,139 which, in turn, led 
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to more treaties and agreements whereby tribal landholdings were reduced.  At the same time the 
subsequent interplay between Court opinions, congressional legislation, presidential policies, and 
Euro-American cultural imperialism would combine to reduce tribal sovereignty.  
 To re-emphasize an earlier point, Indian citizenship and voting rights were bound up in 
discussions of tribal sovereignty.  The Marshall Court’s rulings on tribal sovereignty served as 
both precedent and as a high-water mark.  Over the ensuing decades efforts were made to chip 
away at tribal sovereignty via treaties, legislation, and court cases.  As will be shown, while 
subsequent Supreme Courts acknowledged the Marshall Court’s rulings in the two Cherokee 
cases, the opinions generally acted in one of three ways:   
1) either to assert the primacy of federal control over Indian affairs against state efforts;  
2) to uphold tribal sovereignty which provided impetus for subsequent congressional 
action to diminish tribal sovereignty; or  
3) to uphold congressional action asserting greater federal control over the internal 
affairs of the Indian nations. 
 For the remainder of the nineteenth century, ideas of citizenship for tribal members 
intertwined with efforts to educate and Christianize tribal members, with attempts to diminish 
tribal sovereignty, and with notions of separating tribal members from their tribal government.  
In psychological terms, this latter notion meant removing tribal members from the cultural 
support mechanisms developed over the tribe’s history, and putting tribal members on their own, 
which, it was hoped, would turn them into imitations of the dominant white citizenry.  At the 
same time it would reduce diminish tribal authority.  By the mid-nineteenth century, removal of 
the eastern tribes to lands west of the Mississippi had met the objectives of two differing groups 
of nonIndians.  Removal as a policy option had been made possible by the purchase of the 
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Louisiana Territory under President Jefferson, Prucha explained the motivating forces behind 
one group: 
It cannot be denied that the land greed of the whites forced the Indians 
westward and that behind the removal policy was the desire of eastern 
whites for Indian lands and the wish of eastern states to be disencumbered of 
the embarrassment of independent groups of aborigines within their 
boundaries.  (Prucha, 1962, p. 224) 
 
The other group centered its attention not on “selfish economic motives,” but on the 
“preservation and civilization” of the tribal members (Prucha, 1962, pp. 225, 224).  In this latter 
group’s views: 
[T]he contact of the Indians with white civilization had deleterious effects 
upon the Indians that far outweighed the benefits.  The efforts at 
improvement were vitiated or overbalanced by the steady pressure of white 
vices, to which the Indians succumbed.  Instead of prospering under white 
tutelage, the Indians were degenerating and disappearing.  (Prucha, 1962, p. 
224) 
 
Because of these circumstances, this group supported Indian removal as a government policy.  
They “argued with great sincerity that only if the Indians were removed beyond contact with 
whites could the slow process of education, civilization, and Christianization take place” 
(Prucha, 1962, p. 225).   
 However, as the tide of white settlement continued to expand in a westward direction and 
crossed the Mississippi River, removal became a less feasible policy option.  The presence of 
tribes hostile to white intrusions also complicated matters.  The situation was clear enough in 
1849 that the Committee on Indian Affairs recognized “that the United States was fast running 
out of land to which native people could be permanently removed” (Wilson, p. 289).  As 
described by one historian, the Committee concluded: 
that the only “alternative to extinction” was to settle “our colonized tribes” 
on government-run “reservations,” where they could be protected against 
dispossession and extermination until they were “sufficiently advanced in 
   
   
1209
civilization … to be able to maintain themselves in close proximity with, or 
in the midst of, a white population.”  (Wilson, p. 289) 
 
At the same time, deeply embedded in the American psyche was the notion of the superiority of 
agricultural-based societies.  Jefferson’s promotion of the yeoman farmer as constituting the 
backbone of the American civilization reinforced the agricultural ideal.   
No panacea for the Indian problem was more persistently proposed than 
allotment of land to the Indians in severalty.  It was an article of faith … that 
civilization was impossible without the incentive to work that came only 
from individual ownership of a piece of property.  (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 
224) 
 
Allotment’s impact on government policy towards the Indian nations appeared in several early 
forms, most notably treaties and special legislation, prior to its enshrinement as official policy 
with the passage of the Dawes Severalty Act.  Allotment and citizenship intertwined as part of a 
cause-and-effect relationship.  In Connecticut Senator Orville H. Platt’s view, “[A]llotment of 
land in severalty, and citizenship, are the indispensable conditions of Indian progress” (Cohen, 
1942/1971, p. 154, n. 18).  Individual ownership of land would act to “civilize” individual tribal 
members and lead eventually to citizenship.  This aspect of allotment attracted support from 
many, especially the reformers.  Allotment’s reduction of the tribal land mass attracted support 
from those coveting Indian land.  Both groups supported allotment’s implied reduction of tribal 
sovereignty.  President Theodore Roosevelt characterized allotment as “a mighty pulverizing 
engine to break up the tribal mass” (Cohen, 1942/1971, p. 154). 
 Omaha treaty of 1854. 
 Owing to the different situational relationships between various tribes and the federal 
government, and owing to the gradual evolution of the nation’s Indian policy in incorporating 
allotment into its policy towards tribal members, allotment was offered to some through treaties, 
to others through legislation specific to the tribe, and to yet others through general legislation.  
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The period 1854 – 1861 witnessed multiple “experiments in allotment” using the treaty process 
whereby the federal government entered “into negotiations with the tribes west of the states of 
Missouri and Iowa for white settlement on their land, and extinguishment of their title” (Cohen, 
1942/1971, p. 62).  For example, the treaty negotiated between the Omaha and the U.S. in 1854, 
whereby the Omaha ceded most of their lands “west of the Missouri River” to the United States, 
and whereby the United States “set apart” certain undesignated lands to be “reserved by the 
Omahas for their future home,” contained an article that granted the President authority, “at his 
discretion,” to  
cause the whole or such portion of the land hereby reserved, as he may think 
proper … to be surveyed into lots, and to assign to such Indian or Indians of 
said tribe as are willing to avail of the privilege, and who will locate on the 
same as a permanent home.  (Kappler, 1904/1971, v. II, p. 612) 
 
Figure R1 
Omaha Land in Nebraska Ceded by the Treaty of 1854 
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According to Articles 4 and 5 of the “Treaty with the Omaha, 1854,” the United States agreed 
“to pay to the Omaha Indians” $881,000 “for the country ceded” with the payments being spread 
out over a forty-year period (Kappler, 1904/1971, v. II, p. 612) (See preceding Figure R1, # 315 
for the land being ceded by the Omaha & #’s 467, 570, 636, & 637 for the land being reserved 
for the Omaha; for determination of map numbers identifying particular cessions, see Royce, pp. 
790-791).140 
 However, some sixty-four (64) years later, it appeared the federal government had not 
paid a single penny of its obligations to the Omaha.  In a case filed by the tribe against the U.S. 
that was argued before the U.S. Court of Claims in 1918, the Omaha declared that “the 
Government had failed to pay anything” for the ceded land (Cohen, 1942/1971, p. 63, n. 506).  
The “Treaty with the Omaha, 1854” had been signed on March 16, 1854, and ratified by the U.S. 
Senate on April 17, 1854 (Kappler, 1904/1971, v. II, p. 611).  Federal attorneys admitted that the 
U.S. had not paid anything to the Omaha Tribe since the treaty’s ratification by the Senate, but 
they justified this failure by contending “that the Omaha Indians did not own and [therefore] did 
not have the right to make a cession thereof” (Cohen, 1942/1971, p. 63, n. 506).  Finding for the 
Omaha Tribe, the Court of Claims directly rebutted the federal government’s arguments: 
 
At the time the treaty was made the United States recognized the Omahas as 
having title to this land…, and specifically promised to pay for it….  [T]he 
defendants can not now be heard to say that the Indians did not own the land 
when the treaty was made and had no right to make a cession of it.  (Omaha 
Tribe v. United States (1918), 53 Ct. Cl. 549, 560) 
 
 Also, by that time (1918), the Omaha land base reserved to them by the Treaty of 1854 
had been considerably reduced.  The 1865 Omaha Treaty ceded further land for the use of the 
Winnebago (Royce, pp. 834-835) (See Figure R1, # 467 for this land cession).  An additional 
congressional act in 1882 further reduced the Omaha land base as it provided for the sale of 
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lands “lying W. of [the] Sioux City and Nebraska railroad [sic]” and stipulated that the 
“[r]emainder of reservation to be allotted and patented to individuals or to the tribe” (Royce, pp. 
908-909) (See Figure 1, #’s 636 & 637 for ceded and allotted land).  By the early twentieth 
century, the Omaha land base was a miniscule fragment of even the small portion of land that 
had been reserved to them by the Treaty of 1854 (See Figure R1, # 570 for land remaining in the 
Omaha’s possession). 
 Citizenship – Tied to removal or allotment. 
 Allotment’s purpose, among other objectives, was to pave the road to U.S. citizenship for 
American Indians.  The noted expert in federal Indian law, Felix S. Cohen,141 identified four 
methods whereby Indians acquired citizenship.   
Table R1: 
Methods Whereby Indians Acquired Citizenship 










The preceding table, Table R1, lists the methods identified by Cohen and includes a specific 
example of each that will be subsequently discussed within a chronological framework that also 
 
Method of Acquiring Citizenship  Example Discussed  
(a) Treaties with Indian tribes. Cherokee Treaty of 1817 
  Choctaw Treaty of 1830 
  Delaware Treaty of 1866 
(b) Special statutes naturalizing  Act of March 3, 1843  
 named tribes or individuals. (Stockbridge) 
(c) General statutes naturalizing  Dawes Act of 1887 
 Indians who took allotments. 
(d) General statutes naturalizing  Act of November 6, 1919 
 other special classes. (World War I Veterans) 
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includes Supreme Court cases and other congressional legislation bearing on tribal sovereignty, 
citizenship, and voting rights (See Table R1).142   
 Citizenship – Cherokee treaty of 1817. 
 Treaties with various Indian nations granted citizenship through a variety of means 
whereby U.S. citizenship was granted to heads of families or to all adults in connection with 
removal to lands west of the Mississippi River, or citizenship was granted in connection with 
acceptance of allotment.  The Cherokee Treaty of 1817, negotiated “at the Cherokee Agency, 
within the Cherokee nation, between major general Andrew Jackson…, and the chiefs, head 
men, and warriors, of the Cherokee nation,”143  contained the following provisions as listed in 
Article 8 of the treaty: 
And to each and every head of any Indian family residing on the east side of 
the Mississippi river, on the lands that are now, or may hereafter be, 
surrendered to the United States, who may wish to become citizens of the 
United States, the United States do agree to give a reservation of six 
hundred and forty acres of land, in a square, … with a reversion in fee 
simple to their children…  (Kappler, v. II, p. 143) 
 
 Citizenship – Choctaw treaty of 1830. 
 The Choctaw Treaty of 1830, negotiated at Dancing Rabbit Creek in Mississippi, 
provided citizenship in connection with removal west of the Mississippi, but under 
circumstances similar to the previous events between the Cherokee Nation and Georgia that had 
precipitated two Supreme Court cases, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia.  
With the Choctaw, there would be no Supreme Court case; instead there would be removal.  The 
opening paragraph of the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek with the Choctaw described the 
situation existing at the time of the treaty’s negotiation: 
Whereas the General Assembly of the State of Mississippi has extended the 
laws of said State to persons and property within the chartered limits of the 
same, and the President of the United States has said that he cannot protect 
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the Choctaw people from the operation of these laws; Now therefore that the 
Choctaw may live under their own laws in peace with the United States and 
the State of Mississippi they have determined to sell their lands east of the 
Mississippi…  (Kappler, v. II, pp. 310-311) 
 
It would take America 128 years before a President would use the force of federal troops to stop 
a state from discriminatory action against a minority of its population in violation of both federal 
law and the provisions of international law.  Another article of the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit 
Creek would be unilaterally negated by the federal government within a few years as the new 
lands west of the Mississippi transformed from lands of the Choctaw Nation to the Indian 
Territory that subsequently became the Oklahoma Territory, which in turn became the State of 
Oklahoma.  Article IV of the Choctaw Treaty of 1830 stated: 
The Government and people of the United States are hereby obliged to 
secure to the said Choctaw Nation of Red People the jurisdiction and 
government of all the persons and property that may be within their limits 
west, so that no Territory or State shall ever have a right to pass laws for the 
government of the Choctaw Nation of Red People and their descendants; 
and that no part of the land granted them shall ever be embraced in any 
Territory or State; but the U.S. shall forever secure said Choctaw Nation 
from, and against, all laws except such as from time to time may be enacted 
their own National Councils.  (Kappler, v. II, p. 311) 
 
Owing to the situational differences between the Cherokee in 1817 and the Choctaw in 1830, 
Article XIV of the Choctaw Treaty of 1830 offered citizenship to any “Choctaw head of a family 
being desirous to remain and become a citizen of the States” instead of removing westward 
across the Mississippi River (Kappler, v. II, p. 313).  Furthermore, “he or she shall thereupon be 
entitled to a reservation of one section of six hundred and forty acres of land” (Kappler, v. II, p. 
313).  Each additional “unmarried child” living in the family who was “over ten years of age” 
received an additional half-section of land and each child “under 10 years of age” received an 
additional quarter section of land, each of these additional grants of land “to adjoin the location 
of the parent” (Kappler, v. II, p. 313).  Finally, if the families resided “upon said lands intending 
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to become citizens of the States for five years after the ratification of this Treaty, … a grant in 
fee simple shall issue” (Kappler, v. II, p. 313).  Tribal members who remained in Mississippi in 
order to become citizens and who did not remove westward were guaranteed by the treaty that 
they would “not lose the privilege of a Choctaw citizen” (Kappler, v. II, p. 313).  The concluding 
Article XXII of the 1830 Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek contained an item that was the reverse 
of the nation’s first treaty with another governmental power, the Delaware Treaty of 1778.  
According to Article XXII of the Choctaw Treaty of 1830: 
The Chiefs of the Choctaws who have suggested that their people are in a 
state of rapid advancement in education and refinement, and have expressed 
a solicitude that they might have the privilege of a Delegate on the floor of 
the House of Representatives extended to them.  (Kappler, v. II, p. 315) 
 
The U.S. declined the request of one of the Five Civilized Tribes, stating that the 
“Commissioners do not feel that they can under a treaty stipulation accede to the request,” but 
were willing to present the request as part of the treaty “that Congress may consider of, and 
decide the application” (Kappler, v. II, p. 315).   
 Citizenship – Delaware treaty of 1866. 
 By 1866 the situation of both the Delaware Nation and the United States had greatly 
changed from their relative positions in 1778 when the U.S. had offered the possibility of 
statehood to the Delaware.   Article VI of the Delaware Treaty of 1778 began: 
Whereas the enemies of the United States have endeavored, by every artifice 
in their power … [to convince]the Indians in general … that it is the design 
of the [United States] to extirpate the Indians and take possession of their 
country…  (Kappler, v. II, p. 4) 
 
Article VI continued:  “[T]o obviate such false suggestion, the United States do engage to 
guarantee to the aforesaid nation of Delawares, and their heirs, all their territorial rights in the 
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fullest and most ample manner…” (Kappler, v. II, p. 4).  The next sentences invited the 
Delaware to form a state that would have representation in Congress! 
And it is further agreed on between the contracting parties should it for the 
future be found conducive for the mutual interest of both parties to invite 
any other tribes who have been friends [with] the United States, to join the 
present confederation, and to form a state whereof the Delaware nation shall 
be the head, and have a representation in Congress… (Kappler, v. II, p. 5) 
 
As previously stated, much had changed between 1778 and 1866.  For one, the survival of the 
United States as a nation was no longer in question by 1866. The Delaware’s military assistance 
was no longer needed by the U.S. in 1866.  For another, as the United States had grown stronger, 
the Delaware Nation’s military and political power had grown weaker. By 1866, the Delaware 
Nation “had a long history of shifting locales” at the behest of the federal government (Prucha, 
1984/1986, p. 88).  As described by Prucha: 
The Delaware Indians, … at the beginning of the historic period [of 
European discovery] were located in what is now New Jersey and Delaware, 
but at the end of three centuries of movement Delawares were found in 
Oklahoma, Kansas, Wisconsin, and Ontario.  (Prucha, 1984/1986, p. 88) 
 
Prucha’s summary necessarily 1216omitted several details of that movement.  A portion of their 
tribe had removed themselves quite early from contact with the Americans by removing to 
territory claimed by Spain on land granted to them and the Shawnee “by Baron de Carondolet on 
behalf of the Spanish government, Jan. 4, 1793” near what today is Cape Girardeau, Missouri 
(Royce, p. 724).  Following the Louisiana Purchase, they removed further west to land in 
southwest Missouri “lying above the James fork of White river” under the terms of a treaty 
negotiated October 3, 1818 by territorial governor, William Clark (Royce, p. 724).  The bands of 
Delaware remaining further east were slowly pushed out of Ohio and Indiana by a series of 
treaties until finally the Indiana Delawares joined “their brethren who had lived in Missouri since 
1793” following the Delaware Treaty of 1818 (Royce, pp. 724-725).  In a subsequent 1829 
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treaty, the Delaware ceded their land in Missouri in exchange for lands west of the Missouri 
River in what is now Kansas “for the permanent residence of the whole Delaware nation” 
(Royce, p. 724) (See Figure R2, #’s 263, 488, & 425 for the land reserved to the Delaware in 
Kansas by the Treaty of 1829).144 
Figure R2 
Delaware Lands Reserved & Ceded in Kansas 
 
The permanent residence guaranteed by the Treaty of 1829 didn’t turn out to be permanent.  In 
subsequent treaties, the Delaware sold “39 sections” of their new homeland to the Wyandot (See 
Figure R2, # 263) in an 1843 treaty (Royce, p. 778) and sold another “four sections … to 
‘Christian Indians’ upon payment of $2.50 per acre” in the Delaware Treaty of 1854, which were 
sold three years later by said “Christian Indians to A.J. Isacks, May 29, 1857” (Royce, pp. 790-
791) (See Figure R2, #’s 425 & 488).  Finally, in an 1860 treaty the Delaware sold over half of 
   
   
1218
their remaining land to the “Leavenworth, Pawnee and Western Railroad Company” (See Figure 
R2, # 425; Royce, pp. 822-823) and agreed that a “portion of their [remaining] reserve [be] 
allotted to them in severalty” (See Figure R2, # 488; Royce, pp. 822-823).  All of the preceding 
transactions preceded the Delaware Treaty of 1866, which had been noted by Cohen as an 
example whereby the U.S. government provided citizenship to American Indians through treaties 
(See Table R1). 
 The movement of tribal members from their formerly permanent homeland in Kansas “to 
the Indian country, located between the States of Kansas and Texas,” occupied center stage in 
the Delaware Treaty of 1866 (Kappler, v. II, p. 937).  The opening sentence of the 1866 treaty 
clarified the treaty’s purpose: “Whereas Congress has by law made it the duty of the President of 
the United States to provide by treaty for the removal of the Indian tribes from the State of 
Kansas, …” (Kappler, v. II, p. 937) (See Figure R2, # 488 to identify the lands in question being 
discussed in the Delaware Treaty of 1866).  The lengthy opening sentence of the Delaware 
Treaty of 1866 indicated another reason as well: “[T]he Missouri River Railroad Company has 
expressed a desire to purchase the present Delaware Indian reservation in the said State, in a 
body, at a fair price” (Kappler, v. II, p. 937).  According to Article 2 of the 1866 treaty, the 
Delaware had located in Kansas as a result of a previous treaty negotiated in 1829 (Kappler, v. II, 
p. 938).  In the interim between 1829 and 1866, some Delaware lands had been allotted by the 
Delaware Treaty of 1860 (Royce, p. 822).  Article 3 of the 1866 Delaware Treaty offered the 
opportunity of U.S. citizenship to this group of tribal members: 
It shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to give each of all the 
adult Delaware Indians who have received their proportion of land in 
severalty an opportunity … to elect whether they will dissolve their relations 
with their tribe and become citizens of the United States.  (Kappler, v. II, p. 
938) 
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The lands of Delaware tribal members electing to renounce tribal membership in favor of U.S. 
citizenship were to be “reserved from the sale” of Delaware land described in the treaty 
(Kappler, v. II, p. 938).  The lands of Delaware tribal members who had previously received 
allotment, but who chose to remain tribal members would be sold with the individual tribal 
members receiving only the value “for the improvements on the land” (Kappler, v. II, p. 938).  
Article 9 of the Delaware Treaty of 1866 described the mechanism by which tribal members 
electing to remain in Kansas would obtain their citizenship.  First, “a registry [was] to be made 
of the names of all of said Delawares who have elected to dissolve their tribal relations and to 
become citizens of the United States, as provided in this treaty” (Kappler, v. II, p. 940).  Next, 
the Secretary of the Interior was directed to “present a certified copy of the same [registry] to the 
judge of the district court of the United States for the district of Kansas” as well as send a copy to 
the “office of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs” (Kappler, v. II, p. 940).  Finally, after the list 
had been compiled and submitted to the designated government officials, 
[A]ny of said Delawares, being adults, may appear before the said judge in 
open court, and make the same proof and take the same oath of allegiance as 
is provided by law for the naturalization of aliens, and also make proof, to 
the satisfaction of said court, that he is sufficiently intelligent and prudent to 
control his own affairs and interests, that he has adopted the habits of 
civilized life, and has been able to support, for at least five years, himself 
and family.  (Kappler, v. II, p. 940) 
 
Finally, after completing the enumerated steps in not less than five years, and 
On the filing of the said certificate [by the federal district judge] in the 
office of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the said Delaware Indian shall 
be constituted a citizen of the United States, and be entitled to receive a 
patent, in fee-simple, with power of alienation, for the land heretofore 
allotted him…  (Kappler, v. II, p. 940) 
 
In the penultimate article of the Delaware Treaty of 1866, the U.S. admitted it had not “fulfilled” 
its financial obligations arising under the 1860 Delaware Treaty and “credited to the Delawares” 
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the sum of $30,000 (Kappler, v. II, p. 941).  In the same article, the U.S. promised to investigate 
“the Delawares’ claim that a large amount of stock ha[d] been stolen from them by whites since 
the treaty of [1854]” and to pay the “ascertained” amount of “the value of such stolen stock” 
(Kappler, v. II, p. 941).   
 Citizenship – Act of 1843 re: stockbridge tribe. 
 Having concluded the discussion of how treaties were used by the federal government to 
promote citizenship for tribal members, the ensuing discussion focuses on the use of special 
statutes whereby Congress naturalized specific Indian individuals or tribes.  As an example of 
this procedure, Cohen cited the “Act of March 3, 1843, sec. 7, 5 Stat. 654, 647 (Stockbridge).”145   
Figure R3 
Lands in Wisconsin Reserved for the Stockbridge-Munsee 
by the Menominee Treaties of 1831 and 1832 
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A narrow focus on the 1843 act of Congress whereby citizenship was offered to members of the 
“Stockbridge tribe of Indians” wishing to accept allotments of tribal land would ignore important 
contexts, both prior and subsequent to the act (Kappler, 1904/1971, v. II, p. 574; 5 Stat. 645).  
Such a focus would conceal the fact that the act’s purpose was to allot land that had been 
previously guaranteed the “Stockbridge & Munsee tribes” in 1832 by the U.S. in its Treaty with 
the Menominee (Kappler, 1904/1971, v. II, p. 378) (See Figure R3, #161 & #162 [immediately 
east of Lake Winnebago] for lands guaranteed the Stockbridge, Munsee, & Brothertown Tribes 
by the Treaty of 1832 that confirmed the Menominee Treaty of 1831; for determination of map 
numbers identifying land reserved by treaty, see Royce, pp. 730-731).146   
Although negotiated with the Menominee, the 1832 treaty contained an “Appendix” whereby the 
Stockbridge and Munsee agreed to accept the land purchased for their use from the Menominee 
by the United States, the “Appendix” having been signed by the headmen of “the Stockbridges 
and the Munsees,” among other of the New York tribes (Kappler, 1904/1971, v. II, pp. 381-382).   
 A narrow focus on the 1843 act impacting the Stockbridge-Munsee would also conceal 
the 1839 “Treaty With the Stockbridge and Munsee”  whereby the land guaranteed to them on 
the east side of Lake Winnebago in Wisconsin by the United States was reduced by half 
(Kappler, 1904/1971, v. II, p. 529).  While the 1839 treaty contained incentives for the 
Stockbridge-Munsee to “remove west,” the 1839 treaty also recognized there were Stockbridge-
Munsee tribal members who wished “to remain where they now are” and stipulated that the 
“balance of the consideration money for the lands hereby ceded” would be paid to “such of the 
Stockbridge and Munsee tribes of Indians … as remain at their present place of residence at 
Stockbridge on the east side of Winnebago lake” [sic] (Kappler, 1904/1971, v. II, pp. 529, 530). 
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 A narrow focus on the 1843 act impacting the Stockbridge-Munsee would also conceal 
the subsequent political split it created in the Stockbridge-Munsee Band of the Mohican Nation 
(currently the tribe’s official name), a split that still carries sensitivity among today’s tribal 
members.  The current version of their tribal history references neither the Treaty of 1839 nor the 
congressional act of 1843, but instead discusses the “federal removal policy [which] caused 
dissension among the people who remained in Wisconsin” (Mohican History, ¶ 26).  The tribal 
history continues: “Presented with the opportunity by government agents, some Stockbridge 
people relinquished their Indian status and became tax paying citizens of the United States, while 
others chose to retain their tribal membership and form of government” (Mohican History, ¶ 26).  
A non-tribal  history by the Milwaukee Public Museum laid bare more facts.  It stated: 
In 1843, Congress passed an act making all Stockbridge-Munsee United 
States citizens.  This divided up reservation lands on Lake Winnebago – 
which had been held communally – among individual tribal members.  
Many Stockbridge-Munsee consented to this plan and became known as the 
Citizen Party.  The opposition formed the Indian Party … with the intent to 
retain the federal status, culture, and political sovereignty of the tribe.  
(Stockbridge-Munsee History, ¶ 26) 
 
The non-tribal history continued: 
The Indian Party became distressed when Whites began buying up land 
granted to individual tribal members.  [They] lobbied to have the 1843 act 
repealed, and Congress did so in 1846, but members of the Citizen Party 
refused to give up their American citizenship and stayed on their allotted 
lands along Lake Winnebago.  (Stockbridge-Munsee History, ¶ 10) 
 
The federal government’s version, which was set forth in the Preamble of the 1848 treaty with 
the Stockbridge Tribe stated that  
a portion of said tribe refused to recognize the validity of said act of 
Congress …, and upon their petition a subsequent act was passed by the 
Congress of the United States … repealing the said act of March 3d, 1843…  
(Kappler, 1904/1971, v. II, p. 575) 
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 A narrow focus on the 1843 act impacting the Stockbridge-Munsee as an example of how 
federal legislation was used to promote U.S. citizenship for American Indians would also ignore 
the subsequent attempts of the federal government to deal with aftermath of the two 
congressional acts, which in turn had followed two treaties that had been negotiated with the 
tribe in the short space of seven (7) years.  To review, the Treaty of 1832 (purchasing two 
sections of land from the Menominee on Lake Winnebago for the Stockbridge-Munsee) was 
revised by the Treaty of 1839 (ceding to the U.S. one of the two sections guaranteed the 
Stockbridge-Munsee in 1832), which in turn was negated by the Act of 1843 (abolishing all 
tribal land remaining from the Treaty of 1839 through allotments and making all Stockbridge-
Munsee U.S. citizens), which congressional act was negated by the Act of 1846.   
Figure R4 
Stockbridge-Munsee Tribal Lands 
Guaranteed By the Treaty of 1832 and Modified By the Treaty of 1839 
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For the lands guaranteed by the Treaty of 1832, see Figure R4, #257 & #272; for the land ceded 
by the Treaty of 1839, see Figure R4, #257 (For determination of map numbers identifying land 
reserved by treaty that was subsequently modified, see Royce, pp. 774-775).147 
 As a result of all these actions on the part of the U.S. government, some Stockbridge-
Munsee had forsaken their tribal identity in return for U.S. citizenship and the promise of a fee-
simple land patent while other Stockbridge-Munsee rejected U.S. citizenship in order to retain 
their tribal culture and identity.  To maintain the focus on how American Indians received their 
universal rights of citizenship and voting rights, we will end the discussion of the Stockbridge-
Munsee example and proceed to an early case focused on voting rights for a tribal member who 
severed his tribal ties. 
 Citizenship & tribal sovereignty. 
 Overview. 
 Before resuming discussion of the remainder of Cohen’s categorical examples whereby 
American Indians received citizenship via congressional action (the next being the Dawes 
Allotment Act of 1888), a need exists, based on a belief that understanding historical context 
promotes a fuller understanding and appreciation of the subject being discussed, to examine a 
number of related examples that occurred in the judicial realm during the interim between 1866 
and 1896.  One example also includes a congressional act made in response to a Court ruling.  
The judicial examples relate to both citizenship and to tribal sovereignty.  The congressional 
legislation touches on a reduction in tribal sovereignty.  The court actions and congressional 
action to be discussed (and their subject matter) include: 
• Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884); voting rights and the 14th Amendment. 
 • The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737 (1866); federal v. state jurisdiction. 
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• Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883); tribal jurisdiction of criminal 
  affairs. 
• The Seven Major Crimes Act (1885); removed seven crimes from tribal 
  jurisdiction, thus curtailing tribal sovereignty. 
• United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Affirmed the legality of the  
  Seven Major Crimes Act and confirmed federal control of crimes on 
  Indian land. 
• Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); affirmed Cherokee Court’s jurisdiction 
  over criminal affairs. 
Following discussion of the above-listed items, the focus on Cohen’s examples of congressional 
action granting citizenship to various categories of American Indians and events related to them 
resumes.  These examples and events, along with their subject matter, include: 
• Dawes Allotment Act (1888); allotment of tribal lands & citizenship. 
• Burke Act (1906); modified the Dawes Act. 
• Act of November 6, 1918; citizenship for WWI veterans. 
• Indian Citizenship Act (1924); citizenship for all American Indians. 
• Subsequent events bearing on tribal sovereignty and voting rights. 
• Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F. 2d. 131  
 (1959); status of Indian tribes, tribal sovereignty. 
• Civil Rights Act (1968); tribal sovereignty. 
• Meskwaki Voting Rights (1991); school-board elections. 
 Citizenship/tribal sovereignty – Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884). 
 Introduction. 
 By the 1870s enough developments had occurred in the previous quarter-century 
respecting citizenship, both for nonIndians and for Indians, that the status of Indians once again 
become a legal question.  Before we can approach the definitive Supreme Court answer to that 
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recurring question in Elk v. Wilkins, however, prior developments to that case deserve attention.  
Relevant prior developments include the following: 
• an Attorney General’s opinion, 
• the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
• the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
• a federal district court opinion, McKay v. Campbell (D.C. Ore. 1871).   
Each of the above-listed items will be addressed prior to a discussion of the facts and of the legal 
reasoning used by the Court in Elk v. Wilkins. 
 Attorney general opinion, 1856. 
 On July 5, 1856, Caleb Cushing, the U.S. Attorney General, responded to a previous 
request from the Secretary of the Interior, Robert McClelland, to address the question of “the 
relation of Indians to citizenship” (7 Op. Att’y Gen. 746).  Cushing’s opinion is important 
because it served as a precedent that was cited in subsequent federal court decisions.  Cushing 
began his opinion by grounding citizenship in the U.S. Constitution, drawing attention to Article 
II, § 1 which referenced “a natural born citizen” and Article I, § 8 that gave Congress the power 
“to establish an uniform rule of naturalization” (7 Op. Att’y Gen. 746, 747-748).  Cushing 
concluded, “Here is the first great line of distinction then, - citizens born such, and citizens made 
such by naturalization” (7 Op. Att’y Gen. 746, 748).  In discussing the concepts of alien, citizen, 
and foreigner, Cushing declared: 
The fact, therefore, that Indians are born in the country does not make them 
citizens of the United States. 
 
The simple truth is plain, that the Indians are the subjects of the United 
States, and therefore are not, in mere right of home-birth, citizens of the 
United States.  (Emphasis in original) (7 Op. Att’y Gen. 746, 749) 
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Attorney General Cushing continued by emphasizing the distinction between “citizens” and 
“subjects:” 
This distinction between citizens proper, that is, the constituent members of 
the political sovereignty, and subjects of that sovereignty, who are not 
therefore citizens, is recognized [sic] in the best authorities of public law.  
(See Puffendorf, De Jure Naturæ, lib. Vii, cap. Ii, s.)  Fore the same reason, 
a slave, it is clear, cannot be a citizen.  (Emphasis in original) (7 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 746, 749) 
 
After citing several state court decisions declaring that Indians “are not pleno jure citizens,” 
Attorney General Cushing opined that Indians “cannot become citizens by naturalization under 
existing general acts of Congress” (7 Op. Att’y Gen. 746, 749).  Cushing explained:  “Those acts 
apply only to foreigners, subjects of another allegiance.  The Indians are not foreigners, and they 
are in our allegiance, without being citizens of the United States.  Moreover, those acts only 
apply to ‘white’ men” (Emphasis in original) (7 Op. Att’y Gen. 746, 749). 
 Can Indians become citizens?  According to Attorney General Cushing’s answer, 
“Indians, of course, can be made citizens of the United States only by some competent act of the 
General Government, either a treaty or an act of Congress” (7 Op. Att’y Gen. 746, 749-750).  
Cushing then proceeded to provide examples whereby Indians were accorded citizenship, either 
through particular treaties or through specific legislative acts of Congress.  According to 
Cushing, however, the fact that a treaty or legislative act provided an opportunity for citizenship 
and a tribal member chooses to so become a citizen is in itself insufficient to determine 
citizenship.  In Cushing’s view, the effectiveness of such an action would have to be evaluated 
and a determination made regarding its effectiveness before the question of citizenship could be 
ascertained. 
It may be … competent for him to become a citizen … by ceasing to be a 
member of the tribe.  Be it so.  Let him cease, then, to continue by his own 
volition and election an Indian.  If, by some act of recognized [sic] legality, 
   
   
1228
he has manifested his desire to be considered a citizen, then it will have to 
be considered whether such act is effective…  (Emphasis in original) (7 Op. 
Att’y Gen. 746, 752) 
 
And how was “effectiveness” of the act of choosing citizenship over continued tribal affiliation 
to be determined?  According to Attorney General Cushing, one would have to examine 
Whether, for instance, it was performed in good faith, as in the case of 
alleged change of domicil [sic]; whether it is not contradicted by the party’s 
having in the mean time retained his tribal relations; whether, in a word, if 
of admitted capacity to become a citizen of the United States, he has in fact 
become such, by throwing off the status of Indian.  (Emphasis in original) (7 
Op. Att’y Gen. 746, 752-753) 
 
In concluding his opinion, Attorney General Caleb Cushing raised the question of whether it was 
wise to continue such a public policy as currently existed regarding the legal distinctions 
between whites and Indians.  In Cushing’s view: 
As a question of public policy in the United States, it may be injudicious to 
seek to maintain the present legal distinction between the two races.  But the 
distinction exists; it is broadly drawn by hundreds of treaties and statutes; it 
cannot be disregarded in the administrative construction and execution of 
the law of the land; and if to be obliterated, that can be done only by the 
treaty-making or the legislative powers of the Government.  (7 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 746, 756) 
 
 Civil rights act of 1866. 
 The title for the congressional enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 announced its 
purpose:  “An Act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and furnish 
means for their vindication” (14 Stat. 27).  According to the terms of the act, “All persons born 
in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are 
hereby declared to be citizens of the United States” (Emphasis added) (14 Stat. 427).  For 
Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan, the 1866 Civil Rights Act marked “the first general 
[legislative] enactment making persons of the Indian race citizens of the United States” (112 U.S. 
94, 112).  The 1866 Civil Rights Act differed from previous “statutes and treaties” that provided 
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citizenship opportunities for specific individuals and tribes (112 U.S. 94, 112).  According to 
Justice Harlan, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 “reached Indians not in tribal relations” (112 U.S. 
94, 112).  He explained: 
Surely ever one must admit that an Indian, residing in one of the States, and 
subject to taxation there, became, by force alone of the act of 1866, a citizen 
of the United States, although he may have been, when born, a member of a 
tribe.  The exclusion of Indians not taxed evinced a purpose to include those 
subject to taxation in the State of their residence.  (112 U.S. 94, 112-113) 
 
In support of his interpretation of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, Justice John Marshall Harlan 
described and cited specific comments by senators in their debates preceding the bill’s enactment 
(See 112 U.S. 94, 113-114).  Supreme Court Justice Harlan summarized the congressional intent 
as illustrated by the debate in Congress: 
The entire debate shows, with singular clearness, indeed, with absolute 
certainty, that no Senator who participated in it, whether in favor of or in 
opposition to the measure, doubted that the bill, as passed, admitted, and 
was intended to admit, to national citizenship Indians who abandoned their 
tribal relations, and became residents of one of the States or Territories, 
within the full jurisdiction of the United States.  (112 U.S. 94, 114) 
 
Drawing attention to the fact that even the President of the United States agreed with the 
preceding interpretation of the Civil Rights Act’s purpose, Justice Harlan quoted the following 
from President Andrew Johnson’s veto message: 
By the first section of the bill all persons born in the United States, and not 
subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are declared to be 
citizens of the United States.  This provision comprehends the Chinese of 
the Pacific States, Indians subject to taxation, the people called Gypsies, as 
well as the entire race designated as blacks, persons of color, negroes, 
mulattoes, and persons of African blood.  Every individual of those races, 
born in the United States, is, by the bill, made a citizen of the United States.  
(112 U.S. 94, 114) 
 
Basing his opinion upon a literal reading of the act’s language and upon the recorded debate in 
the United States Senate, Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan concluded: 
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It would seem manifest, from this brief review of the history of the act of 
1866, that one purpose of that legislation was to confer national citizenship 
upon a part of the Indian race in this country – such of them, at least, as 
resided in one of the States or Territories, and were subject to taxation and 
other public burdens.  (112 U.S. 94, 114) 
 
As will be shown in the discussion of the Court’s ruling in Elk v. Wilkins, despite the acuity of 
his legal vision and the factual basis of his constitutional reasoning, Justice Harlan’s legal 
opinion was not a view of American Indian citizenship shared by many Americans, let alone a 
majority of the Supreme Court. 
 Fourteenth amendment to the u.s. constitution. 
 Justice Harlan noted the congruence of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 with the Fourteenth 
Amendment: “At the same session of the Congress which passed the act of 1866, the Fourteenth 
Amendment was approved and submitted to the States for adoption.  Those who sustained the 
former urged the adoption of the latter” (112 U.S. 94, 115).  As with the Civil Rights Act, Justice 
Harlan examined the legislative record to discover congressional intent. 
An examination of the debates in Congress, pending the consideration of 
that amendment, will show that there was no purpose, on the part of those 
who framed it or of those who sustained it by their votes, to abandon the 
policy inaugurated by the act of 1866, of admitting to national citizenship 
such Indians as were separated from their tribes, and were residents of one 
of the States … outside of any reservation or territory set apart for the 
exclusive use and occupancy of Indian tribes.  (112 U.S. 94, 115) 
 
After examining congressional legislation granting citizenship to specific tribal members electing 
to pursue such a path, after describing congressional conversations about the issue of Indian 
citizenship, and after quoting specific remarks made on the floor of the U.S. Senate, Supreme 
Court Justice John Marshall Harlan observed:   
But it was distinctly announced by the friends of the measure [the proposed 
Fourteenth Amendment] that they intended to include in the grant of 
national citizenship Indians who were within the jurisdiction of the States, 
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and subject to their laws, because such Indians would be completely under 
the jurisdiction of the United States.  (112 U.S. 94, 117) 
 
After recounting the discussions and difficulties with the phrase “Indians not taxed,” Justice 
Harlan summarized his findings regarding congressional intent: 
A careful examination of all that was said by Senators and Representatives, 
pending the consideration by Congress of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
justifies us in saying that every one who participated in the debates, whether 
for or against the amendment, believed that in the form in which it was 
approved by Congress it granted, and was intended to grant, national 
citizenship to every person of the Indian race in this country who was 
unconnected with any tribe, and who resided, in good faith, outside of 
Indian reservations…  (112 U.S. 94, 118) 
 
 A little over a half-century later, Felix Cohen noted that the Fourteenth Amendment 
constituted the first congressional effort that “first defined federal citizenship” (Cohen, 
1942/1971, p. 155).  Cohen differed from Justice Harlan in attributing the differing congressional 
interpretations to the effects of the Fourteenth Amendment’s “effect on the Indians” (Cohen, 
1942/1971, p. 155).  Justice Harlan, on the other hand (as previously noted), focused on the 
differing interpretations of the phrase “Indians not taxed” as the major area of differing opinion 
(See 112 U.S. 94, 117-118, for Harlan’s discussion).  Both Cohen and Justice Harlan noted the 
later action by the Senate Judiciary Committee on December 14, 1870, offering its opinion 
regarding the Fourteenth Amendment’s impact upon citizenship for American Indians.   
 According to Cohen, the Senate Judiciary Committee “conclud[ed] that the Indians did 
not attain citizenship by the Fourteenth Amendment” (Cohen, 1942/1971, p. 155, n. 33).  In 
Cohen’s view, the purpose for the Senate Judiciary’s report was “to clarify its [the Fourteenth 
Amendment] effect” on American Indians (Cohen, 1942/1971, p. 155, n. 33).  Cohen viewed the 
Judiciary Committee’s report as a link in a chain stretching from Attorney General Cushing’s 
report to McKay v. Campbell to the Court’s majority ruling in Elk v. Wilkins (Cohen, 1942/1971, 
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p. 155).  Cohen’s perspective was one of looking backward from Elk v. Wilkins as part of a larger 
assignment, that of  
undertak[ing] the forbidding task of bring meaning and reason out of the 
vast hodgepodge of treaties, statutes, judicial and administrative rulings, and 
unrecorded practice in which the intricacies and perplexities, the confusions 
and injustices of the law governing Indians lay concealed.  (Cohen, 
1942/1971, p. v) 
 
Harlan’s perspective was more immediate, ascertaining the facts of a particular legal issue and 
applying the law in a reasoned manner in order to reach a particular set of legal conclusions.  
Justice Harlan, it appears, examined the Senate Judiciary Committee’s report in detail as he 
quoted several times from the report in his opinion.  Based upon his examination, Justice Harlan 
arrived at a different purpose for the report than did Cohen.  According to Justice Harlan:  “The 
report was made in obedience to an instruction to inquire as to the effect of the Fourteenth 
Amendment upon the treaties which the United States had with various Indian tribes of the 
country” (112 U.S. 94, 118).  Where Cohen saw the Judiciary Committee’s purpose as one of 
ascertaining the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment in a general way upon American Indians, 
Justice Harlan viewed the Committee’s purpose more specifically in terms of its impact upon the 
various treaties previously negotiated between the United States and the various tribal 
governments.   
 The Judiciary Committee did, however, address the issue of citizenship in determining 
whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment nullified the treaties with the Indian nations.  Justice 
John Marshall Harlan cited two sections of the Committee’s report.  The first dealt with Indians 
who retained their tribal status.  As can be seen from the cited section of the report, the Judiciary 
Committee viewed this as the critical issue in determining the impact of the Fourteenth 
Amendment upon Indian treaties. 
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[T]he Indian tribes within the limits of the United States, and the 
individuals, members of such tribes, while they adhere to and form a part of 
the tribes to which they belong, are not, within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States; 
and, therefore, that such Indians have not become citizens of the United 
States by virtue of that amendment [the Fourteenth]; … it follows that the 
treaties heretofore made between the United States and the Indians are not 
annulled by that amendment.  (112 U.S. 94, 118-119) 
 
According to the Judiciary Committee, American Indians who remained with their tribe and who 
functioned as tribal members were neither citizens of the United States nor were they “subject to 
the jurisdiction” of the United States (112 U.S. 94, 119).  For Justice Harlan, however, the 
critical portion of the Judiciary Committee’s recommendation, which contained “significant 
language” in Justice Harlan’s view, remained the following:148 
It is pertinent to say, in concluding this report, that treaty relations can 
properly exist with Indian tribes or nations only, and that, when the members 
of any Indian tribe are scattered, they are merged in the mass of our people, 
and become equally subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.  
(Emphasis in original) (112 U.S. 94, 119) 
 
Viewed in light of these citations, members of Congress, both at the time the Fourteenth 
Amendment was considered and proposed and subsequently as members of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, viewed the Fourteenth Amendment as bestowing American citizenship on Indians 
who had severed ties with their tribe and had removed themselves to the larger American society. 
 McKay v. Campbell, 16 Fed. Cas. 161 (D.C. Ore. 1871).149 
 McKay v. Campbell was referenced by the Court in its majority opinion in Elk v. Wilkins 
and by Cohen in his massive tome on American Indian law.  Cohen viewed the decision by the 
federal judge of the District Court for the District of Oregon as a “reiterat[tion]” of the opinion 
offered by Attorney General Caleb Cushing in 1856 (Cohen, 1942/1971, p. 155).  According to 
Cohen, McKay v. Campbell “shattered” any hopes “that a liberal interpretation [of the Fourteenth 
Amendment] would make Indians citizens” (Cohen, 1942/1971, p. 155).  In light of the 
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congressional intent of the Fourteenth Amendment, convincingly illustrated by Justice Harlan’s 
painstaking research, the question of liberality is no longer a question, but instead becomes a 
factual issue of congressional intent whereby the Fourteenth Amendment granted citizenship to 
nontribal American Indians.   
 Reading McKay v. Campbell is the equivalent of a history lesson.  The plaintiff in the 
case was William McKay.  He filed action against James Campbell, one of the judges of election 
in the East Dalles precinct in Wasco County, Oregon.  Campbell refused to allow William 
McKay to vote because “he was not a citizen of the United States, but [instead] was a half-breed 
Indian” (16 Fed. Cas. 161, 162).  Actually, the facts were somewhat more complex and required 
the Court to engage in extensive fact finding regarding the lineage of William McKay and the 
history of Oregon’s settlement before commencing to interpret English & American common 
law, a series of agreements and treaties between Great Britain and the United States focused on 
the Oregon Territory, several congressional acts, previous Supreme Court decisions, and both the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution.  Finally, the actual grounds for the 
suit rested only indirectly upon the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  The law suit was 
technically filed  
to recover a penalty of $500, given by section 2 of an act of congress [sic] 
entitled “An act to enforce the rights of citizens of the United States to vote 
in the several states of the Union, and for other purposes,” approved May 
13, 1870 (16 Stat. 140).  (16 Fed. Cas. 161) 
 
 William McKay’s grandfather, Alexander McKay, “was born in Scotland, and emigrated 
to Canada, where he married Margaret Bruce, a woman having one fourth Indian blood” (16 Fed. 
Cas. 161, 162).  In 1810, Alexander McKay joined John Jacob Astor’s “American Fur 
Company” which departed from New York City “for the mouth of the Columbia river [sic]” (16 
Fed. Cas. 161, 162).  Alexander, taking both his wife and his thirteen-year-old son, Thomas, 
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traveled from Montreal to New York City in order to join the American Fur Company prior to its 
departure for the Oregon country.  Alexander and his family made the journey from Montreal to 
New York “in a birch bark canoe, transporting it on a wagon across the portages between the St. 
Lawrence and the Hudson” (16 Fed. Cas. 161, 166).  Shortly after their arrival in Oregon in 
1811, Alexander McKay (William’s grandfather) perished with the ship, and Thomas McKay 
(William’s father) went to work for the “Northwest Fur Company, a corporation organized under 
the laws of Great Britain, having its principal office in Montreal,” (16 Fed. Cas. 161, 162).  In 
1821 the Northwest Fur Company merged with the Hudson Bay Company “by an act of 
parliament” and became the “Honorable Hudson Bay Company” (16 Fed. Cas. 161, 162).  At an 
unspecified date, Thomas McKay (William’s father) “married a Chinook Indian woman, and the 
plaintiff was the issue of that marriage, born at Fort George (now Astoria), in 1823” (16 Fed. 
Cas. 161, 162).  According to the federal district court judge’s determination, William McKay 
(the plaintiff in the case) was “seven sixteenths white and nine sixteenths Indian blood,” and he 
had “always lived in Oregon except from 1838 to 1843, while in the state of New York to obtain 
an education” (16 Fed. Cas. 161, 162).  The federal district court also determined that “[n]either 
the plaintiff, nor his father, nor his grandfather McKay, were ever naturalized under the laws of 
the United States” (16 Fed. Cas. 161, 162).  The court also determined that while William 
McKay (the plaintiff) had been born in 1823, the Oregon territory didn’t come under the 
jurisdiction of the United States until 1846 (16 Fed. Cas. 161, 163, 165). 
 The federal district court addressed William McKay’s claim that James Campbell had 
violated rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution.  
Judge Deady of the Oregon Federal District Court cited a portion of the Fifteenth Amendment, 
which “provides that ‘the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
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abridged … on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude’” (16 Fed. Cas. 161, 
165).  Deady then cited Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment that states “All persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States, and of the state wherein they reside” (16 Fed. Cas. 161, 165).  According to Judge Deady, 
the Fourteenth Amendment that he had just cited“ is nothing more than declaratory of the rule of 
the common law” (16 Fed. Cas. 161, 165).   He continued: 
To be a citizen of the United States by reason of his birth, a person must not 
only be born within its territorial limits, but he must also be born subject to 
its jurisdiction – that is, in its power and obedience. 16 Fed. Cas. 161, 165) 
 
This passage was cited by both Cohen and the majority Court’s opinion in Elk v. Wilkins.  
Legally, according to Judge Deady, William McKay (the plaintiff) was “[either] an American 
Indian, by virtue of his mother being a member of the Chinook tribe [sic], or [he was] a British 
subject … by virtue of being the son of Thomas McKay, and his birth in the allegiance of the 
British crown” (16 Fed. Cas. 161,  166).  Examining the issue of William McKay’s political 
status based upon his father, Judge Deady concluded that “the plaintiff was born of a British 
subject, in the allegiance of the British crown” (16 Fed. Cas. 161, 166).  Judge Deady then 
examined the alternative claim based upon McKay’s mother’s political status under both the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  He cited Chief Justice John Marshall’s ruling in 
Worcester v. Georgia: 
But the Indian tribes within the limits of the United States have always been 
held to be distinct and independent political communities, retaining the right 
of self-government, thought subject to the protecting power of the United 
States.  Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. [31 U.S.] 575.  (16 Fed. Cas. 161, 166) 
 
Nearing the conclusion of his opinion, Judge Heady couched his ruling in the guise of answers to 
questions he posed immediately preceding the judicial response.  First, he addressed the issue 
from the political status of McKay’s mother in the form of a question: 
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Suppose that the plaintiff should be held to follow the condition of his 
mother, and is therefore a Chinook Indian; is he then a citizen of the United 
States under article 14 of the constitution [sic]?  (16 Fed. Cas. 161, 167) 
 
Judge Heady’s answer followed immediately: 
According to the doctrine that has been uniformly held in regard to the 
status of the Indian tribes in the United States he is not.  Being born a 
member of “an independent political community” – the Chinook – he was 
not born subject to the jurisdiction of the United States – not born in its 
allegiance.  (16 Fed. Cas. 161, 167) 
 
Oregon Federal District Court Judge Heady next addressed the political status of McKay that 
flowed from his father followed by a conclusion addressing both parents’ political status: 
On the other hand, if the plaintiff is held to follow the condition of his father 
he is a Canadian of mixed blood, born in the allegiance of the British crown, 
and therefore a British subject.  In neither case was he born a citizen of the 
United States, and can only become one by complying with the laws for the 
naturalization of aliens.  (16 Fed. Cas. 161, 167) 
 
Judge Heady concluded that since “the plaintiff was not a citizen of the United States,” McKay 
could not “maintain this [court] action” and issued “judgment for the defendant [Campbell]” (16 
Fed. Cas. 161, 167). 
 Facts of elk v. wilkins. 
 The historical facts embedded in the chain of events that eventually precipitated Elk v. 
Wilkins occurred long before the actual legal facts of the case.  Twice Ponca homelands were 
ceded or transferred to other parties without Ponca tribal approval, a treaty guaranteeing the 
Ponca a homeland centered on the mouth of the Niobrara River was unilaterally broken by 
congressional authorization, the Ponca were forcibly removed without either their approval or 
agreement to the Indian Territory, a tribal faction journeyed back undetected to their homeland 
along the Niobrara in the dead of winter and were arrested while staying with their friends on the 
Omaha Reservation in Nebraska, and an early test of habeas corpus involving the issue of 
  
citizenship appeared in United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook
occurred within the lifetime of the plaintiff in 
 The first cession occurred with the Omaha Treaty of 1854 when Ponca lands near the 
Niobrara River were ceded by the Omaha (See previous Figure R1, #315 for the Ponca lands 
ceded by the Omaha) (National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, Standing Bear v. 
the United States [hereafter cited as NPS, Standing Bear], Section “The Home Reservation, ¶ 1).  
The second occurrence involved Ponca lands being recognized as Sioux land by the Un
States.  This first occurred in the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851 which included part of the Ponca’s 
land within the “[b]oundaries of the Sioux or Dahcotah nation” (Royce, pp. 786
Lakota-Ponca Battle for Land Between the Whit
This same boundary served as the means whereby Ponca lands were included as part of “the 
Great Sioux Reservation” (NPS, Standing Bear, Home Reservation section, ¶ 4; Royce, pp. 786
787 & 818-819).  The disputed ownership centered on t
on the northern edge and the Niobrara River on the southern edge, beginning with each river’s 
source in western Nebraska and proceeding eastward through both Nebraska and South Dakota, 
ending where each river empties 
 
 
.  All of these events 
Elk v. Wilkins before the case was even filed.  
-
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indicating the Niobrara as Nebraska’s northernmost east-west river and the White River as South 
Dakota’s southernmost east-west river).150  In actual fact, the Ponca had been driven out of the 
western and central portions of this area by the Lakota until they were located much closer to the 
Niobrara’s confluence with the Missouri along the eastern edge of the territory (NPS, Standing 
Bear, Who Are the Ponca? section, ¶ 3-7).   
 In an 1858 treaty the Ponca ceded a large portion of their remaining land while reserving 
a smaller portion to serve as a reservation (See Figure R6, # 409 for the ceded portion; for the 
reserved portions, see Figure R6, #471 & #472, also located on the following page; for 
determination of map numbers identifying land ceded and reserved, see Royce, pp. 818-819).151    
Figure R6 
Ponca Lands Ceded & Reserved By the Treaty of 1858 
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The lands reserved in 1858 received an additional guarantee by the United States that they would 
be reserved for the tribe in the Ponca Treaty of 1865 (Kappler, v. II, pp. 875-876).  These Ponca 
lands, lying alongside the Niobrara River, constituted “a reservation of 95,000 acres” (Prucha, 
1984,1986, p. 183).  It was the lands on this reserve that the U.S. Government “without 
consulting the Poncas” ceded “to the Sioux, the Poncas’ traditional enemies” in the Fort Laramie 
Treaty of 1868 with the Sioux (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 183). 
 What happened next was described by one historian as “a tragic instance of bureaucratic 
blundering and insensitivity” (Debo, p. 210).  In August of 1876, Congress authorized the 
Department of the Interior to remove the Ponca from their lands in northeastern Nebraska to an 
undetermined location (NPS, Standing Bear, Relocation section, ¶ 2).  In a subsequent  
Figure R7 
Ponca Removal to Quapaw Land in the Indian Territory, 1877 
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congressional act dated March 3, 1877, it was determined that the Ponca were to be relocated on 
Quapaw land in the Indian Territory (Royce, pp. 888-889; see preceding Figure R7, # 504 & # 
505 for the location of the Quapaw lands in what is today northeastern Oklahoma, these being 
the lands to which the Ponca were forcibly removed).152  What happened next was graphically 
summarized: 
The Poncas were not consulted; they first learned of the plan when an agent 
of the Indian Office came to them the following January to carry it out.  
They said they would rather die than to leave their homes.  Their frantic 
protests to the government officials were ignored, and a detachment of 
twenty-five soldiers was sent to force their removal.  (Debo, p. 210) 
 
Debo continued her narrative of the Ponca’s plight: 
Thus, through persuasion and the threat of coercion, they started out, 681 
persons led by their chief, Standing Bear.  By this time it was summer, and 
their journey in the heat was a two months’ disaster, with torrential rains, 
swollen rivers, and even a tornado.  A number died on the way.  No 
preparation had been made to receive them, and they continued to die, 
constantly begging for permission to return home.  (Debo, p. 211) 
 
Standing Bear’s married daughter constituted one of the Ponca deaths on the trip to the Indian 
Territory (NPS, Standing Bear, Relocation section, ¶ 18; Debo, p. 211).  The Ponca arrived at 
their new location without any farming equipment and little food.  They had also arrived too late 
to be able to plant crops even if they possessed the equipment to do so.  During the removal and 
within a year of its implementation, “one hundred and fifty-eight [Poncas] died” (25 Fed. Cas. 
695, 698).  By 1880, only about 400 Ponca remained alive (Poppleton & Webster, ¶ 13).   
 One year after arriving in the Indian Territory, Congress removed the Poncas to a new 
location “w of the Kaws” in Indian Territory (Royce, pp. 892-893) (See Figure R8, #628 for the 
new Ponca “homeland” in Indian Territory).153   The winter following the tribe’s move to a 
second location in the Indian Territory, Standing Bear lost his youngest son, Bear Shield, to 
disease (NPS, Standing Bear, Breaking Away section, ¶ 1; Debo, p. 211). 
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Figure R8 
Poncas’ Second Removal to a New Location in Indian Territory, 1878 
 
 
 Having “promised his dying son that he would be buried among his ancestors in his 
native homeland on the Niobrara,” Standing Bear set out for the Ponca homelands in northeast 
Nebraska in the middle of winter on January 2, 1879 (NPS, Standing Bear, Breaking Away 
section, ¶ 2 & ¶ 4; see also Debo, p. 211).  With Standing Bear went “eight men, six boys, and 
thirteen women & girls” (NPS, Standing Bear, Breaking Away section, ¶ 4).  Avoiding towns 
and populated areas, they traveled undetected, reaching “the reservation of their friends and close 
relatives, the Omahas, in eastern Nebraska, where they received sympathy and asylum” in late 
February (Debo, p. 211; NPS, Breaking Away section, ¶ 6).   
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 Learning of the Poncas’ arrival at the Omaha reservation, Secretary of the Interior Carl 
Schurz ordered the arrest of Standing Bear and his band since they had left the Indian Territory 
without government permission (Debo, p. 211; NPS, Breaking Away section, ¶ 5 & ¶ 8).  
General Crook’s “sympathy was all with the Indians, but he took them into custody” (Debo, p. 
211).  Based upon his experiences with the Indians (he had led troops in the field against the 
Apache, Paiutes, and Lakota), Crook “had come to oppose the government’s Indian policy, but 
as a professional soldier and officer, considered it improper to speak out publicly” (NPS, 
Standing Bear, Breaking Away section, ¶ 10).  General Crook’s professionalism in carrying out 
orders with which he disagreed was noted by Federal District Court Judge Dundy in United 
States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook: 
But I think it is creditable to the heart and mind of the brave and 
distinguished officer who is made respondent herein to say that he has no 
sort of sympathy in the business in which he is forced by his position to bear 
a part so conspicuous…  (25 Fed. Cas. 695) 
 
 Subsequent to arresting Standing Bear, General Crook met with a local editor to enlist his 
help in fighting to prevent the return of Standing Bear and his band to the Indian Territory (NPS, 
Standing Bear, Breaking Away section, ¶ 11 & ¶ 12).  The editor mounted an extensive 
campaign detailing the plight of the fugitive Poncas and recruited two Omaha attorneys to help 
Standing Bear fight the U.S. Government (NPS, Standing Bear, Breaking Away section, ¶ 17; 
NPS, New Battleground section, ¶ 1).  After being advised by most of the attorneys in Omaha 
“that Indians had no rights,” the editor talked to one of his friends from college, an attorney 
named John Lee Webster, who agreed to help (NPS, Standing Bear, New Battleground section, ¶ 
1).  Webster enlisted Andrew Jackson Poppleton, a “prominent Omaha citizen, eloquent speaker, 
accomplished attorney and chief counsel for the Union Pacific Railroad,” to lead the legal battle 
(NPS, Standing Bear, New Battleground section, ¶ 1). 
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 Planning “to file suit for a writ of habeas corpus against General Crook,” Poppleton and 
Webster met with General Crook to discuss the plan (NPS, Standing Bear, New Battleground 
section, ¶ 1 & ¶ 2).  Crook was satisfied that serving the writ would legally block him “from 
obeying any orders from the Interior or War departments” to return Standing Bear and his band 
to the Indian Territory (NPS, Standing Bear, New Battleground section, ¶‘s 2-4).  On April 8, 
1879, Poppleton and Webster petitioned the Federal District Court in Lincoln, Nebraska, 
claiming that confinement of American Indians by the U.S. Army violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (25 F. Cas. 695, ??).  Judge Dundy read the petition and 
“issued the writ of habeas corpus that was served on Gen Crook later that day” whereupon 
“Crook promptly wired his commander, General Sheridan in Chicago” (NPS, Standing Bear, 
New Battleground section, ¶ 4; also see Debo, p. 211).  The U.S. District Attorney received a 
message on April 10th “to appear for the United States to have the writ dismissed” (NPS, 
Standing Bear, New Battleground section, ¶ 5).   
 In United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695 (No. 14,891) (C.C.C. 
Neb. 1879), the “government argued that Indians were not ‘persons’ within the meaning of the 
Constitution, [i.e., they were not citizens] and thus were not eligible for the writ” (Debo, p. 211).  
Debo described the legal proceedings that began on May 1, 1879: 
The trial was a dramatic occasion in a courtroom crowded with white 
sympathizers of the Poncas.  Standing Bear spoke in his own defense with 
an eloquence that moved his hearers – including the presiding judge and 
General Crook – to tears.  When he ended, the audience rose to its feet and 
cheered, and when the judge adjourned the court, all crowded around to 
shake his hand.  (Debo, p. 211; see also NPS, New Battleground section, ¶‘s 
11-24) 
 
On May 12th, the judge issued his ruling.  Federal District Court Judge Dundy began by noting 
the political disparity of the two parties in the case, the Ponca and the U.S. Government: 
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On the one side, we have a few of the remnants of a once numerous and 
powerful, but now weak, insignificant, unlettered, and generally despised 
race; on the other, we have the representative of one of the most powerful, 
most enlightened, and most Christianized nations of modern times.  (25 F. 
Cas. 695) 
 
Judge Dundy continued: 
On the one side, we have the representatives of this wasted race coming into 
this national tribunal of ours, asking for justice and liberty to enable them to 
adopt our boasted civilization, and to pursue the arts of peace, which have 
made us great and happy as a nation; on the other side, we have this 
magnificent, if not magnanimous, government, resisting this application 
with the determination of sending these people back to the country which is 
to them less desirable than perpetual imprisonment in their own native land.  
(25 F. Cas. 695) 
 
Putting aside the sentiments that had been built up around the case, Judge Dundy observed: 
But in a country where liberty is regulated by law, something more 
satisfactory and enduring then mere sympathy must furnish and constitute 
the rule and basis of judicial action.  It follows that this case must be 
examined and decided on principles of law … under the constitution or laws 
of the United States, or some treaty made pursuant thereto…  (25 F. Cas. 
695) 
 
 Beginning his analysis of the “questions of law” raised by the case, Federal District Court 
Judge Dundy addressed the government’s claim that the federal district court did not have the 
authority to issue the requested writ of habeas corpus.  The federal district attorney based his 
claim upon reasons deriving from the “origin of the writ of habeas corpus and the character of 
the proceedings and practice in connection therewith in the parent country [England]” (25 F. Cas. 
695, 696).  Judge Dundy summarized the government’s argument: 
It was claimed that the laws of the realm limited the right to sue out this writ 
to the free subjects of the kingdom, and that none others came within the 
benefits of such beneficent laws; and, reasoning from analogy, it is claimed 
that none but American citizens are entitled to sue out this high prerogative 
writ in any of the federal courts.  (25 F. Cas. 695, 696) 
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Describing the “laws of a limited monarchy” as being “sometimes less wise and humane than the 
laws of our own republic,” Judge Dundy dismissed the government’s analogy as inappropriate 
because “whilst the parliament of Great Britain was legislating in behalf of the favored few, the 
congress of the United States was legislating in behalf of all mankind who come within our 
jurisdiction” (25 F. Cas. 695, 696).  Citing three separate sections of “the Revised Statutes,” 
Judge Dundy concluded: 
Thus, it will be seen that when a person is in custody or deprived of his 
liberty under color of authority of the United States, or in violation of the 
constitution or laws or treaties of the United States, the federal judges have 
jurisdiction, and the writ can properly issue.  (25 F. Cas. 695, 696) 
 
The fact that the Poncas were in the “custody of a federal officer, under color of authority of the 
United States,” met one of the requirements for the writ of habeas corpus outlined in the U.S. 
Revised Statutes (25 F. Cas. 695, 696).   
 Previously Judge Dundy had drawn attention to a Ponca treaty: 
On the 8th of March, 1859, a treaty was made by the United States with the 
Ponca tribe of Indians, by which a certain tract of country, north of the 
Niobrara river [sic] and west of the Missouri, was set apart for the 
permanent home of the said Indians, in which the government agreed to 
protect them during their good behavior.  (25 F. Cas. 695, 696) 
 
Having determined that the Poncas met the first eligibility test for habeas corpus under 
congressional statute by virtue of being in federal custody, Judge Dundy next observed: 
And they may be entitled to the writ under the other paragraph, before 
recited, for the reason, as they allege, that they are restrained of liberty in 
violation of a provision of their treaty, before referred to.  Now, it must be 
borne in mind that the habeas corpus act describes applicants for the writ as 
“persons,” or “parties,” who may be entitled thereto.  It nowhere describes 
them as “citizens,” nor is citizenship in any way or place made a 
qualification for suing out the writ.  (25 F. Cas. 695, 696-697) 
 
Having raised the issue of treaty violation as a justification for releasing the Ponca  under a writ 
of habeas corpus because their federal detention violated the Ponca Treaty of 1859, Judge Dundy 
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next raised the issue of whether Indians were “persons” as referenced by U.S. law.  Dundy never 
returned to the question of treaty violation in his opinion.  Instead, he devoted attention to 
investigating whether or not Indians qualified for the requested writ.  After noting Webster’s 
definition of “a person as ‘a living soul; a self-conscious being; a moral agent; especially a living 
being; a man, woman, or child; an individual of the human race,’” Dundy noted:  “This is 
comprehensive enough, it would seem, to include even an Indian” (25 F. Cas. 695, 697).  Judge 
Dundy continued, “I must hold, then, that Indians, and consequently the relators [the Poncas] are 
‘persons,’ such as are described by and included within the laws before quoted” (25 F. Cas. 695, 
697).  The government had further argued that the federal district court “must be without 
jurisdiction” because “this is the first instance on record in which an Indian has been permitted to 
sue out and maintain a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court” (25 F. Cas. 695, 697)  Judge 
Dundy retorted that the government’s argument was “a non sequitur,” and pointed out that 
“[p]ower and authority rightfully conferred do not necessarily cease to exist in consequence of 
long non-user” (25 F. Cas. 695, 697).  Federal District Court Judge Dundy concluded:  
I cannot doubt that congress [sic] intended to give to every person who 
might be unlawfully restrained of liberty under color of authority of the 
United States, the right to the writ and a discharge thereon.  I conclude, then, 
that, so far as the issuing of the writ is concerned, it was properly issued, 
and that the relators [the Poncas] are within the jurisdiction conferred by the 
habeas corpus act.  (25 F. Cas. 695, 697) 
 
 Having determined that the Poncas were eligible for the writ of habeas corpus and that 
the writ had been properly issued, Judge Dundy turned to the remaining legal issue, whether or 
not the federal government had acted in a lawful manner in detaining the Poncas.  As described 
by Judge Dundy: 
A question of much greater importance remains for consideration, which, 
when determined, will be decisive of this whole controversy.  This relates to 
the right of the government to arrest and hold the relators [the Poncas] for a 
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time, for the purpose of being returned to a point in the Indian Territory 
from which it is alleged the Indians escaped.  (25 F. Cas. 695, 697) 
 
Dundy conducted “[a] review of the policy of the government adopted in its dealings with the 
friendly tribe of Poncas” by focusing upon the treaties and congressional acts centered on the 
Ponca Tribe (25 F. Cas. 695, 698).  Following a somewhat lengthy review, instead of ruling on 
the detention of the Ponca as a treaty violation and thereby illegal under the rule of law whereby 
Article VI of the Constitution declared that the “Constitution,” the “Laws of the United States,” 
and “all Treaties” were to be considered “the supreme Law of the Land,” Judge Dundy focused 
on the procedural question inherent in the legal dispute.  Dundy articulated what should have 
happened: 
As General Crook had the right to arrest and remove the relators [the 
Poncas] from the Omaha Indian reservation, it follows, from what has been 
stated, that the law required him to convey them to this city and turn them 
over to the marshal [sic] and United States attorney, to be proceeded against 
in due course of law.  Then proceedings could be instituted against them in 
either the circuit or district court…  But this course was not pursued in this 
case… (25 F. Cas. 695, 700) 
 
Federal District Court Judge Dundy continued: 
I have searched in vain for the semblance of any authority justifying the 
commissioner [of Indian Affairs] in attempting to remove by force any 
Indians, whether belonging to a tribe or not, to any place, or for any other 
purpose than what has been stated….  In the absence of all treaty 
stipulations or laws of the United States authorizing such removal, I must 
conclude that no such arbitrary authority exists.  (25 F. Cas. 695, 700) 
 
The power of arrest, detainment, and removal are “war power[s] merely, and exist in time of war 
only,” according to Judge Dundy.  He continued: 
Every nation exercises the right to arrest and detain an alien enemy during 
the existence of a war, and all subjects or citizens of the hostile nations are 
subject to be dealt with under this rule.  But it is not claimed that the Ponca 
tribe of Indians are at war with the United States, so that this war power 
might be used against them; in fact, they are amongst the most peaceable 
and friendly of all the Indian tribes, and have at times received from the 
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government unmistakable and substantial recognition of their long-
continued friendship for the whites.  (25 F. Cas. 695, 700) 
 
Judge Dundy concluded: 
If they [the Poncas] could be removed to the Indian Territory by force, and 
kept there in the same way, I can see no good reason why they might not be 
taken and kept by force in the penitentiary at Lincoln, or Leavenworth, or 
Jefferson City, or any other place which the commander of the forces might, 
in his judgment, see proper to designate.  I cannot think that any such 
arbitrary authority exists in this country.  (Emphasis added) (25 F. Cas. 695, 
700) 
 
After recapitulating his holdings, Judge Dundy concluded that the Poncas, having been 
“restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws 
thereof,” ordered that the Poncas “must be discharged from custody” (25 F. Cas. 695, 701). 
 Debo described the aftermath:   
The friends of Indians hoped to carry the case to the Supreme Court for a 
final ruling, but the government shrank from appealing the decision.  
Standing Bear and his followers were released, and they went on to their old 
home [grounds on the Niobrara] and buried the boy [Standing Bear’s son] 
with tribal honors.  (Debo, p. 211) 
 
In point of fact, the government didn’t shrink from appealing the decision, at least according to 
the District Court’s records.  In a note appended to the end of ruling by the Federal District Court 
for Nebraska, the following is stated: 
At the May term, 1879, Mr. Justice Miller [of the U.S. Supreme Court] 
refused to hear an appeal prosecuted by the United States, because the 
Indians who had petitioned for the writ of habeas corpus were not present, 
having been released by the order of Dundy, District Judge, and no security 
for their appearance having been taken.  (25 F. Cas. 695, 701) 
 
But, then again, maybe both sources are correct in so far as they go in relating the matter of 
appeal.  From the following account, it would seem that the federal district attorney appealed the 
case, it was heard, and then it was dismissed on a motion filed by the federal district attorney, 
maybe because he received orders from higher up in the chain of command.   
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The United States District Attorney took the case to the United States 
Circuit Court for the district by appeal and on May 19 at a hearing before 
Mr. Justice Miller Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States was there continued and on June 5, 1880 the appeal was dismissed on 
a motion of the U.S. District Attorney.  (Zimmerman, p. 225) 
 
Another historian provides the remaining piece to the puzzle of what happened with the appeal 
of United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, confirming that the Secretary of the Interior 
directed that no appeal would be made.   According to Father Prucha, “Schurz [Secretary of the 
Interior] quashed an attempt to carry the Standing Bear case to the Supreme Court…” (Prucha, 
1984, 1986, p. 184).   
 Perhaps it is unfortunate that United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook was not heard 
by the U.S. Supreme Court because the issue of noncitizens’ rights to file for a writ of habeas 
corpus arose once again in the aftermath of the attack on the World Trade Center in New York 
City on September 11, 2001, the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, and the U.S. military 
campaign in Afghanistan.  As the Federal Court for the District of Nebraska dismissed such 
arguments in 1879, so too did the U.S Supreme Court dismiss such arguments over one hundred 
years later in a series of cases decided between 2004 and 2008, with the last and most significant 
case being decided by a one-vote margin.154  Or, perhaps after reading the Court’s decision in Elk 
v. Wilkins in the upcoming pages, the reader will conclude that it was just as well that the Court 
didn’t decide to hear United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, that it was more preferable to 
have the lower court ruling stand than to be overturned. 
 John Elk was a Ponca according to one source.  According to another source John Elk 
was a Winnebago.  One won’t find reference to Elk’s tribal affiliation in  any of the court 
records.  Nor will it be found in most of the accounts of Elk v. Wilkins, e.g., Cohen, Debo, 
Deloria, Prucha, etc.  Nor will one find such information in the letter to The New York Times, 
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which was written by Elk’s attorneys, Andrew J. Poppleton and John L. Webster (Poppleton & 
Webster, last paragraph).  Since the severing of tribal relations constituted the basis of his claim 
for citizenship, perhaps Elk’s tribal status as to the particular tribe in which he was born didn’t 
seem important. Deloria and Wilkins do mention that Elk v. Wilkins “was brought by the same 
attorneys who had successfully handled United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook,” but they 
do not mention that John Elk was a Ponca (Deloria & Wilkins, p. 145).  The case material found 
in the U.S. Reports makes only the following references to Elk and his situation without 
identifying his “former” membership in either the Ponca or the Winnebago Tribes: “an Indian,” 
“he had severed his tribal relation to the Indian tribes,” “[t]he plaintiff is an Indian … and has 
severed his tribal relation to the Indian tribes,” “a member of one of the Indian tribes within the 
United States,” “John Elk, the plaintiff in error, is a person of the Indian race,” “he had severed 
all relations with his tribe,” “no longer a member of an Indian tribe,” and “abandoning his tribe” 
(112 U.S. 94, 95, 98, 99, 110, 111, 122).  The following account provides both the missing tribal 
affiliation and a summary of the facts of the case: 
In 1884, … the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case brought by a Ponca 
Indian named John Elk, who had voluntarily left his tribe where it had been 
relocated in the Indian Territory and moved to Nebraska.  There he 
registered to vote and was refused by the Omaha city registrar because he 
was an Indian.  His case was based on the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment…  (Page, pp. 308-309) 
 
No source was cited for the identification of John Elk as a Ponca.  The assertion that John Elk 
was a Ponca is corroborated circumstantially by an earlier history of the Poncas.  In citing Ponca 
efforts subsequent to Standing Bear’s trial to remedy the “displacement of the Ponca tribe 
through Government action,” another writer included  
the case of John Elk to determine the rights of an Indian under the 
Fourteenth amendment to the Constitution.  The Indians had hoped an 
appeal would be taken so that a decision was or was not clothed with the 
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privileges of a citizen so that he could have a standing in a court of law.  
(Zimmerman, p. 226) 
 
In light of the evidence presented thus far, John Elk as a Ponca appeared both correct and 
credible. 
 In addition, two later historians provided what seemed to be yet more corroboration for 
Elk’s identification as a Ponca, an identification that seemed to make sense in light of all the 
facts, by discussing the Standing Bear and Elk cases in connection with Ponca hopes of 
addressing the wrongs done to them through government removal to the Indian Territory.  The 
two university researchers noted that friends of the Ponca had hopes that a congressional bill 
declaring “Indians to be citizens” would help resolve “the battle waged by Standing Bear and his 
supporters” (Mathes & Lowitt, p. 170).  However, upon a closer reading, these same two 
historians clearly identified John Elk as a Winnebago (Mathes & Lowitt, p. 169).   Their index 
provided a page reference note under the heading for John Elk, which, when examined, provided 
source material the two historians had used for John Elk.  An examination of the sources 
revealed the source used to identify Elk as a Winnebago, an article in a historical journal by a 
college researcher whose work “was funded in part by a Marycrest College Dean’s Faculty 
Research Grant” (Bodayla, p. 379).  Furthermore, the editors of the historical journal identified 
the college researcher as the “chairman of the History Department and Pre-Law Coordinator at 
Marycrest College in Davenport, Iowa” who had “received his doctorate from New York 
University” (p. 424).  The cited source [Bodayla], in turn, provided documentation illustrating 
Elk’s connection with the Ponca cause to obtain justice. According to the college researcher 
whose work was examined, found credible, and cited by two university historians, “Elk was a 
Winnebago Indian who had resided among whites in Omaha, Nebraska, for more than year” 
before “he attempted to register to vote” (Bodayla, p. 373).  The connection between the Poncas 
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and Elk v. Wilkins was also examined with the following conclusions drawn and evidence 
presented. 
It appears probable that the so-called “Ponca Committee,” formed in 1879 
by T.H. Tibbles (editor of the Omaha Herald) to oppose the forced removal 
of the Ponca Indians from their reservation in Dakota to the Indian Territory, 
provided financial assistance and advice for Elk’s suit.  The law firm which 
represented Elk had earlier been involved in the Ponca case, Standing Bear 
v. Crook.  (Bodayla, p. 375) 
 
As a result, the evidence from credible college and university researchers appears to be 
convincing that John Elk was a Winnebago who had renounced his tribal affiliation when he 
moved to Omaha to live and work. 
 Exactly what drove John Elk to renounce his tribal affiliation remains unknown to 
history, at least unknown to any of the histories examined by the writer.  Elk would have been a 
tribal member when the Ponca lost their tribal lands to the Sioux, when the Ponca were being 
ineffectively protected by the U.S. from attacks by the Sioux, and when the Ponca were removed 
to the Indian Territory by the U.S. Government, and when yet again the Ponca were moved to a 
new location within a year of the initial removal.  Elk would certainly been aware of his own 
tribe’s relocation from Wisconsin to Iowa to Nebraska.  Otherwise, Elk would not have been an 
adult who had attained the voting-age requirements in order to try to vote in Omaha when he did.  
One can only surmise that, based upon his own personal experiences, John Elk justifiably 
concluded that existence as a tribal member constituted a too hazardous proposition for ones 
well-being. 
 Legal reasoning of elk v. wilkins. 
 Elk’s attorneys presented information that Elk had severed relations with his tribe “more 
than one year prior to the grievances hereinafter complained of,” that he “had been a bona fide 
resident of the State of Nebraska,” that he “had been a bona fide resident of Douglas County, 
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wherein the City of Omaha is situated,” and that Elk “was in every way qualified, under the laws 
of the State of Nebraska and of the city of Omaha, to be registered as a voter” (112 U.S. 94, 95).  
In other words, John Elk had left his tribe, had relocated himself to a city that was removed from 
his tribe, had secured himself a job, had paid taxes, and was a member of the state militia.  In 
every respect he had placed himself under the jurisdiction of local, state, and federal laws (112 
U.S. 94, 110-111).  Furthermore, Elk met the age, gender, and residence qualifications to be a 
voter in the City of Omaha, County of Douglas, State of Nebraska (112 U.S. 94, 110).  In 
attempting to register to vote as specified by law, Elk had been refused by Charles Wilkins, the 
“registrar in the fifth ward of [Omaha]” because “plaintiff was an Indian” (112 U.S. 94, 96).  
Attorneys for Elk stated “that, under and by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, he is a citizen of the United States, and entitled to the right and 
privilege of citizens of the United States” (112 U.S. 94, 95).  Being a citizen because of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Elk, by virtue of the Fifteenth Amendment, “was entitled to exercise the 
elective franchise, regardless of his race and color” (112 U.S. 94, 96).  The attorney for Wilkins 
argued that the original lower court action sustaining “a general demurrer” because the facts of 
the case were not “sufficient to constitute a cause of action” in that Elk was not a citizen of the 
United States by virtue of being an Indian (112 U.S. 94, 96-97).   
 One historian viewed Elk v. Wilkins as “[o]ne of the key cases regarding the civil rights 
of Indians residing off the reservation” (Deloria, 1971, p. 129).  Another historian viewed the 
subject matter of Elk v. Wilkins as clearing up questions about “the citizenship status of Indians 
who voluntarily severed their connections with their tribes and took up the ways of white society.  
Did they, by such an act, automatically receive citizenship” (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 231)? 
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 A knowledgeable observer, i.e., familiar with both Attorney General Cushing’s opinion 
of 1856 regarding Indian citizenship and with the Oregon federal district court’s ruling in McKay 
v. Campbell, would have known after reading the first four paragraphs of the majority Court’s 
opinion how the Court would rule in Elk v. Wilkins.  The final two concluding sentences of the 
fourth paragraph read: 
Though the plaintiff alleges that he “had fully and completely surrendered 
himself to the jurisdiction of the United States,” he does not allege that the 
United States accepted his surrender, or that he has ever been naturalized, or 
taxed, or in any way recognized or treated as a citizen, by the State or by the 
United States.  Nor is it contended by his counsel that there is any statute or 
treaty that makes him a citizen.  (112 U.S. 94, 99) 
 
The two salient points, according to the Court, emerged as a negative image seen only in relief 
against pre-existing expectations in terms of: a) the lack of any official action by any federal 
official regarding Elk’s citizenship; and b) the lack of any official action by the federal 
government itself in the form of either a treaty or a congressional act.   
 Prucha summarized the Court’s ruling in Elk v. Wilkins: 
The majority of the court held against the plaintiff, declaring that an Indian 
who was born a member of an Indian tribe, although he voluntarily 
separated himself from the tribe and took up residence among white 
citizens, was not thereby a citizen of the United States.  Some specific act of 
Congress was necessary to naturalize him.  (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 231) 
 
Cohen viewed Elk v. Wilkins as sustaining the view “that the [Fourteenth Amendment] was 
merely declaratory of the common-law rule of citizenship by birth and that Indians born in tribal 
allegiance were not born in the Untied States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” a view that 
had been first put forth by Attorney General Cushing in 1856 that had received support from a 
lower federal court ruling in McKay v. Campbell (Cohen, 155). 
 The Court majority, affirming the judgment of the lower federal court in Elk v. Wilkins, 
simply stated, “The plaintiff, not being a citizen of the United States under the Fourteenth 
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Amendment of the Constitution, has been deprived of no right secured by the Fifteenth 
Amendment, and cannot maintain this action” (112 U.S. 94, 109). 
 Dissenting opinion in elk v. wilkins. 
 Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented and authored a dissenting opinion which blistered 
the Court’s majority opinion through the use of sound legal reasoning.  Justice Harlan was joined 
by Justice Woods.  As can be seen from the following two citations, Justice Harlan would have 
agreed with Deloria’s assessment of the Court’s reasoning in Elk v. Wilkins.  Deloria, a Standing 
Rock Sioux author, attorney, and theologian,155 characterized the majority Court’s decision and 
its impact as follows: 
The court was anxious to deny Elk citizenship.  To do so it had to twist a 
series of treaties, statutes, and their citizenship provisions beyond 
recognition.  But it found, nevertheless, that an Indian could not of his own 
power become a citizen of the United States – even if federal law appeared 
to say that he could.  The Indians who had followed the directions of the 
United States and severed their tribal ties thus became men without a 
country.  (Deloria, 1971, p. 129) 
 
Although Justice Harlan’s language was not as blunt as Deloria’s, his meaning was similar: 
It seems to us that the Fourteenth Amendment, in so far as it was intended to 
confer national citizenship upon persons of the Indian race, is robbed of its 
vital force by a construction which excludes from such citizenship those 
who, although born in tribal relations, are within the complete jurisdiction of 
the United States.  (112 U.S. 94, 120) 
 
Justice Harlan continued: 
There were, in some of our States and Territories at the time the amendment 
was submitted by Congress, many Indians who had finally left their tribes 
and come within the complete jurisdiction of the United States.  They were 
as fully prepared for citizenship as were or are vast numbers of the white 
and colored races in the same localities.  (112 U.S. 94, 120) 
 
Commenting upon the majority Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice 
Harlan remarked: 
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Our brethren, it seems to us, construe the Fourteenth Amendment as if it 
read: “All persons born subject to the jurisdiction of, or naturalized in, the 
United States, are citizens of the United states and of the State in which they 
reside;” whereas the amendment, as it is, implies in respect of persons born 
in this country, that they may claim the rights of national citizenship from 
and after the moment they become subject to the complete jurisdiction of the 
Untied States.  (Emphasis in original) (112 U.S. 94, 121) 
 
Justice John Marshall Harlan even cited his namesake’s ruling in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia to 
demonstrate the mistaken legal reasoning used by the Court’s majority.  As cited by Justice 
Harlan, Justice John Marshall, describing the situation of tribal Indians in their relation to the 
United States, flatly stated that tribal members were under the jurisdiction of the United States: 
In all our intercourse with foreign nations, in our commercial regulations, in 
any attempt at intercourse between Indians and foreign nations, they are 
considered as within the jurisdictional limits of the United States, subject to 
many of those restraints which are imposed upon our citizens.  (112 U.S. 94, 
122) 
 
Justice Harlan began the concluding paragraph of his dissenting opinion by describing John 
Elk’s factual claim to citizenship. 
Born, therefore, in the territory under the dominion, and within the 
jurisdictional limits of the United States, plaintiff has acquired, as was his 
undoubted right, a residence in one of the States, with her consent, and is 
subject to taxation and to all other burdens imposed by her upon residents of 
every race.  (112 U.S. 94, 122) 
 
Justice Harlan next drew attention to the Court’s failure to properly apply to the facts of the case 
what Congress had intended to accomplish with the Fourteenth Amendment. 
If he [John Elk] did not acquire national citizenship on abandoning his tribe 
and becoming, by residence in one of the States, subject to the complete 
jurisdiction of the United States, then the Fourteenth Amendment has 
wholly failed to accomplish, in respect of the Indian race, what, we think, 
was intended by it…   (112 U.S. 94, 122) 
 
In conclusion, Justice Harlan pointed to the consequences of the Court’s failure to properly 
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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[As a result of the majority Court’s decision], there is still in this country a 
despised and rejected class of persons, with not nationality whatever; who, 
born in our territory, owing no allegiance to any foreign power, and subject, 
as residents of the States, to all the burdens of government, are yet not 
members of any political community nor entitled to any of the rights, 
privileges, or immunities of citizens of the United States. (112 U.S. 94, 122-
123) 
 
The situation would not be fully remedied in a legal sense for another forty years by the passage 
in 1924 of the Indian Citizenship Act.   
 In Elk v. Wilkins the majority of the Court’s justices took what may be described as a 
minimalist approach that prefers to “embrace tradition uncritically because [the justices] believe 
history has achieved a kind of wisdom, slowly over many years, that contemporary critics might 
be unable to appreciate” (Dworkin, p. 29).  Professor Dworkin156 described the application of 
such a minimalist approach to twentieth-century government regulation, but if one substitutes 
“denial of voting rights” or “denial of citizenship for American Indians” in place of “form of 
government regulation,” Dworkin’s description applies to the Court majority in Elk v. Wilkins.  
According to Dworkin: 
Some justices have adopted that form of minimalism [an uncritical embrace 
of tradition] in due process cases: they refuse to declare any form of 
government regulation an unconstitutional infringement of liberty if – like 
the prohibition against doctor-assisted suicide – that regulation is long 
established.  (Dworkin, p. 29) 
 
Minimalism is also associated with the view expressed most recently by the current Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court, John Roberts, who observed “that ‘if it is not necessary to decide more to 
dispose of a case, in my view it is necessary not to decide more’” (Dworkin, p. 29).  Dworkin 
talked about the costs of taking a minimalist approach judicially.  According to Dworkin, 
“Minimalism often has serious costs, however, particularly when important constitutional rights 
are at stake,…” (Dworkin, p. 29).  He provided examples from the Court’s history regarding long 
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established practices to illustrate his point citing “segregating public schools by race, allowing 
prayer in public schools, forbidding mixed-race marriages, capital punishment, and failing to 
recognize same-sex marriages” (Dworkin, p. 30).  The danger in following a strictly minimalist 
philosophy of interpreting the Constitution arises in a justice’s duty “as a guardian of the rights 
[protected by the Constitution]” (Dworkin, p. 30).   
 Dworkin also pointed to the dangers of another facet of a strictly minimalist approach.  
First, he cited a current minimalist view, which states, “If some legal practice has been long 
established, it should be changed only by a fresh decision of democratically elected legislators, 
not unelected judges” (Dworkin, p. 30).  Then Dworkin offered his critique of this argument by 
citing a current law professor’s view: 
As Sunstein [Cass Sunstein, Professor of the Harvard Law School and 
former faculty colleague of Barack Obama at the University of Chicago Law 
School, who was recently appointed by President Obama to head the Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs]157 observes, it begs the question by 
assuming that democracy, properly understood, means only government by 
the will of the majority from time to time.  (Dworkin, p. 30) 
 
Dworkin [and Sunstein] countered the minimalist view of democracy by citing the Constitution’s 
view of democracy: 
The Constitution plainly assumes a different conception of democracy: a 
partnership in self-government in which majority rule is deemed fair only if 
the basic rights of all citizens are protected.  If a justice assumes that the 
right to be treated as an equal in matters of race or sexual preference is 
among these democratic preconditions, then he protects rather than subverts 
democracy by enforcing that right.  (Dworkin, p. 30) 
 
 In reading Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion, it is only too apparent that his views 
correspond with what Dworkin and Sunstein cite as the Constitution’s view of democracy.  It is 
also plain that the majority of the Court in Elk v. Wilkins was searching for some way to sustain 
the 19th century views of citizenship for American Indians.  Congress, through its discussion and 
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enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment, clearly provided the 
opportunity for the Court to do its constitutional duty, that of protecting basic constitutional 
rights.  Instead the Court majority ignored the literal statements of both congressional 
enactments, not to mention the comments made by legislators, and forced a Procrustean fit of 
facts and law whereby the case could be dismissed for a lack of standing by the original plaintiff 
in the case, a procedure that met with popular approval because it accorded with the views of 
most Americans at the time.  The Court majority focused on the line of reasoning developed in 
an opinion by Attorney General Caleb Cushing and a lower federal court ruling in McKay v. 
Campbell, neither one of which paid any attention to the congressional intent as ascertained by 
the actual statements made by the legislators when debating both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
and the Fourteenth Amendment.  By ignoring congressional intent and focusing on legal 
reasoning that was invalidated by the unconsidered congressional intent, the Court’s majority 
reached a decision that seemingly rested upon precedent and also agreed with popular views at 
the time.  Unfortunately, the Court ignored its constitutional duty. 
 Citizenship/tribal sovereignty – The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737 (1866). 
 As noted by one authority, the issue of assimilation provided an underpinning for the 
legal facts in the next Court ruling regarding tribal sovereignty.  According to Vine Deloria, Jr., a 
noted author, legal scholar, and enrolled member of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe: 
The question of assimilation was raised comparatively early in the history of 
the United States.  After the Shawnees, Miamis and Weas had moved to 
Kansas from their ancestral homes in the Ohio valley they settled down and 
made the necessary adjustments to life on the western plains.  In many ways 
they lived no differently than did the white settlers of Kansas.  They farmed, 
owned homes, attended social functions, read newspapers, and generally 
mingled with their white neighbors.,  In nearly every aspect, then, they lived 
like the typical citizen of Kansas.  (Deloria, 1971, p. 65) 
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Because the tribal members “were so well-merged with the other citizens of Kansas the state 
decided that they no longer had any special rights as members of their respective tribes” 
(Deloria, 1971, p. 65).  Based on this determination, Kansas then decided “that it could levy 
taxes and execute judgments against the lands of the tribal members” (Deloria, 1971, p. 65).  The 
preceding state decisions and actions were challenged in the county and state courts of Kansas.  
The Kansas Indians actually consists of three “distinct” and separate cases of the Shawnee, 
Miami, and Wea Nations that wended their way through the county courts of Kansas and the 
Supreme Court of Kansas before reaching the U.S Supreme Court where, because they involved 
“essentially the same question,” were combined into a single Supreme Court decision (72 U.S. 
737).  The legal question, according to the Court, consisted of the following: 
[W]hether the State of Kansas had a right to tax lands in that State held in 
severalty by individual Indians of the Shawnee, Wea, and Miami tribes, 
under patents issued to them pursuant to certain treaties of the United States; 
the tribal organization of these tribes having to a certain extent … been 
broken in upon by their intercourse with the whites, in the midst of whom 
the Indians were…  (72 U.S. 737, 737-738) 
 
A modern-day tribal member, attorney, and history professor summarized the critical issues 
somewhat differently by shifting the figure-ground relationships: 
At issue was the right of the states to determine who was and who was not 
an Indian and whether or not a tribe existed or had to exist in a way of life 
radically differently than other citizens.  Do treaties simply fade away by 
acculturation of the members of the tribe?  (Deloria, 1971, p. 65) 
 
 In The Kansas Indians, the Court reaffirmed federal supremacy in governmental dealings 
with the Indian nations and reemphasized the importance of treaties as both a recognition and a 
source of Indian rights and sovereignty.  Even though the federal policy had been successful in 
inducing the tribes to adopt the ways of Euro-American society (a development that the Supreme 
Court of Kansas relied upon for its decision), tribal existence continued, according to the United 
   
   
1262
States Supreme Court.  The nation’s high court rejected the state high court’s contention that 
since the tribal members had adopted “the habits and modes of life of their fairer-skinned 
neighbors, and are, and have been for years, thrifty, substantial, industrious husbandmen,” and 
because the “farms of the whites are interspersed more or less among these Indian lands,” the 
tribes no longer existed (72 U.S. 737, 748, 743).  The Kansas Supreme Court used the foregoing 
as the basis for their decision upholding the extension of state laws over Indian land, even 
arguing that the situation in Kansas differed from that contemplated by the Court in Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia.  The distinction, according to the Kansas Supreme 
Court, was that the Marshall Court contemplated Indian Country “as occupying exclusively a 
district of country,” with “the Indian Territory as [being] completely separate from that of the 
States” (72 U.S. 737, 750).  The Kansas Supreme Court noted: “The Shawnees do not hold their 
lands in common, nor are they contiguously located.  It is difficult to conceive of a national 
existence without a national domain upon which to maintain it” (72 U.S. 737, 750).   
 As noted previously, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the arguments used by the state 
judiciary of Kansas.  The Court, having presented the legal question presented by the three cases, 
began by pointing state authorities to the proper sources: 
The solution of it [the legal question] depends on the construction of 
treaties, the relations of the general government to the Indian tribes, and the 
laws of Congress.  In order to [arrive at] a proper understanding of the rights 
of these Indians, it is necessary to give a short history of some of the treaties 
that have been made with them.  (72 U.S. 737, 752) 
 
And then, the Court began to model for the lower state courts what they should have done and 
how they should have proceeded.  Later, having reviewed the extensive history of the Shawnee 
Nation, having described the multiple treaties, and having detailed specific provisions and 
congressional acts, the Court declared, “As long as the United States recognizes their national 
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character they are under the protection of treaties and the laws of Congress, and their property is 
withdrawn from the operation of State laws” (72 U.S. 737, 757).  After reviewing the Wea 
Treaty of 1854, the Court similarly declared, “It is sufficient to say, that it leaves the Indians 
most clearly under the protection of the general government, and withdraws their property from 
the jurisdiction of Kansas” (72 U.S. 737, 759).  And finally, addressing the legal action brought 
by the Miamis, the Court declared: 
It is unnecessary to pursue the history of this tribe through the various 
treaties which have been concluded between them and the United States.  It 
is sufficient to state that they are a nation of people, recognized as such by 
the general government in the making of treaties with them, and the 
relations always maintained towards them, and cannot, therefore, be taxed 
by the authorities of Kansas.  (72 U.S. 737, 760) 
 
 Regarding the Miamis, the Court focused attention on a unique provision in the Miami 
Treaty of 1854 by which Miami lands were exempted from “levy, sale, execution, and forfeiture” 
(72 U.S. 737, 760).  This constituted the only part in the Court’s decision whereby the Court 
referenced either of the two landmark Cherokee cases.  In this instance, the Court referenced 
Chief Justice John Marshall’s statements in Worcester v. Georgia regarding the “enlarged rules 
of construction … adopted in reference to Indian treaties” (72 U.S. 737, 760).  Marshall’s 
statement in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832) used by the Court in 1866 
was: 
The language used in treaties with the Indians shall never be construed to 
their prejudice, if words be made use of which are susceptible of a more 
extended meaning than their plain import as connected with the tenor of 
their treaty.  (72 U.S. 737, 760) 
 
Employing Marshall’s rule of interpreting treaties, the Court determined that the exemption of 
Miami lands also prevented Miami lands “from a levy and sale for taxes, as well as the ordinary 
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judicial levy and sale” (72 U.S. 737,  761)  In other words, Miami lands could neither be seized 
nor be sold for nonpayment of taxes. 
 The Court’s record of the opinion in The Kansas Indians concluded by reversing all three 
state high court decisions: “The judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas in all three cases was 
REVERSED, and the causes remanded, with directions to enter a judgment in conformity with the 
opinions above given in the several cases” (Emphasis in original) (72 U.S. 737, 761).  While not 
spelling out exactly the position of the tribes in American government, The Kansas Indians 
decision indicated that the various Indian nations in America occupied a position in between the 
state and federal levels of government.  As viewed by a Twentieth Century tribal activist, “’The 
Kansas Indians’ has been a major case supporting the rights of Indian tribes to maintain 
themselves as a distinct community over and above the changing legal doctrines of states’ rights” 
(Deloria, 1971, p. 65). 
 Citizenship/tribal sovereignty – Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
 A person’s perspective determines ones viewpoint of the case Ex Parte Crow Dog.  From 
a tribal perspective, Ex Parte Crow Dog “marks the beginning of the intrusion of the United 
States Government into the internal domestic affairs of the Sioux Nation” (Deloria, 1971, p. 
154).  From a legal perspective, Ex Parte Crow Dog represents “[a]n extreme application of the 
doctrine of tribal sovereignty” (Cohen, 1942/1971, p. 125).  In a legal analysis of “the basic 
doctrine of tribal sovereignty,” Ex Parte Crow Dog  
contributes not only an intimation of the vast and important content of 
criminal jurisdiction inherent in tribal sovereignty, but also an example of 
the consistent manner in which the United States Supreme Court has 
opposed the efforts of lower courts and administrative officials to infringe 
upon tribal sovereignty and to assume tribal prerogatives without statutory 
justification. (Cohen, 1942/1971, p. 125) 
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From an historical perspective, Ex Parte Crow Dog emphasized “the question of a criminal code 
for the reservations” in which “even a murderer could not be punished” (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 
229).   
 The facts of the case stem from Lakota tribal life.  Succinctly summarized by a 
Twentieth-century Lakota, the facts were as follows: 
A longstanding feud had developed between Spotted Tail, chief of the Brulé 
Sioux at the Rosebud Agency, and Crow Dog, one of the tribal members.  
Lying in wait for spotted Tail, Crow Dog killed him one day while the chief 
was out riding on the reservation.  Although the usual tribal amenities were 
observed when the public discovered that the murderer was not to be 
executed, a great outcry against the savagery of the Sioux arose.  (Deloria, 
1971, p. 153) 
 
The “usual tribal amenities” to which Deloria referred was considered to be “blood-money for 
the slaying” which was sometimes how murder was settled by Lakota tribal custom (Hyde, p. 
65).  In this particular instance, peacemakers from the “Crow Dog faction” offered “six hundred 
dollars, a number of ponies, and some other articles in payment” which was accepted by the 
family of Spotted Tail (Hyde, p. 64).  To avert further trouble, tribal leaders convinced Crow 
Dog “into submitting to arrest,” after which he was “taken by Indian police to Fort Niobrara in 
northern Nebraska and placed in the guardhouse” to await trial “at Deadwood in the Black Hills 
in 1882” (Hyde, p. 65).  Subsequently sentenced to death by “the first Judicial District [Court]” 
of “the Territory of Dakota” following his conviction for Spotted Tail’s murder in tribal territory, 
a judgment that was subsequently “affirmed, on a writ of error, by the Supreme Court of the 
Territory,” Crow Dog petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court “for writs of habeas corpus and 
certiorari” (109 U.S. 556, 557).  Crow Dog’s petition claimed  
that the crime charged against him, and of which he stands convicted, is not 
an offence [sic] under the laws of the United States; that the district court 
had no jurisdiction to try him, and that its judgment and sentence are void.  
(109 U.S. 556, 557). 
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Based on the preceding pleadings, Crow Dog “prays for a writ of habeas corpus, that he may be 
delivered from an imprisonment which he asserts to be illegal” (109 U.S. 556, 557).   
 In its arguments for asserting federal jurisdiction over the Brulé Lakota, the U.S. 
Government relied upon two justifications.  The first justification rested upon twisting the 
interpretation of language contained in the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty with the Sioux in an 
attempt to make it fit the U.S. Revised Statutes sections covering criminal acts in the United 
States Territories, a justification refuted by the Court (109 U.S. 556, 562-568).  The second 
justification rested upon language in “the eighth article” of a subsequent (1877) agreement 
between the United States and the Sioux (109 U.S. 556, 568).  The eighth article of the 1877 
Sioux Agreement stated, “And Congress shall, by appropriate legislation, secure to them an 
orderly government; they shall be subject to the laws of the United States, and each individual 
shall be protected in his rights of property, person, and life” (109 U.S. 556, 568).  The Court also 
refuted the second argument put forth by federal officials, declaring that “the highest” aspect of 
“an orderly government” was that of “self-government” (109 U.S. 556, 568).  According to the 
Court: 
The pledge to secure to these people, with whom the United States was 
contracting as a distinct political body, an orderly government, … 
necessarily implies, … that among the arts of civilized life, … was the 
highest and best of all, that of self-government, the regulation by themselves 
of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among 
their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs.  
(109 U.S. 556, 568) 
 
In concluding its opinion, and immediately prior to delivering its judgment, the Court cited a 
previous Supreme Court ruling in which the Court observed: 
The tribes for whom the act of 1834 [the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act 
of 1834]158 was made were those semi-independent tribes whom our 
government has always recognized as exempt from our laws, whether within 
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or without the limits of an organized State or Territory, and, in regard to 
their domestic government, left to their own rules and traditions, in whom 
we have recognized the capacity to make treaties, and with whom the 
governments, State and national, deal, with a few exceptions only, in their 
national or tribal character, and not as individuals.  United States v. Joseph, 
94 U.S. 614, 617.  (109 U.S. 556, 572) 
 
In granting the “writs of habeas corpus and certiorari,” the Court found “that the First District 
Court of Dakota was without jurisdiction to find or try the indictment against the prisoner, that 
the conviction and sentence are void, and that his imprisonment is illegal” (109 U.S. 556, 572).   
 Citizenship/tribal sovereignty – Major crimes act of 1885, 23 stat. 362, 385, § 9. 
 Following the Court’s ruling in Ex Parte Crow Dog, the next session of Congress 
attached a rider to an appropriation bill “establishing seven major crimes that, when committed 
by one Indian against another, would become federal crimes transcending Indian jurisdiction” 
(Deloria, 1971, p. 154).  Deloria described the nexus between Ex Parte Crow Dog and the 
ensuing congressional action: 
So the Sioux actually won this case, but Congress was so enraged at their 
initial failure to superimpose the Anglo-Saxon concepts of vengeful justice, 
that they promptly initiated legislation which would deny the tribes 
jurisdiction over any major crimes committed by Indians against Indians.  
(Deloria, 1971, p. 154) 
 
According to Deloria’s view of  the congressional reaction, “In doing so the white idea of 
vengeance replaced the Indian idea of compensation as the ideology behind punishment for a 
capital offense” (Deloria, 1971, p. 168).  Prucha analyzed the impact of the bill upon tribal 
sovereignty: 
Restricted though it was, this legislation was revolutionary.  For the first 
time the United States asserted its jurisdiction over strictly internal crimes of 
Indians against Indians, a major blow at the integrity of the Indian tribes and 
a fundamental readjustment in relations between the Indians and the United 
States government.  (Prucha, 1984, 1986, pp. 229-230) 
 
Cohen’s analysis was more tempered: 
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The force of the decision in Ex parte Crow Dog [sic] was not weakened, 
although the scope of the decision was limited, by subsequent legislation 
which withdrew from the rule of tribal sovereignty a list of 7 major crimes, 
only recently extended to 10.  Over these specified crimes jurisdiction has 
been vested in the federal courts.  (Cohen, 1942/1971, p. 125) 
 
The ten crimes “for which federal jurisdiction has displaced tribal jurisdiction” include the 
original seven crimes plus three additional crimes added by legislative acts in 1909 and 1932 
(Cohen, 1942/1971, p. 147).  The three added crimes include “notorious cases of robbery, incest, 
and assault with a dangerous weapon” (Cohen, 1942/1972, p. 147). 
 What were the seven major crimes over which the United States asserted jurisdiction?  
According to § 9, Act of March 3, 1885: 
That immediately upon and after the date of the passage of this act all 
Indians, committing against the person or property of another Indian or 
other person any of the following crimes, namely, murder, manslaughter, 
rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny within any 
Territory of the United States, and either within or without an Indian 
reservation, shall be subject therefore to the laws of such Territory relating 
to said crimes, and shall be tried therefore in the same courts and in the 
same manner and shall be subject to the same penalties as are all other 
persons charged with the commission of said crimes, respectively; and the 
said courts are hereby given jurisdiction in all such cases…  (23 Stat. 362, 
385) 
 
As one tribal member analyzed the congressional actions whereby the United States assumed 
jurisdiction over ten major crimes: 
By thus assuming power over certain aspects of tribal life, the United States 
government broke the ancient customs of the Sioux tribe and imposed a 
foreign standard of justice.  Breakdown of tribal customs was fairly rapid 
after that, leading to the present situation where federal law is considered an 
outside force of the white man and not a means of establishing tribal law 
and order.  (Deloria, 1971, p. 154) 
 
 Citizenship/tribal sovereignty – U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
 Shortly after the Major Crimes Act was appended as § 9 to the Appropriations Act of 
March 3, 1885, its constitutionality was challenged by a case emanating from the “Circuit Court 
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of the United States for [the] District of California” (118 U.S. 375).  “Kagama, alias Pactah 
Billy, an Indian” was indicted for the murder of “Iyouse, alias Ike, another Indian,” the murder 
having taken place “at Humboldt County, in the State of California, within the limits of the 
Hoopa Valley Reservation” (118 U.S. 375, 376).  Another individual, “Mahawaha, alias Ben, 
also an Indian,” was charged with “aiding and abetting in the murder” (118 U.S. 375, 376).  
While referenced as U.S. v. Kagama, the official title is United States v. Kagama & Another, 
Indians (118 U.S. 375). 
Figure R9 
Hoopa Valley Reservation 
As Per Congressional Act, Hupa Treaty of 1864, 
Approval of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, & Executive Order 
  
 
 The tribal land upon which the murder took place had only recently been finally approved 
as the Hoopa Valley Reserve through a series of official interactions between the U.S. and the 
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Hupa.  Pursuant to an act of Congress enacted April 8, 1864, a treaty had been negotiated on 
August 21, 1864, with the “Hupa (S. Fork, Redwood, and Grouse Creek bands)” to reserve “the 
whole of Hoopa valley [sic]” for the Hupa Reserve (Royce, p. 832).  The treaty had been 
subsequently approved by the “Commissioner of Indian Affairs” on October 3, 1864 (Royce, p. 
833).  However, not until June 23, 1876, had an “Executive order” been issued declaring the 
boundaries established by the act of Congress and subsequent Hupa Treaty of 1864 “to be the 
true boundaries of the Hoopa Valley Reserve” (Royce, p. 833).  Thus, at the time the incidents of 
the case occurred, the location in northwestern California had been officially approved by the 
U.S. government as Indian country for less than ten years (See preceding Figure R9, #461 for the 
Indian country under discussion) (See Royce, pp. 832-833 for map number).159  However, 
according to tribal history, “The Hupa people have occupied their lands [in the Hoopa Valley] 
since time immemorial” (Hupa History – Hoopa Valley Tribe, ¶ 5). 
 In its ruling upholding the constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act, the Court described 
the dependency of tribal members upon the United States and discussed relations between tribal 
members and the states, the latter point which they summarized as follows:  “They [the tribal 
members] owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection.  Because of the 
local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies” 
(118 U.S. 375, 384).  Regarding tribal sovereignty (and by implication, citizenship), the Court 
ruled: 
They were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent 
position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as 
nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a 
separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social 
relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the state 
within whose limits they resided.  (118 U.S. 375, 381-382) 
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After citing and discussing the Marshall Court rulings in both Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and 
Worcester v. Georgia regarding tribal sovereignty and the position of tribal governments relative 
to both the states and the national government, the Court noted the federal government’s change 
in direction regarding its dealings with the tribes:  “But, after an experience of a hundred years of 
the treaty-making system of government, Congress has determined upon a new departure – 
govern them by acts of Congress (118 U.S. 375, 382).  The Court determined that the “ninth 
section of the Indian Appropriation Act of March 3, 1885” was “valid and constitutional” in that 
is was “within the competency of Congress” and therefore “the Circuit Court of the United States 
for the District of California ha[d] jurisdiction of the offence [sic] charged in the indictment in 
this case (118 U.S. 375, 383, 385).   
 Prucha described the importance of U.S. v. Kagama in terms with which Deloria would 
have agreed: 
When the Supreme Court in United States v. Kagama on May 10, 1886, 
upheld the right of Congress to take this step [asserting federal jurisdiction 
over strictly internal crimes of Indians], the way was open for unlimited 
interference by the federal government in the affairs of the Indians.  (Prucha, 
1984, 1986, p.230) 
 
Cohen viewed congressional jurisdiction over ten major crimes in Indian country as expressed in 
the acts of Congress and upheld by the Court from a different perspective.  Instead of focusing 
upon what conceivably might happen at some unknown point in the future, Cohen used a 
viewpoint that focused on what was not limited.  According to Cohen, “An Indian tribe may 
exercise a complete jurisdiction over its members and within the limits of the reservation, 
subordinate only to the expressed limitations of federal law” (Cohen, 1942/1971).  He continued: 
What is even more important … is the persistent silence of Congress on the 
general problem of Indian criminal jurisdiction.  There is nothing to justify 
an alternative to the conclusion that the Indian tribes retain sovereignty and 
jurisdictions over a vast area of ordinary offenses over which the Federal 
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Government has never presumed to legislate and over which the state 
governments have not the authority to legislate.  (Cohen, 1942/1971, p. 148) 
 
 Citizenship/tribal sovereignty – Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
 In 1896 the Cherokee Nation again had a case before the Supreme Court, Talton v. Mayes 
(1896).  Talton, a tribal member, had been convicted of murder on New Year’s Eve, 1892, by a 
“special Supreme Court of the Cherokee nation, Cooweeskoowee District” (163 U.S. 376, 337).  
The victim was a Cherokee, and the crime had occurred on tribal lands.  Talton was sentenced to 
death by hanging.  In February of 1893, Talton filed a writ of habeas corpus against Mayes, the 
high sheriff of the Cherokee Nation.  In the writ, Talton contended he had been denied due 
process of law because the Cherokee grand jury violated his Fifth Amendment rights guaranteed 
by the United States Constitution.  The District Court of the United States for the Western 
District of Arkansas in which the writ of habeas corpus had been filed discharged the writ 163 
U.S. 376, 378).  Talton appealed, and the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. 
 After reviewing the facts of the case, the Court observed that tribal sovereignty was 
guaranteed both by treaties and by congressional legislation.  The Court spoke of the Cherokee 
Nation in terms used to describe a protectorate state when considering international law. 
By treaties and statutes of the United States the right of the Cherokee nation 
to exist as an autonomous body, subject always to the paramount authority 
of the United States, has been recognized.  And from this fact there has 
consequently been conceded to exist in that nation power to make laws 
defining offenses and providing for the trial and punishment of those who 
violate them when the offenses are committed by one member of the tribe 
against another one of its members within the territory of the nation.  (163 
U.S. 376, 379-380) 
 
Following a review of pertinent treaties and federal legislation, the Court noted the major legal 
issue of the case – “[D]oes the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution apply to the local legislation 
of the Cherokee nation” (163 U.S. 376, 382)?  Were the powers of tribal government derived 
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from the Constitution and thus controlled by the Fifth Amendment?  Or, were tribal powers 
derived from tribal existence prior to the formation of the United States, subject only to the 
general provisions of the Constitution governing treaties and the regulation of the Indian trade as 
well as related congressional legislation?   
 Before attempting to answer the legal questions posed by itself, the Court reviewed 
previous decisions, noting the evidence provided by judicial precedence regarding the legal 
issues under current consideration.  Previous decisions included, as might be expected, Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, Worcester v. Georgia, and Kagama v. United States (163 U.S. 376, 383-384).  
The Court then presented its own ruling.  In upholding the district court’s dismissal of Talton’s 
writ against Mayes, the high sheriff of the Cherokee Nation, the Court declared: 
It follows that as the powers of local self-government enjoyed by the 
Cherokee nation existed prior to the Constitution, they are not operated upon 
by the Fifth Amendment, which as we have said, had for its sole object to 
control the powers conferred by the Constitution of the National 
Government.  (163 U.S. 376, 384) 
 
The Court further noted that the legal issues raised were “solely” for the courts of the Cherokee 
Nation to determine. 
The question whether a statute of the Cherokee nation which was not 
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or in conflict with any 
treaty or law of the nation, and the determination of what was the existing 
law of the Cherokee nation as to the constitution of the grand jury, were 
solely matters within the jurisdiction of the courts of that nation…  (163 
U.S. 376, 385) 
 
 In the aftermath of Ex Parte Crow Dog, the Major Crimes Act and of U.S. v. Kagama, 
one is tempted to ask, “Why such a different judicial outcome from that of Kagama?”  Deloria 
may well have hit upon the critical difference.  In discussing Ex Parte Crow Dog, Deloria had 
earlier noted: 
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But the Sioux did not have formal courts as did the Five Civilized Tribes of 
Oklahoma.  Thus while the judgments of the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Creek, 
Choctaw and Seminole courts were upheld in capital offenses, there was no 
precedent in Sioux country for the situation of one tribal member killing 
another.  (Deloria, 1971, p. 153).   
 
Introducing the case, Talton v. Mayes, Deloria compared the Sioux and Cherokee in both 
perceptual and operational terms: 
It is unfortunate for the Sioux Nation that it never achieved the status of the 
Cherokee – civilized.  Nearly a decade after the case of Crow Dog – at a 
time when the other tribes had been placed under the Seven Major Crimes 
Act – the so-called Five Civilized Tribes still had well-operated and valid 
court systems of their own.  The courts of the Five Civilized Tribes were 
probably the best operated on this continent.  It was , therefore, a case of 
two systems of law running concurrently on parallel tracks rather than any 
interference from one to the other.  (Deloria, 1971, p. 169) 
 
Deloria concluded: 
In spite of various treaty violations, the Five Civilized Tribes had been able 
to maintain their governments with a great deal of integrity from the time 
they arrived in Oklahoma until the early years of the twentieth century.  
There was, therefore, no intrusion by the federal government into the 
workings of the Cherokee Republic.  Talton v. Mayes was rather an attempt 
to weld the two systems, Cherokee and American, into one consistent 
pattern of jurisprudence.  (Deloria, 1971, p. 169) 
 
In Deloria’s view, Talton v. Mayes has great significance for modern-day tribal governments.  
According to Deloria: 
In a great decision, which still has relevance to every Indian tribe that 
operates its own tribal courts, the Supreme Court found that the Bill of 
Rights did not apply to the relationship between the Cherokee Nation and its 
citizens because the Cherokee Nation had enjoyed self-government before 
the Constitution had been adopted! AS DID EVERY OTHER TRIBE!!  
(Emphasis in original) (Deloria, 1971, pp. 169-170) 
 
 Citizenship via congressional legislation. 
 The preceding material presented several judicial cases related to tribal sovereignty and 
citizenship as well as a congressional response to a Court ruling focused on tribal sovereignty 
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that indirectly bore on citizenship.  We move now to a continuation of examining the major 
methods whereby American Indians acquired citizenship as identified by Cohen (See previous 
Table R1).  All of the methods remaining for discussion whereby the indigenous peoples in the 
United States acquired American citizenship occurred as a result of various legislative actions 
passed by Congress in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  These congressional acts 
include: 
• Dawes Allotment Act (1887). 
• Act of November 6, 1918, pertaining to tribal veterans of World War I. 
• Indian Citizenship Act (1924). 
 The dawes allotment act, 24 stat. 388 (1887). 
 First, it should be noted, citizenship was not the major purpose of the Dawes Act.  
Instead, civilization was the goal.   
[T]he Dawes Allotment Act of 1887 was the first comprehensive proposal to 
replace tribal consciousness with an understanding of the value of private 
property.  The idea was not only to discourage native habits but to 
encourage Indians to accept the social and economic standards of white 
society.  (McDonnell, p. 1) 
 
Ironically, it was the so-called friends of the American Indian who pushed the Dawes Allotment 
Act forward into law.  One historian described Henry L. Dawes, U.S. Senator from 
Massachusetts, as “one of the most active of the well-meaning opponents of Indian nationality” 
(Debo, p. 300).  Another historian noted that Dawes “became one of the most active supporters 
of the individualization of the Indian through private property” (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 226).  
Tribal identity and tribal culture were perceived as standing in the way of any effort to civilize 
the huge mass of tribal members. 
It [the Dawes Allotment Act] was an act pushed through Congress, not by 
western interests greedy for Indian lands, but by eastern humanitarians who 
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deeply believed that communal landholding was an obstacle to the 
civilization they wanted the Indians to acquire and who were convinced that 
they had the history of human experience on their side.  (Prucha, 1984, 
1986, p. 227) 
 
Besides standing in the way of civilization, tribal culture was perceived in negative fashion by 
most nonIndians.  An nonIndian agent for the Yankton Sioux in southeastern South Dakota 
provided the following view of tribal culture in his report to the Indian Bureau in 1877: 
As long as Indians live in villages they will retain many of their old and 
injurious habits.  Frequent feasts, heathen ceremonies and dances, constant 
visiting – these will continue … I trust that before another year is ended they 
will generally be located upon individual land or farms.  From that date will 
begin their real and permanent progress.  (Debo, p. 299) 
 
That civilizing the various tribal members was the dominant purpose of the Dawes Act can also 
be seen in negative relief, i.e., from the criticism of those who opposed the Allotment Act.  
According to Senator Teller, one of the most vocal opponents of the Dawes Act: 
[T]he friends of severalty had the whole matter turned around, mistaking the 
end for the means.  Once the Indians were civilized and Christianized and 
knew the value of property and the value of a home, then give them an 
allotment of their own…  But do not expect the allotment to civilize and 
Christianize and transform the Indians.  (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 225) 
 
 Citizenship would follow once the allotments had been made and received by individual 
tribal members (Debo, pp. 300-301; Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 226).  In actuality, it wasn’t this 
simple as the Dawes Act’s “final provisions on citizenship … were a compromise” of two 
opposing positions within the Indian reform movement (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 232).  One 
reform position asserted that citizenship constituted the “means whereby the Indian would 
advance on the road to civilization” and therefore should “be made citizens in a mass” (Prucha, 
1984, 1986, p. 231).  This position was reflected by the Board of Indian Commissioners’ 
statement issued in 1884: 
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The solution of the Indian problem is citizenship, and we believe that the 
time has come to declare by an act of Congress that every Indian born 
within the territorial limits of the United States is a citizen of the United 
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.  (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 231) 
 
The opposing reform position held that citizenship for Indians was “a reward to be conferred 
when an Indian had demonstrated his desire and his competence to live among the whites” 
(Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 231).  Senator Dawes was the foremost advocate of this position, and he 
“persisted in his opinion that indiscriminate granting of citizenship to all Indians would be bad 
and held to the position that citizenship should be tied to taking land in severalty” (Prucha, 1984, 
1986, pp. 231-232).  The compromise position contained in the Dawes Act, which contained 
portions of both views, consisted of the following: 
Every Indian to whom an allotment was made and every Indian who 
separated himself from his tribe and adopted the ways of civilized life was 
declared to be a citizen of the United States, without, however, impairing the 
Indian’s right to tribal or other property.  (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 232) 
  
Neither party was completely satisfied; however, John Elk’s actions that had precipitated Elk v. 
Wilkins and which had been ruled to be without protection of the law were now legal and had 
been codified into law.  Moreover, the position of the Board of Indian Commissioners would not 
be fully realized until the passage of the Indian Citizenship Act in 1924.  In addition, those 
advocating “immediate citizenship for all Indians were disappointed because tribal Indians on 
reservations were still excluded” (Emphasis added) (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 232).  Finally, the 
Dawes Act’s provisions regarding citizenship were subsequently modified in 1906 by the Burke 
Act, “thus reversing, or at least slowing down, the individualizing, Americanizing process of the 
Dawes Act” (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 267).  The Burke Act accomplished this by postponing 
“citizenship for the Indians until the end of the trust period” (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 267).  The 
Burke Act also permitted the “removal of the trust restrictions from the allotments of Indians 
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adjudged competent” (Debo, p. 301).  The Burke Act was passed despite the strong opposition of 
the “old reformers [who] were no longer able to control the legislative formulation of Indian 
policy” (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 267).160 
 As was noted previously, citizenship proceeded in a somewhat haphazard, piecemeal 
fashion. This occurred partially because the idea of citizenship for American Indians grew out of 
the allotment movement designed to break up the tribal mass, partially because most Indian 
tribes were regarded by nonIndians as uncivilized (and, consequently, in need of tutelage before 
the benefits of citizenship could be granted), and partially because of the confusing notion (to 
nonIndians) that tribes were sovereign nations and as such, tribal members could not possibly be 
citizens of the U.S.  The beginnings of allotment developed with Jackson’s removal of the Five 
Civilized Tribes (the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole) from their lands east 
of the Mississippi to lands west of the Mississippi called the Indian Territory (Debo, pp. 121-
130; Deloria, 1971, p. 128; Prucha, 1984, 1986, pp. 80-93; Wilson, pp. 163-172).  As has also 
been shown, allotment appeared in treaties and in limited acts of Congress regarding specific 
tribes.  Now, however, with the Dawes Act, allotment became enshrined as the dominant force in 
the federal government’s American Indian policy.   
 Besides providing citizenship for some, but not all, Indians, what exactly did the Dawes 
Act provide?  Basically, the Dawes Act authorized the President “to survey the reservations or 
selected parts of them and to allot the land to individual Indians” (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 226).  
The standard size of each allotment “reflected the strong tradition of a quarter-section [160 acres] 
homestead for the yeoman farmer” (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 226).  Standard allotment shares were 
to go “to each head of a family, smaller amounts to unmarried men and children” (Debo, p. 300).  
Interestingly, the idea of a “head of a family” aroused opposition among the various tribes and 
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the Allotment Act had to be modified because women had been excluded from the allotment 
process.  Debo explained: 
But the Indians expressed so much opposition to this alien “head of a 
family” concept – in their society married women and children had property 
rights – that in 1891 the act was amended to provide equal shares to all – 80 
acres of agricultural, 160 acres of grazing land.  These amounts were 
subsequently modified in agreements made with different tribes.  (Debo, p. 
300) 
 
Ella Deloria, a Santee Dakota woman, explained the status of women and women in her society: 
“The simple fact is that woman had her own place and man his; they were not the same and 
neither inferior or superior” (Deloria, p. 39).  Robert Utley, a former historian for the National 
Park Service explained further:   
Far from a mere drudge, the Lakota mother in fact dominated tipi affairs.  
She, not the husband, owned the lodge and all the family belongings.  She 
exerted the paramount authority over the children – daughters until wed and 
sons until their voices began to change.  (Utley, p. 7).   
 
The matrilineal pattern of Lakota life was explained by Mari Sandoz, who had easy access to the 
Lakota camped near her childhood home in the Sand Hills country along the Niobrara River 
where her father operated a trading post.  According to Sandoz: 
Early accounts of Indian life on the Plains were usually by those with no 
understanding of the matrilinear pattern, in which the woman’s family 
accepted the new husband as son in place of the boy who would go to his 
wife’s people when he married, or for the son they never had.  (Sandoz, p. 
78) 
 
Sandoz also explained that the power of divorce resided in the Lakota woman’s hands: 
Divorce was particularly easy for the woman.  The tipi, the lodge, was hers 
and any time she was dissatisfied with the husband she was free to throw his 
possessions out into the village circle as public notice that she was done 
with him.  (Sandoz, p. 81) 
 
Actual title to allotments followed these procedures: 
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When the secretary of the interior [sic] approved the allotments, he would 
issue to each Indian a patent, which declared that the United States would 
hold the allotted lands in trust for twenty-five years for the Indian and for 
his sole benefit or that of his heirs.  At the expiration of the trust period, the 
Indian would receive the land in fee simple.  Any conveyance or contract 
touching the land during the trust period was null and void, and the 
president [sic] at his discretion could extend the period.  Once an Indian had 
received his allotment, he would become a citizen of the United States.  
(Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 226) 
 
Debo viewed the Dawes Allotment Act as a piece of congressional work that resulted from the 
union of “humanitarians and land-grabbers” (Debo, p. 300).  She explained:  
Along with the “benefit” [of civilization] to the Indians was a tempting 
bonus: after the allotments were made, much land would be left over for 
white settlement.  The philanthropists even reasoned that smaller holdings 
would advance the Indians’ “civilization”; too much land encouraged their 
roaming tendencies.  (Debo, pp. 299-300) 
 
Debo wove together the arguments of the “humanitarians” and the “land-grabbers” with the 
voices of the tribal leaders: 
The Indians’ friends also argued that only a fee simple title would protect 
their land from the insecurity of reservation and treaty guarantees.  These 
arguments did not deceive the land-grabbers.  They knew.  The only 
protection the Indian had came from his tribe; standing alone before the 
“equality” of the white man’s law and courts he was helpless.  The Indians 
who had experienced allotment knew this, too.  With the earnestness of 
desperation the leaders of the Five civilized Tribes told what had happened 
in Mississippi, Alabama, Kansas, and elsewhere.  Very people listened.  
(Debo, p. 299) 
 
Some of the people who did listen, however, were members of the Senate committee that he 
chaired, the Committee on Indian Affairs.  Their voices, however, constituted a minority 
viewpoint.  Two twentieth-century tribal members (a Kiowa attorney and a Cheyenne River 
Sioux journalist)161 examining the Dawes Act and its aftermath combined humor with the 
historical record’s pathos of Cassandra-like warnings regarding the consequences to follow 
should the Dawes Act be enacted. 
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It must have been Dawes’s primitive belief in magic that led him to 
advocate allotment of the Plains Indians’ landholdings.  A minority of his 
committee recommended against the plan, declaring that those tribes that 
maintained their lands in tribal tracts were notably lacking in poverty, 
whereas those tribes already allotted under the preceding treaties of the 
1850’s were poverty-stricken and demoralized.  (Emphasis added) 
(Kickingbird & Ducheneaux, p. 19) 
 
 While tribal voices couldn’t derail the engine that was allotment, they did succeed in 
getting some tribes excluded from the Dawes Act, which “became law on February 8, 1887” 
(Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 226).  These tribes included “the Five Civilized Tribes, the Osages, 
Miamis, Peorias, the Sacs and foxes in the Indian Territory, the Seneca Indians in New York, and 
the strip of Sioux lands in Nebraska” (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 226).  However, this didn’t last 
long.  A little over a year later (April, 1888), the Creeks and Seminoles were forced to “choose 
between ceding their unassigned land and losing it” (Debo, p. 304).  Neither the Choctaws and 
Chickasaws nor the other Oklahoma tribes fared well in the aftermath of the American executive 
branch’s actions following congressional passage of the Dawes Allotment Act. 
A number of commissions were sent to Oklahoma to negotiate land 
cessions.  The Atoka Agreement stripped the Choctaws and Chickasaws of 
their lands … and various other agreements spelled out the systematic 
reduction of Oklahoma Indian tribes to a conglomerate of legally 
incompetent individuals with small land allotments under minimum legal 
protections.  (Kickingbird and Ducheneaux, p. 22) 
 
 Section 5 of the Dawes Allotment Act contained the provision operating to the advantage 
of the dominant nonIndian society and to the disadvantage of the various tribes.  Section 5 dealt 
with the issue of “surplus lands remain[ing] after the allotments [had] been made” (Cohen, 
1942/1971, p. 78).  Officially, the procedures for the tribal lands following allotment were that 
“[n]egotiations were to be carried on with the tribes for the sale to the United States of the land 
remaining after the allotments were made and for its [subsequent] opening to white settlement” 
(Debo, p. 300).  The reduction of Indian land holdings was dramatic as millions of acres of lands 
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were lost to the tribes and sold to nonIndians by the federal government.  For the two-year period 
between 1889 and 1891, “the commissioner of Indian affairs [sic] could report that … he had 
restored to the public domain 12,071,380 acres, or 11 ½ per cent, of the total reservation area of 
104,314,349 acres existing in 1889” (Debo, p. 305).  Allotment did not officially end until the 
passage of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) in 1934 as a part of FDR’s New Deal program.  
When passed in 1934, the IRA “prohibited further allotment of tribal lands for those tribes that 
accepted its provisions [the IRA’s] and organized constitutions under it” (Kickingbird & 
Ducheneaux, p. 30).  What occurred during the years between the passage of the Dawes 
Allotment Act and the enactment of FDR’s Indian Reorganization Act was described by 
Kickingbird and Ducheneaux: 
When the allotment period ended in 1934, a total of 246,569 allotments had 
been made.  They comprised 40,848,172 acres of land on some 100 different 
reservations.  The actual land loss to the various tribes was much greater, 
however, than the mere loss of individual allotments.  (Kickingbird & 
Ducheneaux, p. 23) 
 
The two former Bureau of Indian Affairs employees explained how additional tribal lands were 
lost. 
When [tribal lands were] divided into individual allotments, the lands in 
excess of the actual amount needed to satisfy immediate tribal members’ 
requirements was declared “surplus” to the tribes’ needs and sold by the 
United States for a pittance.  The proceeds were placed in the federal 
treasury, where churches went immediately to get the funds for mission 
schools.  In total some 90 million acres were taken from Indians as easily as 
checking out a book in the library.  (Kickingbird & Ducheneaux, pp. 23-24) 
 
Listed in Table R2 are figures showing total Indian land holdings in the United States for various 
years, beginning with figures before allotment became the dominant federal policy towards the 
Indian tribes and ending with the passage in 1934 of the Indian Reorganization Act. 
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Table R2 
Total American Indian 
Land Holdings in the Continental United States 
 Year Indian Land Holdings (in acres) 
 1881 155,632,312162 
 1890 104,314,349163 
 1900 77,865,373164 
 1934 52,000,000165 
The effects of allotment were summarized by one historian:   
By 1934, the grim picture of a shriveling land base and an economically 
deprived people was clearly drawn.  Two-thirds of the Indians were 
completely landless or did not own enough land to make a subsistence 
living….  Many tribes were left with land assets that were not usable 
because of “checkerboarding”166 and complicated land titles,167 overgrazing 
and erosion, or lack of irrigation.  (McDonnell, p. 121) 
  
Another historian summarized the taking of tribal lands for allotment to individual tribal 
members, the sale of tribal land remaining after allotment to the federal government for re-sale to 
nonIndians, and the sale of Indian-owned allotments to nonIndians by noting that as of the late 
1920s, “the bulk of the most valuable land and resources owned by Native Americans in 1880 
was now in non-Indian hands” (Wilson, p. 332). 
 Act of november 6, 1919 re: indian veterans of world war I, 41 stat. 350. 
 Following World War I, the view of the tribes as a military threat had vanished and had 
been replaced by an image of Indian patriotism for the United States.  Although “most of them, 
as non-citizens, were not eligible for the draft,” they volunteered in the “thousands to fight for 
the United States during the First World War” (Emphasis in original) (Wilson, p. 332).  More 
than “ten thousand” Indians enlisted in “some branch of the army and navy” during World War I 
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(Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 267).  Although some advocated that they be placed in “separate Indian 
military units,” the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Cato Sells, “refused to sanction” such an 
idea (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 267).  According to Sells, Indians “should fight shoulder to shoulder 
with the white man in a common cause and go into the war ‘as the equal and comrade of every 
man who assails autocracy and ancient might’” (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 267).  The Iroquois 
Confederacy, having maintained a strong sense of tribal identity, “declared war on Germany in 
1917” (Debo, p. 417).  The various tribal members who enlisted in the country’s armed forces 
“so distinguished themselves” during their service to the nation in World War I that citizenship 
“seemed a fair recognition” (Debo, p. 335).  On November 6, 1919, Congress enacted legislation 
which “provided that any Indian who received an honorable discharge from military service 
during World War I could, if he desired it, apply for citizenship and be granted it by a competent 
court without affecting rights to tribal property” (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 267).168 
 It was previously noted that “tribal Indians on reservations were still excluded” from 
citizenship when the Dawes Allotment Act was passed (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 232).  One of the 
last groups of Indians to surrender to the United States was the Hunkpapa Lakota who had gone 
north into Canada with Sitting Bull.  Following their surrender, they rejoined their fellow tribal 
members on Standing Rock, settling as far from the agency at Fort Yates, North Dakota, as was 
possible and still remain on the Standing Rock Sioux Indian Reservation, in a community 
situated on Rock Creek where it entered the Grand River, not far from where Sitting Bull had 
been born and where he was subsequently killed in December of 1891.169  Sitting Bull and his 
followers actively resisted allotment (Debo, p. 302; Utley, p. 269).  However, the descendants of 
these Hunkpapa Lakota enlisted in large numbers during World War I.  Following their service 
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and return to Standing Rock, a Doughboy monument was erected in the community (See Figure 
R10).170 
Figure R10 














The inscription on the monument reads:  “DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF THOSE WHO MADE THE 
SUPREME SACRIFICE AND IN HONOR OF THOSE WHO SERVED IN THE WORLD WAR 1917-18 – 
PRESENTED BY THE HUNKPAPA BAND OF SIOUX NATION.”171  It should be noted, however, that 
the monument was not erected until the federal government’s policy of allotment and destruction 
of the tribal mass had been officially ended by the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act 
under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.   
   
   
1286
 Today, only three monuments stand on Standing Rock – a monument commemorating 
the Lakota legend of Standing Rock for which the reservation was named, the Sitting Bull 
monument, and the Doughboy monument in Rock Creek commemorating the veterans of World 
War I who fought in the service of a country they had previously defeated in war and in battle, a 
country which was committed to the destruction of tribal existence, and a country with which 
they were currently allied as provided for by their treaties with the United States.  Lakota regard 
for the veterans who served in World War I can also be verified by an examination of three 
current albums of traditional Lakota music.172   
 Indian citizenship act of 1924, 43 stat. 253. 
 Prucha credited “the patriotic fervor that persisted after the war” as being instrumental in 
pushing “for a measure to complete the circle” of citizenship for all Indians (Prucha, 1984, 1986, 
p. 273).  According to Prucha, about two-thirds of all Indians had been accorded citizenship by 
the early 1920s (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 273).  That would, of course, exempt “the still-proud 
remnants of the Iroquois Confederacy in New York” who denied U.S. citizenship, preferring 
instead their citizenship as a tribal member in the Iroquois confederation (Debo, p. 335-336).173  
In fact, a writer could still report in 1971 that “the Iroquois steadfastly refuse to accept American 
citizenship” (Deloria, 1971, p. 130).  Following the passage of the Indian Citizenship Act, the 
Iroquois cited the ruling in Elk v. Wilkins by which a positive act of the United States had been 
required before a tribal member could become a U.S. citizen.  Given the Supreme Court’s ruling 
which had denied any unilateral action on the part of a tribal member (John Elk), the Iroquois 
questioned “whether the United States could extend citizenship on a unilateral basis” (Deloria, 
1974, p. 148).  The Standing Rock Sioux attorney and co-founder of the Institute for Indian Law 
explained: 
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 If it [the United States] previously had required Elk to wait for a 
positive act on the part of the United States before he could become a 
citizen, would it not require a positive act on the part of the Indians in 1924 
to become United States citizens? 
 The Iroquois served notice on the United States that they did not 
want American citizenship.  (Deloria, 1974, p. 148) 
 
 Notwithstanding the position of the Iroquois regarding American citizenship, Congress 
enacted what is currently referenced as the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924.  The act declared “all 
non-citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States … to be citizens of the 
United States” (43 Stat. 253).  It further provided that “the granting of such citizenship shall not 
in any manner impair or otherwise affect the right of any Indian to tribal or other property” (43 
Stat. 253).  The reasons for enacting such legislation were stated in a report of February 22, 
1924, to Congress by the Committee on Indian Affairs.  According to the House of 
Representative’s Committee on Indian Affairs: 
At the present time it is very difficult for an Indian to obtain citizenship 
without either being allotted and getting a patent in fee simple, or leaving 
the reservation and taking up his residence apart from any tribe of Indians.  
This legislation [the Indian Citizenship Act] will bridge the present gap and 
provide means whereby an Indian may be given citizenship without 
reference to the question of land tenure or the place of his residence.  
(Cohen, 1942/1971, p. 82, n. 239) 
 
Despite such sentiments, however, the act did not grant citizenship to all Indians.  Excluded from 
the act were Indians living in the United States who had been born in “Canada, Mexico, or other 
foreign lands, since the 1924 Act referred only to ‘Indians born within the territorial limits of the 
United States’” (Cohen, 1942/1971, p. 154).  This was not remedied until Congress inserted the 
following into § 303 of the Nationality Act of October 14, 1940, that declared: “The right to 
become a naturalized citizen under the provisions of this Act shall extend only to white persons, 
persons of African nativity or descent, and descendants of races indigenous to the Western 
Hemisphere” (Cohen, 1942, 1971, p. 154, n. 27).   
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 Confusion arose over the title of the act, which, according to Cohen, arose from “a 
clerical error” (Cohen, 1942/1971, p. 82).  When the act arose in the House of Representatives, it 
was entitled “An Act To authorize the Secretary of the Interior to issue certificates of citizenship 
to Indians” (43 Stat. 253).  The House “originally … contemplated a procedure whereby the 
Secretary of the Interior was to issue such certificates” (Cohen, 1942/1971, p. 82).  According to 
Cohen, “The Senate amended the bill so as to eliminate all departmental discretion in its 
application” (Cohen, 1942/1971, p. 82, n. 239).  When finally passed, the legislation “acted of its 
own force to confer citizenship upon the Indian” (Cohen, 1942/1971, p. 82).  The title, when 
passed by both houses of Congress, read “A bill granting citizenship to Indians, and for other 
purposes” as can be seen by examining the Congressional Records for the 68th Congress (Cohen, 
1942/1971, p. 82 & p. 82, n. 239).  The original title was not amended by the clerk to reflect the 
Senate changes that had been agreed to by the House when the amended bill was reported in the 
U.S. Statutes At-Large. 
 So, through a lengthy, tortuous, changing process, American Indians received United 
States citizenship.  Ironically (from the perspective of earlier officials) and jubilantly (from the 
tribal perspective), the citizenship received in 1924 was different from that contemplated by the 
Dawes Act in 1877. 
So the complete transition from tribal status to individualized citizenship 
that the Dawes Act reformers had had in mind when they talked about 
citizenship did not occur.  The Indians were both citizens of the Untied 
States and persons with tribal relations.  (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 273) 
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Appendix R1 
Women’s Suffrage: By Country & By State of the Union 
Dates When Nations Accorded Full Suffrage for Women174 
1893 New Zealand 1939 El Salvador 1950 Haiti 
1906 Finland 1941 Indonesia 1952 Bolivia 
1913 Norway 1942 Dominican Republic  Greece 
1915 Denmark 1944 France 1953 Lebanon 
1917 Estonia  Jamaica  Mexico 
 Latvia 1945 Bulgaria 1955 Ethiopia 
 Lithuania  Guatemala  Honduras 
 Soviet Union  Italy  Malaysia 
1918 Austria  Japan  Nicaragua 
 Czechoslovakia  Panama  Peru 
 Germany  Trinidad & Tobago 1957 Columbia 
 Luxembourg 1946 Albania 1958 Iraq 
 Poland  Ecuador  Paraguay 
1919 Netherlands  Malta 1959 Nepal 
 Sweden  Romania 1960 Canada 
1920 Iceland  Yugoslavia 1963 Iran 
 United States 1947 Argentina  Kenya 
1922 Ireland  Pakistan 1964 Afghanistan 
1924 Mongolia  Venezuela  Libya 
1928 United Kingdom 1948 Belgium 1971 Switzerland 
1930 Turkey  Burma 1972 Syria 
1931 Ceylon/Sri Lanka  Israel 1975 Portugal 
1932 Brazil  South Korea 1994 South Africa 
 Thailand 1949 Chile  
 Uruguay  China  
1934 Cuba  Costa Rica  
1937 Philippines  India 
 
U.S. States & Territories Granting Voting Rights to Women Prior to Passage of the 
Nineteenth Amendment:   
FULL SUFFRAGE175 
1869 Wyoming 1912 Arizona 1917 New York 
1893 Colorado  Kansas  Rhode Island 
1896 Idaho  Oregon 1918 Michigan 
 Utah 1913 Alaska  Oklahoma 
1910 Washington 1914 Montana  South Dakota 
1911 California  Nevada 
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U.S. States Granting Voting Rights to Women Prior to the Passage of the 
Nineteenth Amendment:   















U.S. States Granting Voting Rights to Women Prior to the Passage of the  
Nineteenth Amendment:   






U.S. States DENYING Voting Rights to Women Prior to the Passage of the 
Nineteenth Amendment: 
(Listed by Geographic Region)178 
 
 
  New England  Middle Atlantic  South   West  
 
 Connecticut Delaware Alabama New Mexico 
 Massachusetts Maryland Florida  
 New Hampshire New Jersey Georgia 
 Vermont Pennsylvania Kentucky 
 West Virginia Louisiana 
  Mississippi 
  North Carolina 
  South Carolina 
  Virginia 
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Appendix S 
The Fourteenth Amendment 
 Section 1.  All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.  No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
 Section 2.  Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians 
not taxed.  But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of Electors for President and 
Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial 
officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male 
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age and citizens of the United States, or in 
any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation 
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to 
the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in each State. 
 Section 3.  No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or 
under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer 
of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer 
of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection 
or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.  But Congress may, 
by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
 Section 4.  The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing 
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.  But neither the United States nor any State 
shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the 
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, 
obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
 Section 5.  The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 




   




Rejection and Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment: 






  Northern States   Border States   Southern States  
 NH  ra: 07-06-1866  DE  rej: 02-07-1867  VA  rej: 01-09-1867 
 VT  ra: 10-26-1866  MD rej: 03-22-1867 NC  rej: 12-13-1866 
      ra: 07-02-1868 
 MA  ra: 03-20-1867 1792 KY  rej: 01-08-1867SC   rej: 12-20-1866 
     ra: 07-09-1868 
 RI   ra: 02-07-1867 1821 MO  ra: 01-08-1867 GA  rej: 11-09-1866 
     ra: 07-21-1868 
 CT  ra: 06-29-1866 1796 TN ra: 07-19-1866 
 NY ra: 01-22-1867 1812 LA   rej: 02-06-1867 
     ra: 07-09-1868 
 PA  ra: 02-06-1867 1817 MS  rej: 01-30-1867 
1803 OH ra: 01-04-1867 1819 AL   rej: 12-??-1866 
    ra: 07-13-1868 
1816 IN  ra: 01-23-1867 1836 AR  rej: 12-17-1866 
    ra: 04-06-1868 
1818 IL  ra: 01-15-1867   1845 FL   rej: 12-03-1866 
    ra: 02-09-1868 
1820 ME ra: 01-16-1867 1845 TX  rej: 10-27-1866 
1837 MI ra: 01-16-1867 
1846 IA ra: 03-09-1867 
1848 WI ra: 02-07-1867 
1850 CA No Action 
1858 MN ra: 01-16-1867 
1859 OR ra: 09-19-1866 
1861 KS ra: 01-12-1867 
1863 WV ra: No Date 
1864 NV ra: 01-22-1867 
1867 NE ra: 06-15-1867 
 
Key 
 Date of Admission    STATE   ra: (ratification & date) 
     rej: (rejection & date) 
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Source:  James, J.J. (1984).  The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Atlanta, 




Attorneys Arguing For Segregated Public Schools
In 
The Defenders of Segregation 
In defense of segregation, South Carolina gathered a team of lawyers that included the state’s top 
legal officers, headed by one of the most respected constitutional lawyers in the country. Kansas 
sent a lone reluctant young assistant attorney general.
 
Citing Plessy v. Ferguson, the defenders claimed that the equal protection clause of the 
Constitution did not require integration and that the states had already begun a good faith effort 
to make their facilities equal. Inequality between the races persisted, they explained, because 

















John W. Davis was the lead attorney for South Carolina. A graduate of the Washington and Lee 
University School of Law, Davis was one of the most distinguished constitutional lawyers in the 
nation. He had participated in more than 250 Supreme Court cases and ap
some 140 times. He had been a congressman from West Virginia, the U.S. Solicitor General, 
ambassador to Great Britain, and in 1924 the Democratic presidential candidate against Calvin 
Coolidge. In private practice in 1954, he took t
elegant advocate for segregation, he died a few months after the decision in 
Education. 
(Courtesy of Library of Congress)
James Lindsay Almond Jr., as state at
receiving his law degree from the University of Virginia, he was a legislator and judge in the city 
of Roanoke. In his arguments before the Court, he claimed that “with the help and sympathy and 
the love and respect of the white people of the South, the colored man has risen...to a place of 
eminence and respect throughout the nation.” From 1958 to 1962 he served as governor of 
Virginia and remained a leading advocate of segregated schools.
(Courtesy of the Family of T. Justin Moore)
 
 
peared before the Court 
he case without accepting a fee. An intelligent and 
Brown v. Board of 
 
James Lindsay Almond Jr. 








Paul E. Wilson argued the case for Kansas. An assistant state attorney general, he was possibly 
the least enthusiastic of the defenders of segregation. Two of the public schools in Topeka had 
already desegregated, but it remained his job to defend the laws of his state until the Supreme 
Court ruled otherwise. A graduate of the Washburn University School of Law, he served two 
terms as district attorney of Osage County, Kansas. He was later a law professor and 
his memoirs of the Brown case, entitled A Time to Lose, in 1995.




Paul E. Wilson 
 
 







H. Albert Young represented Delaware. A graduate of the University of Pennsylvania 
School, he had misgivings about defending legal segregation. As a trial attorney, he advocated 
for women serving on grand juries. Although he presented a technical defense of Delaware’s 
segregated school system, he later became the first state attorney
Court’s decision. In 1959 Young entered private practice.
(Courtesy of Widner University School of Law) 
Milton Korman defended the District of Columbia. A graduate of Georgetown University law 
school, he served as corporation counsel, or chief legal officer, for the D.C. government for 
several years prior to the Supreme Court case. He claimed that the question of segregation in the 
city schools was beyond the Court’s jurisdiction and that only Congress had
legislate for Washington, D.C. Later he was appointed to the D.C. Superior Court.










 the authority to 











Attorneys Arguing Against Segregated Public Schools
In 
The Challengers of Segregation
The civil rights lawyers of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund were young
and had far fewer resources to prepare their cases. Much of their work was done at the law 
schools of Howard and Columbia universities.
 
The Plessy v. Ferguson decision, they argued, had misinterpreted the equal protection clause 
the Fourteenth Amendment—the authors of this amendment had not intended to allow 
segregated schools. Nor did existing law consider the harmful social and psychological effects of 
segregation. Integrated schools, they asserted, were a fundamental right f
Thurgood Marshall coordinated all of the plaintiff attorneys and presented arguments in the 






Brown v. Board of Education 
 
 











counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense 
rights cases before the Supreme Court.
 
From 1961 to 1965 Marshall served as a judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit and as solicitor general from 1965 to 1967. In that year Pre
appointed him to the U.S. Supreme Court, where he served until his retirement in 1991.
(Courtesy of Library of Congress) 
Robert Carter presented the arguments in the Kansas case. He attended Howard University 
School of Law and completed graduate studies at Columbia University. After encountering 
widespread racism in the army during World War II, he decided to join the NAACP legal team in 
1944 and became Marshall’s key assistant.
 
From 1956 to 1968 Carter became the gen
an aggressive advocate for civil rights. In 1972 he was appointed U.S. District Court judge for 
the Southern District of New York.
(Courtesy of Library of Congress) 
 
 
Fund. After the Brown case, he argued several other civil 
 













Spottswood W. Robinson III argued the Virginia case. A graduate of Howard University School 
of Law, Robinson entered private practice with his partner, Oliver W. Hill, in 1939. At one point, 
Robinson and Hill had ongoing lawsuits with 75 school districts. Robinson w
of Howard’s law school in 1960. In 1966 he was named chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
and served until his retirement in 1989.




Spottswood W. Robinson III 









Louis L. Redding presented a portion of the argume
Harvard Law School in 1929 and became Delaware’s first African American attorney. After the 
1954 decision, he continued his legal practice in Wilmington and his commitment to defending 
civil rights cases. For the rest of his life, he was considered Delaware’s leading civil rights 
attorney. 
(Courtesy of Library of Congress) 
Jack Greenberg presented part of the arguments in the Delaware cases. He graduated from 
Columbia Law School in 1948. After 
as the leading counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.
 
In 1968 he helped found the Mexican
then has helped establish other global humanitarian 
written several books and is currently professor emeritus at Columbia Law School.
(Courtesy of Library of Congress)
 
 




Brown, Greenberg eventually replaced Thurgood Marshall 
 
-American Legal Defense and Education Fund and since 








George E. C. Hayes argued the first portion of the Washington, D.C., case
Howard University’s law school in 1918, he was for many years a faculty member there, as well 
as chief legal counsel for the university. He also served on the District of Columbia school board.
 
After Bolling v. Sharpe, Hayes argued several
represented Annie Lee Moss, a black woman falsely accused of being a Communist, before 




George E.C. Hayes 
. A graduate of 
 civil rights and civil liberties cases. In 1954 he 






James Nabrit Jr. argued the second part of the Washington, D.C., case. A graduate of 
Northwestern University Law School, he joined Howard’s law faculty in 1936 and helped 
establish the school’s coursework in civil rights law. He served as president of Howard 
University in the 1960s and deputy ambassador to the United Nations in 1966.








James Nabrit, Jr. 
 
 









   




Ratification of the United States Constitution 
By Popularly Elected Delegates to the 
State Ratifying Conventions 
 
 
 The Constitutional Convention adjourned on September 17, 1787, following the 
unanimous approval of the state delegations and the signing of the Constitution by the delegates 
(Rossiter, p. 234).  On September 19th, the Pennsylvania Packet devoted its entire issue to 
publishing the Constitution in its entirety (Bowen, p. 268). Without mentioning the word 
“Constitution,” Congress enacted a resolution on September 28, 1787, which directed “that the 
said report … be transmitted to the several legislatures in order to be submitted to a convention 
of delegates chosen in each state by the people thereof” (Bowen, p. 269; Rossiter, p. 275).  This 
resolution followed the content of Article VII of the newly proposed Constitution that required 
“[t]he Ratification of the Conventions of nine States.” 
 Article VII of the Constitution more fully stated, “The Ratification of the Conventions of 
nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so 
ratifying the Same.”  On July 2, 1788, after the constitutional ratification requirement had been 
met, Congress appointed a “committee of five to ‘report an act … for putting the new 
Constitution into operation’” (Rossiter, p. 300).  On September 13, 1788, Congress established 
the date for electing the new government as well as the date “for ‘commencing proceedings’ as a 
more perfect Union,” the latter being March 4, 1789 (Rossiter, p. 300). 
 As can be seen from the table following these remarks, neither North Carolina nor Rhode 
Island approved the Constitution until after one of the following stages had been implemented 
for amending the Constitution to include a Bill of Rights:  1) a Bill of Rights had been proposed 
to the First Congress in April, 1789 by James Madison, who drew largely on the work of fellow 
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Virginian George Mason’s “Declaration of Rights” that was a part of Virginia’s Constitution of 
1776; 2) a Bill of Rights had been approved by the same Congress by the necessary two-thirds 
majority in each legislative chamber on September 25, 1789; and 3) the Constitutional 
amendment regarding the Bill of Rights had been ratified by the required three-fourths of the 
nation’s state legislatures (December 15, 1791 (Hall, 1992, pp. 70-71).  Regarding the specific 
provisions of the Bill of Rights sent to the state legislatures, Congress had proposed twelve 
amendments.  A noted constitutional historian described the situation: 
The first two of these twelve proposals, which dealt with the troublesome 
issues of the scale of representation in the House and the compensation of 
members of Congress, fell mercifully by the wayside on their journey 
through the state legislatures.  The remaining ten, the most important of 
which defended the ancient rights of persons against Congress and 
acknowledged the reserved powers of the states, became part of the 
Constitution…  (Rossiter, p. 303) 
 
On a note of interest, Vermont was admitted as a state after the Constitution was ratified, 
but prior to the approval of the Bill of Rights.  Thus there were fourteen states in the United 
States when the Bill of Rights was being considered.  Eleven of the fourteen state 
legislatures approved what became the first ten amendments to the Constitution.  The three 
remaining states (Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Georgia) waited until 1941 when the 
nation celebrated the sesquicentennial of the Bill of Rights to add “their hitherto withheld 
and unneeded assent” to the first ten constitutional amendments known as the Bill of Rights 
(Rossiter, p. 303).  The table indicating the dates that the popularly elected ratifying 
conventions took action in the original thirteen colonies regarding the U.S. Constitution, 
along with two sources for vote totals for and against the Constitution’s adoption, is located 
on the following page. 
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 STATE  DATE APPROVED VOTE:  (Bowen; Rossiter) 
 
1. Delaware December 6, 1787 Unanimous 30 – 0  
2. Pennsylvania December 12, 1787 46 – 32 46 – 32  
3. New Jersey December 16, 1787 Unanimous 38 – 0  
4. Georgia January 2, 1788 Not Given 26 – 0  
5. Connecticut January 4, 1788 128 – 42 128 – 40  
6. Massachusetts February 5, 1788 187 – 168 187 – 168  
7. Maryland April 26, 1788 63 – 11 63 – 11  
8. South Carolina May 12, 1788 149 – 146 149 – 73  
9. New Hampshire June 21, 1788 57 – 46 57 – 47  
10. Virginia June 25, 1788 89 – 79 89 – 79  
11. New York July 26, 1788 30 – 27 30 – 27  
12. North Carolina November 21, 1789 Not Given 194 – 77  
13. Rhode Island May 29, 1790 Not Given 34 – 32 
 
 
Sources for the information contained in the preceding table are:  
Bowen, pp. 277, 290, 293-294, 304, 306; Brogan, pp. 209 & 209, n. 
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Appendix X 
Ratification of the Eleventh Amendment 
By the Legislatures of the Fifteen States 
 STATE  Date  Approved: Mathis / Jacobs Date Sent to Congress1 
 
1. New York 03-27-17942 SAME3 November 21, 17944 
    January 8, 17955 
  
2. Rhode Island 03-31-17942 Mar-Apr.,17946 January 29, 17967 
3. Connecticut 05-08-17942 05-14-17948 January 8, 17989 
4. New Hampshire 06-16-17942 SAME10 February 17, 179511 
5. Massachusetts 06-26-17942 06-14-179412 January 8, 17955 
6. Vermont 10-9/11-9-17942 10-28-179413 January 8, 17955 
7. Virginia 11-18-17942 SAME14 January 8, 17989 
8. Georgia 11-29-17942 SAME15 February 25, 179516 
9. Kentucky 12-07-17942 12-08-179417 January 8, 17989 
10. Maryland 12-26-17942 SAME18 January 8, 17989 
11. Delaware 01-23-17952 01-30-179519 March 2, 179520 
12. North Carolina 02-07-17952 SAME21 January 29, 17967 
13. South Carolina 12-04-17972 SAME22 January 8, 17989 
Legislatures Refusing to Ratify the Eleventh Amendment (in alphabetical order): 
 New Jersey23 
 Pennsylvania23 
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1. All communications to Congress regarding state ratification of the Eleventh Amendment 
went from the states to the President of the United States, who then forwarded the letter to 
each congressional chamber.  Dates of submission prior to March, 1796 would be letters 
sent to President George Washington and forwarded by him to Congress.  Dates after March 
1796 were communications to Congress from President John Adams.  The listed 
communication date is the date that Congress officially noted receipt of the communication 
from the President in its record, contained in the Annals of Congress.  The source for each 
date will first list the source for the Senate action followed by the source for action taken by 
the House of Representatives. 
2. Mathis, 1968, p. 227, n. 77.  Mathis’s dates are derived from the following collection in the 
National Archives:  “Documents Relating to the Proposal and Ratification of the Eleventh 
Amendment.  Ratified Amendments, National Archives, Record Group 11.” 
3. Jacobs, p. 180, n. 95 (Journal of the Assembly of the State of New York {17th sess., January 
1794}, pp. 177-178). 
4. Annals of Congress, 4, pp. 795, 894.  The letter from President Washington mentioned 
copies of a letter from the Governor of New York as well as the legislative act approving the 
Eleventh Amendment. 
5. Annals of Congress, 4, pp. 809, 1063.  Washington’s letter mentioned: 
 
copies of Acts passed by the Legislatures of the States of Vermont, 
Massachusetts, and New York, ratifying the amendment proposed by 
the Senate and House of Representatives at their last session, to the 
Constitution of the United States, respecting the Judicial power 
thereof. 
 
Washington’s letter also dealt with other matters, which included a communication from 
France regarding “Weights and Measures,” a letter about problems in the judicial system of 
the Western Territory from the governor of that territory, and a letter reporting judicial 
problems in the “District of Pennsylvania” that required the attention of Congress. 
6. Jacobs, p. 180, n. 96 (Journal of the House of Magistrates, 1794). 
7. Annals of Congress, 5, pp. 41, 273.  Washington’s letter dealt with eight enumerated points.  
The first point mentioned that he was sending “for the information of Congress – 1. An Act 
of the Legislature of the State of Rhode Island, ratifying an amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States, to prevent suits in certain cases against a State.”  The second point of 
the same letter referenced “An Act of the State of North Carolina, making the like 
ratification.” 
8. Jacobs, p. 180, n. 96 (Records of the States of the United States). 
9. Annals of Congress, 7, pp. 481, 483, 784-785, 809.  Two communications were made by 
President Adams to Congress in early 1798.  The first  informed Congress that he would 
shortly have a report to submit to them from the Secretary of State [Timothy Pickering] 
regarding actions taken by the “States of Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and South Carolina” on January 1, 1798 (Annals of 
Congress, 7, pp. 481, 784-785).  This list serves as a roll call of the states for which no 
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information had yet been received by either the President or Congress regarding action 
taken with regards to the Eleventh Amendment.   The second communication from President 
Adams to Congress occurred one week after the preceding letter.  On January 8, 1798, 
President Adams wrote Congress that he was  
 
transmitting to Congress a report of the Secretary of State, with a 
copy of an Act of the Legislature of the State of Kentucky, 
consenting to the ratification of the amendment of the Constitution 
of the United States, proposed by Congress in their resolution of the 
second day of December, 1793, relative to the suability of States.  
(Annals of Congress, 7, pp. 483, 809) 
 
Although he was the President of the Senate (being Vice President in Washington’s 
Cabinet) at the time that the Amendment had been approved by Congress on March 4, 1794, 
Adams got the date wrong in his 1798 communication to Congress.  Without mentioning the 
states he had listed in his letter one week earlier, President Adams simply informed 
Congress that the “amendment having been adopted by three-fourths of the several States, 
may now be declared to be a part of the Constitution of the United States” (Annals of 
Congress, 7, pp. 483, 809).  However, of the states listed in Adams’ first communication, 
only Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina (not to mention Kentucky as its 
legislative action was specifically mentioned by Adams in his second communication) 
ratified the Eleventh Amendment (See first page, second column of Appendix V).  Both 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey legislatures opposed the Eleventh Amendment while the 
Tennessee legislature took no action.  The positive actions taken to approve the Eleventh 
Amendment by state legislatures in Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina 
were never directly communicated to Congress.  Kentucky’s action was communicated to 
Congress via the President via the Secretary of State. 
10. Jacobs, p. 180, n. 96 (Journals of the Senate of New Hampshire, 1794). 
11. Annals of Congress, 4, pp. 826, 1230.  President Washington forwarded both “copies of a 
Letter from the Governor of the State of New Hampshire, and of an Act of the Legislature 
thereof…” 
12. Jacobs, p. 180, n. 96 (Journal of the House of Representatives {15th sess.}, p. 102). 
13. Jacobs, p. 180, n. 96 (Journal of the Proceedings of the General Assembly, 1794, p. 179). 
14. Jacobs, p. 180, n. 96 (Journal of the House of Delegates, 1794, p. 20). 
15. Jacobs, p. 180, n. 96 (Executive Department Minutes, in Julia M. Bland, Georgia and the 
Federal Constitution [Washington: Department of State Publication 1078, 1937], pp. 16-
18). 
16. Annals of Congress, 4, pp. 835, 1253.  The Senate record included the actual text of the 
letter from President Washington, while the House record, for the first time, did not include 
the text.  Instead, the House record simply summarized the letter’s content. 
17. Jacobs, p. 180, n. 96 (Journal of the House of Representatives, 1794, p. 34). 
18. Jacobs, p. 180, n. 96 (Votes and Proceedings of the Senate of the State of Maryland, 1794, p. 
52). 
   
   
1310
19. Jacobs, p. 180, n. 96 (Journal of the House of Representatives, 1795, p. 52). 
20. Annals of Congress, 4, pp. 847, 1275. The Senate record included the actual text of the letter 
from President Washington, while the House record, for the second time, did not include the 
text.  Instead, the House record simply summarized the letter’s content. 
21. Jacobs, p. 180, n. 96 (Journal of the House of Commons, 1794-1795, p. 38). 
22. Jacobs, p. 181, n. 99 (Journal of the Senate, 1797, p. 68). 
23. Jacobs, p. 67; Mathis, 1968, p. 227, n. 77; Warren, p. 101. 
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Appendix Y 
Lawsuits Challenging State Actions 

























Claims for Payment Against the State 
 Vanstophorst v. Maryland, 2 U.S. (Dallas) 401 (1791), was the “first suit filed against a 
state by individuals in the Supreme Court” (Mathis, 1968, p. 215).  Jacobs noted the following 
regarding the reporting of the Court’s earliest cases, particularly those reported on by Dallas:  
“The records in Dallas are fragmentary and inaccurate, and several of the early cases are not 
reported at all.  Much of the factual material concerning these cases was taken from the official 
minutes and dockets of the Supreme Court” (Jacobs, p. 174, n. 6).179  In his analysis, Mathis used 
the official minutes and dockets of the case as filed in the National Archives (See Mathis, 1968, 
p. 215, n. 28).   
ORGANIZATION OF CASES 
I. Claims for Payment Against the State. 
A. Vanstophorst v. Maryland (1791). 
B. Oswald v. New York (1793). 
C. Cutting v. South Carolina (1796). 
II. Lawsuits Challenging the State’s Disposition of Public 
Lands. 
A. Grayson v. Virginia (1792), a.k.a. Hollingsworth 
v. Virginia, a.k.a. Indiana Company v. Virginia. 
B. Moultrie v. Georgia (1797), a.k.a. Huger v.  
 Georgia, a.k.a. Huger v. South Carolina. 
III. Legal Battles Pitting Patriots Against 
Tories. 
A. Rutgers v. Waddington (1784). 
B. Vassal v. Massachusetts (1793). 
C. Brailsford v. Spalding (1792); Georgia v. 
Brailford (1794). 
D. Ware v. Hylton (1796) 
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 The suit was brought by Dutch financiers who had loaned the state £40,500 in 1782 
(Jacobs, p. 43).  Apparently the Maryland legislature subsequently “annulled the contract” 
shortly after the loan was negotiated because it viewed the loan’s terms as being 
“disadvantageous” to Maryland (Jacobs, p. 43).  Although the legislature had directed the loan 
funds to be returned, the refund had not been made when the suit was filed.  The Dutch bankers 
“sought recovery of principal, interest, and damages on [the] loan” (Jacobs, p. 43).  Both parties 
agreed to continue the case until the next term so that a commission could be appointed “to take 
depositions from certain witnesses residing in Holland (Jacobs, p. 44; see also Mathis, 1968, p. 
215).  At the same time “out-of-court negotiations looking toward a compromise settlement were 
undertaken” that resulted in a motion by both the plaintiffs and defendants to discontinue the 
case with “each party agreeing to pay his own costs” (Jacobs, p. 44). 
 Oswald v. New York, 2 U.S. (Dallas) 401 (1792); 2 U.S. (Dallas) 415 (1793) involved 
legal actions, the details of which were not reported by Dallas, the Court’s reporter.  Jacobs 
noted the following:   
The facts of Oswald v. New York were not reported by Dallas.  The 
background of the case has been reconstructed from the Oswald v. New York 
case file in the National Archives.  The file is incomplete, however, and 
many of the documents were badly damaged by fire.  (Jacobs, p. 174, n. 13) 
 
Jacobs’ note might explain the confusion emanating from two scholars citing the same case in 
different fashion while using the same records housed in the National Archives.  Jacobs cited the 
case as 2 Dall. 401 (1792) while Mathis cited the case as 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 415 (1793) (See Jacobs, 
p. 174, n. 13; Mathis, 1968, p. 215, n. 31; and Mathis, 1968, p. 216, n. 32).  Confusion may have 
resulted from the confusing record of multiple actions taken at various times by the Court, a case 
described as having “caused the Court considerable embarrassment” (Jacobs, p. 45).180  Both 
scholars, however, reached substantial agreement on the facts and disposition of the case.   
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 In 1776 the New York legislature selected John Holt to be the state’s official printer 
(Jacobs, p. 45; Mathis, 1968, p. 215).  After his death, his widow was selected by the state to do 
the state’s printing.  After printing some materials for the state, Elizabeth Holt received two 
payments, but “claimed she did not receive a just settlement” for her work (Mathis, 1968, p. 
216).  Jacobs stated that part of the disagreement stemmed from a “substantial sum” that the state 
had owed John Holt when he died (Jacobs, p. 45).  Elizabeth Holt died before the suit reached 
the Supreme Court, thus leaving Eleaxer Oswald (a resident of Pennsylvania who served as the 
executor of the Holt estate) to push the suit forward.  The suit finally concluded in 1795 when 
the Holt estate was awarded “$5,315 in damages” (Mathis, 1968, p. 216). 
 Cutting v. South Carolina does not have a standard citation as it was a case “not 
described in the Dallas reports; however, it is listed in Docket 31, there are several references to 
it in the Minutes and there is a Case File in the National Archives” (Mathis, 1968, p. 228, n. 78).  
Warren referred to the case as Caitlin v. South Carolina in two separate references, stating that it 
was located “in the official records” (Warren, p. 99, n. 2; see also Warren, p. 104, n. 2 and 
Jacobs, p. 179, n. 79).  The case represents a lawsuit filed against a state by a noncitizen.  Both 
the facts of the case and its procedural record painted an intricately complicated picture: 
John Brown Cutting, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was administrator for the 
Prince of Luxembourg.  The suit arose over a ship contracted for use in the 
American Revolution.  The ship was to be built for the United States in 
Holland but was sold instead to France, and France had allowed 
Luxembourg to use it.  A South Carolinian made an agreement with the 
Prince of Luxembourg for the use of the ship for three years by the state of 
South Carolina.  The ship was put into service by South Carolina but was 
later captured by the British.  The Prince of Luxembourg attempted to 
recover for the loss of the ship and, not succeeding otherwise, a suit was 
brought in the United States Supreme Court against the state of South 
Carolina.  (Mathis, 1968, p. 228) 
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 South Carolina “acknowledged its indebtedness, but withheld payment” because 
ownership of the ship was complicated by a claim presented to South Carolina by the French 
Republic that it owned the boat, not the Prince of Luxembourg (Jacobs, p. 62).  Following both 
the governor’s refusal to accept the Court’s writ and the failure of South Carolina to appear 
before the Court, “the Supreme Court entered a default judgment in February 1797” (Jacobs, p. 
63).  A jury impaneled by the Court  on August 8, 1797, conducted an “inquiry of damages” and 
“gave a verdict of $55,002.84 damages for the plaintiff” (Mathis, 1968, p. 228).   
 South Carolina was granted an injunction “to stay execution of the judgment” provided 
“that the state deposit in Court the amount of the judgment” (Jacobs, p. 63).  Following this 
pronouncement, the record became murky.  Jacobs noted that it wasn’t “clear whether the state 
satisfied this condition;” he further noted that there was “no record that a writ of execution [was] 
issued” by the Court (Jacobs, p. 63).  Jacobs pointed out that the Court “directed a continuance of 
Cutting v. South Carolina” in February 1798 and observed that “[o]ther cases in which states had 
been sued by individuals were at the time dismissed upon the basis of the Eleventh Amendment” 
(Jacobs, p. 63).  After the action taken in February 1798 to continue the case, the Court record 
became silent, according to Jacobs, who commented, “The later record is silent as to the ultimate 
disposition of the case” (Jacobs, p. 63).  Jacobs opined that the case hadn’t been officially 
dismissed “because the Eleventh Amendment did not, by its terms, preclude actions instituted by 
a foreign state or sovereign against a nonconsenting state” (Jacobs, p. 63).  In a separate note, 
Jacobs pointed to subsequent action regarding the question by a twentieth-century Court: 
Many years later, in Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934), the Court 
held that the judicial power of the United States under Art. III, sec. 2, of the 
Constitution did not extend to suits instituted against a nonconsenting state 
by a foreign state or sovereign.  (Jacobs, p. 179, n. 82) 
 
   
   
1315
 Both Jacobs and Mathis cited similar dates for minutes of the Court from Cutting v. South 
Carolina, which Mathis indicated were contained in Docket 31 (Mathis, 1968, p. 228, n. 78 & n. 
79).  Mathis, however, located minutes for the case South Carolina v. French Republic, and 
Cutting that were contained in Docket 49 and reported, “Before the case could be concluded, the 
eleventh amendment had been ratified and the Court no longer had jurisdiction” (Mathis, 1968, 
p. 228, n. 80). 
Lawsuits Challenging the State’s Disposition of Public Lands 
 Indiana Company v. Virginia, a case not reported by Dallas, Grayson v. Virginia, 3 U.S. 
(3 Dallas) 320 (1796); and Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 378 (1798), all represent 
different legal activities of the same initial lawsuit first filed in 1792 (Gibbons, p. 1904; Jacobs, 
pp. 57-58; Mathis, 1968, pp. 225, 229-230; Warren, I, pp. 91-92).  The issue was land ownership 
and began with the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768 that was negotiated by the British government 
with various Indian tribes while Virginia was still a colony of Great Britain.  Under the terms of 
the treaty, either “1.8 million acres” or “approximately three million acres” of land in western 
Virginia was ceded by the tribes to the Indiana Company “as reparation for having seized and 
carried off property valued at nearly a quarter million dollars” (Gibbons, p. 1904; Jacobs, pp. 57-
58; Jacobs, p. 58).  The Indiana Company, “a group of fur traders,” quickly became a “land 
company” with its newly acquired holdings from the Indian tribes by way of the British 
government (Jacobs, p. 58; Warren, I, p. 92). 
 After acquiring status as one of the said states who formed the confederacy known as the 
United States of America through the Articles of Confederation, the Virginia legislature in 1779 
voided the 1768 Fort Stanwix Treaty’s conveyance of land from the tribes to the British Crown 
to the Indiana Company, citing the “’sea to sea’ charter of 1609, thus finding the conveyance to 
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be part of the state’s public domain” (Gibbons, p. 1904, n. 72).  Virginia then refused to 
recognize the grants of land that had been made by the Indiana Company in the land that 
Virginia now claimed as part of its public domain (Mathis, 1968, p. 229).  Shareholders of the 
Indiana Company “sought unsuccessfully to obtain redress from the Continental Congress,” 
unsuccessful because the only action taken by Congress was to adopt “an ineffectual resolution 
imploring Virginia to refrain from making conveyances of the disputed lands,” a resolution that 
was “ignored” by the Virginia legislature (Gibbons, p. 1904; Gibbons, p. 1904, n. 73; Jacobs, p. 
58).  Virginia subsequently passed legislation that divided the disputed land into “local 
governmental units” and that also authorized the state land office “to sell the land, with receipts 
accruing to the state” (Jacobs, p. 58).  After more failed efforts by the Indiana Company “to 
obtain compensation for Virginia’s confiscation,” the Indiana Company’s shareholders, “some 
ninety persons, most of them citizens of Pennsylvania,” initiated legal action in August 1792 in 
the U.S. Supreme Court by filing “a bill in equity asking relief either in the sum of $1,128,000 
(the estimated sale value of the land) or in the amount of $233,000 (the value of the property 
seized by the Indians)” (Gibbons, p. 1904; Jacobs, p. 57; Jacobs, p. 58).181 
 Virginia’s governor was in Philadelphia when the Court announced its decision in 
Chisholm v. Georgia, and in a letter to the lieutenant governor: 
he predicted that a judgment in favor of the Indiana Company would be 
rendered at the next term of the Court if Virginia followed the example of 
Georgia and failed to enter an appearance.  He also stated that he had 
suggested to the state’s congressional delegation the propriety of an 
explanatory constitutional amendment concerning the federal judicial 
power.  (Jacobs, p. 59) 
 
The lawsuit by the Indiana Company raised fears in Virginia that other land issues would be 
subjected to judicial scrutiny.  One such issue centered on the state’s disposition of the land 
claims “of the late Judge Richard Henderson, who had attempted unsuccessfully to create the 
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proprietary state of Transylvania in the Cumberland region of Kentucky, then a part of Virginia” 
(Jacobs, p. 59).  Another questionable transaction involved Virginia’s confiscation of Lord 
Fairfax’s lands which had been enacted by the Virginia Assembly well after the treaty of peace 
had been negotiated with Great Britain ending the Revolutionary War, an article of which 
stipulated that “there should be no further confiscations” (Gibbons, p. 1905, n. 76).  Since Article 
VI of the recently adopted Constitution stipulated that treaties were to “be the supreme Law of 
the Land,” since Fairfax had clear title to the land prior to Virginia’s confiscation, and since the 
confiscation occurred after the treaty article had been approved by Congress, Virginia officials 
had good reason to be fearful.  As one law professor noted: 
The dispute over the Fairfax lands, though recognized immediately, was to 
be in litigation for more than two decades.  Eventually it precipitated the 
first great challenge by a state court to the reviewing authority of the 
Supreme Court.  See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 
(1816); Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 379 
(1813); Hunter v. Martin, Devisee of Fairfax, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 11 (1815); 
Hunter v. Fairfax’s Devisee, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 90 (1810)…  (Gibbons, p. 
1905, n. 76) 
 
 The Indiana Company’s lawsuit “was taken up by the Court each year between [the filing 
of the suit] and 1798” (Mathis, 1968, p. 229).  During this same period of time the Eleventh 
Amendment was being proposed, developed, and sent to the states by Congress for adoption.  
Finally, after President Adams informed Congress that the Eleventh Amendment had been 
ratified by the required number of states, the Court dismissed the Indiana Company’s lawsuit on 
February 14, 1798, stating, “The Court is of opinion, that, on consideration of the Amendment of 
the Constitution respecting suits against States, it has no jurisdiction of the Cause” 
(Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. 378). 
 Moultrie v. Georgia was “not described in the Dallas reports” (Mathis, 1968, p. 228, n. 
81).  Professor Mathis provided further explanation: 
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[H]owever, it [Moultrie v. Georgia] is listed in Docket 32; there are several 
references to it in the Minutes; and there is a Case File in the National 
Archives.  The entry in the Minutes, Feb. 10, 1797, lists Huger v. Georgia; 
however, the date, the information and the names involved are the same as 
given under Moultrie v. Georgia in Docket 32.  Isaac Huger was one of the 
members of the South Carolina Yazoo Company bringing the suit.  (Mathis, 
1968, pp. 228-229, n. 81) 
 
Mathis continued to provide further information about the confusion of names that he uncovered 
during his historical research, an investigation that also shed light on the state of affairs prior to 
the implementation of more standardized procedures for reporting the Court’s actions: 
In the Court reports there is a case called Huger v. South Carolina, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) 339 (1797); however, there is no mention of this case in the Minutes 
or the Docket and there is no Case File among the Court records in the 
National Archives.  It appears quite likely the case listed by Dallas as Huger 
v. South Carolina is the one listed as Moultrie v. Georgia on the Docket and 
supported by a Case File.  (Mathis, 1968, p. 229, n. 81) 
 
However the case was named, it was an intriguing lawsuit dealing with the Yazoo Company that 
featured land fraud, breach of contract, and bribery of state legislators, all of which centered on 
Georgia’s claims to and disposition of public lands between the Mississippi River (the western 
border) and the Tombigbee River (the eastern border).  When one realizes that the land claim 
occupied much of the current-day state of Mississippi in addition to a small western slice of 
Alabama, one gains a sense of the unbounded greed for land at the time.   
 The situation began its movement towards legal conflict in 1789 when the Georgia 
legislature passed the first Yazoo Act whereby “nearly 16 million acres of western lands claimed 
by the state” were sold “to the Virginia, South Carolina and Tennessee Yazoo Companies” 
(Jacobs, pp. 63-64; Mathis, 1968, p. 229).  The total price of the purchase amounted to $200,000 
and “was to be paid within two years” (Jacobs, p. 64).  The share of the South Carolina Yazoo 
Company was “a little more than one-third” (Jacobs, p. 64).  However, in 1790, the Georgia 
legislature unilaterally changed the terms of the contract by stipulating that the payment had to 
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be “in specie” (Jacobs, p. 64).  Experiencing financial difficulty, the South Carolina Yazoo 
Company, unable to meet the changed requirement that payment be made in specie, submitted 
“paper money [and] other certificates in satisfaction of the price,” which the state treasurer 
“refused to accept” (Jacobs, p. 64).  Viewing the contract as “no longer binding upon it,” the 
Georgia legislature then enacted another Yazoo Act in 1795 that “sold a part of the tract to other 
parties, who in turn conveyed [it] to the New England Company” (Jacobs, p. 64).  The Yazoo 
Act of 1795 “was effected through widespread bribery of legislators, and its attempted rescission 
the following year set the state for Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (1810)” (Jacobs, p. 179, n. 84).  
Professor Mathis described the response of the South Carolina land company: 
A bill in equity was then filed by Alexander Moultrie and other members of 
the South Carolina Yazoo Company with the Supreme Court of the United 
States to force completion of the sale, the acceptance of the money offered, 
and to stop the resale of the same land by the Georgia legislature…  (Mathis, 
1968, p. 229) 
 
Mathis also summarized the Court’s actions:  “The suit was heard by the Court in the February 
and August terms in 1797, and in the February term in 1798.  On February 14, 1798, the suit was 
dismissed because of the ratification of the eleventh amendment” (Mathis, 1968, p. 229). 
Legal Battles Pitting Patriots Against Tories 
 Rutgers v. Waddington, unreported, N.Y. (1784), involved a challenge to the legitimacy 
of a state law regarding actions of Loyalists against New York citizens during the British 
occupation in the American Revolution and also served as “a marker on the long road that led to 
the ultimate formulation of the American doctrine of judicial review” (Goebel, p. 282).  The 
Attorney General of New York served as the lead attorney for the plaintiff in the case while 
Alexander Hamilton headed a three-member team of attorneys for the defendant (Goebel, pp. 
292-293).  Elizabeth Rogers initiated the legal action when she “brought suit for damages under 
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the New York Trespass Act, which allowed people who had fled from the British army to 
recover damages from anyone who used the property during the British occupation” (Jacobs, p. 
167, n. 21).   
 The facts of the case began with the British occupation of New York City during the 
summer of 1776 when many patriots, including Elizabeth Rutgers, fled the City.  Abandoned 
property “was commandeered ‘ for the use of the army’ by the British Commissary General” 
(Goebel, p. 289).  From August-September, 1776, until June 10, 1778, “the Rutgers brewery was 
one of the three within the city occupied by Royal troops and used for public purposes” (Goebel, 
p. 289, n. 19).  In September, 1778,  Mrs. Rutgers’ brewhouse and malt-house were assigned to 
two British merchants by the Commissary General. Joshua Waddington served as the agent for 
the merchants, Evelyn Pierrepont and Benjamin Waddington (Goebel, p. 289).  Although they 
spent “about £700 in extensive repairs and added a necessary storehouse, a stable, and an 
inclosure [sic] for firewood,” they apparently occupied the property rent free until May 1, 1780” 
(Goebel, p. 290).  On May, 1, 1780 the British Commander-in-Chief ordered everyone 
“occupying abandoned Patriot premises” to pay rent to a British agent “for the Vestry of the 
Poor” (Goebel, p. 291).  Waddington and Pierrepont paid an annual sum of £150 rent to the 
British agent for the next three years. 
 On June 20, 1783, as the British were preparing to evacuate New York City, the British 
Commandant ordered Pierrepont and Waddington “to commence payment of rent to the owner’s 
agent, Anthony Rutgers, retroactive to May 1” (Goebel, p. 290).  Immediately prior to the British 
evacuation of the city in November 1783, “a fire broke out that reduced the brewery ‘to ashes’ 
and cause the merchants a loss computed at ‘upwards of £4,000’” (Goebel, p. 291).  Within a 
month, the two British merchants turned over the keys of the stable and storehouse to Rutgers.  
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Continuing negotiations for the amount of rent broke down, possibly because of prior passage by 
the New York legislature of the Trespass Act on March 17, 1783, the same date on which the 
“preliminary articles of a treaty of peace” were dispatched to Governor Clinton (Goebel, p. 288; 
see also pp. 287, 290-291).  One of the “three major anti-Loyalist acts” passed by New York, the 
Trespass Act was described as “the one that most effectively accomplished the aims of the 
legislature,” largely because the number of lawsuits “under this statute far outnumbered those 
brought under either the Confiscation or the Citation Act” (Goebel, p. 282).  A lawsuit to recover 
£8,000 in rent was filed in the Mayor’s Court of the City of New York by Elizabeth Rutgers 
against Joshua Waddington, the agent for the two British merchants (Goebel, p. 291).  The 
lawsuit “was initiated at a moment when anti-Tory feeling was at a peak and when the state 
legislature, despite the Treaty of Peace, was confecting further punitive measures against the 
Loyalists” (Goebel, p. 291).  As it was further noted, “Rutgers to the man in the street became a 
melodrama the plot of which involved an aged Patriot widow who was done out of her property 
by two prosperous British merchants” (Goebel, pp. 292-293).   
 Presenting their case before the Mayor’s Court on June 29, 1784, plaintiff arguments 
stressed state sovereignty (Goebel, p. 301).  The attorneys for Rutgers argued that the case 
should be decided according to the terms of New York’s law, that the law of nations “did not 
bind the State of New York for it was not a part of the common law,” and that “even if the law of 
nations was a part of the common law, it was no more obligatory on the legislature than was the 
common law which itself did not bind the legislature” (Goebel, p. 303).  Finally, Rutgers’ 
attorneys stressed two major points:  first, “that the legislature as the supreme law-giving 
authority within the state was subject to no control except that of the people;” and second, “that 
the judges, as agents of the state owing primary allegiance to its laws, did not have the power or 
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authority to apply law from any other source or jurisdiction in derogation of those laws” (Goebel, 
p. 304). 
 As can be seen by comparing the preceding argumentation with the following defense 
arguments, Hamilton’s use of initial pleadings “had fixed the issues so that plaintiff’s counsel 
were forced to argue on Hamilton’s grounds” (Goebel, p. 304).  Hamilton’s first line of argument 
“claimed the Trespass Act to be in violation of the law of nations” (Goebel, p. 304).  He next 
cited the Treaty of Paris, which, when combined with the law of nations “implied … a general 
amnesty for all public and private injuries arising from the war” that the individual states were 
obligated to respect (Goebel, p. 305).  Hamilton’s third, concluding argument claimed “that if the 
Trespass Act were void for either of the above reasons, a state court had the power and the 
obligation to declare the statute void and to refuse to give it effect” (Goebel, p. 305).  In support 
of his arguments for judicial review, Hamilton quoted “the rule of Cicero” governing 
determinations of legal primacy, which he presented in its original Latin and which he cited as 
“De In: L 4 No. 145:” 
Primus Igitur leges oportet contendere comparando utra lex ad Majores hoc 
est ad utiliories ad honestiores ac magis necessaries res pertineat, ex quo 
confiscitur ut si legis duae aut sip lures aut quot quot erunt conservari non 
possunt quia discrepant inter se ea maxime conservanda sunt quæ ad 
maximas res pertinere videatur.  (Goebel, p. 352) 
 
H.M. Hubbell’s English translation of the same passage from Book II, 49, § 145 of De 
Inventione reads as follows: 
In the first place, then, one should compare the laws by considering which 
one deals with the most important matters, that is, the most expedient, 
honourable [sic] or necessary.  The conclusion from this is that if two laws 
(or whatever number there may be if more than two) cannot be kept because 
they are at variance, the one is thought to have the greatest claim to be 
upheld which has reference to the greatest matters.  (Cicero, 1949, p. 313) 
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Perhaps, due to the nature of his argument and his wish to be logically concise by citing an 
ancient rule of interpretation, Hamilton cited only this portion of Cicero’s thought on legal 
matters.  However, one wonders why Hamilton didn’t cite from De Legibus, which contained 
several anticipations by Cicero of judicial review.  For example, in Book II, 13 of De Legibus, 
Cicero had his main character ask, “What of the fact that many harmful and pernicious measures 
are passed in human communities – measures which come no closer to the name of laws than if a 
gang of criminals agreed to make some rules” (Cicero, 1998, p. 126)?  After drawing an analogy 
between lawmaking and medical treatment, Cicero’s alter ego, Marcus, answered his own 
question: 
In a community a law of just any kind will not be a law, even if the people 
(in spite of its harmful character) have accepted it.  Therefore law means 
drawing a distinction between just and unjust, formulated in accordance 
with that most ancient and most important of all things – nature;182 by her, 
human laws are guided in punishing the wicked and defending and 
protecting the good.  (Cicero, 1998, p. 126) 
 
Or, Hamilton could have cited Cicero’s thought from Book II, 31 of De Legibus when, nearing 
the end of a lengthy monologue, Cicero’s alter ego asked a series of rhetorical questions, which 
contain two examples of laws being overturned: 
What is more awesome than the power to grant or withhold the right to do 
political business with the people or plebs?  Or than quashing laws illegally 
approved, as when the Titian Law was annulled by the decree of the college, 
or when the Livian Laws were cancelled on the recommendation of 
Philippus who was both consul and augur?  (Cicero, 1998, p. 134) 
  
Perhaps the reason for Hamilton’s citation of De Inventione and omission of De Legibus derived 
from Hamilton’s own legal training, of which, one can surmise from the available evidence, De 
Inventione, but not necessarily De Legibus, must certainly have been a part.183  Ability in rhetoric 
was highly prized, both by the ancients and by the nation’s founders.  The reasons for valuing 
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rhetoric can be ascertained partially from Hubbell’s introduction to his translation of Cicero’s De 
Inventione: 
An ancient Rhetoric trained men entirely for speaking, and almost 
exclusively for speaking in the law court.  It is a doctrine of controversy and 
debate.  Furthermore, it is concerned with matter as well as with style.  
Invention, or the discovery of ideas and subject matter, was the first and 
perhaps the most important section of any formal treatise on rhetoric.  In 
developing “invention” the authors are of necessity busied with the concepts 
and procedure of the court-room.  A rhetoric thus becomes a “Practical 
Pleader’s Guide.”  Hence much of the de Inventione reads like a law book.  
(Cicero, 1949, pp. ix-x) 
 
One of Hamilton’s principal biographers suggested a possible reason for Hamilton’s limited use 
of Cicero when he differentiated between two types of argument put forth by Hamilton regarding 
judicial review.  The first type focused on seeking “judicial review of the statute on grounds of 
incompatibility with higher law,” which Hamilton supported with Cicero as noted previously 
(McDonald, 1979, p. 68).  While Hamilton had made that argument, his real focus, according to 
McDonald, was “another and more effective ground” because it “undermined the ground on 
which plaintiff’s case had been built” (McDonald, 1979, p. 68).  McDonald continued:  
Courts were regularly called upon, Hamilton said, to construe the meaning 
of the law as it applied to particular cases.  The rules of construction were 
clear and well known.  One of these was the supposition that the legislature 
is wise and honest; and thus if a narrowly literal reading of the language of a 
statute leads to an absurd, contradictory, or unjust application, it must be 
assumed that the legislature had not intended for the act to be read that way.  
(McDonald, 1979, p. 68) 
 
Professor McDonald continued his analysis of Hamilton’s legal argument: 
Similarly, if the general language of one statute, read literally and without 
reference to circumstances, resulted in a conflict with the specific language 
of another statute or with the common law, it must be supposed that the 
legislature intended no such conflict.  (McDonald, 1979, p. 68) 
 
McDonald then explained how Hamilton had “undermined” the arguments used by plaintiff’s 
attorneys. 
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Counsel for Mrs. Rutgers had argued for legislative supremacy over court 
decisions; and though Hamilton disagreed, he emphasized the question of 
presumed legislative intent, not judicial review, as the basis for a decision in 
favor of his client.  That enabled the court to affirm plaintiff’s position and 
disavow any power to overrule a statute (for this were to set the judicial 
above the legislative”), and yet at the same time do just that by ruling for 
Waddington.  (Emphasis in original) (McDonald, 1979, p. 68) 
 
 The judgment of the court was not delivered until August 17, at which time it was 
“rendered without opinion” (Goebel, p. 306).  On August 27, 1784, the court delivered its 
opinion, which appeared “to have been primarily the result of [Mayor James Duane’s] own work 
and thought” (Goebel, p. 307).  The Mayor’s Court reasoned that: 1) the law of nations, as part of 
the common law, was a part of the New York Constitution; 2) the Revolutionary War was 
governed by the law of nations; 3) the resulting “capture of New York [was] such a conquest as 
to transfer the rights to rents to the British Commander during the occupation;” and that 4) the 
rights to rent were not, however, transferred to the Commissary General (Goebel, p. 308).  
Regarding the Treaty of Peace, the court stated that “although the treaty legally could not be 
violated by the state, it provided no express amnesty for the defendant” (Goebel, p. 308).  
Employing a bit of legal sleight of hand, the Mayor’s Court reasoned that it “could not presume 
that the Trespass Act was intended to apply to the defendant in so far as he was justified and 
protected by the law of nations” (Goebel, p. 309).  However, “whoever is clearly exempted from 
the operation of this statute by the law of nations, this Court must take it for granted, could never 
have been intended to be comprehended within it by the Legislature” (Emphasis in original) 
(Goebel, p. 309).  In summary, the Mayor’s Court held the following: 
In so far as the defendant’s occupation was not justified by the law of 
nations (1788-1780), his plea of military authorization would not avail him.  
On the other hand, the court construed the Trespass Act as not intended to 
apply to the defendant when his occupation was justified (1780-1783).  
(Goebel, pp. 309-310) 
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 On September 2, 1784, a jury “awarded a verdict of 791 pounds, 13 shillings, 4 pence 
damages and 6 pence costs, to the plaintiff,” a verdict that the Mayor’s Court ordered “be the 
judgment of the court” (Goebel, p. 310).  It was also a verdict well shy of the original mark of 
£8,000 sought by Mrs. Rogers when her attorneys filed the lawsuit. 
 Vassall v. Massachusetts, unreported, U.S.S.C. (1793), involved a potential clash 
between a state statute and the Treaty of Paris ending hostilities between Great Britain and the 
United States.  A few months after the Court issued its Chisholm decision, William Vassall filed 
a “bill in equity” in August, 1793 against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in the U.S. 
Supreme Court (Mathis, 1968, p. 224; see also Jacobs, p. 60 and Jacobs, p. 175, n. 25).  Vassall, 
a Loyalist and British subject, had fled to England during the Revolutionary War.  Subsequently 
his property had been confiscated by the state according to provisions of a state law that had 
been passed at the beginning of the rebellion (Jacobs, p. 60; Mathis, 1968, p. 224).  After the suit 
was filed a federal marshal served subpoenas upon both Governor John Hancock and Attorney 
General James Sullivan.  The Massachusetts Mercury commented on this circumstance in its 
July 16, 1793 edition: 
The precept now served on the governor and Attorney General is for monies 
arising from the sequestered property of a refugee….  If he should obtain 
what he has sued for, what a wide extended door will it open for every dirty 
Tory traitor to his country’s liberties to enter.  (Warren, pp. 99-100, n. 3) 
 
 Hancock reacted to the federal subpoena by “issuing a proclamation calling the 
legislature into special session in September” (Jacobs, p. 60).  On September 18, 1793, 
Hancock’s address was read to a joint session of the legislature by the secretary of the 
commonwealth in Hancock’s presence as Hancock was “critically ill and too weak to stand,” 
(Jacobs, p. 60).  Described as “a fiery speech” by one historian and as “surprisingly moderate in 
tone” by a legal scholar, Hancock’s address to the joint session of the Massachusetts’ legislature 
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presented the issues contained in the lawsuit and described “several alternatives which the 
legislature might pursue” (Mathis, 1968, p. 224; Jacobs, p. 61; Jacobs, p. 61).  The critical issue 
for Vassall’s lawsuit, according to Governor Hancock, “turned on the legality of the state’s 
absentee laws” (Jacobs, p. 61).  This, in turn, raised the issue of which court was empowered to 
address the legality of state law.  Hancock expressed doubt “that the judicial power of the United 
States extended to matters of civil contract involving the states” (Jacobs, p. 61).  However, if the 
federal judiciary’s power did extend to such a matter, “[W]hat law would be applicable” (Jacobs, 
p. 62)?  The only choices, in Hancock’s view, were the Scylla of federal law, a situation that 
“would render the legislative authority of Congress over the particular states, as mere 
corporations commensurate to the claim of the judiciary power,” or the Charybdis of state/British 
law, a circumstance which “would be absurd” (Jacobs, p. 62). 
 Nine days later, the Massachusetts’ legislature issued its response to Governor Hancock 
in the form of a resolution directing “the Unite States Senators and Representatives from 
Massachusetts” to work for an amendment to the Constitution that would prohibit states from 
being “compellable to answer in any suit by an individual or individuals in any Court of the 
United States” (Mathis, 1968, p. 225).  The resolution also directed Governor Hancock “to 
communicate the foregoing Resolutions to the Supreme Executives of the several States, to be 
submitted to the consideration of their respective Legislatures” (Mathis, 1968, p. 225).  Nothing 
found by this investigator indicated that anyone in Massachusetts recognized that the 
Massachusetts’ confiscation law conflicted with provisions of the 1783 Treaty of Paris.    
 After examining the minutes of the case and taking into account the context of the 
historical circumstances, one scholar observed: 
With action now imminent in Congress, the subsequent judicial history of 
Vassall v. Massachusetts was somewhat anticlimactic.  There is no record of 
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the state’s appearance.  Neither the plaintiff nor the Court pressed for an 
early decision in the case, and, at successive terms of the Court, 
continuances were repeatedly granted until February 1797, when the case 
was dismissed.  (Jacobs, p. 62) 
 
 Brailsford v. Spalding, unreported, U.S.C.C., Ga. (1792) and Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 
U.S. (Dall.) 402 (1792), 2 U.S. (Dall.) 415 (1793, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 1 (1794), while appearing to be 
separate legal matters, share the same factual background and are connected actions.  Following 
the Revolution, the Georgia legislature enacted a statute on May 4, 1782, that provided for the 
state confiscation of properties owned by Loyalists with the money from the sale of such 
properties being deposited into the Georgia Treasury (2 U.S. 402).  The Georgia action also 
provided for the sequestration of all debts “due or owing to British merchants” (2 U.S. 402).  The 
Georgia law did not abolish the debts; it simply took over the ownership of the debt.  Under the 
terms of the Georgia law, instead of paying the debt to the British party with whom it was 
originally contracted, a citizen or business would pay the amount owing on the debt to the State 
of Georgia. 
 In 1791 three Loyalist merchants (Samuel Brailsford, Robert Powell, and John Hopton) 
filed suit in the U.S. “circuit court for the district of Georgia” to collect on a debt owed them by 
James Spalding, a Georgia Patriot (2 U.S. 402, 403).  After the lawsuit had been filed, the 
Georgia Attorney General “applied to the circuit court, for the admission of the state, as a party, 
to defend its claim” under the previously passed Georgia statute to the debt claimed by the 
loyalist merchants (2 U.S. 402, 403).  The circuit court rejected the state’s application and ruled 
for the merchants. 
 Following the circuit court’s ruling, the State of Georgia “filed in the Supreme Court an 
original bill in equity to enjoin execution of the circuit court’s judgment in favor of the creditor” 
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(Jacobs, p. 177, n. 56).   The confluence of Georgia v. Brailsford and Chisholm v. Georgia 
caused one legal expert to remark: 
Thus, while complaining in the Chisholm Case because it had been 
made a party to a suit by a British creditor, Georgia was complaining 
in the Brailsford Case because it had not been allowed to become a 
party in another suit by a British creditor.  (Warren, p. 103) 
 
The opposing attorneys arguing before the Supreme Court for and against the injunction were 
Alexander J. Dallas, entrepreneurial Court reporter, and Edmund Randolph, formerly the 
Governor of Virginia, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention who presented the Virginia 
Plan to that body, a staunch constitutional proponent in the Virginia convention to ratify the 
Constitution, and, at the time of his appearance before the Court, the U.S. Attorney General.184  
Justices Johnson and Cushing issued seriatim opinions opposing the injunction while Justices 
Iredell, Blair, Wilson, and Chief Justice Jay issued seriatim opinions favoring the granting of an 
injunction.  Thus, by a 4-2 margin, the Court granted Georgia’s request for an injunction during 
the August, 1792 term of the Court (2 U.S. 402, 405-408).  According to the Chief Justice, “For 
my part, I think, that the money should remain in custody of the law, until the law has adjudged 
to whom it belongs; and, therefore, I am content, that the injunction issue” (2 U.S. 402, 408). 
 The following Court term (February, 1793), the matter was again before the Court as 
Randolph presented a motion “to dissolve the injunction which had been issued, and to dismiss 
the bill” (2 U.S. 415).  After hearing argument, the Court issued its 3-2 opinion (Justices Iredell 
and Blair dissenting, Justice Johnson being absent, Justices Wilson and Cushing, along with 
Chief Justice Jay, forming the majority) whereby the Court ruled that Georgia had a right to 
pursue the debt “at common law” and that the injunction be continued “until the next term; 
when, however, if Georgia has not instituted her action at common law, it will be dissolved” (2 
U.S. 415, 418).   
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 One year later (the February, 1794 Court term) the matter was again before the Court.  At 
this time the “cause was now tried, by a special jury, upon an amicable issue” to determine the 
rightful ownership of the debt (between Brailford and Georgia) due from Spalding as well as 
“the right of action to recover it” (3 U.S. 1).  Nothing in the Court record indicated a switch from 
an equity lawsuit to a common law action requiring a jury trial, yet that was what occurred.  
After four days of hearing argument, the jury was charged to deliberate upon a verdict by Chief 
Justice Jay.  After deliberating for “some time,” the jury returned to the bar “and proposed the 
following questions to the court” (3 U.S. 1, 4): 
1. Did the act of the State of Georgia completely vest the debts of 
Brailsford, Powell & Hopton, in the state, at the time of passing 
the same? 
2. If so, did the treaty of peace, or any other matter, revive the right 
of the defendants to the debt in controversy?  (3 U.S. 1, 5) 
 
Chief Justice Jay replied that the Court was unanimous in its opinion that the Georgia 
sequestration law “did not vest the debts of Brailsford, Powell & Hopton, in the state at the time 
of passing it” (3 U.S. 1, 5).  Regarding the second question, the Chief Justice began by 
explaining that “no sequestration divests the property in the thing sequestered” and that, 
accordingly, Brailsford et al were “the real owner[s] of the debt” (3 U.S. 1, 5).  The Georgia law 
only served “to prevent Brailsford’s recovering the debt, while the war continued, but that the 
mere restoration of peace [by the law of nations], as well as the very terms of the treaty, revived 
the right of action to recover the debt” (3 U.S. 1, 5).  Thus, by means of some legalistic 
maneuvering, the Court avoided addressing the direct conflict of state law with a congressionally 
approved treaty as well as dodged having to rule on which of the two, by virtue of constitutional 
superiority, should prevail.  The Court’s affirmation of “all Treaties made” enjoying equal status 
with the “Constitution” and the “Laws of the United States” as the “supreme Law of the Land,” 
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at least according to Article VI of the Constitution, would have to wait for a subsequent legal 
conflict.  From the more modern framework of adaptive work articulated by Dr. Heifetz, the 
decision in Brailsford v. Georgia could be viewed as “orchestrating the conflict” (Heifetz & 
Linsky, p. 102). 
 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 199 (1796), directly confronted the conflict between a 
state law and treaty provisions, thereby achieving status as the precedent for the supremacy of 
treaties over state laws and constitutions as stated in Article VI, ¶ 2 of the U.S. Constitution that 
reads as follows: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; 
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.  
(Emphasis added) 
 
Ware v. Hylton also served as a typical example “of numerous cases brought by British creditors 
to recover pre-Revolutionary War debts owed them by Americans” (Hall, 1992, p. 910).  
Emanating from Virginia, the case marked the only time that future Chief Justice John Marshall 
argued a case before the Supreme Court, an argument that he lost as he represented Daniel 
Hylton and Francis Eppes, the defendants (3 U.S. 199, 210; Hall, 1992, p. 523).   
 The pertinent facts of the case follow.  Hylton and Eppes contracted a debt of slightly 
more than £ 2,796 sterling with the firm of Farrel & Jones on July 7, 1774, approximately two 
years before Virginia and her sister colonies declared their independence from Great Britain.  
Beginning May 6th and continuing through July 5, 1776, elected representatives “of the several 
counties and corporations of Virginia” met “in general convention, for the purpose of framing a 
new government” (3 U.S. 199, 223).  Prior to the U.S. Declaration of Independence, “the 
convention of Virginia formally declared, that Virginia was a free, sovereign and independent 
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state” in June, 1776 (3 U.S. 199, 224).  On July 4, 1776, “the United States, in congress 
assembled, declared the thirteen united colonies free and independent states” (3 U.S. 199, 224).  
Following the Declaration of Independence, Hylton and Eppes elected to become “citizens of 
Virginia,” while both Jones and Farrel chose to remain British subjects “paying allegiance to the 
king of Great Britain” (3 U.S. 199).   
 On October 20, 1777, the Virginia legislature enacted a statute “to sequester British 
property” (3 U.S. 199, 220).  The Virginia law also contained provisions “enabling its citizens to 
pay debts owed to British subjects into the state treasury in depreciated currency and thereby 
obtain a certificate of discharge” (Hall, 1992, p. 910).  Pursuant to the Virginia legislation, 
Hylton and Eppes “paid into the loan-office of Virginia, part of their debt, to wit, $3,111 1/9, 
equal to 933l. 14s. 0d. Virginia currency; and obtained a certificate from the commissioners of 
the loan-office” on April 26, 1780 (3 U.S. 199, 220).  While approved by Congress on November 
15, 1777, and ratified by ten of the thirteen states in 1778, the Articles of Confederation were not 
officially ratified and adopted as the official operating document of the “confederation of the 
United States” until March 1, 1781 (3 U.S. 199, 222).185 
 On September 3, 1783, a treaty of peace was finalized in Paris between the United States 
and Great Britain.  The fourth article of the treaty stated, “It is agreed, that creditors, on either 
side, shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value, in sterling money, of 
all bonâ fide debts, heretofore contracted” (Emphasis in original) (3 U.S. 199, 239).  The fifth 
article of the peace treaty read, “That all persons who have any interest in confiscated lands, by 
debts, should meet with no lawful impediment in the prosecution of their just rights” (3 U.S. 199, 
238-239).   
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 In 1790 William Jones, the surviving partner of Farrel & Jones, filed suit in the U.S. 
Circuit Court for the District of Virginia to recover the debt originally contracted by Daniel 
Hylton and Francis Eppes, who were named as defendants in the lawsuit (Gibbons, p. 1940; 3 
U.S. 199).  At some unknown point in the litigation, Jones died; subsequently the administrator 
of his estate, a Mr. Ware (whose first name was not recorded) “was duly substituted as plaintiff 
in the cause” (3 U.S. 199).  In 1793 the circuit court, with Justice Iredell serving as one of the 
judges, found for the defendants, Hylton and Eppes, whereupon Ware successfully applied for a 
writ of error to the U.S. Supreme Court.186 
 Appearing before the Court, attorneys Marshall and Campbell presented five arguments 
on behalf of the American defendants, Hylton and Eppes.  First, they argued that the debt had 
already been paid.  Marshall declared, “There cannot be a creditor, where there is not a debt” (3 
U.S. 199, 213).   
 Second, defense attorneys pointed out that Jones and Farrel became enemies of Virginia 
because they chose to remain loyal to the British crown.  As enemies of Virginia, their property, 
including loans, had been confiscated by Virginia when the legislature passed the sequestration 
act on October 20, 1777.  Furthermore, Hylton and Eppes had made payment to “the state of 
Virginia” on April 26, 1780, in accordance with the requirements of the Virginia law (3 U.S. 
199, 200).  As a result, no debt remained that could be an issue in any legal proceedings.  
Particularly referencing the treaty provisions, defense attorneys concluded: 
British debts were extinguished by the act of confiscation.  The [treaty] 
article, therefore, must be construed with reference to those creditors, who 
had bonâ fide debts subsisting, in legal force, at the time of making the 
treaty; and the word recovery can have no effect to create a debt, where 
none previously existed.  (Emphasis in original) (3 U.S. 199, 213) 
 
   
   
1334
 Third, Marshall and Campbell pointed again to the British citizenship of Jones and Farrel, 
noted their status as “enemies of, and at open war with, the state of Virginia, and the United 
States of America,” and cited two subsequent actions by the Virginia legislature, the first of 
which confiscated all British property on behalf of the “commonwealth,” the second of which 
prohibited any “subject of Great Britain” from recovering any confiscated property “in any court 
in this commonwealth” (3 U.S. 199, 201). 
 Fourth, Marshall and Campbell pointed out “that his Britannic majesty hath willfully 
broken and violated” the peace treaty of 1783 between the United States and Great Britain, on 
account of which “the plaintiff ought not to maintain an action” (3 U.S. 199, 202).  Violations 
included the carrying off “the negroes in his possession, the property of the American inhabitants 
of the United States,” the refusal “to withdraw his armies and garrisons from every port and 
harbor,” the retention “of the forts Detroit and Niagara, and a large territory adjoining the said 
forts … within the bounds and limits of the United States of America,” and finally, supplying 
and furnishing “certain nations or tribes of Indians” with “arms, ammunition and weapons of war 
… for the purpose of enabling them to prosecute the war against the citizens of these United 
States” (3 U.S. 199, 202-203). 
 Fifth, Marshall and Campbell noted that the original debt was contracted under the 
colonial government, a government that no longer existed since on July 4, 1776, “the people of 
North America … dissolved the until then subsisting government,” an action “whereby the right 
of the plaintiff to the debt … was totally annulled” (3 U.S. 199, 203). 
 Attorneys Tilghman and Wilcocks presented arguments for the plaintiff Ware, 
administrator for the estate of William Jones, “the surviving partner of Farrel & Jones, subjects 
of the king of Great Britain” (3 U.S. 199).  To the first defense argument, Tilghman and 
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Wilcocks responded, “Non solverunt,” a plea emanating from the Latin form of the verb, 
“solvere, to loosen, release, dissolve” (Random House Webster’s College Dictionary, p. 1230).  
Thus, the defense argument didn’t serve to loosen or release defendants from their legal 
responsibility regarding payment of the contracted debt. 
 In response to the defense argument regarding the Virginia sequestration law and 
subsequent action under that act by the defendants Hylton and Eppes, plaintiff attorneys 
Tilghman and Wilcocks, declaring that defense arguments were “not sufficient in law to bar the 
said plaintiff from … maintaining his said action,” directed attention to the 1783 “treaty of peace 
between the United States of America and his Britannic majesty” (3 U.S. 199, 203).  Tilghman 
and Wilcocks first noted the treaty clause stipulating “that the creditors of either side should 
meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all bonâ 
fide debts theretofore contracted” (Emphasis in original) (3 U.S. 199, 204).  Pointing out that the 
debt occurred before treaty was negotiated and thereby fell under the treaty provisions, plaintiff 
attorneys Tilghman and Wilcocks directed attention to the U.S. Constitution which: 
expressly declared, that treaties which were then made, or should thereafter 
be made, under the authority of the United States, should be the supreme 
law of the land, anything in the said constitution, or of the laws of any state, 
to the contrary notwithstanding.  (3 U.S. 199, 204) 
 
Regarding the remainder of defense arguments, Dallas noted, “To the 3d [sic], 4th and 5th pleas 
in bar, the plaintiff demurred generally” (3 U.S. 199, 205). 
 Only four of the six justices participated in the case:  Chase, Cushing, Patterson, and 
Wilson.  Ellsworth did not participate, and Iredell recused himself because he had served on the 
circuit court that ruled in favor of the defendants, Hylton and Eppes.  Although he didn’t 
participate, Iredell later submitted an opinion that was included in the Dallas Reports (3 U.S. 
256, n. a).187  Finding 4-0 for the plaintiff, Ware, the Court delivered seriatim opinions that 
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“revoked and annulled” the judgment of the circuit court (3 U.S. 199, 284).  The opinion by 
Justice Chase was the most comprehensive in its scope, treating both international and national 
law as it bore on the subject matter. Also of interest, Chase’s opinion clarified the international 
legal status of the states under the Articles of Confederation.  The states possessed a quite 
different legal status under the Articles than they did under the Constitution.  According to 
Justice Chase: 
From the 4th of July 1776, the American states were de facto, as well as de 
jure, in the possession and actual exercise of all the rights of independent 
governments….  [A]ll laws made by the legislatures of the several states, 
after the declaration of independence, were the laws of sovereign and 
independent governments.  (Emphasis in original) (3 U.S. 199, 224-225) 
 
And later, discussing Virginia’s sequestration law after comprehensively reviewing statements 
by Vattel, Grotius, and others regarding the law of nations (as well as leading British authorities 
and legal rulings bearing on the issue) , Chase declared, “I conclude, that Virginia had a right, as 
a sovereign and independent nation, to confiscate any British property within its territory…” 
(Emphasis added) (3 U.S. 199, 231).   
 The opinion by Justice Chase was also the most direct of the Court’s seriatim opinions in 
confronting the conflict between state laws and ratified treaties.  For example, Chase was the 
only justice to explicitly frame the legal question involved.  As presented by Justice Chase: 
The question then may be stated thus: whether the 4th article of the said 
treaty nullifies the law of Virginia, passed on the 20th of October 1777; 
destroys the payment made under it; and revives the debt, and gives a right 
of recovery thereof, against the original debtor?  (3 U.S. 199 235) 
 
After quoting Article VI of the Constitution, Justice Chase observed, “It is the declared will of 
the people of the United States that every treaty made by the authority of the United States, shall 
be superior to the constitution and laws of any individual state” (3 U.S. 199, 237).  From that 
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observation, Chase drew four conclusions of law about the supremacy of treaties over state 
constitutions and laws: 
1st. That it is retrospective, and is to be considered in the same light as if the 
constitution had been established before the making of the treaty of 1783.  
2d. That the constitution or laws of any of the states, so far as either of them 
shall be found contrary to that treaty, are, by force of the said article, 
prostrated before the treaty.  3d. That, consequently, the treaty of 1783 has 
superior power to the legislature of any state, because no legislature of any 
state has any kind of power over the constitution, which was its creator.  4th. 
That it is the declared duty of the state judges to determine any constitution 
or laws of any state, contrary to that treaty (or any other), made under the 
authority of the United States, null and void.  (Emphasis added) (3 U.S. 199, 
237) 
 
Thus, the question that the Court had avoided confronting in Georgia v. Brailsford was squarely 
faced in Ware v. Hylton. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1
 I am indebted to Dr. Jim Davis, Director of the Iowa Writing Project for this insight.  Jim 
vocalized this insight at countless meetings and IWP workshops throughout Iowa over the 
past twenty years.  See Davis, 1996.  Jim’s insight was statistically verified by the work of 
two professors in England, Paul Black and Dylan Wiliam.  See Endnote #4 below as well for 
Black & Wiliam, 1998. 
2
  No research exists to support a positive correlation between the adoption of standards and an 
increase in student achievement.  Research does support positive correlations between: a) 
teacher knowledge/expertise and increased student learning; and b) increased student 
learning and professional development focused upon increasing the teacher’s instructional 
expertise.  One researcher discovered that teacher expertise accounted for approximately 
40% of variance in student achievement gains in reading and mathematics which was far 
more than any other factor accounted for (See Ferguson, 1991).  Researchers at the 
University of Chicago reported that teacher expertise, teacher experience, and teacher levels 
of education were the three variables most associated with significant increases in student 
achievement (See Hedges, Laine, & Greenwald, 1994 and Greenwald, Hedges, & Laine, 
1996).  The executive director of the National Commission on Teaching and America’s 
Future examined research and reported that “teacher knowledge of subject matter, student 
learning and development, and teaching methods” were critical elements of teacher 
effectiveness (See Darling-Hammond, 1998). 
3
 In addition to my twenty-four years spent in Iowa as a public school teacher and 
administrator (1980-2004), this assertion also rests upon the following multiple sources:  
Iowa Department of Education, 2000, pp. 2-3; Iowa Writing Project, 1999, pp. 3-5; School 
Administrators of Iowa, 2002, pp. 1, 5; Stilwill, 2003, May 1, p. 1; Stilwill, 2003, May 14, 
pp. 6, 8, 10, 12.  
4
  Black and Wiliam conducted a metanalysis of research about assessment.  One of their 
questions asked, “Does better classroom assessment improve student achievement?”  Black 
& Wiliam discovered that the effect sizes for classroom assessment were larger than those 
normally found in educational research, ranging from +0.4 to 0.7 standard deviations.  To put 
those numbers into perspective, an effect size of +.04 would equalize achievement between 
an average student in the pilot study and the top students in the control group.  An effect size 
of +.07 would have raised England’s mathematics achievement ranking in TIMSS from 21st 
to 5th.  Black & Wiliam found that the greatest boosts occurred for low achievers which 
decreased the range of differences in student achievement in classrooms.  They concluded 
that as teachers use classroom assessment to know about student difficulties with learning 
and to learn how students are progressing with their learning, teachers will be able to more 
effectively adapt their teaching to meet student learning needs.  This supports the belief that 
the best educational decisions are those made in closest proximity to the learner. 
5
  See Bogdan & Biklen, 2003; Creswell, 1998; and Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2003. 
6
  See Elias & Levinkind, 1999, pp. 6/3-6/4; Roberts & Schlueter, 2000, pp. 29-36; and Yelin & 
Samborn, 2003, pp. 20-26. 
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7
  At the time he was interviewed on May 14, 2003, Mr. Stilwill served as both the Iowa 
Director of Education and as the President of the National Council of Chief School Officers.  
Mr. Stilwill retired as the Iowa educational leader in August, 2004. 
8
  See Christensen, 2003; Stilwill, 2003, May 14; and Janson, 2003. 
9
  This format was developed using my previous experience with legal research combined with 
my reading of Deaver, 1992, pp. 69, 72-73, 93; Gottesmann & Gottesmann, 1998, pp. 22-23, 
63-65; Miller, 2004; and Nunneke, 2001, pp. 47-53. 
10
 All quotations from Director Stilwill’s unpublished interview come from the May 14th 
citation.  For ease and simplification, Stilwill’s remarks will simply be cited as “Stilwill, 
2003” followed by the page of the interview transcript. 
11
  Sources for the individual items follow:  “allowable growth,” 
http://www.myiowaschools.org/funding_tools/recent_cuts_to_education.pdf; “negotiated 
settlements” and “health insurance cost increases,” http://www.ia-
sb.org/HumanResources/TAs/tentativeagreements.asp; “districts on budget guarantee,” M. 
Buckton (Government Relations Director, Iowa Association of School Boards), personal 
communication, November 29, 2004.  All electronic resources were retrieved 11-29-04. 
12
  See Dobbs, 2004; Feller, 2004; and Editorial, 2004.  According to The Washington Post, 
Sandy Kress, an attorney from Austin, TX, assisted Spellings in authoring NCLB.  Spelling’s 
second husband is Robert Spellings, an Austin attorney who lobbied on behalf of vouchers.  
13
  Christensen stated that the Nebraska Senators and Representatives reported to him that they 
were unable to find out the content of what they were voting on because it was written 
behind a closed door and was still being revised as the voting was taking place.  Stilwill also 
confirmed this in his interview and observed that Iowa’s congressional delegation voted on a 
piece of legislation that they didn’t fully understand.  Stilwell related that the Iowa legislators 
told him that they didn’t realize it would have an impact on Iowa, given Iowa’s leading 
position on education.  Neither Christensen nor Stilwill were aware of any input by public 
school educators regarding the content of NCLB.  To their knowledge, no public school 
educators and no state department of education personnel from either Nebraska or Iowa were 
involved in the writing of the federal education bill. 
14
  See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 570-572 (1985) 
(Powell, J., dissenting); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 790 (1982) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting in part); Amar, pp.1425, 1500-03; Merritt, pp. 4-7. 
15
  See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 575-577 & n. 18 
(1985) (Powell, J., dissenting); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 u.s. 742, 789-790 (1982) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting in part); Merritt, pp. 7-8; Beer, pp. 9-10; Kaden, pp. 855-857. 
16
  See Graglia, 1982, pp. 23, 25-26; Howard, 1985, p. 795; Kaden, 1979, p. 854; Merritt, 1988, 
pp. 8-9; Olson, 1982, pp. 7, 12; Scheiber, 1978, pp. 619, 621. 
17
 Sources for the percentage of the Iowa state budget spent on education include the Iowa 
Association of School Boards (IASB, 2002) and Lisa Oakley, Iowa Department of 
Management, personal communication on February 1, 2005 (see Appendix G). 
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18
 Sources for Iowa being the most literate state in the U.S. include Radio Iowa (Kelley, 2004) 
and Time Magazine (The State University of Iowa, 1954, p. 63).  The Time article stated, 
“For one thing, Iowa itself is the most literate state in the union (i.e., has the lowest 
percentage – 3.9% - of illiterates) …”  It is difficult to obtain recent data regarding state 
comparisons of adult literacy.  While the National Adult Literacy Survey was administered in 
1992 and the International Adult Literacy Survey was given during 1994-98, no data 
emerged in terms of state comparisons.  Data was disaggregated in a number of ways 
(gender, level of education, geographic region, country, ethnicity/race, age, etc.), but not by 
state [see Kirsch, I.S., Jungeblut, A., Jenkins, L. & Kolstad, A. (1993) and OECD & 
Statistics Canada (2000)].  According to John Hartwig at the Iowa Department of Education 
who coordinated Iowa’s participation in both the national and international literacy surveys, 
ETS (Educational Testing Service) didn’t want to get into the politics of state comparisons.  
ETS was responsible for the national literacy survey (NALS) and collaborated with Statistics 
Canada for the design and implementation of the international survey (IALS).  Hartwig stated 
that his own analysis of the national survey data put Iowa in the “top 5% of the states in 
terms of adult literacy,” but that the survey data as compiled by ETS could support no clear 
ranking beyond that (Hartwig, personal communication, January 31, 2005).  In NALS the 
Midwest region had the highest average proficiencies on prose literacy, document literacy, 
and quantitative literacy of all the regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, West) (p. 47).  The 
Iowa adult literacy results indicated that Iowa’s average proficiencies on prose, document, 
and quantitative literacy all exceeded the Midwest averages in those categories (Jenkins & 
Kirsch, 1994, Figure 1).  These figures would support the notion of high adult literacy in 
Iowa compared to the rest of the nation. 
19
 There are two main sources for Iowa City having the country’s highest educated population:  
an article in Utne Reader entitled “The 10 Most Enlightened Towns in America” (Walljasper, 
1997) that was also reported in the Cedar Rapids Gazette (Muller, 1997); and a data set from 
the 2000 U.S. Census (Appendix H) provided by Beth Henning, Census Specialist at the 
State Library of Iowa.   
20
  See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-789 (1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting in part); 
Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 578-580 (1981); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 
505-506 (1957) (Harlan, J. dissenting). 
21
 See the following books of the Bible (King James Version):  Numbers 14: 6-7; Deuteronomy 
1: 28-30; Joshua 23: 6-10; 1 Samuel 17: 26, 33-37, 45-47; 2 Samuel 10: 11-12; 1 Chronicles 
19: 12-13; 1 Chronicles 28: 20; Job 38: 3; Job 40:7. 
22
 See Brogan, pp. 288-323; Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); and Woodward, pp. 11-
29. 
23
 Political analyst and historian Garry Wills highlighted the role of the Three-fifths Clause of 
the Constitution as a critical factor in Southern dominance of the federal government.  Early 
on, northern legislators understood the key role that the Three-fifths Clause would play in 
sectional politics.  From an early senatorial appeal to New Hampshire constituents, Wills 
quoted Senator William Plumer’s explanation of the Clause’s implications (“Impartialis” 
[William Plumer], An Address to the Electors of New Hampshire, 1804, cited in Lynn W. 
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Turner, William Plumer of New Hampshire, 1759-1850 [University of North Carolina Press, 
1962], p. 146): 
  
Every five of the Negro slaves are accounted equal to three of you …  
Those slaves have no voice in the elections; they are mere property; yet 
a planter possessing a hundred of them may be considered as having 
sixty votes, while one of you who has equal or greater property is 
confined to a single vote.  (Wills, 2003, p. 3) 
 
Referencing Andrew Jackson’s victory over John Q. Adams, Wills noted figures developed 
by another historian (Leonard L. Richards, The Life and Times of Congressman John Quincy 
Adams [Oxford University Press, 1986], p. 15): 
 
Thanks to the mechanics of the electoral college and the three-fifths rule, 
Jackson’s 200,000 southern supporters provided him with far more help, 
man for man, than some 400,000 northerners [for Adams]: 105 electoral 
votes as compared with 73.  (Wills, 2003, pp. 202-203) 
 
Wills provided more information about the extra representation granted southerners courtesy 
their slaves when discussing Adams efforts in the House of Representatives to defeat a gag 
rule that would prohibit any petitions discussing the abolition of slavery from being 
presented to Congress.  Citing a different historian (William Lee Miller, Arguing about 
Slavery: John Quincy Adams and the Great Battle in the United States Congress [Viking 
Press, 1998], pp. 306-307), Wills quoted: 
 
Adams would have won except for his parallel hate, the three-fifths 
clause.  In a House apportioned on the one-white-man, one-vote basis, 
southerners would not have had the 19 representatives received for black 
non-citizens in 1840.  The slave power needed most of those 19 boosts 
in power to pass the latest gag rule by six votes.  (Wills, 2003, p. 220) 
 
Discussing the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 and its passage by a mere thirteen votes, Wills 
quoted from yet a third historian to provide further illumination into the operation of the 
Three-fifths Clause of the Constitution (William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion, Vol. 1, 
Secessionists at Bay, 1777-1854 [Oxford University Press, 1990], p. 559): 
 
The slave power’s extra representatives aided Northern Democrats in 
securing the minority’s legislation.  Because every five slaves counted as 
three votes in apportioning House representatives, southerners received 
19 more seats than a one-white-man, one-vote egalitarian republic would 
have provided.  The slave power needed a third of those extra votes to 
pass Kansas-Nebraska.  Anti-Nebraska forces had yet another reason to 
denounce the rape of republicanism.  (Wills, 2003, p. 225) 
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Finally, free laborers and farmers in Northern states did not begin to view slavery as an 
economic threat to their well-being until after the Mexican War (Brogan, pp. 306-323). 
24
 Dorr then filed for a writ of habeas corpus, but in Ex parte Dorr, the U.S. Supreme Court 
refused to hear the plea “because the federal writ [of habeas corpus] did not reach state 
constitutions” (Hall, 1992, p. 516). 
25
 The office of solicitor general was set forth by Congress in 1870 “when Congress created the 
Department of Justice” (Hall, 1992, p. 803).  Congressional intent was to provide assistance 
for the attorney general by creating a position that would represent “the United States 
wherever the government had an interest in litigation” (Hall, 1992, p. 803).  Besides serving 
in the Justice Department, the solicitor general “also has chambers in the Supreme Court” 
(Hall, 1992, p. 803).   
 Out of all the federal government’s officials, only the solicitor general is required by law to 
be “learned in the law” (Hall, 1992, 803).  The solicitor general “is the chief courtroom 
lawyer for the executive branch” and “is the only amicus curiae regularly given time to 
argue” (Hall, 1992, p. 803).  When arguing cases before the Court, the solicitor general 
dresses “in formal swallowtail, striped trousers, and pearl gray vest, an age-old tradition for 
attorneys representing the United States,” because such “attire was meant to symbolize ‘the 
dignity of the United States in arguments before the Supreme Court’” (Gormley, p. 149).   
 All petitions for a writ of certiorari submitted to the Court from federal agencies must first 
pass through the office of the solicitor general who typically forwards only one out of six 
submitted as the “justices rely heavily on the solicitor general to help choose and present the 
most pressing cases for review” (Hall, 1992, p. 803).  While the Court grants certiorari to 
“only 3 percent submitted by other lawyers across the country,” the Court grants about “80 
percent of the certiorari petitions submitted by the solicitor general” (Hall, 1992, p. 803).  
The Court also relies on the solicitor general “for help on legal problems that appear 
especially vexing” by inviting “him to submit briefs in cases where the executive branch is 
not a party” (Hall, 1992, p. 803).  In these latter instances the Court’s “justices expect him to 
look beyond the government’s narrow interests, to take a long view about the development of 
legal doctrine” (Hall, 1992, p. 803).  In these ways the solicitor general serves as the 
“conscience of the government” (Gormley, p. 143). 
26
 After the Sipuel case, Houston’s primary role changed from arguing cases himself to that of 
coordinating attorney representation and serving in an advisory capacity.  On August 27, 
1949, fatigued by a heart condition, Houston wrote to Robert L. Carter, First Assistant 
Special Counsel for the NAACP, about the change.  Houston wrote, “These education cases 
are now tight sufficiently so that anyone familiar with the course of the decisions should be 
able to guide the cases through.  You and Thurgood can proceed without any fear of crossing 
any plans I might have” (McNeil, p. 200).  The letter was written slightly more than a month 
before Houston was hospitalized and diagnosed for “acute myocardial infarction” in October, 
1949 (McNeil, p. 193).  Houston had approximately eight more months to live before he 
would die of a heart attack on April 22, 1950 (McNeil, p. 211). 
27
 To illustrate the original literary rendering of a dilemma from which there is no escape, the 
dilemma given the name of the novel in which it appeared, the following selection is 
presented: 
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 Yossarian looked at him soberly and tried another approach.  “Is Orr 
crazy?” 
 “He sure is,” Doc Daneeka said. 
 “Can you ground him?” 
 “I sure can.  But first he has to ask me to.  That’s part of the rule.” 
 “Then why doesn’t he ask you to?” 
 “Because he’s crazy,” Doc Daneeka said.  “He has to be crazy to 
keep flying combat missions after all the close calls he’s had.  Sure, I 
can ground Orr.  But first he has to ask me to.” 
 “That’s all he has to do to be grounded?” 
 “That’s all.  Let him ask me.” 
 “And then you can ground him?” Yossarian asked. 
 “No.  Then I can’t ground him.” 
 “You mean there’s a catch?” 
 “Sure there’s a catch,” Doc Daneeka replied.  “Catch-22.  Anyone 
who wants to get out of combat duty isn’t really crazy.” 
 There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified 
that a concern for one’s own safety in the face of dangers that were real 
and immediate was the process of a rational mind.  Orr was crazy and 
could be grounded.  All he had to do was ask; and as soon as he did, he 
would no longer be crazy and would have to fly more missions.  Orr 
would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he didn’t, but if he was 
sane he had to fly them.  If he flew them he was crazy and didn’t have 
to; but if he didn’t want to he was sane and had to.  (Heller, p. 52) 
 
28
 The following is based on Clinton Rossiter’s edition of The Federalist Papers which is listed 
in the references.  John Jay wrote five of the articles (numbers 2-5 & 64).  James Madison 
authored twenty-six of the articles (numbers 10, 14, 37-58, & 62-63).  Alexander Hamilton 
wrote fifty-one of the articles (numbers 1, 6-9, 11-13, 15-17, 21-36, 59-61, & 65-85).  
Hamilton and Madison co-authored three articles (numbers 18-20). 
29
 Cited from Jacques Necker, A Treatise on the Administration of the Finances of France 
(Translated by Thomas Mortimer, 3 vols., London, 1785), p. xxx. 
30
 See the following: Brogan, pp. 264-265; Elkins & McKitrick, pp. 112 & 115-119; and 
McDonald, pp. 146, 163-166, 177, & 189. 
31
 See Benton, I: 282, 303; Elkins & McKitrick, p. 51; Ketcham, pp. 288-289; McDonald, p. 
130. 
32
 See Federalist No. 44, pp. 251-253; Banning, p. 329; McDonald, p. 201. 
33
 Boudinot’s comments in response to Madison’s challenge of the bank bill’s constitutionality 
occurred on Friday, February 4, 1791.  Prior to reading excerpts from Federalist No. 44, 
Boudinot remarked that another congressman had brought forth incomplete remarks from 
that same document whose author was “alleged … to be also the author of the present plan 
before the House” (Benton, I: 290).   
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34
 See Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 159, 206 (1819); 
see also p. 360 of this paper. 
35
 For the Virginia Resolutions, see PJM, 17, pp. 188-190.  For the Kentucky Resolutions, see 
Peterson, 449-456.  For historical discussion, see the following:  Brogan, pp. 269-270; Elkins 
& McKitrick, pp. 719-721; Ketcham, pp. 395-400; and Wills, 2002, pp. 48-49.  
36
 Ironically, Madison’s behavior precipitated the events culminating in Marbury v. Madison, a 
case, which in most Americans’ minds, officially established judicial review, a concept that 
Madison had rejected in authoring the Virginia Resolutions.  Marbury proved to be ironic for 
Madison in another sense as well.  The man later dubbed “The Father of the Constitution” 
was judged by the U.S. Supreme Court to have violated the law in this constitutional 
landmark case.  William Marbury, a Federalist, had been appointed to be a justice of the 
peace in the last days of President John Adams administration.  Marbury’s appointment, 
signed by President Adams and stamped with the seal of the United States by the outgoing 
secretary of state, remained undelivered when the incoming secretary of state, James 
Madison, took office.  Madison refused to deliver the commission whereupon Marbury filed 
suit.  In its opinion, the Court ruled that Marbury had been legally appointed and that 
Madison’s action in withholding Marbury’s commission was “not warranted by law” and 
violated “a vested legal right” (5 U.S. 137, 162). 
37
 This is one of several cases from the early days of our country in which the written opinion 
of the case has not been located.  Evidence for this case “includes a series of petitions 
introduced in the New Jersey legislature” that denounced the high court’s ruling that 
invalidated the state law (Gerber, p. 15, n. 1). 
38
 This is another case in which the court’s written decision has not been located.  Evidence 
consists of resolutions condemning the court’s decision that were passed by the Rhode Island 
legislature, newspaper accounts suggesting that most judges approved of the court’s handling 
of the case, and a detailed account of the case by the attorney, James Varnum, who argued 
the case for the merchants challenging the constitutionality of the state law.  See Varnum, 
J.M. (1787), The Case, Trevett Against Weeden: On Information and Complaint for Refusing 
Paper Bills in Payment for Butcher’s Meat, in Market, at Par with Specie.  See also, Gerber, 
pp. 9-10. 
39
 Even as a co-author of The Federalist, Madison was still promoting a variation on his 
original proposal (which was deliberately rejected by the Convention, see Appendix L)  for a 
Council of Revision that would have an absolute veto on congressional action.  In Number 
51, Madison advocated remedying the “defect of an absolute negative” through an added 
executive-Senate role: 
 
An absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the 
natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed….  
May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some 
qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker 
branch of the stronger department…  (Federalist No. 51, p. 291) 
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 As one historian assessed Madison’s position, “[His] plan would [have made] the Court far 
more intrusive in the passage of legislation than the existing Court has ever been or 
pretended to be” (Wills, 1981/2001, p. 155).  Wills concluded: 
 
It cannot be said that the Madison of The Federalist opposed judicial 
activism, though some have taken certain words out of context to 
maintain this.  His own plan would have been the greatest nightmare 
possible for those who have twisted his words in that fashion.  (Wills, 
1981/2001, p. 155) 
  
 A constitutional historian likewise summarized Madison’s position in the following manner: 
 
The Madisonian scheme had profound implications for the development 
of judicial power.  Madison convinced the delegates that because the 
people formed the sovereign base for all of the government, the branches 
of government could be separated on the basis of function.  The new 
Constitution elevated the judiciary to a position of equality with the 
other branches, a status it had not previously enjoyed….  The 
Madisonian vision of constitutional democracy demanded an active 
judiciary capable of sustaining common national interests over the 
parochial wishes of the states, while preserving minority property rights 




 Regarding The Federalist, it is interesting to note that Hamilton is the sole author of the 
primary articles focused upon the judiciary and the major author (by an overwhelming 
majority) in terms of discussing the concept of judicial review.  Six articles of The Federalist 
contain the term “judiciary” in their title – Numbers 78 through 83.  All were authored by 
Hamilton.  Only one other article contains the term “judiciary” in the subheadings of the 
articles in the table of contents – Number 22 – which was also written by Hamilton.  Given 
the criteria of having the term “judiciary” in either the main title or the subheadings, Madison 
wrote no articles focused upon the judiciary.  The concept of judicial review was noted in six 
different index citations involving the following five articles of The Federalist:  Numbers 16 
(p. 85), 78 (pp. 433-440), 80 (p. 444), 81 (pp. 450-451), all written by Hamilton, and Number 
44 (p. 254), written by Madison. 
41
 Montesquieu’s full thoughts on the subject, from which Hamilton selected only a phrase, 
were: 
 
 When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same 
person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; 
because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate 
should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. 
 Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated 
from the legislative and executive.  Were it joined with the legislative, 
the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; 
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for the judge would be then the legislator.  Were it joined to the 
executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression.  
(Montesquieu, 1748/2002, Book XI, § 6, pp. 151-152) 
 
42
 Madison had been elected as a delegate to the Virginia ratification convention on March 25, 
1788.  He arrived in Richmond on June 2nd to attend the convention, which had begun 
meeting that day, and immediately began leading the campaign for ratification.  On June 20, 
as the convention debated the judiciary, “Pendleton, Randolph, and Marshall, all experts in 
legal matters, carried the main burden.  Madison intervened only to explain the view taken of 
the judicial power at the Philadelphia convention” (Ketcham, p. 261).  See also Ketcham, pp. 
251, 253-259, 261-264.    
43
 Senators who were Convention delegates and voted in favor of the act included: John Blair, 
VA; Oliver Ellsworth, CT; William Johnson, CT; Robert Morris, PA; Richard Bassett, DE; 
William Few, GA; George Read, DE; and Caleb Strong, MA (Beard, pp. 19, 21, 44-45, 48, & 
50; Annals of Congress, 1, p. 51).  Two senators who were Convention delegates and voted 
against the Judiciary Act of 1789 were:  Pierce Butler, SC; and John Langdon, NH (Beard, p. 
54).  What is not known are their reasons for voting against the act since neither had voiced 
opposition to judicial review during the Convention.  Nor did they record their reasons for 
opposing the Judiciary Act.  Butler and Langdon could have instead favored the federal court 
model put forth by Virginia Senator Richard Henry Lee by which the federal court system 
would have consisted of only “a few admiralty judges scattered among seaports, dealing with 
maritime matters, and a single appellate Supreme Court (Hall, 1992, p. 472).  If so, their 
opposition to the Judiciary Act would have been based upon opposition to the proposed 
model, not upon dislike of judicial review.  The reason for their opposition, however, remains 
in the realm of conjecture.  
44
 According to Madison, the Attorney General’s “coadjutor” succeeded only in raising “a fog 
around the subject, and … inculcat[ing] a respect for the Court for preceding sanctions in a 
doubtful case” (Madison’s letter of March 6, 1796, to Jefferson; quoted  in Warren, p. 149; 
see also PJM, 16, p. 247).  As can be seen, Madison’s opinion was quite different from that 
of others who witnessed Hamilton’s appearance.  Besides referencing Justice Iredell’s 
impression of Hamilton, Warren also quoted a newspaper account of Hamilton’s argument 
before the Court which reported “that Mr. Hamilton ‘by his eloquence, candour and law 
knowledge has drawn applause from many who had been in the habit of reviling him’” 
(Warren, p. 149, n. 1).  Warren also recounted Justice Story’s  impressions of Hamilton’s 
legal abilities that he gained from others’ accounts.  According to Story, “I have heard 
Samuel Dexter, John Marshall, and Chancellor Livingston say that Hamilton’s reach of 
thought was so far beyond theirs that by his side they were schoolboys – rush tapers before 
the sun at noon day” (Warren, p. 149, n. 1).  Warren also quoted another newspaper account 
of Hamilton’s appearance before the Court: 
 
[T]he whole of his argument was clear, impressive and classical.  The 
audience, which was very numerous and among whom were many 
foreigners of distinction and many of the Members of Congress, testified 
the effect produced by the talents of this great orator and statesman.  
(Warren, p. 148) 
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45
 It is somewhat ironic that Madison, as one of the joint authors of The Federalist Papers, used 
the concept of the state interposing itself to defeat congressional actions.  That concept is one 
that he and others had found to be a fault of the Articles of Confederation.  Furthermore, it 
was presented as a fault that the new Constitution corrected through judicial review in 
Federalist No. 16, authored by Hamilton. 
 
If the interposition of the State legislatures be necessary to give effect to 
a measure of the Union, they have only NOT TO ACT, or TO ACT 
EVASIVELY, and the measure is defeated…. 
But if the execution of the laws of the national government should not 
require the intervention of the State legislatures, if they were to pass into 
immediate operation upon the citizens themselves, the particular 
governments could not interrupt their progress without an open and 
violent exertion of an unconstitutional power….  If the judges were not 
embarked in a conspiracy with the legislature, they would pronounce the 
resolutions of such a majority to be contrary to the supreme law of the 
land, unconstitutional, and void.  (Federalist No. 16, pp. 84 & 85) 
 
46
 The practices complained of by Madison and noted by other constitutional delegates “were 
widespread … under the views then obtaining of ‘legislative power,’” according to Professor 
Corwin (Corwin, 1925, p. 515).  Corwin also noted that one didn’t have “far to seek” in order 
to get at “the explanation of such views” (Corwin, 1925, p. 515).  Professor Corwin 
continued: 
 
Coke’s fusion of what we should to-day distinguish as “legislative” and 
“judicial” powers in the case of the “High Court of Parliament” 
represented the teaching of the highest of all legal authorities before 
Blackstone appeared on the scene.  What is equally important, the 
Cokian doctrine corresponded exactly to the contemporary necessities of 
many of the colonies in the earlier days of their existence.  (Corwin, 
1925, p. 515) 
 
 Coke, of course, was Sir Edward Coke, who “was best known to our ancestors as the 
commentator on Littleton’s Tenures” (Corwin, 1965, p. 41).  Corwin continued by citing 
Thomas Jefferson’s homage to Coke. 
 
“Coke’s Lyttleton [sic],” wrote Jefferson many years afterward with 
reference to the pre-Revolutionary period, “was the universal lawbook 
of students, and a sounder Whig never wrote, nor of profounder learning 
in the orthodox doctrines of the British Constitution, or in what was 
called British liberties.”  (Corwin, 1965, pp. 41-42) 
 
 Tracing Coke’s career in English law, Professor Corwin stated: 
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Before he was a commentator on the law of England, however, Coke 
was successively law reporter, crown attorney, chief justice of the 
Common Pleas, chief justice of the King’s Bench, and member of 
Parliament; and always he was Edward Coke, an outstanding, aggressive 
personality, with a fixed determination to make himself mightily felt in 
whatever place of authority he might occupy.  (Corwin, 1965, p. 42) 
 
 Corwin observed of Coke: 
 
While Coke as attorney general had shown himself conspicuously 
subservient to the royal interest, his clashes as judge with James I make 
a notable chapter in judicial history.  His basic doctrine was “that the 
King hath no prerogative, but that which the law and the land follows,” 
and that of this the judges and not the king were the authorized 
interpreters.  (Corwin, 1965, pp. 42-43) 
 
 Being introduced to Coke and being aware of his influence with American politicians and 
lawyers still doesn’t explain his fusion of legislative and judicial functions resulting in the 
abuses complained of by Madison.  According to Corwin, Coke’s writings “classified 
Parliament as primarily a court, albeit a court which may make new law as well as declare 
the old” (Emphasis in original) (Corwin, 1965, p. 55).  As Corwin assessed Coke’s writings, 
“Clearly, what we have here exemplified is not legislative sovereignty, but rather entire 
absence of the modern distinction between legislation and adjudication” (Corwin, 1965, p. 
56).  As a result, in the early days of our nation, state constitutions claimed to be operating on 
the basis of the separation of powers, but state legislatures actually operated as miniature 
parliaments that combined legislative and judicial functions.   
 However, not all states waited for the Constitutional Convention to remedy legislative 
violations of the state constitutions.  John Adams and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
reformed the previous fusion of legislative and judicial functions in the Massachusetts 
Constitution of 1780 in which they spelled out how the concept of the separation of powers 
actually worked.  Article XXX of the Massachusetts Constitution, which was approved on 
March 2, 1780, stated: 
 
In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department 
shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: 
The executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or 
either of them: The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and 
executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government 
of laws and not of men. 
 
 This answer to the problem of state legislative tyranny embedded Montesquieu’s doctrine of 
the Separation of Powers into a constitutional requirement for institutional practice in order 
to provide “a government of laws and not of men” as an answer to Aristotle’s question posed 
more than 2,000 years previously (See n. # 67).  An observer of the widespread practice of 
state legislatures to fuse both legislative and judicial functions criticized the American 
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constitutions as representing “an unreasonable imitation of the usages of England” (Corwin, 
1925, p. 520).  In response, John Adams wrote his Defence of the Constitutions that, as 
described by Corwin, “was much less a ‘defence’ than an exhortation to constitutional reform 
in other states along the lines which Massachusetts had already taken under Adams’s own 
guidance” (Corwin, 1925, p. 520).  The Defence of the Constitutions impacted the delegates 
to the Constitutional Convention.  According to Corwin, “Copies of the Defence reached the 
United States early in 1787, and were circulated among the members of the Philadelphia 
Convention, reviving and freshening belief in ‘political science’ and particularly in the 
teachings of Montesquieu” (Corwin, 1925, p. 520). 
47
 Madison’s principle biographers attempt to make much of the fact that Madison disapproved 
of the use of the term “nullification,” thus attempting to distance him somewhat from it and 
from being a state rights advocate; this is derived from two incidents (see Ketcham, p. 396; 
Wills, 2002, p. 49).  First, Madison wrote Jefferson on December 29, 1798, asking him: 
 
Have you ever considered thoroughly the distinction between the power 
of the State, & that of the Legislature, on questions relating to the 
federal pact.  On the supposition that the former is clearly the ultimate 
judge of infractions, it does not follow that the latter is the legitimate 
organ especially as a Convention was the organ by which the Compact 
was made.  This was a reason of great weight for using general 
expressions that would leave to other States a choice of all the modes 
possible of concurring in the substance, and would shield the Genl. 
Assembly agst. the charge of Usurpation in the very act of protesting 
agst the usurpations of Congress.  (Emphasis Madison’s) (PJM, 17, pp. 
191-192) 
 
 Second, Madison objected to attempts by John Taylor and Jefferson to insert the phrase “null, 
void, and of no effect” after the word “unconstitutional” in the Virginia Resolutions, and they 
were withdrawn (Ketcham, p. 397; see also Smith, p. 1071).  According to Ketcham, 
Madison displayed an “astute understanding of constitutional pitfalls” which permitted the 
Virginia Resolutions to be more moderate and shun “the centrifugal tendencies of the more 
categorical resolves Jefferson had sent to Kentucky” (Ketcham, p. 397).  Such attempts to 
split the two collaborators ignore at least two considerations.  First, Madison wrote his letter 
to Jefferson well after the Kentucky Resolutions had passed and well after he had seen copies 
of Jefferson’s draft and the resolution as passed by the Kentucky legislature.  According to 
data provided by Ketcham, Madison had a copy of the former several weeks before writing 
Jefferson his concern – no earlier than mid-October and no later than mid-November 
(Ketcham, p. 395).  Second, although he didn’t like to openly refer to nullification, he did 
call for the states to “interpose” themselves between their citizens and an unconstitutional 
action by the federal government.  Perhaps being obtuse instead of clearly stating a position 
makes one a better politician, but it does not make Madison any less a state rights person at 
the time, nor does it excuse the use made later of his arguments by southern nullifiers and 
secessionists.  Third, he did defend the idea of the Constitution as being a compact among the 
states (Ketcham, p. 396) and not springing from the people (although he had been 
instrumental in ensuring that popularly elected conventions, not state legislatures, acted to 
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ratify the Constitution).  Fourth, the other states in the Union made no such distinction at the 
time between the two sets of resolutions, liking neither one. 
48
 These states, categorized according to the type of resistance offered by their state 
legislatures, are provided below, alphabetized within each category (See Woodward, pp. 156-
157): 
 
 Nullification   Interposition  Condemnation/Protest 
 
 Alabama Louisiana North Carolina 
 Georgia Virginia South Carolina 
 Mississippi  
 
49
 See Hall, 1985, p. 3.  His investigation of judicial review resulted in a determination that the 
Constitutional Framers: 
 
created a constitution that was meant to be a charter for government for 
government rather than a legalistic code of government operations.  
They expected each branch of the government to function in broad 
spheres of constitutional responsibility, and they anticipated that the 
justices would participate in establishing the boundaries of the new 
system.  (Hall, 1985, p. 3) 
 
50
 See Alexander Hamilton’s opinion regarding the constitutionality of the First Bank of the 
United States that he submitted to President Washington on February 23, 1791  (PAH, 8: 
107).  See the following pages of this paper: for the context of Hamilton’s opinion, pp. 279-
312; for Hamilton’s remark, p. 312; for Chief Justice Marshall’s use of Hamilton’s remark in 
McCullough v. Maryland, p. 360; for a subsequent Court’s paraphrase in United States v. 
Darby of Marshall’s paraphrase in McCullough v. Maryland of Hamilton’s legal opinion, p. 
394; for the Court’s use in Atlanta Motel v. United States of Darby’s paraphrase of Chief 
Justice Marshall’s paraphrase of Hamilton, p. 594. 
51
 In Hoke v. United States the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an act of Congress 
that prohibited the transportation of women in interstate commerce for the purpose of 
prostitution.  The popular name for the act was the “White Slave Traffic Act.”  See Hammer 
v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 at 270 (1918).  Unfortunately this act was used against Jack 
Johnson, a Black heavyweight boxing champion, because white racists didn’t like his 
consorting with white women. 
52
 The states included Arizona, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming (426 U.S. 833, 836).  States actually 
submitting briefs for argument before the Court were the following states:  Arizona (Bruce 
Babbitt, A.G.), California, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa (Richard Turner, A.G.), Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri (John Danforth, A.G.), Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota (Bill Janklow, A.G.), 
Texas, Utah, and Wyoming; they were joined by the National Association of Counties, the 
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National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, and the Public Service Research Council (426 
U.S., at 834).  States filing briefs of amici curiae urging the Court to rule against the 1974 
FLSA amendments were New York and Virginia (426 U.S., at 835).  States filing briefs of 
amici curiae urging the Court to uphold the Act’s amendments included Alabama, Colorado, 
Michigan, and Minnesota; they were joined by the AFL-CIO, Coalition of American Public 
Employees, International Conference of Police Associations, and the Florida Police 
Benevolent Association (426 U.S., at 835).   
53
 Unlike previous Court opinions, this opinion did not separately present the legal arguments 
made by either the appellee or the appellant attorneys.  That the Solicitor General cited 
precedents in his arguments to the Court on behalf of the federal government is inferred from 
two facts: first, the thrust of part of his arguments are summarized by the majority opinion; 
second, the nature of legal arguments requires case citations of holdings and dicta used to 
support attorney argumentation of a legal position. 
54
 Rehnquist was referring to “regulations proposed by appellee [the federal government]” 
which stated that “whether individuals are indeed ‘volunteers’ rather than ‘employees’ 
subject to the minimum wage provisions of the Act [were] questions to be decided by the 
courts’ (p. 850).  Rehnquist then cited “Brief for Appellee 49, and n. 41,” which was of no 
use since the applicable material was not included in a footnote, which customarily happened 
in other case opinions (p. 850). 
55
 § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads, “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article” (Farrand, IV, p. 99). 
56
 Interestingly, Justice Brennan’s dissent in National League of Cities v. Usery linked the two 
cases, Hammer v. Dagenhart and Carter v. Carter Coal Co.  See 426 U.S. 833, 867-868. 
57
 Justice O’Connor joined the Court on September 25, 1981 (Hall, 1992, p. 987.  Thus, FERC 
was argued during her first term on the bench, the October Term, 1981.  Consequently, her 
dissent in FERC constituted one of her first Supreme Court opinions.  As will be shown in 
the remainder of this note, O’Connor’s dissent was marked by the use of propaganda 
techniques, or as Justice Blackmun referred to them, “rhetorical devices” (p. 767, n. 30).  It is 
simply too difficult to argue with Justice Blackmun’s assessments and characterizations of 
her dissenting opinion.  Some (but not all) examples follow, placed in the order in which they 
appeared in Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion.  First: 
 
Justice O’Connor reviews the constitutional history at some length, 
ultimately deriving the proposition that the Framers intended to deny the 
Federal Government the authority to exercise “military or legislative 
power over state governments” …  If Justice O’Connor means this 
rhetorical assertion to be taken literally, it is demonstrably incorrect.  
(pp. 761-762, n. 25) 
 
 Next, Justice Blackmun observed, “It seems evident that Congress intended to defer to state 
prerogatives – and expertise – in declining to pre-empt the utilities field entirely” (p. 765, n. 
29).  After some further discussion of the issue, he remarked: 
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Justice O’Connor’s partial dissent’s response to this is peculiar.  On the 
one hand, she suggests that the States might prefer that Congress simply 
pre-empt the field, since that “would leave them free to exercise their 
power in other areas.”  Yet Justice O’Connor elsewhere acknowledges 
the importance of utilities regulation to the States … and emphasizes 
that local experimentation and self-determination are essential aspects of 
the federal system….  Certainly, it is a curious type of federalism that 
encourages Congress to pre-empt a field entirely, when its preference is 
to let the States retain the primary regulatory role.  (p. 765, n. 29) 
 
 Next, Justice Blackmun cited examples of name calling, reasoning from a false premise, 
exaggerated claims, etc., from Justice O’Connor’s dissent.  He then continued: 
 
While these rhetorical devices make for absorbing reading, they 
unfortunately are substituted for useful constitutional analysis.  For 
while Justice O’Connor articulates a view of state sovereignty that is 
almost mystical, she entirely fails to address our central point. 
 
The partial dissent does not quarrel with the propositions that Congress 
may pre-empt the States in the regulation of private conduct, that 
Congress may condition the validity of State enactments in a pre-
emptible area on their conformity with federal law, and that Congress 
may attempt to “coerce” the States into enacting nationally desirable 
legislation.  Given this, the partial dissent fails to identify precisely what 
is “absurd” about a scheme that gives the States a choice….  [T]he 
partial dissent has pointed to no constitutionally significant theoretical 
distinction…  (pp. 767-768, n. 30) 
 
 Finally, Justice Blackmun addressed some accusations made by O’Connor that were 
misrepresentative and untrue. 
 
Justice O’Connor’s partial dissent accuses us of undervaluing National 
League of Cities, and maintains that our analysis permits Congress to 
“dictate the agendas and meeting places of state legislatures.”  …These 
apocalyptic observations, while striking, are overstated and patently 
inaccurate[emphasis mine].  We hold only that Congress may impose 
conditions on the State’s regulation of private conduct in a pre-emptible 
area.  (Emphasis added) (pp. 769-770, n. 32) 
 
58
 See Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the unanimous Court in McCullough v. Maryland, 
17 U.S. 159, 198-199 (1819), which emphatically dismissed the states’ rights view of the 
Constitution as a compact between the states.  See also the following pages of this paper:  for 
Hamilton’s argument in The Federalist in favor of the people as the source of constitutional 
sovereignty, pp. 327-329; for Attorney Pinkney’s arguments in McCullough v. Maryland in 
favor of the people as the source of constitutional sovereignty, p. 360; for the view of the 
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Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions in favor of the states as the source of constitutional 
sovereignty, pp. 322, 342-343, 347; for the Court’s McCullough ruling against the 
Constitution as a compact of the states, pp. 367-368. 
59
 In its opinion, the Court explained the difference between “registered” bonds and “bearer” 
bonds as flowing from “the mechanisms used for transferring ownership and making 
payments” (p. 508).  According to the Court: 
 
Ownership of a registered bond [emphasis mine] is recorded on a 
central list, and a transfer of record ownership requires entering the 
change on that list.  The record owner automatically receives interest 
payments by check or electronic transfer of funds from the issuer’s 
paying agent.  (p. 508) 
  
 Bearer bonds, however, operate through a different process.  As explained by the Court: 
 
Ownership of a bearer bond [emphasis mine], in contrast, is presumed 
from possession and is transferred by physically handing over the bond.  
The bondowner obtains interest payments by presenting bond coupons to 




 For Justice Rehnquist’s use of the quote in National League of Cities v. Usery, see 426 U.S. 
833, 844 (1976).  For Justice Brennan’s disbelief at a quote being completely removed from 
its context by Rehnquist, see 426 U.S. 833, n. 8 at 867-868.  See also the following pages of 
this paper:  for the case summary of Texas v. White (1869) under the case law of the 
Guarantee Clause, pp. 124-126; for Rehnquist’s use of the Texas v. White dicta in the 
National League of Cities majority opinion, p. 413; for Brennan’s criticism of Rehnquist’s 
use of the Texas dicta in Brennan’s dissent from the National League of Cities ruling, p. 425; 
for subsequent use of the Texas dicta by Scalia in Printz v. United States (1997), p. 501; for 
an analysis of the multiple misuses of the dicta in Texas v. White by various justices as a 
propaganda technique, pp. 508-510. 
61
 The Hamilton quote is found on p. 76 of the 1999 C. Rossiter (Ed.) edition. 
62
 That Madison’s Virginia Plan as presented by Randolph to the Convention meant to replace 
rather than amend the Articles while Patterson’s New Jersey Plan aimed at keeping the 
Articles of Confederation except for the amendments he proposed can be demonstrated by 
several points.  First, the wording of Resolution 1 in each proposal.  Both contained the 
phrase “corrected and enlarged” in reference to the Articles of Confederation.  The New 
Jersey Plan, however, added the word “revised” to immediately precede “corrected and 
enlarged (Farrand, I, pp. 20, 242).  Second, the only reference to the Articles of 
Confederation, by full name, in the Virginia Plan occurs in the first resolution.  By contrast, 
Patterson’s New Jersey Plan refers to the Articles of Confederation in Resolutions 1, 2, 3, 
and 6.  Third, the content of each plan supports the contention that the Virginia Plan meant to 
replace the Articles while the New Jersey Plan sought only to amend the Articles.  Finally, 
Patterson and Lansing’s remarks in support of the New Jersey Plan at the Convention support 
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the contention.  Speaking the day after the plan was presented, Lansing of New York noted 
the fault of the Virginia Plan, that in seeking to replace the Articles it exceeded the “power of 
the Convention” to “discuss & propose it” (Farrand, I, p. 249).  Lansing noted the 
congressional authorization of the Convention as well as that of the several states in 
restraining “the power of the Convention … to amendments of a federal nature” (Farrand, I, 
p. 249).  Patterson expressed his preference for the New Jersey Plan “because it accorded … 
with the powers of the Convention” (Farrand, I, p. 250).  The next statement implicated what 
Patterson believed to be both the shortcoming of the Virginia Plan and the strength of the 
New Jersey Plan: “If the confederacy was radically wrong, let us return to our States, and 
obtain larger powers, not assume them of ourselves” (Farrand, I, p. 250). 
63
 See the following:  SAI Report, 2001, p. 1; School Administrators of Iowa, 2002, p. 1; 
Schemo, 2001, p. A32; Christensen, 2003, pp. 1-3, 21; Stilwill, 2003, p. 2; Rothstein, 2002, 
p. B10; Anderson, December 11, 2001.    
64
 Article VIII of the Articles of Confederation read in part: 
 
All charges of war, and all other expences [sic] that shall be incurred for 
the common defence [sic] or general welfare, and allowed by the united 
states in congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common 
treasury, which shall be supplied by the several states … according to 
such mode as the united states in congress assembled, shall from time to 
time direct and appoint.  The taxes … shall be laid and levied … within 
the time agreed upon by the united states in congress assembled.  
(Rossiter, p. 354) 
 
Article IX of the Articles read in part: 
 
The united states in congress assembled shall also have the sole and 
exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and value of coin 
struck by their own authority, or by that of the respective states.  
(Rossiter, p. 356) 
 
Another paragraph of Article IX also read: 
 
The united states in congress assembled shall have authority … to 
ascertain the necessary sums of Money to be raised for the service of the 
united states, and to appropriate… - to agree upon the number of land 
forces, and to make requisitions from each state for its quota … which 
requisition shall be binding, and thereupon the legislature of each state 
shall appoint…  (Rossiter, pp. 356-357) 
 
65
 For previous discussion in this paper regarding the multiple misuses of the Texas v. White 
quotation by various justices as a propaganda technique, see the following pages:  for the 
actual context in which the original dicta was used in Texas v. White, pp. 118-119; for 
Rehnquist’s use in National League of Cities v. Usery, pp. 398-399; for Brennan’s reaction to 
Rehnquist’s misuse of the quote in his National League of Cities dissent, pp. 409-410; for 
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O’Connor’s use in New York v. United States, pp. 445-446; for Scalia’s use in Printz, pp. 
481, 488-490.   
66
 The immediate context occurred in a play written by Hamlet, in which a character went to 
great lengths to state that if her husband died, she would never remarry.  Given the 
vehemence of Scalia’s response in the note, and given Scalia’s response to one possible use 
of a propaganda technique by someone differing from him when he was guilty of multiple 
uses of the same technique (even to the point of repeating the same technique with the same 
quotation on two separate occasions), one could also be reminded of another line from 
Shakespeare’s Macbeth:  “[I]t is a tale Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, Signifying 
nothing” (Act V, Scene v, Line 17). 
67
 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provides interest from another standpoint as well.  It 
forms one of the links of an ancient chain identified by a professor of constitutional law, 
Edward S. Corwin.  The chain consists of responses to a fundamental legal and political 
question, the answer to which constitutes the cornerstone of constitutional democratic forms 
of government.  The question, first posed in written form by Aristotle in his Politics, asked, 
“Which is preferable in government, the rule of law or the rule of an individual?” Aristotle 
answered the question he posed by stating: 
 
To invest the law then with authority is, it seems to invest God and 
reason only; to invest a man is to introduce a beast, as desire is 
something bestial, and even the best of men in authority are liable to be 
corrupted by passion.  We may conclude then that the law is reason 
without passion and it is therefore preferable to any individual.  (Corwin, 
1965, p. 8) 
 
John Adams embedded Aristotle’s answer in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, 
combining it with Montesquieu’s principle regarding the separation of governmental powers.  
Article XXX of the 1780 state constitution reads: 
 
In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department 
shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: 
The executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or 
either of them: The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and 
executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government 
of laws and not of men.  (Emphasis added)  (Massachusetts Constitution 
of 1780) 
 
Chief Justice John Marshall next highlighted Aristotle’s answer when a unanimous Supreme 
Court enunciated the principle of judicial review in 1803.  As articulated by Marshall, the 
rule of law was preferred to that of individuals and even majorities.  According to Marshall, 
the rule of law, when combined with a written constitution and the concept of limited 
government, provided justification for judicial review (Hall, 1992, p. 522).  The Chief 
Justice, combining quotes from Blackstone with his own reasoning, opined: 
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The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every 
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an 
injury.  One of the first duties of government is to afford that 
protection….  Blackstone states…“[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, 
that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit, or 
action at law, whenever that right is invaded.”  (Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. 137, 163) 
 
Chief Justice Marshall continued with another quote from Blackstone serving to buttress his 
own reasoning: 
 
“[F]or it is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of England, that 
every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its 
proper redress.”   
 
The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a 
government of laws, and not of men.  It will certainly cease to deserve 
this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a 
vested legal right.  (Emphasis added)  (Marbury v. Madison, p. 163) 
 
This idea was subsequently cited in another high court decision, Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), 
with the Court’s reference pointing to the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, perhaps unaware of 
the connection to Aristotle or of Professor Corwin’s identification of its lineage (See 
Appendix N for discussion of the same case).  More recently, the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals referenced the same quotation from the Massachusetts Constitution in Butler v. 
United States, 78 F.2d 1, 8 (1935) in ruling that the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 
unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to the President of the United States (See 
discussion of the case in Chapter Six of this paper). 
68
 List deductively compiled by the writer from the list of states with “durational residency or 
citizenship requirements” supplied by District Court Judge Bownes (p. 1217, n. 14). 
69
 In similar fashion, the Warren Court reached its decision in Brown v. Board of Education by 
jettisoning the case law undergirding “separate but equal” that was enshrined by Plessy v. 
Ferguson.  See the following pages of this paper:  for the Plessy Court’s creation of “separate 
but equal” legal doctrine, pp. 246-248; for Justice Harlan’s Plessy dissent opposing “separate 
but equal,” pp. 248-250, 803-804; for the Warren Court’s reasoning in overturning Plessy’s 
“separate but equal” doctrine in its Brown decision, pp. 252-253, 255-256, 809-811, 813-814. 
70
 The term “Four Horsemen” was used during the 1930s by critics of the Court to refer to the 
four justices of the Supreme Court previously listed because of their anti-New Deal stance.  
“[T]he term evoked the legendary Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse” as described in 
Revelation 6: 2-8 (Hall, 1992, pp. 309, 584).  Joined by Justice Owen Roberts, the four 
justices had: 
 
overturned the Railway Pension Act in Railroad Retirement Board v. 
Alton Railroad (1935), voided the Agricultural Adjustment Act’s 
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processing tax in United States v. Butler (1936), and struck down the 
New York State minimum wage law in Morehead v. New York ex rel. 
Tipaldo (1936) as commerce, tax, and due process clause violations.  
These decisions and Schechter Poultry v. United States (1935), which 
condemned the National Industrial Recovery Act, precipitated a 
constitutional crisis.  (Hall, 1992, p. 895) 
 
 The Four Horsemen, joined by Roberts, had also invalidated the Bituminous Coal 
Conservation Act of 1935 “that established minimum wage requirements and collective 
bargaining” for the coal industry in Carter v. Carter Coal Company (1936) (See p. 426, this 
paper).  The Four Horsemen’s attempts to invalidate the Social Security Act in Steward 
Machine Co. v. Davis (1937) and a minimum wage statute in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish 
(1937) were resisted by the same five justices who upheld the New Deal’s National Labor 
Relations Act in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation – Justices Louis Brandeis, 
Benjamin Cardozo, & Harlan Fiske Stone as joined by Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes 
and Justice Owen Roberts (Hall, 1992, p. 895). 
 Van Devanter retired following the completion of the 1936 Court term and was replaced by 
Justice Hugo Black while Justice Sutherland resigned the following term and was replaced 
by Justice Stanley Reed (Hall, 1992, p. 986).  Justice Butler, who “voted against the 
constitutionality of every New Deal measure that came before the Court in the 1930s,” died 
during the Court’s 1939 term and was replaced by Justice Frank Murphy (Hall, 1992, pp. 
111, 986).  McReynolds retired in 1941 and was replaced by Justice James Byrnes (Hall, 
1992, pp. 542, 986). 
71
 According to the Court, these took different forms.  Seven states “still [had] dormant on their 
statute books laws passed in 1917-18, empowering the governor to require registration when 
a state of war exist[ed] or when public necessity require[d] such a step” (pp. 61-62, n. 8).  
These states included Iowa, Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, New York, Florida, and 
Louisiana.  North Carolina and South Carolina “passed registration laws more recently” in 
similar fashion to Pennsylvania (pp. 61-62, n. 8).  The Court also noted that the 
“[r]egistration statutes of Michigan and California were held unconstitutional” (pp. 61-62, n. 
8). 
72
 The Civil Rights Act of 1870, § 16 can be found in 16 Stat. 140, 144, 8 U.S.C. § 41 and 
reads: 
 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the 
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to 
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all 
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is 
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, 
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other. 
 
73
 The Chinese Exclusion Case is the secondary name for the case filed as Chae Chan Ping v. 
United States and was one of six cases resulting in four decisions that “refined congressional 
legislation designed to prevent Chinese immigration” during the 1880s and the 1890s (Hall, 
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1992, p. 143).  While the singular designation referred to the particular case, Chae Chan Ping 
v. United States, the plural designation, “Chinese Exclusion Cases,” referred collectively to 
the following Supreme Court decisions:  Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884); 
United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621 (1888); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 
U.S. 581 (1889); and the following three cases combined into one decision, Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, Wong Quan v. United States, and Lee Joe v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 
(1893).  The particular case, Chae Chan Ping v. United States a.k.a. Chinese Exclusion Case, 
upheld the constitutionality of the Scott Act’s “outright prohibition of reentry” by Chinese 
laborers who had left the country and desired to return (Hall, 1992, p. 143). 
 A constitutional scholar summarized the efforts of the Court in the four decisions known 
collectively as the Chinese Exclusion Cases:  “After initially offering narrow holdings to 
protect Chinese reentry to the United States, the Supreme Court eventually succumbed to the 
anti-Chinese hysteria of the era and ratified far-reaching restrictions on basic rights for 
Chinese under American law” (Hall, 1992, p. 144). 
74
 The provisions of the 1875 Civil Rights Act declared unconstitutional by the 8-1 Court , 
Justice Harlan dissenting, “prohibited racial discrimination in inns, public conveyances, and 
places of public amusement” (Hall, 1992, p. 149).  
 
The decision curtailed federal efforts to protect African-Americans from 
private discrimination and cast constitutional doubts on Congress’s 
ability to legislate in the area of Civil Rights, doubts that were not 
completely resolved until enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
(Hall, 1992, p. 149) 
 
 The majority opinion interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment  as prohibiting the state, as 
opposed to private individuals and businesses, from abridging individual rights.  The Court 
majority viewed the 1875 Civil Rights Act as “an impermissible attempt by Congress to 
create a municipal code regulating the private conduct of individuals in the area of racial 
discrimination” (Hall, 1992, p. 149).  One outcome of the decision was “the withdrawal of 
the federal government from civil rights enforcement,” a policy that would not be reversed 
until the 1950’s (Hall, 1992, p. 149).  
75
 31 states had enacted public accommodation laws while the “Governor of Kentucky issued 
an executive order [in 1963] requiring all governmental agencies involved in the supervision 
or licensing of businesses to take all lawful action necessary to prevent racial discrimination” 
(p. 259, n. 8).  Rather than list the states with either laws or executive orders regarding public 
accommodation as cited by the Court, it is simpler to list the states that DID NOT.  In 
alphabetical order, they are: 
 
 Alabama Louisiana South Carolina 
 Arizona Missouri Tennessee 
 Arkansas Mississippi Texas 
 Florida North Carolina Utah 
 Georgia Nevada Virginia 
 Hawaii Oklahoma West Virginia 
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76
 In this paper, see the following:  for the context of Hamilton’s original remark made in his 
opinion regarding the constitutionality of the Bank Bill, pp. 279-312; for Hamilton’s original 
remark, p. 312; for Chief Justice Marshall’s paraphrase of Hamilton in McCullough v. 
Maryland, p. 360; for the Court’s paraphrase in United States v. Darby Lumber Company of 
Marshall’s use of Hamilton in McCullough, p. 394. 
77
 Within the framework of American government, power is distributed horizontally between 
the three branches of government and vertically between the state and federal governments.  
The latter, vertical division of power refers to federalism.  Thus, most arguments against 
federal power translate into arguments on behalf of state governments and/or their political 
subdivisions, whether or not they actually mount a Tenth Amendment defense. 
78
 An Iowa native played a major role in the passage of the Bituminous Coal Act, also known as 
the Guffey-Snyder Act.  John L. Lewis, a coal miner from Lucas, Iowa, represented the 
driving force behind the United Mine Workers.  In concert with unionized northern coal mine 
operators, Lewis and the United Mine Workers threatened a national coal strike unless 
Congress made coal “a public utility subject to federal regulation” (Leuchtenburg, p. 161).  
The ensuing Guffey-Snyder Act “re-enacted the old bituminous coal code;” furthermore, it: 
 
guaranteed collective bargaining, stipulated uniform scales of wages and 
hours, created a national commission which would fix prices and 
allocate and control production, authorized closing down marginal 
mines, and levied a production tax to pay for the mines and to 
rehabilitate displaced miners.  (Leuchtenburg, p. 161) 
 
79
 Abe Fortas attended Yale Law School when Douglas taught there.  Later, while teaching at 
Yale Law School, Fortas spent time commuting to Washington to work at the SEC during the 
time Douglas was there.  “In 1939, Fortas joined the Department of Interior,” where he was 
working when Sunshine Anthracite Coal Company’s appeal was granted by the Supreme 
Court (Hall, 1992, p. 308).  The nexus between the Interior Department and the coal 
company’s appeal of the Bituminous Coal Commission’s decision to deny the company’s 
application for exemption as a producer of non-bituminous coal arose because the 
Commission’s “functions ha[d] been administered since July 1, 1939, by the Bituminous 
Coal Division of the Department of the Interior” (p. 387, n. 2). After participating in 
arguments before the Court in this case, Fortas spent the remainder of WW II working in the 
Interior Department where he “supported land reform, opposed the imposition of martial law 
in Hawaii, and fought the internment of Japanese-Americans” (Hall, 1992, p. 308). 
 
 Following the war, Fortas “vigilantly protected civil liberties during the postwar Red Scare” 
by defending “Owen Lattimore and other victims of McCarthyism” (Hall, 1992, p. 308).  
Lattimore, of course, was one of “the “Old China Hands’ … on [McCarthy’s] original list of 
eighty-one ‘cases’ of Communist sympathizers in the State Department” who had 
“engineered the overthrow of our ally, the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China 
and aided in the Communist conquest of China” (Hilsman, p. 297; Hilsman, p. 296).  
Described as a “brilliant legal strategist,” Fortas, in one of his pro bono cases, successfully 
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argued the landmark Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), a case that “established a right to counsel 
in all state felony cases” (Hall, 1992, p. 308).  The case was chronicled in Gideon’s Trumpet, 
a book by Anthony Lewis that was popularized by being made into a movie of the same 
name starring Henry Fonda as Clarence Gideon, the convicted felon who had been too poor 
to hire legal counsel for his original trial.  Taking advantage of the literalness of the name 
Gideon, Lewis derived the title from the Book of Judges in the Bible (ch. 6, v. 34), which 
stated, “But the Spirit of the Lord came upon Gideon, and he blew a trumpet …” (Lewis, 
1964, p. vii).  Lewis, a two-time winner of the Pulitzer Prize and Supreme Court/Justice 
Department reporter for the New York Times, described Fortas as “a high-powered example 
of that high-powered species, the Washington lawyer” (Lewis, 1964, p. 48).  However, 
“unlike most prominent lawyers Fortas ha[d] an interest in criminal law,” admired and 
looked up to Justice Brandeis, and “had deep social convictions,” having “fought for liberal 
causes throughout his life” (Lewis, 1964, pp. 51, 52).   
 Indirectly, Fortas had an Iowa connection in that he authored the Court’s opinion in Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), the case 
precipitated by high school students wearing black armbands at school in protest of the 
Vietnam War being waged by the United States.  Later Fortas “resigned from the Court in 
disgrace” because of controversy surrounding money he had received while serving as a 
Justice of the Supreme Court (Hall, 1992, p. 309).  A legal scholar summed up Fortas’ legal 
life by observing, “He did not have the time or temperament to become a great justice, but he 
was a great lawyer” (Hall, 1992, p. 309).  President Nixon nominated Harry A. Blackmun, 
who was subsequently approved to take the seat left vacant by Fortas’ resignation from the 
Court (Hall, 1992, p. 987). 
80
 To examine how this question was argued and to see how it was played out by the major 
actors in President Washington’s first administrative cabinet and in the First Congress, see 
the following pages of this document:  for Madison’s “strict construction” argument related 
to Constitution-as-detailed-plan as presented in his arguments to the House in opposition to 
Hamilton’s proposed Bank Bill, pp. 300-302; for Madison’s prior “broad construction” 
arguments related to Constitution-as-general-blueprint which he presented regarding 
interpretations of the Articles of Confederation, the President’s removal power of cabinet 
officials, the expansion of the census beyond the specifications of the Constitution, the 
crafting of the Tenth Amendment, and as discussed most completely in Federalist No. 44, pp. 
302-307; for Jefferson’s “strict construction” argument as presented to President Washington 
opposing the constitutionality of Hamilton’s proposed Bank Bill, pp. 312-313; for the 
House’s debate of the Bank Bill connecting “broad interpretation” to Constitution-as-general-
blueprint instead of Constitution-as-detailed-legal-code and for the debate in favor of a broad 
interpretation of the Constitution regarding implied powers, pp. 308-311;  for Hamilton’s 
argument for “broad construction” of the Constitution-as-general-blueprint as presented in 
his opinion to President Washington regarding the constitutionality of the Bank Bill, pp. 314-
320.   
 To see how this was argued and decided in McCullough v. Maryland, see the following pages 
of this document:  for arguments by Wirt in favor of a broad construction of the Constitution-
as-general-blueprint, pp. 354, 355-356; for similar arguments by Pinkney, pp. 354-355, 356-
357; for arguments by opposing attorney Hopkinson in favor of a narrow construction of the 
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Constitution-as-detailed-plan, pp. 360-361; for arguments by opposing attorney Jones in 
favor of a narrow construction of the Constitution-as-detailed-plan, p. 361; for arguments by 
opposing attorney Martin in favor of a narrow construction of the Constitution-as-detailed-
plan, pp. 361-362; for the Court’s unanimous ruling in favor of the Constitution-as-general-
blueprint and against the Constitution-as-detailed-plan, which was delivered by Chief Justice 
John Marshall, pp. 368-370. 
81
 The cotton dust limits were to be “measured by a vertical elutriator, a device that measures 
cotton dust particles 15 microns or less in diameter” (p. 500). 
82
 Somewhat ironically, Bork was later appointed to be a federal appellate judge by President 
Reagan on the same circuit court that ruled against him in American Textile Manufacturers 
Institute v. Donovan.  This occurred in 1982, just two years after the Supreme Court issued 
its ruling in the same case (Hall, 1992, p. 79).  Five years later Reagan nominated him to fill 
Justice Powell’s seat on the Court.  The Senate Judiciary Committee vote was 9-5 in rejecting 
Bork, while the full Senate “defeated [Bork’s nomination to the Supreme Court] by a vote of 
58 to 42 on 23 October 1987” (Hall, 1992, p. 79).  This occurred after “an unusually lengthy 
hearing” and “unprecedented efforts to mobilize grassroots opposition” to Bork’s 
“conservative and legal views, particularly those relating to the constitutional right to privacy 
and the First Amendment” (Hall, 1992, p. 70).  The Court seat was viewed by 
nonconservatives as “crucial because of Justice Powell’s swing vote in many civil rights and 
liberties cases and because of his support of Roe v. Wade (1973)” (Hall, 1992, p. 79).  After 
his nomination was defeated, Bork resigned from the court of appeals and “became a resident 
scholar at the American Enterprise Institute” (Hall, 1992, p. 79). 
83
 The first case, Panama Refining Company v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), was decided on 
January 7, 1935.  Responding to demands by the oil-producing states for federal controls on 
production to remedy the collapse of oil prices, Congress, as part of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act of 1934 “authorized the president to prohibit the shipment in interstate 
commerce of petroleum produced in excess of quotas fixed by the states (popularly referred 
to as ‘hot oil’)” (Hall, 1992, p. 619).  By an 8-1 majority, the Court invalidated the “’hot oil’ 
program … of the NIRA” as “an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the 
president” (Hall, 1992, p. 619).  Panama Refining Company v. Ryan marked the Court’s first 
invalidation of federal legislation on the grounds of unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
authority, which was derived from the concept of “[s]eparation of powers [as] a basic 
principle of the Constitution” (Hall, 1992, p. 619).  Chief Justice Hughes authored the 
Court’s opinion and “held the statute invalid because Congress had established no ‘primary 
standard,’ leaving the matter to the president without direction or rule, ‘to be dealt with as he 
pleased’” (Hall, 1992, p. 619).   
 The second case, Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), was 
decided on May 27, 1935, a day known as “the New Deal’s ‘Black Monday’” (Brogan, p. 
548).   Schechter also focused upon the National Industrial Recovery Act.  Congress had 
enacted the NIRA in order to “curb unemployment and stimulate business recovery” during 
the Great Depression (Hall, 1992, p. 757).  The NIRA “reflected a variety of different 
demands” from different quarters, which included (Leuchtenburg, p. 56): 
 
• “theorists of the Progressive era” (Leuchtenburg, p. 56); 
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• the “doctrines of “the New Nationalism” proclaimed by the “old Bull Moosers” 
(Leuchtenburg, p. 56);  
• the “urban social reformers of the Jane Addams tradition” as carried forward to the 
“campaign for public works” (Leuchtenburg, pp. 33, 56);  
• the older Wilsonians’ beliefs in “the need for national planning” and their experience 
with the War Industries Board in “government co-ordination [sic] of the economy 
during the war” (Leuchtenburg, pp. 56, 57); 
• the industrialists and business leaders who wanted the government to “suspend the 
antitrust laws to permit trade associations to engage in industrywide planning” 
(Leuchtenburg, p. 56); 
• various union leaders “who were willing to agree to business proposals for a 
suspension of the antitrust laws because they assumed the Supreme Court would not 
sanction a federal wages and hours law” and viewed “industrial codes” as “badly 
needed protection” for the “high-wage businessmen” in order not to be undersold by 
businessmen “exploiting their workers” (Leuchtenburg, p. 57); and  
• by Senator Wagner, who “insisted that if business received concessions labor must 
have a guarantee of collective bargaining” (Leuchtenburg, p. 57).   
 
 As described in one account, “All shared a common revulsion against the workings of a 
competitive, individualistic, laissez-faire economy” (Leuchtenburg, p. 56).  The Act’s 
“principal reliance was upon codes of fair competition, which all industry groups were 
directed to draw up” (Hall, 1992, p. 757).  However, as one historian noted, “[I]t was easier 
to get codes agreed than to secure compliance with them” (Brogan, p. 548).  Such was indeed 
the situation in Brooklyn with the code regulating “the trade in kosher fowls in the New York 
area” where the Schechter Corporation “violated numerous provisions of the code eighteen 
times” (Brogan, p. 548).  Protesting its indictment, the Schechter Corporation challenged the 
constitutionality of the NRA code governing its business.  In a unanimous decision, the 
Supreme Court invalidated the code provisions of the NIRA.  The Court ruled:  
 
that the grants of power made by Congress to the President in the codes 
provision of the NIRA were beyond the limits imposed by the 
Constitution, amounting to ‘an unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
power’ – for they enabled the President to make what laws he liked for 
the regulation of any economic activity whatever.  (Brogan, p. 549) 
 
 Neither the Panama nor the Schechter decisions have ever been overruled by the Court.  
According to one legal scholar, “Panama, (nearly always paired with Schechter) has been 
cited in more than forty subsequent Supreme Court decisions, typically where administrative 
exercise of delegated power was involved” (Hall, 1992, p. 619).  “But,” the legal scholar 
continued, “in none of these cases was the congressional delegation held invalid” (Hall, 
1992, p. 619).  Justice Byron White observed of the delegation issue in Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985 (1983), that “restrictions on the scope 
of the power that could be delegated [have] diminished and all but disappeared” Hall, 1992, 
p. 757). 
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84
 Alger Hiss would later work for Dean Acheson at the State Department and would be 
accused by Whittaker Chambers of being a Soviet spy in the celebrated Pumpkin Papers 
Case.  Long before that happened, however, he was a graduate of Harvard Law School 
recruited by the “liberal faction in the Department of Agriculture headed by the assistant 
secretary, Rexford Tugwell, and by the volatile general counsel, Jerome Frank” 
(Leuchtenburg, pp. 76, 75).  Leuchtenburg described the group as follows: 
 
These men wanted to exploit the sense of crisis to push through long-
needed reforms to relieve the poverty of sharecroppers, tenant farmers, 
and farm laborers, and to crack down on packers, millers, and big milk 
distributors to make sure that increased farm prices came out of 
middlemen and not the consumer.  “Henry’s father’s gang,” as they 
called the old hands in the Department, scorned the Tugwell-Frank 
crowd as a strange crew of urban intellectuals whose knowledge of 
agriculture, such as it was, came not from tilling the upper forty but from 
books.  (Leuchtenburg, p. 76) 
  
 Henry, of course, was Henry Wallace, the native Iowan serving as the Secretary of 
Agriculture.  “Henry’s father’s gang” was headed by George Peek, the administrator of the 
AAA.  According to Leuchtenburg, Peek “argued that there was no farm surplus, only a 
disparity in price, and that the country needed more people in agriculture than fewer. 
 
Peek reasoned:  “It is not a healthful thing from any angle to have people 
crowded together in industrial centers where they may become the 
victim of every ‘ism’ of any agitator.  The healthsome atmosphere of the 
country is far better for all of us.”  He had a pioneer’s hatred of the “un-
American policy” of restricting production.  He would let the farmer 
grow all he wanted, negotiate marketing agreements to push up farm 
prices, and dump the surplus overseas.  (Leuchtenburg, p. 75) 
 
 Peek was moved by FDR to the State Department and Chester Davis became the new AAA 
Director.  Davis was “sympathetic” to the Tugwell-Frank’s group’s pleas on behalf of “the 
politically voiceless sharecroppers and tenants,” despite his thinking that “the main purpose 
of the Triple A was farm recovery rather than overhauling the rural power structure” 
(Leuchtenburg, p. 139).  While Davis was out of town, “Alger Hiss of the Legal Division 
drafted an opinion, approved by Frank, which required planters to retain the same individuals 
as tenants during the life of the contract” which Frank then circulated as a new AAA edict 
(Leuchtenburg, p. 139).  When Davis found out, “he canceled the directive,” and with the 
backing of both Wallace and Roosevelt, “wiped out the office of General Counsel and ousted 
Frank” as well as four other top officials (Leuchtenburg, p. 139).  Hiss resigned in protest.  
According to Leuchtenburg, “Liberals viewed the ‘purge’ of the Frank faction as the end of 
an era, the triumph of the planters and processors over the advocates of a ‘social outlook in 
agricultural policy’” (Leuchtenburg, p. 139).   
 Later an investigative journalist, I.F. Stone, recounted the events surrounding Hiss’s efforts at 
the Ag Department and commented on Alger Hiss during an interview: 
   
   
1364
                                                                                                                                                             
 
I was never able to make up my mind about Hiss.  I admired him when 
he and two others walked out of the Agriculture Department.  There 
were two Section 7’s in the New Deal that were controversial and 
crucial.  There was the one that was in the National Recovery Act, 
giving labor the right to organize – although it had a lot of ambiguity in 
it.  And there was the other, in the Triple A Act, designed to make sure 
that when the government subsidized a withdrawal of acreage from 
crops such as cotton, that part of the benefits would go to the 
sharecroppers and tenant farmers, so the big landowners couldn’t take 
the money and keep it and throw the ‘croppers and tenants off of the 
land.  It was a very fundamental issue.  Henry Wallace was then 
Secretary of Agriculture, and he wasn’t what he became later on.  He 
represented the big farmers.  And … Hiss walked out in protest.  The 
New Deal tried to remedy a little of that, but it was never really 
enforced…  So I admired Hiss for that.  (Patner, p. 85) 
 
85
 According to the Court’s description of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, Section 1 of Title I 
of the Act 
 
recite[d] that an economic emergency ha[d] arisen, due to disparity 
between the prices of agricultural and other commodities, with 
consequent destruction of farmers’ purchasing power and breakdown in 
orderly exchange, which, in turn, have affected transactions in 
agricultural commodities with a national public interest and burdened 
and obstructed the normal currents of commerce, calling for the 
enactment of legislation.  (p. 53) 
 
86
 George Wharton Pepper served as the “Biddle Professor of Law” at the University of 
Pennsylvania for seventeen years before he resigned to devote full-time efforts to his law 
practice (Hall, 1992, pp. 630-631). 
87
 Evoking the “legendary Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse,” the phrase was used during the 
mid-1930’s to describe the opposition of the following four Supreme Court justices to the 
New Deal’s efforts to legislate on economic and social matters:  “Pierce Butler, Willis Van 
Devanter, George Sutherland, and James McReynolds” (Hall, 1992, p. 309). 
88
 See the following pages of this paper criticizing the Court majority for using the Tenth 
Amendment to limit congressional application of a delegated power or for noting the lack of 
a textual basis in the Amendment for limiting the application of a specifically delegated 
power: for Justice Stevens’s dissent against Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in National 
League of Cities v. Usery, pp. 403-404; for Justice Brennan’s dissent (joined by Justices 
Marshall & White) against Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery, 
pp. 404-411; for Justice White’s dissent (joined by Justices Blackmun & Stevens) against 
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in New York v. United States, pp. 457-467; for Justice 
Stevens’ dissent against Justice O’Connor’s opinion in New York v. United States, pp. 467-
469; for Justice Stevens’ dissent (joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer) against 
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Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Printz v. United States criticizing the lack of both textual 
and historical support for the majority opinion, pp. 495-496. 
89
 Wallace had anticipated that the AAA of 1933 might not survive the Court’s scrutiny in 
United States v. Butler and “had put in place a team to devise a program that would meet 
constitutional objections” (Cutler & Hyde, p. 160).  Within four days of the Court’s Butler 
decision, Wallace met with farm leaders and outlined the new program, subsequently 
implemented by Congress as the Soil Conservation and Domestic allotment Act of 1936.  
The Court announced Butler on January 6, 1936, and the soil conservation legislation was 
enacted on February 27, 1936.  The new program  
 
empower[ed] the Agriculture Department to enter into rental agreements 
with farmers who would promise to replace certain soil-depleting crops 
– such as corn, wheat, cotton, and tobacco – with “green manure” such 
as grass and legumes.  Money for the program would be appropriated by 
Congress.  The plan would be administered at the local level by elected 
soil conservation district committees.  The local committees, in turn, 
would be responsible to the department’s Soil Conservation Service, 
which would determine conservation needs on a regional and national 
basis.  (Culver & Hyde, pp. 160-161) 
 
 The Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 was described as “a doubly 
sweet victory for Wallace” because he “had rescued the farm relief program and returned soil 
conservation services to the Agriculture Department all at once” (Culver & Hyde, p. 161).  
Another historian described the new farm bill as “reflect[ing] the intense national concern 
with soil conservation aroused by the terrible dust storms of the early 1930’s” which had 
caused “red snow to [fall] on New England,” had “darkened the city of Cleveland” with “a 
dust cloud seven thousand feet thick,” had caused “yellow grit from Nebraska [to sift] 
through the White House doors,” and had caused “bits of [the] western plains [to come] to 
rest on vessels in the Atlantic three hundred miles at sea” (Leuchtenburg, p. 172).  While the 
Act of 1936 undoubtedly increased both awareness and practice of soil conservation 
measures by farmers, it “proved unworkable” in terms of reducing the supply of farm 
commodities as “not enough farmers [cooperated] voluntarily to limit production” 
(Leuchtenburg, p. 254).  Continuing his evaluation of the Act’s economic ineffectiveness, the 
historian noted, “The south staggered under an eighteen-million-bale crop which drove 
cotton prices down, and wheat growers faced a new glut” as part of the recession in the fall 
and winter of 1937 (Leuchtenburg, p. 254). 
 Another measure aimed at economic relief for rural Americans was passed in the wake of the 
Court’s Butler decision prior to the second AAA, but not quite as quickly as the soil 
conservation measure.  The Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenancy Act of 1937 was enacted by 
Congress partly as a result of the Butler decision, partly as a result of “the threat posed by 
Huey Long” to southern leadership, and partly as a result of Agriculture Secretary Wallace’s 
increased awareness of the extreme rural poverty he witnessed first-hand on “an incredible 
odyssey along back roads of the Mississippi Delta, across the Great Smoky Mountains and 
into the hollows of Appalachia” in November 1936 (Leuchtenburg, p. 140; Culver & Hyde, 
p. 169).  The Bankhead bill was first introduced in 1935 “to help tenant farmers and farm 
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laborers become landowners,” but was resisted by both southern conservatives and northern 
radicals because for the former, the bill was too “revolutionary,” while for the latter the bill 
“would set up a caste of peasantry” (Leuchtenburg, pp. 140, 141).  Discussed again in the 
aftermath of the Butler decision, it continued to languish until “it received the blessing of the 
President’s Special Committee on Farm Tenancy in 1937” (Leuchtenburg, p. 141).  
Agriculture Secretary Wallace chaired the President’s committee following his trip along 
“[t]wo thousand miles of Tobacco Road” in late 1936, an experience that “appalled and 
unsettled Wallace” (Culver & Hyde, pp. 169, 170).  According to one account: 
 
He [Wallace] returned from the South with a willingness, heretofore 
resisted, to engage his department in the politics of rural poverty [For his 
contrasting prior record, see note # 82].  Subsistence farmers scratching 
out a living on worn-out land, landless tenants, sharecroppers, and day 
laborers made up half of the nation’s agricultural work force, yet they 
received only 12 percent of the national farm income.  They obtained 
virtually no help from farm subsidies aimed at commercial farmers and 
landlords.  (Culver & Hyde, p. 170) 
 
 Of his own reaction to what he witnessed on his tour, Wallace wrote, “I have never seen 
among the peasantry of Europe poverty so abject as that which exists in this favorable cotton 
year in the great cotton states” (Culver & Hyde, p. 170).  The Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenancy 
Act created the Farm Security Administration (FSA) within the Department of Agriculture to 
extend “long-term loans to tenant farmers for the purchase of land and equipment” (Culver & 
Hyde, p. 170).  The Act also “extended rehabilitation loans to farmers” and provided 
assistance to migrant workers “by establishing a chain of sanitary, well-run migratory labor 
camps” (Leuchtenburg, p. 141).  According to one assessment, “The FSA was the first 
agency to do anything substantial for the tenant farmer, the sharecropper, and the migrant” 
(Leuchtenburg, p. 141).  Closer to Iowa, the FSA “reaped the anger of Twin Cities grain 
dealers when it lent money to co-operatives to buy grain elevators” and was “scrupulously 
fair in its treatment of Negroes” (Leuchtenburg, p. 141).  Yet, for all of its positive 
accomplishments, the Farm Tenancy Act was never able to “measure up to the dimensions of 
the problem it faced” (Leuchtenburg, p. 141). 
 
The main boast of the FSA – that the rate of repayment of its loans was 
impressively high – suggested that the FSA did not dig very deeply into 
the problem of rural poverty.  The FSA had no political constituency – 
croppers and migrants were often voteless or inarticulate – while its 
enemies, especially large farm corporations that wanted cheap labor and 
southern landlords who objected to FSA aid to tenants, had powerful 
representation in Congress.  The FSA’s opponents kept its 
appropriations so low that it was never able to accomplish anything on a 
massive scale.  (Leuchtenburg, p. 141) 
 
 Thus, the two agricultural acts passed by Congress between the voiding in early 1936 of the 
first Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 and the passage of the second Agricultural 
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Adjustment Act of 1938, while helpful in terms of addressing soil conservation needs and 
providing some relief for the problem of rural poverty, didn’t effectively deal with the 
problem of the overproduction of agricultural commodities, which, as a result, didn’t impact 
the problem of low prices for farm products and the low purchasing power of rural America.   
90
 In describing the ever-normal granary, one historian compared Wallace to the Old Testament 
Joseph who stored up surpluses “when yields were good and distribut[ed] them in lean years” 
(Leuchtenburg, p. 255).  As described in another account, Wallace: 
 
 had written and spoken of it [the ever-normal granary] for most of his 
adult lifetime.  He had documented its origins in Confucius and found 
scriptural support for it in the biblical story of Joseph.  He had preached 
its benefits to a generation of Wallace’s Farmer readers and had talked 
of it again and again during the two great droughts of the 1930s.  (Culver 
& Hyde, p. 178).   
 
 Wallace’s success in getting the concept of the ever-normal granary enacted as part of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 was described by Wallace as the “action of which I was 
most proud as secretary of agriculture” (Culver & Hyde, p. 179). 
91
 While democratic participation was embedded in the Act, it should be noted both who 
participated and who did not participate, as well as who directly benefited and who did not.   
One historian noted: 
 
The farmers who took the lead in the administration of the AAA were 
not the worst-hit victims of the Depression: not the sharecroppers of the 
South, the tenants of the Middle West, the hired hands everywhere, the 
illiterate, the black, the ignorant, the smallholders trying to live off 
pocket-handkerchief holdings, owners of exhausted land, or young men 
and women forced to stay on the land because there was no work in the 
cities.  (Brogan, p. 554) 
 
 Further noting that “the big commercial farmers and, in the South, the landlords” dominated 
the workings of the AAA, partly because the “AAA subsidies were paid … to acres, not 
individuals,” the commentator also pointed out that they were greatly helped by “abundant 
collusion from within Congress and the Department of Agriculture” in strengthening “their 
position more ruthlessly and determinedly than big business did under NRA, and with far 
more permanent success” (Brogan, p. 555).  The question arose, “Against whom did the large 
commercial agricultural interests strengthen their position?”  As further noted, it was the 
“reforming followers of Tugwell within the administration” and the “organizations of poorer 
farmers outside it” who were able to make “no great headway against” the commercial 
farming interests (Brogan, p. 555).  The rising tide of prosperity brought about by the 
demands of World War II also worked to diminish the “sense of social solidarity as had been 
induced in 1932” as well as the perceived need to reform agriculture.  The consequences 
were spelled out with attention being drawn to the inherent conflict between the rhetoric 
focused on family farms and the policies pursued which favored further consolidation of 
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larger and fewer farms with no attention given to those displaced by the process.  As noted 
by our historian: 
 
[A]fter 1941 (when the factory boom of the Second World War opened 
up the job market again) the movement from the land to the cities 
resumed.  It was probably an economically necessary process; but the 
human and political gains to America would have been enormous if the 
movement could have been regulated with intelligence and compassion, 
instead of being left, in the old way, to the brutally impersonal 
operations of ‘the profit system’, which were only marginally braked by 
the commitment of the New Deal and succeeding administrations to 
maintain the existing farm population in situ.  (Brogan, p. 555) 
 
 The historian described the cyclical process of continuing the process begun by the two 
major farm acts of the New Deal. 
 
Agriculture Secretaries came and went and made the same pledges to 
uphold the small family farm (anything was better than the effort and 
conflict involved in thinking out a new policy); but the number of such 
farms went on shrinking, and nobody did much for the displaced.  
(Brogan, p. 555) 
 
92
 Hall (1992, p. 426) listed some of the specific cases by which various provisions of the Bill 
of Rights came to be protected against intrusion by state and local governments via the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. Chicago, 
166 U.S. 226 (1897), the Supreme Court “unanimously held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause compelled the states to award just compensation when it 
took private property for public use” (Hall, 1999, p. 51).  Justly famed for his ringing 
dissents, this case proved to be one in which Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote the Court’s 
unanimous opinion.  Perhaps the Court selected Justice Harlan to write the majority decision  
in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. Chicago because of his previous 
dissent in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), in which he argued that Hurtado’s 
murder conviction and death sentence had proceeded without meeting the “Fifth Amendment 
requirement of grand jury indictment in federal capital cases” (Hall, 1999, p. 133).  
According to Justice John Marshall Harlan’s dissent, “’[D]ue process of law,’ within the 
meaning of the national Constitution, does not import one thing with reference to the powers 
of the States, and another with reference to the powers of the general government” (Hall, 
1992, p. 362).  In Hurtado, the Court rejected Justice Harlan’s claim that the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporated the Fifth Amendment’s requirements as a binding requirement on 
state action.  Deprivation of life wasn’t sufficient reason for the Court majority to agree to 
Harlan’s argument, but perhaps the passage of time, the persuasiveness of Harlan’s 
reasoning, and the threat of deprivation of property combined to change the Court’s 
reasoning regarding the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment mean state and local 
governments had to respect the Bill of Rights, or at least the Fifth Amendment portion of the 
Bill of Rights. 
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Subsequently, in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), the Court held “that the speech 
and press protections of the First Amendment should be extended to the states” (Hall, 1999, 
p. 106).  The Court, however, rejected Gitlow’s free speech claim put forth by his attorney, 
Clarence Darrow, during the trial before the New York court, and carried forward by ACLU 
attorney Walter H. Pollak before the U.S. Supreme Court.  Pollak argued  
 
that liberty of expression was a right to be protected against state 
abridgment.  This, he contended, was established by the authoritative 
determination of the meaning of liberty as used in the Fourteenth 
Amendment and by implicit declarations with respect to the related right 
of free assembly.  (Hall, 1999, p. 106) 
 
Justices Louis D. Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes, while agreeing with the Court 
majority that state and local governments were obligated to respect the provisions of the First 
Amendment, disagreed with the Court majority “that words separated from action could be 
punished” (Hall, 1999, p. 106).  Holmes’ and Brandeis’ view that expression and action 
should be separated and viewed as separate activities, that action (and not expression) could 
be punished was not “embraced by the Supreme Court” until the 1960s (Hall, 1999, p. 106).  
In 1931, however, the Court did strike down a state law as an unconstitutional infringement 
of First Amendment free speech.  Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)  
 
is considered a milestone in First Amendment constitutional law, for it 
was the first ruling in which a Court majority extended the Fourteenth 
Amendment to include a protection of First Amendment substance – in 
this case symbolic speech – from state encroachment.  (Hall, 1999, p. 
296) 
 
The most comprehensive argument for the Incorporation Doctrine was expressed by Justice 
Hugo Black in a dissenting opinion joined by three other justices in Adamson v. California, 
332 U.S. 46 (1947).  Dissenting against the 5-4 decision in Adamson, Justice Black argued 
“the Fourteenth Amendment required the states to respect all rights specified in the Bill of 
Rights” (Hall, 1992, 427).  According to Justice Black: 
 
[T]he due process clause should be read to guarantee that “no state could 
deprive its citizens of the privileges and protections of the Bill of 
Rights” and … that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates “the full 
protection of the Fifth Amendment’s provision against compelling 
evidence from an accused to convict him of a crime.”  (Hall, 1999, p. 5) 
 
Ironically (ironic by virtue of this position being articulated in a minority dissenting opinion 
rather than a majority opinion establishing a basic legal principle), Justice Black’s position, 
to some extent, mirrored that originally proposed by James Madison to the House of 
Representatives on August 24, 1789.  Madison’s proposal for Article XIV stated that “no 
state shall infringe the right of trial by jury in criminal cases, nor the rights of conscience, nor 
the freedom of speech, or of the press” (Amar, 2005, p. 386).  Although approved by the 
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House, Madison’s proposal was defeated by the Senate.  The idea lay dormant until 
resurrected by Congressman Bingham’s proposal for the successful Fourteenth Amendment 
(Amar, 2005, p. 386).  In his public remarks: 
 
Bingham repeatedly pointed his audience to the leading Supreme Court 
opinion, Barron v. Baltimore, authored by Chief Justice Marshall in 
1833.  Barron said that if the First Congress had meant to apply the Bill 
of Rights to states, Congress would have used explicit words to that 
effect, just as the Philadelphia framers had used explicit words in Article 
I, section 10 when they imposed various limits on state governments.  
Taking his cue from Barron, Bingham decided to use the very Simon-
Says language the Barron Court had called for; thus, his proposal 
borrowed the words, “No State shall” verbatim from Article I, section 
10.   
Bingham’s public explanations of his proposed amendment repeatedly 
linked the phrase “privileges or immunities of citizens” to “the bill of 
rights.”  (Amar, 2005, p. 387) 
 
While the Court “has never adopted Black’s ‘total incorporation’ approach…, [i]t has, 
however, incorporated nearly all the individual components of the Bill of Rights under a 
doctrine called ‘selective incorporation’” (Hall, 1999, p. 5). 
93
 The other two amendments were the Thirteenth Amendment that abolished slavery and the 
Fifteenth Amendment that eliminated “race, color, or previous condition of servitude” as 
reasons to deny citizens the right to vote. 
94
 Senator J.W. Grimes of Iowa served as one of the six senators on the Joint Committee of 
Reconstruction, which was chaired by Senator William Pitt Fessenden of Maine (Stampp, p. 
110, n. 7).  The remaining senators were Ira Harris (New York), J.M. Howard (Michigan), 
Reverdy Johnson (Maryland), and G.H. Williams (Oregon).  They were joined by 
Representatives J.A. Bingham (Ohio), H.T. Blow (Missouri), G.S. Boutwell (Massachusetts), 
Roscoe Conklin (New York), Henry Grider (Kentucky, J.S. Morrill (Vermont), A.J. Rogers 
(New Jersey), Thaddeus Stevens (Pennsylvania), and E.B. Washburne (Illinois).  Although 
the Joint Committee had been created by a joint effort by both “the radicals and moderates” 
in Congress, and although “some of the leading radicals served” on the Joint Committee on 
Reconstruction, “the moderates actually controlled it” (Stampp, p. 110). 
95
 The Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation confirmed 
  
the rights of slave-holders in the loyal states, and even in those parts of 
the Confederacy which had been reconquered (chiefly Louisiana and the 
Sea Islands off the coast of South Carolina).  (Brogan, p. 340)  
 
The Preliminary Proclamation also stipulated that slaves in the disloyal areas “if their masters 
made peace by 1 January 1863” (Brogan, p. 340).  However, if by 1 January 1863 the “states 
designated should still be in rebellion, the slaves would be ‘then, thenceforward, and forever 
free’” (Brogan, p. 340). 
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96
 Congressmen from Iowa included William B. Allison, Josiah B. Grinnell, Asahel W. 
Hubbard, Hiram Price, John A. Kasson, and James F. Wilson, all of whom voted for the 
proposed Thirteenth Amendment (Keller, pp. 207-209). 
97
 Senators representing Iowa in the Thirty-eighth Congress included James W. Grimes and 
James Harlan, both of whom voted in favor of what became the Thirteenth Amendment 
(Keller, p. 206). 
98
 Black Codes is a term referencing state laws passed by southern state legislatures in the 
aftermath of the Civil War to maintain white control over the newly freed slaves.  Having 
had to adopt the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery as a pre-condition for re-
admission to the Union under President Johnson’s program of reconstruction, southern states 
passed these laws as a way to maintain the slavery laws under a different guise.  A historian 
specializing in nineteenth century southern history identified the well-spring from which the 
Black Codes were drawn:   
 
Whites clung unwaveringly to the old doctrine of white supremacy and 
innate Negro inferiority that had been sustained by the old regime….  
The temporary anarchy that followed the collapse of the old discipline 
produced a state of mind bordering on hysteria among Southern white 
people.  The first year a great fear of black insurrection and revenge 
seized many minds, and for a longer time the conviction prevailed that 
Negroes could not be induced to work without compulsion….  In the 
presence of these conditions the provisional legislatures established by 
President Johnson in 1865 adopted the notorious Black Codes.  
(Woodward, 1966, pp. 22-23) 
 
An outside observer, upon reviewing the situation, commented on the Black Codes and 
observed, “Provisions varied somewhat from state to state, but on the whole it is true to say 
that the codes … in every other respect tried to maintain the slavery laws” (Brogan, p. 362).  
He concluded by noting that all Black Codes in every southern state “forbade freedmen the 
use of weapons of any kind” (Brogan, p. 363).  Brogan continued: 
 
So much for the Northern crusade for human equality.  As a leading 
Northern liberal, Carl Schurz, remarked, the codes embodied the idea 
that although individual whites could no longer have property in 
individual blacks, “the blacks at large belong to the whites at large.”  
(Brogan, p. 363) 
 
99
 Patrick, n., p. 65. 
100
 Woodward, 1951, p. 62. 
101
 Woodward, 1951, p. 400. 
102
 Perhaps this was, in part, a culmination of a “movement to get rid of illiteracy through 
education,” an effort that had begun in 1911, and that had involved “statewide campaigns 
designed to reduce illiteracy” in Kentucky, Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, Georgia, and 
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South Carolina (Butts, p. 64).  Despite these efforts, “[w]hen the United States entered World 
War I, the Army found that about 700,000 young men could not write their names on their 
draft-registration cards” (Butts, p. 64).  Education and literacy thus became intertwined with 
patriotism and military preparedness.  
 However, while illiteracy had been reduced between the two world wars, the idea of simple 
literacy no longer sufficed.  By the time “the selective service law went into effect in 
September, 1940, the Army found that many men could not read and write well enough for 
military purposes.  More than 1,000,000 were rejected for this reason” (Butts, p. 65).  
Literacy, the ability to read and write, was not enough to meet the demands of modern life; 
hence, the idea of “functional literacy emerged.  
 While the effort to establish “free education beyond the primary-school years” had begun “in 
the three decades after 1870,” only a foothold had been established by 1910 (Hofstadter, p. 
324).  The literacy and functional literacy needs of an industrial society emerging as a world 
power provided support for expanding the system of public education to include a secondary 
education for the nation’s students.  The figures below illustrate the increase (Hofstadter, p. 
325): 
 
 1910 1960 
Percent of Seventeen-year-olds in HS 35 % 70 % 
 
103
 The eighteen northern states in 1860 were:  Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Illinois, Oregon, and California (Williams, 
p. 474 & p. 478).  Kansas joined the Union on January 29, 1861, with the removal (following 
the secession of their states from the Union) of the southern Democrats who had blocked 
Kansas’ admission as a free state (Pearson, Self, & Socolofsky, p. 192i). West Virginia, 
formed from counties in western Virginia who refused to secede from the Union with 
Virginia in 1861, joined the Union as a state on June 20, 1863, and contributed 30,000 
soldiers to the Union forces (Hoffman, Jones, & Little, pp. 181-182). 
 While the four border states of Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri never left the 
Union in 1861, they were slave states whose citizens served in opposing armies.  While 
“[m]en from every state fought in both armies,” it was more evenly divided between the two 
sides in the four border states (Williams, p. 478).  “[S]ecessionist groups from Kentucky and 
Missouri set up their own state governments, and even sent representatives to the confederate 
Congress” (Williams, p. 478).   
 The eleven southern states who seceded from the Union and formed the Confederate States 
of America were:  Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia, Florida, 
Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas (Williams, p. 474 & p. 478). 
 While not yet official states of the Union at the time of the Civil War, the following 
territories “fought on the Union side:”  Colorado, Dakota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, 
Utah, and Washington (Williams, p. 478). 
   
   
1373
                                                                                                                                                             
104
 Justice Bradley served on the electoral commission which had been created to determine the 
winner of the 1876 presidential election between Samuel Tilden, a Democrat, and Rutherford 
B. Hayes, a Republican.  A legal scholar described Bradley’s role on the electoral 
commission as well as subsequent activities on the nation’s High Court bench: 
 
On a commission equally balanced between Democrats and 
Republicans, Bradley was assigned the role of swing man.  Although 
apparently pulled in both directions, he closed ranks with his fellow 
Republicans and declared Rutherford B. Hayes president-elect.  As if in 
support of Hayes’s conciliatory policy toward the South, Bradley lather 
authored the opinion of the Court in the notorious Civil Rights Cases 
(1883), invalidating key provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875.  
(Hall, 1992, p. 82) 
 
105
 Justice Bradley used the term “corrective” to refer to legislation on pp. 15-16, 18-20, & 23 in 
his majority opinion in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).  Justice Bradley used some 
form of the word “regulate” on pp. 18-19 of the same case.  Finally, the phrase “direct and 
plenary powers of legislation over the whole subject” was used by Justice Bradley in his 
majority opinion for the Civil Rights Cases on p. 18. 
106
 The cases are grouped according to information contained in the cases themselves: Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483; and Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497. 
107
 The two categories of state laws are self-explanatory; however, the geographic groupings 
within the one category require some explanation.  The “Deep South” grouping is familiar, 
but the “Border States” grouping is not as clear.  “Border States” are those states that were 
slave states situated on the border between the North and the Deep South before and during 
the Civil War.  Most of them had close economic ties to the North, but family connections 
and slavery tied these states to the South.  All of the border states remained within the Union 
following the formation of the Confederacy and the commencement of the Civil War with the 
exception of Virginia.  When Virginia seceded and joined the Confederacy, her western 
counties did not; Subsequently, they became the separate state of West Virginia. 
108
 Data for the system of racially segregated schools for public education in the United States at 
the time the Brown decision was delivered by the Court in May, 1954, was gathered from 
Luther A. Huston’s “Special” to The New York Times of May 17, 1954, which appeared the 
following day on the front page of that newspaper under the headlines “High Court Bans 
Segregation; 9-0 Decision Grants Time to Comply” along with the sub-headlines “1896 
Ruling Upset” and “’Separate but Equal’ Doctrine Held Out of Place in Education.” 
109
 Hall, 1992, p. 631, provides the Latin translation as well, “by the court.” 
110
 What Hamilton actually wrote follows.  After discussing the idea of sovereign immunity and 
after declaring that state governments enjoyed sovereign immunity, Hamilton wrote: 
 
The circumstances which are necessary to produce an alienation of State 
sovereignty were discussed in considering the article of taxation and 
need not be repeated here.  A recurrence to the principles there 
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established will satisfy us that there is no color to pretend that the State 
governments would, by the adoption of that plan, be divested of the 
privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free from every 
constraint but that which flows from the obligations of good faith.  The 
contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the 
conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive 
force.  They confer no right of action independent of the sovereign will.  
(The Federalist, No. 81, p. 456) 
 
111
 As Professor Mathis noted, “Alexander J. Dallas, who wrote the reports which are generally 
recognized as official for the first years of the Supreme Court, does not give the background 
facts of the case” (Mathis, 1968, p. 217, n. 38).  Mathis then provided the pertinent 
background facts, which included the following account of Farquhar’s untimely demise that 
resulted in Alexander Chisholm being appointed executor of his estate: 
 
Still having failed to collect for the sale to Stone and Davies in 1777, 
Farquhar was knocked overboard and drowned when he was hit by the 
boom of a pilot boat coming into Savannah in January, 1784.  
Farquhar’s will provided that practically all of his estate was to pass to 
his daughter Elizabeth who was only ten years old at his death.  
Alexander Chisholm of Charleston was named executor of the estate 
until Elizabeth should become of age.  Chisholm and Peter Trezevant, 
who married Elizabeth Farquhar in 1789, were responsible for most of 




 Professor Mathis’ research provided the missing details.  According to Professor Mathis’ 
findings: 
 
Thomas Stone and Edward Davies were commissioned by the Executive 
Council of Georgia to make a large purchase from Robert Farquhar, a 
merchant….  It was agreed that Farquhar was to receive $169, 613.13 
for the merchandise.  Delivery was made on November 3 with payment 
to be made by December 1.  On the day after the payment was due 
Farquhar requested the money, but was refused as was to be the case on 
numerous later occasions.  It seems that Georgia paid Stone and Davies 
the necessary sum in continental loan office certificates for the purpose 
of paying the debt, but Farquhar, from all evidence obtained, received no 
part of the funds.  (Mathis, 1968, pp. 217-218) 
  
113
 Since the middle of the Twentieth Century, “there has been a dramatic increase in concurring 
and dissenting opinions” (Hall, 1992, p. 780).  In some cases, it appeared as if the Court had 
reverted back to the English practice of seriatim opinions.  In several cases each of the nine 
justices authored individual opinions, either in concurrence or in dissent, e.g., “the Pentagon 
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Papers case of New York Times v. United States (1971) and the capital punishment case of 
Furman v. Georgia (1972)” (Hall, 1992, p. 780).   
114
 “Acadia and Justice” – retrieved December 13, 2004, from 
http://www.ac.wwu.edu/~jay/pages/evangel.html. 
115
 The series of bizarre events that commenced with Georgia’s deliverance of funds to the two 
agents, monies that were never delivered to the merchant, continued even after the award of 
money in 1794, not to Farquhar’s daughter, but to her husband, Trezevant.  Although 
Trezevant sold three of the certificates in order to pay the expenses incurred in trying to 
collect the money, “Trezevant continued to hold five certificates valued at £5,000” (Mathis, 
1968, p. 223).  Trezevant apparently continued to hold the certificates “for more than forty 
years” (Mathis, 1968, p. 223).  In 1799 the Georgia legislature legislated that “all certificates 
issued by the state should be renewed within two years or ‘be thenceforth deemed fraudulent 
and forever barred’” (Mathis, 1968, p. 223).  Trezevant failed to renew the certificates as 
required, and subsequently moved to London.  Later, when he presented his certificates, 
Georgia did not honor them since they hadn’t been renewed as required by law.  Beginning 
November 19, 1838, Trezevant began presenting a series of petitions to the legislature for 
payment that were studied and denied each time.  According to Professor Mathis: 
 
In 1847, the Trezevant petition was again presented to the Georgia 
legislature.  Favorable committee reports were made in each house and a 
bill for relief was passed by the House on December 18 and in the 
Senate on December 23.  Thus, from the original sale to the final 
settlement the controversy brought before the Supreme Court in 
Chisholm v. Georgia had spanned a period of seventy years.  (Mathis, 
1968, pp. 223-224) 
 
116
 What exactly transpired has been a source of confusion among historians and scholars.  The 
debates and proceedings of the Second Congress (October 24, 1791, to March 2, 1793) do 
not contain a record of any specific resolutions being offered on the floor of the House from 
February 19, 1793 until its adjournment on March 2, 1793 (See Annals of Congress, 3, pp. 
882-962).  There are, however, general references made to resolutions without specifying 
their content. Professor Levy’s information about the resolution being offered on the floor of 
the House immediately following the Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia came from the 
record of the Court’s decision in a subsequent case, Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheaton (19 U.S.) 
264 (1821); (See Levy, p. 59, n. 24).  Warren reported that a House member had offered the 
following resolution on February 19, 1793:  
 
that no State shall be liable to be made a party defendant in any of the 
Judicial Courts established or to be established under the authority of the 
United States, at the suit of any person or persons, citizens or foreigners, 
or of any body politic or corporate whether within or without the United 
States.  (Warren, p. 101) 
 
However, Warren offered no citation for his source.  Mathis reported the same resolution 
being offered on February 19, 1793, and cited the following sources:  “Philadelphia Dunlap’s 
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American Daily Advertiser, Feb. 22, 1793; Salem (Mass.) Gazette, Mar. 5, 1793; 
Philadelphia Gazette of the United States, Feb. 20, 1793; Philadelphia Gazette and Daily 
Advertiser, Feb. 20, 1793; Philadelphia National Gazette, Feb. 23, 1793” (Mathis, 1968, p. 
226, n. 73).  Mathis further reported the resolution as being offered by “Theodore Sedgwick, 
Representative from Massachusetts” (Mathis, 1968, p. 226).  Fletcher cited  “Pa. J. & Weekly 
Advertiser, Feb. 27, 1793, at 1, col. 2” as the source for the same House proposal (Fletcher, 
pp. 1058-1059, n. 116). Fletcher then incorrectly reported that the House (instead of the 
Senate) offered a proposal on February 20, 1793; however the source for the February 20th 
action was reported correctly (Fletcher, pp. 1059; p. 1059, n. 117).  Attempting to identify 
Warren’s source, Judge Gibbons cited the Pennsylvania Journal, Feb. 20, 1793, as containing 
“similar but not identical language” and identified it as being “apparently his source” 
(Gibbons, p. 1926, n. 186).  Gibbons also reported that a “search of the National Archives, 
moreover, has produced no evidence of such a resolution in official government records” and 
concluded that the “existence of such a resolution thus appears dubious” (Gibbons, p. 1926, 
n. 186).  Jacobs did not mention the House resolution in his discussion of the congressional 
reaction to Chisholm v. Georgia (see Jacobs, pp. 64-65). 
117
 Senate proceedings were not open to the public as “the Senate sat with closed doors during 
its Legislative as well as its Executive sittings, from the beginning of the First Congress up to 
the 20th day of February, 1794, in the first session of the Third Congress” (Annals of 
Congress, 3, p. 10).  While a record of the executive sessions of the Senate were kept of the 
First Congress, only an abbreviated record was included in the Annals of Congress for the 
Second Congress because of its “being in general a monotonous record” (Annals of 
Congress, 3, p. 10). 
118
 Because Rehnquist will subsequently belittle this work in the 5-4 decision reached in 
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the reader should be aware of both the extensive nature 
of the research as well as the legal expertise behind the research, all of which appeared in 
peer-reviewed journals of law.  The list, as provided by Justice Stevens in his concurring 
opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., follows:  
 
See, e.g., Marshall, Fighting the Words of the eleventh Amendment, 102 
Harv. L. Rev. 1342 (1989); Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh 
Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 Yale L.J. 1 (1988); 
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425 (1987); Lee, 
Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment: The Uses of 
History, 18 Urb. Law. 519 (1986); Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh 
Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 61 (1984); 
Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A 
Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889 (1983); Fletcher, A Historical 
Interpretation of the eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an 
Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against 
Jurisdiction, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1033 (1983); Tribe, Intergovernmental 
Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of 
Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 682 
(1976).  (Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 24, n. 1 [Stevens, 
J., concurring]) 
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119
 One of the first actions taken by the First Continental Congress on July 12, 1775, was to 
create “three departments of Indian affairs – northern, southern, and middle” whose duties 
included the following:  “to treat with the Indians … [sic] in order to preserve peace and 
friendship with the said Indians and to prevent their taking any part in the present 
commotions” (Cohen, p. 9). 
120
 A word of explanation regarding jurisdiction of federal question lawsuits is in order, 
particularly its origin in the Judiciary Act of 1789 and its subsequent treatment in the 
Judiciary Act of 1875.  As explained by one legal authority: 
 
The most significant restriction in the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the 
trial of federal question suits to the state courts.  Only upon appeal to the 
Supreme Court after a final decision was had in the highest court of a 
state might a federal question actually reach a federal court.  (Except for 
a brief interlude in 1801-1802, federal courts did not obtain general trial 
jurisdiction over federal questions until 1875.)  (Hall, 1992, p. 474) 
 
121
 The textual basis for the logical fallacy in Alden v. Maine centers on, but is not limited to, the 
following articulations of the Rehnquist Court: 
 
We have … sometimes referred to the States’ immunity from suit as 
“Eleventh Amendment immunity.”  The phrase is convenient shorthand 
but something of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity of the States 
neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh 
Amendment.  …[T]he States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental 
aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification 
of the Constitution, and which they retain today … except as altered by 
the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments….  
Any doubt regarding the constitutional role of the States as sovereign 
entities is removed by the Tenth Amendment, which … was enacted to 




 For examples of Madison’s anti-British attitudes, see:  Elkins & McKitrick, pp. 224, 234, 
269, 376, 442, & 449; Ketcham, pp. 313, 328-329, 357, 361, & 365. 
123
 The Robert Bork who fired Archibald Cox was the same Robert Bork who would be rejected 
by the U.S. Senate for a seat on the U.S. Supreme Court some fifteen years later.  Ronald 
Reagan had successfully nominated Bork in 1982 to a seat on the U.S. Court of Appeals, 
District of Columbia Circuit in 1982 (Hall, 1992, p. 79).  When Justice Powell retired, 
Reagan nominated Bork to fill the empty seat on the Court on July 1, 1987 (Hall, 1992, p. 
79).  Powell had represented a “swing vote in many civil rights and liberties cases” and had 
supported the Court’s Roe v. Wade decision (Hall, 1992, p. 79).  Described as 
“ultraconservative,” Bork had also been “an outspoken critic of the one-person-one-vote 
decisions, as well as of the Court’s constitutional right to privacy and Roe v. Wade (Gormley, 
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pp. 418, 419).  Bork had also opposed the Court’s remedies “for public school segregation” 
(Gormley, p. 419).   
 Previously, during his academic career, Bork had been known as “an extremely conservative 
Yale law professor who ‘drove the liberal Yale law students up the wall by arguing that 
everything that happened after January 1, 1937 [the beginning of the Supreme Court’s liberal 
New Deal decisions] was outrageous’” (Gormley, p. 357).  Regarding his role in firing Cox 
at Nixon’s behest, Bork believed that “the president was justified in asking the attorney 
general to fire Cox,” that “Cox deserved to be fired,” that Nixon “had the power to [fire 
Cox],” and that “it really wasn’t his [Bork’s] role to question the exercise of that power, but 
rather to carry out the President’s wishes” (Gormley, pp. 365, 367).  The only reservation 
Bork had about his role was that “his friends would view him as an ‘apparatchik,’ someone 
blindly devoted to his superiors” (Gormley, p. 366).   
 During Bork’s confirmation hearings for the Supreme Court position, Senator Ted Kennedy 
“personally grilled nominee Bork” by quoting from “Cox’s newly published book, The Court 
and the Constitution” (Gormley, p. 420).  Kennedy concluded his examination of Bork by 
holding the book “in midair” and stating, “I think that most Americans would agree that the 
man who fired Archibald Cox does not deserve to be promoted to Justice on the Supreme 
Court” (Gormley, p. 421).  According to one description, “Images of Senator Kennedy 
holding Cox’s book aloft and chastising the Supreme Court nominee appeared on television 
networks across the country” (Gormley, p. 421). 
 Bork’s confirmation hearing was “unusually lengthy” (Hall, 1992, p. 79).  The Senate 
Judiciary Committee rejected Bork’s nomination by a 9-5 vote (Hall, 1992, p. 79).  One 
observer attributed Bork’s rejection to a number of factors:  “his widely articulated 
jurisprudence, the success of well-organized interest groups’ opposition, [and] his prickly 
performance during his confirmation hearings” (Hall, 1992, p. 597).  On October 23, 1987, 
the full Senate rejected Bork’s nomination “by a vote of 58 to 42” (Hall, 1992, p. 79).  Bork 
was one of only twenty-five nominations the “Senate has rejected or forced a president to 
withdraw” since 1789, an event that happened “only five times in the twentieth century” 
(Hall, 1992, p. 596).  The 58 – 42 rejection of Bork constituted “the larges margin of defeat 
for any Supreme Court nominee in American history” (Gormley, p. 422).  After his rejection 
by the full Senate, Bork resigned from the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia and “became a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute,” a 
conservative think tank (Hall, 1992, p. 79). 
124
 The abbreviations B.C.E. and C.E. will be used to denote the time periods “Before the 
Common Era” and “Common Era” instead of the religious abbreviations B.C. and A.D. used 
prior to the end of the Twentieth Century C.E. to denote the years “Before Christ” and “Anno 
Domini” (Latin, meaning “The year of our Lord”).  In quotations used throughout the paper, 
however, the form used by the cited author will be used. 
125
 The states, listed in alphabetical order, that enacted their own civil rights statutes were (328 
U.S. 373, 382, n. 24): 
 
California Iowa Nebraska Pennsylvania 
Colorado Kansas New Jersey Rhode Island 
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Connecticut Massachusetts New York Washington 




 The states whose attorneys general submitted briefs in support of Arkansas’ discriminatory 
statute are listed in alphabetical order by column below.  They may be found listed in the 
Court’s opinion, 313 U.S. 80, 88. 
 
Arkansas Georgia Mississippi Texas 




 For further information about Charles Hamilton Houston and his role as the architect of the 
NAACP’s legal strategy, see the following pages of this manuscript:  pp. 250-252, 257, 805, 
811, 813, and Appendix O, pp. 1155-1157. 
128
 The 6-2 vote occurred because the Court was missing one of its justices.  The Court was 
short-handed as the result of Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s death on July 9, 1938 (Hall, 1992, 
p. 986).  The case was argued November 9, 1938, and the opinion was delivered on 
December 12, 1938 (305 U.S. 337, 337).  Felix Frankfurter was not sworn in as justice to fill 
the seat formerly held by Cardozo until January 30, 1939 (Hall, 1992, p. 986). Justice 
McReynolds wrote a separate dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice Butler (305 
U.S. 337, 353-354). 
129
 University of Maryland v. Murray, which began as Murray v. The University of Maryland, 
was a case referred to Houston by Thurgood Marshall, who, at the time, “was practicing in 
his hometown of Baltimore” and had “flawlessly laid” the “groundwork” for the case 
(McNeil, p. 138).  Just one year shy of twenty years later, the roles would be somewhat 
reversed – Thurgood Marshall would triumph in Brown v. Board of Education on the 
strength of the strategic groundwork laid by Charles Hamilton Houston. 
130
 The two cases were both initiated against the same defendant, Sheriff Hopkins, for 
imprisonment following conviction for violation of a city ordinance: Yick Wo v. Hopkins and 
Wo Lee v. Hopkins.  After imprisonment, the two laundry operators selected different appeal 
processes, due to a time differential in their convictions.  Yick Wo appealed to the California 
Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus and was denied, whereupon Wo Lee, seeing that 
an appeal through the state system would be futile, applied for his writ of habeas corpus to 
the federal circuit court for California.  Wo Lee did obtain a fairer hearing in federal court, 
but in spite of the Circuit Court Judge’s opinion that the case represented violations “of the 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the National Constitution, and of the treaty 
between the United States and China,” he deferred “to the decision of the Supreme Court of 
California in the case of Yick Wo, and contrary to his own opinion as thus expressed, the 
circuit judge discharged the writ and remanded the prisoner” (p. 363). 
131
 The legal status being referred to in the passage included these aspects of life:  “[T]he 
husband alone controlled any property held in common; a wife could not sue in court, sell or 
mortgage her own property, or contract a debt without her husband’s consent” (Censer & 
Hunt, p. 147). 
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132
 Although the two treaties negotiated with the Six Nations and with the Wyandot et al were 
the first treaties laid before the Senate, neither of the two treaties was the first treaty ratified 
by the Senate.  As detailed by Professor Hayden, the Consular Convention with France was 
the first treaty to which the Senate formally “gave its advice and consent” (Hayden, p. 4).  
President Washington first submitted this treaty to the Senate on June 11, 1789 (Sen. Exec. 
J., p. 5).  After detailed examination of the extent to which the various parties involved in 
negotiating the final product followed the original instructions issued by the Continental 
Congress in 1782, and after considering the question of whether or not it was necessary for 
the Senate to ratify the agreement, on July 1, 1789, the Senate “unanimously consented to the 
[Consular] convention and advised the President to ratify it” (Hayden, p. 6; Sen. Exec. J., p. 
9). 
Hayden noted that in acting to ratify the Consular Convention with France,  
 
the government of the United States had acted in accordance with the 
principle of international law, that except under extraordinary 
circumstances a nation was bound to ratify any agreement which it had 
instructed its representative to make.  (Hayden, p. 9). 
 
This is the decision to which President Washington referred in his message of September 
17th to the Senate regarding the treaties negotiated at Fort Harmar. 
133
 A Professor of History at Duquesne University, participating in a session, “Law, Morality, 
and the Marshall Court,” at a meeting of the Organization of American Historians meeting on 
April 19, 1968, noted that the date on which the Court delivered its opinion in Worcester v. 
Georgia was March 3, 1832 (Burke, p. 500, n., 525).  This would tend to validate Prucha’s 
reported date for the opinion.  Bass also reported March 3, 1832, as the date of the Court’s 
opinion (Bass, p. 154). 
134
 Following the Court’s decision, President Jackson was alleged to have remarked, “John 
Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it” (Burke, p. 525; Debo, p. 122).  Debo 
commented, “Whether or not the President used the words ascribed to him …, he ignored the 
court ruling and advised the Georgia officials to continue their persecution of the Cherokees” 
(Debo, p. 122).  Burke commented, “Most historians … echoed these cries [of the anti-
Jackson press following the Worcester decision]” accusing the President of allowing 
“Georgia to defy federal laws, treaties, and the decision of the Supreme Court” (Burke, p. 
524).  According to Burke’s analysis, most historians ended “their discussion of the 
Worcester case with the quote [attributed to Jackson]” (Burke, pp. 524-525).  Burke 
continued: 
 
While most [historians] admit that they cannot prove what Jackson said, 
none seems to doubt that he thought it and acted on it.  The impression 
left by these discussions is that Jackson ignored his constitutional duty to 
enforce the Court decree.  (Burke, p. 525) 
 
While acknowledging that the alleged quote reflected Jackson’s views, both Prucha and 
Burke detailed factual problems with the conclusion that the President ignored his 
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constitutional duty in enforcing the Supreme Court’s ruling.  According to their analysis, 
even if Jackson had agreed with the Court’s ruling (which he didn’t), a combination of 
shortcomings and loopholes in the existing law of the period made federal enforcement of the 
Court’s ruling both impracticable and impossible.  According to Prucha: 
 
United States marshals could not be sent to free the prisoners until the 
state judge had refused formally to comply with the order.  But Georgia 
completely ignored the court’s proceedings, and no written refusal was 
forthcoming.  Anyway, the Supreme Court adjourned before it could 
report Georgia’s failure to conform.  Nor was there any other procedure 
that Jackson could adopt, even if he had wanted to.  He himself declared 
that “the decision of the supreme court has fell still born, and they find 
that they cannot coerce Georgia to yield to its mandate.”  (Prucha, 1984, 
1986, p. 77) 
 
Burke filled in more details regarding “the deficiencies in federal laws” by relying upon 
William Wirt’s analysis of the enforcement difficulties (Burke, p. 525).  Professor Burke 
began by summarizing Wirt’s legal conclusions:  “William Wirt, Worcester’s own attorney, 
doubted that the Court decree could be enforced even in 1833, or that the Court could do 
anything for the missionaries” (Burke, p. 525).  Responding to a fellow attorney’s suggestion 
that the Supreme Court issue a writ of habeas corpus when the state court refused to execute 
the Court’s decree, Wirt observed that such a procedure was not authorized by the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 which “allowed federal judges and courts to issue such writs only when 
prisoners were held under federal authority” (Burke, p. 526).  Since Worcester and Butler 
were imprisoned by the State of Georgia, such a writ to free prisoners held under state 
authority could not automatically be issued.  The Judiciary Act of 1789 and the course of 
action taken by Georgia presented yet another problem.  According to Burke: 
 
Though the Judiciary Act permitted the Court, when a case had once 
been remanded without effect, to proceed to a final decision and award 
execution, this action required a written record of the state court’s 
refusal to carry out the first decree.  Since the Georgia court never put its 
refusal in writing the Supreme Court could not have awarded execution 
in its next Term.  (Burke, p. 526) 
 
Based upon his analysis of the then current defects in the law, Wirt “recommended a new law 
and a series of amendments to cure the defects that this case had revealed in the judicial 
processes” (Burke, p. 526).  Wirt’s recommendations centered on three changes that needed 
to be made: 
 
• new legislation regarding habeas corpus; 
• an amendment to the Judiciary Act of 1789; and 
• an amendment of the Militia Act of 1795. 
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First, new legislation would authorize “all federal judges to issue writs of habeas corpus to 
free persons held under state authority for violating a law that had been declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court” (Burke, p. 526).  Second, amending § 25 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 would “permit the Supreme Court to execute immediately its own 
sentence in a case where the state court seemed likely to resist” (Burke, p. 526).  Third, the 
then current Militia Act “merely authorized the President to call out the militia to execute the 
laws of the Union” (Burke, p. 526).  Despite his conviction that the Militia Act of 1795 
already authorized presidential action in the current Worcester case, Wirt “wanted Congress 
to amend it to ‘require’ him to act” (Burke, p. 526). 
Meanwhile, Worcester and Butler languished in a Georgia prison, having been sentenced to 
“four years of hard labor in the penitentiary” (Bass, p. 137).  The political scene also shifted 
by the time the Court reconvened in January 1833.  Jackson had been re-elected and the 
nullification crisis between South Carolina and the United States created the need for a 
“united front against the nullifiers” (Burke, p. 530).  Acting behind the scenes William Wirt 
and Daniel Webster “advised the Cherokees not to renew the contest in the Supreme Court” 
because of the nullification crisis (Burke, p. 530).  Wirt and Sergeant, who had represented 
the two missionaries, “begged them [Wirt & Butler] to drop [their] case for the same 
reasons” (Burke, p. 530).  At the same time, “prominent Jacksonians … pleaded with 
Governor Lumpkin of Georgia [on behalf of President Jackson] to pardon Worcester and 
Butler on the grounds that it would remove the pretext for bringing together Georgia and 
South Carolina on nullification” (Burke, p. 530).  Simultaneously, the American Board of 
Commissioners for Missionaries, with whom Worcester and Butler were affiliated and who 
had hired Wirt to represent the two missionaries in Worcester v. Georgia, worked to 
convince the two reluctant missionaries to accept Governor Lumpkin’s pardon releasing 
them from prison (Prucha, 1984, 1986, pp. 76-77).  Finally, on January 14, 1833, the two 
missionaries were released from prison based on orders the prison commandant received 
(Bass, p. 159).  According to a researcher and professor at the University of Oklahoma, “The 
Governor sent them no written discharge, but issued his proclamation, stating that they [the 
two missionaries] had appealed to the magnanimity of the State, and had been set at liberty” 
(Bass, p. 159). 
Although the second of the Cherokee cases had revealed the deficiencies of the Judiciary Act 
of 1789, it took the nullification crisis and the “need to defend the Constitution and the 
Union” to effect the needed changes in the law that had been defeated “for years” (Burke, p. 
531).  Professor Burke observed, “[I]t was not the missionary cause but the nullification 
controversy that turned Wirt’s hopes [for amending the Judiciary Act] into reality” (Burke, p. 
531).  He continued: 
 
The Force Act of 1833 [the revision of the Judiciary Act of 1789] reads 
more like the revisions recommended by Wirt in April of 1832 
[immediately following the Worcester decision] than those suggested by 
Jackson in his message to Congress in January of 1833.  In fact Daniel 
Webster felt obligated to deny that “there was the slightest reference to 
the Georgia case in my own mind, or ever, as far as I know, in that of 
any other gentleman, in preparing and passing the bill for the better 
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collection of revenue.  It is true that some of the provisions of the bill 
ought, in my judgment, to be permanent.”  (Burke, p. 531) 
 
Regarding Webster’s denial of Worcester’s influence, one is reminded of the line from 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet, “The lady doth protest too much, methinks” (Act III, Scene 2, Line 
239).   
Some 160 years later in November of 1992, the State of Georgia formally acknowledged that 
it made a mistake in jailing “two missionaries for fighting its seizure of Cherokee land” 
(Associated Press, 1992; hereafter, AP, 1992).  In its formal pardon of the two missionaries, 
Georgia called “the incident ‘a stain on the history of criminal justice in Georgia’ and 
acknowledge[d] usurping Cherokee sovereignty and ignoring the Supreme Court” (AP, 
1992).  While Georgia’s action represented repentance, no acts of either penance or 
restitution accompanied the gesture.  The action merely acknowledged Georgia’s public 
awareness and acceptance of history’s judgment.  And, while it publicly acknowledged 
Georgia’s wrongdoing to the general public, no mention was made that the State of Georgia 
issued a direct formal apology and request for forgiveness to either of the two federally 
recognized tribal governments whose members’ ancestors suffered at the hands of Georgia – 
the Cherokee Nation, based in Tahlequah, Oklahoma, or the Eastern Band of Cherokee 
Indians, based in Cherokee, North Carolina (see the tribal websites, 
www.cherokee.org/Government/Default.aspx and www. 
Cherokeesmokies.com/about_cherokee.html respectively).  While Georgia admitted 
“usurping” Cherokee sovereignty, apparently it couldn’t bring itself to acknowledge the then-
current sovereign governments of the Cherokee. 
135
 The official title, taken from the title page, is Reports of Cases At Law and In Equity, Argued 
and Determined in the Supreme Court of Alabama.  The compilers of the Alabama Supreme 
Court Reports are listed as George N. Stewart and Benjamin F. Porter.  It was originally 
published in 1836 at Tuskaloosa by Marmaduke J. Slade.  When originally published, 
Stewart had resigned as the official reporter for the Alabama high court.  His successor, 
Porter, made an arrangement with Stewart for the reports of the January and July terms of 
1831 as well as part of the January term of 1832 to be published, using both their names as 
the reporters.  The foregoing is explained in a note on an unnumbered page following the title 
page of the cited volume. 
136
 The two choices presented by the Alabama Chief Justice as the only alternatives available 
constitute a false position in that it ignored the pathway taken by the Marshall Court in the 
two Cherokee cases previously discussed. 
137
 The concept was originally developed by Friedrich Ratzel, a German geographer who lived 
from 1844-1904.  Ratzel developed lebensraum as a concept that related “human groups to 
the spatial units” in which they lived (Friedrich Ratzel, ¶ 1).  Ratzel’s “essay, ‘Lebensraum,’ 
[was] often cited as a starting point in geopolitics,” and served as a model “study in 
biogeography” (Friedrich Ratzel, ¶ 4).  Following World War I, “the subsequent misuse of 
the Lebensraum concept by the Nazi regime in Germany was largely based on the 
interpretation of Ratzel’s concept by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén” 
(Friedrich Ratzel, ¶ 1). 
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“Anti-Semitism and notions of German racial superiority were at the core of [the] ideology” 
promoted by Hitler in Mein Kampf, translated as “My Struggle” (Germany-The Third Reich-
The Nazi Revolution [hereafter cited as “Nazi Revolution”], ¶‘s 2 & 3).  As Hitler envisioned 
the future: 
 
Racially superior Germans were to be gathered into a tightly knit 
Volksgemeinschaft, or racial community, in which divisions of party and 
class would be transcended in a spirit of racial harmony, a harmony that 
would necessarily exclude people of inferior blood.  (Nazi Revolution, ¶ 
3) 
   
In Hitler’s view, “the German Volk could never achieve their destiny without Lebensraum 
(“living space”) to support a vastly increased German population and form the basis for 
world power” (International Relations-Origins of WW II-Rise of Hitler and Fall of 
Versailles-Failure of the German Republic [hereafter cited as “Failure of the German 
Republic”], ¶ 5).  According to Hitler, Lebensraum 
 
was to be found in the Ukraine and intermediate lands of eastern Europe.  
This “heartland” of the Eurasian continent … was especially suited for 
conquest since it was occupied, in Hitler’s mind, by Slavic 
Untermenschen (subhumans) [literally, less than, or below the status of 
men] and ruled from the centre of the Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy in 
Moscow.  (Failure of the German Republic, ¶ 5) 
 
138
 Prucha comprehensively detailed the basic problems needing to be addressed by 
governmental policy immediately after the Revolution.  Besides the need to establish peace 
with the tribes who had allied themselves with the British during the Revolution, other 
problems requiring attention were: 
 
• determining the precise authority of the states and of the national 
government in managing Indian affairs, 
• extinguishing in an orderly way the Indian title to the land so that the 
expanding settlements might find unencumbered room, 
• restraining aggressive frontiersmen from encroaching upon country 
still claimed by the Indians, 
• regulating the contacts between the two races that grew out of trade, 
• providing adequate means to protect the rights of the red man, and 
• fulfilling the responsibility that the Christian whites had to aid the 
savage pagans along the path toward civilization.  (Prucha, 1962, pp. 
1-2) (List formatting as bulleted points added) 
 
Based on his extensive study, Prucha further concluded that by the 1830’s, the United States 
“had determined a set of principles which became the standard base lines of American 
policy” (Prucha, 1962, p. 2).  Prucha identified the “fundamental elements of the federal 
program” as follows: 
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1) Protection of Indian rights to their land by setting definite boundaries 
for the Indian Country, restricting the whites from entering the area 
except under certain controls, and removing illegal intruders. 
2) Control of the disposition of Indian lands by denying the right of 
private individuals or local governments to acquire land from the 
Indians by purchase or by any other means. 
3) Regulation of the Indian trade by determining the conditions under 
which individuals might engage in the trade, prohibiting certain 
classes of traders, and actually entering into the trade itself. 
4) Control of the liquor traffic by regulating the flow of intoxicating 
liquor into the Indian Country and then prohibiting it altogether. 
5) Provision for the punishment of crimes committed by members of 
one race against the other and compensation for damages suffered by 
one group at the hands of the other, in order to remove the occasions 
for private retaliation which led to frontier hostilities. 
6) Promotion of civilization and education among the Indians, in the 
hope that they might be absorbed into the general stream of 
American society.  (Prucha, 1962, p. 2) 
 
139
 An eminent historian aptly characterized the situation when he observed, “Regardless of the 
century, the reactions of a frontiersman to the sight of good arable land in the possession of 
an Indian were as easy to predict as the reflexes of Pavlov’s dog” (Hagan, p. 44).  An astute 
Indian agent serving in the Mississippi Territory in 1809 “witnessed a drive of white settlers 
into Chickasaw lands north of the Tennessee River in what is now the state of Alabama” 
(Prucha, 1962, p. 159).  In his report to the Secretary of War, the agent described the 
situation: 
 
These intruders are always well armed, some of them shrewd and of 
desperate character, have nothing to lose and hold barbarous sentiments 
towards Indians.  They see extensive tracts of forest exceedingly 
disproportioned to the present or expected population of the tribes who 
hold them.  They take hold of these lands, some of them in hopes the 
land will be purchased, when they will plead a right of preemption, 
making a merit of their crimes.  With these people remonstrance has no 
effect; nothing but force can prevent their violation of Indian rights.  
(Prucha, 1962, p. 160) 
 
140
 Library of Congress, Omaha, Item 3, Nebraska [Homepage, select “Omaha” from the list of 
tribes, select Item # 3 from the list of items presented, click on “Nebraska” at bottom of page 
for Item #20]. 
141
 In 1933 Cohen (working in private practice in New York City and teaching classes at what 
later became the Rutgers Law School, at the New School for Social Research, and an 
additional course in legislative drafting at Yale Law School) was drafted by the Interior 
Department’s Solicitor to serve as the Assistant Solicitor for a one-year term in order  
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to help draft basic legislation which would transfer to Indian tribes and 
individual Indians greater authority over their economic and political 
affairs.  The act, originally called The Wheeler-Howard Act, later 
became known as the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.  (Felix S. 
Cohen, p. 347). 
  
The request for one year turned into fourteen years of government service.  In 1939 Cohen 
was loaned by the Interior Department to the Justice Department (again for one year) to serve 
as a Special Assistant to the Attorney General in order to head-up the “Indian Law Survey of 
the Department of Justice” (Felix S. Cohen, p. 348).   
 
With the assistance of a colleague and friend of longstanding…, he 
compiled a 46-volume collection of Federal laws and treaties, and on the 
basis of this special study prepared a Handbook of Federal Indian Law 
which has become a standard source book in Indian law.  (Felix S. 
Cohen, p. 348) 
 
Cohen had the advantage of a unique and prodigious education.  His father had a Ph.D. in 
philosophy and taught mathematics at City College in New York City.  His mother gave up 
her job of teaching school and devoted herself to her first-born son for the first eight years of 
his life.  At age eight he entered elementary school in Yonkers from which he graduated four 
years later.  After attending Yonkers High School for one year, he transferred to a high 
school in New York in order to take advantage of a unique “seven-year educational system 
coordinated with City College” (Felix S. Cohen, p. 346).  Six years later he “graduated from 
the College magna cum laude, just before his nineteenth birthday” (Felix S. Cohen, p. 346).  
After being awarded  
 
a fellowship at the Harvard Graduate School, he spent the next two years 
at Cambridge, majoring in philosophy but spending many hours reading 
in law, political science, anthropology, and auditing the classes of 
professors outside the Philosophy Department for whom Harvard was 
also justly famous – Roscoe Pound, Felix Frankfurter…  (Felix S. 
Cohen, p. 347) 
 
Receiving his M.A. in philosophy in 1927, Frankfurter completed his “residence for a PhD. 
in 1928 on the Henry Bromfield Rogers Fellowship in Ethics and Jurisprudence” (Felix S. 
Cohen, p. 347).  That fall (1928) Cohen entered the Columbia Law School.  During the law 
school’s mid-year break, Cohen successfully completed “the comprehensive examination in 
philosophy at Harvard” (Felix S. Cohen, p. 347)  At age 22 Cohen was awarded the Ph.D. in 
philosophy by Harvard and two years later received his LL.B. from Columbia Law School in 
1931, having served as the “book review and legislation editor of the Columbia Law Review 
from 1929 to 1931” (Felix S. Cohen, p. 347).  Cohen brought the full depth and breadth of 
his education to bear on his work at the Interior Department and the Department of Justice.  
His Handbook of Federal Indian Law is a work of prodigious scholarship and analysis. 
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Just how prestigious and authoritative Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law is 
considered by those knowledgeable in the field of Indian law can be seen through 
consideration of the federal government’s actions towards it in the 1950’s when the U.S. 
Government embarked on “a policy of terminating all tribes and ending Federal services to 
Indians” (Bennett & Hart, p. v).  Cohen’s work ran directly counter to the government’s new 
Indian policy  Just how is explained by the Director of the American Indian Law Center and 
a professor of law, both at the University of New Mexico: 
 
Based on his painstaking studies and drawn from his rich background in 
law, philosophy, anthropology, and international affairs, it [the 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law] presented legal and moral arguments 
demonstrating that the American Indian was possessed of certain rights, 
among them self-governance and self-determination.  (Bennett & Hart, 
p. v) 
 
The Department of the Interior’s response was to “rewrite Cohen’s book and discredit the 
original under the guise of a revision” (Bennett & Hart, p. v).  Since Cohen had died in 1953, 
he could not object.  As a result the so-called revised version of Cohen’s landmark work was 
issued in 1958 by the Government Printing Office.  The purpose of the revision was baldly 
stated in the introduction to the 1958 edition: it was rewritten “for the purpose of foreclosing, 
if possible, further uncritical use of the earlier edition by judges, lawyers, and laymen” 
(Bennett & Hart, pp. v-vi).  The new theme of the “revised” version was that “the Federal 
Government’s power over Indian Affairs is plenary” (Bennett & Hart, p. vi).  In other words, 
the federal government can do whatsoever it desires in unlimited fashion.  It took over a 
decade and multiple congressional hearings to discredit the Termination Policy of 
Eisenhower’s Republican administration.  The major point is this: the 1958 edition of 
Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law is not Cohen’s work, despite the title page or the 
card catalog listing in any library. 
142
 Cohen, 1942/1971, p. 153. 
143
 Kappler, v. II, p. 140. 
144
 Library of Congress, Delaware, Item 20, Kansas 2 [Homepage, select “Delaware” from the 
list of tribes, select Item # 20 from the list of items presented, click on “Kansas 2” at bottom 
of page for Item #20]. 
145
 Cohen, 1942/1971, p. 153, n. 11. 
146
 Library of Congress, Menomini [sic], Item 3, Wisconsin 1 [Homepage, select “Menomini” 
from the list of tribes, select Item # 3 from the list of items presented, click on “Wisconsin 1” 
at bottom of page for Item #20]. 
147
 Library of Congress, Stockbridge, Item 1, Wisconsin 2 [Homepage, select “Stockbridge” 
from the list of tribes, select Item # 1 from the list of items presented, click on “Wisconsin 2” 
at bottom of page for Item #1]. 
148
 112 U.S. 94, 119. 
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149
 The case was previously cited in at least two different ways.  Cohen (1942) used the citation 
employed in this paper for McKay v. Campbell with the difference being the use of the case 
number, i.e., “McKay v. Campbell, 16 Fed. Cas. No. 8840 (Cohen, 1942/1971, p. 155, n. 34).  
The Supreme Court (1884) in Elk v. Wilkins cited it as 2 Sawyer , 118 (See 112 U.S. 94, 
109).  L.S.B. Sawyer, Esq. is listed as the reporter for the case (16 Fed. Cas. 161, n. 1)  I 
found the case on page 161 in the 16th volume of the Federal Case series, so I used the 
modern legal format to cite the case.  The Drake Law Library did not contain any of Sawyers 
reports, but did have the Federal Case series, whose formal title is “The Federal Cases, 
Comprising Cases Argued and Determined in the Circuit and District Courts of the United 
States:  From the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the Federal Reporter, Arranged 
Alphabetically by the Titles of the Cases, and Numbered Consecutively” (16 Fed. Cas., Title 
Page). 
150
 Map retrieved July 28, 2009, from the World Sites Atlas web site: 
http://www.sitesatlas.com/Flash/USCan/static/SDFF.htm 
151
 Library of Congress, Ponka [sic], Item 1, Dakota 1 [Homepage, select “Ponka” from the list 
of tribes, select Item #1 from the list of items presented, click on “Dakota 1” at bottom of 
page for Item #1]. 
152
 The location of this map derives from the Quapaw Treaty of 1833 whereby the Quapaw 
removed from Arkansas to the Indian Territory (Royce, pp. 748-749):  Library of Congress, 
Quapaw, Item 3, Indian Territory 2 [Homepage, select “Quapaw” from the list of tribes, 
select Item #3 from the list of items presented, click on “Indian Territory 2” at bottom of 
page for Item #3]. 
153
 Library of Congress, Ponka [sic], Item 5, Indian Territory 3 [Homepage, select “Ponka” from 
the list of tribes, select Item #5 from the list of items presented, click on “Indian Territory 3” 
at bottom of page for Item #5]. 
154
 The cases are Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), Rasul v. Bush (2004), Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), 
and Boumediene v. Bush (2008).  Professor Ronald Dworkin discussed the cases and their 
significance in an article published in The New York Review of Books on August 14, 2008.  
Anthony Lewis, who won his second Pulitzer Prize for his reporting on the U.S. Supreme 
Court as a reporter and columnist for The New York Times, also wrote about the cases.  His 
citations are taken from his article in The New York Review of Books that appeared on 
September 25, 2008.  According to Lewis, Rasul v. Bush (2004) was decided by a 6-3 
majority, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) was decided by a 5-3 majority, and Boumediene v. 
Bush (2008) was decided by a slim 5-4 margin (Lewis, 2008, p. 46).  Lewis focused on these 
three cases because they were unified by the following theme:  “Three times in the last four 
years the Supreme Court has rejected the Bush administration’s legal defenses of its program 
for detention of alleged ‘enemy combatants’” (Lewis, 2008, p. 46).  U.S. Senator Arlen 
Specter also discussed the same cases in an article published in the same journal, The New 
York Review of Books, on May 14, 2009.  Dworkin described the importance of Boumediene 
v. Bush: 
 
The Court held by a 5-4 vote that aliens detained as enemy combatants 
in Guantánamo have a constitutional right to challenge their detention in 
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American courts.  The decision frees none of them, some of whom have 
been held without trial for six years, but it makes it possible for them to 
argue to a federal district court judge that the administration has no 
factual or legal ground for imprisoning them….  American law has 
never before recognized that aliens imprisoned by the United States 
abroad have such rights.  (Dworkin, 2008, p. 18) 
 
Dworkin anchored the decision in Anglo-American law by noting that “the principle the 
Court vindicated is simple and clear.  Since before Magna Carta, Anglo-American law has 
insisted than anyone imprisoned has the right to require his jailor to show a justification in a 
court of law” (Dworkin, 2008, p. 18).  The professor of law also described the actions taken 
by the Bush administration that violated basic precepts of habeas corpus.  Bush 
administration arguments echoed a portion of the argument used by the U.S government in 
1879 against Standing Bear’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus – noncitizens have no legal 
standing to request such a writ: 
 
The Bush administration, as part of its so-called “war on terror,” created 
a unique category of prisoners who it claims have no such right [to a 
writ of habeas corpus] because they are aliens, not citizens, and because 
they are held not in an American prison but in foreign territory.  
(Dworkin, 2008, p. 18) 
 
Senator Specter couched his references to Boumediene v. Bush in terms of what he perceived 
to be a threat to the traditional notion of the separation of powers in American government.  
In Senator Specter’s view: 
 
In the seven and a half years since September 11, the United States has 
witnessed one of the greatest expansions of executive authority in its 
history, at the expense of the constitutionally mandated separation of 
powers.  President Obama, as only the third sitting senator to be elected 
president in American history, and the first since John F. Kennedy, may 
be more likely to respect the separation of powers than President Bush 
was.  But rather than put my faith in any president to restrain the 
executive branch, I intend to take several concrete steps, which I hope 
the new president will support.  (Specter, p. 48) 
 
While Senator Specter’s views represent a viewpoint from within the federal government, 
they are corroborated by outside sources as well.  Consider the following assessment of the 
Bush-Cheney Administration’s use of “fear flowing from the attacks on September 11 to 
institute a policy of deliberate cruelty that would have been unthinkable on September 10” by 
an independent journalist with specialized knowledge of the situation gained from arduous 
research and study: 
 
President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and a small handful of trusted 
advisers sought and obtained dubious legal opinions enabling them to 
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circumvent American laws and traditions.  In the name of protecting 
national security, the executive branch sanctioned coerced confessions, 
extrajudicial detention, and other violations of individuals’ liberties that 
had been prohibited since the country’s founding.  They turned the 
Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel into a political instrument, 
which they used to expand their own executive power at the expense of 
long-standing checks and balances.  (Emphasis added) (Mayer, p. 41) 
 
Viewing Boumediene v. Bush as an effort by the Supreme Court “to beat back the 
encroachment of executive power,” Senator Specter expressed that he “was frustrated that 
Congress had left the task of reining in the executive to slow-paced and incomplete judicial 
review” (Specter, p. 50).  He explained: 
 
While the Boumediene decision ensured habeas rights for detainees, it 
took seven years; and even then the Court almost failed to take on the 
case.  All along, the Court’s rulings [in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and in Rasul 
v. Bush] were piecemeal and avoided taking strong stands on 
controversial constitutional questions.  The result was a protracted 
process that delayed justice for detainees and left important areas of the 
constitutional law murky.  (Specter, p. 50) 
 
Senator Specter presented further information in support of his contention that the “Court 
almost failed to take on the case” (Specter, p. 50).  According to the senator: 
 
Indeed the Supreme Court actually denied Boumediene’s initial petition 
for review on April 2, 2007.  Then, on June 29, in a highly unusual 
move, the Court reconsidered and agreed to hear the case.  The justices 
gave no reason for the reversal, but some speculate that they were 
moved by intervening disclosures concerning the military commissions.  
In particular, a military officer and lawyer who had been involved in 
overseeing the tribunals said that the process was flawed and that 
prosecutors had been pressured to label detainees as enemy combatants.  
(Specter, p. 50) 
 
Anthony Lewis pointed to a ruling in June of 2008 by a “three-judge panel of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia” that may have impacted the Supreme 
Court’s surprising reversal of its earlier refusal to consider Boumediene et al’s  petition 
(Lewis, 2008, p. 47).  The case involved “Huzaifa Parhat, one of a number of Uighur 
Muslims from China [incarcerated at] Guantánamo” who had been “captured in Pakistan in 
the fall of 2001” (Lewis, 2008, p. 47).  Citing the case as “[a] striking example of the 
importance of having courts check official decisions that someone is an ‘enemy combatant,’” 
Lewis reported that the Court of Appeals found “that there was no persuasive evidence to 
support the government’s labeling of him [Parhat] as an enemy combatant” (Lewis, 2008, p. 
47).  According to Lewis: 
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The [three-judge] panel included the court’s chief judge, David Sentelle, 
one of the most conservative federal judges in the country.  Its opinion 
ridiculed the government argument, comparing it to the statement of a 
Lewis Carroll character:  “I have said it thrice.  What I tell you three 
times is true.”  (Lewis, 2008, p. 47) 
 
The military commissions were a response by the Defense Department to the Court’s ruling 
in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld whereby  
 
an American citizen designated an enemy combatant nevertheless has a 
right, under the Constitution’s due process clause, to “notice of the 
factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the 
Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decision-maker.  
(Dworkin, 2008, p. 18).   
 
The administration’s response, “only a minimal interpretation of O’Connor’s description of 
what due process required,” was based partially on Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s plurality 
opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld in which she “said that the administration might satisfy the 
[notice] requirement through appropriately constituted military tribunals that do not provide 
the procedures and protections of ordinary criminal courts” (Dworkin, 2008, p. 18).  The 
“minimal interpretation” of O’Connor’s description of due process by the Bush 
administration’s military tribunals included the following: 
 
Detainees were provided with special legal “representatives” appointed 
by the administration rather than lawyers of their choice.  They were not 
allowed to confront government witnesses, and could call only those 
witnesses the government decided could be produced “reasonably.”  
Hearsay evidence was allowed against them, and the government’s 
factual claims were to be presumed correct unless rebutted.  (Dworkin, 
2008, p. 18) 
 
On the same day that the Court decided Hamdi v. Bush, the Court also reached its decision in 
Rasul v. Bush wherein the Court ruled “that the Guantánamo detainees were entitled to bring 
a habeas corpus challenge to their detention in the federal district court for the District of 
Columbia” (Dworkin, 2008, p. 18).  It was this ruling that “opened the way for Lakhdar 
Boumediene and thirty-six others held at Guantánamo to file habeas corpus petitions in 
federal courts challenging their detention” (Dworkin, 2008, p. 18).  
However, after the petition was filed by Boumediene et al, Congress got into the act and 
“overturned the Rasul decision” with its enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 
an act which provided 
 
that no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider 
… an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an 
alien detained by the Department of Defense at Guantánamo Bay, 
Cuba…  (Dworkin, 2008, p. 19) 
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On June 29, 2006, the Supreme Court ruled on a challenge to the legitimacy of the military 
commission trials. 
 
[T]he Court announced in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that the president could 
not conduct military commission trials under procedures that had not 
been authorized by Congress and that failed to satisfy the obligations of 
the Geneva Conventions’ Common Article III and the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice.  (Specter, p. 50) 
 
The Court also held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that the provisions of the Detainee Treatment 
Act prohibiting detainees at Guantánamo Bay from filing for habeas corpus were “not 
intended to apply to petitioners who had already filed habeas corpus applications when the 
DTA [Detainee Treatment Act] was enacted” (Dworkin, 2008, pp. 19). 
 
Congress once again responded to the Court’s ruling with another legislative act, the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, in which it stated “that the DTA was intended to apply 
retroactively,” thus prohibiting the Boumediene et al petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  
Senator Specter supplied the reasoning behind the legislation, which was a view “that foreign 
terrorist suspects did not have the same rights as others in US custody” (Specter, p. 50).  
Specter reported that he “offered an amendment that would have guaranteed habeas corpus 
for detainees,” arguing that he “was ‘trying to establish … a course of judicial procedure’ to 
determine whether the accuses were in fact enemy combatants” (Specter, p. 50).  According 
to Specter: 
 
I pointed out that my fight to preserve habeas rights was, in essence, a 
struggle to defend “the jurisdiction of the federal courts to maintain the 
rule of law.”  I concluded with a plea for the Senate not to deny “the 
habeas corpus right which would take us back some 900 years and deny 
the fundamental principle of the Magna Charta imposed on King John at 
Runnymede.”  Despite these entreaties, my amendment narrowly lost on 
a 48-51 vote.  (Specter, p. 50) 
 
As the name of the act suggests (the Military Commissions Act), Congress reinstated the 
military tribunals (“Combatant Status Review Tribunals” or CSRT’s) under procedures it 
authorized that continued the limit of the right of appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court (Dworkin, 2008, p. 18 & p. 19, n. 7). 
According to Dworkin, congressional maneuvering to thwart Supreme Court rulings 
eventually “forced the justices to face two new questions,” both of which were addressed in 
Boumediene v. Bush (Dworkin, 2008, p. 19).  This occurred because, as noted by Dworkin, 
Congress had forced the issue of habeas corpus up against  the “suspension clause” of the 
Constitution, which even “Congress [could]not overrule” (Dworkin, 2008, p. 19).  As 
described by Dworkin, the “suspension clause” of the Constitution provides “that Congress 
may suspend the writ of habeas corpus only during an invasion or a rebellion” (Dworkin, 
2008, p. 19).  Since no one had put forth the argument that the terrorist attacks of September 
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11, 2001, constituted either a rebellion or an invasion, the Supreme Court was faced with 
interpreting congressional limitations of habeas corpus in light of the Constitution’s strictures 
regarding the abolition of habeas corpus.  The two questions confronting the Court were 
described by Dworkin: 
 
[1]  Does the constitutional guarantee of habeas corpus apply to aliens 
imprisoned at Guantánamo outside the formal territory of the United 
States?  [2]  If so, is the scheme provided by Congress in the Detainee 
Treatment Act [of 2005] and the Military Commissions Act [of 2006] – 
military tribunals that could be followed by a limited appeal to the D.C. 
Circuit Court – an adequate substitute for the traditional writ? 
 
Dworkin noted the Court’s answer to both questions:  “In Boumediene, Kennedy, for the 
five-justice majority, answered the first question yes and the second no, and he therefore 
declared the congressional scheme unconstitutional” (Dworkin, 2008, p. 19).   
The response from the right side of the political spectrum was mixed, but a majority of the 
response “predicted in strident language that the decision would gravely damage the 
country’s security” (Lewis, 2008, p. 46).  Senator John McCain, “a survivor of torture as a 
prisoner in North Vietnam who was once a critic of the Bush detention practices,” described 
as “wav[ing] the bloody shirt,” declared that the Court’s decision was “one of the worst 
decision in the history of the country” (Lewis, 2008, 46, 47).  However, George Will, a 
conservative columnist, supported the Court’s decision.  In a column he wrote that blasted 
“Senator McCain for the ignorance of his comments on habeas corpus,” Will wrote that “the 
Supreme Court’s ruling only begins marking a boundary against government’s otherwise 
boundless power to detain people indefinitely” (Lewis, 2008, p. 47).  Will further noted: 
 
No state power is more fearsome than the power to imprison.  Hence the 
habeas right has been at the heart of the centuries-long struggle to 
constrain governments, a struggle in which the greatest event was the 
writing of America’s Constitution, which limits Congress’s power to 
revoke habeas corpus to periods of rebellion or invasion.  (Will, p. A17) 
 
One is reminded of the exchange that took place in A Man For All Seasons regarding the 
desire to circumvent the law in order to get at ones adversary, a play illustrating the tensions 
between a government of men versus a government of law: 
 
Roper So now you’d give the Devil benefit of law! 
More Yes.  What would you do?  Cut a great road through the law to 
get after the Devil? 
Roper I’d cut down every law in England to do that! 
More Oh?  And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned 
round on you – where would you hide, Roper, the laws all 
being flat?  This country’s planted thick with laws from coast 
to coast – man’s laws, not God’s  - and if you cut them down – 
and you’re just the man to do it – d’you really think you could 
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stand upright in the winds that would blow then?  Yes, I’d give 
the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety’s sake.  (Bolt, p. 
66) 
 
While the lower federal court judge in United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook didn’t 
address a constitutional issue as did the nation’s highest court in Boumediene v. Bush, the 
effect was similar – the Court rejected executive arguments for arbitrary military power over 
noncitizens and upheld the right of habeas corpus, a cornerstone, we now see, in the long-
traveled, arduously constructed, difficultly maintained road towards maintaining a 
government of laws as opposed to a government of men. Under a government of men, 
arbitrary whims & desires of those in power would prevail over notions of liberty and 
equality under the law.  Perhaps it was a notion of this long and ancient battle that prompted 
Benjamin Franklin’s reply in the story related below: 
 
A lady asked Dr. [Benjamin] Franklin, “Well doctor, what have we got, 
a republic or a monarchy?”  “A republic,” replied the Doctor, “if you can 
keep it.”  - Papers of Dr. James McHenry, describing the scene as they 
left the Federal Convention of 1787 in Philadelphia.  (Mayer, p. 41) 
 
155
 Vine Deloria, Jr., described as “a leading spokesman for Indians,” after being educated by 
reservation schools on the Pine Ridge and Standing Rock Sioux Indian reservations, received 
a B.S. in science from Iowa State University, an MA in theology from the Lutheran school of 
Theology in Illinois, and his JD from the University of Colorado (Johnson, ¶ 13).  He was a 
leading figure in the National Conference of American Indians from 1964 – 1967.  Gifted 
with a “scathing, sardonic humor, which he was able to use on both sides of the Indian-white 
divide,” Deloria “steadfastly worked to demythologize how white Americans thought of 
American Indians” (Johnson, ¶ 3).  In a 1976 Op-Ed article he wrote for the New York 
Times, Deloria wrote:   
 
We have brought the white man a long way in 500 years.  From a 
childish search for mythical cities of gold and fountains of youth to the 
simple recognition that lands are essential for human existence.  
(Johnson, ¶ 5) 
 
Deloria authored 21 books “about the Native American experience” during his lifetime 
(Johnson, ¶ 1).  Deloria taught history at the University of Arizona from 1978-1990 before 
moving to the University of Colorado where he taught from 1990 until his retirement in 2000 
(Deloria, Vine, Jr.; Johnson, ¶ 14).  Deloria died Sunday, November 13, 2005 (Deloria, Vine, 
Jr.). 
156
 For those unfamiliar with his professional work, the following information about Ronald 
Dworkin was found in the “Contributors” section of the Contents page of the April 30, 2009 
edition of The New York Review of Books (p. 3): 
 
Ronald Dworkin is Frank Henry Sommer Professor of Law and 
Philosophy at NYU and Jeremy Bentham Professor of Law and 
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Philosophy at University College London.  His books include Is 
Democracy Possible Here?, Justice in Robes, Sovereign Virtue: The 
Theory and Practice of Equality, and Freedom’s Law.   
 
Information on his faculty web page at New York University also reveals the following: 
 
He received BA degrees from both Harvard College and Oxford 
University, and an LLB from Harvard Law School and clerked for Judge 
Learned Hand. He was associated with a law firm in New York 
(Sullivan and Cromwell) and was a professor of law at Yale University 
Law School from 1962-1969. He has been Professor of Jurisprudence at 
Oxford and Fellow of University College since 1969. He has a joint 
appointment at Oxford and at NYU where he is a professor both in the 
Law School and the Philosophy Department. He is a Fellow of the 
British Academy and a member of the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences. Professor Dworkin is the author of many articles in 
philosophical and legal journals as well as articles on legal and political 




 Dworkin, p. 29. 
158
 In a work focused upon the Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts from 1790 to 1834, Prucha 
discussed the origin and continuation of “crimes committed by one Indian against another” in 
“Indian Country:” 
 
The provision of the act of 1817 that declared that laws providing 
punishment of crimes committed within any place within the sole and 
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States should be in force also in the 
Indian Country was continued [by the “act of 1834”], along with the 
proviso that these laws did not extend to crimes committed by one 
Indian against another.  (Prucha, 1962, p. 268) 
 
The intersection of legislation and treaties resulted in the following Court interpretation as 
described by Deloria: 
 
Throughout most of the treaties the tribes had been given “free and 
undisturbed use” of their lands.  In many previous cases this phrase had 
been interpreted to mean that the United States could not interfere with 
the domestic relations of the tribe when practiced according to custom.  
(Deloria, 1971, p. 153) 
 
159
 Library of Congress, Hupa (S. Fork, Redwood, and Grouse Creek bands), California 2 
[Homepage, select “Hupa (S. Fork, Redwood, and Grouse Creek bands)” from the list of 
tribes, click on “California 2” at bottom of page]. 
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160
 Prucha described the hold that the so-called reformers had on the federal government’s 
American Indian policy during the latter part of the nineteenth century.  For those familiar 
with the right-wing fundamentalists’ affiliation with the twenty-first century Bush 
administration, it seems eerily familiar.  According to Prucha: 
 
Protestant Christian reformers had dominated the formulation of Indian 
policy in the late nineteenth century, operating effectively through the 
Board of Indian Commissioners and such voluntary organizations as the 
Indian Rights Association and the Lake Mohonk Conference.  They 
looked upon themselves as the guardians of the Indians and the 
watchdogs and arbiters of national Indian policy.  They saw themselves, 
not unrealistically, as the effective force in moving the Indians into an 
individualized, Americanized society (which meant to them a Protestant 
Christian nation).  (Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 267) 
 
161
 Vliet, p. 158.  Vliet, a professor of law at the University of Oklahoma, reviewed 
Kickingbird’s and Ducheneaux’s work, A Hundred Million Acres, for the law review journal 
(American Indian Law Review) published by the University of Oklahoma College of Law.  
According to Vliet: 
 
Kirke Kickingbird, a Kiowa, is currently with the Institute for 
Development of Indian Law.  He graduated from the College of Law of 
the University of Oklahoma.  Karen Ducheneaux, a Cheyenne River 
Sioux, is now a staff writer for the American Indian Press Association.  
Both authors formerly were with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and both 
left the agency to aid in the development of the Institute.  Vine Deloria, 
Jr., [who wrote the book’s introduction], a Standing Rock Sioux, is a 
former Executive Director of the National Congress of American 
Indians.  He, too, is now with the Institute for Development of Indian 
Law and is a widely read author.  (Vliet, p. 158) 
 
162
  Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 227. 
163
 Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 227. 
164
 Prucha, 1984, 1986, p. 227. 
165
 McDonnell, p. 121. 
166
 For those unfamiliar with land holdings on late twentieth-century Indian reservations, 
McDonnell provides an explanation showing how most Indian reservation land holdings 
came to resemble a giant checkerboard. 
 
As Indians disposed of their allotments they were replaced by whites 
moving onto the reservation so that by 1934 a checkerboard pattern 
dominated maps of allotted reservations.  While whites steadily 
consolidated their holdings into viable farming and grazing units by 
purchasing or leasing allotments, Indian lands became more divided.  
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The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 would try to reverse the 
checkerboard pattern and consolidate what was left of the Indian estate.  
(McDonnell, p. 121) 
 
167
 A 160-acre allotment at the time of its creation might have been a sustainable unit, depending 
upon topography, geography, and weather.  However, the Dawes Act hadn’t contemplated 
the complications arising from tribal customs and heirship.   
  
Heirship policies so subdivided Indian lands among multiple owners that 
they were no longer economically viable units and the only way to get a 
return was to lease it.  One 160-acre allotment made in 1887 would by 
1985 pass to 312 heirs.  The largest holding was four acres and the 
smallest was .0009 acres (the yearly income for the owner of this plot 
was less than one cent).  (McDonnell, p. 121) 
 
168
 Entitled “An Act Granting citizenship to certain Indians,” the specific language of the act 
referred to “every American Indian who served in the Military or Naval Establishments of 
the United States during the war against the Imperial German Government” (41 Stat. 350).  
The date it became official (November 6, 1919) is not the date it was submitted to the 
President (October 25, 1919) subsequent to being approved by the Senate and the House of 
Representatives (41 Stat. 350).  President Wilson neither signed nor vetoed the bill, and, “not 
having been returned by him to the House of Congress in which it originated within the time 
prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, [the Indian Citizenship Act] ha[d] 
become a law without his approval” (41 Stat. 350). 
169
 This writer lived and taught in the two Hunkpapa Lakota communities of Bullhead and Little 
Eagle, South Dakota, on the Standing Rock Sioux Indian Reservation from 1970 – 1980.  
The fact of the Hunkpapa locating on communities along the Grand River on the South 
Dakota side of Standing Rock in order to be a good distance away from the agency in Fort 
Yates, North Dakota, was a matter of common knowledge among the residents of both 
communities as it was their direct ancestors who were involved. The names of Hunkpapas 
mentioned in histories of the Hunkpapa during the period of Hunkpapa resistance to white 
incursions on their land in the nineteenth century, i.e., Smith (1975), Utley (1993), & Vestal 
(1932), are the names of families still residing on Standing Rock, e.g., Gray Eagle, Bear 
Ribs, Black Crow, Village Center, Red Tomahawk, Thunder Hawk, Circling Hawk, Red 
Bear, Otter Robe, Bear Shield, Bone Club,  Bullhead, DeRockbraine, Elk Nation, Flying By, 
Grindstone, Higheagle, Long Feather, Kills [Pretty] Enemy, Old Bear, Red Bird, Little Dog, 
etc.  The Grand River country was also ground upon which the Hunkpapa had previously 
lived and hunted.  Finally, after returning from Canada and surrendering to the U.S., after 
touring “with the Allen and Cody shows [that] had shown him the seamy underside of the 
white world,” Sitting Bull told missionary Mary Collins, “the farther my people keep away 
from the whites, the better I shall be satisfied” (Utley, p. 269). 
 The communities, Rock Creek and Running Antelope Settlements, were renamed by the 
Indian agent, Major James McLaughlin, following the assassination of Sitting Bull at his 
home on the Grand River (For the Running Antelope Settlement being renamed Little Eagle, 
see also Utley, p. 305).  The names McLaughlin selected were the names of two of the Indian 
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police killed in the fight following the killing of Sitting Bull, Bullhead and Little Eagle.  
Before the end of the twentieth century, local citizens cast off the name of Bullhead and 
reinstated the original name, Rock Creek, to the name of both their local school and their 
tribal district on Standing Rock (See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe website, 
http://www.standingrock.org/tribalGov/; and the South Dakota Department of Education 
website, http://doe.sd.gov/ofm/edudir/schooldata/results.asp?districtnumber=15302.   
 It was also well known that Sitting Bull located his settlement on the Grand River near his 
birthplace, which also happened to be the place where he was killed by Indian police while 
being arrested in December 15, 1890 (See also Smith, pp. 98, 153-160; Utley, pp. 3, 22, 299-
305; Vestal, pp. 3, 256, 290-300, 314).  
170
 Personal photo of Doughboy Monument, Rock Creek, South Dakota. 
171
 Personal Photo of inscription on Doughboy Monument, Rock Creek, South Dakota. 
172
 The 1971 recordings of William Horncloud, an Oglala Lakota singer born on the Pine Ridge 
Sioux Indian Reservation contain sixteen songs which can be categorized as follows:  two 
honoring songs, four dance songs, three love songs, the Sioux National Anthem & Victory 
Song, and four war songs (Horncloud, CD cover).  Of the four war songs, one is a marching 
song of one of the Lakota warrior societies, one recalls a battle against the Crow, one 
describes a fight against the Pawnee, and the other one celebrated “the victory of the United 
States over the Germans in World War I that was amended to include the victory over the 
Germans in World War II (Horncloud, CD cover).  The English lyrics are: 
 
The enemy is crying. 
The Germans wanted a fight. 
And now they are crying.  (Horncloud, CD cover) 
 
The 1977 recordings of traditional Lakota songs by the Porcupine Singers from the 
Porcupine District of the Pine Ridge Sioux Indian Reservation contains ten songs recorded at 
a powwow on the Rosebud Sioux Indian Reservation.  Besides dance and love songs, and 
besides the Lakota National Anthem and Veterans Song, the album featured songs 
celebrating the Lakota victory at the Little Big Horn, commemorating a victory of the 
Western Lakota over the Eastern Lakota who were scouting for the U.S. cavalry, celebrating 
the return “of a successful raiding party,” and a song, “World War I Veterans’ Song,” 
honoring Lakota patriotism for its ally, the United States.  The lyrics in Lakota and English 
follow: 
 
Lakota hoksila iya sica tamakoce k iota 
Iyacuca ekta wicaceyahe. 
The Lakota soldiers took the Germans’  
Land so they are still crying.  (Porcupine Singers, CD cover) 
 
Finally, the 1974 recordings of the Ho hwo sju Lakota Singers, a group of Minneconju 
Lakota from the Red Scaffold district of the Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Reservation 
further illustrate the importance of Lakota participation in World War I.   In addition to three 
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dance songs, the Sioux National Anthem, an old-time honor song for a wounded warrior, a 
“Veterans Rabbit Song,” and a more modern song for the Lakota veterans who served in the 
U.S. armed forces, the album contains two songs honoring World War I veterans.  The lyrics 
of the first song honoring Lakota veterans of World War I were explained by Steve Charging 
Eagle, one of the singers: 
 
A veteran carries a small flag in, then he chooses a partner, and gives 
it to this lady.  At a certain place in the song, this lady goes and gives 
the flag to another man, and this man has to get another partner, and 
it goes from there until everyone is out on the floor.  Nobody can 
refuse this flag, because they have to honor this flag, and that’s how 
the words go in this song:  (Ho hwo sju Lakota Singers, CD cover) 
 
The lyrics (in English) of the Lakota language song are: 
 
You have to honor the flag.  So I did. 




 The Iroquois Confederacy was not the only tribal group to oppose the granting of U.S. 
citizenship to tribal members.  The expert on American Indian law, Felix Cohen, noted that 
the “delegates [to petition Congress in 1887] of the Five Civilized Tribes opposed the grant 
of federal citizenship to their people because they feared it would terminate their tribal 
government” (Cohen, 1942/1971, p. 155).  Cohen attributed this position on the part of the 
Five Civilized Tribes as being one of the reasons that the “Five Civilized Tribes were 
excluded from the General Allotment Act” (Cohen, 1942/1971, p. 155, n. 46). 
174
 World Suffrage Timeline – Women and the Vote. 
175
 Filler, 1977b, p. 322. 
176
 Filler, 1977b, p. 322. 
177
 Filler, 1977b, p. 322. 
178
 Filler, 1977b, p. 322. 
179
 It would be easy to find fault with the reporting done by Dallas if compared to subsequent 
reporters.  However, such a comparison would ignore the historical context of our Court’s 
beginnings, and thus would leave unrecognized the fact that  the country’s judicial history 
owes a debt of gratitude to Alexander J. Dallas for his initiative in undertaking such a vitally 
important task as that of compiling reports of the Court’s activity, which otherwise would 
have been known only by haphazard newspaper accounts, personal correspondence, and 
word of mouth. Initially the Court did not require written opinions (Hall, 1992, p. 215).  
Congress did not officially recognize the office of Supreme Court Reporter until 1816 and 
didn’t provide a salary for the position until passage of the Judiciary Act of 1817 (Hall, 1992, 
p. 727). 
   
   
1400
                                                                                                                                                             
 Described as “a journalist, editor, and future secretary of the treasury,” Dallas assumed the 
Court’s reportership as “purely an entrepreneurial venture” (Hall, 1992, pp. 727, 215).  Prior 
to the Court’s arrival in Philadelphia from New York City in 1791, Dallas had already begun 
publishing reports of Pennsylvania court decisions “for private sale” (Hall, 1992, p. 727).  
Titling his reports “in the tradition of English nominative reports,” his first volume was titled 
“1 Dallas” (Hall, 1992, p. 727).  This first volume, it should be noted, contained only state 
opinions for Pennsylvania; however, his second volume contained some U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions, which he continued publishing until the Court moved to Washington, D.C. in 1800 
and “William Cranch assumed the reporter’s job” (Hall, 1992, p. 727).  Interestingly, Cranch 
was the nephew of President John Adams, being the “son of Abigail Adams’s sister” (Hall, 
1992, p. 207).  One legal scholar described the situation confronting Dallas: 
 
The execution of Dallas’s self-appointed task was marked, however, by 
delay, expense, omission, and questionable accuracy.  In fairness, he 
faced formidable obstacles.  Lack of government funding forced 
selective reporting, reflecting purchasers’ unwillingness to finance fuller 
reports.  Likewise, because the Court had no requirement of written 
decisions and Dallas’s practice precluded constant attendance at its 
proceedings, he often relied on others’ notes.  The results were uneven 
….  Barely half of the Court’s dispositions during its first decade were 
reported, and accounts of many cases … contain matter clearly not the 
justices’ own.  (Hall, 1992, p. 215) 
 
 Dallas himself, comparing his original aspiration with his actual accomplishment, wrote in 
1800 upon the Court’s relocation to Washington, D.C., “I have found such miserable 
encouragement for my Reports that I have determined to call them all in, and devote them to 
the rats in the State-House” (Hall, 1992, p. 215). 
180
 The citation, 2 U.S. (Dall.) 401, referred to activity taken during the February, 1792 term of 
the Court by which “the marshal had returned the writ served; and now, Sergeant moved for 
a distringas, to compel an appearance on the part of the state.”  Following this statement by 
Dallas is an asterisked note, which appears to have been inserted later as it referred to a later 
action and also referenced a later case:  “While, however, the court held the motion under 
advisement, it was voluntarily withdrawn, and the suit discontinued.(a)” [sic].  The 
referenced “(a)” stated, “But see s.c. infra, and Grayson v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 320.” 
 The next citation for Oswald v. State of New York occurred on the following page during the 
following August, 1792 term of the Court.  2 U.S. (Dall.) 402 directed “the marshal of New 
York district” to return the writ to New York officials and provided “that in case of a default, 
he do show cause therefore, by affidavit before one of the judges of the United States.” 
 The citation, 2 U.S. (Dall.) 415, referred to the activity taking place in the Court’s next term 
of February, 1793.  It followed the activity that took place in the previous two terms of the 
Court, but preceded the activity asterisked in the February, 1792 report compiled by Dallas.  
At the February, 1793 term of the Court, the case was called, but no one appeared to 
represent the State of New York.  The Court then issued the following order:  “Unless the 
state appears by the first day of next term to the above suit, or show cause to the contrary, 
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judgment will be entered by default against the state.(a)” [sic].  The referenced “(a)” noted:  
“See ante, p. 401; and also Chisholm, executor v. Georgia, post, p. 419; Cutting, 
administrator, v. South Carolina, and Grayson v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 320.” 
181
 The term, “bill in equity,” derived from the English legal system.  According to one legal 
scholar, “By the fourteenth century, England possessed two distinct and somewhat rival court 
systems, known popularly as ‘law’ and ‘equity’ courts” (Hall, 1992, p. 430).  According to 
the previous source, “Law courts were characterized by their development of the common 
law, use of juries, reliance on common-law pleading and the writ system, and a rigid 
formality in their approach to resolving legal conflicts” (Hall, 1992, p. 430).  Equity courts, 
on the other hand, “adopted a more flexible approach to cases and provided for broad 
remedies” (Hall, 1992, p. 430).  Instead of the common law approach limiting an injured 
party “to a recovery of money as compensation for injury or damage,” an injured person 
initiating a suit in equity court “could choose from an array of coercive remedies, including 
injunctions to require or prohibit conduct, to require the specific performance of a contract, 
or to order the division of jointly owned property” (Hall, 1992, p. 430).  Thus the equity 
courts “provided a flexibility lacking in the law courts” (Hall, 1992, p. 430).   
 The court system in the United States “drew heavily on its English origins” (Hall, 1992, p. 
430).  Defining the nation’s judicial power in Article III, § 2 of the Constitution, the Framers 
declared, “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under 
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made…” (Emphasis added).  
By this statement, the nation’s federal courts were empowered “to provide all the remedies 
developed in England’s equity courts” (Hall, 1992, p. 431).  Thus, “after the Revolutionary 
period all states provided for equity courts, either as separate bodies or unified with law 
courts” (Hall, 1992, p. 431). 
182
 For Cicero, nature, or natural law, had a different connotation than it does for the modern 
reader, who thinks of natural law as referring to scientific laws and processes.  When Cicero 
used the term, he meant the following, which can be derived from his discussion of reason: 
 
For reason existed – reason derived from the nature of the universe, 
impelling people to right actions and restraining them from wrong.  That 
reason did not first become law when it was written down, but rather 
when it came into being.   And it came into being at the same time as the 
divine mind.  Therefore the authentic original law, whose function is to 
command and forbid, is the right reason of Jupiter, Lord of all.  (Cicero, 
1998, p. 125) 
 
183
 According to Professor McDonald, in 1772 Hamilton “was placed in Francis Barber’s 
Elizabethtown Academy to prepare for Princeton’s entrance requirements” (McDonald, 
1979, p. 11).  Princeton’s requirements for admission included: “besides the ‘common 
branches’ of English literature and composition, elocution, mathematics, and geography – 
‘the ability to write Latin prose, translate Vergil [sic], Cicero, and the Greek gospels, and a 
commensurate knowledge of Latin and Greek grammar’” (McDonald, 1979, pp. 11-12).   
184
 One legal historian cited Edmund Randolph as an example of one of the primary authors of 
the Constitution who didn’t view the concept of sovereign immunity as a limitation upon the 
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federal judiciary’s jurisdiction over lawsuits between states and either citizens of other states 
or citizens of foreign powers as provided under Article III, § 2 of the Constitution.  After 
noting Randolph’s presence on the Committee of Detail at the Constitutional Convention 
who drafted the Convention’s sense of the Constitution after the lengthy and arduous debates 
of June and July, 1787, the legal scholar provided supporting detail for his argument: 
 
Edmund Randolph, for example, had presented to the convention the 
first draft proposal on the powers of the national judiciary, which as 
generalized by the delegates, stated the objectives for which specific 
assignments were to be worked out in committee.  (Jacobs, p. 25) 
 
 He continued: 
 
Later, Randolph, as a delegate to the Virginia ratification convention, 
argued repeatedly against the immunity of the states from suits by 
individuals.  And it was Randolph who appeared as counsel for the 
plaintiff in Vanstophorst v. Maryland, the first of the suits instituted 
against a state, and subsequently in Chisholm v. Georgia.  (Jacobs, p. 25) 
 
185
 Regarding ratification of the Articles of Confederation by the individual states, Professor 
McDonald observed: 
 
To become effective, the document (and future amendments to it) had to 
be ratified by every state….  Virginia was first to ratify unconditionally; 
New York soon followed, and after seven months all but four states had 
ratified, with or without proposing amendments.  The four holdouts were 
Georgia, Delaware, New Jersey, and Maryland.  Soon the first three 
came through, and Maryland stood alone.  (McDonald, 1965, p. 9) 
 
Discussing the reluctance to ratify the proposed Articles, McDonald began by presenting an 
overview of the situation: 
 
The reasons for opposition – as well as for support – were many, but at 
bottom lay a single reason and the fourth great enemy of the Republic.  
Behind the façade of slogans about the rights of Englishmen and the 
rights of man, different colonies had supported the revolution in pursuit 
of different goals, all local and few high-minded.  If they failed to obtain 
these, they would view Union and even Independence as barren gains.  
(McDonald, 1965, pp. 9-10) 
 
McDonald explained the opposition in socioeconomic terms: 
 
The goal whose pursuit blocked ratification of the Articles was the 
ownership of the western lands.  The question had meaning in many 
places, for several states were “landless,” having no claims or only 
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nebulous claims to western areas, and most of these landless states had 
more population than their arable land, under existing technology, could 
support.  (McDonald, 1965, p. 10) 
 
McDonald continued explaining the historical context underlying Maryland’s reluctance: 
 
In Pennsylvania and Maryland the land supply had been limited by 
features of their charters, under which the proprietors, the Penns and 
Calverts, reserved large tracts for themselves.  During the decade before 
Independence both colonies had sought a two-part solution: abrogation 
of the proprietary charters and releasing all lands west of the Alleghenies 
to buyers from all colonies.  (McDonald, 1965, p. 10) 
 
Specifically describing the socioeconomic grounding of Maryland’s opposition to the 
Articles of Confederation, McDonald elucidated: 
 
In Maryland it [the quest for more land] was a matter of economic 
necessity.  Maryland’s slave-labor plantation system was grossly 
inefficient, consuming great quantities of land; and its land disposal 
system – whereby planters left the eldest son the home plantation and 
gave the others money, slaves, and large acreage in the interior for 
establishing new plantations – required even more.  By 1770 most of the 
land was taken up, and it was apparent that Maryland would soon either 
have to obtain some more land from somewhere or suffer the collapse of 
its entire socio-economic system.  (McDonald, 1965, p. 10) 
 
Virginia’s actions in 1780 regarding its western land claims, brought about by the financial 
exhaustion of most states, the need for the confederation to establish public credit, and the 
“shift of the war to the South” began to pave the way for Maryland’s ratification of the 
Articles of Confederation (McDonald, 1965, p. 15).   
 
[I]n the fall of 1780 Virginia suddenly reversed its long-adamant stand 
and ceded all its lands north of the Ohio River to Congress.  It imposed 
only one condition, that private claims to lands in the ceded territory be 
explicitly rejected.  This action dissolved Maryland’s public reason for 
refusing to ratify the Articles, though it left intact the private reason. 
(McDonald, 1965, pp. 15-16) 
 
The private reason involved Virginia’s rejection of claims by private land companies, which 
provided a much-needed source of public lands.  McDonald explained: 
 
The ablest spokesmen for Pennsylvania and Maryland were several 
private companies, the most important being the Illinois-Wabash and the 
Indiana, that had acquired claims to huge tracts in various ways, 
particularly by buying “titles” from Indians.  Many of the prominent 
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stockholders of these companies were also prominent nationalist leaders 
– including Robert Morris, Benjamin Franklin, William Duer, James 
Wilson, and Carroll of Carrollton. (McDonald, 1965, p. 11) 
 
McDonald then drew the connection between the private companies’ 
stockholders, American politics, and western land claims: 
 
Because Congress would, until the Articles were ratified, operate extra-
legally and thus have all such powers as it could get away with 
exercising, these nationalists were not eager for ratification anyway; and 
if they stalled, leaving Congress to cope with foreign powers without 
being a legal power itself, perhaps they could force the landed states to 
cede their claims. (McDonald, 1965, p. 11) 
 
The final impetus behind Maryland’s ratification of the Articles was provided by the 
intersection of the need for naval power and the French. 
 
While Marylanders considered whether to ratify anyway and hope that 
Virginia’s condition [regarding elimination of claims to western lands by 
private companies] could be obviated in Congress, the war gave them a 
nudge that settled the matter.  In January, 1781, Maryland applied to the 
French minister for aid in defending Chesapeake Bay against the British 
navy, and the minister suggested that unless Maryland should ratify, it 
would be impossible for the French to act.  The Maryland legislature 
promptly responded by authorizing its congressmen to subscribe to the 
Articles of Confederation. (McDonald, 1965, p. 16) 
 
An English historian regarded the western land issue as one of the major accomplishments of 
the Articles of Confederation, a process begun prior to ratification of the Articles. 
 
In the years since 1783 it [government under the Articles of 
Confederation] had achieved a settlement of the Western land question 
that was to be of incalculable importance to the American future.  To get 
the Articles ratified it had been necessary to induce Virginia and other 
states with charter claims to relinquish them and concede that the vast 
stretch of territory between the Appalachians and the Mississippi, 
between the Great Lakes and the borders of Florida, should be held by 
Congress on behalf of all American citizens.  The existence of this 
heritage did much to cement national loyalties and to diminish the 
importance of state identities.  (Brogan, pp. 197-198) 
 
186
 A legal expert provided more detail than that provided by the Court’s record of the facts of 
the case.  In addition to filling in the missing information, his account also provided 
information about another factor that may have influenced the Court’s decision to directly 
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face the issue regarding the conflict between state laws and treaty provisions.  According to 
Judge Gibbons description: 
 
In 1793, ruling on a demurrer, Justice Iredell and District Judge Griffin 
outvoted Chief Justice Jay and held that payment of the debt by the 
defendant into the Virginia loan office in 1780 pursuant to the Virginia 
Sequestration Act of 1777 was a valid defense.  By the time the appeal 
was argued before the Supreme Court in February 1796 Jay’s Treaty had 
been signed and the joint commission established [to process 
outstanding debt claims by British merchants].  (Gibbons, p. 1940) 
 
Also, by the time the appeal was heard by the Court, Chief Justice Jay had resigned the Court 
as of June 29, 1795 (Hall, 1992, p. 978).  The treaty named for him had been ratified and he 
had been elected “governor of New York in absentia” (Hall, 1992, p. 447).  Jay’s motives 
were described by a legal scholar: 
 
Jay finally concluded that the Court was an ineffective instrument of 
domestic unification and diplomacy.  When Georgia responded to the 
Court’s ruling against the state’s claim of sovereign immunity in 
Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) with defiance and the introduction of the 
Eleventh Amendment in Congress, Jay abandoned the federal bench.  
(Hall, 1992, p. 447) 
 
One might think Jay’s abandonment of the bench meant his resignation from the Court; 
however, that would be a mistake as he didn’t submit his actual resignation until later.  As 
described in one account: 
 
In 1794, while still sitting as chief justice, he sailed to England as envoy 
extraordinaire to defuse tensions with Britain over unpaid debts, 
sequestration of Loyalist estates, and New World trading rights.  The Jay 
Treaty established mixed commissions to resolve economic disputes, 
granted trade concessions to Britain, and shifted responsibility for 
payment of defaulted loans to Congress.  While resistance to the treaty 
was formidable, the Senate ratified it in 1795.  (Hall, 1992, p. 447) 
 
According to another source, however, “The commission … never completed its work.  The 
dispute over the unpaid debts dragged on until 1802, when it was settled by an agreement 
that the United States pay a lump sum of £ 600,000” (Gibbons, p. 1939, n. 270). 
187
 Iredell’s opinion defended the decision in which he participated as a member of the circuit 
court.  One legal scholar observed of his opinion:  “Iredell thus demonstrated his continuing 
sensitivity to the intensity of Southern feeling against the British over the issues of debt 
payment and compensation for emancipated slaves” (Gibbons, p. 1940, n. 276). 
